

Replied 1-11-89

03 OCT '89 13:12 WERKGROEP KAIROS

P.1



christenen tegen apartheid  
christians against apartheid

A4-55  
Kromme Nieuwegracht 10  
3512 HG Utrecht - Nederland  
telefoon 030-319714, giro 632686  
telex 40701 - telefax 030-316518

To: the Ad Hoc Support Group

Utrecht, 3-10-1989,

Dear friends,

We received information about a new group of conscientious objectors who joined the 143.

Please send us more detailed information including statements if available.

We will pay attention to this important action and we will support you as we did before.

With kind regards,

working group Kairos

Hans Hartman

95 Yeo Street  
Yeoville  
• 2198 SOUTH AFRICA  
28 October, 1989

Dear Hans,

Thank you for your letter about the stand of the 771 objectors. I hope that the enclosed general letter provides sufficient detail. Otherwise please contact me again and I can forward press clippings, etc. about it. The Weekly Mail this week puts the number of names on the register as 880 and hopefully it will continue to increase. COSAWR in London will probably be co-ordinating an overseas register of SA objectors, but when that gets underway we will let you know.

COSG now has an office and telephone number, so hopefully international contact will be more regular from now on. If I can help with anything, information etc. please do not hesitate to ask.

I hope you are well and still enjoying your work. Please give my love to Annet and Erik. It was very nice to receive a letter from Annet recently.

Alastair is still in London and working for the CIIR. He says that he is planning to return to SA in February next year. Rob is also well and getting used to being a fulltime church worker and a father. Their daughter Joanna is now two months old and I think that they are enjoying her very much - although at times both he and Sally look quite exhausted!

I have been enjoying my work very much. This national conference that happened a few weeks ago kept me very busy and now I'm sure that the process of consultation that we are undertaking will also keep me very busy. I am getting used to living in Johannesburg although I miss Cape Town. Luckily my job involves quite a lot of travelling so I end up coming back to Cape Town quite often which is very nice.

Keep well Hans. I hope we can keep in touch. Do any of you have any plans to visit Namibia in the next while. Maybe one of these days we will be able to meet up there.

Love



# St. David's Congregational Church

Verbena Avenue,

Sunridge Park,

Port Elizabeth

Minister:

Rev. T.O. Scarborough  
64 Lily Avenue  
Sunridge Park  
Port Elizabeth 6001  
Tel.: 30-2091

Correspondence  
P.O. Box 7258  
Newton Park  
6055  
Port Elizabeth

Sunday 5 November 1989.

The Objector  
P.O. Box 591  
Kengray 2100.

Dear Friends,

Thank you for the latest edition of the Objector. It contains some interesting and useful information.

For your interest, I enclose a copy of my statement for the National C.O. Register.

Yours faithfully,

*Thomas Scarborough.*

Rev. Thomas O. Scarborough.

Contacted Therese B. with his name & no. 11/89.

PUBLIC STATEMENT OF CONSCIENCE.

NAME: Rev. Thomas Oliver Scarborough.

AGE: 29 years. Born: 29 May 1960.

OCCUPATION: Minister of Religion.

SERVICE DETAILS: Force No.: 77619591 BJ. Rank: Private. Exempted from National Service 14 June 1985, but liable for Reserve obligations.

In good conscience, and of my own accord, I have decided not to serve in the South African Defence Force for the following reasons:

1. As a follower of Christ and a minister of religion, I take this stand within the context of my Christian faith and experience.
2. The unequivocal teaching of Christ is that violence and war is not an option for the Christian. Rather service and suffering is the way of Christ. "Christ suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in His steps." (1 Peter 2:21).
3. Christ's teaching of love for one's enemies is not intended merely as a mental attitude, nor is there any justification for applying it only to personal relationships. "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you." (Luke 6:27).
4. There is no record before A.D. 300 of any Christian justifying war. Among early Church leaders who opposed the participation of Christians in war are Justin, Tatian, Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, Tertullian, and Cyprian. (The Politics of Love, by J. Ferguson).
5. One of mankind's continual failures has been to subordinate man's needs and feelings to systems and ideologies, sustained through physical or psychological force. Thus man has failed to identify with people for who they are in themselves. "Rejoice with those who rejoice; and weep with those who weep." (Romans 12:15).
6. Violence should be rejected not only because it is evil in itself, but because there are more positive and effective alternatives for engaging evil. Alternatives to violence, as well as their efficacy, have been well documented. (What Would You Do? by J.H. Yoder).
7. The only way to stop the cycle of violence is to step out of it. Evil is merely compounded when we attempt to overcome it by evil. The only effective way to disrupt the sequence of events is through doing good - the way of love. "Do not be overcome by evil; but overcome evil with good." (Romans 12:21).

DATE: 18 October 1989.

SIGNED: *Thomas Scarborough*.

8. The way of love may mean taking suffering or death upon oneself. However, this does not mean it is inferior to armed resistance. Every armed force must face the possibility of defeat, while the person who suffers for love and human dignity is never defeated within himself. "We are hard pressed on every side, but not crushed." (2 Corinthians 4:8).

9. Though I am a universal pacifist, my present stand must also be understood in relation to the South African Defence Force. In rejecting violence as a means to peace, I hold that the SADF, insofar as it relies on force, is using evil means to support the structures of the state.

10. Though my conscientious objection is set within the Christian religious framework, I believe that conscience is by no means invalidated when it falls outside this framework. I therefore support the right of all bona fide conscientious objection to war. "When He comes, He will convict the world." (John 16:8).

11. I not only believe that actual war is evil. I also believe that the training process in preparation for war is evil. In many respects this training is a dehumanising process, which destroys individual conscience and responsibility.


12. I cannot wear a military uniform, nor serve in any formal capacity in the SADF. This would identify me with the military machine and so with the methods of that machine. As a representative of Christ, I am to love all men. I cannot simultaneously represent an organisation which denies the love of all men.

DATE: 18 October 1989.

SIGNED: Thomas Scarborough

Please consult me before publishing my name.

# THE BLACK SASH



# DIE SWART SERP

(Albany Region)  
P.O. Box 319  
Grahamstown  
6140  
phone: 28091

6 November 1989

COSG  
P.O. Box 591  
Kengray

Dear Editorial Collective

For some months now you have been sending us The Objector, and we are delighted to be on your mailing list. However, the address you have for us is incorrect. Please could you use the one at the top of this letterhead.

