

MEMORANDUM ON VAAL HISTORY

in re : GOLDSTONE COMMISSION / BOIPATONG INQUIRY

1. A key event in the history of the violence which has taken place in the Vaal Triangle over the past years was the Inkatha rally held on the 22nd July 1990. On or about the 16th July 1990, information was received by COSATU that a meeting had been held at Denver Hostel on the 10th July 1990, concerning the forthcoming rally, and at which meeting there had been incitement to participants that they should attack persons and property belonging to COSATU and ANC members.
2. Communications then followed to Inkatha, the Minister of Law & Order, the Commission of Police and the Divisional Commissioner of Police for the West Rand. In essence, these communications sought effective steps to be taken to prevent any such attacks. A copy of a Memorandum relating to this is annexed hereto, marked "A". **(NOTE : A PROPER COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM AND ITS ANNEXURES MUST BE OBTAINED, AS WELL AS IDENTITY OF THE AUTHOR AND CONFIRMATORY AFFIDAVITS).**
3. These communications eventually resulted in an undertaking being given by Inkatha, through its lawyer, that there would be no attack on Vaal residents. COSATU also received an assurance from the Commander of Police in Sebokeng that those attending the Inkatha

rally would not be allowed to carry weapons. On the 20th July 1990, COSATU issued a press statement (Annexure "B"), inter alia, detailing the steps that had been taken and calling on all township residents and hostel dwellers to remain calm and disciplined. (CLARITY SHOULD BE OBTAINED ON WHO RELEASED THIS STATEMENT AND A CONFIRMATORY AFFIDAVIT OBTAINED; IT MUST BE ENSURED THAT THE FULL COPY IS AVAILABLE).

4. In fact, however, Inkatha members who attended the rally on the 22nd July 1990 had not been disarmed. The rally was held at the Sebokeng Stadium in Zone 7a. Among others, Rev. P Moerane of the Vaal Council of Churches, attended at the stadium with the intention of ensuring that no violence broke out. A number of police vehicles were parked next to the stadium. At about 15h30, the rally ended and a large group of Inkatha members left the Stadium. Rev. Moerane saw police talking to them, assumed that this concerned the embarking of Inkatha members on the buses which were available, for them to depart. However, these persons went past the buses and marched into Zone 7a. As they did so, people in the group started assaulting persons within their reach. Rev. Moerane himself came under

threat. He appealed unsuccessfully to Col. Fourie, who was present, that the Inkatha members should be ordered into their buses to leave. About 99 houses along the main road in Zone 7a were attacked. Scores of people were injured and Mr. Daniel Rapuleng was stabbed to death. After the attacks started, Col. Mazibuko arrived at the scene. Rev. Moerane had discussion with him. All that time, all that Col. Mazibuko was successful in doing was to persuade the Inkatha members to change their route away from the main residential areas.

5. Inkatha supporters from the rally then moved to the Sebokeng Hostel in Zone 14. At the hostel, attacks were launched on hostel dwellers who had refused to participate in the rally. Large scale conflict followed. It may be remarked at this stage that the Inkatha supporters who came to the rally had come from, principally, hostels around the reef area. It was the first public meeting of Inkatha in the Vaal Triangle. A number of deaths resulted from the conflict at the hostel, being some 13 hostel dwellers and 2 policemen.

6. After the conflict at the Sebokeng Hostel on the 22nd

July 1990, Inkatha supporters who had lived in that hostel, who were in a minority, moved out of the hostel and took occupation of the Kwa-Madala Hostel, which at that time was standing empty. That group formed the nucleus of residents in Kwa-Madala, and thereafter made calls on Zulu speaking people from the Kwa-Masiza and Sebokeng Hostels to join them at Kwa-Madala. In time, a large number of people took up occupation at the Kwa-Madala Hostel. Iscor, which own the hostel, arranged for basic services to be reconnected.

7. On the 1st August 1990, there was a raid on Sebokeng Hostel by a large number of SAP and SADF members. This happened immediately after a clash between Inkatha members and the hostel residents. Some hostel dwellers were arrested during this raid and the police seized weapons. Later that afternoon, two hostel inmates were shot dead at the Houtleuwen Station, next to the hostel. In the days thereafter, a number of hostel residents were shot through the windowpanes of their rooms. Rev. Moerane received a number of reports alleging that these shots were fired by members of the police, driving in vehicles without registration plates.

8. In response to these events, on the 9th August 1990, some 33 church leaders participated in a march in order to hand in a Memorandum to the District Commissioner in Vereeniging. Rev. Moerane was one of them. A copy of the Memorandum which was submitted is annexed hereto marked "C". The Memorandum was handed to Col. Fourie, the District Commissioner. No proper response was forthcoming from the police, who wanted to know why church leaders were siding with COSATU and not with Inkatha. Seemingly, no attention was given by the police to the matters raised in the Memorandum. Only 2 days later, on the 11th August 1990, there was another attack on the Sebokeng attack on the Sebokeng Hostel by an identified gunman or gunmen, in which 9 people were shot dead and 10 badly injured.

9. In the early hours of the morning of the 4th September 1990, there was a further major attack on the residents of the Sebokeng Hostel. It is alleged that this attack was initiated by Inkatha members from the Kwa-Madala Hostel. This attack met with fierce resistance from the hostel residents and the attackers were driven into one of the hostel blocks. A large number of people gathered around this block, some of whom wanted to

ensure that those inside did not escape arrests and others who wanted to attack. Themba Khoza, the regional chairman of Inkatha, was present at the scene. Firearms and explosives were found in the booth of his car. He was charged with possession, although eventually acquitted because the necessary elements for possession had not been proved.

