

on his conflicts with President Muammar Qadhafi's regime in Libya to win greater support from the United States. (US military aid to Sudan jumped from US\$5million dollars in 1979 to US\$100million dollars in 1981). Policy differences between Libya and Sudan over Chad have in the past caused contention, but since the Organisation of African Unity has adopted a peace-keeping role, Chad has become a less divisive issue for Sudan. The Chadian leader, Goukouni Oueddei, visited Khartoum in January for talks with Numeiri. Sharif Hussein al-Hindi, who had been one of the most influential of Numeiri's conservative political opponents in exile, died in January, which may make Sudan less sensitive to Libyan pressures.

Numeiri has spoken much of a threat from Libya. Particularly in the aftermath of Sadat's assassination in 1981, there can be no doubt that Sudan's stability depends on internal factors. Under IMF prompting, the Sudanese government introduced austerity measures, including the removal of a subsidy on petrol, and phased withdrawals over 18 months of subsidies on sugar and wheat. At the end of 1981, petrol was in short supply and tightly rationed, with private motorists facing long queues in the Khartoum area to collect their ration. As happened in mid-1979, when similar measures were taken on the insistence

of the IMF, the rise in sugar prices provoked urban demonstrations, although in January this year, the main demonstrators were schoolchildren and students who were dispersed initially by police and army units and then by the closure of educational institutions.

The government saw the demonstrations over sugar prices as a pretext to attack the government, rather than as the expression of discontent. Demonstrations by university students in December 1981 and January 1982 were partly over specific issues relating to conditions in the University of Khartoum.

It is symptomatic of Sudan's underlying failure that the price of sugar had become a fiery issue. Five years ago Numeiri stated the domestic production of sugar would rise from 294,000 tonnes in 1977 to 883,000 tonnes by the 1982-3 season, and that by 1979-80 the Kenana sugar scheme would produce more than 305,000 tonnes. But in 1980, Sudan imported 305,000 tonnes of sugar at a cost of US\$235million. Kenana did not produce refined sugar until 1981, and Numeiri officially opened the refinery in March of that year. When the project was debated in 1973, production was due to begin in 1978 and the estimated cost was US\$125million; when

production actually began last year, the cost had risen to US\$613million. The price to be paid for Kenana sugar in the future will reflect this capital investment and the consequent debt servicing; the effective cost is above the current world market price, which is ominous for a project intended to provide an export product.

In the late 1970s, Sudan's domestic production of sugar was around 132,000-137,000 tonnes, whereas national consumption was as high as 44,000 tonnes. Sugar is produced on several smaller schemes, which contend with a variety of mechanical and manpower problems, and the minister of industry estimates that it may be another two years before Sudan achieves self-sufficiency in production of refined sugar.

Sudan has an estimated foreign debt of more than US\$3billion, and the rescheduling of December 1981 included a grace period of one year for payment of US\$100million of unpaid interest on a commercial debt of US\$400million owed to foreign banks. Almost the only hope of servicing this debt, if not repaying it, is through the establishment of an oil industry to meet domestic fuel needs and to provide export earnings. Oil exploration, notably by the Chevron subsidiary of Standard Oil of California, has shown that Sudan has oil. Although it has long been suggested the domestic

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
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Cotton ginnery, Sudan: export earnings do not match trade deficit.

demands can be satisfied, the export potential is less clear. The Sudan government, in conjunction with Chevron Oil Company and the International Finance Corporation in the World Bank group, are considering a project to build a refinery at Kosti for an estimated US\$600-900million.

The refinery project, with a suggested capacity of 25,000 barrels per day to supplement the existing Port Sudan refinery in supplying the domestic market, will not be attractive to outside investors unless there is a reasonable prospect that the capital can be repaid and that crude oil will be available for export. And in the short term at least, the oil industry will make Sudan heavily dependent on foreign technicians, as has the capital-intensive Kenana sugar scheme.

The latter years of Numeiri's administration have been characterised by a shift from central planning to a prominent private sector, which is entrepreneurial rather than productive. The neglect of public services contrasts with the affluence of a new national bourgeoisie, whose fortunes are built on national and regional commerce, and whose patterns of spending and consumption are imitated by politicians and officials with access to scarce resources. The new class has encouraged forms of petty corruption in the private sector and in public service, and created a spirit of individualism which contradicts the asceticism and sense of community that typified Sudanese society in historical accounts over the past hundred years.