With best wishes for the successful continuation of your work,

Yours sincerely

*Bronwyn Brady*  
Bronwyn Brady

(fieldworker)

10 November, 1989

Mrs. L. Melunsky  
177 Prospect Rd  
Walmer  
6070 Port Elizabeth

Dear Mrs. Melunsky

Many thanks for your recent letter and cheque for R10. I confirm that your name has been placed on the OBJECTOR mailing list.

I completed my LLB degree at UCT with David. We have had no contact since leaving varsity, but if you are in touch with him, please give him my love.

Yours sincerely

COSG National Worker

VV

10 November, 1989

Mr. Norman Holland  
Flat 2  
13 Berkeley Place  
Wimbledon  
London SW 19 4NN

Dear Mr. Holland

Many thanks for your subscription to THE OBJECTOR, and for the sum of £10.  
I confirm that your name has been placed on THE OBJECTOR mailing list.

In case you are not in contact with them, may I give you the Committee on  
SA War Resistance address. They also produce a regular publication which  
you may want to subscribe to.

COSAWR  
Box 2190  
London WC1V 6XX .

Yours faithfully

COSG National Worker

10 November 1989

Freddie Nogal  
208 York Street  
Greytown  
3500

Dear Mr. Nogal

Many thanks for your subscription form and the PO of R10. I confirm that your name has been placed on our mailing list.

I now enclose the most recent copy of OBJECTOR, as well as a petition in support of the recent stand of objectors. It would be great if you would get some Greytown people to sign.

Yours faithfully

COSG National Worker

10 November, 1989

Alison Saayman  
18 Lower Main Road  
Observatory 7925

Dear Alison

Many thanks for the subscription form and cheque for R10. I confirm that your name has been put on our mailing list.

You may remember me from your last year yoga class. I am now living in JHB and working fulltime for COSG. I have recently joined a JHB yoga class which I am enjoying very much.

I hope everything is going well with you.

Love

# End Conscription Campaign

National Office  
P.O. Box 537  
2100 Kengray

Tel (011) 836-8423  
Fax (011) 834-3189

ref: Min DF1.

Durban Office  
56 Ecumenical Centre  
20 St Andrew's St.  
4001 Durban

Tel (031) 304-5883  
Fax (031) 301-6611

15 NOVEMBER 1991

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
PRIVATE BAG X 427  
PRETORIA  
0001


Dear Sir

## URGENT REQUEST FOR MEETING: NOVEMBER 1991

In the first place, the ECC wishes to congratulate you on your appointment to the Defence portfolio. We are encouraged by the sentiments you have voiced, your reputation as a fair negotiator (as displayed during the recent Peace Accord negotiations) and news of an enlightened new approach by your ministry and department (apparently encapsulated in the SADF Code of Conduct, yet to be released).

We welcome these changes and their implications, and hope accordingly, that the government has softened its previously antagonistic regard for the ECC. Recognition of the ECC (and its legitimate support base) by the Department of Defence is long overdue, and we hereby wish to register our desire to commence constructive dialogue with you and your representatives. We submit that such engagement is not only appropriate in this era of negotiation, but also necessary and mutually beneficial.

For instance the ECC has created the position of Natal Fieldworker, whose brief it is to monitor SADF activity in the violence-wracked townships of Natal. Regular reports have been published - and we have posted our latest report to your office for your perusal - and a number of disclosures leading to criminal prosecutions have resulted. We wish to point out that we are not blind to the positive role that is so often played by the SADF in these situations (see Pg 2. of the October report), but simply stand by the public's right to know exactly how conscripts - who are after all, members of the public themselves - are utilised in their present internal role.



ECC

End Conscription Campaign

We also believe that the conduct of non-conscripts, ie. Permanent Force members of the SADF, has a direct bearing on the conscription issue, since young men are currently being compelled by the Defence Act to associate themselves with the SADF, and therefore all its other employees. Thus we believe that the activities of the SADF's Special Forces for example, are entirely relevant to the conscription issue.

On the basis of the new era of tolerance and the imminent changes within the South African Defence Force itself, the End Conscription Campaign wishes to meet with you personally to discuss inter alia, the following points:

1. VIOLENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE SADF

- 1.1 Our perceptions on the successes and failures of the SADF in its domestic/law-enforcement capacity,
- 1.2 The possibility of the ECC playing a facilitative role between SADF personnel and representatives from (specifically Natal) communities where the former are deployed, in line with the National Peace Accord or otherwise, including representation of the SADF on Local Dispute Resolution Committees, and the content and application of the proposed Code of Conduct for Defence Force members, and
- 1.3 Our concerns about (possibly unsanctioned) actions on the part of certain individuals and elements within the SADF, especially so-called "covert" units such as Special Forces, and their accountability (or otherwise) to DMI and your office.

2. COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE:

- 2.1 The progress or otherwise of the Gleeson Committee on Conscientious Objection,
- 2.2 The report of the Van Loggerengerg Committee on SADF Manpower policy,
- 2.3 The anomalous nature of racially based conscription at the present time,

We acknowledge the sensitivity of aspects of this proposed agenda, but urge your office in turn to recognise both our bona fides and our potential contribution to your information network. We intend to approach any discussions emanating herefrom, in a spirit of frankness and openness, and sincerely hope that you will do the same.

We must emphasise that we regard this proposed meeting as a matter of the utmost urgency and accordingly request that you respond to this letter (fax) by Friday 22 November, with a proposed time and venue for the meeting to take place within ten (9) days from that date, ie. before the end of November 1991. Our delegation, which will consist of 4 representatives, will be prepared to travel to Pretoria.

For the sake of convenience, we recommend that your office deal with the ECC's National Office [tel + fax nos. SUPRA] who will in turn liaise with other branches and the Natal Fieldworker in particular.

We anxiously await your reply,

Yours Faithfully



H B OSBORN  
NATAL FIELDWORKER

pp ECC NATIONAL

The Conscientious Objectors' Support Group  
P.O.Box 591  
2100 KENGRAY  
Phone: (011) 3397613

19 November, 1989


B.H.Collectt  
38 Eric Street  
Murrayfield  
Pretoria  
0184

Dear Mr. Collett

Many thanks for your subscription form and the cheque in the sum of R50. I confirm that we have placed your name on our mailing list.

Should you wish to get in touch with some of our Pretoria members, please phone Davin Chown at: 832767 (h) or 463205 (w). They have recently started up a branch of COSG in Pretoria.

