

COMMUNITY CONFLICT MONITORING SERVICE

An IDASA project.

Report prepared on 1 November 1990

This report has been prepared for general dissemination

SUBJECT: March by Inkatha members from the Kwa Mashu hostels to Besters on Sunday 28 October 1990

This report attempts to outline the events as witnessed by CCMS monitors and a lawyer on 28 October 1990. The events, which took place in Inanda, were important in that on the one hand they displayed they had the possibility of erupting into violence on the same scale of that witnessed in the Vaal and not seen in Inanda since 1985, and on the other hand they demonstrated that effective action by the security forces and monitors on the scene can defuse the immediate tension in any area.

On Friday 26 October I received a report from three residents of Bambayi that their were rumours of a planned Inkatha march to take place on Sunday 28 November. According to them the march was to start at the Phoenix settlement in the centre of Bambayi. From the reports I received as well as my own knowledge of the area I knew that such a march could cause conflict in the area as there is no real Inkatha support in the area and the area is known for its Xhosa population. The residents who came to me requested that I seek to stop the march as they were sure that the march did not have the permission of the Trust.

I referred the matter to the trustees of the Phoenix Trust who consulted with the Legal Resource Centre.

After seeing the residents of Bambayi I was contacted by the Joint Working Committee of the ANC

and Cosatu who had a resident of Besters (Ukuthuleni) in their offices. When I met him he talked about rumours of an " Inkatha forced recruitment drive in Besters" to take place on Sunday 28. He said that he had heard about the decision to do this through people at the Kwa Mashu hostel. He asked that I try to arrange police and SADF protection as he felt that such action would result in a armed conflict between the hostel dwellers and the residents of Besters. He also said that there was very little if any support for Inkatha in Besters itself. I made an arrangement to see him on Sunday.

Howard Varney informed me at about 3pm that he had spoken a Captain Smith who had told him that there was a prayer service to be held at "Ukuthuleni School". Mr. Varney also told me that the captain had assured him that there would be a police presence at the march to the venue at during the meeting itself. He had also taken note of the fears of residents of Bambayi and Besters (Ukuthuleni).

On Sunday 28 October myself, Howard Varney went to Kwa Mashu to monitor the Inkatha march and meeting, which we thought would take place at a school near by the hostel, not at Besters which is at least 2.5 kilometres from the hostel. On arrival at the hostels near the administration office we noticed two groups of men armed with sticks, spears and pangas. We then left the area to meet with the person from Besters.

When we met him we gave him the assurance that the police would be at the hostels and that we did not think that Inkatha had permission to march from the hostel to Besters and that the police would stop them. The resident was happy with this explanation. We then proceeded back along the M25 towards the Hostels. As I passed the Phoenix Industrial "Coke

Cola" turn off I noticed about 1000 people marching towards Besters on the new road which runs parallel to M25. There were no police or SADF in sight.

We continued towards the hostel until we met the march on Mandela Road. I asked several of the marcher where they were going. Some said they were going to Besters, some said to Mshayazafe. Howard Varney took several photographs and we decided to rush to the Riot unit based at Newtown B to ask for assistance.

On the way to Newtown near the top of Besters on Ntuzuma road we met a group of about 80 Inkatha marchers being escorted by the SAP and SADF towards the bottom. I informed the SAP and SADF about the groups we had seen on the M25 and asked that he radio for security forces to be sent to monitor that group. I was told that they would this.

Besides the marchers there were groups of angry resident who had armed themselves with bricks, pangas, spear and sticks. They were demanding that the marchers not be allowed into the area. One person I spoke to pleaded with me to get them removed as they had come there just "to cause trouble".

At one point I had to step in between a soldier and a resident who were shouting at each other. The soldier was about to hit him with the butt of his rifle when convinced both of them to walk away from me in opposite directions. It is concerning that all the other security forces did nothing and it was me who had to tell the soldier to walk away.

We then followed the procession of marchers, SAP, SADF and KZP which had arrived on the scene down the hill towards the crossroads.

At the intersection we drove past the marchers and went to see where the group from the hostel were. At this point they were about 500 meters from the bridge which spans Ntuzuma road.

At this point, at about 11.15, several hundred residents of Besters had gathered on the top of the steep slope which overlooks the end of the new road just past the bridge. The Inkatha march, by this point numbering about 5 000, stopped beneath the slope. When the march came to a halt it was clear that there was confusion about where exactly they were supposed to be going. As was to be expected there was a lot of tension and the local residents and marchers began to taunt each other. Howard Varney and myself quickly explained the situation to a SADF lieutenant and asked that he place men between the two groups.

Leaving Howard Varney to speak to the police I placed myself between the two groups and tried to clam the situation, while we waited for police reinforcements.

After discussions between the police, a Inkatha Leader (a Mr. Bengu), and Howard Varney it was agreed that the Marchers would gather on a field on the Kwa Mashu side of Besters. This is after it was made clear that the meeting could not take place between the shacks in Ward 2 Ukuthuleni where the permission slip stipulated. It is however very disturbing that permission can be granted for a march and meeting to take place where the organisers do not have a venue or public address system that is adequate for the task. This is besides the fact that the marchers were allowed to carry a wide array of dangerous weapons into an area where they do not live.

