

# END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN

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ECC PEACE FESTIVAL, 16th to 18th JULY 1993.

Welcome and Introduction by Chris de Villiers, Johannesburg ECC.

When the decision was taken almost exactly 10 years ago to form the End Conscription Campaign, I am sure the founder members and organisations had no idea where we would be in ten years time. A few years after that, as South Africa teetered on the brink of civil war, and as one state of emergency after another was imposed, it felt to many of us in the ECC as if we had bitten off more than we could chew. Almost all legal avenues of protest against apartheid were closed and tens of thousands of people were detained without trial. Were we not, in fact, powerless to influence the course of events? During that desperate period of our history, I remember going to listen to a talk by Reverend Frank Chikane, who pointed out that there were still a few groups who had some "political space" in which to operate. Churches, business, and organisations in the white community had some leeway in which to work, and we were urged not to shirk that responsibility. I like to think that the ECC accepted that responsibility, and that we have played our part, however small, in the struggle against apartheid.

A journalist told us that he once heard General Magnus Malan, then Minister of Defence, state that the ECC was the "fourth most dangerous organisation in South Africa," after the African National

Congress, the SA Communist party, and Cosatu. (You do remember General Malan don't you?). I don't know if that is a true story or not, but I like the idea of it, so thanks for the compliment General Malan, wherever you are.

Ten years ago, in response to the defiance of a handful of conscientious objectors, the government tightened up the Defence Act to provide for compulsory jail sentences for conscripts refusing to do any military service. This, they believed, would safeguard the real cornerstone of the apartheid state - the whites-only military call-up. What they got was a brain drain, with tens of thousands of University graduates and skilled people leaving the country: a loss which we are still feeling today. Resistance to the call-up was set back briefly, but soon resumed and intensified, with a number of brave individuals receiving severe jail sentences for refusing to serve in the SADF.

However, the trials of conscientious objectors were politically costly and embarrassing to the government. Towards the end of 1988, after the public refusal of 143 men to perform any further military service in the SADF, the ECC was effectively banned under the Emergency Regulations, along with many other organisations such as the UDF. When we were unbanned again in February 1990 and resumed our public activities, we found that the government had lost its taste for prosecuting conscientious objectors, and the state started to drop charges against objectors, rather than proceed with politically humiliating trials, which highlighted the enforcement of an apartheid call-up at a time when the government was proclaiming to the world that apartheid was dead.

Now, in July 1993, our campaign has reached a point where last week's national service call-up was, by all accounts, a complete flop, with probably less than 20% of those called up actually reporting for service. Prosecutions of objectors have all but ceased, and dozens of lawyers who had thrown their weight in behind the ECC, to defend individuals charged under the call-up laws, would be unemployed if they depended on us for work.

It seems certain that the July National Service call-up which has just taken place will be the last such call-up. We in the ECC fail to see how a racially exclusive call-up, whether for one year's national service or for camps, can continue after the formation of a Transitional Executive Council.

It has long been my personal suspicion that the government has obdurately retained the whites-only call-up, contrary to all logic and morality, in order to have recourse to what I call the "Rhodesia option" if negotiations fail. This would amount to a circling of the wagons and a retreat into the laager for a last-ditch stand against the world, and can be thought of as a sort of ace up the government's sleeve in the negotiations poker game. Exercising this option would inevitably require a mass mobilisation - a general call-up - of the Citizen Force. I think that it must now be clear to even the most knuckle-headed general that this option is no longer viable, and that negotiations are the only way forward. If all the efforts of the ECC over the last ten years have contributed just a little to that result, then we are satisfied that all our work was worth it.

You will gather from what I am saying that I believe that the ECC's work is almost completed. Indeed, our primary goal has been to end

military conscription, and that goal is in sight. But the ECC's aim of ending conscription had a context: the call for a just peace in our country. I want to read to you the ECC's original Declaration, issued in 1984, which sums up rather nicely what our organisation has stood for over the years.

**TOWARDS A JUST PEACE IN OUR LAND**  
**A DECLARATION TO END CONSCRIPTION**

We live in an unjust society where basic human rights are denied to the majority of the people.

We live in an unequal society where the land and wealth are owned by the minority.

We live in a society in a state of civil war, where brother is called on to fight brother.

We call for an end to conscription.

Young men are conscripted to maintain the illegal occupation of Namibia, and to wage unjust war against foreign countries.

Young men are conscripted to assist in the implementation and defence of apartheid policies.

Young men who refuse to serve are faced with the choice of a life of exile or a possible six years in prison.

We call for an end to conscription.

We believe that the financial cost of the war increases the poverty of our country, and that money should rather be used in the interests of peace.

We believe that the extension of conscription to coloured and indian youths will increase conflict and further divide our country.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE MORAL RIGHT OF SOUTH AFRICANS TO EXERCISE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND TO CHOOSE NOT TO SERVE IN THE SADF.

WE CALL FOR AN END TO CONSCRIPTION  
WE CALL FOR A JUST PEACE IN OUR LAND.

It should be obvious from our Declaration that we have always seen ourselves as an anti-apartheid organisation, even though the issue on which we focused mainly affected young white males, and inevitably resulted in most of our members being white. We are not unique in that respect, and the Black Sash springs to mind as another organisation which, in our strange, racially polarised society, attempted with a largely white membership to embrace the principles of non-racialism.

