

forefront of reducing military cooperation with South Africa. On 20 October 1982 the Dutch government, in response to Parliamentary questioning announced that no permission will be granted for voluntary service in the South African armed forces, and that disregard of this rule would result automatically in the deprivation of Dutch nationality.

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However, it was also pointed out that the fulfilment of compulsory military service in a foreign army does not result in the deprivation of Dutch nationality when a new Dutch Citizenship law came into force. Immediately following the South African Citizenship Amendment Act the Dutch Consul General in South Africa S. Siedenburch announced that Dutch citizens would not lose their citizenship as a result of the Act<sup>57</sup>. The legal position in this regard was regularised in January 1985. There are currently around 40,000 Dutch citizens resident in South Africa, with perhaps a further 160,000 being eligible for Dutch citizenship (see note B p. 56).

Not only do these 200.000 eligible Dutch in South Africa not endanger their Dutch citizenship or their right thereof when they serve in the SADF, but they are freed by this job from their Dutch national service obligations if they should return to Holland.

This contrasts strongly with the official Dutch policy and casts doubt on the intensity of the Dutch government anti-Apartheid protestations.

Since an insignificant number of Danes reside in South Africa, the question of the participation of European citizens in the SADF has not yet become an issue in Denmark. However, this does not mean that the Danish government should not be concerned about this issue, for under EC regulations leading to the completion of the internal market in 1992, Denmark too will have to extend all the rights of abode and work seeking to the between 1.3 million and 2.1 million EC citizens in South Africa who may one day return to Europe, having played their part in the destruction and devastation of their adopted country, South Africa.

This common European citizenship to which the Community is moving means that the question of British, German, Portuguese, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, French, Greek and Irish citizens in South Africa is not simply a source of concern to their respective governments, but impinges upon all member states of the European Community and as such needs to be considered by the European Community as a whole.

Before 31.12.92 a solution needs to be found for the right of return for citizens or eligible citizens of member states of the European Community, and especially for those coming from South Africa and having served in the SADF.

In the case of Ireland, it was estimated that between 20,000 and 25,000 South African citizens may claim Irish citizenship, though this could be

(57) See Rand Daily Mail, 12.10.84.

up to three times larger, reaching a total of up to 75,000<sup>58</sup>. In 1985-86 alone 2,400 South African citizens applied for Irish citizenship, up from an insignificant number in the preceding years. This upsurge in South African applications for Irish citizenship was in part the result of pending changes in Irish citizenship laws and in part the result of the deepening crisis in South Africa.

Ethnic Irish South Africans would feel quite at home in the SADF where the 22 Field Regiment is now known as the South African Irish Regiment. This regiment was one of the last regiments to withdraw from Angola in 1976 during the first South African invasion of Angola. Since then the South African Irish have been regularly deployed in Namibia. Although the regiment is now ethnically diverse, the association of Ireland with the brutal and illegal acts perpetrated by this regiment reflects poorly on Ireland.

At a European level, although a number of countries (France, Italy, Holland and Denmark) have been developing a growing positive involvement in the SADCC region and even the conservative British and West German governments are now recognising the need to reduce the SADCC region's dependence on South Africa, the continued involvement of European citizens in the SADF highlights the inconsistency of Europe's approach to the crisis in South Africa.

#### WHITES IN SOUTH AFRICA, HOLDING OR ENTITLED TO A EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP

Country	Currently holding a European citizenship	Currently holding, eligible or undetermined
UK	500,000	1,000,000 (A)
Portugal	600,000	600,000
Germany	100,000	100,000
Italy	50,000	50,000
Holland	40,000	200,000 (B)
Belgium	25,000	25,000
France	8,000	8,000
Greece	80,000	80,000
Ireland	2,400	75,000 (C)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,405,400</b>	<b>2,138,000 (D)</b>

(A) Source: British Foreign Office via British embassy in The Hague. The discrepancy arises because many SA citizens are eligible for UK citizenship

(58) See Irish Times, 19.11.86.

and may at some time in the future chose to exercise this right. See comments by Malcolm Rifkind cited in *Business Day* 25.10.85.

