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EDITORIAL NOTES

WHAT THE NKOMATI ACCORD MEANS FOR AFRICA

Once again we are reminded that the future cannot be foretold. Who could have studied the political developments of Southern Africa only one year ago, and foretold the events of the past months? Which analyst would have been bold enough to foretell that in April 1984, the Mozambican government, headed by the Frelimo party, would be deporting the cadres of the South African revolutionary movement from their country? Or raiding ANC homes and offices in Maputo, under the supervisory eye of a joint Mozambican-South African commission? Yet these, and other actions of a similar kind, are all the consequences of South Africa's foreign policy, whose general lines were in evidence over a year ago but whose detailed working out is only now becoming apparent. The ANC presence in Mozambique has been reduced from a substantial working cadre to a "diplomatic mission" of only 10 approved members, with the President and one or two others having the right of entry. All other ANC cadres are being deported, or restricted to refugee camps to which the

ANC leadership will be denied access. And at the frontiers, Mozambique's troops "... exercise ... rigorous control over elements proposing to carry out or plan ... hostile actions against the apartheid state. The so-called Nkomati Accord entered into between Mozambique and South Africa at the town of Komatipoort on 16th March this year, made provision for all this, and more.

In the propaganda gloss put upon this Accord by the South African and world press, there is constant reference to the liquidation of ANC and Umkhonto "armed bases"; but in fact, as South Africa well knows, there are not and have never been any such bases in Mozambique.

Yet the South African regime's propagandists — from Premier Botha to Defence Minister Magnus Malan and all their lick-spittle radio and press commentators — portray the Accord as a "triumph" over threats of armed ANC incursion into the country from across its borders. This travesty of the truth serves two purposes. It serves as a smokescreen to hide from South Africans themselves the patent fact that the growing Umkhonto armed and sabotage attacks within the country originate from within the country, far from its heavily patrolled borders. And it serves as a smokescreen to obscure the hostility of the Botha regime to the social and economic policies of what have become known as the frontline states.

Rough Treatment

The real nature of that hostility lies heavily camouflaged by the apparently reciprocal nature of the Nkomati Accord. As quid-pro-quo for all that the Mozambican government has undertaken to do, South Africa reciprocally undertakes to prevent hostile broadcasting from its territories, and to end aid and assistance to anti-Frelimo armed forces in Mozambique. On paper, it all appears eminently equal and reasonable. But the test of the fairness and equality of such an Accord is not to be made on the paper it is written on, but on the ground of actual political operations.

Here already there are the gravest signals that all is not what it might seem on paper. Already since the Accord, there have been new and savage assaults launched inside Mozambique by counter-revolutionary mercenaries of the MNR, who everyone knows and admits to be the running dogs of South African foreign policy, trained, paid for, equipped and directed from South Africa. There is nothing in South Africa's past history of relations with its black neighbours to give any confidence that its post-Accord policy will be anything more than the continuation of the pre-Accord policy, only differently wrapped to suit a new advertising campaign.

What was the pre-Accord policy? We are told by the South African propaganda machine that its policy towards the frontline states generally is to seek friendly co-operation; that towards Mozambique particularly, it has been concerned only with attacks on ANC-Umkhonto camps and bases to prevent armed revolutionary incursions into South Africa from across its borders. If this is so, why did its MNR running dogs then not attack ANC personnel and positions, rather than the important Mozambican industrial, economic and transport installations which have been its main targets? The MNR was — perhaps still is — South Africa's surrogate in Mozambique. Its purposes and aims are South Africa's purposes and aims. And those purposes were never to counter the ANC's revolutionary efforts against apartheid, but always to undermine the Frelimo government and its efforts to reconstruct and develop Mozambique. Only the most naive will believe that because the ANC presence in Mozambique is now severely reduced the South African policy of undermining the Frelimo government's policy and future has been cancelled.

Such long-term considerations as these cannot be allowed to be glossed over in consideration only of the important but essentially short-term problems thrown up by the Nkomati Accord. Neither South African nor Mozambican policy can be accepted as short-term, temporary expedients, to cope with the imagined threat of the ANC incursion across the Mozambique-South Africa frontier. It can do no good for revolutionaries of either country to pretend that yesterday's running sore has been cured by agreement. Perhaps a sticking-plaster has been applied to the wound, but underneath the old sources of South African infection remain.

South Africa's apartheid regime lies at the core of the cancer; it promotes discontent and revolutionary upheaval at home, which it seeks to contain by a combination of police-state terror and corruption of a black elite; it promotes conflict and upheaval outside in all the frontline states, to roll back the tide of independence and to reassert a new era of colonial-type economic and political dependence.

The frontline states correctly understood their real situation when they created a *cordon sanitaire* of isolation around South Africa. The Nkomati Accord marks the breaking of that *cordon*. The Botha regime now feels more confident that it can spread the infection of apartheid and neo-colonialism more easily through Africa. The invitation to Premier Botha to visit a number of European states shows that his allies are of the same opinion.

The International Dimension

The Nkomati Accord though ostensibly a Mozambican-South African affair, does not occur in isolation from the whole international dimension, which

includes repeated armed incursions into Angola, the attempted Muzorewa putsch and subsequent internal destabilisation of Zimbabwe, the suborning of the Swaziland ruling authority, military incursion and counter-revolutionary sabotage in Lesotho, military rapine and conscription of Namibia, and so on. All these many facets of South Africa's overt and covert operations in all the neighbouring territories constitute the reality of its consistent foreign policy and programme.

It is customary in South Africa, and elsewhere in the capitalist world, to present that policy as a native product of South Africa alone; and to present the Nkomati Accord as the greatest triumph of that South African policy, and a vindication of the so-called "new direction" in which P.W. Botha is said to be leading the apartheid state. The truth, however, is not that simple. The Nkomati Accord may have been hatched in Pretoria, but the strategy behind it has been produced in Washington.

Washington, before Reagan but more particularly since Reagan's presidency, has had a simplistic view of the world, and an equally simplistic view of Africa. In that simplistic view, every dispute or division in the world can be satisfactorily viewed as a conflict between 'good and evil' — or, in interchangeable terms of Washington-speak, as anti-Communist versus Communist. There are no shades in between.

Everywhere — but especially in Africa — every non-aligned state which does not concede knee-jerk obedience to US policy is seen from Washington as a "puppet of Moscow." Every anti-imperialist and popular liberation movement is understood to be a "front for communism". Washington, as leader of the imperialist alliance of Western states, has devised what it deems an appropriate strategy for dealing with the world. It has been described by Reagan himself as "... rolling back the frontiers of communism."

