

July 17, 1993

respective political movements, subject to independent verification. That these control points also serve as collection points for all those members of the guerrilla armies (according to the defined and agreed criteria) who have no other source of regular livelihood. In this case, members who so wish should be sheltered, fed and clothed, and placed under the discipline of MK/APLA with appropriate non-partisan validation, where required. These collection points would serve as temporary centres from where selection will occur for either demobilisation into civil society, or the provision of preparatory training for integration into a future defence force.

It is proposed that the existing SADF bases serve a similar purpose, also with international and ANC or other representation.

Further, it is proposed that a similar system be used to accommodate all members of MK/APLA presently outside the country who wish to return to the country prior to elections. We also propose that an approach be made to the international community for support in the application of such a programme.

CRITERIA FOR INTEGRATION

It should be obvious that formal criteria would have to be negotiated, or at least approved at a political level to define the minimum requirements for integration into a future defence force. Given the present transitional context such criteria would have to be negotiated at a political level. It is also reasonable to assume that existing SADF recruitment criteria/civil service regulations regarding posts, etc. would have to be revised as a one off gesture of reconciliation. Some criteria would, however, have to be applied. These would include some or all of the following:

- age (maximum and minimum);
- specific age brackets (rank for age - even perhaps per corps);
- physical health;
- very controversially, the policy with regard to HIV (at present all recruits into the SADF are screened for HIV - positive tests exclude acceptance);
- educational criteria;
- certain specific musteringings require specific qualifications/skills;

- psychological testing;
- track/service record.

Acceptance/integration into a Defence Force is, of course, not the only option. Acceptance/integration into the proposed Peacekeeping Force is also an option.

DEMOBILISATION

Demobilisation then occurs for those persons who do not want to join the military or Peacekeeping Force or do not meet the criteria, or for whom there is no place. The purpose of demobilisation is to cut costs and reduce capabilities that are not needed. In the present poor economic climate demobilisation, I fear, is literally a program to enable the former soldier to survive.

Demobilisation is the programme during which the individual is separated from his original or mother organisation. It can or should provide access to other training, educational, counselling schemes or courses. Once the individual accepts the package, he or she then becomes part of a different programme. It can or should also provide attempts to 'place' the individual concerned, i.e. to obtain suitable employment if possible.

In this view education and development schemes to provide the individual with skills which are utilised or useable outside the mother organisation do not form part of the demobilisation programme.

Demobilisation is, therefore a sausage machine which processes persons for a fixed period across the board. Alternatively it is simply a one-off payment of a set amount of money which is more simple, administratively more manageable, and generally the method preferred in the private sector as opposed to that of the civil service. It makes accounting possible.

Ideally the demobilisation programme should link into any national development scheme or strategy. As such it should serve the national interests. According to this approach additional training should be done outside or before the demobilisation period. Assistance should be sought from the international community, various Government departments and the private sector, both in terms of expertise and resources, to assist in the reintegration into civilian life of those present members of the

armed forces not suitable for service in a future military or for whom there is no room.

Demobilisation enhances social stability and prevents frustration, reducing the propensity towards criminality. It provides the 'new' Defence Force with a clean slate, reducing the hang-over problems from the past and enabling them to recruit on the basis of requirement and qualification. It allows a future Defence Force to focus on its primary responsibility, i.e. ensuring against external aggression.

CONCLUSION

Agreement should be sought that:

- All further expansion of the military (SADF, TBVC armed forces and guerrilla forces) be halted upon the institution of the TEC. The normal manpower replacement cycles of the SADF and TBVC armed forces should not be affected by this agreement.
- No additional training commitments be undertaken by any of these armed forces apart from the completion of training that had physically commenced at the time of the institution of the TEC and normal force development (cyclical) training. Additional training, including foreign training, should require the agreement of the sub-council on defence of the TEC.