(B) The discrepancy in the Dutch figures arise because many SA citizens are eligible for Dutch citizenship and may at some future date choose to exercise this right. The estimate of 200,000 is the Dutch government's own estimate.

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(C) It is difficult to ascertain how many Irish passport holders are resident in SA. The figure of 2,400 applies only to recent applications from SA for Irish citizenship (1985-86). The figure of 75,000 represents an Irish Foreign Affairs maximum estimate of how many SA citizens may be eligible for Irish citizenship. See *Irish Times* 19.11.86.

(D) The figures for Germany, Italy, Belgium and France are taken from the *Financial Mail* (SA) 18.10.85. The estimates in the *Financial Mail* for the UK, Portugal and Holland were lower than the figures provided by the respective embassies and Ministries. Consequently, the figures quoted for the UK and Portugal are those provided by the embassies accredited to the Netherlands. The Greek figures are taken from a letter dated 6.10.87 from the Greek embassy to the Netherlands to the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement (AABN).

(52) The total white population of South Africa on December 31st 1984 was 4,845,000 (10% of which were non South African citizens), of which 600,000 have a citizenship link with Portugal, 1,000,000 with the UK and 100,000 with the Federal Republic of Germany. This combined total (1,700,000) represents 35% of the total white population of South Africa. Of this 35% 301,000 did not have South African citizenship (18% of the 1,700,000). The male population in the approximately 1.4 million South African citizens with a citizenship link with Portugal, the UK and Germany are eligible for conscription into the various arms of the SADF. Assuming an even age and sex distribution across the whole of the white South African population this implies that up to 32 % of the strength of the SADF could be drawn from whites with a citizenship link to one of these three countries. As immigrants tend to be young males, this would be an underestimate.



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# 5 RESISTANCE AGAINST EXTENDED CONSCRIPTION AND THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE

## 5.1 The Position of the Church in South Africa.

The South African Churches have become deeply disturbed at the path of confrontation which the extension of conscription represented and both the Catholic and Protestant Church have now addressed themselves to the moral and ethical dimensions of fighting in defence of an unjust system, by throwing their full support behind the right to object to military service. It is the churches' belief, as expressed by the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) and the South African Council of Churches (SACC), that the denial of basic human rights to the majority of South Africans and the unequal distribution of land and wealth is the root cause of violence in South Africa. If the escalating cycle of violence is to be broken then it is essential that the root cause of injustice and inequality be addressed, for only if this is done can a lasting peace be brought to South Africa. How, then, can a war fought in defence of such an heretical system of injustice and inequality be a just war?

As early as 1974 the South African Council of Churches had sought to place the issue of individual moral decision in the context of the justice of the cause for which the individual was being called up. This took the SACC beyond the universal pacifist position as the basis for rejecting military service, to the specific context of Apartheid in South Africa. The SACC position was supported by Catholic Archbishop Hurley who summed up his own position in four brief statements:

1. If South Africa gets involved in a border war, this war will have been provoked by the policy of Apartheid.
2. To defend white South African society by force of arms is to defend the policy of Apartheid.
3. To defend Apartheid is to defend an unjust cause.
4. It is not permissible for Christians to fight an unjust war.

This line of reasoning underpinned the stand of a number of early conscientious objectors in South Africa. The Churches' opposition to the militarisation of South African society has inevitably brought them

into conflict with the South African state. As the situation has deteriorated with regard to South Africa's war against its neighbours, its war in Namibia and its war against its own people inside South Africa, so the churches have been forced to adopt stronger and stronger positions. Currently the Catholic church is considering an appeal to foreign governments to grant political asylum and refugee status to South African conscientious objectors. This action is based on the Catholic church's firm believe that the SADF and those serving in it are engaged in regular contraventions of international law by illegally occupying Namibia and by raids into neighbouring countries. The Catholic Church has furthermore highlighted how the SADF is used as a political weapon against community leaders and communities inside South Africa, through its occupation of black residential areas and through assisting the South African Police in detaining large numbers of people. The Church is now putting its full weight behind the growing opposition to conscription, as expressed both through the vehicle of the End Conscription Campaign and the Conscientious Objectors Support Groups. This move towards an implicit condemnation of the role of the SADF and an open call to the international community to support Conscientious Objectors, demonstrates fully the church's rejection of the militarisation of South African society and its grave concern about the implications for the whole of Southern Africa.