Investment to provide employment has been left to the state and to external investors whose projects have often had no integral link with the Sudanese community and environment. Small

industries in the towns have been affected by failures of supply from the water and electricity utilities, labour difficulties and a scarcity of foreign exchange for the purchase of materials and spare parts for machinery. International projects and development agencies have tried to bypass these difficulties by bringing in all their own requirements in vehicles, fuel, and equipment, and by relying on expatriate skilled staff.

Sudanese society has also been affected by an influx of refugees from neighbouring African countries and an outflow of skilled Sudanese personnel to the Arab oil-producing states. Official estimates show 625,000 African refugees, of whom 80 per cent are from the northern parts of Ethiopia; Ugandans account for 100,000 and Chadians for a further 20,000; the remainder are longstanding refugees from Zaire. In addition are the "invisible refugees" who are not recorded in the programme of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, although the UN's Sudan programme is the largest in the world. International funds are allocated to refugee relief but the younger refugees represent a burden on Sudan's scant educational facilities.

The emigration of trained Sudanese has been particularly marked in the past five years, which may reflect the increased economic activities of Gulf states after the improvement in oil prices in 1973-4; it also shows a loss of confidence by professional Sudanese in the country. Sudan is losing lawyers, doctors, university teachers, engineers, construction workers, and technicians at all levels. The brain drain has become a significant constraint on training programmes for Sudan's own future development, and on the government's ability to provide effective public services. The Sudanese

government has tried to monitor and control the scale of emigration, but it has proved impossible to prevent pilgrims to Mecca taking the opportunity to find employment outside Sudan at much higher rates of pay than at home. Officials estimate that there are 100,000 to 400,000 Sudanese workers abroad, while unofficial estimates put the total at more than a million. The government has recently taken fiscal measures to levy a small tax on the assumed earnings of such Sudanese expatriate workers, and has encouraged them to remit foreign exchange to Sudan, but much of the surplus wealth of this significant group is going into house-building and consumer goods.

Numeiri's political response to the vastness of Sudan, which is almost ungovernable from a single administrative centre, has been to encourage decentralisation and regionalisation. The north has been divided into new regions. The south has had regional autonomy as a single unit since 1972, and Numeiri's apparent support for a suggestion by Lieutenant-General Joseph Lagu, a former regional president, that the south be redivided into three regions, is much more controversial. The proposal has split the southern political establishment, and not merely on ethnic lines. Some politicians fear that a divided south will wield less bargaining power at the centre, which has in the past heavily subsidised the cost of southern regional administration. Prominent politicians who were pressing for southern unity were arrested in December 1981, and although 12 out of 17 were released almost immediately, five of the best known were held in prison, pending investigation of alleged links with other countries.

As part of the decentralisation pattern, Numeiri dissolved the national assembly, and reduced the number of seats to 151, for which elections were held at the end of last year; it was a sign of the hybrid form of the political system that 68 seats were allocated on a geographical basis (52 to the north and 16 to the south), 70 open to the alliance of working forces and 13 to nominees directly appointed by the president. While southern redivision is still under consideration, by the national assembly and a regional referendum, the south has a provisional government led by an army officer of southern origin. Numeiri has told his cabinet members that they must be a "revolutionary vanguard" against the past ills of the Sudanese economy, but this is mere rhetoric. Though the Sudanese people have often given full support to self-help schemes at local level, the Sudanese Socialist Union has failed to prove itself a political party able to mobilise the people for a common and collective purpose.

Michael Wolfers

African National Congress: seventy years on

Seventy years after its foundation, and twenty-two years after it was outlawed the ANC is stronger than ever before.

"Splattered across walls, houses and shop facades in the streets of Soweto and Johannesburg's Western Coloured Township, is an array of African National Congress slogans. At the funerals of black leaders there is a display of green, gold and black ANC colours and flags, and the hurried distribution of ANC pamphlets. Newspapers continuously publish evidence of the dominance of ANC cadres and sympathisers in South Africa's political trials, and the escalation in activities by the ANC's armed wing, Umkonto we Sizwe." — The Sunday Mail, Zimbabwe, 4 Oct, 1981.