It is very tempting on an occasion like this to reminisce, and to review our successes and failures over the years. I am going to resist the temptation, partly because we have more exciting speakers here, and partly because there is a session tomorrow morning during which ECC's history will be reviewed, and there is a sort of variety

show on Sunday night when a number of the performers who have supported ECC in the past will be appearing.

This is also an occasion when thank-you's would be in order, to all of the organisations and individuals who have supported us over the years. These include our members, many of whom paid a high price for their involvement in the ECC. A word of thanks is due to our funders, without whom we could not have continued our work. Thanks are also due to the journalists, newspapers and radio stations who took a gamble and reported our point of view when it was unfashionable and even unsafe to do so. Our lawyers have always backed us up beyond the call of duty, and have taken on our cases even when they looked like losers.

Then there are all the individuals and organisations who helped and supported us behind the scenes, often risking their businesses or their own safety for us. So far, I have avoided naming names, otherwise I will be here all night. But I see in the audience one person who falls into this last category that I have mentioned, and that is our printer Duggie, who faithfully churned out our posters and pamphlets when other printing houses wouldn't touch us. I think Duggie symbolises the kind of quiet support that we have received over the years, without which we couldn't have been successful.

Where does all this leave us? Clearly, although the end of the conscription system is in sight, peace continues to elude us. Vast numbers of people are poverty stricken, violence is endemic, and all sectors of the population are alarmingly militarised. There is a desperate need for initiatives to defend communities against

violence, to create a truly impartial and effective peace-keeping force, and for the promotion of a culture of peace and tolerance. In the workshops and plenary sessions this weekend, we hope that some light will be shed on these issues, and that our festival will act as a catalyst for positive developments in at least some of these areas.

The End Conscription Campaign has had a unique character and a very specific focus, and we do not think that it is the ideal vehicle for addressing broader issues such as the demilitarisation of our society and the promotion of a culture of peace. We are hopeful that the organisations represented in our workshops will take these issues further in the future. There are also a number of groups and individuals who believe that there is a need in South Africa for a new, broadly based peace movement, and we encourage any one who is interested in such a movement to use this opportunity to set the ball rolling.

MESSAGE OF THE ANC PRESIDENT NELSON MANDELA ON THE OCCASSION  
OF THE ECC PEACE FESTIVAL

Comrades and Friends

I am very delighted to be here tonight, to open your historic peace festival; marking the 10th anniversary of the End Conscription Campaign.

I take this opportunity to salute you for your selfless contribution in the struggle to end apartheid. You are among those in this country who rejected the privileges of minority rule, and instead chose to fight for peace. You suffered detention, and other forms of harassment for refusing to do military service. Thousands of objectors fled the country rather than defend apartheid, and many more simply failed to report for military service each year.

The ECC's opposition to conscription is based on the fundamental belief that no person should be forced to take up arms, to kill innocent people.

Your campaign against conscription put you firmly on the side of the democratic forces, and contributed considerably to the overall efforts of the people of South Africa to overthrow racial oppression. It is your principled struggle, and those of the masses of the people of our country, and the international community, that forced the apartheid regime to negotiate.

The struggle for democracy in this country is also a struggle for peace. That is why the ANC and the broad mass democratic movement welcomed the establishment of the ECC, and derived much strength and hope from your stirring campaign.

Through out its history the African National Congress used non-violent and peaceful means of struggle. But the response of the regime was to unleash the most brutal forms of racial oppression that this country has ever seen. It was for this reason that we embarked on armed action during which the youth of our country made the highest sacrifices. They paid for freedom with their own lives.

A combination of the operations of MK and ECC, and of other democratic forces inside and outside our country, has brought us to the most exciting moment of our history; when we can say with confidence that victory is in sight.

The apartheid regime unleashed violence, not only against our people, but also against those in the Southern Africa region. The neighbouring states are struggling to recover from the devastation and intrigue of this regime. It spread weapons in the region which are being used today to massacre our people in the townships.

Only the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council and the holding of elections in April next year will eventually free South Africa from the corruption of the present regime. Only then will peace and happiness come to our bleeding country.

A massive arms industry exists in this country. A democratically elected government will reverse this policy, drastically reduce the defence budget and allocate more resources to a programme of reconstruction and development, improve the living standard of our people, develop our economy so that it can generate wealth and offer job opportunities.

The security forces were trained to defend white minority rule, and to deal most ruthlessly with the demand for a democratic and non-racial society. We can not expect the same security forces to defend democracy. A thorough re-organisation will thus be necessary where a democratic culture will be the corner-stone of the new force.

Re-organisation will mean that some soldiers and policemen will be demobilised. This must be a matter of serious concern to the security forces. This is an issue which will be handled in a humane manner and every effort will be made not to throw people into the streets to fend for themselves. We do not want solutions which create a host of other problems. The activities of the National Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence, have tarnished the name and integrity of the security forces. The upsurge of violence in Natal, East Rand and the Vaal area, the failure of the police to bring the culprits to book, together with their inaction against rightwing invasion of the world trade centre, only reinforced the perception that they are working together with those who are systematically killing our people.

In conclusion I wish to call upon the youth of our country, black and white inside and outside the security forces to accept that the future of this country lies not with the dying forces of apartheid, but with those of democracy. Let us walk the last mile and celebrate freedom day together.