### **THE END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN**

In 1983, as the result of an initiative taken by the Black Sash, the End Conscription Campaign was formed.

Since its formation it has gained the support of over 50 organisations for its call to end conscription, including amongst others the South African Council of Churches (SACC) the United Democratic Front (UDF), Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC), the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and the Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (JODAC).

By 1985 it had branches in Cape Town, Durban, Grahamstown, Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg and Port Elizabeth.

The ECC is constantly walking on eggs, for under the Defence Act it is an offence to call on people to refuse the call up, punishable by six months in prison or a R5,000 fine.

The State has become increasingly concerned about the impact of the ECC campaign and has moved against its activists, attempting to associate them with the ANC, presumably as a prelude to the banning of the organisation.

The ECC campaign has increasingly focussed white opinion on the war taking place in the townships and has, even if equivocably, gained support from sections of the liberal Progressive Federal Party (PFP) for its campaign.

This courageous resistance by young white South Africans demands the support of European governments, not their acquiescence in sowing the seeds of destruction in Southern Africa.

## 5.2 Responses to Extended Conscription inside South Africa

How have European citizens in South Africa responded to their conscription into the South African armed forces? The first point to make is that European citizens were already participating in defence of Apartheid on a voluntary basis at all levels before both the 1982 and 1984 extensions of the call up. European professional soldiers were signed up for the Permanent Force in increasing numbers from the mid-1970s, whilst young European immigrants have been volunteering for national service since conscription was introduced in 1957. However especially since 1982 European citizens have been drawn into the defence of Apartheid on a larger scale as a matter of routine. It is this routine involvement in an increasingly violent conflict within South Africa which has led to the development of a serious challenge to the whole system of conscription.

The first response to the 1984 measure within the immigrant community was an increase in emigration by some 20%, whilst migration to South Africa dropped by 25%<sup>59</sup>. In the immediate aftermath of the April 1984 Citizenship Amendment Act a total of 1,335 immigrants signed declarations stating that they did not wish to become South African citizens. Of this 1,335 fully 84% were males, with the principal underlying cause being the concomitant obligations to serve in the SADF in defence of Apartheid.<sup>60</sup> In January 1985, 7,589 conscripts failed to answer their call up, compared with 1,596 in the whole of 1984.<sup>61</sup> In January 1986 the Minister of Defence refused to provide figures on the number of conscripts failing to answer their call up on the basis that "it is not in the public interest".<sup>62</sup>

Many of these young South Africans are either forced to live underground existences within South Africa or to flee the country. Some of them, however, prefer to make a stand, and on religious, moral and political grounds have refused to undertake military service in the SADF. These young men have received long prison sentences. Nevertheless resistance to service in the SADF has expanded remarkably over the past three years as troops have increasingly been deployed in the townships of South Africa.

Although the majority continue to render service in defence of white privilege, which the current government of South Africa is committed to

(59) Business Day, 4.9.1985. (60) Star, 13.4.85. (61) *ibid.* (62) cited in Resister No. 49.

perpetuating, a growing minority are actively opposing this unjust war. At an organisational level there is the End Conscription Campaign, which has through its campaigns breached the walls of media censorship which hides the horror of the war in the townships from white South Africans. As a result the ECC has come under intense pressure from the South African government.

On 3 August 1987 organisational and individual aspects of resistance to the militarisation of South African society came together when 23 young conscripts joined together to publicly refuse to serve in the SADF. They released a joint statement which expressed the belief that

*"our country is best served if we refuse to fight in the SADF. The laws of this country make this a serious step to take. Yet we feel there comes a time when moral choices, no matter how difficult, cannot be avoided."*<sup>63</sup>

Their brave stand is symptomatic of a growing unease at the slide towards civil war which is taking place and deserves the full support of the European Community both at a political and material level, something they have yet to receive.

There are others, however, who judge such a direct challenge to be too dangerous a course of action and these simply fail to answer their call up and go underground inside South Africa. Sometimes this proves too difficult and they are forced to flee the country and seek refuge abroad.