For an organisation that has had no legal existence in its own country for the past 22 years, whose leaders are serving life imprisonment on Robben Island, or are in exile; whose colours, emblems, slogans, songs, policies (embodied in the Freedom Charter) are all proscribed under pain of imprisonment, this is a formidable achievement.

The African National Congress of South Africa is celebrating its 70th anniversary this year. It was formed on 8 January, 1912, the first organisation on the African continent to cut across tribal and ethnic groups and strive for unity in the struggle to establish rights and justice that had disappeared under the onslaught of colonialism.

"The demon of racialism," wrote Pixley ka Isaka Seme, convenor of the 1912 conference, "the aberrations of the Xhosa-Fingo feud, the animosity that exists between the Zulus and the Tongas, between the Basutos and every other native must be buried and forgotten; it has shed among us sufficient blood. We are one people. These divisions, these jealousies, are the cause of all our woes and of all our backwardness and ignorance today."

This meant the creation of a loyalty of a new type, a non-tribal loyalty which was inherently anti-colonial.

Internal conflicts are not easily overcome, and are inevitable in a national organisation that embraces a wide spectrum of class interests. Seized on by their enemies, dissension was always hailed as the beginning of the disintegration of the ANC. (The best-known is the formation of the PAC in 1959 by a break-away group.)

How, then, has the ANC been able to maintain and increase its authority over so long a period and with the diverse interests and attitudes on the part of leading members?

The answer lies in the nature of South Africa's own economic and political development. It is an

organisation forced by historical circumstances to respond to a particularly avaricious and savage form of modern colonialism, rooted in South Africa's diverse wealth. While in other African countries colonialism was modified or changed its form, the South African prize was too rich to be relinquished, and it is this continuing and increasing harshness that has demanded the ANC's response. Only a year after its formation, the Land Act of 1913 completed the alienation of the majority of the people from their land. It allocated to the whites, then 1.5 million, more than 90 per cent of the total land area, while the 5.5 million Africans were allotted less than 10 per cent (70 years on, the now 23 million blacks, out of a total population of 27 million, possess a mere 13 per cent of the land). It was the beginning of an industrial revolution accelerated by the creation of a dispossessed black peasantry; the working population came to be considered largely as unskilled black labourers and landless farm workers.

It was for these people that the ANC was voice and organiser, and while originally substantial support came

from the rural areas represented by the chiefs, the main strength shifted to become largely urban. In the towns, tribal feelings and loyalties are eroded and a unity based on common interests is possible.

The drift to the towns became a flood during and after the rapid industrialisation brought by the 2nd World War. Leaders tend to cling to forms of action that may outlive their times. The triumph of the ANC was that its leaders were able to adapt to new forms of activities, pushed by the impatience of a new generation of both intellectuals and workers. The founders of the ANC's Youth League, who appeared at first to challenge the old leadership, themselves became the leaders. Among them were, Duma Nokwe, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and the most influential of all at that time, Anton Lembede. Lembede died young, Nokwe died in exile; Mandela and Sisulu are on Robben Island.

Another key to the ANC's vitality has been its ability to initiate new forms of struggle over a very long period. It began with the petitions and deputations presented to the authorities by the founder-members before the First World War. These men, chiefs, ministers of religion, and representatives of a new, educated élite, were the recognised spokesmen at a time when the working class barely existed. The formation by Clements Kadalie in 1919 of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union demonstrated mass industrial action and the ANC became more representative of the workers who were themselves only beginning to

Song of freedom: Ida Mntwana leads the voices as Congress adopts the Freedom Charter.





Treason Trial: ANC thumbs-up signs for some of the accused being taken to court in a prison van.

understand the power of organisation and industrial action.

