

2.2.2.2.4 **Right-wing terrorism**

A new feature in the RSA is so-called right-wing terrorism. It is likely to occur in greater form and frequency. Right-wing terrorists employ such tactics as bomb attacks and threats to express their dissatisfaction with concessionary and liberal reform tendencies. The most well-known groups are the Wit Kommando, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the Afrikaner Wit Weerstandsbeweging in SWA. Amongst their activities have been bomb attacks on academics' offices and multi-racial drive-ins (Ackerman 1983:39, Marais 1982:9). Much talk about hidden weapons and ammunition has been reported in the media. The danger of the attacks lie not so much in the physical threat they pose, but that they help to create a climate of collapse, promote division amongst the ranks of the Whites and possibly retard reform, thus furthering Black frustration and possible violence.

2.2.2.2.5 **SWAPO and SWA/Nambia**

In the case of SWA/Namibia the threat is centered round SWAPO. It was founded in 1958, consisting of members of the largest tribal group in the country, the Ovambo. Its formation received much support from the left and ultra-left groups including the SACP (Greig 1979:1). In response to the argument that SWAPO only gradually turned to a policy of violence to gain their objective of independence from the RSA, Greig (1979:2) quotes Mr Andreas Shapanga, a former senior SWAPO official, who states that he and other future leaders had in the early period formed a study group, Yu Chi Chen, to study Marxism-Leninism and the writings of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara on guerilla tactics.

In 1960 the group changed its name to SWAPO. In 1961 the first SWAPO national congress was held and soon afterwards the movement began recruiting for training in guerilla warfare. Most of these men were sent to Egypt and Algeria (Greig 1979:2-3).

In 1965 they established their first base inside Ovambo. The first clash between SWAPO and the security forces occurred in August 1966. The arms wing of SWAPO adopted the name Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) (Greig 1979:3). With specialist training in overseas countries and bases established in Angola and Zambia, it is estimated that 2 500 troops are constantly available for infiltration. From 1965 onwards, we see the beginning of rural terrorism in SWA. These terrorists are trained to use infantry weapons and operate in small groups or singly on foot, crossing the border in the rainy season in order to intimidate, injure and kill the local population (Ackerman 1983:34, Menaul 1983:6-7).

Although it is not the writer's purpose to provide a chronicle of events to illustrate SWAPO's activities, he will briefly list some incidents and statistics. Mine warfare, sabotage and intimidation of the local population constitutes 50% of its activities. 104 of the local population were killed in 1982 and 101 in 1983, among them women and children (RSA 1984(a):5). An average of 43 incidents per month in 1983 and 62 per month in 1982 were recorded. 1983 saw twice as many terrorists involved as during 1982 (RSA 1984(a):5). April 82 and February 83 saw a major assault launched by SWAPO, involving some 1 200 to 1 500 terrorists (Menaul 1983:14). SWAPO, due to a lengthy programme of lobbying, have been awarded sole legal representative status by the UN. They rely on the USSR and East bloc for advisors and financial and logistic support (Greig 1979:3,5,6). They have refused to take part in elections, wanting special status and bases in SWA. They have on a number of occasions spoken out against a constitution (Greig 1979:8).

2.2.2.2.6 Conventional threat against the RSA/SWA

Revolutionary strategy provides, in the first place, for guerilla/terrorist activity, but at the same time doesn't exclude action and escalation towards a more conventional onslaught. This possibility is receiving constant attention, especially in the light of the involvement of Soviet and surrogate forces (Vanneman 1982:18, Viljoen, C L 1983:2,4). The African countries pose no real threat; the conventional threat lies chiefly in the fact that the USSR is disturbing the military status quo and therefore the possibility of the RSA becoming involved in a conventional war is a real one (Viljoen, C L 1983:7). It is a known fact that the RSA's neighbours have considerably expanded their conventional military capabilities since 1975. Military vehicles have increased by 300%, aircraft by 200% (RSA 1984(a):iii, Vanneman 1982:18, Viljoen, C L 1983:4-6). Military forces have been expanded by 300% to a total of some 270 400 troops. Of these at least 10% are surrogate forces. The arms build-up is out of proportion to their defence needs. Analysis of the military budget of hostile countries and of their conventional capabilities, can be an indication of their intention to attack.

In Angola, the western zone houses a Cuban brigade with motorized infantry, T-55 tank units and ground to air missiles, as well as an air base at Lubango with 20/24 MIG-21's. The central zone houses a Cuban brigade where guerilla training takes place. The Angolans have also placed a line of early warning radars across the country more or less 100 km north of the border. There are surface to air missiles with SAM -3's and associated radar in all three zones (Menaul 1983:7-8).

Recent expansions in the Soviet Navy, and deployment of its naval forces in both the Indian and South Atlantic oceans, constitute a threat not only to the Cape sea route but to the economy and security of the RSA itself (RSA 1977(a)22-23). Due to USSR support and involvement in Southern Africa, a situation is created whereby conventional war could become a reality (RSA 1984(a):2).

2.2.2.2.7 Conclusion

The physical/military onslaught is thus an undeniable force operating in the RSA. It is therefore a factor of reality and must be acknowledged as a co-determining life-world force for the education system. It is essential that the implications it holds for man be determined to ensure that the necessary accommodatirary action can be taken by the education system.