While the police ushered the Inkatha march to the meeting point the residents of Besters, numbering about 1 500, had gathered on Ntuzuma road about 750 metres away from the Inkatha meeting.

I noticed that at least a quarter of the Marchers left to go back to the hostel within the first 15 minutes of gathering on the field. There did not seem to be much interest in the meeting.

The meeting did not start properly because Inkatha refused to begin the meeting as long as the Besters residents were on the road. The police therefore decided that the residents should move out of the road. After the police made it clear that they would teargas the group if they did not move I agreed to talk to the group. Using a police loudhailer we spoke to the residents. It was clear that they would not move from the road as they were worried that the hostel dwellers might attack the near by shacks if they went away.

After reporting this back to Captain Hunter he agreed to let me go to Durban to fetch a ANC leadership person to come speak to the group. I left the scene at 12:40 with a Riot Unit constable. He gave me until 1:30 to return.

I returned at 1:20 with a youth leader from the area. As we came into Phoenix we noticed that most of the Inkatha members were walking back towards the hostel. I drove around the hostel and noticed that one of the cars which had accompanied the Inkatha march had been stopped by the SADF. It seems that they had found a automatic weapon in the possession of the owner. I then left the area. I have subsequently found out that a Mr. Hlela a prominent Inkatha leader in the area has been charged with possession of a AK47.

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN

P.O. Box 537
Kengray 2100

Phone: 836-8423
Fax: 834-3189

LONGER STATEMENT FOR ENDORSEMENT BY ORGANISATIONS AND PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS.

On 1 December, a group of South African Conscientious Objectors (COs) who have been living in exile will be returning to South Africa.

Over 23000 white males, many of whom are highly skilled graduates, have left South Africa since 1980. Many of them left because they were not prepared to serve in the SADF, a structure which they believed upheld apartheid, and no other legal alternatives were available to them.

The recent positive political developments in South Africa have convinced many exiles to return and use their skills and talents in building a non racial democracy in South Africa.

Unfortunately, upon their return these COs will still face prosecution for their ongoing refusal to serve in the SADF, a structure which they still believe upholds apartheid.

The return of this "advance party" of exiled COs on 1 December serves as a challenge to the government to prove its commitment to a new South Africa and facilitate a reversal of the brain drain, by ending the system of military conscription.

We commend the courage of these COs and call on the government to:

1. Refrain from prosecuting the returning objectors.
2. End all objector trials.
3. End the system of apartheid conscription and in the interim provide a system of non-punative alternative national service.

SHORTER VERSION FOR THE PRESS ADVERT

On 1 December 1990 the first group of exiled South African Conscientious Objectors will be returning to South Africa.

They face the possibility of jail sentences for their ongoing refusal to serve in the SADF.

We commend the courage of these Conscientious Objectors and call on the government to:

1. Refrain from prosecuting the returning objectors.
2. End all objector trials.
3. End the system of apartheid conscription and in the interim establish a system of non-punative alternative national service.



End Conscription Campaign

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN

P.O. Box 837
Kengray 2100

Phone: 836-8423
Fax: 834-3189

PRESS STATEMENT FOR ENDORSEMENT BY ORGANISATIONS FOR PRESS CONFERENCE 1/12/90.

On 1 December, a group of South African Conscientious Objectors (COs) who have been living in exile will be returning to South Africa.

Over 23000 white males, many of whom are highly skilled graduates, have left South Africa since 1980. Many of them left because they were not prepared to serve in the SADF, a structure which they believed upheld apartheid, and no other legal alternatives were available to them.

The recent positive political developments in South Africa have convinced many exiles to return and use their skills and talents in building a non racial democracy in South Africa.

Unfortunately, upon their return these COs will still face prosecution for their ongoing refusal to serve in the SADF, a structure which they still believe upholds apartheid.

The return of this "advance party" of exiled COs on 1 December serves as a challenge to the government to prove its commitment to a new South Africa and facilitate a reversal of the brain drain, by ending the system of military conscription.

We commend the courage of these COs and call on the government to:

1. Refrain from prosecuting the returning objectors.
2. End all objector trials.
3. End the system of apartheid conscription and in the interim provide a system of non-punative alternative national service.


SHORTER VERSION OF STATEMENT FOR ENDORSEMENT BY ORGANISATIONS FOR PRESS ADVERT

On 1 December 1990 the first group of exiled South African Conscientious Objectors will be returning to South Africa.

They face the possibility of jail sentences for their ongoing refusal to serve in the SADF.

We commend the courage of these Conscientious Objectors and call on the government to:

1. Refrain from prosecuting the returning objectors.
2. End all objector trials.
3. End the system of apartheid conscription and in the interim establish a system of non-punative alternative national service.