It is indeed fitting for us to mark the ten fighting years of the End Conscription Campaign by directing our attention to the concept of peace-keeping in South Africa. For it is common cause that the problem of violence is a manifestation of the past which we inherit; that it emanates from the society which we all say must be changed.

Even in this period of transition, our country continues to be decimated by the scourge of violence. Indeed the post-February 1990 period has seen incidents of violence happening with debilitating frequency leaving in their wake, untold material destruction and a staggering loss of human life. Presumably moved by this, the organisers of this festival have posed the question: Can the National Peace Accord bring peace? Mr. Chairperson, if they are looking for a simple and straight forward answer, they will not get it.

We in the African National Congress chose, out of our own intuition and hope, to participate in activities leading up to the conception and signing of the National Peace Accord. We were convinced then, and we remain convinced to this day, that we need a multilateral instrument with which to combat the scourge of violence. Looking back, we can say with confidence that the ebb of violence in some areas is attributable in part, to the efforts deployed by peace accord structures and the work of observer groups (both local and international). The Peace Accord and its structures, is one of the few institutions which have provided an opportunity for political rivals to gain positive interpersonal and intergroup experience and to work, compromise and hopefully, coalesce across partisan lines. This is indeed a remarkable achievement; given the need to encourage diversity and tolerance - a need which has become so compelling in our daily lives.

Despite this professed shared concern and commitment to address the problem, the legacy of human destruction sadly persists in our country. This in our view, underscores the point that as a solution, the National Peace Accord is incomplete and provisional. If it is indeed true (as we think it is), that the causes of violence are many and complex, then what is required is a comprehensive solution. We require a solution which takes into account, amongst others the following factors:

- That there are people who benefitted from the system of Apartheid. Some of those people, driven by nostalgia for "the good old days" of unfettered Apartheid rule, will do everything including resorting to violence, in order to forestall the advent of democracy in this country.
- That there are people within the security establishment who have not necessarily changed their minds simply because F.W. De Klerk said what he said on February 02/2/1990.

That a sense of systematic injustice and the prolonged denial of democracy are prescription for instability and explosion.

Realised of the fact that there is a need to improve the National Peace Accord and its intended impact on violence, the National Peace Committee decided to appoint a technical committee whose brief is to receive proposals from parties and to synthesize them for submission to principals when they meet in the envisaged signatories meeting. The negotiators at the World Trade Centre, sensing the profound danger posed by ongoing violence in the country, assembled a technical committee and charged it with the responsibility of putting forward proposals on the primary set of conditions to be created in order to eliminate violence. These two decisions amply demonstrate the complementarity between the peace process and the process of democratisation.

They show that all those who are for peace and progress, have finally come to terms with the fact that democracy is part of the solution. Accordingly, the recommendations which are emerging from the two technical committees have, as a common denominator, an attempt at improving the efficacy of the peace accord and its structures, and subsuming peace-making to the process of transition.

Mr. Chairperson, the proposals are premised on the fact that there are many issues germane to the problems of violence which are not adequately addressed by the provisions of the peace accord as it currently stands, or are not within the competence of its structures. These are issues such as:

- Ensuring an effective enforcement of the Code of Conduct of Political parties and organisations as contained in Chapter 9 of the National Peace Accord.



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- Ensuring that non-signatory parties are induced to desist from activities which are inimical to peace.
- Ensuring that incidents of violence are properly investigated and the perpetrators are brought to book and
- Ensuring that those gross material disparities which have contributed to violence are addressed.

With regard to the Code of Conduct it is proposed that the relevant Chapter of the peace accord be amended to provide for more effective enforcement mechanisms. The proposed measures include:

- Ordering the organisation to publicly repudiate the breach/breachor;
- Ordering the organisation to those adversely affected by the breach;
- Ordering the organisation to suspend those guilty of the breach for a specified period of time;
- Ordering the organisation to expel persons responsible for serious or repeated breaches;
- Prohibiting persons guilty of breaches from appearing on public platforms or the organisation concerned for a specified period of time;

It is somewhat odd and disconcerting that there are more parties at the World Trade Centre than there are in the peace accord structures. This shows that the clamour to influence the future constitutional dispensation is not matched by the commitment to bring about peace. Those who refuse to sign the Peace Accord have not availed themselves of the voluntary procedures which the accord provides for solving problems between parties. One point bears emphasizing : namely that statutory and compulsory sanctions will have to be the first instrument of intervention in the case of non-signatory parties. Also, given the consensus arrived at on the question of the election date, the Independent Electoral Commission which will hopefully be established soon, will work very-closely with the peace committees to ensure that no untoward behaviour on the part of any organisation goes unaccounted for.

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One of the issues which threatened to rock the delicate peace-making process has been the role (perceived and real), played by the various armed formations and police forces, in the violence. It is my considered opinion that we have finally found a formula capable of resolving this problem. For it is agreed that we have to approach this issue in the light of a single, overriding objective: To establish impartial, accountable, effective and legitimate security forces for a democratic South Africa - security forces who will provide a sense of security for all.

The process of achieving this goal is envisaged to follow a series of phased confidence - building measures within a common framework. In the first phase, all parties who have armed formations will be expected to exercise proper control over such formations. This seen as a prelude to the establishment of a multiparty agency to formulate policy and oversee all armed formations. The final phase will come about as a result of democratic elections. That is a phase in which a legitimate, democratically-elected government will establish a single army and a single police force to serve our people.