Yours sincerely



Mandy Taylor  
COSG National Worker

war resisters' international.  
internationale des résistant/es à la guerre  
internationale der kriegsdienstgegner/innen  
internacional de resistentes a la guerra  
internacio de militgerezistantoj



55 Dawes Street, London SE17 1EL, Britain  
Telex: 933524 box GEO2:WAR.RESISTERS

*Mandy Taylor.*

November 23, 1989

Phone: +44 1 703 7189  
Email: gn:warresisters

## SOCIAL DEFENCE AND NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE: developing people's power as a defence policy

WRI and IFoR in association with the Bradford School of Peace Studies are holding an international study conference on this theme from 3-7 April, 1990. The Greens in the European Parliament have still to decide whether to co-sponsor the conference. We are inviting a mixture of peace researchers and participants in social movements, and of course we also want a good representation from our affiliated organisations.

Space is limited to 100 participants, all of whom should be familiar with the basic concepts of social defence and debates around the question. We are therefore asking each Section of WRI and branch of IFoR to recommend participants from their own country. If there is a group working on this, please put us in touch with them.

Please will you send the names and addresses of the people from your country who you think should be informed about this conference, plus some details about what they are involved in or what kind of contribution they might be able to make. Plenary sessions will have simultaneous interpretation for English, French and German. As social defence has traditionally been a very male-dominated area of discussion, we would especially like suggestions of women to be resource people.

It would be ideal if you could send this information to WRI by 18 December 1989. We will then send more details about the agenda, and background papers will be circulated before the event.

I enclose some preliminary information about the seminar.

Yours in peace

*Howard Clark*

Howard Clark



# **SOCIAL DEFENCE AND NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE**

## **developing "people's power" as a defence policy**

Unarmed communities have ways of defending what they value, be it their environment or their very integrity as communities, be it basic rights and freedoms or particular social structures. There are *alternatives* to submission or violent resistance. This is illustrated both in many day-to-day social struggles and by populations without weapons defying the might of the military.

In the last five years, the experience of people's power in the Philippines with the overthrow of Marcos, in bringing the elections in South Korea and Chile, in the Palestinian *intifada* and in Beijing have shown the potential of unarmed struggle. In Eastern Europe, too, the progress towards pluralism and establishing the essential forms of civil society has not just been the result of a change of heart in the Soviet leadership and economic pressures but has been an achievement of social movements which sometimes have faced harsh repression.

As a defence policy against would-be invaders, social defence recognises that there is a dissuasive quality in the determination of unarmed people to assert their rights and in the power of popular non-co-operation - whether it takes an open, confrontational form or more subtle methods of non-compliance and hidden disobedience.

### **3-7 April 1990, Bradford, Yorkshire, England**

War Resisters' International and the International Fellowship of Reconciliation in association with the University of Bradford School of Peace Studies are holding a five-day study conference on Social Defence and Nonviolent Struggle. WRI and IFoR have had a long-standing interest in nonviolent social defence as a contribution towards a non-military security policy and promote nonviolent resistance as not just an effective but an appropriate means of struggle for freedom and peace. Bradford School of Peace Studies has sponsored research into nonviolent social defence since its foundation in 1974.

#### **The purpose of this conference**

Social defence has not had a high profile in debates on peace and war in recent years. Strategic developments - from the superpowers down to small nations and emerging nations - have combined with the recent experiences of nonviolent struggle to give it a new relevance and topicality. As the international security agenda changes in response to "new thinking" in the Soviet Union, Hungary and Poland, this conference will look at possible future roles for nonviolent struggle as a defence strategy - between blocs, for nations seeking to free themselves from military alliances, and for nations striving for self-determination in the face of military intervention.

The conference aims to bring together the experience of unarmed social struggles by social movements in many countries - including peace, ecology, regionalist, feminist, human rights and labour movements - with researchers and small groups working on developing nonviolent methods into defence policies.

With discussions in a mixture of plenary and small working groups, the conference will address basic questions such as:

- \* what elements are essential for success in a social defence strategy?
- \* what have been the critical factors in determining the outcome of nonviolent struggles?
- \* when does social struggle become social defence?
- \* what are the processes of transition from military to social defence?
- \* how do concepts of social defence relate to "defensive defence"/"non-offensive defence"/"preservative defence" and other approaches?
- \* what role might social defence play as the blocs dissolve?
- \* what can social defence concepts contribute to visions for demilitarisation?
- \* how can social defence combat low-intensity operations?
- \* what social defence strategies might be appropriate for movements for regional autonomy?
- \* how can the concept be more widely introduced to populations?

#### **Who can participate?**

Space is limited to 100 people. If you want to participate, please write to the WRI office giving some information about your interest and involvements. The conference will cost £110 including accommodation at the university, breakfast and lunch every day and evening meals on two days, £60 for those not requiring bed and breakfast.

**WRI, 55 Dawes Street, London SE17 1EL, England. Tel: +44 1 703 7189.  
Email: GreenNet@warresisters**

The Conscientious Objector Support Group  
P.O.Box 591  
KENGRAY  
2100  
Phone: (011) 3397613

24 November, 1989

Ingrid de Villiers  
2 Kent Avenue  
Sandringham  
2192

Dear Ingrid,


Thank you for your inquiry about COSG.

I now enclose a fact sheet about Johannesburg COSG as well as the latest copy of OBJECTOR, our newsletter. On the back page of OBJECTOR you will see a subscription form for objector as well as the rates, which is in effect our membership fee. We would be grateful if you would return this form to us.

Should you wish to know more about COSG and how you can be more involved in our work, may I suggest that you telephone me at the above number. We are planning a number of activities for December and could greatly use some more help.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely



Mandy Taylor  
COSG National Worker

# *Haydn Elbarn*

MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE MILITARY RESEARCH GROUP HELD AT SHELL  
HOUSE ON THE 25 NOVEMBER 1991.

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## Present:

1. Jackie Cock.
  2. Krish Naidoo
  3. Laurie Nathan
  4. Abba Omar.
  5. Sandy Africa.
  6. Calvin Kahn.
  7. Ian Robertson.
  8. Rocky Williams.
- 

## 1. APOLOGIES.

Apologies were conveyed regarding the absence of Tokyo Sekgwale, Peter Vale and Mo Shaik.

## 2. OPENING.

The meeting was opened by Rocky Williams who briefly outlined the rationale behind the convening of the meeting. In the immediate-term it was intended as a pre-DISA meeting (scheduled for the following day) so that progressive delegates could meet one another and discuss issues relating to the conference. In the long-term it was intended to provide a forum whereby researchers, academics and policy analysts could network with one another, discuss issues of common relevance and prioritise future areas of co-operation. The meeting was initially chaired by Rocky Williams but was latter taken over by Laurie Nathan.