The overriding concern when considering the question of demobilisation and integration is *'To establish impartial, accountable, effective and legitimate security forces for a democratic South Africa.'* (Report Number Four of the Technical Committee on Violence, 2 June 1993, p. 4) This implies that we take a long term perspective on pressing problems such as those relating to integration. We need to know where to go before we will know how to get there. This requires that some thought be given to the role and tasks of our armed forces in a post-apartheid South Africa. That we have clarity on the concept of defence policy in South Africa, our regional role, etc.

Police as Peacekeepers

3 inputs

Colonel Alf Dyke (SAP)

- ~~14 July 1989~~ - parallel law laws XVI + storming of Bastille to S.A. situation today
- far reaching effects on SAP
- SAP at present is not ethnically based + does not rep broader Comm.
- Police does not have capacity to execute policy of new gov
- How are we going to change the SAP.
- Must not try to do this by alienating it from Soc.
- SAP is not a rock of granite and is not as inflexible as most people think. Members come from the community. Come from all aspects of Soc
- Come to serve comm
- 1/2 is 25/6 or younger.
- is not as parbal as many think.
- must to make it acceptable to all former community relations dep.
- want to be accountable to community.
- 'The People's Police Force' is what they want to become
- ~~off~~ ~~exp~~ expect mutual accountability.
- need to change attitudes of all policemen officers + attitude of society.
- First step change syllabus of training programme - much emphasis on community relations.
- top down approach of training police force of a whole.
- Command Structure is being changed so no branch is dominated by a certain race, colour gender.
- Change must not be only cosmetic.
- must remember to have time to retrain personnel.
- not all existing ~~new~~ people are happy to change. - those who are not willing to change must be got rid of.
- police officers moved to grass roots level.

Police seen as reps of the gov.

- Police + community must join hands.

- Crime line has been introduced

- Fire arm ~~unit~~ unit.

- One-vehicle high-jacking units

- Crime forums

- crime-labour camps

- also set up a joint-operational communication centre

- if violence breaks out can use this to address problems immediately.

Gerald Williamson (El Dorado Park Centre for Peace Action)

- Small project that will lead the way for SA.

UNISA psycho unit + community rel.

- Community safety unit linked to socio-eco relations

- see solution as reconstructing rel b/w police + comm.

- Community policing → adhere to what comm wants in terms of its own needs.

- want to promote a culture of peace at all level - schools etc.

- 40 page charter set up by police + community of what each expects of each other.

- comm decided^d what safety was to them + how it should be carried out. Consultation was slow.

- Comm came up with good ideas. Also looked at psychological well being. Looked at security system at Disney world.

Site similar to JHB - rich tourists, ignorant tourists etc.

unschool culture of violence.

- design abides so that people are not in contact with others.

- meet constantly along the way and watched (every donald duck + Mickey mouse is a police officer.)

- people see the SAP as a 'hammer + nail' rel. each crime seen vice this.

Committees to review criminals if judiciary is needed that is the next step All the criteria for this is in the document.

- We do need the SAP They are rotten but they can be worked with and transformed.
- biggest problem is that the whole police force must be changed

Alfred Woodington - COSATU rep.

Transformation of police force how can this take place?

They are warriors need to be protected as such. However are not doing a good job. Must follow peace accord recommendations

- community relations org must not be talk shops.
- Yankee squad disbanded + people sent to diff units but they are still there + action is not transparent.
- Action should be taken at very first point + be transparent
- Training methods must change from military style to community
- Independence of political influence - independent think^{ers} must obviously be politically aware.
- must understand supremacy of community as opp to gov
- Crime - respect for police must be reinstated
- purge of security forces + element within in the police force
- massacres in Sebokeng are not being dealt with appropriately.
- community must be involved in crime prevention - not enough police to watch every house etc
- cause of problem must be addressed. Socio-economic problems - need holistic approach to crime prevention.
- Alexandra - Wits comm, Eldorado Park, Kangaroo courts (Sophisticated) will take pressure off police.
- idea of SDU should not be totally discarded. Operating in other areas as neighbourhood watches.
- Peace corp - much debate around this - dupp programmes? security matters?
- need to deal with dupp measures. \$ accountability of police.