End Conscription Campaign

NOV 09 '90 09:45 NCAR 011 8366931
P.O. 04 1092 203 130

545

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN

P.O. Box 537
Kengray 2100

Phone: 836-8423
Fax: 834-3180

Dear

6/11/90

On 1st December a group of conscientious objectors (COs) who left South Africa because of their refusal to serve in the SADF will be coming home.

Since 1975, when the SADF invaded Angola, thousands of white male South Africans have gone into exile because of their moral, religious or political objections to being conscripted into apartheid's army.

After a meeting in London in March this year, a group of COs decided that the time is now right to return home and to join thousands of other exiles in contributing to the building of a democratic South Africa.

There is, however, a problem. These returning COs will face prosecution on their return to South Africa as they will continue in their stand of refusing to serve in the SADF. They see the SADF as an army which still upholds apartheid and helps to maintain minority rule. They also see the SADF as an element of the state which has consistently shown itself to be out of step with the current reform initiatives of the National Party.


In this present climate, can the National Party justify jailing loyal South Africans who want to return and contribute their skills to the building of a future South Africa, or will the government make a contribution to the reversal of the "brain drain" by recognising the right of conscientious objection and take seriously the call to end military service and develop a non racial professional defence force.

The End Conscription Campaign (ECC) and the Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR) have launched a joint campaign to raise public awareness on the status of exiled COs.

Part of this campaign is the collection of endorsements from a broad range of organisations for a national press advert and a national press statement to be released at a press conference at Jan Smuts airport on 1/12/90, the date of the exile's return.

It would be greatly appreciated if you could discuss the possibility of endorsing the attached statement within your organisation and contact ECC's national office if you wish to give your public support to this campaign.

Yours,



Roddy Payne, ECC National Organiser.

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN

P.O. Box 537
Kengray 2100

Phone: 836-8423
Fax: 834-3189

LONGER STATEMENT FOR ENDORSEMENT BY ORGANISATIONS AND PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS.

On 1 December, a group of South African Conscientious Objectors (COs) who have been living in exile will be returning to South Africa.

Over 23000 white males, many of whom are highly skilled graduates, have left South Africa since 1980. Many of them left because they were not prepared to serve in the SADF, a structure which they believed upheld apartheid, and no other legal alternatives were available to them.

The recent positive political developments in South Africa have convinced many exiles to return and use their skills and talents in building a non racial democracy in South Africa.

Unfortunately, upon their return these COs will still face prosecution for their ongoing refusal to serve in the SADF, a structure which they still believe upholds apartheid.

The return of this "advance party" of exiled COs on 1 December serves as a challenge to the government to prove its commitment to a new South Africa and facilitate a reversal of the brain drain, by ending the system of military conscription.

We commend the courage of these COs and call on the government to:

1. Refrain from prosecuting the returning objectors.
2. End all objector trials.
3. End the system of apartheid conscription and in the interim provide a system of non-punative alternative national service.

SHORTER VERSION FOR THE PRESS ADVERT

On 1 December 1990 the first group of exiled South African Conscientious Objectors will be returning to South Africa.

They face the possibility of jail sentences for their ongoing refusal to serve in the SADF.

We commend the courage of these Conscientious Objectors and call on the government to:

1. Refrain from prosecuting the returning objectors.
2. End all objector trials.
3. End the system of apartheid conscription and in the interim establish a system of non-punative alternative national service.



End Conscription Campaign

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN

P.O. Box 537
Kengray 2100

Phone: 836-8423
Fax: 834-3189

PRESS STATEMENT FOR ENDORSEMENT BY ORGANISATIONS FOR PRESS CONFERENCE 1/12/90.

On 1 December, a group of South African Conscientious Objectors (COs) who have been living in exile will be returning to South Africa.

Over 23000 white males, many of whom are highly skilled graduates, have left South Africa since 1980. Many of them left because they were not prepared to serve in the SADF, a structure which they believed upheld apartheid, and no other legal alternatives were available to them.

The recent positive political developments in South Africa have convinced many exiles to return and use their skills and talents in building a non racial democracy in South Africa.

Unfortunately, upon their return these COs will still face prosecution for their ongoing refusal to serve in the SADF, a structure which they still believe upholds apartheid.

The return of this "advance party" of exiled COs on 1 December serves as a challenge to the government to prove its commitment to a new South Africa and facilitate a reversal of the brain drain, by ending the system of military conscription.

We commend the courage of these COs and call on the government to:

1. Refrain from prosecuting the returning objectors.
2. End all objector trials.
3. End the system of apartheid conscription and in the interim provide a system of non-punative alternative national service.


SHORTER VERSION OF STATEMENT FOR ENDORSEMENT BY ORGANISATIONS FOR PRESS ADVERT

On 1 December 1990 the first group of exiled South African Conscientious Objectors will be returning to South Africa.

They face the possibility of jail sentences for their ongoing refusal to serve in the SADF.

We commend the courage of these Conscientious Objectors and call on the government to:

1. Refrain from prosecuting the returning objectors.
2. End all objector trials.
3. End the system of apartheid conscription and in the interim establish a system of non-punative alternative national service.