## 3. MATTERS ARISING.

### 3.1. The need for an independant Military Research Forum.

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(Discussion on point 2.1. of the agenda)

Laurie Nathan initiated more detailed discussion on the need for a forum of this nature. He cited an anecdote from the "Lusaka 1" conference in May 1990 where progressive academics/policy researchers, MK delegates and A.N.C. delegates were often met with the retort from the S.A.D.F./Armscor delegation that "You don't know what you are talking about" each time they attempted to engage the S.A.D.F./Armscor delegation. The present historical circumstances, LN argued, demanded the need for a coherent and co-ordinated strategy from progressive academics/activists in this regard. LN outlined the factors that would influence this process:

- 3.1.1. The outcome of military-related research was dependant on the political will of those political actors involved.
- 3.1.2. A future network should provide direction in respect of non-state related strategic studies research and practise.
- 3.1.3. The sophisitication of the state's formal and informal strategic studies network was considerable. Their extensive links and finances made it imperative that progressive research into strategic studies be both pro-active and purposeful.
- 3.1.4. A possible parallel was suggested with that of the existing Police Commission. Incorporating a number of actors involved in police-related research (Project for the Study of violence, Institute for Criminology etc) the network operated at an informal but efective level. Members remained in constant contact with one another and material was shared informally amongst its members.
- 3.1.5. Co-operation within a military-research group would be determined by the following factors:
  - The sharing of information, material, ideas etc.
  - Joint strategising around issues of common concern i.e. liaison and networking with one another, formal networking with other institutes and individuals and informal networking with other instances and individuals.
  - Joint projects embarked on in the future.

Consequent to LN's outline of the need for and the factors influencing the creation of a military-research group comment was invited from the members present on the issue.

Jackie Cock stated that she envisaged the network operating in a more formal manner whereby areas of research were prioritised and entered into, meetings held and regular contact was kept between the members of the group. She cited her own experience with her Research on Militarization Project which operated in a structured and formal manner.

Abba Omar stated that the media should be used to highlight and popularise such issues and debates and that there was a need for progressive organizations to catch up in these research areas.

Krish Naidoo stated that his major area of interest was the discipline of strategic studies and that he was particularly interested in the regional dynamics of this process. He felt that issues like Defence Economics should also be incorporated in the field of research. He felt that the military-research group could act as a theoretical "bank" for the A.N.C. and that the A.N.C. required a solid position on issues pertaining to security and defence (not least of which was their psychological value). Questioned by JC whether this would involve developing position papers for the A.N.C., KN

responded by stating that papers should cover all aspects of defence (both present and future).

JC said a parallel influence could be drawn from that of the Environmental Task Group established by Max Sisulu. While researching issues related to the environment it also managed to develop positions of benefit to the A.N.C. and progressive organizations. LN emphasised that with regard to policy issues there was a need for both independant institutes as well as A.N.C. policy units. JC stressed that there was a present need for independant institutes as opposed to party-partisan think tanks in this sphere. Calvin Kahn argued strongly that it was important in deliberating on the nature of a strategic studies institute/policy research unit not to create a conflict of interests. As a representative of MK Military Headquarters he felt that such institutes could also try and develop positions on integration for MK - particularly in the light of developments in the homeland "defence forces" where some of these issues were already being debated.

Rocky Williams felt that there was a need for an institute that was both independent but also did not exclude the interests of the A.N.C. and M.K. He was concerned that issues both in the transition - such as integration - and in the long-term - such as defence policy and defence posture - be considered by such an institute/research body. Sandy Africa stated that she felt that departmental issues within the A.N.C. have tended to ignore military-related developments. Lack of co-ordination between respective departments has also clouded the issue. In this regard it was important to develop long-term and short-term perspectives on military/security related issues. It was also important for future strategic studies institutes to retain their independance and provide access to non-partisan interests and parties.

After having received the general comments from those members present, LN felt that each individual should specify their interest in and hopes for a strategic studies institute/policy research unit in the future. Members present were asked to outline their particular areas of research.

### 3.2. Areas of interest/research of members present.

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(Discussion of point 2.2. of the agenda)

3.2.1. Jackie Cock: JC's areas of interest revolved around three main issues - most of which were reflected in her ongoing academic work:

- ☒ - Defence Manpower policy and its implications for the future.
- The position of women in the military and the question of the armed forces in general.
- The impact of the military and military-related issues on the environment - both in the short-term and the long-term (the transferring of

military resources to environmental concerns). A joint project between JC and Eddie Kock was underway on this issue already.

JC stressed that she was particularly concerned to raise debate around women-related issues in respect of the armed forces.

3.2.2. Abba Omar: AO was interested, in the light of a recent DIP conference, in the issue of networking with the state's information services. Where this impinged on military-related issues was in the following spheres:



- The role of the state's Psychological Warfare operations (largely derived from the S.A.D.F.'s experience in this arena) in underpinning their communications strategy.
- Identifying nodal points in the state's communication services and analysing methods of interfacing with them at a formal and informal level.

3.2.3. Krish Naidoo: KN identified the following areas (Some of which had been commented on earlier):



- Regional strategic studies institutes and the question of raising debate around regional strategic studies issues.
- The need for pro-active policy from progressive instances in terms of convening conferences and seminars on strategic studies issues.
- The importance of incorporating foreign academics in all spheres of strategic studies and research.

JC emphasised KN's third point on the necessity of networking with foreign academics and institutes.

3.2.4. Calvin Kahn: CK stated that he was present in a military and not an academic or (at this stage) a research capacity. No structure had yet been established within MK to research and/or network i.r.o. MK's short-term objectives. An example was the immediate question of determining, for instance, MK's present force levels. CK was concerned with:

- Establishing an institute that would benefit MK - whether within or without its structures.
- Research i.r.o. MK's immediate and short-term goals.

3.2.5. Rocky Williams: RW stated that his major area of interest was civil-military relations and that this involved the following:

- The changing parameters of civil-military relations under the Botha and the De Klerk administrations.

~~A~~ - Likely forms of future civil-military relations.

~~A~~ - Current tensions within the military establishment and within and between the military and the politico-civilian establishment.

~~A~~ - Forms of accountability for the armed forces in terms of future defence policy.

- The modalities of integration.

3.2.6. Sandy Africa: SA stated that her interest was, to a large extent, non academic. Her interests were mainly:

- Developing policy positions on the police and the intelligence services particularly with regard to the morality thereof. More space should be created for creative networking.