2. structures in place on an ad-hoc basis

some operations + comm centre } sub-committee ^{established}
SAP-comm relations } problems with action

some operations centre are working together but police still have to carry out rules of superiors SAP-SAD r problems in terms of operations

Questions

is there efforts on command structures to admit that things have been done + things must change?

Police executes laws of the land ∴ police did not act incorrectly but politicians did.

response: what about extra-legal activity pointed out by Giddson etc... state must be cleared, so psycho space for peace will be created.

Challenge police's action at world trade centre if police must admit to atrocities each one must be mentioned. The police force as a whole ~~must~~ can not apologise

bad elements must be purged but we must not generalise + turn 'good apples bad'

ISU in Durban causes violence - has there been a programme for rehab?

ISU was set up to act independantly - did not work this way.

Problem - police remain too long in this unit + dup tunnel vision working on a way to solve the problem. want to change structure of unit. Any change cannot ~~be~~ ^{happen} overnight.

Communities are divided + police are from these ranks. Corruption + mismanagement. Suggestions must come out of comm. SAP 'we' must work together. Can people come up with good suggestions

- need to deprogramme people on apartheid policy. 80% of officer core are white - lowering standards is not an excuse there are competent people who could be moved up.

• people need experience to move up - ~~experience~~ his boss is a general

• collaboration down AWRB + ISU at World Trade Centre

• new legislation on camouflage uniforms

• weapons in hospital reported nothing is done but in individual homes police search with many casspirs etc.

• Police should not work partially should respond to all reports.

• should use crime stop number - takes many people to raid a hospital

• change from state being major client to community being major client

• decisions come to with the community ~~allow police to~~ empower

• police to carry out ~~action + etc~~ community assistance

• Police lack the political will to take effective action re AWRB

• traditional weapons etc.

• People re AWRB incidents + sebokeng have been taken to court

• why aren't local police officers in Tlokoza, sebokeng etc investigating crimes - they are only used as translators. Outsiders (whites) investigate

• telephones must work in police stations

• people being taken out of the community by the police should be noted in local station.

• professionalism in police stations.

• Police must be recognised + ~~seen~~ credible perhaps they can work with POPCEN

• 33% of police officers are involved in admin these must be pulled out and put on the beat.

• don't have internal investigations

• SAP must push for a peace-keeping force to be put in place to relieve police so that they can go out into the community and be visible.

• District arresting office should be implemented in the short term, all arrested people can be noted in one place so that whereabouts are known.

• must think about what the community can do to make the job easier + change the police.

- need to show community small gains to prevent disillusionment
crimes committed by police what action is taken these people
are not removed but are promoted.

- need to encourage people to come forward but these people
must be assisted

* We should not generalise in terms of police force.

restructuring must ~~be~~ not be done behind closed doors

must be done with community

SAP RECOMMENDATIONS
any effort to admit that things have been wrong.

If wrong not SAP but the govt
he executes duty as laid down.
in order to clear state & regain credibility

Police as a force must be kept but those who
have acted unlawfully must be acted against.

I.S.U. retreating?

Unit within police force. in order to act independently
Police remain in unit too long develop tunnel vision
have a programme to change them.

Joint change should be looked at together

DEPROGRAMMING. officer corps 80% white.

uniforms AWB & security now similar, also NK
new legislation; camouflage unlawful

SEARCHES.

Lack political will
Wants to know what restructuring is taking place -
can't say.

LOCAL POLICE ^{be used to} ~~should~~ investigate rather than outsiders.

TELEPHONES to work always.

Different units e.g. crime etc report to local police
station that they have taken some one

COMPLAINTS. should be more professional.

POPCRU to be recognised

RESTRUCTURE

33% of SAP administrative staff - unnecessary should be
in the field. 46 Generals.