The peace accord also provides for a role for peace structures in the area of socio-economic reconstruction. A common feature of all communities which are flashpoints of violence today the depressing conditions in which our people are forced to live. Special attention needs to be paid to these communities. A related question will be find an agency with the appropriate profile to receive resources and to mobilise such communities to participate in the reconstruction process. Peace Accord structures because of their multiparty character, appear to be the only appropriate agencies in a situation where we still do not have legitimate local and regional governmental structures.

In conclusion Mr. Chairperson, I wish to emphasize that the question of the effectiveness of the Peace Accord must consistently be treated as part of the whole process of change. The same operational principles which underpin the process of constitutional negotiations principles such as:

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- The patient search for consensus and the search for reconciliation, must be applied in the quest for peace in our land. At the same time, it is important to be firm with those who have made violence their stock and trade. This cannot wait for tomorrow. For the future of our country depends on the extent to which we develop our own capacity to manage and resolve today's conflicts.

Thank you !

SYDNEY MUFAMADI  
ANC PEACE-DESK

Addition

PS Jonathan

I did preface this input by saying that I was not going to address the fact that women are missing in all the Peace Accord structures and the problems surrounding both the SADF and the "third force".

Because the term "peace" is problematic in that peace does not always mean the absence of repression, I emphasized the need to develop a non-violent society which would include using non-violent tactics to achieve democratic ends. Reference in the last para to giving people working in PA structures a role beyond the PA, is a way, I believe, of ensuring that the violence is not perpetuated because of jobs and money generated by the Accord. In being given the last word I was able to draw attention to the fact that special arrangements for NGO's to be part of the PA so as to bring in women and the youth, was not a solution to the bigger problem facing South Africa, i.e. the exclusion of women in mainstream politics.

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Not long after the Peace Accord was signed, I was approached by the press for comment on whether or not I thought the Accord was working. It was too soon to make an assessment and I said that very clearly. At that stage, the resources which have been pumped into backing the Accord were not there. The Accord was battling to find an identity and all involved parties were, I believe, also battling to communicate to their constituencies the complexities of the agreement.

Nearly three years and thousands of deaths later the task of actually assessing the success of the Accord and its ability to bring peace, is still difficult and how the Accord is actually functioning differs from region to region. In this region I would like to suggest that a very positive development is the appointment of Peter Harris as Chair of the Wits/Vaal Peace Secretariat. From my conversations with people at all levels, I have established that he is perceived in a positive light and that he has already made a valuable contribution. Speaking to a Sowetan community leader recently he was positive about Harris but said he felt that appointing a white person to this position, did not enhance the image of the PA in the eyes of the community. He said that he believed that this was where the churches could have played a more active role and that a mutually acceptable person of colour should have been considered for the position. This is something to think about.

Personally I think that the area where the PA has been the most successful is that of rallies or marches. Highly visible, PA monitors, international monitors and local independent monitors, have all contributed to bringing violence at these events down to a minimum. I know that there have been many incidents where monitors from all these sectors have risked their lives in the cause of peace.

However, I do believe, that the accord is failing to address the

major problem of assassinations and I note that National Peace Secretariat Director, Deon Rudman, has also recognised the failure of the Peace Accord in this respect (Star 5 July 1993). I quote: "But it is a different case when it comes to assassinations. It is very difficult for us to deal with faceless assassins who drive through a township killing people. We have no idea who they are and their victims are not normally even politically involved."

I would like to suggest that this statement manifests two of the most important defects of the peace process. Firstly, that although the police are a part of the PA they are not held sufficiently accountable and I would like to elaborate at length about this a little later. The second defect is that the PA forces people to identify with one or other of the perceived conflicting parties (in this region it would generally be the IFP or ANC). Being an agreement signed by political parties (and other groups which do not necessarily reflect the diverse nature of our civil society) it is predicated on the fact that a) the violence is as result of an ongoing feud between two parties and b) that all solutions will be reached through political parties making their supporters accountable to the PA. This has serious implications for the up and coming elections as political positions will have been taken and lines clearly drawn before one can even get into the job of electioneering.

With regard to the police. The degree of attention given to mass killings is very dependent on a number of things including how much attention they receive in the media. However, in general, most killings are considered by all to be just that - casualties in a war. It is this attitude which has eroded the rule of law and brought an already ailing police and justice system further into disrepute. International police monitors have highlighted the many problems inherent in the current police force and top of the list must be the lack of investigative techniques. I do not include the beating of information from people in custody a technique but this appears to be the one method the police

understand. Immediately after an incident, the police may be on the scene, but they are not there in an investigative capacity. LHR records show that out of more than 30 cases followed over the last year (some of them originating from the previous year) on only one has any real progress being made - none have come to court or led to convictions. This can only lead one to believe that the will to investigate has gone.

The accord needs to keep these kinds of statistics so as to be able to challenge the police in a constructive manner. With regard to the track record of the police I am reminded of the theory that if you deny something enough people start to believe that you are in fact right. Information, such as the high number of people who die while being held in custody is presented and because the police obfuscate the discussion by disputing a leading pathologist's findings, they are able to come out of the accusations as if they are being wrongly accused!

Whether or not the police can ever effectively retrieve the situation and win some respect is questionable at this stage. LHR has long propagated the idea of the establishment of a Peace Keeping Force and I am pleased to note that the idea is being discussed in so many circles. In fact I think I can say that the idea has been accepted and that what form and where the force is located is now a matter of discussion.