10. Rev. Moerane was present and spoke to Col. Fourie and Col. Steyn about the situation. A number of SADF reinforcements arrived. It appeared that the situation was under control. Rev. Moerane then went into the hostel to ascertain the state of affairs with regard to deaths, injuries and damage. Some ten minutes later, he heard gunfire and found that the SADF had opened fire, with some 11 people dead. (An account of the shooting by Rev. Lord McCamel dated the 6th September 1990 is annexed hereto marked "D").

11. Some 135 of the attackers were arrested. (DETAILS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CRIMINAL CASE AND INQUEST REQUIRED. DETAILS ALSO REQUIRED FROM SELLO MORAKE ABOUT MEETINGS WITH GENERAL ERASMUS AND COL. MAZIBUKO CONCERNING A POLICE PATROL AND WHY IT WAS WITHDRAWN ON THE 4TH SEPTEMBER).

12. One of the results of attacks of the sort recounted above and the absence of effective policing intervention, was a deepening distrust of security forces, particularly those consisting of white members or under the command of white officers. This concern led to an approach in early December 1990 to Col. Mazibuko for the appointment of an exclusively Black police patrol around the Sebokeng Hostel. Incidents of violence and a fear of further major attacks continued to be a source of anxiety for the hostel residents and surrounding community. Col. Mazibuko agreed to the request and members of the local police force who were trusted by the community were appointed to such patrol. It proved to be successful and letters of appreciation from the VCC and the Hostel Residents' Committee, dated the 10th December 1990, were forwarded to Col. Mazibuko. Copies are annexed hereto marked "E1" and "E2".

13. The question of the involvement of White security forces has been, and remains a matter of grave concern to residents. It is widely perceived to be the general pattern of events that complaints concerning, for instance, abductions and assaults concerning Kwa-Madala

residents are made to the local police. It is generally not clearly that any effective investigation or any investigation at all has been launched. Rev. Moerane has had several communications with w/o Letlala, the Public Relations Officer at the Sebokeng Police Station, concerning this perception and the apparent lack of effective follow-up investigation. From these communications, it has emerged that there is a problem concerning the interaction between the Black police at Sebokeng and the White police at Vereeniging. Cases reported to the police at Sebokeng would be taken over by the police at Vereeniging and nothing further would be heard about them by the Sebokeng police. It would also happen that the Sebokeng Police would be informed that Vereeniging Police had carried out a raid at Kwa-Madala Hostel. No information would have been given to the Sebokeng Police before hand. There would therefore be no participation by them and they would remain clear about what had happened in the raid and as a result thereof. As a result of all this, there is the serious problem that Black police are seen as having no authority or power to act properly as a police force. In turn, this lead to great frustration and lack of confidence with the local police and

mistrust of other security force elements. This is currently and acute problem.

14. By December 1990, the ongoing pattern of violence in the Vaal and the role of residents of Kwa-Madala Hostel therein, led to a decision by the VCC that an approach should be made to Iscor concerning this matter, since Iscor owned the hostel. A meeting took place on the 11th December 1990 and on the 12th December 1990, the management of Iscor recorded its position in a fax to the VCC. A copy of the fax and a typed transcript thereof is annexed hereto marked "F1" and "F2" respectively. On the same day, pursuant to a request from Iscor management, that prove be furnished of involvement of Kwa-Madala residents in acts of violence, the VCC forwarded the names of some persons arrested by the police in Sebokeng, for cross-checking against Iscor records. A copy of the said letter is annexed hereto marked "F3".

15. In December 1990, Rev. Moerane received a report from Saul Tsotetsi, then a fieldworker of the VCC, who was killed on the 22nd March 1992, concerning a complaint from 2 young men concerning an assault by "comrades".

Early in January 1991, a youth called Nangalembe was found dead and it had been reported that he had been abducted by 2 young men in question.

16. On the 11th January 1991, Rev. Moerane was told by the family of the deceased that they feared an attack during the funeral proceedings and that the house was being kept under surveillance. Rev. Moerane conveyed this to the police at Sebokeng and was assured that there would be a police patrol. This was set out in a memorandum to an attorney from Rev. Moerane on the 17th January 1991, a copy of which is annexed hereto marked "G". In addition to the telephone call, Rev. Moerane had gone personally to the police station and discussed the matter with Sg. Makgethe.

17. Saul Tsotsetsi was assigned by the VCC to attend the night vigil. He reported that he had been present from the start until 12:45 and that during that time he had not seen any police vehicles patrolling the area. Almost immediately after he left, there was an attack on the mourners and some 48 people were killed.

18. The son of Beulah Kubeka, a prominent member of the Inkatha Freedom Party, was identified as having been one of the attackers. Eleven people were thereafter arrested and their trial is pending. They were granted bail and reside at the Kwa-Madala Hostel (NOTE THAT DETAILS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE TRIAL ARE REQUIRED).
19. In response to the night vigil massacre, attacks were carried out on the homes of certain members of the Inkatha Freedom Party, including that of Khetisa Kheswa. Several homes were burned. The families who had been thus attacked left their homes and moved into the Kwa-Madala Hostel.
20. On the 25th January 1991, the VCC addressed an urgent fax to the Minister of Law & Order. This memorandum detailed a number of instances and mentioned that there was dissatisfaction with the response of Col. Fourie to the earlier approach by church leaders, referred to above. Reference was made also to the use of Kwa-Madala Hostel as a springboard for attacks on residents. A copy of this letter is annexed hereto marked "H".