End Conscription Campaign

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN

P.O. Box 597
Kengray 2100

Phone: 836-8423
Fax: 834-3189

Dear

6/11/90

On 1st December a group of conscientious objectors (COs) who left South Africa because of their refusal to serve in the SADF will be coming home.

Since 1975, when the SADF invaded Angola, thousands of white male South Africans have gone into exile because of their moral, religious or political objections to being conscripted into apartheid's army.

After a meeting in London in March this year, a group of COs decided that the time is now right to return home and to join thousands of other exiles in contributing to the building of a democratic South Africa.

There is, however, a problem. These returning COs will face prosecution on their return to South Africa as they will continue in their stand of refusing to serve in the SADF. They see the SADF as an army which still upholds apartheid and helps to maintain minority rule. They also see the SADF as an element of the state which has consistently shown itself to be out of step with the current reform initiatives of the National Party.


In this present climate, can the National Party justify jailing loyal South Africans who want to return and contribute their skills to the building of a future South Africa, or will the government make a contribution to the reversal of the "brain drain" by recognising the right of conscientious objection and take seriously the call to end military service and develop a non racial professional defence force.

The End Conscription Campaign (ECC) and the Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR) have launched a joint campaign to raise public awareness on the status of exiled COs.

Part of this campaign is the collection of endorsements from a broad range of organisations for a national press advert and a national press statement to be released at a press conference at Jan Smuts airport on 1/12/90, the date of the exile's return.

It would be greatly appreciated if you could discuss the possibility of endorsing the attached statement within your organisation and contact ECC's national office if you wish to give your public support to this campaign.

Yours,



Roddy Payne, ECC National Organiser.

End Conscription Campaign

National Office

P.O. Box 537
2100 Kengray

Tel (011) 836-8423
Fax (011) 834-3189

Durban Office

56 Ecimencal Centre
20 St Andrew's St.
4001 Durban

Tel (031) 304-5883
Fax (031) 301-6611

OCTOBER 1991

ECC SPECIAL REPORT

Since there has been a recent spate of allegations of SADF misconduct in the Natal region, it was decided that the incidents warranted a focus of attention. In this region, the ECC has received 36 reports (in the last month alone) of alleged assault, including the administering of electric shocks to suspects, asphyxiation by means of rubber tubing, sjambokking, punching and kicking used as interrogation methods, unlawful detentions, searches and theft. Many victims have been admitted to hospitals with various injuries, or missed work as a result.

When one combines the negative aspects of SADF conduct with recent revelations and allegations in the media about covert military actions by special units and divisions in the SADF such as the now "officially dibanded" CCB, and other Special Forces or "reconnaissance" regiments, one is left with a rather gloomy picture of the role of the SADF in the present South Africa. This report intends to outline the overt and covert role of the Defence Force, specifically in the context of the civil violence, both regionally (ie. in terms of Natal), and nationally (especially the Reef). Hopefully this report will help to bring the SADF's role under public scrutiny, which would do no harm regardless.

While many regiments and individual SADF personnel have succeeded in earning communities' respect, and have often intervened constructively in conflict between warring factions, alarming incidents such as those mentioned above, continue to occur at a rate that is hardly "sporadic," as claimed by former Defence Minister Malan. For the benefit of the new minister, Mr Roelf Meyer, the ECC wishes to express its approval of his sentiments and the news of a binding code of conduct for SADF members, but wish to point out that with every day that goes by, more and more civilians are suffering the effects of SADF misconduct, and those responsible, including in at least two cases, army officers bearing the rank of captain, remain unapprehended. We therefore urge the authorities working on the



ECC
End Conscription Campaign

document to finalise the draft as soon as possible.

There are many examples of responsible and constructive intervention on the part of the Defence Force, especially in the Midlands (for which Group 9 HQ must be commended). For example, a section of Cape Corps soldiers were almost certainly responsible for averting an attack by hostel-dwellers in Bruntville, near Mooli River on Friday the 11th of October of this year. These men remained with community members in the face of the attack, while police ordered all their vehicles and personnel out of the area on the basis that AK47 rifles were being used.

But despite many regiments and companies acting impartially and professionally in situations of conflict between fighting rivals, we continue to receive reports of bias on the part of some SADF personnel. Equally disturbing is the fact that virtually all cases of Defence Force misconduct appear to be directed at one particular political group. In some south coast areas of Natal for example, we have received reports of SADF members raiding ANC meetings and confiscating written minutes and attendance registers. People whose names appear on such documents have subsequently been targeted for harassment by the security forces, with homes being raided by them as well as attacked by anonymous forces.

Of an even more sinister nature, are the allegations which have been made by former 5 Reconnaissance Regiment sergeant Felix Ndimene, of SADF involvement in train massacres on the reef. The admission by State President De Klerk of Zulu civilians being "trained" by the SADF in the Caprivi strip prior to Namibian elections, and the subsequent revelations by the Natal Mercury, of a secret SADF training camp in Kwa Zulu (near Mkuze), with suggestions that there are possibly links between the two, do not speak of healthy activities.