Apart from the lack of investigative techniques the police are also perceived to be lacking in a will to respond to calls for help from the community. This has been an ongoing complaint and it would seem that Joint Operation Centres can go a long way to resolving it.

Other areas of concern with regard to the police:

- \*their expressed fear of raiding hostels, with a concomitant lack of fear of raiding ordinary people's homes; the treatment of residents during those raids and the repeated allegations of money and goods taken by police in raids;

\*the failure of the police to retrieve goods which have been hijacked by attackers;  
\*and the arrest and harassment of certain sectors of communities, in particular the youth, returnees and their families and partners.

Attention to these issues would go a long way in proving that the PA cares about ordinary people and their loss and that they are going about their duties in an even manner. Furthermore, while taking care that PA monitors do not have their community images tarnished by appearing to be in cahoots with the police, PA monitors accompanying police on raids could be extremely helpful in ensuring that raids on people's homes are conducted in a civilised manner.

The Accord also needs to address the major problems which the Police Reporting Officer is experiencing - particularly that of the police themselves hampering investigations.

The other major area in which I believe the Accord is attempting to make a difference and could in fact make an even bigger contribution, is that of socio-economic reconstruction and development - the component known as SERD. Recognition by SERD of the need to convey the fact that SERD funding is not intended to be as it says "an alternative source of funds to IDT, Kagiso, the government of the day, or corporations" is indeed welcome. Focusing on local development through consultation on grassroots is commendable as is the raising of corporate funds. However, we must guard against the privatisation of reconstruction and development. The involvement of private enterprise in SERD is to be encouraged but without actually knowing how the future government (possibly soon in the form of the TEC) perceives reconstruction on a macro-scale a conflict of interests could emerge.

I am not sure whether the category of social-welfare falls under SERD or another of the Peace Secretariat's components. Of great



concern on this level is helping individuals on the following:

- \* the replacement of homes where they have been raised to the ground and the repair of those which have been damaged;
- \* compensation for goods removed from homes;
- \* assisted return of displaced people where sometimes whole communities, and other times just those in the immediate firing lines, have been forced out;
- \* assistance to families where their incomes have been slashed through the death of a provider;
- \* assistance in expediting state grants to people who automatically become beneficiaries through the violence, i.e. those who have become disabled through injuries;
- \* providing counselling and medical care where needed.

These needs are those of individuals and should be responded to on that level and not through committees.

Other problem areas I picked up through speaking to people about why the PA and the peace process in general battled for acceptance are as follows:

- \* A repeat of a problem already articulated by others i.e., that very often peace committees are used by the opposition to identify leaders in communities thereby making them vulnerable;
- \* Unhappiness with the TPA's campaign to upgrade the hostels because of the belief that until such time as the hostels include families as tenants who have a stake in the community, there will always be trouble;
- \* The realisation that the fencing of the hostels does not resolve the problem of snipers.

From my own observation peace committees appear to function fairly effectively and that that very tension between the diverse group of parties is what makes a committee effective. However, I would like to mention that I believe we should be cautious

about using the peace committees for chastising people for something they may or may not have said. Obviously, people committed to the PA can be called to account but at times I have a sense that this becomes almost inquisitorial. The cohesion of the peace committee group can also have a self-censoring effect on information and I also believe that this should be guarded against.

In conclusion I would like to quote two people. One of them is peace committee chair Peroshaw Camay who is on record as saying that "peace is a collective effort". I couldn't agree more. The Accord on its own cannot solve our problems. Peace is a loaded word: we have to develop a culture of non-violence.

The second person I quote is Middle East Mediator Professor Cohen who warned when he was out here some years ago that we must beware of getting into the business of "managing violence" and "not resolving" it. Although millions of rands invested in the peace process are justified, we must make sure that there is a role for people involved beyond that process. I would like to suggest that it is in the promotion of a non-violent society for the benefit of all South Africans.

ATT: JONATHAN

## CAN THE PEACE ACCORD BRING PEACE TO OUR COMMUNITIES ?

NOTES BY : SENZO MFAYELA

This is the question we should be asking ourselves more and more in these sort of forums in order to create transparency in the functioning of the National Peace Accord structures.

Provided that there is a common will amongst all South Africans to create peace, the National Peace Accord will bring peace. But there has to be realization that the N.P.A is only one link in the peace process. Therefore peace work must not be limited to the Peace Accord and its structures. The peace should belong to the people out there, the communities

We also need to realize that violence is multi-faceted. We must outgrow a fallacy of thinking that violence is primarily political in character, as there are many socio-economic factors contributing to the present violence.

The signing of the N.P.A was not just another agreement, but an indication of the commitment of various political parties and organisations to work together to resolve the ongoing violence in our country.

This signing by parties was also an announcement to thier respective members and supporters of their commitment to working together and to adhere to certain principles to ensure a peaceful new South Africa. All these parties, administrations and organisations, by signing the Peace Accord, indicated their realisation, that peace can only be achieved by actively working on all levels towards reconciliation.

These signatories at present have representatives on the National Peace Committee, supported by the National Peace Secretariat, which in turn is supported by the Regional and Local Peace Committees.

These decentralised structures were formed to ensure the involvement of all South Africans, at all levels of political, social and economic activity in the creation of a peacefull South Africa. These structures were also necessary, as peace is never achieved by a handful of political representatives, but by the people who live in the various parts of South Africa .