INVESTIGATIONS include people from communities
SAP to push for peace keeping force to ^{release the SAP} ~~include~~

DISTRICT OFFICE to have names from all cells

FAC 555

* A NATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE

The recommendation on the establishment of a Peacekeeping Force by the Technical Committee on Violence reads as follows:

The committee proposes the establishment of of an independent peacekeeping force with a multi-party composition to function as the primary peacekeeping force for the election. Its function thereafter should be determined by the elected Government in consultation with relevant parties. The force should be specially trained, should be constituted in such a way as to have legitimacy across the political spectrum and should fall under the control of either the Independent Electoral Commission or under multi-party executive control.

This workshop looked at the establishment of a peacekeeping force (PKF) in the run-up to elections. How the PKF will be formed and how it will be used to protect the electoral process. It also looked at whether the SADF will continue to be deployed in dealing with violence or whether this task will be left to the PKF.

Chair - Abba Ommar

Aubrey Lekwana (Lawyers for Human Rights)

Kelvin Kahn (MK)

Bishop Stanley Mogoba (National Peace Accord)

Jakkie Celiens (Institute for Defence Politics)

Rocky Williams (Military Research Group)

Summary's of presentations in the workshop:

Bishop Mogoba (NPA)

Bishop Mmutlanyane Stanley Mogoba, of the National Peace Accord, outlined the reasons for establishing a National Peacekeeping Force. Bishop Mogoba pointed out that there is an immediate need to establish a PKF due to the high level of violence in South Africa and due to the fact that, how ever powerful, no single person or leader is able to stop the violence. According to Mogoba the violence is a result of the failure of the police, and the community, to keep peace. He added that the existence of a number of armed forces, all operating under different command structures, with separate agendas is a recipe for disaster and instability.

Mogoba said: "One thing alone can save South Africa, a commitment to collective responsibility and joint action for peace."

For Mogoba the PKF would include the SAP, SADF, Umkhonto we Sizwe, APLA, ZANLA, Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Gazankulu defence forces and the police forces of KwaNdebele, Kwazulu, KaNgwane, Lebowa and QwaQwa, which would therefore prevent the threat of isolating any political party or community. The NPKF would be made up 5 000 persons who would act under an agreed and experienced international command and would be accountable to the National Peace Accord structures. The NPKF would have a clear identity with distinct peacekeeping uniforms, vehicles and helicopters.

Aubrey Lekwana (Lawyers for Human Rights)

According to Lekwana in order to prevent or reduce high levels of violence there needs to be a strengthening of the 'powers of enforcement' of the National Peace Accord. There needs to be a creation of an acceptance of the NPA and its articles. Participation could be strengthened through involvement in a grass roots 'peace corps'. Lekwana believes that it would not be practical to establish a new peacekeeping force and the establishment of a PKF through existing structures should be seriously considered. The building block should be the Internal Stability Unit (ISU) because of ISU's skills such as training etc. The ISU would be removed from the control of the South African Police. The PKF would require international participation in command structures. the Size of the PKF should be determine by the functions and demands. LHR have recommended a force of about 20 000 - 40 000 and have motivated for the inclusion of members of the South African Police, the Self Defence Units, the TBVC police forces and defence forces etc. A selection panel would include international participation. LHR believe that 'time is of the essence' and have urged the Goldstone Commission to make appropriate recommendations on a peacekeeping force. The PKF will be guided by the principle of minimum force.

Calvin Khan (Umkhonto we Sizwe)

Kahn stated that the formation of a National peacekeeping force needed to be placed in a political context. Elections would be meaningless if they were not free and fair and without intimidation. For Kahn the South African Government's security forces are seen as part of the problem and cannot fulfill the job of peacekeeping. The ammount of peace monitors that the international community can contribute to observing the elctions are not suufficient. The National peacekeeping force needs to deal effectively in reducing the levels of violence. It needs to be acceptable to the majority of the population and should be made up of all elements party to the negotiation process. The PKF should be placed under the authority of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC).

Kahn believes that a committee needs be established by the TEC known as 'The Peace-Keeping Committe', with local and international experts, to advise on the composition, the recritment process, the deployment and the activities of the PKF. The PKF should be established through legislation passed by the Transitional authority. According to Kahn the peacekeeping force should be between 7 000 and 10 000 'recruits', and training of these peacekeepers needs to be immediate. Kahn concluded by saying that althopugh there are difficulties ahead the only realistic solution to the problems facing the democratic trend, is the establishment of a peacekeeping force.