2.2.3 Causes and factors affecting the onslaught

2.2.3.1 USSR expansionism

This cause has already been alluded to. The major threat, according to many authorities, remains the USSR's pursuit of world domination (Time 1977:31, Viljoen, C L 1981:49). This is reflected in that country's purposeful exploitation and instigation, either directly or indirectly, of conflict in all the strategically important parts of the world, such as in Southern Africa (Greyling 1982:105, RSA 1984(a):1). Proof of such involvement is reflected in the astronomical amounts spent on training and ammunition in African states by the USSR (Malan 1983:3). Campbell (1983:40) makes reference to the presence of Soviet bloc troops and "civilian" technicians. The stock piling of USSR weapons is indicated by Vale (1983:12). Vale (1983:1-10) in drawing parallels between the initial motives of British imperialism and the USSR concludes that the USSR can be termed the neo-imperialist. The role the USSR played via the Cubans in bringing the MPLA to power is common knowledge (Griffith 1979:41). Griffith (1979:39) maintains that the USSR, due to lack of success in other more strategically important parts of the globe, is responding to opportunities in Southern Africa and is consequently stronger in Africa than it was in 1974. Vanneman (1982:16-19) maintains the expansion of government structures dealing with Africa, the utilization of high calibre personnel and the quantity of equipment and advisors are indicative of the fact that the USSR is committed to expanding involvement.

The SACP, the ANC and SWAPO are used as major elements to gain control of the RSA and SWA (RSA 1984(a):1). Because of investigations undertaken by the USA sub-committee on terrorism, there is now no doubt as to the Soviet connection to the ANC and SWAPO. Senator Denton states:

We may well sympathise with the original goal of these two movements ... to achieve democratic political rights and expanded freedom for the black peoples of Namibia and South Africa. We cannot, however, delude ourselves that their purpose now is the achievement of those praiseworthy aims They have been deeply infiltrated by those who seek to advance the imperialistic ambitions of the Soviet Union (Mensual 1983:6).

Several world-wide and regional organizations lend themselves to furthering USSR objectives (Campbell 1983:404). Examples of such organizations are the UN, OAU, Amnesty International the International University Exchange Fund (Greyling 1982:107). The exploitation of humane, liberated organizations and individuals, is apparently so common that Lenin spoke of them as communism's "useful idiots" (Hurry 1983:13).

A lack of progress with USSR expansionism led to the establishment in Moscow of the Co-ordinating Committee for Southern Africa, in 1981. A series of priorities was indicated:

- consolidate influence in 'hostile' neighbouring countries;
 - develop military power of neighbouring countries;
 - continue to plan and implement an isolation programme for the RSA;
 - commit the RSA's security forces to as many fronts as possible.
- (RSA 1984(a):1-2, Viljoen C L 1983:3).

South Africa is regarded as one step in the process towards the final liquidation of capitalism and imperialism, and the concurrent expansion of Marxism (Campbell 1983:413, RSA 1977(a):7 Viljoen, C L 1984:4).

There are individuals such as Jaspers who bear down heavily against what he calls the South African leaders' obsession with world communism (FARI 1980:6). The Economist refers to the "Soviet threat or rather the lack of it" (The Star 1983:7). Arnheim maintains that the USSR, far from being an expansionistic nation, is itself trying to consolidate internally, as it is itself a multi-national state (Arnheim 1979:116-117). The idea of world domination is an original aim much expressed by early marxist leaders, but no longer relevant (Arnheim 1979:119). Arnheim maintains that it is not so much the USSR using fronts and organizations but those fronts using the USSR to achieve their goals. This he illustrates with his theory that, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" (Arnheim 1979:112). That the Black leaders exploit the situation to the maximum without nailing their alignments but in fact often shifting their loyalties is shared by other writers (vide Griffith 1979:42, Time 1977:31). On this note, Hough (1981(a):20) signals a warning to the West, that if it adopts a wait-and-see policy, it may be too late to halt the thrust of Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa.

2.2.3.2 The strategic importance of the RSA

Related to the above mentioned cause is the concept that Southern Africa and specifically South Africa is of strategic importance, and is thus often caught in a power struggle between super powers extending far beyond its borders (RSA 1973:1, RSA 1984(a):1). The writer will briefly discuss the traditional arguments.

2.2.3.2.1 Strategic geographical position

Because of the geographic position of the RSA it occupies a strategic position in terms of the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The importance is demonstrated by the fact that 60% of Western Europe's, 20% of the USA's and 90% of Japan's oil requirements are transported via this route. Yearly, an average of 1 200 ships have called at SA ports since the closure of the Suez canal (Anderson 1982:4, Gueritz 1981:1-9, Hough 1981(a):21). In addition to the economic importance of the Cape sea route, the military importance of the route is centered on the Simonstown Naval Base and the communications centre at Silvermine. Major ports such as Cape Town and Durban, modern airports and a small but sophisticated navy (Hough 1981(a):21) reveal the fact that South Africa could potentially be an important wartime ally because of its position and facilities (Hough 1981(a):24, Menaul 1983:11).

2.2.3.2.2 Strategic Mineral wealth

In the Southern Africa region the largest resources of strategic minerals are found in South Africa, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Southern Africa as a region is therefore of strategic importance as far as minerals are concerned (Hough 1981(a):19, Liebetrau 1983:93, Malan 1982:21-22). The situation is clearly visible when analysing a table which indicates South Africa's role in world mineral reserves as a percentage of Western and World reserves (vide Hough 1981(a):20).

The defence white paper in 1981 (RSA 1984(a):1) states that one of the major considerations of Soviet strategy with regard to Southern Africa is the control of the sub-continent's riches in strategic minerals and the denial of these to the West. Brezhnev, a former Russian ruler, is quoted as having stated in 1975: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends - the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa" (RSA 1984 (a):1). This is echoed by Igor Glagolef, one time advisor for the Central Committee of the Communist Party (King 1981:109).