That strategy has been followed relentlessly, world-wide. Every weapon in the American arsenal — money, control of world markets, leadership of international agencies for development — all have been allied to the world-wide network of CIA agents of subversion. In total, these weapons add up to international terrorism; its purposes are to strangle national economies of independent states, to disrupt their links with their allies and the rest of the world, to purchase internal subversion and sabotage, to arm counter-revolution, and finally — when all else fails — to set the scene for direct US military intervention against sovereign independent states. Internal terrorism has been let loose everywhere — to overthrow a disliked regime in Nicaragua, just as they had done previously in Guatemala and Chile; to finance wars as in Lebanon, Afghanistan and Kampuchea; to bolster

reactionary regimes and finance death squads as in El Salvador. It has supplanted international diplomacy as a way of dealing with nations, especially wherever peoples of the under-developed world choose to form their own governments and plan their own economic ways forward out of poverty.

Africa — and Southern Africa — are not exceptions to the global strategy. Where there are client states, pliable enough or venal enough to serve US aims — as in Botha's South Africa or Smith's Rhodesia — there has been US aid and support for regimes which maintain themselves through police-state terror and oppression of black majorities. UDI has been acceptable; illegal occupation, and military dictatorship of Namibia have been acceptable; armed invasion of Angola and internal subversion by military means of Mozambique have been acceptable. All conform to the grand strategy of "rolling back the frontiers of communism" as seen from Washington, and recreating a continent which will once again be a docile cog in the world of free enterprise and the pursuit of private profit. The hand on the Nkomati Accord and in the many facets of destabilisation of the frontline states may be South African. But the policy and strategy are those of the US. Everywhere, in the recent events in Southern Africa, the shadowy figure of the US special agent Chester Crocker can be discerned as the controller, mostly offstage.

The Southern African Dimension

US-led international terrorism has been in evidence in all the frontline states as their peoples seek desperately to break out of their colonial pasts, to throw off their shackles of former dependence and colonial-style poverty. Nowhere has terrorism operated as openly and fiercely as in Angola and Mozambique — the two countries of the area where the way forward has been proclaimed most clearly to be the building of socialist society. In many parts of Africa, and elsewhere, there has been lip-service paid to the aim of "socialism", often merely as a slogan. But here, in Angola and Mozambique, the perspective of socialism has been based on programmes of social reconstruction presented explicitly in terms of Marxist theory, headed by parties which declared their aim to mobilise according to Marxist doctrine to create their own destinies. These two countries were thus seen simultaneously as the main standard-bearers of socialism in Southern Africa, and in consequence the main targets of the US-led terror.

All the weapons of the arsenal have been used against them; economic isolation and strangulation; diplomatic isolation; fomenting of internal armed subversion, and mounting of external armed invasion. World

markets have been manipulated to produce rising prices of essential imports of machine-tools and manufactured goods at the same time as falling prices of vital exports of raw materials; 'development' aid has been slanted towards schemes based on capital-intensive processes and high technology which undermine the traditional economies and their accompanying social orders.

Yet despite it all — and despite the cruel circumstances of one of the worst and most prolonged droughts of recent times — despite it all, it must be remembered that neither Angola nor Mozambique have fallen, as Ghana's socialism under Nkrumah or Zaire's under Lumumba fell. For radicals and revolutionaries everywhere this is a most important aspect of the present time in the area — not that Mozambique has been brought by *force majeure* to sign a scarcely creditable Accord; but that its government has survived and is still proclaiming adherence to socialism.

It is argued forcibly by many of Frelimo's friends that the combined weight of drought and foreign terrorism had brought Mozambique to the point where the stark choice was between the Nkomati Accord and total collapse.

Perhaps so. But that is not a judgement that any of us in the South African liberation movement should seek to make on their behalf; any more than we could accept the right of others to make their own independent judgements about what is best for us in our own country. If our comrades in Frelimo judged their situation in their country in this way, we must take note of that judgement. If they concluded that *force majeure* had left them with no alternatives between the collapse of their revolution and a reduction of our facilities in their country, that too we have to take note of, much though we regret it.

But there are judgements of a different sort which arise from the Nkomati Accord which are not the province of our Frelimo comrades alone. It is being said in some quarters, for example, that now that the Nkomati Accord has been reached, the appetites of the US and South Africa in that part of the world have been satisfied; that therefore the international terrorist actions against Mozambique are at an end. And, by way of extrapolation from that: that if other frontline states also enter into similar — though regrettable — accords with South Africa, they too will have appeased their enemy and created peace for themselves in which to pursue their aims of national development and independence.

We do not agree. The harassment of the ANC, which is the ostensible centrepiece of the Nkomati Accord, is nothing more than a single piece in the whole global strategy of "rolling back" the frontiers of national independence and economic independence. Other and more severe

pressures will certainly follow — for Mozambique, for Angola, and for all others; the full terrorist arsenal will still be used, excluding nothing. The pressures will not end until either the South African government itself is overthrown, or the independent governments have been overthrown, and their people brought back into subservience with dependent economies tailored to fit the world-wide net of imperialist relations of inequality. The Nkomati Accord is not a peace signal for Africa. *It is, in our view, the fore-runner of worse pressures, worse aggressions to come, for all the frontline states. And it should be a warning to them all to prepare!*

The South African Dimension

No one has felt the immediate post-Nkomati increase of imperialist and reactionary pressure more sharply than our own South African liberation movement, headed by the ANC and supported by all the main popular and patriotic forces and organisations at home and abroad, including this journal and the South African Communist Party. Our position in regard to the Nkomati Accord is unique, not directly shared by others in the front line. Premier Botha undoubtedly hopes that the Accord will destroy our movement and our challenge to apartheid; undermining the frontline states is only one aspect of it as far as he is concerned.

It is we South African revolutionaries who are at the centre of the Accord and its main target. Yet it is we, uniquely, who are not a party to the discussions; not asked whether any accord is possible; not asked even to talk about a treaty whose subject is, after all, ourselves: *us; our country; our people; our future.*

And just because we and *our* revolutionary movement are at the centre of the Nkomati Accord, it is *our* movement and *our* people who are most directly affected by it, and who feel its most immediate consequences. No one could possibly pretend that the Accord has not adversely affected our freedom to operate. Of all the valuable acts of international aid our movement has received from many countries, the facilities accorded to us by Mozambique in the past have been amongst the most important. Now these facilities have been severely restricted, in some spheres totally withdrawn.