### **5.3 The European Governmental Response to Extended Conscription**

What has been the response of European governments to the conscription of their nationals into the SADF in defence of Apartheid? At the time the new legislation came into force British government representatives in South Africa showed themselves to be ignorant of the implications of the SACAA and showed little inclination to assist British citizens who wished to avoid conscription into the SADF.

Questioned in Parliament in June 1986 as to any representations the British government may have made to the South African government concerning the effect on British citizens of the 1984 legislation, Lynda Chalker replied that the legislation:

*"did not affect, and could not have affected, a British citizen's status as such"*<sup>64</sup>

and that as a result no representations had been made to the South African government on the issue. A similar attitude was manifested by other European governments.

(63) ECC Focus, September 1987.

(64) Written Reply to Michael Meadowcroft (Leeds West) no. W166, 30 June 1986.



Overall in Europe, the view was taken that the acquisition of South African nationality under the 1984 legislation was an involuntary act and therefore, no citizen of a member state who entered the armed forces of South Africa would suffer any adverse consequences as a result of his action (despite the fact that in the case of Italy, France and Greece entry into the South African armed forces could result in the loss of nationality if the Italian or French governments specifically ordered its citizens not to undertake military service or if, in the case of Greece, the government declared participation in the South African armed forces to be contrary to Greek national interests).

This position, coupled with reciprocal arrangements in Holland and Belgium concerning military service obligations of dual nationals, leads one to conclude that European governments have done little to discourage their citizens from participating in the military defence of Apartheid. Indeed, not only have conservative governments in Europe succeeded in blocking the introduction of broad and effective economic sanctions, as a means of exerting real pressure for fundamental change, but they are in reality conniving in their citizens' participation in defence of Apartheid.

Within the positive measures approach favoured by conservative European governments it has been suggested that the European Community could support both the anti-militarisation campaign and organisations working to increase awareness amongst the white population on the need for political change. However, under the Community's Special Programme for victims of Apartheid at least one project aimed specifically at educating whites for change was excluded on the grounds that it was too politically sensitive. It seems ironic that extending financial and political support to organisations opposed to militarisation and advocating peaceful political change should be deemed too politically sensitive whilst the daily participation of several hundred thousand European citizens in the armed defence of Apartheid is not even deemed to be a political issue worthy of governmental concern.

#### **5.4 The European Governmental Response to War Resisters**

As early as December 1978 the United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon its members to grant asylum or safe transit to persons compelled to leave their country of nationality solely because of a conscientious objection to assisting in the enforcement of Apartheid through service in the military or police force. The following case studies are illustrative of the ambiguous positions adopted by European governments towards South African War Resisters.

#### **5.4.1 *The Netherlands: The Case of Erik van Hoekelen***

In January 1985, as a result of the provisions of the 1984 Citizenship Amendment Act, a Dutch citizen, Erik van Hoekelen was conscripted into the SADF. Initially Erik was hesitant to participate in the SADF but under peer group pressure he finally opted to join the army. Having witnessed the brutal and repressive nature of the SADF, he soon regretted his decision and within six months had gone Absent without Leave (AWOL). In August 1985 he decided to desert from the South African army. He was captured and brought before a military court on 9 December 1985, where he was sentenced to 90 days in detention barracks, suspended for the length of his national service. He was ordered to report back to his unit on the 14 December. Erik however, reported to the South African Ministry of Home Affairs, where he sought to cancel his South African citizenship. Initially the Ministry of Home Affairs refused to accept this application for cancellation, insisting that he first complete his national service. As a result van Hoekelen sought the assistance of the Dutch Consul. The attitude of the Dutch Consul, however, was nothing short of hostile and he rendered little or no assistance to Erik in his efforts to avoid fighting in defence of Apartheid. Instead he sought to reduce the issue to one of individual conscience and choice. After considerable legal argument Erik van Hoekelen was eventually permitted to leave South Africa for Holland. The case however, raised a number of disturbing questions concerning the Dutch government's attitude towards this aspect of military cooperation with South Africa. It seems that the Dutch government along with its European colleagues felt that the preparation of a brochure on the consequences of Apartheid was sufficient guidance for its citizens when faced with conscription into the SADF.