2.2.3.2.3 Industrial and economic capability

The fact that the RSA has developed an industrial infrastructure and is a nett-exporter of food, especially in a regional context, is of strategic value. In 1981 the RSA traded with 47 countries, sometimes obviously in a clandestine fashion, its exports amounting to Rm 56 107 (Hough 1981(a):21-22). Its developed transport system, its communications network and experienced human resources, all add up to make the RSA a sought after region (Hough 1981(a):22, Liebetrau 1983:93, Malan 1982:21-22).

2.2.3.2.4 Critique

It is argued that the West would not tolerate interference with commercial shipping around the Cape, and that it would be difficult to create a choke point around the Cape. Alternatives could be found for Simonstown base, in fact, maritime bases are not so important in modern times. The strategic minerals argument seems to be the most enduring and a radically unstable government could create difficulties for the West regarding supplies (Hough 1981 (a):25-26). Foreign academics, too, acknowledge the strategic importance of both the Cape sea route and the supply of minerals, as these are largely interlinked (FARI 1980:3, Menaul 1983:1). Vale (1983:5) is of the opinion that it is of little relevance for the West to argue, as it so often does, that minerals may be stockpiled or substituted or that part of the African coastline is as good as another. The fact remains, the RSA's location is good for further empire building, something the USSR has realized. According to Hough (1981(a):26), it is ironical that the USSR has come to recognize the strategic importance of South Africa to the extent Pretoria would like the West to. Arnheim (1979:100,127,130) maintains that the West has evaluated the situation and, realizing the importance of Southern Africa, has projected who will eventually control the country and are playing the game "spot the winner" (Arnheim 1979:109).

2.2.3.3 Events in Africa

Events in Africa over the last few decades directly influence the current threat. The ousting of European colonial administrators such as the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique, and the subsequent establishment of Marxist regimes, have boosted the potential of the threat. A spirit of Black nationalism as expressed in Zimbabwe (FARI:1980:1) and in South Africa (vide Lodge 1981:8) cannot be isolated. The RSA is regarded as unfinished business in the process of ousting colonial imperialism. The grouping of the so-called Frontline States, declared to liberate the RSA, is proof of this (ISSUP 1983:1). These occurrences and trends beyond our borders, directly influence our security situation (RSA 1976:6). The development and extent of the threat is co-determined by the degree of willingness on the part of African states to become involved.

2.2.3.4 The RSA as military aggressor

A certain school of thought maintains that the RSA, through its security forces, activates and aggravates military activity and destabilizes the region through such acts as raids, sabotage, backing of dissident groups and manipulation of agreements as an article in The Economist suggests (The Star 1983:7). It suggests the ANC is overstated as a threat and has become an excuse for an increasingly militarized state (The Star 1983:6). This is echoed by an article in the Strategic Survey (IISS 1982:110) which suggests that South Africa's armed attacks into Angola and Mozambique, threats of such attacks against Zimbabwe and other states, and support of armed dissidents in the region, all suggest an increasingly belligerent and provocative military stance. The reason for such activity according to the report is more due to South Africa's internal politics than to an objective assessment of the threat (IISS 1982:110).

2.2.3.5 Internal reasons

The writer will now focus on reasons and factors which can be re-

garded as internal. These factors are interrelated and are merely compartmentalized for purposes of discussion.

2.2.3.5.1 Political factors

One school of thought maintains that peace will only come when the RSA changes its internal policy. The cause of the physical onslaught is said to be based on the premise that the majority of the country's inhabitants do not have the franchise. Menaul (1983:1, 16,17) maintains that it is not by accident that the Pretoria outrage occurred when the government was planning constitutional reform which excluded the Blacks. Odendaal (1985) argues that Black protest, since its inception, has centered around the exclusion of Blacks from the government and that only the degree of their demands and form of expression have changed with time. Programmes such as those instituted by the World Council of Churches in 1970 to combat racism, stating as their aim the freedom of the suppressed element in the country (Kapp 1982:25), rests on this argument.

A second school of thought argues that the political problems are merely a pretext. Because of the alignment of the liberation movements with communism, they will not be satisfied with majority rule or independence but total surrender so that a new order, moulded on the Marxist-Leninist model, can be created (Campbell 1983:413 Liebetrau 1983:91-92, Viljoen, C L 1984:5). It is argued that it would be folly to think that internal adjustments and concessions will cause terrorism to cease. There are those that go so far as to say that internal concessions will actually aggravate the onslaught (Arnheim 1979:70-91, Hurry 1983:16-17).

2.2.3.5.2 Economic factors

It is true that economic hardships such as inflation affect the poorer group more seriously. In South Africa this group is largely made up of Blacks. The average income for various ethnic groups in 1979 was as follows: Whites R7 627, Asians R3 280, Blacks R1 831 (Ackron 1982:15).

This progressive impoverishment is accentuated during periods of economic hardship, causing Black aspirations to be thwarted, creating frustration and anger and thus potential violence against the authorities (Ackron 1982:15). Yet the creation of a Black middle class appears to hold potential violence too. It is argued that with their new economic powers they will want equal accessibility to all social spheres. If this is not realized, this group may become frustrated and potentially violent (Ackron 1982:14-15). Arnheim (1979:90-91) argues that such a new black middle class identifies with their own race group and not a economic class group, hence its power as a stabilizer is a fallacy.

2.2.3.5.3 Social and cultural factors

As South Africa is a developing country, it will obviously be prone to disequilibrating factors in human attitude because values and ideas change faster than the institutional background. Those subject to such forces are often exploited by Marxists with their ideology of "haves" and "have nots", as well as a vision of a new dispensation (Ackron 1982:18) without true comprehension of the complexity of the problems and with a rose-tinted vision of the alternative.