But of themselves, they do not demand of us any new policies. It was never our strategy to seek to conduct the struggle of our country's liberation from outside its borders. Activity outside our borders was forced upon us, unwillingly, in the worst period of our movement's decimation in the early 1960's. After the period of the Rivonia trial and the mass arrests, imprisonments and torture of our militants, our movement had been

brought close to ineffectiveness. Had it remained totally restricted to work only within the country, it was our judgement then that it might well be totally extinguished. It was decided to commence the building of an apparatus outside the country, to take on the task of rebuilding an organisation out of the remnants of the wreckage — an organisation which would once again function within our country but with fraternal assistance and support of personnel and organisation abroad.

The Way Back Home

That central strategy has never altered. The ANC leadership outside South Africa, like the Communist Party leadership, has never seen itself as permanently in exile. It has always seen itself as a temporary caretaker for the movement which had to be rebuilt, regrouped and re-established at home. That the task of rebuilding would never be easy was always understood by those who had experienced for themselves the reality of operating a revolutionary force within the terror of the South African apartheid state. It has been underway for over twenty years. And though it is still not a task that can be said to be complete, it has achieved signal success.

Within South Africa today, every aspect of our people's struggle contrasts sharply with the bleak days of 1960. Today there is everywhere widespread readiness for struggle, which flares up repeatedly in a myriad of local actions by workers, peasants, squatters, students, house-holders, professionals and politicians. Everywhere, on a local level, there are respected and trusted local spokesmen and leaders, together with local organisations who fill the vacuum created by the 1960 setbacks. And there is now the evidence everywhere of the existence of an armed force of guerillas, freedom fighters, operating within the country and surviving amongst the people "like fish in water".

This is not to claim that every mass popular resistance to the regime in township or factory is organised by the ANC. Far from it. But the ANC presence is there, everywhere; its influence and reputation, upheld and spread by the external leadership, give coherence, unity and self-confidence to every popular movement. To this extent, the external ANC leadership has fulfilled a large part of its task — the essential part — of sponsoring the spirit of mass resistance amongst the people, without which there can be no safe basis for a rebuilt organisation. And the SACP has played its full part in all this.

Now, for sure, the basis is there for rebuilt revolutionary organisations, underground and yet ubiquitous within South Africa. Whether, or in what

strength such organisations have in fact been built already, is not something that can possibly be discussed in such a forum as this. But certainly the objective circumstances are there. And so the external leadership has done what it set out to do — in part at least. It has created the conditions for a return of the organisations and their leadership to South Africa. It has fought a way back; via propaganda and underground organisation; and it has fought a way back via foreign training and cross-border return of the armed fore-runners of the peoples' liberation forces.

Our organisations have had over twenty years' hospitality in the frontline states to make this possible. If the curtailment of facilities in Mozambique is to have any long-term influence on our movement, it will be simply to lend urgency to the pace of this process of fighting our way back into the country; and thus to expedite the date at which an internal revolutionary leadership is once again established — this time securely surrounded by an armed cadre and an aroused and supportive population. The difficulties for us arising from the Nkomati Accord are short term; the challenging opportunities long term.

Facing The Future

For in South Africa's freedom struggle, then, there is now intense pressure to meet the long-term challenge and re-establish the centres of our movement clearly within the borders of South Africa. It is a formidable challenge; but not more formidable than that faced in 1960 — and accomplished — of resurrecting our movement from the ashes of defeat.

For all the frontline states too there are formidable challenges. All are now being subjected to the international terrorism which finally brought the government of Mozambique to Komatipoort, with the aim of finally forcing each of them in turn to sign an Nkomati-style agreement.

But the main issue, as we argued above about Mozambique, is not the signing of an agreement itself, even though such an agreement may seriously handicap the South African freedom struggle. The fundamental issue is what will happen thereafter; and thereafter. For a containment of the ANC is not a final strategy of the US-South African axis. The "rolling back the frontiers" of national liberty and independence, of economic independence and of self-sufficient nationhood, is. Against that strategy, will any frontline state ultimately be able to hold fast to its chosen course towards its own future? This is the main question of Southern Africa at the moment. It is the overriding question Southern Africa needs to solve for itself, before which all the other manifold problems of the region must take second place.

The equation for holding out looks improbable. Against the vast financial, economic, technical and military resources of the aggressor can be arrayed only the spirit of independence and the still feeble economies and armies of the victims. If this were all to the equation, there would seem to be only one answer.

But this is not the whole story, for no people fighting against racism and imperialism should think of themselves as fighting alone, naked and unprotected against a more powerful foe. History has shown again and again that, despite the seeming disparity between contending forces, the outcome cannot be precisely predicted by counting numbers. Who would have foretold the military triumph of puny, underdeveloped Vietnam over the military strength first of the French empire, then of the United States? Or the political and social survival of the people's struggles in El Salvador and Nicaragua against improbable odds? The future is not fore-ordained. It depends finally on the perspectives and courage of peoples, on their ideology, strategy and tactics, on their decisions and their unity and determination in carrying them out, on the strengthening of the bonds between all the anti-imperialist forces everywhere, and perhaps above all, on strengthening the links between the forces of national liberation and national independence and the mighty bloc of the socialist countries with the Soviet Union as its heartland.

These are the perspectives which must be considered by the peoples of Southern Africa in deciding what must be done: to halt the racist and imperialist juggernaut. It is not for us, in this journal, to dictate the details of strategy to the South African liberation movement, and even less to the frontline states. But we can put forward, and we do so here, some ideas for consideration, in the hope that they will eliminate pessimism and raise the prospect of successful resistance to the axis of enemy forces.

There are acceptable alternatives to the strategies incorporated in the Nkomati Accord. We must remember that if the position of Angola differs from that of Mozambique, it may be due in part to the substantial support and underpinning from fraternal Cuba, plus the warning from the Soviet Union that South Africa would simply not be allowed to occupy Luanda. For various reasons that deserve analysis, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho have so far resisted the South African pressure. But in the end there is, in our view, only one realistic strategy for Southern African independence to survive, and that is in long-term co-operation and unity of the national and international forces opposed to racism and imperialism, and ready to act against the aggression the enemy has unleashed in southern Africa.

One of the tragedies of today's dilemma is that Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord without adequate consultation with all the parties concerned. It appeared to be an individual decision reached unilaterally. If that is to be the pattern for the future, then there is no doubt that enemies of the apartheid regime will be knocked off one by one. They truly either stand together or they will go under individually. One of the most encouraging developments since the Nkomati Accord was signed was the unanimity reached at the meeting of the frontline states attended also by the ANC and SWAPO at Arusha towards the end of April.