This brochure by the way, the government until now did not succeed in producing. The inadequacy of the response to those European citizens seeking to extricate themselves from military service in defence of Apartheid is matched only by the callousness of certain European governments to war resisters who seek refuge in Europe.

#### **5.4.2 *Germany: The Case of Hanno Rumpf***

The German government has received no applications for political asylum from South African war resisters in large part because of the prohibitive nature of the interpretation laid on its asylum laws. However, the attitude of the West German government in its treatment of war resisters claiming German citizenship highlights the particular hostility which exists at a federal government level in Germany towards South African and Namibian war resisters. This is illustrated by the case of Hanno Rumpf.

Hanno Rumpf is a 30-year-old Namibian whose paternal grand-parents

were German citizens and whose mother was a German citizen. In 1984 Hanno Rumpf, a SWAPO member, was forced to flee Namibia in order to avoid conscription into the South African army of occupation. Before leaving Namibia Hanno applied for West German citizenship on the basis that his father had had his West German citizenship restored. Hanno himself takes up the story:

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*“At the same time my two sisters and brother applied for citizenship of the FRG as well. About two or three months into 1985 they received their FRG citizenship. I did not receive my FRG citizenship at the time because I was told by the Department of the Interior in the FRG that my application was treated according to a different paragraph of the nationalisation laws in the FRG (due to the fact that my application was considered to have been filed within the FRG before I was naturalised.) I had to comply with certain demands stated in the law such as the fact that I had integrated myself into FRG society; and that I had to prove that I could make a living in the FRG. My attorney in Bremen where I lived ... told me that another demand of the re-naturalization law was that I would receive a security vetting by the relevant FRG authorities. At that stage I was quite active politically in West Germany for SWAPO, travelling most weekends to meetings to educate people with regard to the Namibian issue. At some stages I had the distinct impression that the same faces and people appeared at the meetings at which I spoke, and I concluded that this had something to do with the security vetting that I was supposed to receive before FRG citizenship was granted to me. The problem I had was that the actual granting of the citizenship dragged out for many months. At some stage I was close to receiving citizenship, and then my South African passport ran out, and on the very same day I was called by an official of the Federal Ministry of the Interior who told me that I should have my South African passport renewed immediately otherwise my permit of residence in the FRG would become invalid. I immediately contacted my lawyer and he told me that it seemed very clear to him that a legal basis from which they could deport me to South Africa was being created. It seemed that the government had taken a dislike to my policies and didn't want to make an FRG citizen out of me”.*

The political support extended to Hanno Rumpf by the Social Democratic controlled government in Bremen, prevented the Federal government from deporting him, but the Federal government did force Hanno Rumpf to renounce his South African citizenship. While he was willing, indeed keen to do this, it proved rather difficult, for the South African Consulate General in Hamburg declined to answer any of Hanno Rumpf's correspondence on this issue. It was only when Hanno Rumpf threatened to raise the matter both in the media and the Bundestag that

the difficulties were resolved and West German citizenship granted. It seems strange that while Hanno Rumpf, a known opponent of Apartheid and South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, should be forced to give up his South African citizenship in order to gain West German citizenship, thousands of German speaking Namibians and South Africans are allowed to hold dual nationality, retaining their West German citizenship despite their participation in South Africa's war against the region and the continued illegal occupation of Namibia.

It appears as if the West German government has one set of rules for those opposed to Apartheid and another for those who acquiesce in the crimes of Apartheid. The West German government took no action when one of its nationals, Gerald Eckert volunteered for the SADF in July 1982, neither did it seek to withdraw German citizenship from Lt. Eckert when in February 1983 he took out South African citizenship. Their treatment of Gerald Eckert (who deserted from the SADF, fled to Mozambique, returned to Germany and then returned once more to South Africa) stands in marked contrast to their treatment of Hanno Rumpf.