Ackron (1982:16) states that revolutions are more prevalent amongst uneducated people. If this is so, the distribution of educational qualifications speaks volumes. The percentage of various population groups with diplomas and degrees is as follows: Whites 15,5%, Indians 4,0%, Coloureds 2,1% Blacks 0,1%. The percentage with no formal education is as follows: Whites 1,1% Indians 11,4% Coloureds 21,4%, Blacks 47,1% (Ackron 1982:16).

Arnheim (1979:85), maintains that it is actually education and the concomitant benefits that raises expectations and thus the potential for violence amongst such a group. Since the introduction of Bantu Education in 1955, black secondary school pupils and matriculants have increased by 350% and 900% respectively by 1975. To illustrate his point he highlights that civic violence enjoys the active participation of the school-going youth. The involvement of school-going youth is endorsed by Chief Butelezi (Radio 702 1985).

Rigid stratified societies are more susceptible to violence (Ackron 1982:16). The fact that South Africa can be easily divided into two groups, a top white group in which most of the countries expertise and income per capita is found and a predominantly non-white group lacking in education and subsequently a lower per capita income, makes the situation potentially flammable. Upper and lower categories within these two groups are likely to experience relative deprivation whether there is an objective cause is immaterial. It is the individuals' perception of the situation that is crucial (Ackron 1982:16,19, Arnheim 1979:76-77).

In South Africa, concern is often expressed for the frustration experienced by lower income groups on the level of the satisfaction of basic needs. Added to this, frustration may also be experienced in the need for esteem and dignity because of discriminatory and offensive laws. Such attitudes often persist after the particular statutory measures cease to exist (Ackron 1982:16,19).

The multi-ethnic, multi-national composition of the RSA is often quoted as a domestic factor which complicates the issue of peace and harmony (Van der Walt 1979(b):28). The statistical composition of the various race groups aggravates the question of franchise and so, too, the fear of a revolution. The rise of black consciousness, especially in the form of militant action is an internal factor to be noted.

The above stated social and cultural factors are obviously inter-related and thus as a total situation should cause or aggravate civil violence, or be exploited by external forces.

2.2.3.6 **Factors unique to SWA/Namibia**

The primary cause for the war in SWA centres around the independence of SWA/Namibia. This becomes apparent when one looks at its history. SWA became a German colony in 1884. In 1914 the British government asked General Botha to march against German SWA. He did this and the Germans surrendered in 1915. Following the Peace of

Versailles in 1920, General Botha and General Smuts were given a League of Nations mandate to administer SWA. When in 1946 the newly established UNO deemed to have taken over the functions of the League of Nations in regard to mandates, the South African government refused to recognize its claim and so the territory became a matter of international controversy. The International Court at the Hague having made a pro-South African decision in 1966, decided in 1971 that the RSA was in illegal occupation of the territory. The UN Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976 commended free elections under UN supervision and control to take place. Constitutional developments to grant SWA independence started on 1 September 1975 with the first sitting of the constitutional conference in the Turnhalle building involving delegates from the 11 ethnic groups. In 1976 elections were held in the territory but these were boycotted by SWAPO. In May 1979 the Assembly was transferred into the National Assembly with legislative power (Menaul 1983:5, Arnheim 1979:93-94). Because SWAPO did not participate, the elections have not been recognized. Independence and the withdrawal of South African security forces have not yet been achieved, due to lack of agreement on the interpretation of the terms of the resolution from various quarters. The controversy surrounding the territory still remains. The South African government is not prepared to withdraw until it is satisfied that a justly elected government representing all groups and enjoying international recognition has been elected; consequently the physical onslaught from SWAPO forces continues. There are certain authorities that hold forth the view that the RSA and not so much SWAPO, for political reasons, is holding out on a settlement (IISS 1982:117). That the outcome of the SWA/Namibian polemic holds serious geo-strategic implications for the RSA is undeniable and is illustrated by Campbell (1983:405-409).

2.2.3.7 Conclusion

Which of the factors can be termed causes and which are excuses draws us directly into the field of politics; and it is not within the scope of this study to make such a judgement. The writer has attempted to do justice to a fair scope of theories. Just like it is not the task of the jurist when studying criminal prevention of terrorism to make a pronouncement upon the conflict (Ackerman 1983:7), it is not the task of the pedagogician to make a pronouncement thereupon. The crux of the issue for this study is that the onslaught is a reality. As a force it is obvious that individuals' reactions to it will differ according to their perception of the causes and its form. As an aspect of reality the pedagogician must have knowledge and insight thereof to determine what implications it holds for education specifically in the light of the perception of this aspect of reality the individual or group holds.

2.2.4 Counter-reaction

In this section the writer will illustrate the nature and magnitude of the state's counter-reaction to the onslaught. This must then be viewed as part of the total military situation in the RSA of which the pedagogician must take account.

2.2.4.1 National strategy

The process of ensuring and maintaining a state's authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from a purely military, to an integrated national action. The successful resolution of a conflict situation is no longer based purely on the victory of one army over another. The resolution of a conflict currently demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields: military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, diplomatic, ideological and cultural (RSA 1977(a):4, Hough 1981(b):14). A national strategy can thus be seen as a total response to a total onslaught. The idea of a national strategy for the RSA was implemented as far back as 1972 when Act No 64, the

Security and State Security Council Act, was developed (Hough 1981(b):10). In August 1973, the Prime Minister declared that the RSA would in future be governed in accordance with a comprehensive national strategy.

The national strategy requires the co-operation of all state departments and institutions inside and outside the public sector in order to realise certain fixed aims (Hough 1981(b):6). The defence white paper of 1979 formulates the strategic planning at national, inter-departmental and departmental level (RSA 1979:2). During 1980, the so-called twelve point plan was announced in parliament. It was a plan aimed at the co-ordination and practical implementation of a national strategy. It spells out the RSA's determination to defend itself in every practical way (Hough 1981(b):6-7). At national level, the cabinet is assisted by the State Security Council and its executive agencies. At interdepartmental level, national security is co-ordinated by fifteen inter-departmental committees. At departmental level it is conducted by means of a departmental organization (RSA 1979:2-3).