Revolutionary Perspectives

The strength of the front line against imperialism in Southern Africa would be greatly enhanced and the balance of forces substantially altered if the revolutionary struggle of the South African people were advanced much further, requiring the whole of the apartheid regime's military and economic resources to be concentrated at home. The balance of forces not only in Southern Africa but in the whole of Africa and indeed the world would be fundamentally altered if the South African revolution were to succeed in its aims and overthrow the apartheid state.

Here indeed lies the prospect of a real future for all Southern Africa's peoples. But it depends on the advance of the South African freedom struggle and the emergence of a new people's South Africa — socialist-oriented South Africa — to lend its weight, moral and material, to the frontline alliance. Here alone, in our view, lies the real security of the region, and the only way finally to secure its future against the "rolling back" inroads of imperialism.

It is a simple and obvious conclusion to which this leads: namely that our South African revolutionary movement needs the steadfast resistance of the frontline states in order also to facilitate our own work; but even more do the frontline states themselves need the advance and growth of our revolutionary movement to ensure their own independent future. In addition, the anti-imperialist forces of South Africa and the frontline states need to strengthen their ties with the world-wide association of anti-imperialist forces, above all the socialist countries. And it is to be hoped in turn that the world anti-imperialist forces and the socialist states will be able to increase their support of the peoples of Southern Africa to help them to withstand the destabilising pressures and outright terrorism of the racists and imperialists.

Southern Africa is now, more than ever, interdependent. And the people of South Africa, represented by our liberation movement, are now more than ever to be seen as a vital part of that interdependence. We cannot acquiesce

in the surrender of any part of Africa to the enemy. Everything must be done by the progressive forces of all countries to strengthen the ability of Africa to resist the counter-revolutionary pressure of the racists and imperialists, to build up the economies of the independent African states, to raise the living standards of their peoples.

Let us in South Africa accept the challenge thrown down by the Nkomati Accord by consolidating and extending the revolutionary process at home. We can always be sure that our own people, whose struggle nourishes the roots of our liberation movement, can never let us down.

ANTI-COMMUNISM AND ANTI-SOVIETISM PAVE THE WAY FOR FASCISM AND WAR

The great Bulgarian Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov, while secretary general of the Communist International, wrote in 1939, in the course of the world-wide campaign to build a united front against fascism and war:

"Under the present international circumstances there is not and there cannot be any other more genuine criterion for distinguishing between a friend and any enemy to the cause of the working class and socialism, between a supporter and an opponent of democracy and peace than the attitude towards the Soviet Union. The touchstone for testing the sincerity and honesty of each member of the working class movement, of each workers' party and organisation of the working people, of each democrat in the capitalist countries, is their attitude towards the great country of socialism. It is impossible to fight in practice against fascism if one does not help by all available means the consolidation of the most important bulwark in this fight, the Soviet Union."

"There is no possible serious struggle against the fascist instigators of a new world war if there is not unreserved support for the Soviet Union, the most significant factor in the preservation of international peace. It is practically impossible to fight for the just cause of socialism in one's own country, if one does not fight against the enemies of the Soviet state where socialism is being realised through the heroic efforts of the working people."

These words were written in 1939, on the eve of the outbreak of the second world war, and their truth was demonstrated by the experiences of the war itself. It was the refusal of the western powers to accept the Soviet Union's peace proposals — on disarmament, on the fascist threat to Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland — which made the outbreak of war inevitable. And the war itself demonstrated that without the contribution of the Soviet Union fascism could not have been defeated and peace secured. If not for the Soviet

Union, the peoples of the world might all today be living under the Nazi jackboot, subjects and victims of the herrenvolk.

It was anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism which led to the holocaust of the second world war and the loss of 50 million lives. It is the anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism at the heart of western policies today which once again threatens world peace, and in whose name democracy, freedom and independence of peoples are being undermined and destroyed. Just as the western powers built up Hitler's war machine in the hope that it would destroy the Soviet Union, the home of real socialism and an inspiration for oppressed peoples everywhere, so today the imperialists are supporting reactionary regimes and movements throughout the world, and threatening to launch nuclear war, in their desperate bid to prevent social change which would imperil the future of the capitalist system. When President Reagan called the Soviet Union "the source of all evil", he was paying his own tribute to the Soviet Union as the main bulwark of the forces fighting for liberation from the yoke of imperialism and neo-colonialism. At the same time Reagan was making it clear that he regards all movements of liberation and social reform as agents of Moscow, suitable targets for destabilisation and destruction. Hence the whole drift of US policy in Central America, the Middle East and Southern Africa. Hence the US embrace of mass murderers like Pinochet and Pol Pot. Hence the US invasion of Grenada. Hence US support for Israel and "constructive engagement" with the murderous Botha regime in our own South Africa.

Defence White Paper

The White Paper tabled in the House of Assembly in Cape Town last April by Defence Minister Magnus Malan is a perfect example of the way in which anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism are utilised to justify the destabilisation and destruction of the freedom and independence of the frontline states; not to mention the ANC and SWAPO and all those actively engaged in the struggle against apartheid. It was South Africa's aggression against the frontline states which laid the foundation for the current "peace initiative", said the White Paper:

"Forceful military action by the South African Security Forces during the last decade or more has provided sufficient time to allow Africa to experience the dangers of Russian involvement in their countries, as well as the suffering and retrogression that follows upon the revolutionary formula."

"During the decade, said the White Paper, many of South Africa's neighbours had "come to their senses and have had their eyes opened to the dangers of Russian imperialism".

The breathtaking impudence of this declaration is almost beyond belief. It is not the Soviet Union but racist South Africa and the western capitalist countries whose investment and trade dominate the economies of the frontline states. It is not the "Russians" but the racists who have been responsible for atrocities like the Kassinga massacre and the repeated invasions of Angola, the Koevoet murders in Namibia, the raids and killings in Maseru and Matola.

The White Paper declares: "Discussion and co-operation remains a better choice than terrorism, hostility or subversion". Yet it is the racist Botha-Malan regime which has undertaken more than a decade of terrorism and subversion, euphemistically referred to as "forceful military action", and which refuses to enter into discussion with the ANC. Not only the UN and the OAU but also "several churches, church leaders and church organisations" in South Africa and abroad are accused of "furthering USSR objectives in Southern Africa" by joining the propaganda onslaught against the Republic of South Africa. The White Paper maintains that it is the Soviet Union, acting through its agents the ANC and SWAPO, that is to blame for all the "social and labour unrest" in South Africa:

Thus anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism are used as a cloak to conceal the responsibility of the racists and the imperialists for the horrific situation in South Africa, where the majority of the population whose skins are not white are subjected to endless discrimination, deprivation and oppression, and banned, banished, jailed or executed if they dare to defend themselves and demand their rights. Defence Minister Malan's increase of his military budget by 21.4% to a record R3,755 million glaringly demonstrates his lack of confidence in the regime's willingness to engage in meaningful "discussion and co-operation" instead of bloodshed.