With the new militancy injected by the Youth League at the end of the 2nd World War, the ANC once more discarded outworn methods of struggle. During the 1950s resistance and opposition to apartheid laws and oppression took many forms: it was an era of stay-at-home strikes (a method of protest devised to avoid the severe reprisals against strikes at the workplace, then — as now — illegal,) boycotts, mass "defiance of unjust laws", mass demonstrations and marches, picketing, opposition to the Bantu Education Act (the ANC formed its own schools in the townships), organisation and militancy among women, as witnessed by the women's 20,000 strong demonstration against passes in Pretoria in 1956. Women's participation at many levels in the ANC has been considerable and influential, although the movement reflects the attitudes of its social background and has been largely male-dominated. These mass activities culminated in the Congress of the People, after a whole year of nationwide activities, leading up to the adoption of the Freedom Charter.

The ANC also drew considerable strength from the fact that during this period and, subsequently, it formed a working alliance with like-minded groups of other races, Indian, coloured and a small group of militant whites, who came together in a joint committee known as the Congress Alliance. This led critics to claim that the ANC was unduly influenced by non-Africans, particularly from communist groups. There is no doubt that the existence of a strong Communist Party in South Africa working in the short term for the

same policies as the ANC, and legal until 1950 (underground from that time) had an influence on the political development of the ANC — as the ANC had on the CP. Many ANC leaders who had won high regard — such as Moses Kotane, J B Marks and Duma Nokwe — were known to be members of the CP.

Perhaps those who have been the most outstanding public representatives of the ANC have, in their origins and the nature of their lives, seemed most unlikely to lead a militant and radical organisation. Professor Z K Matthews and Chief Luthuli, both mission-educated and religious, were men of unique personal abilities. Extremely flexible in their outlook, firmly non-racial, they readily accepted anyone who genuinely wished for the liberation of their people. Those who worked with Chief Luthuli know that no major policy decision was ever taken during his lifetime without his knowledge and consent. It is therefore ironic that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961, two months before the public launching of the new, militant wing of the ANC — Umkhonto we Sizwe, the spear of the nation.

The 1960s, when the ANC was declared illegal, brought disaster. The organisation for so long had operated as a legal, mass-based body that its transformation into an underground operation was traumatic, when every leading figure and all its most active supporters were known to the security police. The innumerable political trials, detentions, bannings and banishments of that period seriously weakened the whole structure. The campaign of sabotage, begun in December, 1961, seemed at first amateurish and ineffectual. Yet today,

20 years later, it can be recognised as laying the foundations for the widespread sabotage activities in South Africa, which despite the awe-inspiring wealth and might of the security and armed forces, are constantly growing in number and daring. On the last day of 1980, the *Rand Daily Mail* commented that it had been a year of "terror unparalleled in the history of South Africa". One year later, the same paper displayed a banner headline: "It's been a year of widespread unparalleled acts of sabotage". And went on to describe this assault on the infrastructure, adding that the blow to white morale was in-calculable.

The ANC does not believe that this type of resistance to white minority rule will, of itself, achieve the liberation of the people of South Africa. Drawing lessons from the experiences of the past, it sees the necessity of involving the mass of the population in diverse actions of all kinds, including industrial and political strikes and resistance on many different fronts.

At the end of last year, South Africa's largest daily newspaper, the *Star*, conducted a survey on black opinion in three major urban areas. Asked to choose between four organisations, the ANC, Inkatha, Azapo and the PAC (and bearing in mind that as both the ANC and PAC are illegal, those polled were making a dangerous declaration) 40 per cent said they would vote for the ANC in parliamentary elections, almost as many as those who supported the other three put together. Mandela emerged clearly as the most popular leader, with 76 per cent of those polled. His popularity was greater than his rivals, in all classes, both sexes, and both young and older age groups, and significantly, in Durban, Buthelezi's own stronghold.

These are extraordinary results. The stature of Mandela is higher today than when he was jailed 20 years ago, and he emerges through letters, the reports of released prisoners and that submerged world of the incarcerated with increased influence. Support for the Freedom Charter is still illegal, yet it is more openly proclaimed than ever in the past. Military preparations for guerilla invasions have closed South Africa's borders with hundreds of miles of double wire fencing and with mined and electrified fortifications.