We would also like to ask the Minister of Defence to clarify the relationship of the SADF to Ciskei's covert intelligence unit, International Researcher (IR), as the directors of this so-called company have all been exposed as SADF officers with links to the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Despite the Ciskei government's claims that the unit had been closed down on August 30, the unit has merely changed its name to the Ciskei Intelligence Services, and the same personnel remain in place. In the light of recent developments in the Ciskei (which include the declaration of a State of Emergency, and hundreds of detentions in violation of universally accepted human rights), it is a matter of grave concern that the SADF has links with the security establishment of Brigadier Oupa Gqozo's government.

Other questions which remain unanswered, are (1) the role of Special Forces personnel in the "new South Africa," in particular whether or not the SADF retains in any way, their relationship with former CCB operatives who have now located themselves in the private sector after receiving massive "golden handshakes" to the tune of 5 or 10 million-plus, and (2) the expenditure of the R4 billion Special Defence Account not subject to public audit (a 4-man commission appointed by President De Klerk will apparently not be permitted to

make its findings public).

In the context of the South African scenario of a politicised and minority-controlled army, the Chief of the Defence Force, General Kat Liebenberg's statement to the effect that the calling up of young white men to the army will continue as usual, is either totally naive or politically shrewd and conniving. The anomalous nature of ongoing "whites only" conscription in the context of a supposed era of change, as well as the personal history of General Liebenberg (he is a former commanding officer of the SADF's Special Forces) continue to deny this institution the legitimacy it so desperately seeks. The disproportionate composition of the SADF hierarchy and their superiors in government, along with the incredibly "murky" lines of accountability (we do not even know whether or not former Defence Minister Malan retains his position on the all-powerful State Security Council and the Cabinet Committee for Security Matters), are other areas which, in the interests of peace, have to be made known.

Until these and other questions are resolved, young men in their droves will refuse to be associated with the South African Defence Force, and the number of objectors will continue to grow.

The End Conscription Campaign has sent a letter to the new Minister of Defence, requesting clarity on all of these issues, in particular, on the question of conscription. We are hopeful that the Minister will do justice to his labelling as a "dove" (as opposed to his "hawkish" predecessor) by the media and other informed observers; but we must emphasise that the Minister has yet to implement meaningful changes in the operation of the SADF, and has thus, still to earn popular credibility. He can and should do so now, by clarifying the questions raised. We anxiously await his reply.

H E OSBORN

NATAL FIELDWORKER

ECC

ECC Fieldworker Report For Natal, No. 1
(November 1-11)

Introduction


This report may, to the experienced eye, appear a bit thin around the edges. It probably is. If I may point out though (in mitigation) that this has only been my first week on "the job," and that the argument I propose revolves largely around my first impressions. Hopefully however, the research that I have done will reveal itself in the points I make below, so that my (few) personal experience/s do not need to convey them on their own.

The past week or so has highlighted both the efficiency of the Security Forces when they commit themselves to playing a constructive role, as well as their destructiveness when they don't.

(Inanda)

The SADF for example, in conjunction with the SAP, almost certainly prevented a blood-bath from occurring on Sunday, the 28th of October, at Ekuthuleni, outside Inanda. It may be regrettable that it took considerable persuasion from Steven Collins (an IDASA monitor), and Howard Varney (an LRC lawyer) to get the security forces to act - at considerable danger to themselves - but they had the desired effect. The SADF, by driving between a marching Inkatha Impi, prevented them from entering into Bester's Farm, which is an ANC supporting area. It was also regrettable that when the confrontation had been defused, the security forces chose to order the local residents of Bester's (who had gathered to defend themselves and their property from the approaching mob) to disperse, as opposed to their marching neighbours from Kwa Mashu. And perhaps the most regrettable aspect of all is that a local magistrate found it safe to grant permission for an Inkatha meeting to be held in the middle of an almost exclusively ANC area.

But those form another issue on their own, completely separate from the principle point of the argument around the capacity of the security forces. Both the SAP and the SADF proved that they have the means to prevent clashes of the kind that threatened to occur in Inanda that day.




(Ndwedwe)

This was again confirmed, albeit on a smaller scale, on the following Saturday (03/11/'90), when Steven Collins, along with myself and a refugee family from Ndwedwe, were escorted back to the latter's farm in that area by two armed riot policemen. Their presence was inarguably instrumental in the peaceful resolution of a potentially dangerous situation. This was when, during a feast to mark the end of the customary period of mourning, the family 'kraal' was approached by a convoy of vehicles, which included a local Inkatha leader, his supporters and a ZP patrol van. The Inkatha leader, a person by the name of Cele, reminded the family (all ANC supporters) of the fate of the son they were mourning, and warned them not to move back to the area. The family's pledge to leave again as soon as they had eaten their slaughtered goats and paid their respects at the grave-side, seemed to placate the Inkatha people. But the departure of the ZP van and the rest of the vehicles was certainly hastened by the well-timed entrance into the "discussion" of the two SAP constables.

It is my assertion, based on the above and earlier evidence, that contrary to statements made by certain cabinet ministers to the effect that the security forces do all in their power to prevent violence, it is not their physical capability which is in question.