Jakkie Cilliers (Institute for Defence Policy)

"Are ideals taking the place of reality ?"

Cilliers argued if a South African Peacekeeping Force is practicacable ? According to Cilliers the creation of a PKF is

3/

a repetition of the 'KitsKonstabel' experiment. Cilliers believes that a number of problems are inherent in the process of a primary peacekeeping force being established by the negotiating forum. Cilliers gave background of to the notion of establishing a peacekeeping force:

The requirements for a South African PKF arose because of the legitimacy crisis confronting the SAP and the SADF in the townships. A non-partisan force is required in the run-up to elections because of the level of distrust and mistrust that the SAP and SADF face at a political level.

Cilliers believes that the consensus between the major negotiating parties on the question of a PKF appears to be based on short term political expediency rather than on a deliberate strategic vision.

According to Cilliers the SADF have 7 000 soldiers deployed in the townships if these soldiers are removed a peacekeeping force would require roughly 12 000 people.

Cilliers believes the levels of violence will increase in the run up to elections because political competition and tension will rise. Therefore the requirement for the deployment of forces will increase rather than decrease. A PKF of 12 000 strong would be inadequate to deal with escalating violence in the absence of the SADF. Cilliers also argues that the cost of the PKF would be enormous at least R1 billion per year.

Cilliers proposed some alternatives to establishing a PKF these are:

- * Establishing full and complete multi-party control over the security forces by the sub-councils of Defence and Law and Order of the Transitional Executive Council.
- * Insert international monitors into the command and control structures of those SADF forces deployed in support of law and order duties and the SA Police.

Although Cilliers does not reject the notion of a PKF he believes that there is little chance of establishing one in good time large enough and of sufficient training. He did add recommendations should a PKF be established. These are that minimum entry standards be required, people who wish to join a PKF must resign from their organisations, international funding and training assistance be sought, the PKF should be built around the Internal Stability Unit and the PKF should be constituted as a permanent organisation.

Rocky Williams (Military Research Group)

Williams supports the establishment of a Peace Keeping Force. He stated that there must be exact clarity on the functions and role of a Peacekeeping Force. A PKF must be distinguished from the socio-economic functions of a peace corps, from peace monitors, from development brigades, from civic action and from community policing. According to Williams the long term advantages of a PKF are immense; the police will be drawn to community policing, the defence force will be withdrawn from the townships and redirected to the traditional function of protecting the nations sovereignty.

Williams argued that a strong unit would be instrumental in

overcoming political difference. A PKF would need intensive training. Williams expressed caution in using the Internal Stability Unit as a building block for the PKF but added that it was conceivable that they could be used. The PKF would function as a small tactical intelligence organisation under the department of Internal Affairs.

SESSIONS

Sat. & Sun morning

Esther Rowland
Michael Joseph

Morning Session - Suggano Suggu
- Audata Suggu

Workshop
17-7-93

Intervening to Prevent Violence

Venitia Govender + Sally Seabey (IBI)

Sally Seabey

- BACKGROUND
- Violence described as "black on black violence", "tribal conflict" etc - we need to move away from this perception
 - Historically, there was only one Xhosa / Zulu clash - in 1800s
 - Prior to outbreak of violence in 1990, people of different ethnic groups lived together quite OK - need to question therefore the perception of this whole thing as an historical based ethnic war
 - → Coincided with Inkatha moving out of cultural organisation role + ~~becoming~~ becoming a political party aggressive recruitment campaign, Buthelegi's push to become a major political player
 - Violence rises + falls according to what's happening in the country politically
 - July / August 1990 - characterised by massive "unipi attacks" - have become more sophisticated - train attacks, "drive-by" shootings firearms instead of trad. weapons designed to instil terror.