#### **5.4.3 Belgium: The Case of Michael Healey**

The callousness of European governments is further illustrated by the case of Michael Healey, which came to light in Belgium in 1987. Michael Healey was called up for service in the SADF in 1976. He became known as a "nigger lover" because he refused to accept the racist indoctrination of the SADF and after a few months he deserted. He eluded capture for several months but was eventually captured and court-martialled. He was sentenced to three months in detention barracks after which time in August 1977 he was returned to his unit. After only a few months he deserted once again, but this time succeeded in eluding the authorities. He even managed to get a job and whilst living a semi-clandestine existence met a Flemish girl who was visiting South Africa. Their relationship developed and in October 1982 he accompanied her to Belgium on a visitor's visa. It was here that Michael Healey made a major mistake. Relaxing after his ordeal of a life on the run in South Africa he neglected to apply immediately for refugee status. This did not become a problem until his relationship with his girlfriend turned sour and their marriage plans were abandoned. He then became acutely aware that he had no legal basis for his continued residence in Belgium. Healey after considerable uncertainty and only after receiving advice from COSAWR in Holland applied for refugee status in Belgium. His request was turned down, because of the prior irregularities in his residence, as was his subsequent appeal. Healey is now in hiding from the Belgium authorities, in the full knowledge that should he be apprehended he will be deported back to South Africa,

where he will face up to ten years in prison for desertion. After this he will be forced once again to return to his unit to complete his term of national service in the defence of Apartheid.

Although the case of Michael Healey is in some respects exceptional, his confusion and sense of security upon arriving in Europe is not all that uncommon, given the pressures placed on white South African youth. Although there are hundreds of South African war resisters who have been given refuge in Europe the treatment of Healey is symptomatic of the indifference shown by European governments to those whites, many of whom are also citizens of European countries, who are opposed to serving in defence of Apartheid. South African war resisters have to apply for refugee status and thereby take up part of the national allocation for refugees. These principled and courageous young men are partially ostracised for their opposition to fighting in defence of Apartheid, whilst mercenaries, volunteers and ordinary conscripts resident in South Africa who enjoy a European citizenship are free to enter Europe and live a normal life after committing untold crimes in defence of Apartheid.

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#### **5.4.4 Britain: A Reserved Attitude**

In Britain government spokespersons have made it clear that all applications for asylum from South African war resisters are carefully considered on individual merit in accordance with the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, and that an unwillingness to perform military service is not generally regarded in itself as sufficient grounds to justify the granting of rights of asylum and refugee status. However where opposition to military service is held to be based on other deeply held moral, religious or political beliefs which would result in the national authorities treating the applicant for refugee status more harshly than that normally accorded to those refusing military service, then the British government's position is that granting asylum might be appropriate. Where asylum is not granted the British government is willing to consider the granting of "exceptional leave to remain" in the UK.

Overall the British government's position seeks to give the government leeway in its handling of individual cases. This uncertainty seems designed to generate insecurity so that the asylum seeker feels constrained in the activities he may pursue in opposition to Apartheid whilst resident in the UK.

In view of UN resolutions on this issue and recent calls from the Church inside South Africa, what is required of the British government and other European governments is a clear declaration welcoming South African war resisters as an integral part of the European Community's stated anti-Apartheid stance.



*End Conscription Campaign*

# 6 CONCLUSIONS

Not only is the Community the largest investor in South Africa and its major trading partner, but apparently one third of South Africa's whites either hold EC passports or have a right to acquire one.

Because of the recent extensions of military service in South Africa in 1982 and 1984, EC/South African dual nationals now constitute one third of the South African armed forces. To white men in South Africa, military service means active involvement in the defence of Apartheid from the age of 18 to 55. The EC member countries choose to disregard their subjects' military activities in South Africa. There is only one exception. In the case of remigration (partial) fulfilment of military service in South Africa engenders exemption in some EC countries.

No EC country feels responsible for what its subjects do in South Africa. This keeps creating schizophrenic situations, for instance in the case of South Africa's terrorist activities in the frontline countries. They are condemned by the Community, but at the same time there is a proven involvement of EC subjects in these activities; non-lethal military aid is extended by EC member states to the countries of the SADCC to defend development projects threatened by South African Reconnaissance Commando saboteurs or regular army units, whilst EC citizens commonly participate in these acts of state terrorism.