21. The Minister's response was to refer us to the local police. (A COPY OF THE REPLY IS REQUIRED). After this, Col. Steyn telephoned the VCC office as a result of our letter to the Minister. (DETAILS ON THIS ARE REQUIRED FROM REV. KOLOKOTO).
22. In the months thereafter, there were regular incidents of assaults, kidnappings and killings. By far the greater number of such reports included allegations of involvement on the part of Kwa-Madala residents. There were also reports of abductions by residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel of residents of the Kwa-Masiza Hostel. Rev. Moerane and others attended a further meeting with the District Commissioner of Police, in order to convey the extreme concern of the VCC and Vaal residents concerning this ongoing violence and to request action on the Kwa-Madala Hostel. It was found to be difficult to convince the police of the dangers posed for the community by the residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel. The meeting concluded with oral undertaking from the police that they would investigate and take whatever action they considered necessary. A press release was made after this meeting. (COPY THEREOF IS REQUIRED).

23. At the end of May 1991, the Lekoa City Council decided to switch off electricity to the townships in its area with effect from the 3rd June 1991. In the belief that the cutting of electricity would further destabilize the area, the VCC directed an appeal to the State President for his intervention. This letter went by fax from the VCC offices on the 1st June 1991. On the 3rd June 1991 church leaders marched to the Lekoa City Council offices, from which offices the letter to the State President was again fax. (DETAILS TO BE VERIFIED). A copy of the letter is annexed hereto marked "I". Our request was transferred from the State President's office to that of the Minister concerned. In the result, the decision to cut off the electricity stood. The church leaders staged a sit-in at the Lekoa Council offices and were arrested and subsequently convicted for trespassing.

24. On or about the 6th June 1991, a group of residents from Kwa-Madala Hostel went to the house of Mr. Ernest Sotsu, a prominent ANC member living in Boipatong. Amongst this group was Mr. Kheswa. Mr. Sotsu, not being at home, his family was informed that Sotsu was to report to them at the Kwa-Madala Hostel, failing

which drastic action would be taken against him. Similar visits were made on a number of occasions thereafter. They were reported to the police and Kheswa and others were arrested on charges of intimidation. They were released on bail.

25. On the 3rd July 1991, while Sotsu was in Durban at the ANC National Conference, his home was attacked and his wife, daughter and grandson were killed. Two other grandchildren who were also shot survived and were able to identify one of the attackers as Kheswa. He was arrested on charges of murder, but subsequently released from custody.

26. Kheswa is a notorious figure in the Vaal. Rev. Moerane, at a meeting with senior officers of the police sought clarity from them on the number of instances that Kheswa had been arrested on serious charges, but released on bail. The information was promised for a further meeting, but never materialised.

27. On or about the 8th July 1991, a tavern in Zone 7, Sebokeng, was shot up and 5 people killed, with some 14 injured. Immediately after this, a search was carried

out of the Kwa-Madala Hostel and 3 AK 47 rifles and ammunition seized. Rev. Moerane circulated these matters in a letter of the 12th July 1991 to churches, in which there was again reference to the need for an urgent meeting with Iscor management. A copy of these circular is annexed hereto marked "J".

28. Pursuant to these matters, doctor Vanaroff of NUMSA wrote to Iscor on the 22nd July 1991, proposing inter alia, that Kwa-Madala be demolished. A copy of the fax is annexed hereto marked "K". The reply from Iscor dated the 24th July is annexed hereto marked "L". The management of Iscor were of the view that there was no reason to treat Kwa-Madala differently from Kwa-Masiza.

29. Mounting dissatisfaction with, inter alia, the continued escalation of violence led to the launch of a consumer boycott of white businesses in the Vaal area. A copy of a press release from ANC Vaal relating to this boycott is annexed hereto marked "M". In August 1991, the issue of Kwa-Madala was again taken up by the VCC with Iscor management. On the 15th August 1991, Rev. Moerane accompanied a group of women from the VCC Women's Ministeries to Iscor, where a letter concerning

Kwa-Madala was handed to Mr. Viljoen. A copy of the letter is annexed hereto marked "N1". Iscor replied on the 19th August 1991, enclosing a copy of their policy on Kwa-Madala. Copies of these documents are annexed hereto marked "N2" and "N3", respectively.

30. On the 24th September 1991 conflict arose between residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel and the police, resulting in 5 residents being killed. Pursuant thereto, a meeting was held between the VCC and Iscor. A memorandum was prepared for this meeting, a copy of which is annexed hereto marked "N4".

31. At the meeting with Iscor, the VCC put forward the notion of a joint monitoring commission. In a letter from the VCC on the 4th October 1991 to Iscor, this proposal was confirmed. A copy thereof is annexed hereto marked "N5". Also annexed, marked "N6" is a letter of the 8th October 1991 from Iscor, enclosing the Aid Memoir as prepared by them in respect of a meeting of the 24th September 1991.

32. It will be seen that Iscor suggested that the Commission be linked to the National Peace Accord. At

the meeting, management had made it clear that they saw the issue as being one between the ANC and Inkatha. They therefore wanted it linked to a political dimension with Mr. Mandela and Chief Buthelezi being brought in. This is contrary to the position we were representing, being that workers wanted it resolved as a matter between employees and did not want it politicized. An additional problem was that Iscor put forward names of people from Kwa-Madala Hostel to be part of this Commission, who were widely recognised in the community as war-lords. In addition also, the violence emanating from the Kwa-Madala Hostel was not against ANC persons only, but against the community as a whole. As a result, no joint Commission was ever established.