ANC's perception →

①

Inkatha's perception - Violence stemmed from ANC's campaign to make Sebokeng a no-go area + ANC call to disband Kwa Zulu police + reintegrate homeland

THIRD FORCE - attackers not speaking (don't speak local language?)
- whites seen at site of massacres - involved (cf. Boipatong)

SAP involvement - fundamentally a failure to investigate, a failure to respond when called - cf. destruction of evidence relating to Boipatong - SAP only has one way of investigating - forcing people (through torture etc) into giving confessions.

* No single one fact which can be blamed for the violence - combination of factors

* coincided with ANC's suspension of armed struggle

* IFP recruitment of councillors

* conditions in single-sex hotels + squatter camps

* unequal distribution of resources

incidents of hostels
see end of apartheid
as end of migrant
labour + hostels -
destruction of them
lifestyles rather
than "freedom at last"
- reason to
resist + inhibit
change

THIRD FORCE - allegations of IFP members being framed by S.A. in the Caprivi & by military in Israel
- Inkatha doesn't have the person power to maintain a conflict of the magnitude of that on the Reef.

Who has benefitted from the violence?

ANC? No - resources used up in crisis management - ^{gone} _{resources}

IFP? Yes - have been able to move out of hostels & into townships, plus have become a national organisation
- Buthelezi has emerged as a major player in the negotiations

NP gov? Yes - by virtue of the fact that ANC have not been able to recruit

OPEN DISCUSSION

Audrey Coleman - Peace Action & Black Sash

* gave example of police inaction in wake of township violence - police failing to arrest suspects who had been seen committing the crime by witnesses

Shirley Ancer - Union of Jewish Women

* In light of lack of integrity of S.A. need for community involvement in policing, accountability?

SS. → lack of responsibility amongst SAP - refusal to respond, not enough vehicles

racism in SAP, SAP use of confederates
- How do we change it?

Steven from Sharpville

* ^{last week} comrade shot dead in gate of police station - friends went to police for help, gave statement including whereabouts of murderers - SAP refused to "help the blacks" because "APLA is hitting the white man" - SAP respond when they want to (eg when tip-off given about whereabouts of AK-47s)

Edison

- * The way the SAP is structured is a problem - there is a big gap between the police + the community, which must be closed before there can be any community involvement in policing - need for SAP to sit down with community to discuss problems etc, ∴ to get an understanding of township situation + prevent crime rather than just responding (or not responding) when the situation has already erupted.
- * SAP need to stop seeing themselves as a group which needs to be protected + begin seeing that they are a group who are supposed to protect
- * young police, fresh from training with no experience are doing all

(4)

The wars - trained only in violent response to conflict.

New Speaker?

- top-down structure of police doesn't help police / community relation - need for more consultative approach.

New speaker

- problem of police causing youth to fight ANCYL
- white police inciting violence - causing problems for black police actually living in the townships
- perpetrators need to be arrested
- need for honesty in SAP

MONITORING OF VIOLENCE - Sally

3 types of violence monitoring

Observer
Investigative
Preventative

Observer monitoring - keeping an eye on the situation looking for potential problems, recording details of incidents (people involved, registration of cars, what happened etc) - during events, such as funerals, protest marchers etc

Investigative monitoring - after the event - collecting statements etc (imp. that statements are taken separately & signed) recording conditions of site of incident - get community members to guard area, or draw map & collect cartridges (don't get your fingerprints on them - prints of person

(5)

From Verdict Violence Intervention

firing gun may be an (them) -
 try + get photographs of poss - take
 down registration numbers of any
 vehicles involved - if anyone has
 been assaulted, try to get pictures of
 injuries (from ISS - police will require
 it to be filled in in cases of
 assault - by any medical practitioner
 not just District Surgeon)

* Important to know area, know situation
 utilise knowledge, skills of community
 members

* Be identifiable as a member -
 tee-shirts, badges, marked cars

* Use simple, neutral language

* Be sensitive to funeral traditions etc

* Equipment - (ideally) car, walkie-talkie,
 pen, paper, camera.