The white population is mentally and in many ways physically prepared for the final great struggle for the preservation of their wealth and privileges but they see it as something of the future. What they fail to realise is that in this year, 1982, it is here, it has arrived. The ANC presents itself to its people as the organisation that founded and led their struggles in the past, that spearheads the attacks of the present, and that has the undoubted leaders and policies that can head a free South African that must come — soon.

Hilda Bernstein

THE AVALANCHE AND THE VOLCANO----

TEN YEARS IN THE LIVES OF THE WOMEN OF SOUTH AFRICA

--by Hilda Bernstein, writer, artist, member of the African National Congress, one of the founders of the Federation of South African Women, and Secretary of the South African Peace Council until banned and restricted by the apartheid regime, fled to England

For South African women the past ten years have been like an avalanche and a volcano. The avalanche is the apartheid system, pursuing its inexorable path across women's lives, crushing and destroying as it moves on. Do not listen to the stories you may hear that apartheid is being "reformed". A system based on outright racial discrimination cannot be reformed. It can only be scrapped entirely. The removal of a few minor apartheid signs in parks or shops does not alter the nature of the system. The pass laws have not been relaxed. The mass removals of populations continue; and African women still suffer the chains of their triple oppression: as women in a patriarchal society, as blacks in a racist society, and as workers forever confined to the very bottom of the economic pile.

More than 3 1/2 million people have been forcibly removed in South Africa since 1960; another 1.7 million are under threat of removal. The true dimensions of the uprooting are difficult to estimate. But the vast majority are removed in keeping with the apartheid plan which divides the country into "white" areas and bantustans--the white areas being 87% of the country and the bantustans 13%. Those who suffer most in this relentless destruction of homes, communities, villages, and settled peasant life are the women. The majority of those moved to the bantustans are women, children, the old, the sick, and the disabled. Those men who can work go to the towns but the women are prohibited by law from leaving the areas where they have been sent. For the vast majority there is no work, and they exist on the pensions of the old, if available, or on occasional payments from husbands or sons in the towns.

VIOLENT REMOVALS

The removals are a violent and brutal process, part of a strategy that seeks to push increasing numbers of South Africans into remote, inhospitable areas where the powerlessness of the women is compounded by the frustration and aggression of the men that they are unable to express in their workplaces. In many of these bantustan camps, wife- and child-beating is as common as rape.

During the Decade for Women there have been forced migrations of peoples in many parts of the world, driven by war or famine. But nowhere else have 3 to 4 million people, leading reasonable and settled lives, been torn up and thrown away. Those children who do not die in infancy grow up under these harsh conditions without education, social guidance or understanding. They have no role models of a settled family life and they learn no skills since only the most elementary tools for existence are available. Referred to by a government Minister as "superfluous appendages" to the male labour force in the white economy, these are people who are being thrown away. The conditions in which they are forced to live are a form of genocide. In our whole Decade, these mass removals are the most horrific action suffered by women and children.

CONTROLLING FERTILITY

Women are virtually perpetual minors in South Africa, subject always to the authority of men. In the field of family planning, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), the largest church and the theological and ideological power base of the apartheid regime, has always been opposed to both contraception and abortion on both "Christian and ethical grounds". However, the DRC has developed a new position. "It is the duty of whites to multiply on the earth...and thus keep the increase of the white population high," and so they want to ban the pill for all white women. It leads, they say, to promiscuity and prostitution. But "the Bantu could be given the pill with an easy mind...the morals of the blacks have already sunk so low that promiscuity could not be greater".

Responding to a claim that the country's crippling drought could increase the infant mortality rate, the Health Minister blamed "uncontrolled breeding" for the high death rate among undernourished children. South Africa was one of the testing grounds for injectible contraceptives like Depo Provera, which has been banned in the USA because of indications that it may cause cancer. A black physician in Soweto has stated that "The developed world is dumping Depo Provera on the Third World, and government-funded

agencies are administering the drug to young black women without their consent".

Although a 1975 law legalised abortion in certain very tight conditions, hardly any African women have been permitted to have them. The number of backstreet abortions is conservatively estimated at 100,000 a year. Approximately 25% of all bed space in gynecological wards is occupied by women suffering complications from these unsafe procedures, and some hospitals run special wards on weekends to treat incomplete abortions. The need to control their own fertility runs parallel to women's distrust of the regime's intentions when promoting family planning among African women and their suspicion of injectibles and other methods used.