~~A~~ - The strategy of the regime at the present juncture.

- The links and political positions within the different South African political parties at present.
- The question of making overtures to the security establishment with reference to policy and security matters.

3.2.7. Laurie Nathan: LN stated that there was a vast area of research that he was interested in and that there was a need for specificity in terms of isolating key areas of importance. He felt that the key issues that he pursued were:

- Developing perspectives on strategic studies as a discipline.
- The publishing of articles.
- Networking with South African progressive bodies and individuals.
- Networking with international bodies.
- Undertaking joint projects with a variety of organizations.

L.N. said that the problems with realising the above-mentioned goals were - in terms of his own capabilities - the following:

- He found it difficult to handle the volume of work.
- The scope of research was too broad.
- The demands for immediate and/or short-term research tended to limit long-term considerations.

The manner in which LN had attempted to redress this work load was to expand the size of his project but even then the outfit on its own could not realise the volume of work. A training capacity was also needed.

In the light of the individual contributions made above a measure of general discussion was entered into by all members present. Regarding LN's reference to the need for training JC stated that she had been doing this via her ROM project for quite a while. LN stated that what was required was an outfit that could produce concrete ideas for policy units and that considerable plurality (both at a national and regional level) should be encouraged in this regard. JC opposed this suggestion stating that a centralised strategic studies institute/research unit would be necessary i.r.o. funding proposals and rationalization of efforts.

SA concurred with LN that a plurality of institutes should be encouraged and said already individuals had made a variety of contacts with these units in their own spheres. JC retorted that there was a need to formalise the Military-Research Group (MRG) as a net for different inputs elsewhere. CK remained concerned that any institute formed for progressives involved in strategic studies research should not simply be limited to academic concerns. Political problems should also be highlighted with a simple and accessible focus for non-academics.

LN emphasised that a policy vacuum in the sphere of progressive research would witness the policies of the security establishment dominating the current ideological and theoretical discourse. Although academic research demands should be met he also felt that research should be popularised. CK expressed his concern with the over-academicization of any proposed institute/military-research group and stated that military people felt more secure with concrete products at the end of the day.

### 3.3. The isolation of research priorities.

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(Discussion of point 2.3. of the agenda)

The daunting task of isolating central and crucial areas of research was entered into by all present. A number of suggestions were made and it was jointly agreed that the following constituted "core" areas in this regard:

- 3.3.1. The examination of alternative security theory and the broadening of its conceptual parameters.
- 3.3.2. The development of a coherent threat analysis.

- \* 3.3.3. The dynamics of regional security collaboration in Southern Africa.
- \* 3.3.4. The formulation of defence policy and doctrines for the future.
- 1/1 3.3.5. The parameters of civil-military relations with specific reference to accountability.
- \* 3.3.6. Modalities of integration regarding S.A.D.F. and M.K.
- \* 3.3.7. The restructuring of the intelligence environment. ?
- \* 3.3.8. Women and militarization.
- 3.3.9. Environmental issues and the military.
- 3.3.10. The arms industry and its conversion.
- \* 3.3.11. Improving the image of the security forces in a democratic South Africa.
- 3.3.12. Defence Economics.
- 3.3.13. Reintegration of soldiers into civilian life.
- 3.3.14. Monitoring the activities and developments within the state's strategic studies institutes.
- \* 3.3.15. Monitoring current military initiatives within the state.
- 3.3.16. The culture of the armed forces (both in the transition and in the future).
- \* 3.3.17. The question of transition and its impact on military-related issues and civil-military relations.

Consequent to prioritising the above-mentioned areas of research CK felt that the immediate concerns would be the examination of a threat analysis and its influence on the future form and influence of the armed forces. Additional areas would be the monitoring of the security forces in the current transition. SA was concerned as to whether security-related issues were being presented on the MPC and whether the A.N.C. was strong in this regard.

Laurie Nathan stated that he felt the areas of prioritization could be broken into four major areas:

- TRANSITIONAL ISSUES:

- \* a. containment of the armed forces
- b. role of MK in the transition.

~~A~~- ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW DEFENCE FORCE:

- a. threat analysis and defence policy.
- b. integration of the armed forces.
- c. regional co-operation.

- ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

- INTELLIGENCE (both within the domestic and international sphere).

With regard to the skills and capabilities of those present it was felt that the four major areas isolated by LN should be examined in the light of the capabilities of those present to "deliverW" work on them. The following schemata was drawn.



- Immediate transitional issues regarding military and military-related activities on the ground were felt to be the domain of RW and LN (containment of the armed forces).
- The role of MK in the transition - training, preparedness of its members to serve and the sharing of facilities - was felt to be the preserve of CK.
- Threat analysis and its implications was allocated to KN and CK.



- Regional security co-operation was felt to be the preserve of LN and KN.

Debate around the issue of threat analysis was opened by JC. She felt that we were possibly inadequate to take on a task of this immesnity. Was this not rather that perogative of individuals overseas. LN retorted that his experience had shown him that overseas individuals were ill-equipped to fulfill this task at a practical level because of the lack of a "feel" for the local dynamics. RW stated that it was possible to embark on this project as a collective effort and co-ordinate threat analysis perspectives from different individuals of the group, inputs from the state and from quasi-academic non-state instances. He also inidictaed that computing a threat analysis - for instance the rationale behind the disbanding of the Special Forces - was often a question of political "suss" rather than military-technical jargon. It was agreed that RW would co-ordinate inputs on threat analyses.



- Integration of the S.A.D.F., M.K. and other military structures - the technical modalities thereon - were felt to be the preserve of MHQ, RW, LN and KN.

- The question of the armaments industry was allocated to Gary Littlejohn, JC, LN, KN and networking with other institutes involved in this research.



- Intelligence - its moral, methodological and structural dynamics - was felt to be the preserve of SA. The question of the South African intelligence community was also felt to be SA's preserve whilst the role of the S.A.D.F.'s intelligence structures was felt to be RW's preserve.

#### 3.4. Progress made towards the establishment of strategic studies bodies.

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(Discussion of point 2.4.1. of the agenda)

Individual comments were made in this regard as a lot of the ground had been covered in previous discussions. SA stated that her initiative should not be seen as solely an A.N.C. initiative. An overture had been made to the University of Durban Westville but logistic and financial problems had prevented the erection of such an institute - at this stage. The creation of a fully fledged institute would take time and a redefinition of the project had consequently been entered into - partially because of the funding involved. Research could be done if alternative routes were followed - the idea of establishing a strategic studies post under UDW's Department of Political Science or Sociology for instance. SA stated that she was pursuing an incremental approach with a narrower focus of research so as not to duplicate efforts elsewhere. Funding would now be secured for salaries and not administrative costs seeing that the idea was to resort the initiative under the aegis of an already existing department.