South Africa is of course not the only country in Africa (or the world) where anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism are resorted to by the regime to justify internal repression. Yet it is noteworthy that General Malan and his counterparts continually raise the spectre of "Russian expansionism" without feeling it necessary to produce any evidence that it exists; they know it is a formula that will go down well with the Reagan administration, who have it on the brain, and who are ready to pour out dollars by the million to prop up regimes whose leaders proclaim fervently that they would rather be dead than red.

To return to the Dimitrov doctrine: hostility, or even neutrality, towards the Soviet Union and the other countries of existing socialism can only undermine the struggle for national liberation; peace and social progress in

South Africa, Africa and the world. The enemy of our enemy is our friend, not for opportunistic reasons, but because Soviet policies have been firmly rooted in the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Ever since 1917 the Soviet Union has shown itself to be the most consistent ally in the struggle against imperialism, for national independence, peace and social progress. At a time when the racists and imperialists are leaving no stone unturned to destabilise the socialist bloc and destroy the monumental achievements of the October Revolution, it is the duty of all genuine revolutionaries to make it unmistakably clear that they have the correct attitude towards the Soviet Union and are ready to come to its defence.

OUR GENERAL SECRETARY HONOURED

On April 6, 1984, the President of Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov bestowed on the general secretary of the South African Communist Party Moses Mabhida the Order of the People's Republic of Bulgaria 1st Class. The Order had been awarded to mark Comrade Mabhida's 60th birthday on October 14, 1983, but the presentation had been delayed because circumstances had made it impossible for Comrade Mabhida to visit Bulgaria earlier.

President Zhivkov pinned the medal on Comrade Mabhida's chest at a glittering ceremony in Sofia in the presence of members of the Political Bureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the whole event was seen by millions on Bulgarian television.

In his speech of acceptance, Comrade Mabhida said: "In accepting the Order, allow me, dear comrades, to assure you that in the struggle for peace, for the unity of the International Communist Movement, for the defence of human dignity in which the Communist Party of Bulgaria is involved, our Party, the South African Communist Party, will always be at your side. Together with you we will continue to fight for all that is connected with the future of mankind, for Socialism".

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND ETHNICITY

The Case of the United Democratic Front and the National Forum

By Nyawuza

The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in mid-1983 was a sign that indicated a new level of organisation. This was not simply a response to a call for unity; it was a culmination of the development of organisations and the need to coordinate isolated struggles into broader forms of national campaigns and resistance.

The period after the Soweto uprising witnessed successful campaigns which were a reflection of the inexhaustible people's strength. In 1976 the dummy Soweto Urban Bantu Council was forced to resign. So, too, was the Coloured Labour Party forced to resign from the dummy Coloured Representative Council. In 1977 an active boycott organised against the election of the dummy Soweto Urban Bantu Council resulted in a 6 per cent poll, and in 1981 another active boycott against the dummy South African Indian Council resulted in a less than 10 per cent poll. This is to say nothing of the strikes, the struggles on the church front, the school boycotts and women's resistance.

At the same time there developed another trend which led to the formation of the National Forum. These developments — the emergence of the UDF and the National Forum — have been widely commented upon in the South African press and this essay is an evaluation and assessment of the two trends in the light of the ongoing struggle inside the country.

It is worth remembering that the emergence of contradictory and even antagonistic trends and tendencies is not a new phenomenon in the liberation struggle in South Africa. It is as old as the struggle itself. What is of interest in these trends is their direction and how the participants visualise solving the national question, for the essence of the national question at this stage of struggle is the national liberation of the Africans and all other nationally oppressed ethnic groups.

The Points of Departure

It was at the annual congress of the Transvaal Anti-South African Indian Council Committee in January, 1983, that Dr Allan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, made a call for the formation of the UDF. At the same congress a decision was made to revive the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC). It is worth noting that the decision to revive the TIC was proposed by an old member, R. Parakh, and supported by two African trade union leaders, Thozamile Gqwetha, president of the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU), and Samson Ndou, president of the General and Allied Workers' Union (GAWU).

This decision to revive the TIC was condemned by the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) as "one calculated to strengthen the forces of ethnicity and harm the cause of black unity." Ishmael Mkhabela, publicity secretary for Azapo, said:

"From our point of view, any ethnically-based organisation by Indians, Coloureds or Zulus is directly in line with Pretoria's policy of apartheid."⁽¹⁾

Even the idea of a formation of UDF was denounced by the same Mkhabela:

"We see it as a conglomerate of ethnically orientated groups which perpetuate ethnicity and tribalism at a time when the oppressed should be rallied into a single organisation which does not have ethnicity in its structure."⁽²⁾

One African leader Mpiyake Kumalo responded:

"Throughout its existence Azapo has proved to be a reactionary organisation which hibernates comfortably in its cocoon for most times and only comes alive to react in comments about current events. Azapo gives the impression that it is hollower than all other organisations."⁽³⁾

Six months later Zinzi Mandela, daughter of Nelson Mandela, spoke at a TIC meeting in Lenasia where she attacked what she called "ideologically lost political bandits" who "turn against the people's wishes as embodied in the Freedom Charter."⁽⁴⁾ Curtis Nkondo, a former President of Azapo, attacked the Black Consciousness ideology for being misleading and said that any organisation which says whites are irrelevant may as well disband.

These few quotations indicate that within the black opposition groups in South Africa there are many problems, contradictions and even animosities. But before we attempt to assess these trends let us get the facts straight.

A Big National Event

Dr Allan Boesak made a call for the formation of the UDF in January, 1983 and the first national conference which coincided with the official launching of the UDF was on August 20, 1983. Those of us who were present or who have seen the films on the national launch of the UDF will agree that this was really a big national event.