This dissertation focuses on the military and therefore will not elaborate further on the aspect of national strategy except to indicate firstly that the military counter-action is but one arm of a national strategy against a multi-faceted onslaught and secondly, to point out that because it is a multi-faceted onslaught undermining man in all spheres, and because a total national strategy has been designed to counteract this on every terrain, the inhabitants of the RSA are all involved and implicated, in all spheres of life.

2.2.4.2 **The military counter-reaction**

Obviously a defence force as part of the state's household, will still play a vital role in countering the threat. The importance of force as a very definite and necessary aspect to counteract terrorism is indicated by C L Viljoen (1981:51). The state as a social structure is founded in the power of the sword and qualified by justice (Stone 1979:80,84). A police force and defence force

are those components of the state that execute power against internal and external forces respectively. A defence force is thus an executive body responsible for certain national security goals as directed by the state (RSA 1977(a):4). Military strategy, the general plan whereby military means are applied to bring about a militarily advantageous situation, is but one aspect of strategy, in this instance executed by a defence force (Nel 1981:19). That a strong defence force is essential for the continued survival and security of the RSA and its peoples is acknowledged (RSA 1984(a):22, King 1981:110-111). More than for mere survival, a defence structure is needed to ensure stability so that progress and development can continue in all spheres of life (Nel 1983:67, Viljoen, C L 1981:57). Political evolution and progress can only take place in a situation of stability. The SADF derives its existence from the Defence Act, 1957 as amended (Act 44 of 1957). The power of the defence force is determined, limited and defined in this act. The SADF is functionally organized in such a manner as to execute this task imposed by the act (RSA 1977(a):4, RSA 1984(b):1). As the defence force was established as an instrument of the state to defend the RSA, it is thus a national defence force consisting of members with different political convictions. The organization as such is to be completely neutral and impartial and therefore removed from the arena of party politics (RSA 1984(b):6). The defence force is open to volunteers from all ethnic groups. Currently, Indian, Coloured and Black units exist. According to Malan (1977:7), 20% of the members doing operational duty are Non-Whites.

2.2.4.3 Development of the SADF

It is not the intention of the writer to trace the development of the SADF since 1652. By way of reference, it is worthy to note that a defence ability and thus a defence organization, has been essential since VOC days and that citizens have been involved in defence since the earliest days (Malan 1977:5-6, Nel 1983:62-63). With reference to the military threat, the writer will schematically sketch the development of the SADF since World War II.

South Africa's defence force was part of a joint defence system with Britain and on this principle South Africa sided with allied forces during World War II. Towards the end of World War II South Africa was relatively speaking, militarily strong, but in a role of a subordinate partner in a conflagration (Spence & Thomas 1966:1). After World War II, while other nations began progressively to modernize their defence forces, the Union Defence Force was drastically reduced in 1946 as regards its numerical strength and its armaments consisted of used equipment from World War II (RSA 1977(a):11, SADF 1971:5).

Apart from isolated activities such as fulfilling obligations in the Middle-East, taking over the Simonstown Base in 1950, participating in the Berlin air-lift and the Korean war during 1950-1953, the Union Defence Force was not very active (SADF 1971:5). As a result of instability in world politics and in the light of escalating threats from outside, a military appreciation of the world situation was made in 1960 to determine what this would mean for South Africa's peaceful existence and safety. The General Staff of the SADF concluded that it would be of vital importance for South Africa to enhance its military capabilities and state of readiness, not for offensive reasons but for defensive action. The need became more acute with the formation of the Republic of South Africa as the country no longer had any firm defence ties. Against this background, planning was commenced with respect to the next few years in terms of manpower, armaments and organizational structuring, so that the defence force's combat readiness could be enhanced (RSA 1969:2, SADF 1971:6). The planning programmes meant renovation and expansion of a much antiquated defence force resulting in considerable expenditure. This is reflected in the defence budget if one looks at the years 1960 to 1965 (RSA 1977(a):11-14, SADF 1971:8).

1960/61	Rm 44
1961/62	Rm 61
1962/63	Rm 120
1963/64	Rm 230

The sixties, once initial modernization had been effected, were, militarily speaking, fairly peaceful. Following the initial increase in defence spending, the budget was restricted to a minimum for the next nine years at approximately Rm 300 (RSA 1977(a): 11). Politically, this period was active in preparing the scene in some way for the late 1970's. Anti-South African feelings intensified and new sovereign Black states insisted that the UN and Western states impose an arms embargo on South Africa. In May 1963, the Security Council made an appeal to all states to cease sales of arms and ammunition and military vehicles (SADF 1971:10). Development and self-sufficiency in this sphere became essential as illustrated by the origin of an Armaments Corporation and its development (vide Heitman 1985:22-32).

In 1970, a ten year plan was submitted to the government according to which the SADF would develop to meet the threats against the RSA (Conradie 1983:53). It became apparent in 1974 that the threat against the RSA was escalating and consequently the need arose to strive for full military preparedness at an increased rate (RSA 1977(a):11-14). The withdrawal of colonial powers in Angola and Mozambique and the continued pressure around the question of independence for SWA, have intensified the threat. Once again this is quite apparent if one scrutinizes the defence budget covering the period 1973 to 1978 and 1984:

1973/74	Rm 472
1975/76	Rm 1043
1977/78	Rm 1711
1984/85	Rm 3755 (RSA 1971:8, 1975:9, 1977(a):11-14, IISS 1984:82)

As was previously stated, it is not the intention of the writer to provide a comprehensive account of the expansion of the SADF in all facets. The writer will at a later juncture when looking at the implications of the military situation scrutinize defence amendment acts which clearly illustrate the growth of the SADF through the national service system (vide 3.6, 3.7).