It is true that soldiers and policemen cannot be expected to be at every point of conflict at the time they erupt, and aim is not to begrudge them travelling/response time. But given the security force's relatively extensive "man-" and fire-power, and even allowing for their limited (though not debilitating) mobility, the level of casualties is still unacceptably high.



(Bhambai)

The most logical explanation for this state of affairs, is the apparent mismanagement of the "means" at the disposal of the authorities. For instance, an entirely peaceful mass-meeting of ANC supporters in Bhambayi, near Inanda, on 03/11/90 was subjected to massive security force scrutiny: 3 Buffels and 2 Casspirs were only some of the vehicles which converged on the old Ghandi settlement, while at the same time, an Inkatha meeting in neighbouring Kwa Mashu - attended by uniformed and often armed "amakatha," was allowed to proceed without so much as a corporal in sight.

The ANC meeting was ordered to disperse before conclusion, despite no apparent threat to person or property. A delegation of members from the Inanda Peace Committee was permitted to drive to a near-by police station to deliver a memorandum outlining the grievances of the community. The contents thereof reveal a much more worrying possibility as regards conflicts and casualties in that particular area: namely that the security forces -and particularly the SADF in this instance- are frequently guilty of exacerbating tensions in the community, thus contributing directly to the instability which they purport to be attempting to eradicate.

The SADF was allegedly involved in all of the incidents which were referred to in the memorandum. Some of these include: Anton Majola, who was allegedly tortured by having a rubber tube held over his face, and his testicles squeezed with a "pliers-like" instrument, Azaria Blose, also allegedly tortured with a tube and pliers, Phumlani Mhlongo, who required hospitalisation after a number of assaults which allegedly included the rubber tube torture, and Bhubs Cele who was allegedly thrown into the air by a group of soldiers together, some of whom would then jump on him in turns while others kicked him.

Also a matter of grave concern is some of the security force's apparent complete disregard for other individual rights of community members. Among the nearly thirty complaints of theft of property reported in the last few months, are Sizane Sukude, a 60 year-old pensioner, who had a whole month's pension of R 600 stolen, allegedly by SADF personell during a body search, and Tamari Bidi, who has been robbed (on 4 occasions this year) of cigarettes, liquor, and several hundred rand cash - allegedly by armed SADF members who regularly enter her shop and help themselves to goods. All 26 reported incidents of theft allegedly involved SADF members.

This overtly criminal behaviour is reason enough for concern, but an even more sinister aspect thereof is the apparent selectivity of these perpetrators, as regards their victims. No known reports of similar crimes have emanated from shopkeepers or residents in Inkatha areas. This pattern of "favouritism" is confirmed, and even illuminated by the case of Pushu Msibi of Inanda B Section. Besides allegedly being assaulted and tortured by SADF members (including a sergeant), on the 1st of November, he was handed over (by these soldiers) to a group of Inkatha people, who were told to do with him as they pleased. Witnesses confirm that he held onto a soldier's legs while he was assaulted by sjambok-wielding Inkatha men. One witness, Moses Jaca in his affidavit, has the following to say: "I could hear him screaming from where I was. All the other soldiers ignored Pushu and the crowd; and the soldier whose feet Pushu was holding onto, 'shook him off,' and went to join the other soldiers..."

Fortunately, Msibi escaped from the crowd; how he did so is not clear, as his memory is blank from the time he was struck to the ground by his assailants. What is clear is that he was not aided in any way whatsoever by the SADF members at the scene. It is this type of evidence, indicating security force bias and collusion, which is the most alarming of all.



(Mooi River)

Thursday the 8th of November marked one of the bloodiest clashes that the rural areas of the Natal Midlands have seen. Sixteen people, mostly ANC supporters, were killed in the fighting of that night and the next day. Up to 1500 refugees, all residents from Bruntville Township, were being housed in the town hall situated in the town of Mooi River when I got there on Friday afternoon. My attempts at establishing the number of SADF troops who had been moved into the area were thwarted by an extremely uncooperative Lt Nicholas of the SAP. He would not divulge any information other than to say that the SADF had been mobilised, and were "monitoring" the situation. When I encountered an SADF patrol on foot in the white area of Mooi River, I stopped and enquired (from their section leader) about the number of troops in the area. He informed me that there were two platoons (about 60 troops). When I asked about their role in the apparently quiet white areas, he said that they were protecting the citizens of the town. I asked if the other platoon were stationed in the nearby township, to which he replied that they were off duty. The only troops in the area, it would seem, were being used to protect the local whites from (specifically) all the refugees who were staying in the town hall, and (generally) the residents of Bruntville. After speaking to about 30 refugees in the hall, and after trying unsuccessfully to locate Derek Majola, the chair of the local civic association who was in hiding, to facilitate peace-talks or negotiations, I returned to the police station. I communicated a number of the community's concerns, as well as some of my own, to the station commander. These included:

1) Allegations of police support for the attackers,:

a) Allegations that weapons of the sort used by SAP (eg 12 bore pump-action shot-guns) were used by Inkatha supporters against the residents of the community,

b) Concerns that bus-loads of Inkatha supporters from outside the area were permitted to enter the township despite ample warning from locals that there were rumours of an imminent attack, and

*2) The fact that the SADF was used primarily to patrol the peaceful white areas, as opposed to those where they were more urgently needed.