33. During this period, there continued to be instances of assaults, abductions and killings. As had been the case previously, allegations continued to be made that residents of Kwa-Madala were involved in a great number of such incidents.
34. On or about the 17th November 1991, an Inkatha member was attacked and killed in Sharpville by a group of

youth allegedly supporting the ANC. There were fears concerning security for the day of the funeral, fixed for the 24th November 1991. In order to address this, Rev. Moerane and others attended a meeting with the Station Commander of the Sharpville Police. He was persuaded by the community representatives that mourners at the funeral should not carry arms. He telephoned a White senior officer, who overrode that request, on the basis that disarming Inkatha members would result in violence. On the day of the funeral, the police presence which had been promised was absent and the Inkatha mourners were armed. Violence resulted and one sharpville resident was stabbed to death. A report on these events prepared at the time by Rev. Moerane is annexed hereto marked "O".

35. During the second half of 1991, several meeting were held with the Divisional Commissioner of Police in Vereeniging. Rev. Moerane was present at 3 of these meetings. At each of these meetings, the VCC raised its concern about attacks against the residents of Sebokeng, Sharpville and Boipatong, which were emanating from the Kwa-Madala Hostel. At each of these meetings, the response of the police was in essence

that there was insufficient evidence of them to take action.

36. On the 8th January 1992, Rev. Moerane and others attended a meeting with Col. Steyn and Cpt. De Klerk in Vereeniging, concerning the abduction of Johannes Mthumkulu, allegedly into the Kwa-Madala Hostel. Initially, these police officers agreed that a raid of the hostel would be carried out. On the following day, however, at a meeting with the Divisional Commissioner, it was said by Cpt. Roos that the police needed to be on "the right side of the law" before they could conduct a raid. After further discussion, the meeting reached a deadlock, with the police holding the view that there was no basis upon which a raid could be conducted. Subsequently, Saul Tsotsetsi was informed by the police that they had conducted a raid on or about the 16th January 1992, but had not discovered any weapons, nor found anyone being held against their will at the Kwa-Madala Hostel.

37. Incidents of the sort already described continued to take place and members of Inkatha and or residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel were identified in respect of

such incidents. Certain of these have already been set out in Memoranda placed before this Commission.

38. In recent months, complaints about police conduct and calls for proper investigation have continued. An example of this relates to several students who were arrested and allegedly assaulted while in custody at the Sebokeng Police Station. A self explanatory letter addressed by the attorneys of record for the VCC and ANC (Vaal) in this Commission on the 6th March 1992 to the Commissioner of Police is annexed hereto marked "P". **(DETAILS ARE REQUIRED OF THE REACTION TO THIS LETTER).**

39. The tardiness on the part of police authorities to respond to complaints about police misconduct has produced extreme levels of anger and frustration in the community. A recent instance concerns a shooting by Const. Skuta Marumo on the 1st March 1992 of A M Molebatsi. Documents relating thereto have already been placed before a Committee of this Commission. For convenience, a copy thereof is annexed hereto marked "Q". **(FULL COPY TO BE OBTAINED).** As is evident from this documentation, repeated requests that Const.

Marumo be suspended, arrested or transferred went unheeded. Subsequently, on (DATE TO BE INSERTED), Const. Marumo was killed by unidentified members of the community. An indicator of their rage was that his body was chopped into pieces and distributed at various places where allegations had been made of unlawful conduct by the late constable.

40. On the 28th April 1992, the Sebokeng Branch of the ANC approached the Station Commander of the Sebokeng Police to arrange a meeting concerning violence and police action. A copy of the letter is annexed hereto marked "R". This approach was rejected by the police. (DETAILS OF THIS ARE TO BE OBTAINED FROM V M TAHMAE).

ANNEXURE "F2"

With reference to our conversation of the 11th December 1990, regarding the conflict situation in the Vaal Triangle and with specific reference to Iscor employees living in the Kwa-Madala complex, the management of Iscor, Vanderbiljpark, would like to state their position as follows : -

1. We fully share your concern regarding the present situation and alleged escalation of violence. Iscor has done and is doing everything possible to ensure the safety and stability of its workforce.
2. Our ultimate objective is to have all our employees living together harmoniously in Kwa-Masiza. The reason why we allowed some of our employees to move to Kwa-Madala is that they felt their lives threatened in Kwa-Masiza and to force them to return against their will, has the potential of creating further tension and conflict at this stage.
3. Extensive negotiations between the leaders of residents of Kwa-Madala and Kwa-Masiza and management to ensure the return of residents to Kwa-Masiza have been underway for several weeks and considerable progress

have been made. The continuation of the negotiation are schedule for early January 1991.

4. There is an understanding between the residents of Kwa-Madala and management that only Iscor employees may live in the hostel and several inspections by our security department have been carried out to ensure compliance with this agreement. The latest inspection was during the evening of the 11th December 1990.

I trust that the above gives you a clearer perspective of management's endeavours to ensure the well-being of all its employees, as well as the local community.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING CO-OPERATION WITH THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

1. All the earlier facts are set out in our letter dated the 9th October 1992, which is annexed hereto. I note, however, that the fax only went out on the Monday, which was the 12th October 1992.
2. On the 12th October 1992 I got a telephone call from Adv. Van der Merwe at the Sebokeng offices. When I phoned back, there was no reply.
3. On the 14th October 1992 I got another message that Adv. Van der Merwe phoned. I telephoned him back on the 15th October and was told that he was on leave until Monday. (It should be noted that I phoned him both in Pretoria and at Vereeniging, who both said that he would be on leave until Monday). A message was left for him to phone me.
4. On the 16th October 1992 I received a telephone call from Adv. Van der Merwe, but was not in at the time. I returned Adv. Van der Merwe's call the same day and was told that he was not in. I left a message for him to phone me.
5. On the 19th October 1992 I got a message to phone Adv. Van der Merwe very urgently. As I was not in the office at the time, I asked Crystal to return the call, who informed him that the community were taking their final decision at a meeting on Wednesday night, the 21st October 1992, and that as soon as I knew, I would inform him. Crystal also told him that I would probably be informed on Thursday or Friday this week. Apparently Adv. Van der Merwe indicated to Crystal that

there had been a great misunderstanding and that he would be prepared to meet with the residents anywhere, anytime, night or day.