KN stated that a Centre in the fullest sense of the word would take years to develop and wondered what the possibilities were of SA's centre merging with an MK research body. SA said it should rather be an independant body with a commissioned approach to work. It should also be practically oriented in terms of work and should even liase with state bodies. LN stated that one should be realistic about networking with state agencies because the theoretical framework of a progressive unit often deterred state and state-related agencies from working with it. JC stressed that ROM had already been training people in areas related to the military and that people should raw more extensively on her resources. She felt it important for both the group and everyone present that a Resource Centre be established. LN said that he was looking for people involved in his area of work to incorporate into his programme as welcomed suggestions in this regard.

#### 3.5. The establishment of an MK Research Commission.

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(Discussion of point 2.4.2. of the agenda)

CK acknowledged the need for a MK Research Commission and affirmed that the MK Command echelons had recognised this reality. The problems encountered were the fact that MK was in the process of reorganising itself within the country and that manpower problems had thusfar prevented its realization. LN stated that both he and RW had had extensive discussions with the MK High Command and that everyone recognised the need for such an institute. RW stated that the need for an MK research body had also been adopted as one of the proposals of the Venda conference. RW stated that he had drawn

up a proposal for a research body for MK and had distributed it to certain commanders but felt that in the light of the MRG meeting the proposal should be fleshed out by RW, CK and Ian Robertson. CK stated that the unit will identify problems in relation to MK.

### 3.6. The use of the media to publicise and popularise strategic studies issues.

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(Discussion around 2.4.3. of the agenda)

JC stated that it was important to feed information into policy making and grassroots journals. CK said we should send out a pamphlet announcing our existence while LN said we should concentrate on grassroots publications. AO stated that a more systematic approach to the New Nation, Vrye Weekblad and the Weekly Mail was needed and that we should try and use the radio to this end. LN raised the point mentioned by Peter Vale that we should take over a copy of Work In Progress to be devoted to issues related to strategic studies. CK felt that there existed a definite need for workshops in this regard. On SA's question as to how we communicate information JC recommended that we institutionalise ourselves as a network.

### 3.7. The formation of the Military-Research Group (MRG).

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(Discussion around 2.4.4. of the agenda)

JC stated that the group constitute themselves as a research group with minutes, research agenda, possible institutional connections, recommendations and meetings. LN recommended that minutes be drawn up and distributed and that RW facilitate and co-ordinate the initiative. In addition to the present members it was agreed that the following individuals involved in military-related research be approached to join the group:

- Frene Grinwala and Tony Trew of the A.N.C.'s Research Department.
- Garth Strachan, Peter Vale, Tony Holiday and Damien De Lange of Cape Town.
- Ian Phillips of Natal.
- Gavin Cawthra and Bill Anderson of London.

The modus operandi of the Group was agreed to as follows:

- monthly meetings cum seminars would be convened on a national and regional basis (if possible).
- meetings amongst members could be convened at will if so desired.

- material should be distributed amongst members according to their specific interests.
- Addresses should be circulated amongst members.
- a flyer announcing the existence of the group should be distributed.

It was decided that the first meeting would be convened before the opening of the Multi-party Conference and that KN would present a paper entitled:

"Strategic Initiative: a conceptual framework"

and that the meeting would be held at Shell house on the 11 December 1991 (see end of minutes for details).

### 3.8. International networking.

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(Discussion around point 2.4.5. of the agenda)

It was felt that at this stage Gavin Cawthra would be responsible for the international dimension of networking.

### 3.9. MK's needs in respect of the MRG.

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KN stated that MK's needs needed to be isolated by MK cadres and distributed amongst MRG members. CK undertook to do this.

### 3.10. Report back on the DISA conference

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RW would report back on the DISA conference to JC and KN and any interventions at the conference would be made on an individual and not corporate basis.

### 4. Date/s for next meeting.

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Date: Wednesday 11 December 1991.

Time: 14h00 - 18h00

Place: D.I.P. conference room, 19th floor, Shell House, Plein Street.

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OVERVIEW OF THE DEFENCE INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA'S CONFERENCE ON  
"SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY RELATIONS TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000" HELD AT THE  
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA ON THE 26 NOVEMBER 1991.

INTRODUCTION.

The DISA conference could be best described in the private comment of one of its chief organisers, Jakkie Cilliers, as being an "establishment conference". Apart from a solitary COSATU representative ("small" Jay Naidoo) and six A.N.C. alliance members the meeting was dominated by representatives of the S.A.D.F., S.A.D.F. - related organizations, ARMSCOR, local and foreign strategic studies institutes and foreign military attaches. However, the exclusion and marginalization of progressive strategic studies practitioners and the small A.N.C./MK presence also reflected itself in the nature of the debate at the conference - largely uninnovative and uninspiring in content. The capacity of progressive instances to organise a similar conference but with a far more wide-ranging agenda remains considerable - not least of which is the theoretical terrain within which progressive strategic studies instances find themselves. These points, and others, are examined below.

1.) CONFERENCE DELEGATES.

Approx. 120 delegates attended the conference although the conference had been hoping to attract 180 delegates. A bigger S.A.D.F. delegation would have been fielded, it appears, had the Chief-of-the S.A.D.F. "Kat" Liebenberg been prepared to allow S.A.D.F. members to attend in an official capacity. The presence of Peter Vale as one of the speakers and the nominal presence of an A.N.C./MK delegation resulted in an order being issued by Liebenberg to the acting Chief-of-Staff Planning, General Ben Vorster, to withdraw his 8 delegates from the Chief-of-Staff Planning Division. The S.A.D.F. did nevertheless remain prominent in the proceedings and this was manifest at a number of levels. :

At a covert level, and somewhat unexpectedly, the Military Intelligence Division fielded at least 8 known "delegates" according to private discussion with one of the conference organisers. S.A.D.F. representation was also evident in the presence of senior S.A.D.F. officers from the "independant" homelands - Lt. Col. Meiring (Chief-of-Staff Intelligence, Venda Defence Force), Brigadier Oelrich (Ciskei) and Brigadier Moller. S.A.D.F. officers engaged in research at either the Military Academy, the Institute for Strategic Studies (University of Pretoria) and the Defence College attended in their capacity as students. An interesting development included the presence of Major General Thackeray (Chief-of-Air Staff Logistics, former military attache to West Germany and known "verligte" in the General Staff of the S.A.D.F.) at the conference. Despite "Kat" Liebenberg's injunction against an official S.A.D.F. presence at the

conference he attended because he claimed the order had reached him too late.