* Report-backs - vital to report back
 to community every step of the
 way

* When taking statements, it's not
 always a good idea to hand them

must get
 person's permission
 for statement
 to be handed
 to police

over to the police - SAP may take
 a second statement which will conflict

- better to keep own statement + let
 SAP take own independently

* Don't promise what you can't deliver
 (in terms of witness protection etc)

Preventive monitoring - when well-established
 in community - negotiating with
 protagonists to prevent escalation of conflict

⑥

* Helpful to have pictures of guns + vehicles
 to help with identification.

Community Initiatives Against Violence

Chair: Howard Vinyay

Speakers: Royal Lakoba, Peace Action field worker

Topic: SDUs

Peace Action makes contact with SDUs

SDUs lack accountability

They are easily infiltrated

Sometimes they turn against their communities and perpetuate the violence

This makes it difficult to monitor the causes of violence

Floor: 1. This is not necessarily true of all SDUs.

They are a brainchild of the civics

2. Q: What is the origin?

A: They are formed by the civics to defend the people

3. Q: Have the civics got guidelines for SDUs? Do SDU members come and go?

A: They are supposed to be accountable to civics, but ~~they~~ the civics have lost control

4. Q: How do ~~the~~ people become members of SDUs?

A: The civics lay down guidelines

5. Q: Is it appropriate to create armed units to counter violence?

A: People have a right to defend themselves.

6. Q: Do the civics participate in the Peace Accord?

A: The civics are composite organizations
→ Civics perceived to be allied to particular parties

Police have failed

Q: What is Peace Action's relationship to the Peace Accord

A: Close working relationship

3. Q: What power do the SDUs have? How accountable are they?

A: Supposed to be accountable, but not in practice

Q: They are supposed to defend the people. They patrol the areas.

9. Q: What is the difference between Peace Action and Peace Accord?

A: Peace Action is ~~an~~ independent, thus available to non-signatories

10. Q: SDUs were set up by the ANC

Q: Have the ANC and SACP got control of the SDUs? Can the SDUs be incorporated into a new society?

A: SDUs were not set up specifically by the ANC

~~Abraham~~^{Albaram} Zwane Violence Monitoring Committee
former member of SDU

Started SDU in 1985 fighting against totobes
1986/1987 police started

Formed another SDU fighting against AZASM

Launched Vuma Campaign to get police out of township

We were arrested and tried

1991 After massacre decided on formation of SDUs in Sebokeng and Ewaton fighting against Kwa Madala. They were protected by the police.

Police formed Yankee Squad. Most of the comrades arrested or kidnapped. Some left the country for further training.

In contact with civic and ANC.

1. Q Why retaliate against police in Agassan?

A The most important thing is to attack the base.

Q In other words its a military strategy?

A I am a member wherever I am

2. War against councillors in 1984. SDUs were formed because there was a war.

3. Q Is it OK to launch pre-emptive attacks?

4. Q The process needs to be understood within its historical context. But now the context has changed. Are pre-emptive attacks still legitimate?

A We met with Ewaton station commander demanding that they should defend the people and work with the SDU. We are no longer prepared to launch attacks. The station commander has referred the matter to higher authority.

5. Q What about the third force?

A That's not the problem. Police implicated are mostly white as at Kwa Madala hostel. Those who live in the location I wish to return.

6. ~~At~~ The police must change their attitudes towards SDUs

There must be a mechanism

The police should live in the township

All SDUs should be converted into agencies of peace as suggested by Chris Hani

Gerald Williamson - Eldorado ~~Waller~~ Park Centre for Peace Action (running since 1987)

Formally linked to NUSAS

~~Was~~

We tend to discuss interorganizational violence
183 000 deaths by violence in 1989. Only a fraction was political. Must consider it more broadly

Inadequate statistics in S.A.

Homicide rate is higher than anywhere else.

S.A. is a very violent society

Statistically only 0.01% involved in political violence.

Racial and economic inequalities in post-colonial societies tend to produce violence
Social and economic reconstruction is fundamental.

More people hurt or killed in Eldorado Park than in Hillbrow.