These concerns were unfortunately not well received by the station commander. He threatened to detain me for "obstructing the ends of justice," and when I explained to him that he could not do so as I was not doing anything of the sort, he threatened to assault me. I eventually left the police station under threat of forced removal if I did not do so voluntarily.

I had intended to bring up these and other issues with a Major Schreuder, the officer commanding Group 9 in Pietermaritzburg, when I met him the following day. He was unfortunately indisposed at the time, and had to cancel our meeting. He did however express an interest in reading my weekly reports (as did Colonel Adams of Group 10 in Durban), which is an encouraging sign that at least some levels of leadership in SADF structures appear interested in entertaining constructive criticism from outside their own information networks.

Hayden Osborn
10 Nov. 1990

REPORT ON MOOI RIVER (09/11/90)

~~~~~  
by Haydn Osborn, ECC Fieldworker

On the afternoon of Friday the 9th of November, I was "paged" by Radley Keys, an "unrest monitor" for the Democratic Party in Pietermaritzburg. When I returned his call, he said that Bruntville in Mooi River was in a state of chaos. He said that he had with him a person by the name of Tim Jeebodh from Estcourt, who was now also helping the refugees in Mooi River. Radley said they needed someone to monitor the situation there. I asked to speak to Tim, in order to establish the seriousness of the situation. He said that community members were extremely unhappy with the SA Police, that the latter were uncooperative and arrogant, and that he would appreciate me coming up.

We arranged to meet at the DP offices at 17h30; I cancelled my other appointments and left for Maritzburg. I met Tim, and we proceeded to Mooi River. When we arrived, at about 18h30, it was still light, and the road into Mooi River, from the toll-gate past the garage and all the way into the town was lined with refugees, mostly women and children. From the toll-gate, we could see a group of people under some trees up on a hill to the east, overlooking Bruntville. A number of refugees claimed they were the Inkatha supporters who had attacked them, and that they had been there for most of the day. I was informed that no attempts to disperse them had been made by the SAP.

We then drove into the town of Mooi River to see the refugees who were being housed in the town Hall. I spoke to a number of these people, and virtually all of them made allegations of police inaction and neglect of duty. A number of refugees went further and even accused the police of allowing the attackers to use their weapons (eg some of the Inkatha members were allegedly in possession of 12-bore, pump-action shotguns, of the sort used by the SAP). Unfortunately, none of these people I spoke to were prepared to put their names to statements alleging the above. The response was always that they were afraid for their lives.

I then went with Tim to the police station to ascertain if there had been any attempts to initiate peace-talks, and if so, the progress that had been made. I introduced myself to an SAP lieutenant who appeared to be in charge. He did not introduce himself, although I later discovered that his name was Nicholas, and he was the station commander. His opening words to me were to the effect that he did not have time to waste, and so he could not speak to me. I asked about peace-talks, and he replied that he could not find one of the parties. I understood him to mean Derek Majola, the leader of the local civic association (from my talks with community members at the town hall). I decided to return to the town hall to see if I could find someone who would lead me to Majola. I communicated this to Lt Nicholas, to which he replied "good luck."





At the hall I spoke to a Mrs Maphumulo, who was in charge of organising food for the refugees. She explained that he (Majola) had received numerous death threats, and that he did not feel he could even trust the police. This was confirmed by others I spoke to, who added that they did not think he was in the area.

I then returned to the police station. On the way I encountered an SADF patrol in the streets of Mooi River, and not far away from them, I came across another.

At the police station I asked to be shown to Nicholas' office. He was meeting with other security force personnel, including SADF officers. I was shown in, and I explained that I could not locate Majola. I then proceeded to communicate the concerns of the community as regards the role of the security forces, including the fact that SADF troops were being used to patrol the apparently quiet and peaceful white areas instead of the township. I also mentioned the allegations of those I had spoken to, about the role of particularly the SAP during the height of the fighting. Lt Nicholas did not receive my queries well. He said that he would detain me if I made allegations of that sort ("I'll lock you up!"). I explained that I was not making any allegations, merely communicating those of the community. I added tht he could not "lock" me up anyway, as I was not doing anything unlawful. He said he would arrest me for "interfering with the ends of justice." I explained that I have studied law, and was not doing anything like interfering with the ends of justice, but rather attempting to facilitate it. At that point he ordered me to leave his office, but I still needed to ask him about the weapons of the attackers, so I did not move. He then threatened to assault me ("I'll lay you out!"). I still did not leave his office as I had other questions to ask. He then ordered an SADF officer who was standing next to me near the door, to close the door: "Skop hom uit Lt! Maak daa'i deur toe!" The leutenant was apparently reluctant to do so, and Nicholas had to repeat himself another two times, eventually shouting at the SADF leutenant to get me out of his office. I eventually left of my own volition, saying to the station commander that I felt his attitude required adjustment.

On my way back through the town, I stopped to speak to one of the SADF foot-patrols. I was informed that two platoons had been moved into the area, and that while their particular platoon was patrolling the white areas, the other was off-duty. I asked if that meant that there were no SADF troops in the township of Bruntville at the time, to which the section leader of the patrol replied that he did not think so.