6. On Friday morning, the 23rd October 1992, I was informed by Scot that the community had agreed to meet with the Attorney-General staff on Sunday, the 25th October 1992 at 10.30a.m at the Boipatong Municipal offices. Faxes were sent to Dr. D'Oliviera at the Pretoria number and at the Vereeniging number. (A copy of the faxes are attached hereto).
7. At 3.45.pm on Friday afternoon, I telephoned the Attorney-General's office in Pretoria to check that Dr. D'Oliviera had received the message. I was told that Dr. D'Oliviera was not available until Monday and that there was no reply from Adv. Van der Merwe. I then spoke to a Mr. Bredenkamp and informed him of the urgency of the matter and he promised that he would get the message to D'Oliviera and/or Van der Merwe at their home numbers. He also took my home number in case there were any problems.
8. During the course of this week I have tried to find out from Scot whether the meeting actually took place and what transpired, but have had no success so far. Scot was meant to come up to Johannesburg yesterday and give me a full breakdown of the meeting. I am still in the process of attempting to contact him.

BOIPATONG INQUIRY

MEMORANDUM ON SADF VEHICLES

The following is a schedule of the movements of the SADF vehicles on 17 June 1992, insofar as these can be identified on the records furnished by the SADF, together with some general notes drawn from the records:-

Vehicle 19A

17:18 Picks up someone from rugby.
20:30 Advised of fault with radio.
23:10 On the way to Kwa-Madala (not identified from where).
00:30 Reports everything quiet.

Vehicle 19B

12:00 Verlaat roepsein na umas (?).
17:22 Seine 5/5.

Vehicle 19H

15:57 Seine 5/5.
02:00 Seine 5/5.

Vehicle 31A - Riot BGK592M (Bredenhann)

15:04 Kom roepsein binne.

Vehicle 31B - Toyota Riot BGK587M (Van Stratten)

11:31 Kom roepsein binne.

Vehicle 31C - Riot BGK588M (Roberts)

15:50 Verlaat roepsein na Groep 17 daarna na H4.

- 18:55 Returns to HQ.
- 19:45 Leaves HQ.
- 20:00 (Approx) Arrives at Sakesentrum.
- 21:10 (Approx) Leaves Sakesentrum for Boipatong.
- 21:40 (Approx) Back at Sakesentrum.
- 21:45 (Approx) Leaves Sakesentrum.
- 22:00 (Approx) Arrives at Boipatong.
- 21:50 Reports vehicle burning out (on the underside of the road which runs past Cape Gate, on a dirt road; see Roberts' Report)
- 22:05 Reports complaint received about crowd at robot to Iscor. (Told of about 300-350; see his report. According to the report, when Roberts went to investigate he saw nothing, so he went to the traffic lights at Bophelong, where there was also nothing to be seen).
- 22:30 Is informed by Signals about shooting at Cape Gate. (When they arrived at Cape Gate, they were given a report about gunshots and could hear them from across the road in Boipatong; they immediately requested reinforcements. A man came running to say that they had broken in at his house and were shooting and that he didn't know where his wife was; Roberts sent him to the gate of Cape Gate - ex his report).

Roberts transferred his men to a Buffel 31D (see below) and took his vehicle back to Cape Gate (it is not clear from where). He was then instructed by base to move back to Kwa-Madala to wait for Jordaan. In the meantime, 31D had seen the people crossing over the road to Kwa-Madala. He called them back where 31B joined them (not clear where). 31D reported that they had been fired at when they turned back (it is again not clear precisely what happened or where). They all then went back to Kwa-Madala where they were joined by Jordaan. He moved out with 31B and 31D, while Roberts and his driver were instructed to wait in the soft-skinned vehicle at the East gate.

Roberts goes on to report that one of his men fired gas on the command of Jordaan in order to chase out the people who were hiding in the grass. They later moved into the Iscor works with some people from Iscor to see if they could locate the people.

- 22:57 Reports itself at East Gate (presumably, of Iscor).

01:40 (Approx) At Vaal Kommando.

Vehicle 31D - Riot BGK617M (Odendaal)

07:49 Kom roepsein binne.

01:15 Back to HQ.

NOTE: The above entries come from the Signals Log. However, in the report of Roberts, there is reference to 31D as, apparently, being a Buffel and not a Riot vehicle.

According to Roberts, 31D joins him at Cape Gate at the stage when there has been shooting in the township and after someone has come running up to report an attack. Roberts then transferred his men to the Buffel, which moved around the area.

See further: the summary of the rest of Roberts' report under 31C above.

Vehicle 32A - Buffel BCV633M (Odendaal/Pienaar)

18:15 Leaves HQ.

22:00 Seine 5/5 (meaning ? - possibly, a signals test)

01:16 Returns to HQ.

Note: In his report, Odendaal refers to his task as:

"Patroleer gebied by Ooshek Yskor saam met 31C en 31B onder bevel van Majoor Jordaan."

From this, read with the report of Roberts, it would appear that this is the vehicle which Roberts refers to as 31D.