Other military delegates included representatives from the "independant" homelands - particularly a strong delegation from the Venda Defence Force headed by Brigadier Ramushwana himself and representatives from the military attaches of the various Pretoria-based embassies (U.S.A., Germany and U.K.). ARMSCOR fielded a number of representatives and the major ARMSCOR contractors were also visible by their presence - Barlow Rand, Reunert Technology and others. Ex-S.A.D.F. officers included the President of DISA and former Chief-of-Naval Staff (retired in 1990), Rear Admiral Bennett, and the Chairman of DISA and ex-S.A.D.F. Commandant, Jakkie Cilliers.

Local academic delegates were wide-ranging and included delegates from most universities involved in stratetic studies and/or military-related research - U.C.T., Wits, Stellenbosch, University of Pretoria (ISSUP), Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit and UNISA. Foreign academic delegates included the co-conveners of the organization, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, and a representative from NATO who also delivered keynote address. The Department of Foreign Affairs fielded a small delegation - including the Head of its Africa desk and officials involved in the homeland "desks" - while other organizations such as the South Africa Foundation were also present. The A.N.C./MK/progressive academic delegation consisted of six members - 3 from MK, two from the A.N.C. and one from an academic institution.

## 2.) INTENTION OF THE CONFERENCE.

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It is difficult to compute the exact intention of the conference given the fact that it was organised by former S.A.D.F. senior officers who motive for the conference was not precisely elaborated. Whilst the conference quite clearly did intend giving prominence to certain issues affecting security relations into the year 2000 it provided neither a comprehensive nor challenging account of all factors likely to influence this process. While the conference did incorporate two speakers whose sympathies were not inclined in the direction of the S.A.D.F./ARMSCOR axis - the NATO representative and Peter Vale - the other five speakers were all drawn from those nodes of the ideological spectrum generally construed to be sympathetic to the state.

It seems reasonable and non-conspiratorial to believe that the conference was a deliberately organised attempt by the more professionally and constitutionally-inclined sectors of the S.A.D.F. to seize the moral and strategic highground in the terrain of defence-related debate in the current transition. This fact is confirmed not only by the nature and content of most of the papers delivered but also by the evident tension that existed between the conference organisers and the S.A.D.F. "old guard" under the leadership of General "Kat" Liebenberg.

What the conference did achieve was to "open up" the debate for many S.A.D.F. members around key issues likely to influence the development of defence policy in the forthcoming decade - the changing balance of international relations, changing regional dynamics and alternative defence

models for a defence force in the future. Its failures included the lack of legitimacy and credibility accruing to most of the speakers and the partisan nature of its organization.

### 3.) DEBATE AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONFERENCE.

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The accompanying index provides an overview of the papers delivered at the conference. The keynote address by Colonel Hallerbach did not raise anything radically new but did provide an intriguing account of the internal and external factors influencing defence posture, policy and co-operation in Europe. The cessation of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the EEC and the consolidation of its links with Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavian crisis and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. were cited as factors in this regard.

Col. Hallerbach argued that while substantial revision was being introduced into European threat analysis and defence budgets and manpower levels were being rationalised in the light of the reduced Cold War threat scenario, this did not entail a total reduction in the influence of either NATO or the armed forces of the region. Two examples are pertinent in this regard - the growing fear amongst many Europeans about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its influence on Europe and the psychological fact that the decline in Eastern Europe has not necessarily introduced a higher level of security in the region.

The parallels between Col. Hallerbach's scenario and the Southern African one were evident at a number of levels. Whilst wide-ranging and incisive revision of security strategy and doctrine will have to be broached in both South Africa and Southern Africa old perceptions and current insecurities will continue to problematise (even if only minimally) regional security co-operation and defence strategy. The ideal of full regional military co-operation and the introduction of non-offensive strategic doctrines into the discourse of a future South African Defence Force will have to take cognisance of these realities.

Peter Vale's paper provided a critical examination of the ending of the Cold War - from a "Southern" perspective. He challenged many of the prevailing wisdoms regarding the restructuring of the terrain of international politics and urged the necessity of introducing the concept of the "South" as a crucial element of international political and economic restructuring. He challenged the tyranny of such concepts as "democracy" and argued that the Western export of these concepts was based on a historically subjective and value-laden understanding of the term.

Derrick Auret's paper remained singularly uninspiring. Indeed, as Laurie Nathan perceptively observed, virtually half of his paper was derived and plagiarised from the Kampala Document! The paper basically endorsed the Department of Foreign Affairs' strategy with regard to the negotiating process at present - the need for regional co-operation, the necessity for the peaceful resolution of regional and domestic problems, the endorsement of the free market economy and the primacy of negotiations in this process (Auret is the Director of the Africa desk in the D.F.A.). The theoretical paucity of Auret's paper highlighted an important issue - to what extent are

the various apparatuses of the state ensemble capable of developing a creative and indigenous strategy in response to the unfolding negotiating process?

Admiral Bennett's request for debate to be limited to non-partisan questioning did not deter many of the speakers from advocating their own party-political, and highly subjective, perspectives on a number of issues. Mr A Gende's paper (himself the DTA shadow minister for defence) was supposed to provide an overview of Namibian fears and expectations regarding the dynamics of regional security. In reality his paper provided a DTA-inspired account of the integration of PLAN and SWATF fighters into the new Namibian Defence Force and the attendant victimization of SWATF therein. He lamented the numerical imbalance between Plan soldiers and former SWATF soldiers, the high level of illiteracy amongst returning PLAN combatants and the noticeable decline in professional standards - the last point receiving considerable support from the S.A.D.F. contingent in the audience!

Brigadier Ramushwana and Professor Hough's papers were noticeable for the lack of information they communicated. Ramushwana's paper simply conveyed a repackaged version of what innumerable other speakers/papers/opinions have stated regarding defence policy and the future - the need for a defensive brief, some form of integration etc. Hough's paper was aptly described by Peter Vale as being an exercise in "methodological madness". Instead of stimulating debate on the key questions contained in his paper title "Integration, absorption or marginalization" he simply provided a descriptive overview of the different positions in this regard - a sort of strategic studies review of the prevailing literature!