# End Conscription Campaign

National Office  
P.O. Box 537  
2100 Kengray

Tel (011) 836-8423  
Fax (011) 834-3189

Durban Office  
56 Ecmimical Centre  
20 St Andrew's St.  
4001 Durban

Tel (031) 304-5883  
Fax (031) 301-6611


FIELDWORKER REPORT NN5

APRIL 1991

This analysis has been put together for the purposes of the ECC National Council of 9 -12 May 1991. It is not intended to be an authoritative document in any way, nor does it pretend to be anything like an imposition of what ECC policy with regard to the ongoing violence should be. I have made this qualification because I have drawn a lot of conclusions which in fairness to the significance of the topic, are not substantiated to the extent that they deserve. The constraints of this paper are the main reason for this, but I should add that I have also been asked to give an analytical as opposed to factual report. There are other aspects of the analysis which should be mentioned, such as the fact that the sweeping generalisations I have tended to make do not do justice to the complexity of the subject concerned, or, for that matter, to the people and groups concerned. I have for instance, made some condemnatory remarks about the role of the security forces. While I am prepared to stand by those, they should be seen as the generalisations that they are. I have been witness to a number of incidents in which security force conduct has been exemplary, but these, unfortunately, are overshadowed by the majority of incidents which range from examples of mild negligence to gross incompetence and malicious provocation. I should mention that there has been an apparent improvement in the conduct and policy of the security forces recently, and that where it is found wanting, the likelihood is that it has been negligent, ie where SADF/SAP members have failed to act, as opposed to taking an active and destructive part in the violence.

The last qualification which should be made is that while I have made an effort to be objective, any analysis is inherently subjective since it involves the "interpretation" of factual data. This analysis recognises its fallibility, as I hope that any discussion emanating herefrom, will do too.

\*\*\*\*\*



End Conscription Campaign



## INTRODUCTION

As the initial period of my term of employment draws to a close, it is perhaps fitting to look back not only over the past six months to assess the conflict in the Natal townships as the picture is formed through experiencing the situation and the people on the ground, but also further back, to the beginnings of the conflict. This will lead us to the situation as it presently appears, looking at the "exacerbating factors" which may also be seen as "immediate" obstacles to peace (rather than the long-term need to undo centuries of institutionalised oppression and exploitation). If we were then to look at ways of removing these obstacles we would surely be getting closer to the answer. As it will be shown, the security forces have too often contributed to a deterioration of relations in specific cases, thus exacerbating tensions regionally and even nationally. As such they must be regarded as an obstacle to peace. And yet they have been known to prevent and avert eruptions of that tension into violent conflict on many occasions. This irony is highlighted by the fact that they (or the police at least) are an inevitable part of the short-term solution. As such, we will be looking at what needs to change, particularly in the field of "law enforcement," and how that could possibly be achieved.

## THE ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE

This analysis accepts as a given that the injustices of Apartheid and the preceding years of colonial rule are fundamentally responsible for the violence now tearing apart the very fabric of our society on a national scale. Poverty and hunger (and sometimes greed too), have played a substantial role in providing a base upon which conflict would inevitably develop; undemocratic and authoritarian local government structures and practices have reduced tolerance to a minimum; and the scarcity of material resources has done nothing to improve the lack of positive, socially developmental stimuli normally catered for by a sound and relevant education system, an equitable land and housing programme and an adequate health care policy. These "essentials" are non-existent, and as long as they remain unaddressed, or only partially dealt with, there will simply not be a solution. They are historical realities which must be undone if we are to avert an even greater catastrophe than the one we are enduring now.

This historical background, the reality of Apartheid and before, may broadly be regarded as the "powder keg" of the conflict, and the removal thereof obviously a pre-requisite to a peaceful solution. In order to do so however, it is first necessary to "disarm" the explosive, which in turn necessarily involves the identification of the catalyst or catalysts in the reaction. These, in the light of the "powder keg" analogy, may broadly be regarded as "detonators," since they are responsible for sparking off the ongoing explosion.



**Collection Number: AG1977**

**END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN (ECC)**

**PUBLISHER:**

*Publisher:- Historical Papers Research Archive*

*Location:- Johannesburg*

©2013

**LEGAL NOTICES:**

**Copyright Notice:** All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

**Disclaimer and Terms of Use:** Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only.

People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate, distorted or untrue. While these digital records are true facsimiles of paper documents and the information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand has not independently verified their content. Consequently, the University is not responsible for any errors or omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the website or any related information on third party websites accessible from this website.

This document is part of a collection held at the Historical Papers Research Archive at The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.