In his report, Odendaal records against the time of 23:10 and at "Frikkie Meyer by robot van Metalbox", the following incident:

"Sien 'n groot groep swartes met wit kop bande oor die pad beweeg in die rigting van Kwa-Madala (raporteer aan basis)."

Vehicle 32B

20:12 Leaves HQ

21:00 Reports shots at Kwa-Masiza

21:40 Reports gathering at a certain house; place unidentified.

22:15 Reports everything quiet; place unidentified.

22:45 Reports +-600 blacks moving in direction of Kwa-Mandela (sic)

22:50 Reported as requesting reinforcements.

23:12 Beweeg saam met SAP.

01:17 Returns to HQ.

Van Stratten's Vehicle

There is a report by Van Stratten, but the records do not per se indicate in what vehicle he was then moving; it would seem that it was no longer the Riot vehicle in which he had been earlier in the day. He was assigned to the escorting of buses to Kwa-Masiza and in his report notes that everything was quiet (he does not mention any shots). He then notes that: "Om +- 21:00 is ek ontrek na Boipatong nadat daar hewige geweervuur was en groepe mense gevorm het
(Note: his time of 21:00 must be inaccurate).

His report contains, further, the following:

"'n Groep mense +- 500 het geskiet in Boipatong en toe oor Frikkie Meyer Blvd beweeg na Kwa-Madala se rigting. Persone het agressief opgetree."

"Skietvoorval te Boipatong +- 500 mense was in Boipatong en het oorbeweeg na Kwa-Madala se rigting. Mense redelik agressief. Weet nie wat hulle doel van optrede is nie."

In respect of the action taken, Van Stratten records:

"Deursoek en fynkam gebied tussen Frikkie Meyer Blvd en Kwa-Madala. Vind egter geen swarte van die groep nie. Weet nie waarheen hulle verdwyn het nie."

MOVEMENTS OF 21 BATTALION

The report for the movements of 21 Battalion sets out specically what its tasks were, in the following terms:-

Mission: "Om in samewerking met die SAP die (unclear) van geweld te onderdruk."

Specific Tasks: "Beweeg na Metalbox Trek vulstasie om SAP te help om mense van Boipatong te verhoed om oor te beweeg na KwaMadala hostel."

Task Feedback: "1 Seksie is agtergelaat by die vulstasie. Die ander 2 is saam met die SAP in Boipatong om gebied te patroleer. +- 02h00 keer hulle terug en ons keer terug na Groep 17 (02h30)."

Note: it is striking that these troops were in no way to be deployed in an attempt to locate and arrest the attackers.

SADF: GENERAL

It is worth taking note of the following entry in one of the signals logs (it is not entirely clear whose):-

22:40 From Vaal K to GP 17:-

"Vaal Komdo berig dat +- 300 swartes op pad is na Kwa Madala hostel toe om die hostel te gaan aanval. SAP gaan stel ondersoek in. Vaal K berig later dat die situasie afgekoel het. RM word uitgestuur."

Note: The report that the group is on its way to attack the hostel is inconsistent with the indications in Van Stratten's report that the purpose of the group was not clear. The reference to "RM" is presumably to Reaksie Mag, which would be the troops of 21 Battalion.

Further logs show the following:-

2300 Vaal Komdo berig dat +- 500 mense oppad is Kwa Madala hostelle toe. Hulle wil blykbaar KwaMadala aanval. Vaal Komdo monitor die situasie. Geen verdere besonderhede nie."

2320 Kapt Roos doen navrae omtrent Vaal Komdo se patrollie se ligging. Hy beweer sy mense is op die toneel maar kan nie Vaal Komdo se patrollie sien nie. Kontak Vaal Komdo en hulle lig my in dat hulle patrollie by Yskor se Ooshek is. Verwittig kapt Roos."

NOTE: Capt Roos is involved in the co-ordination of the security forces.

2330 "RM van 21 SAI is uit na toneel by Kwa Madala."

0045 "RM berig dat die toneel gestabiliseer het en
dat die mense in klein groepies rondstaan. 9A
beveel dat die RM moet onttrek."

0050 "Dra boodskap so aan RM oor."

KST.

In re: Boipatong Inquiry

Memorandum on Police and other Records

The following is an outline, prepared on a chronological basis, of extracts from police and related records, which bear on the events in Boipatong on 17 June 1992.

17 JUNE 1992

18:40 (ISU-Ver)

Sers Strydom rapporteer dat by Cape Gate 'n groep s/jeugdiges die pad toepak met klippe en die verkeer met klippe gooi. 5J gee aandag.

18:55 (ISU-Ver)

5J rapporteer dat daar +/- 10 s/jeugdiges is wat die pad toe pak by Cape Gate. Toe hulle die Casper sien toe hardloop hulle weg. Geen optrede en verder alles stil en rustig. 5J doen patrollies.

19:10 (ISU-Ver)

5J Sers Du Toit rapporteer dat hulle in Boipatong patroulie gery het Boipatong. Hulle het 'n groep van tussen 40-50 ouderdom +/- 15-19 jaar gesien en dit gelyk het of hulle iemand aanrand. Hulle het toe na die groep gery en die groep het 3 petrolbomme na hulle gegooi. Net een van die drie het afgegaan. Hulle het wel opgetree en as volg Sers Du Toit mag nr 0445402-2 skiet 3 no 5's haalgeweer no 1398, Kst van Heerden mag nr 0439065-2 skiet 3 no 5's no 1485 en Kst (illegible) mag no 0443351-3 skiet 2 no 5's no 1433. Geen beseerings en die groep is uit een gejaag. Daar was wel nie 'n aanranding nie.