First restructure people. Intervention required in families, ~~and~~ schools and businesses.

Five-tier model

1. Achieve a presence - marketing phase

2.

Community safety is required. Community policing is part of that.

We must learn from the situations where violence is absent.

We have created eleven safe houses for women. We have recruited youth leaders and trained them. We have used the steward concept to bring down inflation.

1. Q How do we transfer that culture of safety?

A Teach children how to resolve conflict. Teach people to be accountable and transparent.

2. Q Have you noticed any effect?

A We have many successes. More people reporting crime. More socialization of youth.

3. Some areas are less polarized than others. We need such organizations in other areas. The problem relates to the ghetto.

4. Q Whereabouts in Soweto does this agency work?

A Baragwanath, Rockville; contact with wives on a consultative basis.

5. Q Do you have the resources to implement your mission?

A Problems: funding, community involvement. We train volunteers to take over our work.

6. Q A programme of such as this would have difficulty with a polarized society. People in the community must take the initiative.

A Communities are polarized.

7. Q Suburban areas also need to regain a sense of community.

A process of oral history is needed
to create community

Integration of the armed forces.

The process will determine the size of the armed force.

one of could first analyze the need and then start integration.

→ Jafarie Cilliers:

Integration is not an event but a process.

Integration and demobilization are 2 sides of the same coin.

steps:

- ① Make an audit (independent) of what is there.
- ② What do we need? (political decision).
- ③ Where is the money going to come from (SADF budget is not enough).
- ④ Who wants and can (requirements!) be integrated.
→ further training will be needed.

The process will be finalized after elections.

demobilization:

Those who do not want to be integrated or do not meet the requirements need a programme, linked to civilian development schemes. International assistance should be sought.

TEC should coordinate training etc. of the various armed forces at this stage.

→ Calvin Khan:

We should look at how we want to control the armed forces during transition. The ruling classes usually control armed forces.

We can have formal democracy, but the ruling class will still control armed force (e.g. Chile). It is therefore essential that control of armed forces reflects the democratic process, legitimacy is key. MK can bring that.

Council of defense (under TEC) will initiate the process. The present SADF wants to absorb MK. But that is not integration.

The debate around integration will be political for a long time.
Integration is only first step towards total restructuring.
~~Integration is only first step towards total restructuring.~~
New threat analysis is needed beforehand.
Demobilization is essential to remain control (employment etc).

Francis Nathan:

Integration is

- ① need for new defence force.
- ② need for new defence policy.
- ③ need for disarmament

ad ①: new symbols, doctrine, culture etc.

It needs to be different in order to get legitimacy. None of the present armies are set up to serve democracy.

ad ②: primary role: to defend against external aggression.

Not: to offend internally (as the practice is now).
civilian control should be key

ad ③: possession of arms creates a culture of violence

* There is now realistic external threat.

* resources will be limited: priorities should be set by new government.
defence is not priority.

Integration is not a mechanical process. It needs to be planned carefully.

Jaklyn: Why do we need an army at all?

Jakkie: armed forces are there to defend peace. Africa has soft borders, there is intense violence in the region. The world is not peaceful.

We are close to the point where you can not spend less on defence.

Caunice: There is no external threat, but there is a need for policing

But we as people and countries are not ready to do without army. So the fact is that we will have an army.

Jahira: Requirements:

We should not just get people in the army that say they are in a defence force.

- What is MK? What is SADF? → define that.
- requirements have to change but they still have to be there (eg. age, physical health, educational criteria, psychological testing etc)

Calvin: Issue is important when it comes to marginalising people. Are standards important? SADF claims exclusive professionalism. Those things need to be fundamentally changed.

Gaurie: Are we going to exclude people that have committed abuses of human rights?

If you do not do that: Bad for the credibility. There is no guarantee that somebody would not do that again.

If you do that: You need to investigate 2 decades, you would touch the question of responsibility of crimes under duty.

Besides it would create tension in terms of "nation building" you could select some notorious cases, though

No one dares to predict how big a new SADF would be.

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