This brochure lays out how South Africa is able to keep up its war on three fronts (at home against the black population, in Namibia and against the Front-Line States) by including new groups of whites in compulsory military service and extending the duration of military service obligations. In the last two instances when the group eligible for military service was enlarged (in 1982 and 1984) it concerned large numbers of EC citizens. It is exactly this incorporation of Europeans which makes possible the continuation of this war on three fronts.

The incorporation of Europeans strengthens the military clout of the Apartheid regime and delays the moment when political solutions will have to be found. Therefore the "none of our business" approach of the EC to the extension of conscription to European citizens living in South Africa undermines the credibility of Europe's policy towards South Africa. The EC member states are on record as favouring a political

solution, but when their citizens are used to try and enforce a military solution they sit by and do nothing.

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EC countries have a strong interest in a political solution to the conflict in South Africa since over 2 million white South Africans are entitled to an EC passport. In view of EC moves towards the single internal market for employees and self-employed this should alarm not only Portugal and the UK but all EC countries.

Not all dual nationals with a right to an EC passport will contemplate repatriation to Europe in the case of a further escalation of confrontation in South Africa. Nevertheless, an EC passport is certainly considered a valuable insurance policy. Thus the EC has substantial possibilities to influence these dual nationals. Since one third of the white population is involved, it provides the EC with a powerful bargaining position towards South Africa. Any pressure brought to bear on even apart of this segment of the white population to prevent them fulfilling their military service can weaken the regime's military clout and jeopardise its struggle on any of the three fronts on which it wages its war.

Discouraging enlistment in the South African armed forces could be one of the most effective methods of depriving the Apartheid regime of its military options. The EC has excellent leverage to pursue a policy of discouraging the pursuit of a military solution, as one third of the current and future conscripts are EC subjects.

The militarisation of South African society has reached a point where neither inhabitants nor companies can remain neutral and prevent themselves from becoming part of the machinery which serves to perpetuate Apartheid. EC countries should face this reality and give up their myopia with regard to the complicity of their subjects and companies in the armed defence of Apartheid. If we condemn Apartheid, internal repression, the illegal occupation of Namibia and southern Angola and the destabilisation of the Front-Line States, then we must acknowledge that all this would not be possible without the active participation of EC citizens and the financial and logistical support provided by European companies. The credibility of the EC will depend on the measures it will take to put an end to this crucial role played by its subjects: on the one hand by making enlistment in the South African armed forces incompatible with the retention of an EC citizenship; on the other hand by banning European companies from making voluntary supplementary payments to South African conscripts and by demanding disinvestment should these supplementary payments become compulsory.



Positive measures may include a magnanimous policy on taking in South African draft dodgers. At present there is no such thing. Unfortunately, however, negative measures are essential as well. Depending on the legal possibilities in the respective EC countries, the return of EC citizens who have fulfilled their military service in South Africa must be made either more difficult or impossible. Obviously this means first of all that EC countries should no longer exempt anyone from military service because of fulfilment of this obligation in South Africa. In those countries which have this legal possibility already (France, Italy, Greece), fulfilment in South Africa should result in loss of European citizenship: the necessary legal measures should be taken. The possibilities to return to the European Community should be limited or completely ended for those binationals living in South Africa and Namibia and having served in the SADF or SWATF. The as yet unaddressed problem of the right to return for people living outside the community and eligible for a citizenship of an EC member state should in this light be urgently addressed in the framework of the completion of the internal market.

Finally, the EC should prohibit companies with South African branches from making voluntary supplementary payments to their employees who fulfill their military service.

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At present one third of the South African armed forces consists of whites who possess or are entitled to the passport of a European Community country.

The South African government has an urgent need for white manpower to curb black resistance at home and intervene militarily in the region.

Fighting for Apartheid: a job for life shows how the regime has gradually incorporated the white holders of European passports living in South Africa into the Apartheid armed forces. Over two million white South Africans are entitled to European Community passports, yet no EC government has expressed any concern for the actions of its subjects in South Africa.

After an investigation of two years this publication reveals the shocking involvement of European citizens and transnational corporations in the armed defence of Apartheid.

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