19:35 (ISU-Ver)

(Report of house 1304 Zone 10 Sebokeng burning)

19:45 (ISU-Ver)

(Report of 100-200 gathered at NG Kerk Zone 10-11)

20:05 (ISU-Ver)

5J Sers Potgieter - (detailed report regarding house burning)

20:05 (Boip)

Sit Rapp Alles nog stil en rustig te Ak (presumably aanklag kantoor) as ook gebied.

20:15 (ISU-Ver)

(5J and 5J3 patrolled at NG Kerk)

21:00 (Boip)

Sit Rapp Alles normaal te Ak as ook gebiede

(QUESTION: On the basis of what inspection or other source is this type of entry made, i.e. that all is quiet in the area? Does it imply that anything untoward in the township would be noticed from the police station?)

21:00 (SADF)

Vaal Commando Report This is the approximate and clearly incorrect time given by Cpl Van Stratten (vehicle unidentified) for the following incident description: Skietvoorval te Boipatong +/- 500 mense was in Boipatong en het oorbeweeg na KwaMadala se rigting. Mense redelik aggresief. Weet nie wat hulle doel van optrede is nie. Deursoek en fynkam gebied tussen Frikkie Meyer Blvd en KwaMadala. Vind egter geen swarte van die groep nie. Weet nie waarheen hulle verdwyn het nie.

(NOTE if the description is correct, then it would appear that the group moved off Noble Blvd and into the veld/reeds between Frikkie Meyer and the hostel. There is no mention of any police vehicle accompanying or following the group)

21:25 (ISU-Ver)

5J Sers Potgieter rapporteer dat Boipatong alles stil en rustig.

21:30 (ISU-Ver)

5J Sers Du Toit rapporteer dat Sharpeville alles stil en rustig is.

21:40 (ISU-Ver)

Diens aan "C" aflossing rapporteer aan diens soos per SAP 15

21:40 (SADF)

R10 - 31C (Roberts) Patrol in vicinity of Metal Box and Cape Gate: "stil en rustig".

21:50 (ISU-Ver)

Oordrag (various items of equipment listed)

21:55 (ISU-Ver)

Diens aan "B" aflossing rapporteer...

21:55 (Cape Gate)

Rapporteur Mnr W Wilken skakel vanaf sy woning en noem dat daar +/- 200-300 swartes die pad by die Trek garage oorsteek in die rigting van Boipatong, toe moes hy omdraai. Hy sal later probeer om by sy werk plek aan te kom. SAP is telefonies gekontak.

(QUESTIONS ARISING: Precisely which police were contacted? This does not correspond with the terms of the report recorded at the VdBP police which makes no mention of a large group of people, but only that shots were being fired. This is an important enquiry, because the conjunction of a report of this large group and of shots being fired ought to have indicated a serious situation, calling for a more appropriate response than to send Sgt Kruger out).

21:55 (Boip)

Voertuig Uit Wyk Sers Kele en Sers Lesibo rapporteer uit - te Cecil Oldridge patroleer met voertuig SAP 102250 en km lesing 115764.

(NOTE that this puts a local police vehicle into circulation in the area at the critical time: where is Cecil Oldridge and what type of police vehicle?)

22:00 (Boip)

Sit Rapp Alles nog stil en rustig te Ak as ook gebied.

22:00 (SADF)

R10 - 31C (Roberts) Burning vehicle past Cape Gate. Then stays in area and times thereafter not specified. Gets report of +/- 300 - 350 group at the robot; goes to the robot at

Bophelong; later patrolling in Donges str when gunfire heard from Boipatong; goes to Cape Gate: gunfire; crew transferred to Buffel 31D; ordered to Kwa Madala; Jordaan patrolled with 31D and 31B.

22:00 (VdBP)

Klagte Algemene rapport verskeie lede van die publiek kontak telefonies dat verskeie skietvoorvalle plaasvind in Donges & Playfair Blvd. Klaarblyklik vind dit plaas vanuit Boipatong & Sharpeville. Victor Zero stabiliseringseenheid is gekontak vir aandag.

(NOTE that this report speaks of shots coming from out of inter alia Boipatong and not of an attack into Boipatong)

22:01 (ISU-Ver)

Meganiese vervoer terug O/Sers Potgieter boek Casper SAP no 62543H met km lesing 23450. Voertuig alles in orde...

(NOTE this Casspir is booked out again at 07:30 with the same km reading. Also booked in at 22:00 is Casspir SAP 48737M, booked out again at 06:00 with an unchanged km reading)

22:05 (ISU - Ver)

Vehicle Register Cassper SAP 58397R booked out for general patrols in Sharpeville and Boipatong; this is the Casspir which Schlebusch was in command of.

22:05 (SADF)

Vaal Cmdo Signals Log Report from 31C: Klagte ontvang van skare by robot na Yskor.

(NOTE that it is not entirely clear whether 31C has observed the group or whether it is simply relaying a complaint)

22:10 (ISU-Ver)

Klagte ontvang Vanaf "Q" dat 'n groep Inkatha lede in Boipatong besig is om eiendom te beskadig. 512 Sers Kruger gee aandag.

(QUESTIONS ARISING: Who is "Q"?

If "Q" is not the Vanderbijlpark Police Station, then what happened about the reports made to the latter, and apparently communicated to the ISU?

On what basis was it at that early stage already said that these were Inkatha members?

Were any steps taken to verify this report

or to establish the extent of the damage -
such as contact with the Municipal Police
Station in Boipatong?
In the light of previous conflict
involving Inkatha, what alarm bells rang
in response to this information?
Where was Sgt Kruger at this time?)