WOMEN RISE UP

In contrast to this bleak picture of the lives of African women under the crushing effects of the apartheid avalanche, there is the volcano--the tremendous eruption of activity, organisation and fiery militancy among the women of South Africa during the past 10 years. This eruption spreads across the whole age spectrum, from schoolgirls to women in their 70s and 80s. The revolt of the young in the schools and colleges has been continuous since 1976 when the outburst that began in Soweto against the imposition of an inferior education left hundreds of children dead or disabled. From that time agitation among the young, and in which females are as active as males, has never abated.





United Press International

The militancy of the young is fully matched by the heroic militancy of the old. Mothers whose sons have been executed for acts against apartheid stand up on public platforms to support their dead sons, defiant and unrelenting. The day after her son was hanged, Martha Mahlangu appeared at a public meeting, wearing draped over her the green, black and gold flag of the banned and illegal African National Congress. She declared that it was disgraceful for black mothers to watch their children dying for their motherland without joining the struggle. "Nothing is going to stop blacks from being free," she said. On the morning her son was executed, Sarah Mosololi said, "Go well, my son, I love you. I am proud of you because you are to die for your people...the struggle will not end, even after your death."

In these past 10 years more women have been detained, banned and silenced, and sent to jail than ever before. Barbara Hogan, the first woman to be convicted of treason was jailed for 10 years. Others are serving sentences for a wide range of political offences. The reorganisation of former women's organisations and the birth of new ones have marked these recent years, and women such as Albertina Sisulu and Winnie Mandela continue to stand out as leaders against apartheid, inspiring millions. Last year also saw the release from jail of Dorothy Nyembe, who served 15 years imprisonment for assisting the ANC.

THEIR STRUGGLE CONTINUES

The strength and militancy shown by individual women, their increasing role in the trade unions and the United Democratic Front (an alliance of peoples against apartheid) is also reflected among women in the squatters' camps, in particular at Crossroads near Cape Town. Throughout the whole Decade women have defied the authorities in their determination to be allowed to live as families, not separated from their husbands and sons.

During one particularly bitter winter a whole community became known as the "bed-people". They built shelters of branches and plastic over their beds and took them down in early dawn to hide in bushes or bury in sand to save them from confiscation and destruction. The authorities grabbed hundreds of women, put them on trains and sent them hundreds of miles away. But the women return, enduring inconceivable hardship. They squat on beds under benders (shelters made of pliable branches) and in homes made out of plastic bags.

BONDS JOIN WOMEN

Bonds of desperation, of terrible necessity, of tremendous courage and endurance join women in many countries together. There is one thread that runs from the "bed-people" of the Cape to the women under their benders at Greenham Common to the mothers of the disappeared demonstrating in El Salvador. It is as though women have invented an entirely new form of protest. Their defiance is the central fact of their existence. "Here I am--what more can you do?". They have become the ultimate defiance, the living protest. There is no way of ending the women's protest except by the physical destruction of all the women. And that is what apartheid is trying to do by driving the women to the rural dumping grounds, out of sight of the cities, the tourists, and the press, unseen by visitors to beautiful prosperous, sunny South Africa.

They would like them all to disappear, just as the British government wants the Greenham women to disappear and the El Salvadoran government wants the wives and mothers of the disappeared to disappear. The women refuse. They refuse to eliminate themselves. We exist. Our existence is the ultimate defiance. □



COMING NGO EVENTS

March 4-16	UN Preparatory Committee meeting for Decade for Women Conference and NGO Planning and Steering Committee, Vienna
14	Seminar on Transnational Corporations and Education-Geneva
June 4-5	International NGO Conference on 40th Anniversary of UN and Its Work Against Racism and Colonialism, Geneva
Sept. 5-6	NGO Committee on Disarmament meeting, Geneva
9-12	Conference of NGOs General Assembly, Geneva
Dec. 13	Special NGO Committee on Human Rights Seminar on 40th Anniversary of Victory over Nazism and Fascism, Geneva
Jan 86 21-25	International NGO Conference to Launch International Year of Peace, Geneva.



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