Although these structures are in place, we also have to realise that peace goes beyond the Peace Accord structures. Peace, and all the freedom and rights that go with it, can only be brought about by all the people of this country.

The Peace Accord and the Peace Committees can only be a legitimate forum where people meet to work towards peace. If there is no commitment, the principles of the Peace Accord are worthless and anything else we may put in its place will be equally worthless without commitment and trust.

The Peace Accord is the contract and all of us the signatories - directly, or indirectly, participate due to our commitment to peace and a future South Africa. We must ensure that the principles of the Peace Accord, agreed upon by the signatories, are at all times adhere, to

to ensure that all the people in this country do not have to fear for their possessions, lives and the lives of their families in the expression of their political orientations.

We must not only consider that our respective parties have signed the Peace Accord and are actively working within its structures, but we must all be active participants and adhere at all times to the principles set forth in the Peace Accord.

I admit that the Peace Accord is not perfect, but this Accord is not a declaration of peace, but a contract between various parties and organisations, to work towards the normalisation of politics and the creation of a free political culture and political tolerance.

We must also realise that the Peace Accord was signed after decades of raging violence in various communities. Understandably, so far the bulk of the activities of the Peace Accord structures need to have more authority and powers to ensure that all participants adhere to the principles set forth in the Peace Accord.

At present, the Peace Accord has succeeded in bringing people from various backgrounds - economically, socially and politically - together. Many of these people have been able to understand and talk to persons they have previously considered to be their adversaries.

This is a very important breakthrough in the creation of peace and stability in South Africa. If people are able to talk and listen to each other, they start to understand each other and also the problems that face different people.

The next step is the creation of trust. This is where more work is desperately needed. Parties, administrations and organisations have to take responsibility for the actions of their respective memberships and supporters. If this is not done, trust, which is essential for peace, cannot be gained.

In many cases various parties or organisations, or even specific high profile individuals within these structures, have contravened the Peace Accord, yet, there has been no effective way in ensuring that individuals, parties or organisations can be held accountable for these contraventions. The Peace Accord structures lacks teeth. The reason being that it is a document built on trust.

Our mistake was that we wanted peace, which is obtained by trust, yet we pre-empted trust building by stating that we trust each other and will adhere to the principles set forth in the National Peace Accord. This lack of accountability needs to be urgently addressed. The Peace Accord can only work if all parties, administrations and organisations work in accordance to the principles of this Accord.

The Peace Accord is not only a document which is there to act as policeman to parties, administrations and organisations. It also play an important role in addressing the issues of socio-economic imbalances.

It will be one-dimensional to think that the violence in our country is solely due to the lack of a democratic political culture or political tolerance. Many persons and communities have

been marginalised by the previous political dispensation. People have suffered to survive and are angry. This also has to be addressed. Socio-economic reconstruction needs to be stepped up as a matter of urgency.

People who perceive themselves to be disadvantaged obviously find it difficult to talk and negotiate with others whom they perceive to have all the socio-economic advantages.

If one looks at the areas in South Africa where violence is taking place, it is in the marginalised areas. It is in areas where people are feeling the real bite of this economic depression. Crime levels are rising and so are the frustrations of people who believed that the new South Africa has already arrived.

Most violence takes place in the less developed sections of the townships, squatter camps and hostels. People who kill and get killed are the most marginalised socio-economically. The majority of these people have very little ideological content if any.

We also need to ensure that the expectations of those people are rationalised to what the country can deliver. If people's expectations are unrealistic, there is an obvious sense of frustration when this is not realised.

We need to differentiate between short and longterm expectations. Many marginalised South Africans want better living conditions and employment. This is not possible in the short term. We need to consult with people concerning their expectations and openly discuss with them the realisation of these expectations.

It is therefore important to have more resources and effort injected into the Peace Accord. We need the co-operation of economic and social organisations and also their commitment to the Peace Accord.

For the Peace Accord to succeed, the following is thus required :

1. A psychological framework of commitment to work for peace needs to be created .
2. The Peace Accord must be empowered to ensure accountability when the Peace Accord is contravened.
3. More resources must be made available to Peace Accord structures.
4. The participants in the Peace Accord structures must be broadly representative of the communities in which they operate. Not only political groupings, but also economic and social groupings must be actively involved and accountable.
5. The expectations of people in South Africa must be addressed.

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## **SUBMISSION TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON VIOLENCE**

### **DEMOBILISATION AND INTEGRATION OF ARMED FORCES**

*Dr Jakkie Cilliers  
Director, Institute for Defence Policy*

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

A range of challenges face the South African military as the country moves through a fundamental social transformation. To most people this is encapsulated by the question of integration of MK and the armies of the TBVC countries into the SADF, which is the subject of this submission.

This submission must be considered against the overriding objective as set out by the Technical Committee on Violence '*To establish impartial, accountable, effective and legitimate security forces for a democratic South Africa.*' (Report no. 4, par. 5.1)

Stability is a prerequisite for an enduring transition. Our expectation is that **politically inspired violence and intimidation will increase** in the run-up to elections, decrease thereafter, but that criminal and possibly even political violence will eventually increase once the inability of government to meet the extent of demands/expectations becomes apparent. This apart from the demands that could be made upon a new government to deal with elements threatening the transition such as threats of secession.