2.2.4.4 SADF : current composition and organization

2.2.4.4.1 The SADF's task

The task of the SADF is to analyse the nature and extent of the military threat against the RSA and to formulate plans and take steps to ensure that the government will have the freedom of action needed to develop its internal and foreign policy. In accordance with the overall national aims, the state's purely military objectives can be formulated as follows according to the defence white paper of 1977:

- The development of a national defence structure necessary to prevent and/or counter any threat;
- to ensure the defence and security of the RSA and its body politic against external aggression or internal revolution (RSA 1977(a):9).

Although the responsibility for combating internal and especially urban unrest, rests primarily with the SAP, the SADF must at all times be ready on a country-wide basis to quickly mobilize trained forces to render assistance to the SAP (RSA 1977(a):21). The composition of the SADF has thus been brought into closer line with its two main functions:

- maintaining a credible and balanced force;
- countering all forms of insurgency (RSA 1975:10).

2.2.4.4.2 SADF : organizational framework

In order to execute its identified task, the SADF is currently divided into four arms of service: the SA Army, the SA Air Force, SA Navy and SA Medical Services. Further services are rendered by two supporting components : Quartermaster General and Chaplain General. There are five staff divisions to help Chief of the SADF execute his function : Personnel, Intelligence, Operations,

Logistics and Finance Service (RSA 1984(b):1). The following organogram (vide page 42) will diagrammatically illustrate the overall structure and organization of the SADF (Heitman 1985:26, SADF 1982:4, Van der Merwe 1985:17). The writer will, with reference to the order in the organogram, briefly define the aim of each component to illustrate how the SADF meets its assigned task.

a. Chief of staff divisions


The Chief of Staff Personnel Division ensures that the SADF has manpower at its disposal, prepared and ready for battle. The Chief of Staff Intelligence Division determines the nature and extent and timescale of the military threat against the RSA. The Chief of Staff Logistic Division places the logistic preparedness on the level required by the Operations Division. (Logistics is the science of provision and maintenance of material facilities and services and the movement of material and personnel in support of actions by military forces (RSA 1984(b):25)). The Chief of Finance Division controls the overall financial management of the SADF in terms of budgeting, accounting and remuneration matters. The Chief of Staff Operation Division ensures the effective utilization of the operational potential of the SADF (RSA 1984(b):7,21-22, 26-27, 29).

b. Arms of service

i. SA Army

The aim of this arm of service is to ensure the national safety of the RSA and SWA within army context. Its functions are : to develop a credible deterrent capable of discouraging landward conventional onslaught and insurgency; to provide landward defence of the RSA; to engage in conventional battle in co-operation with the other arms of service and to prevent or suppress internal unrest in support of the SAP. To execute its task, it has at army

ORGANOGRAM OF S.A. DEFENCE FORCE



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HQ level, sub-divisions in personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics and finance which function according to similar lines as their respective chief of staff divisions, only in army context. As the army is responsible for a variety of tasks, each demanding specialization in personnel, training and equipment, the army consists of functional corps, divided into fighting corps and supporting corps. The fighting corps are: the Field-artillery Corps; Anti-aircraft Corps; Infantry Corps; Armoured Corps; Intelligence Corps and Corps of Engineers. The supporting corps consist of: the Corps of Signals; Technical Service Corps; Ordnance Service Corps; Personnel Service Corps; Financial Service Corps; SA Corps of Military Police and the Catering Corps. (RSA 1984(b): 36-39).

The army executes its task on a functional and regional system of decentralization. The first division is between units fulfilling a conventional task and those fulfilling a counter-insurgency task. The conventional forces are then regionally divided into divisions, brigades and units. The counter-insurgency forces are divided into ten geographically located commands and thereafter into units.

ii. **SA Air Force**

The aim of the SAAF is to provide an air capability for obtaining the security objectives of the RSA. Its functions are: to secure a favourable air situation; to patrol the coastline in co-operation with the navy; to provide air support to the SAP and to participate in search and rescue operations.

It too has five staff divisions at SAAF HQ level and is further sub-structured by means of functional and regional commands (RSA 1984(b):40).

iii. SA Navy

The aim of the navy is to defend the RSA and SWA against maritime threats and attacks against the RSA and SWA by means of combined air and sea combat elements; to support landward operations; to assist in safeguarding the maritime assets of the RSA and SWA. It executes its function by means of five staff divisions and functional and regional commands (RSA 1984(b):42-43).

iv. SA Medical Services

The aim of this service is to provide medical and related services and support to the SADF. It executes its function with the aid of five staff divisions. It is structured into seven medical commands and one functional training command (RSA 1984(b):46). Apart from three military hospitals and sick-bays at all units, it supplies mobile specialist services in the field (RSA 1984(a):9).

c. Support services**i. Quartermaster General**

The aim of this support service is to provide the SADF with general logistic services. It executes its function by being divided into a number of directorates with specialist tasks (RSA 1984(b):50).

ii. Chaplains Service

The aim of this service is to ensure the effective ministering of the Word of God to all members of the SADF and their dependents. To meet the pastoral needs this service is sub-divided into four functional directorates. Chaplains are posted to all units (RSA 1984(b):51-52).

2.2.4.5 The SADF's military activities

2.2.4.5.1 Counter insurgency

The writer will briefly turn his attention to the military/security activities of the SADF. If revolutionary warfare utilizes unique techniques, it will have to be counteracted in a unique manner. This type of activity is usually termed counter-insurgency (Coetzee 1984:32). According to Geldenhuys (1984:42-44), the SADF can and does, use four types of operations to a varied degree.