A steering committee was established to facilitate the formation of the UDF and a declaration of its fundamental principles was drawn up to which aspirant members will have to subscribe. A key requirement for membership was and is:

"An unshakeable conviction in the creation of a non-racial, unitary state in South Africa, undiluted by racial or ethnic considerations as formulated in bantustan policy."⁽⁹⁾

The decision to reactivate the TIC was taken to meet the demands of the new political situation created by the pending "new deal" constitution. The Transvaal Anti-SAIC was formed in June, 1981, with the specific purpose of dissuading Indians from voting in elections to the South African Indian Council in November of that year. The result was that fewer than 10 per cent of registered voters went to the polls. An Anti-SAIC statement said:

"It is believed that the Anti-SAIC, which enjoyed tremendous support during the Anti-SAIC campaign, has outlived its mandate. It is (now) necessary to assert more positively our position in relation to the broad democratic forces."⁽¹⁰⁾

It should be remembered that the TIC is one of the oldest organisations in South Africa — older than the ANC — with its origins going back to the British Indian Association founded by Gandhi before the Act of Union in 1910. It, together with the Natal Indian Congress, has a hard-won legitimacy in the Indian community. The South African Indian Council (SAIC) is controlled by the National People's Party of Amichand Rajbansi, chairman of the Council's executive committee.

Whilst these developments — the formation of the UDF and the revival of the TIC — were going on, a new organisation, the National Forum, was launched on June 11-12, 1983 at Hammanskraal, near Pretoria.

The Debate

According to Saths Cooper, one of its leaders, the National Forum "is the realisation of a long search for a common working basis that began with the advent of the Black Consciousness Movement in the early seventies in the course of which Steve Biko paid with his life."⁽¹¹⁾

However, there are differences between the National Forum and the original Black Consciousness Movement. In contrast to original Black Consciousness utterances, the National Forum is analysing the South African Society in terms of "class". But their "class analysis" is confusing. According to them South Africa is divided into a "ruling class" and an "oppressed working class". The implication here is that all whites are oppressors and all blacks are workers. They do admit that there are whites "who have rebelled and reneged on their class" but their role as a force for change is minimal.

Mkhabela, publicity secretary, expressed himself as follows:

"The dominant position in Azapo today is that the struggle is both a racial and a class struggle. And the dominant group in politics, in economics and the social sphere, are whites."⁽¹²⁾

And Cooper added:

"Whites in Southern Africa have never learned — or been taught — to follow. Those who wish to remain relevant can work to change such attitudes in their own communities, prepare for the change — and prevent white future shock as in Zimbabwe."⁽¹³⁾

Surely this differs from our movement's position which states that — although the black masses are the major forces for change — everybody has a role to play in this struggle for change. We do not advocate a policy of "preparation for change" and "prevention of future white shock"!

There is basically nothing new in these policies of the National Forum. This is the old thesis of the Trotskyite Non-European Unity Movement — a thesis of the haves and have nots. What is perhaps new is this "broad alliance" of the Trotskyite and Black Consciousness organisations.

Some of the leading stars in this broad alliance are Dr Neville Alexander, Muntu Myeza and Saths Cooper. Neville Alexander was a former member of the National Liberation Front which, it was said 20 years ago, was the continuation of the Yu Chi Chan Club. He was imprisoned for 10 years on Robben Island, released in 1974 and restricted — the ban expired in 1979. Muntu Myeza and Saths Cooper, General Secretary and Vice President of Azapo respectively, are also Robben Island "graduates" who both served 6 years after being found guilty in the Black Consciousness trial of 1975/76 of

conspiring to commit acts which might have endangered the maintenance of law and order: they organised a "viva Frelimo" rally!

In other words the fundamental pillar of black consciousness ideology, today is that in the South African context there are "two classes" of people; the oppressed and oppressor. The oppressed and exploited are disfranchised and can therefore not join hands with whites — no matter how sincere those whites may be.

Even the Freedom Charter is questioned. Cooper says:

"Basically, we have serious reservations about its ethnic orientation. It is centred on preservation of racial groupings and recognising minority rights. We are fighting to stamp out all traces of ethnicity."⁽¹⁰⁾

The Freedom Charter is regarded as a "particular demand at a particular epoch in history" and "certain things there would not find much relevance in a society almost three decades removed because a society is not a static thing like a document bound in history can be".⁽¹¹⁾ It is said that the Freedom Charter is "a document of a particular political persuasion" and it stands for 'liberal democracy' whereas the Manifesto, a National Forum document, stands for 'socialist democracy'.⁽¹²⁾

The Manifesto

It is worth noting that the UDF does not feel it necessary to involve itself in this mud-slinging exercise. This is perhaps a sign of its maturity.

The National Forum was convened by Azapo, an organisation formed in 1978 which regards itself as a torch-bearer of Black Consciousness. The shift in the positions of Black Consciousness have been discussed, but this shift is more in words because the conception of "class" tends to coincide with "race": the whites are oppressors and the blacks are workers. Besides the fact that Azapo advocates non-participation in any government structures or plans, it also rejects the emergence of the TIC as reinforcing the government's ethnic divisions among blacks. Azapo is suspicious of whites. Said Mkhabela:

"We won't sanction campaigning under white tutelage."⁽¹³⁾

And Saths Cooper:

"We recognise there is a handful of dedicated whites who happen to find themselves as members of the white class. We say these people have a role to play.

But, as I have already said, the only role they can play is within their own community. Their role can only be positive if they prepare their fellow whites for change in the country ... The challenge facing white liberals and the white left is that of working among their people. They should make them aware of evils they are perpetuating and prepare them for the dawning of a new Azania where whites will cease to see themselves as whites ... Black people don't have to be told by whites about oppression. Blacks know it by experience."⁽¹⁴⁾

The theories propounded in this quotation are fraught with danger. Suffice to say that this is a typical example of the very ethnicity which Saths Cooper and his colleagues are denouncing.

Nearly 600 delegates representing about 100 organisations attended the Hammanskraal National Forum meeting. It must be stated that some organisations, supporters of the UDF, attended because it had been said no decisions would be taken, only opinions would be canvassed. It was to be a forum of discussion. All the same, four commissions sat at the Forum dealing with the land question, the basis for principled unity, minimum demands and consolidation of these efforts against the so-called new deal. A Manifesto of the Azanian people was adopted. The resolutions commission reports and the Manifesto are full of inconsistencies.

The common and recurring themes are the struggle against "racial capitalism" — at times it is called "racist capitalism"; the struggle in South Africa is "nationalist in character and socialist in content"; the goal is the "establishment of a democratic anti-racist worker Republic in Azania" under black working class leadership. "They (the workers) alone can end the system as it stands today because they alone have nothing at all to lose." The land is going to be under the control of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We are told by Saths Cooper that those organisations present constituted "the only road to liberation"⁽¹⁴⁾ and that the Manifesto is "the only clear socialist document to emerge from amongst the ranks of the Black people"⁽¹⁷⁾.