The ending of apartheid will do little to change the conditions of absolute and relative deprivation of much of our population. In this our problems reflect in many ways upon the problems of the wider region. These range from high levels of unemployment the erosion of social rules and the creation of alternative social structures such as gangs, warlords and even nascent 'revolutionary parties'. The authority and legitimacy of the state, of family and traditional authority has sharply declined.

It is imperative therefore to temper expectations about the benefits (especially the short-term benefits) that the creation of a poor, weak, and potentially an unstable democracy could produce in South Africa. The structural and predisposing factors for violence will endure for very long. As a result **conflict management as opposed to conflict resolution** may be a more realistic and practical approach to restructuring and legitimising the South African Security Forces.

The preceding all point to the need to maintain the organisational integrity, loyalty and enhance the legitimacy of the Security Forces whilst transforming these institutions.

#### **SCOPE**

This submission deals with four issues as regards armed forces and a potential future National Peacekeeping Force:

- ◆ ensuring supervision, transparency and accountability over the armed forces through the establishment of, amongst others, collection/assembly points;
- ◆ the timing and nature of demobilisation programmes;
- ◆ the nature and content of integration; as well as the
- ◆ interrelationship of the above.

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These recommendations concur and build upon the process outlined in par. 5.2 of Report no. 4 of the Technical Committee on Violence. In that report the Technical Committee proposed the following three-phased approach:

**5.2.1 The Immediate Period.** *All parties/administrations/organisations with armed formations must establish proper control over these, conduct an audit of all existing weapons and personnel and establish mechanisms for bringing all weapons and personnel under the supervision of a joint multi-party agency. All parties and organisations should simultaneously take every possible step to ensure that their members and supporters do not use weapons for any unlawful purposes.*

**5.2.2 Phase Two.** *There should be a joint multi-party agency to formulate policy and oversee all armed formations. The agency will need to make a distinction between statutory and non-statutory armies on the one hand and police forces on the other hand. This distinction is consistent with the Committee's view that policing functions should be clearly distinguished from military functions, and with proposals made to the Committee that various armies play no role in the election process, unlike the various police forces which will be required to fulfill ongoing law and order functions. The multi-party agency must ensure effective supervision, including clear identification of personnel, weapons and locations and the circumstances and manner in which any armed formation or members of any armed formation may be deployed in peacekeeping functions. The agency should also give consideration to assisting any personnel who wish to leave an armed formation with constructive programmes for their integration into society.*

**5.2.3 Phase Three.** *In the third phase it will be the responsibility of an elected Government constituted on the agreed basis in terms of the Declaration of Intent adopted on 7 May 1993 to integrate, disband and rationalise the various armed formations and introduce comprehensive measures for the integration of their personnel into a democratic society, so as to achieve the objective of impartial, accountable, legitimate and effective security forces for South Africa.*

Figure 1 on page 4 attempts to illustrate the **interrelationship** between integration, demobilisation, (socio-economic) youth programs and the creation of a National Peacekeeping Force. It also attempts to present the **nature of the process**, namely the collection of the various members of the non-statutory armed forces (in particular), registration, audit, processing of combatants as well as the need to match supply (those volunteers who meet minimum standards) and the demand (force level requirement/budget capacity).

## **ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL/ASSEMBLY POINTS**

The first concrete step, in terms of Phase Two above, is the establishment of a system of control/assembly points be established countrywide. These points should be manned by the ANC/MK and PAC/APLA but with permanent representation (in a monitoring capacity only) by the Government and the international community. The purpose of these control points should be to establish a system of control and accountability of the guerrilla armies by the respective political movements, subject to independent verification. The control points should also serve as collection points for all those members of the guerrilla armies who have no other source of regular livelihood. In this case, members who so wish should be sheltered, fed and clothed, and placed under the discipline of MK/APLA with appropriate non-partisan validation, where required.

These collection points would serve as temporary centers from where selection will occur for either demobilisation into civil society, or the provision of preparatory training

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of volunteers for integration into a future defence force or National Peacekeeping Force.

It is proposed that the existing SADF bases serve a similar purpose, also with international and ANC or other representation.

Further, it is proposed that a similar system be used to accommodate all members of MK/APLA presently outside the country who wish to return to the country prior to elections. An approach should be made to the international community for support in the application of such a programme.

## **INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILISATION**

### **Options**

The integration of the guerrilla armies into a single national defence force is a political requirement. It will provide a degree of legitimacy which will not be obtainable by any other means.

The integration of the armed forces of the TBVC countries is a practical consideration which will follow the constitutional developments in this regard. The latter will also allow a degree of immediate and visible affirmative action unachievable by other means.

There are essentially **two options** when discussing demobilisation and integration (see Figure 1):

- ◆ **Demobilise** directly from the various armed forces **and integrate** only what you require into a single military; or
- ◆ **Integrate** all elements into the military **and then demobilise** what is not required subsequently.

### **Integrate First, Demobilise Later**

The latter option will open the doors to the absorption into the military of the sum of all the armed formations in the country bar those who will go into a National Peacekeeping Force. This will occur irrespective of basic entry standards or the demand/requirement for armed forces in terms of threat or security requirement. Only after some stability has been achieved in the broader society, or when it becomes patently unaffordable, or once these persons have been provided with portable skills, will demobilisation occur.