The first type of activity is an offensive action. This is when the SADF seeks out the guerillas and their bases and destroys both, thus giving further activities a serious set-back. These cross-border actions can be pre-emptive, retaliatory or hot-pursuits. Operation Smokeshell, Protea, Reindeer, Sceptic, Hot-Pursuit and Mopping Up are examples of such activity (Conradie 1983:54, Geldenhuys 1984:42). These operations are highly cost- and life-effective and thus, from a purely military point of view, the most effective (Geldenhuys 1984:42).

A second possibility is to seal off borders and entrance routes. Given the distances involved (SWA/Angola border is 1850 km) and the terrain, any "fence" type structure will have to be proved practicable and cost effective. At Ruacana hydro-electric power station, there is an electrified fence of 40 km (Geldenhuys 1984:43, Menaul 1983:7).

The third activity is commonly used. This is when the security forces seek out and destroy the guerillas once they have infiltrated the country. In a rural context, it requires a lot of foot-slogging and a good intelligence network (Geldenhuys 1984:43). In urban areas it is further complicated in that the insurgents

intermingle and thus disappear in the masses. In rural context the SADF is very effective. Menaul (1983:14) reports that with the large infiltration in February 1983, 250 terrorists were accounted for by the end of March while the SADF lost 27 men during that operation.

A fourth possibility is a totally defensive method. This is achieved when the SADF protects key points, administrative points and important individuals. This is a necessary type of operation but not very effective for winning a war situation (Geldenhuys 1984:45).

A last possibility, and a widely used one, is the civil action movement. The so-called "hearts and mind" programme forms an integral part of any counter-insurgency programme. The aim of civil action, which entails medical, educational, agricultural and social assistance, is to improve the standard of living of the local population (Viljoen, C L 1984:5). This type of activity can only weaken the chances of the insurgents gaining political control over the indigenous people and can enhance the image of the SADF in their minds.

2.2.4.5.2 Conventional operations

The SADF has at present, a number of battle-ready conventional formations which include mechanized units as well as paratroop forces. Planning is structured in such a manner that a force in training is available at all times on short notice (RSA 1984(a):5). The RSA, as a result of conventional build-up in hostile neighbouring states, must be prepared to meet a conventional onslaught. Operation Thunder Chariot, the first divisional exercise since World War II, involved 11,000 men and 4 500 machines. It was held at Lohatla in August-September 1984 and it bore testimony to the SADF's preparedness in this sphere (De Smidt & John 1984:34-43).

2.2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter the writer attempted to indicate that war appears to be an inescapable feature of human life. By schematically illustrating the development and categorization of war the writer came to the conclusion that modern war is total war. It involves every structure of society and so by definition affects most human beings.

This was followed by an attempt to determine the nature and magnitude of the current military onslaught and counter-reaction in South Africa. The writer came to the conclusion that the military onslaught is an undeniable reality in South Africa and is a facet which is very likely to intensify in the future and continue to be a feature for quite some time.

Knowledge of this feature of reality had to be obtained to put those individuals and organizations who contemplate the task and structure of the education system in a better position to bring about the actualization of the most normative education system possible.

In the following chapter the writer will attempt to indicate the general spheres of influence of the military onslaught and counter-reaction which will hold implications for South African inhabitants and so by definition for the education system.

CHAPTER 3**THE GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY ONSLAUGHT AND COUNTER-REACTION****3.1 INTRODUCTION**

In this section the writer will specifically try and illustrate the general civilian involvement through the national service system. It is the latter facet of life and the implications thereof that the pedagogician must specifically be aware of and accommodate.

3.2 MANPOWER COMPOSITION OF THE SADF

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The SADF is made up of three types of groups. Firstly, the full-time force consists of: permanent force members - they form the core of the command and training group as well as civilians and in total constitute 7,4%. Secondly, a semi-full-time force consisting of the national servicemen doing their initial training, they constitute 13%. Thirdly, the part-time forces which are made up of national servicemen who have completed their initial training and have further commitments and a volunteer group. These are known as citizen force and commando members, and these together constitute 79,3% (IISS 1984:82).

3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE SYSTEM

The nature and magnitude of the threat and the manpower resources of the country have made it necessary for the state to utilize a conscription system whereby the ordinary citizens become involved in the defence of the country (RSA 1977(a):10, Nel 1983:1). By tracing the expansion of the system of conscription, the writer will not only illustrate the development of the SADF but more importantly, will highlight the role that the citizen plays as a result of the military onslaught.

The Defence Force Act, 1957 (Act 44 of 1957) (RSA 1957) regulates, inter alia, the inhabitants' service. The original act made provision for training in the CF for 3 months per year to a maximum of 9 months over a period of 4 years. Continuous training amounted to 26 days over a period of 4 years. Defence Amendment Act, 1961 (Act 12 of 1961) (RSA 1961(a)) provided for the employment by the Minister of Defence of members of the CF and the commandos for service in the defence of the RSA or suppression of internal disturbances during the period of training.

The Further Defence Amendment Act, 1961 (Act 42 of 1961) (RSA 1961 (b)) increased the period of training to 9 months in the first year, plus 3 weeks in every subsequent year.

The Defence Amendment Act, 1963 (Act 77 of 1963) (RSA 1963) made provision for the employment of CF and commando troops in support of the SAP.

Defence Amendment Act, 1964 (Act 81 of 1964) (RSA 1964) empowered the Exemption Board to extend exemption from training to citizens as well as to allocate CF members to the commandos.