When Saths Cooper talks like this it is clear that he has either not seen the Road to South African Freedom — the Programme of the South African Communist Party — or he refuses to accept it. The Programme does not talk of "racial capitalism"; but of *colonialism of a special type* — a thesis which the National Forum will not accept. Indeed, compared with the Communist Party Programme the demands in the Manifesto of the Azanian people look like a shopping list.

National Question and Ethnicity

The term "racial capitalism" not only conceals but rejects the national oppression of our people. Indeed, Neville Alexander tells us:

"The class struggle against capitalist exploitation and the national struggle against racial oppression become one struggle under the general command of the black working class and its organisations. Class, colour and nation converge in the national liberation movement."⁽¹⁸⁾

This formulation is repeated in the report on the land question:

"The working class struggle against capitalist exploitation and the national struggle against racial oppression have become one struggle under the general control and direction of the Black working class."⁽¹⁹⁾

This wrong thesis inevitably leads to the rejection of the national democratic stage of our revolution and calls for a socialist Azania or what Nosizwe calls in his book *One Azania, One Nation*.⁽²⁰⁾ This theoretical framework "socialism now" is the basis for an attack on the Freedom Charter, for the trivialisation of the national question and a refusal to move from abstract theory or abstract intellectualism to concrete and living reality.

Here we see an attempt to "impose" working class leadership. The attempt to merge the working class struggle with the national liberation struggle is *sectarianism par excellence*. According to this sectarian view the stages of our revolution are negated and the working class is being mobilised, not to spearhead the struggle for national liberation and against national oppression, but to spearhead a struggle for a "socialist Azania." There is a lot that is assumed without being worked for.

ANC President O.R. Tambo hit the nail on the head when, at a press conference in London recently, he said:

"We have been aware of the growing insistence on South Africa being an independent, sovereign African state. The people of South Africa do not regard this regime as presiding over an independent sovereign country because that independence and sovereignty is restricted only to the white population, a small minority of the people of South Africa. Therefore, if you see South Africa as simply a white country of 4½ million people, then indeed it is independent, it is sovereign... But then you are proceeding on the basis that 26-27 million people just don't exist. We reject that, totally. We say South Africa is one country. It has some 30 million people, but it is being run as if it was two countries, the one colonising the other..."⁽²¹⁾

On the question of civil rights, President Tambo said:

"... The South African constitution excludes the blacks. They are outside the constitution. There is nothing they can do about decisions, policies of the South African regime. They don't belong. They are fighting from outside this white state. That is not a civil rights struggle at all. If we were part of the constitution, if we were citizens like any other, then of course there would be rights to fight for, as there are rights to fight for in the United States. But in South Africa the position is different. Our struggle is basically, essentially, fundamentally a national liberation struggle..." (our emphasis).⁽²²⁾

This is where the National Forum people go wrong. They do not accept the colonial nature of the apartheid regime and logically reject that our struggle is, to quote President Tambo, "basically, essentially, fundamentally a national liberation struggle."

On the Transvaal Indian Congress

It should be remembered that the anti-SAIC campaign in 1981 not only dislodged the reactionary and collaborationist hold over the Indian community in the Transvaal, throwing their ranks into complete chaos and disrepute, but also indicated a need for a fully-fledged progressive political organisation.⁽²³⁾ The anti-SAIC presented an alternative political leadership and organisation to the community in the context of a massive popular rejection of apartheid and its puppets. The campaign was the first national political campaign in the Indian areas since the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and served as a political lever for advancing the level of political consciousness in the Indian community. The Transvaal anti-SAIC operated as a committee which sought to mobilise Indians in the Transvaal against the SAIC elections. It was an issue-oriented organisation rather than a political organisation with a long-term programme.

By the end of the campaign it had become evident that gains could no longer be made by mobilising public support through mass meetings and distributing newsletters, and that what was needed was to create a basis for ongoing political activity and organisation. Only in this way could activists provide the community in which they are based with consistent political, moral and intellectual leadership. This becomes all the more important when the state takes initiatives to coopt sections of the population. How can one mobilise or win over these sections — for instance the middle strata — if one declares them enemies? To declare them enemies is to play into the hands of the regime.

A political organisation was necessary to consolidate the gains made during the anti-SAIC campaign, to entrench the position of the political leadership that emerged during the campaign and to forge alliances with religious, cultural, sporting and other organisations which already existed and draw them together in an attempt to unify them under a political programme.

Those who are critical of the idea of reviving the TIC seem to be confusing goals with methods and mistake the consciousness of political activists and intellectuals for the consciousness of the masses. Establishing structures which are sensitive to the unique conditions confronted by the oppressed and linked by coordinating machinery, ensures both mass organisation and the unity of the oppressed at mass level.

An organisation can only be accused of being ethnic if it evokes an ethnic identity amongst its supporters, if it encourages an ethnic separateness and protects and advances its own separate and corporate group interests. But

mention of the TIC evokes not ethnicity, but historical events and symbols rich in significance and meaning: the Xuma-Dadoo-Naicker pact; the Congress of the People; the Defiance Campaign; Congress Alliance; the Freedom Charter; Dadoo, Lutuli, Mandela, Naicker, Sisulu etc.

Since the late 1940's the TIC has been closely associated with the struggle for liberation from all forms of oppression and exploitation for all the people of South Africa. It is deeply rooted in the community, with many people still supporting its proud history in the struggle for a non-racial democracy in South Africa. A new political organisation would have to prove itself anew and spend a great deal of time and energy in an attempt to establish its legitimacy at a mass level.

It is through the medium of ideology that the mass relate to a political programme and therefore an organisation. The Freedom Charter is a strong material force at a mass level, not only because of its content, but because it has a deep symbolic resonance. The revival of the TIC is not a sentimental act of faith — important as that is — but the establishment of a continuity between popular revolutionary tradition of struggle and present interests and goals of the people.

One cannot mobilise people politically on the basis of some abstract notion of politics. One has to begin from where the people are, from their understanding of the burning issues, and proceed from there. The reality of our situation is that the enemy has divided our people. It has imposed not only separation but also a hierarchy of racial oppression.

The oppressed people react and respond differently to this separation and hierarchy of racial oppression. Let us take the various student boycotts. In the Soweto uprising of 1976 the African students led the way and called on the other students to boycott. The response was slow and uneven. The Coloured students led the boycott in 1980. Again the response was very uneven. Even the famous Committee of 81 in the Cape — hailed as a model of organisation and discipline in the conduct of a student boycott — revealed some problems. The African students were never totally integrated into this committee, as demonstrated by their continued boycott after other students had called theirs off.⁽²⁴⁾

What we are saying is that unity must be created and not assumed.