This will inevitably be an extremely complicated and messy process, but also require constant special dispensations in terms of the public service regulations. Most important of all, it will be massively expensive and either require that additional funds be allocated to defence at a time that there is a concerted attempt to reduce such expenditure or, at a minimum, require the redirection of virtually all of the remaining capital expenditure component of the Defence Budget to operating or running costs. This translates into the virtual destruction of the South African defence manufacturing industry with all the effects that this would have on South Africa's ability to compete in the international manufacturing industry.

In terms of this 'integrate first, demobilise later' option, South Africa would have to be prepared to live and pay for a very large army - one far in excess of the present, declining defence budget.


The major advantage of this strategy is that it would control and neutralise any potential destabilising elements. They would all be in the military, irrespective of either the need for such a large military or of qualifications/suitability.



### DEMobilISE - INTEGRATE



### INTEGRATE - DEMobilISE



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## Demobilise Directly, then Integrate

We believe that **South Africans should be extremely circumspect about integrating persons into the military who will inevitably have to be demobilised.** The demobilisation of members of the various armed forces should occur directly from these forces, prior to any amalgamation or integration.

This would require that formal (minimum) criteria would have to be negotiated as soon as is practically possible to define the requirements for integration into a future defence force. Given the present transitional context such criteria would have to be negotiated or at least approved at a political level. It is also reasonable to assume that existing SADF recruitment criteria/civil service regulations regarding posts, etc. would have to be revised as a one off gesture of reconciliation. Some criteria would, however, have to be applied. Secondly, some upper limits and quotas would have to be determined in terms of the broad requirement for our military of the future.

Assistance could be sought from the international community, various Government departments and the private sector, both in terms of expertise and resources, to assist in the reintegration into civilian life of those present members of the armed forces not suitable for service in a future military or for whom there is no room. Such demobilisation programmes should, however, only commence once the TEC is in place/phase 2 in Report Number Four.

In this regard we differ from par 5.2.3 of that report which places the responsibility on an elected Government (i.e. much later in the process) to '*integrate, disband and rationalise the various armed formations*'. (p. 6)

Acceptance/integration into a Defence Force is, of course, not the only option. Acceptance/integration into the proposed Peacekeeping Force is another. By present indications the Peacekeeping Force would absorb 10 000 members from the various Security Forces and guerrilla armies.

## Demobilisation

Demobilisation then occurs for those persons who do not want to join the military or Peacekeeping Force or do not meet the criteria, or for whom there is no place. The purpose of demobilisation is to cut costs and reduce capabilities that are not needed. In the present poor economic climate demobilisation may literally be a program to enable the former soldier to survive.

Demobilisation can or should provide access to other training, educational, counseling schemes or courses. But demobilisation is essentially a 'sausage machine' which processes persons for a fixed period across the board. Alternatively it is simply a one-off payment of a predetermined amount of money.

Ideally the demobilisation programme should link into any national development scheme or strategy. As such it should serve the national interests. According to this approach additional training should be done outside or before the demobilisation period. Assistance should be sought from the international community, various Government departments and the private sector, both in terms of expertise and resources, to assist in the reintegration into civilian life of those present members of the armed forces not suitable for service in a future military or for whom there is no room.

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## CONCLUSION

The approach to first demobilise and then integrate would enhance social stability and prevent frustration, reducing the propensity towards criminality. It provides the 'new' Defence Force with a clean slate, reducing the hang-over problems from the past and enabling them to recruit on the basis of requirement and qualification. It allows a future Defence Force to focus on its primary responsibility, i.e. defence of the country.

In addition to the process discussed above, agreement should be sought that:

- ◆ All further expansion of the military (SADF, TBVC armed forces and guerrilla forces) be halted upon the institution of the TEC. The normal manpower replacement cycles of the SADF and TBVC armed forces should not be affected by this agreement.
- ◆ No additional training commitments be undertaken by any of these armed forces apart from the completion of training that had physically commenced at the time of the institution of the TEC and normal force development (cyclical) training. Additional training, including foreign training, should require the agreement of the sub-council on defence of the TEC.

## DEMOBILISATION AND INTEGRATION\*

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### INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This document briefly comments upon the following:

- a South African peacekeeping force;
- demobilisation; and
- integration.

### A SOUTH AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE

As its special name implies, the idea of a South African Peacekeeping Force is distinct from that of a blue-beret International Peacekeeping Force. In the interests of balance and legitimacy, the Peacekeeping Force is proposed as a multi-party body, made up of members of various organisations. The following potential sources of recruits exist: the SADF, MK, TBVC armed forces, SA Police (including the Internal Stability Division), police forces of the homelands, persons that have previously served in any of these organisations, community marshals, members of Self-Defence Units and new recruits (persons that have not previously served in any of the forces listed but meet the minimum entry requirements). But simply allowing indiscriminate recruitment into a Peacekeeping Force would be counter-productive.

The South African Force was originally proposed by the churches (particularly Bishop Stanley Mogoba). More recently it has been taken up by Lawyers for Human Rights and has subsequently become part of the ANC's negotiation position. Until recently the Government was at best ambivalent about the idea. The creation of a Peacekeeping Force has now been suggested by the Technical Committee on Violence in its Fourth Report to the multiparty negotiation forum at the World Trade Centre, and agreed to by all parties. This recommendation reads as follows

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\* Talk delivered at the ECC 1993 Peace Festival, University of the Witwatersrand, 17 July 1993.

**Collection Number: AG1977**

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**PUBLISHER:**

*Publisher:- Historical Papers Research Archive*

*Location:- Johannesburg*

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