22:20 (ISU-Ver)

Berig ontvang vanaf "BU" dat by begraafplaas in Sharpville 'n
skietery aan die gang is. 511 O/Sers Schlebusch gee aandag.

(QUESTIONS ARISING: Who is "BU" and from where was he
reporting?
Where was Schlebusch at this time?)

22:20 (VdBP)

Klagte David (?) van 772 Batswana atr Boipatong tel 882299
kla van openbare geweld by die adres. Die
stabiliseringseenheid gekontak vir aandag.

(Do we have a statement from this person concerning inter alia
what he conveyed to the police?)

22:20 (Cape Gate)

Skote Drie is van uit die lokasie (naby die hoof hek)
geskiet. Dit is nie verseker in watter rigting nie, maar een
van Dunsteel se werkers, Joseph Mgcina 70395 het vanaf die
lokasie aangehardloop gekom glo met 'n skouer wond wat
behandel was by eerstehulp. Hy is toe glo by die hek uit na
sy woning. Sy vrou is glo dood geskiet.

22:25 (ISU-Ver)

Klagte ontvang Berig ontvang vanaf "V" dat by Cape Gate is
daar 'n geskietery op masjinerie by Metal Box. "511" sal
aandag gee.

(QUESTIONS ARISING: Who is "V" and from where was he
reporting?
Who was doing the shooting?
Where was Schlebusch at this time?)

22:30 (ISU-Ver)

Meg vervoer Kst le Grange boek voertuig SAP 108100H uit...

(NOTE :this is an Nyala; the vehicle register records it as

being booked out at 22:00).

22:30 (SADF)

Vaal Cmdo Signals Log To 31C: Laat weet van skietery by Cape Gate.

22:35 (Boip)

Rapport Ek konst Hara (?) rapporteer dat daar is mense wat hier te Ak kom rapporteer dat te Moshoeshoe, Hlubi straat daar is mense wat skiet as ook die huise aanval. Ons het Bravo 3 gekontak en Kst Maphosho, Sers Maseko, Sers Lesibo, Kst Njoli (?), Kele, Sefatsa en Kst Mphaka uit met die Kasper gery soon toe.

(QUESTIONS ARISING: When was the actual report of the attack made (given that there may be some delay between report, sending out Casspir and making the entry)?
Who is Bravo 3 and what was their response?
Before the report, had no-one at the police station heard anything of the attack being in progress?
When the Casspir went out, was the attack still in progress?
What action if any did this group take?

22:40 (SADF)

Incident Report Schedule Inkatha-aanval in Boipatong. 18 mense dood, 8 beseer.

(NOTE this document appears to be of a secondary nature prepared from other source material; it is not clear what the primary source is for this particular entry. In a Group 17 Incident Report to "Kmdmt Wit", the following appears:
Om 172240 B Jun 92 het 'n persoon gebel om 'n skietery te rapporteer. 'n Onbekende aantal swartes het voor huis 696 Mafokong str op mekaar geskiet. SAP het gaan ondersoek instel. Geen verdere besonderhede nie.

NOTE that it generally emerges from the incident reports put out by the SADF that incidents reported by members of the SAP seem to be closely monitored; whether that is done on a routine and contemporaneous basis is not clear from the records themselves.)

22:45 (ISU-Ver)

Klagte ontvang Vanaf Victor dat by huis 696 Mafekeng (?) straat en by 113 Mabedi straat word daar geskiet. By 229 Tuinkle (?) str word daar gebrand. "5I1" en "5I2" gee aandag.

(QUESTIONS ARISING: Who is Victor, reporting from where?
How did it happen that there were reports about these addresses particularly?
Do we have statements from the people at these addresses which might help to clarify whether the police were on the scene at a time when the attack was still in progress?
Precisely where were Schlebusch and Kruger at that time?

22:45 (SADF)

Vaal Cmdo Signals Log Report from 32B: +/- 600 (?) Swartes beweeg in die rigting van Kwa Mandela.

22:50 (SADF)

Vaal Cmdo Signals Log 32B ... vra vir versterkings.

22:52 (ISU-Ver)

Klagte ontvang Vanaf Victor dat by Kwamadala hostels geskiet word.

(QUESTIONS ARISING: From where was this report made and how did it arise?
Who was doing the shooting and at whom?
Was action taken by the police and if so what?

22:55 (ISU-Ver)

Rapport "511" O/Sers Schlebusch rapporteer dat by huis 761 Lekoa str Boipatong het 3 mense in die huis ingegaan en begin skiet en met pangas gekap. Twee mense beseer en een gedood. (details of injured given)

22:55 (Iscor)

Rapport ...S de Bruto telefonies meld dat hy berig ontvang het vanaf ... Johannes wat 'n boodskap ontvang het vanaf Vaal Kommando dat daar +/- 800 Swartes op pad is na Ooshek se rigting.

(QUESTIONS ARISING Note that the group is not seen by Iscor personnel; the report comes from Vaal Commando.
Did the report to Iscor make mention of the precise location of the group of 800?
Precisely from where were they coming?
Did the SADF report that they were doing anything about the group, and if so what?

Collection Number: AK2672

Goldstone Commission BOIPATONG ENQUIRY Records 1990-1999

PUBLISHER:

Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand

Location:- Johannesburg

©2012

LEGAL NOTICES:

Copyright Notice: All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Disclaimer and Terms of Use: Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only.

People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate, distorted or untrue. While these digital records are true facsimiles of the collection records and the information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand has not independently verified their content. Consequently, the University is not responsible for any errors or omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the website or any related information on third party websites accessible from this website.

This document is part of a private collection deposited with Historical Papers at The University of the Witwatersrand.