We must fight against any ethnic separatism or anything that promotes ethnic differences or exclusive ethnicity. This does not mean that we should ignore all manifestations of ethnicity. We must *build up* a truly united struggle against national oppression, starting from the realities of separation. A simple assertion of the desirability of unity means nothing. Unity has to be built; it has to be fought for.

Problems and Contradictions

Problems facing organisations at home are manifold. Azapo was formed in 1978; the Azanian Students' Organisation (Azaso) in 1979. Whilst Azapo is strongly opposed to the Freedom Charter, or parts of it, Azaso endorses the Freedom Charter. This endorsement of the Freedom Charter by Azaso represents also a sharp break from Azaso's predecessor, SASO, which was firmly in the Black Consciousness tradition.

The attitude to the Freedom Charter has become a demarcation line, and now as in the past, amongst black organisations at home. In a joint statement released to *The Sowetan*, the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU), General and Allied Workers' Union (GAWU), Congress of South African Students (Cosas) and Azanian Students' Organisation (Azaso) said they could not be party to the adoption of the National Forum's Manifesto because they were still committed to the Freedom Charter:

"We reiterate our uncompromising commitment to the historic Freedom Charter as the only democratic document drafted in the history of the liberation struggle. The Charter stands out from all other alternatives for change in South Africa, not only because of the manner in which it came into being, but also because of the demands reflected in it. It can therefore never be substituted without the will of the majority. Any attempt by an individual or group to discredit or undermine it can only be seen as an act of betrayal to the aspirations of all the people of South Africa."⁽²⁵⁾

In its opposition to "ethnicity" Azapo refused to deal directly with UDF because of UDF's multi-racial composition. Azapo talks only to UDF's black affiliates — in itself a form of ethnicity.

These problems hit the Media Workers' Association of Southern Africa (MWASA) at its conference in East London in January 1984. The organisation split over:

- (a) a decision to open its doors to whites and
- (b) affiliation to UDF.

Most members from the Southern and Northern Transvaal regions and the Natal region staged a walkout. The problem here is that the old constitution restricted membership to black workers and, according to the new MWASA president, J. Fuzile of Mdantsane, the new constitution is designed to meet the requirements of an industrial trade union which MWASA has evolved into from its original journalists-only body.⁽²⁶⁾ The other problem is that those who are against joining UDF because "this was a betrayal of workers' interests" maintain that black workers have common problems and there is a need to identify with one another and "no whites are members of the working class because they make the laws and are privileged."⁽²⁷⁾

A brief glance at the historical background will put these arguments into their proper perspective.

MWASA has been a major component of Black Consciousness. Three significant Black Consciousness unions existed prior to the regime's clampdown on 18 Black Consciousness organisations in 1977. These were the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU), the Consultative Committee for Black Trade Unions (CCBTU) and the Union of Black Journalists (UBJ). Several breakaways have occurred in BAWU, basically on ideological grounds. Out of these have appeared the non-racial General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), the National Federation of Workers (NFW) and, most notably, the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU). BAWU still lingers on, in fact limps about, as a feeble and ineffective organisation. The CCBTU shifted away from orthodox Black Consciousness in 1979 and became known as the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA). The UBJ is the only labour organisation to be outlawed by Pretoria. That was in 1977. SAAWU has been banned by the Ciskei bantustan.

The Writers' Association of South Africa (WASA) was formed by the Black Consciousness journalists following the ban on the UBJ. In 1980 WASA expanded to include other black workers in the media industry and became MWASA, the Media Workers' Association of South Africa. MWASA remained loyal to the tenets of Black Consciousness and rejected all contact with the South African Typographical Union and the South African Society of Journalists, which are largely white organisations.

Indications of strife within MWASA appeared when the Western Cape branch joined UDF towards the end of 1983. At their regional conference the Southern and Northern Transvaal branches of MWASA expressed their displeasure at this move. Both wings call themselves MWASA.

What has actually happened to MWASA is that a new, non-racial MWASA, intent on joining UDF, has emerged and for the first time the union is being led by a majority of non-journalist media workers. Both president and vice-president are non-journalists.

The UDF, though welcoming MWASA in its ranks, expressed its displeasure at the split and urged both factions to settle the dispute.

The UDF — which has more than 600 affiliates — fights against the Koornhof Bills (the most notorious of which is the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill)⁽²⁴⁾ and the new constitution. The two conditions for affiliation are support for the UDF declaration⁽²⁵⁾ and working outside the government-created structures. The structure of UDF is a decentralised, federal structure with five established regions: Transvaal,

Natal, Border, Western and Eastern Cape. Plans are afoot to establish regional structures in the Northern Cape and the Orange Free State.

This is not to suggest that the UDF does not have problems. The very emergence of the UDF and its fast rate of development created an excitement which drew the leadership of many of the affiliated organisations into UDF campaigns at the expense of the affiliates themselves. There has also been the problem of police harassment and intimidation, the distribution of false leaflets by the enemy, arrests and bannings, the attempt to project the UDF as a "front of the ANC". All this is aimed at isolating the UDF from the masses.

Another problem is that the base of the UDF is largely urban, yet repression is at its worst in the rural areas. These and many other problems are cause for concern and their solution is not always easy.

The defeat of the new constitution is imperative. It seeks to co-opt the Coloured and Indian people into the ruling group as junior partners in the continued oppression of our people, thus destroying the basis for a non-racial democratic movement. It is imposed by the Nationalist Government as a blueprint for minority rule maintained by institutionalised violence. This new constitution implies African denationalisation and exile to barren bantustans. It opens the way for the incorporation of Indian and Coloured youth in the armed forces where they will be compelled to shed the blood of fellow blacks.

Conclusion

In this article we have tried to show that the ideology of Black Consciousness today is at a crossroads. Roughly speaking, one can identify these trends or tendencies in it: there is the residue of the 60's and 70's; there is that wing which has accepted or is moving towards acceptance of the Freedom Charter; and there is the National Forum group which is heavily influenced by the Unity Movement through leaders like Neville Alexander. Neville Alexander took the term Azania from Black Consciousness, but in return he gave them "class analysis" which did not differ much from the Black Consciousness ideology except that he threw overboard the "national question" and substituted it with terms like "racial capitalism" and the struggle for a "socialist workers' Republic of Azania". He attacks all those who are fighting for national liberation as advocates of ethnicity, thus creating a platform to attack the ANC and the Freedom Charter from ultra-left positions.

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