Although the Defence Act of 1957 provided for compulsory service in the commandos, the latter was purely a voluntary organization. From 1960 to 1967 citizen force supplementation was effected by the so-called ballot system applicable to all young men who could be called up. Through this system, only a certain number of men were annually called up for service. In line with the extension to nine months in 1962, the number called up was substantially increased. The statistics for 1962 to 1967 were as follows:

1962	11 759
1963	14 500
1964	19 513
1965	19 784
1966	23 164
1967	22 583 (SADF 1971:6,15).

The amendments to the Defence Act mentioned up to this point had no real effect on the existing system. Gradually it became apparent that the existing system had to be overhauled and revised to suit changing circumstances. Defence Amendment Act, 1967 (Act 85 of 1967) (RSA 1967) had far-reaching consequences and is often referred to as marking the beginning of the national service system. The major changes brought about were:

- the old ballot system fell away and was superseded by annual selection lists with respect to all national servicemen (NSM) for the subsequent year;
- selection boards were created in order to assist the Registration Officer with allocation for services in the different branches of the SADF;
- all NSM were compelled to render services either in the CF or commandos;
- service in the CF was increased from 4 to 10 years, and continuous training extended from a maximum of 9 months to a maximum of 12 months plus three periods of 26 days and five of 12 days with a maximum of 16 months altogether;
- compulsory service in the commandos was activated and the period of service lengthened from 4 to 16 years. Service in the first year was increased to a maximum of 60 days plus 19 days in each subsequent year;
- non-citizens under a certain age, who had been domiciled in the country for five years and had given notice of their intention to take out citizenship, were liable for service;
- provision was made for taking into consideration the aptitude, qualifications, interests and needs of the individual NSM together with the requirements of the SADF by means of a selection system;
- recognition was given to the educational and career preparation of the young in the form of deferment;
- the age limit was increased from 60 to 65.

Defence Amendment Act, 1970 (Act 28 of 1970) (RSA 1970) increased the period of service of members of the commandos in the first year to 90 days with a maximum of 345 days over a period of 16 years. The Registration Officer was empowered to cancel allocations and reallocate NSM either to the CF or commandos.

Defence Amendment Act, 1974 (Act No 8 of 1974) (RSA 1974) read that services shall be completed in 6 periods : 12 months during the first period and 19 days during each subsequent period. Provision was made for individuals to bind themselves to extra services of not less than 18 months and not more than 24 months during the initial service period. Such an agreement involved certain financial and concessionary rewards. Commando service was to extend over a period of 10 years from 1 January of the first service period.

Due to lack of cost-effectiveness of NSM training, especially in the case of leader groups, the training undergone in the first year was not fully utilized and so as not to draw older experienced men out of the economy, certain alterations had to be made in the system of manpower. The Defence Amendment Act, 1977 (Act 68 of 1977) (RSA 1977(b)) extended the initial training period to 24 months. Subsequent periods of service would not exceed 30 days and in aggregate would not exceed 240 days.

Due to higher defence commitments and because the present reserves could only be called up by a very cumbersome procedure and to ensure a more even spread of commitments, various changes were instituted. The Defence Amendment Act, 1982 (Act 103 of 1982) (RSA 1982) brought about the following changes:

- the period of service in the CF was increased from 10 to 14 years with effect 1 Jan 1983;
- initial training remains two years and post-initial training is to be performed in 6 cycles of 2 years. No tour of service is to be longer than 90 days and the total service per cycle will not exceed 120 days;

- service may be performed continuously or non-continuously, with day for day credit being granted;
- all persons who are called up for initial service will be allocated to the CF. In future, persons will no longer be allocated to the commando before or during initial service;
- only certain categories of individuals will do post-initial service in the commandos viz. volunteers, area-bound members, national reserve members and those coming off the active citizen force reserve;
- Commando 10 year compulsory service was abolished and replaced by an age barrier of 55 years;
- individuals who will suffer undue hardship due to CF training, such as one-man businesspeople, certain professions or people with serious personal or situational problems, can be classified area-bound by the Exemption Board;
- area-bound members do service of 50 days per year up to 1000 days, thereafter 12 days per year. The RSA has been divided into regional command areas for this purpose;
- the age limit for registration was increased from 25 to 55 years. This will especially affect immigrants, who in the past waited until they were 25 before becoming citizens. Such persons, on becoming citizens, irrespective of the age at which this takes place, may now be considered for initial national service and additional service after that;
- all other South African males under the age of 55 who have never served are now compelled to register and will form the national reserve. Persons allocated to the national reserve are compelled to do 30 days training initially, followed by 12 days per year till age 55. The activation, registration and training will take place according to military priority. These men will register after notice to this effect has been published

in the Government Gazette. The acquired strength is allocated to the commando. Areas such as Vryheid, Piet Retief, Carolina and Ermelo have already been affected.


Citizen Amendment Act, 1984 (Act No 43 of 1984) (RSA 1984(c)) activates immigrants automatically for citizenship under certain categories, thus automatically making them liable for national service. Those refusing can forfeit work and residence visas.

3.4 Present National Service System

With reference to three organograms (vide page 54,55,56) the writer will briefly explain the present national service career (SADF 1982 11,12,14). A registering officer registers all males at age 16 for national service. This task is performed in co-operation with high schools throughout the country. In their 17th year, prospective NSM receive questionnaires in which they are required to furnish personal details, capabilities and preferences so that they may be allotted to a specific arm of service or corps in the SA Army. The individual is then allocated to a unit for his training. At present, the needs of the SADF are such that allocation is proportionally done as follows:

- 84% to the Army (50% of this group ie. 42% of total to Infantry);
- 9% to the Air Force;
- 5% to the Medical Services;
- 3% to the Navy (Van der Merwe 1985:31).


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PART-TIME FORCES




NATIONAL SERVICE CAREER

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THE SUPPLY SOURCES FOR COMMANDOS ARE



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