Jakkie Cillier's paper represented a creative attempt to grapple with the likely military models which a future Defence Force may approximate. Although the logical continuity of many of his arguments could be queried and despite his failure to problematise the question of the legitimacy of the armed forces in transition, he nevertheless tried to raise the issue of instilling democracy into a future Defence Force. His model in this regard was the West German construct known as the "Citizen in Uniform" whereby the armed forces commit themselves to the democratic principles of society and their legitimacy is ensured via their integration into civil society. Key elements influencing the accountability of the armed forces in the future would be the military/organizational culture of the armed forces, the discipline inherent therein and the political stability of South Africa in the future. Cilliers' paper was a pertinent reminder of the need to develop a theoretical model (or rather models) of military organizations - particularly in the current transition. It also underlined the importance of studying other military models in this regard - the British notion of the "professional" armed forces, the prevailing sentiment amongst certain quarters regarding a "People's Army" and the variants of a conscript/militia army doing the rounds at present.

Discussion on the papers was limited by considerations such as time and the fact that intervention was confined to the delivering of questions to the speakers involved. The circumscribing of the debate in this manner ensured that contentious questions relating to the modalities of integration, future defence policy and defence posture and likely parameters of civil-

military relations (both in the transition and the future) were largely avoided. It also highlighted the very narrow line between academic concerns and political interest in certain circumstances.

#### 4.) OUR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISA EXPERIENCE.

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Despite the fact that the MRG delegation at the DISA conference failed to make an impact on the debate conducted by the delegates, there is still scope for optimism, however. The strengths of the DISA/S.A.D.F./S.A.D.F. - related axis was self-evident to anyone attending the conference. They possessed considerable access to resources and felt relatively confident conducting the debate within a strategic studies context. Their weaknesses, nevertheless, were equally visible and included the following:

1. Whatever the institutional and political prominence of the S.A.D.F. within the country, it remains stymied in its ability to organise a conference with broad backing because of the crisis of legitimacy it has faced over the years. Even when a conference is organised by the more "verligte" sectors of the S.A.D.F.'s senior officer corps it has to account for the fact that both they and the S.A.D.F. itself have been perceived of as being unrepresentative and partisan in their corporate political profiles.
2. Whatever the implicit support for the S.A.D.F. amongst certain international quarters - NATO, Western intelligence agencies and the armed forces of the U.S.A., the U.K. and Germany - such support will be predicated on the ability of the S.A.D.F. to develop a profile that is both domestically and internationally acceptable. These instances will remain pragmatic in their support for the S.A.D.F.
3. The internal level of debate within the S.A.D.F. and its related think-tanks regarding integration and future defence strategy and defence policy remains relatively undeveloped - with some noteable exceptions. MRG and related progressive organizations carry the potential to seize the moral and strategic high-ground regarding the parameters of defence-related debate both in the current conjuncture and the future. The S.A.D.F. remains limited in its ability to respond flexibly and creatively to these challenges precisely because of the vested interests it is attempting to protect.
4. MRG, MK and related progressive organizations undoubtedly have the capacity to invite a much wider range of local and international delegates to a DISA-type conference - with the corresponding intellectual and strategic diversity that such a conference would produce. This range of instances would extend across a borad spectrum of individuals - local and foreign military "experts"; local and foreign soldiers;

local and foreign strategic studies experts and a range of other organizations involved in this sphere.

A suitably structured and appropriately organised conference along the lines of point (4) referred to above may even make it very difficult for the S.A.D.F. to avoid attending - particularly in the light of the impending MPC and possible transitional government. What MRG, MK and others may not deliver to the "integration table" in terms of numbers and infrastructure, they can almost certainly deliver in terms of ideas, creative strategies and politically legitimate constructs. This surely constitutes a major challenge for us during the forthcoming years.

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# CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY RELATIONS TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000

26 NOVEMBER 1991

SENATE HALL, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

Item 1	07h30 - 08h30	60 min	Registration and Coffee	
Item 2	08h35 - 08h45	10 min	Welcome and Admin Arrangements	Prof Mike Hough Director Institute for Strategic Studies University of Pretoria

## MORNING SESSION CHAIRMAN

R Adm C.H. Bennett (SAN Ret), President of DISA

Item 3	08h50 - 09h30	40 min	<b>Keynote Address</b> Shifts in the international balance of power - the implications for regional peace and security after the ending of the Cold War. What are the implications for Southern Africa	Col R F Hallerbach (ret) NATO representative for the monthly magazine <i>European Security</i> , Brussels
Item 4	09h35 - 10h15	40 min	<b>Paper 1</b> New trends in global security: some questions from the South	Prof P Vale Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape
Item 5	10h15 - 10h30	15 min	<b>Coffee/Tea</b>	
Item 6	10h30 - 11h10	40 min	<b>Paper 2</b> Regional co-operation in Southern Africa: current and future prospects	Mr D Auret Acting Deputy Director-General: Africa, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa
Item 7	11h15 - 11h55	40 min	<b>Paper 3</b> The experience in Namibia and Namibian fears, perceptions and expectations regarding regional security	Mr A Gende Shadow Minister of Defence for the DTA Republic of Namibia
Item 8	12h00 - 12h45	45 min	<b>Discussion/questions on keynote address, papers 1, 2 and 3</b>	
Item 9	12h45 - 13h45	60 min	<b>Lunch</b>	

# CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY RELATIONS TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000

26 NOVEMBER 1991

SENATE HALL, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

## AFTERNOON SESSION CHAIRMAN

*Mr G. Linska, representative of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in South Africa*

Item 10	13h45 - 14h25	40 min	<b>Paper 4</b> The future of the armed forces of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei - expectations and prospects	Brigadier M G Ramushwana Chairman of the Council of National Unity Republic of Venda
Item 11	14h30 - 15h10	40 min	<b>Paper 5</b> Integrating the military into democracy - the South African soldier as a Citizen in Uniform	Dr J K Cilliers Director Institute for Defence Politics
Item 12	15h10 - 15h30	20 min	<b>Coffee/Tea</b>	
Item 13	15h30 - 16h10	40 min	<b>Paper 6</b> The SADF and MK: Integration, absorption or marginalization?	Prof M Hough Director Institute for Strategic Studies University of Pretoria
Item 14	16h15 - 17h00	45 min	<b>Discussion/questions on papers 4, 5 and 6</b>	
Item 15	17h00		<b>Closing</b>	Prof M Hough Director Institute for Strategic Studies University of Pretoria

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