

Southern Africa DOSSIER

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Documented incidents of SADF action in Mozambique since the capture of Casa Banana, Gorongosa

Notícias 26/10/1985.

Inhabitants of the Manhica district of Maputo province saw three aircraft flying over the district the previous Saturday night at about 10 p.m.. At about the same time inhabitants of Impamputo near the SA border saw helicopters coming from SA. Impamputo is about 15 kms from the SA border, near Namaacha. There have been a number of other similar reports in the past two weeks of violations of Mozambican airspace by aircraft supplying armed bandits.

Notícias 5/11/1985.

Jorge Valoi, an armed bandit recently captured in Manhica district, tells how SA continues to train and equip bandits. He went to SA in May seeking work. He was detained by SA police and sent to a bandit training camp. He was then given an FN rifle and told to destroy communal villages. He passed himself off at Ressano Garcia as an unsuccessful applicant for work as a miner and was transported to Maputo. From there he made his own way to Manhica. He said instructors in SA spoke Zulu and that the pilots of aircraft and helicopters making drops are white. He said he burnt 9 villages and killed 10 people.

Notícias 7/12/1985.

A railway bridge 8kms from the SA border sabotaged on 5/12/85 by "a specialist sabotage group infiltrated from South Africa". The group returned to SA. In recent weeks there have been a number of denunciations by Mozambican authorities of violations of Mozambican air space by aircraft and helicopters coming from SA.

Notícias 10/2/1986.

Frontpage editorial reads:

"The explosion of two anti-personnel mines on the beach at Costa do Sol in Maputo on Thursday is typical of the destabilisation action to which our country has been subjected. It is part of a strategy pursued since the

independence of our country: explosive pens, bombs in the Scala, the parcel bomb which killed Ruth First, booby-trapped radios, explosive devices in vehicles...

These acts of terror are deliberately directed at the ordinary citizen.

The adult and the child who were seriously wounded on Thursday are part of those defined by the Republic of South Africa and the armed bandits as the enemy: the Mozambican people. All of us, men, women and children, young and old, have been defined as the enemy. This demands therefore an increase in our level of vigilance and especial care of our children.

The acts of terror seek to affect the psychological stability of the citizen and create a climate of insecurity in the capital of our country. Such acts of terrorism have always coincided with grave internal crises in neighbouring racist states - yesterday in Rhodesia today in South Africa - and they occur in a very dangerous moment in the political process in Southern Africa. It is not, therefore, by chance that the actions now taking place coincide with a serious crisis in the South African government and parliament.

The re-occupation by South Africa of part of Angolan territory, the threats by Pretoria against Botswana and Zimbabwe, the coup in Lesotho, the increase in the supply of arms and ammunition to the armed bandits in Mozambique, are clear signs that the bellicose forces of Pretoria are not only pledged not to comply with their undertakings, they also want to provoke an escalation of aggression throughout the zone. They are trying through such means to prevent the continuation of the important victories won by the Mozambican, Zimbabwean and Angolan peoples against destabilisation during the past year.

They also want to make us forget the significant victories which the South African people have achieved in more than half a century of struggle and, in particular, in the last two years of rebellion.

In relation to Mozambique, the authorities of Pretoria defined, at the end of last November, a series of actions to be carried out either by the armed bandits or by specialist units of the South African army.

The principal focus of this intensified action in the province of Maputo is attacks on the railway system and electricity lines. This escalation began in December, with the sabotage of an important railway bridge and was followed by regular attacks on the railway lines (trains) Maputo/Swaziland and sabotage of the electricity line Komatipoort/Maputo.

The murder of defenceless persons on the outskirts of Maputo and the planting of various explosives directed at civilians, completes the picture of terrorist actions decided upon by the South African authorities.

With respect to these actions, it is important to record a passage in the diary of the armed bandits captured at Casa Banana last August and made public by our government. In the column referring to 18 and 19 August 1984, Brigadier van Tonder says:

'With respect to material for urban guerrilla warfare, we will send some but not all types of material asked for, because there are some bombs manufactured in the RSA and this would compromise us in relation to the Nkomati Accord. Therefore we will send watch bomb devices and temporary mechanisms to detonate explosives'.

Thus Thursday's explosions are not an isolated case. They are part of the destabilisation action launched by the RSA against the PRM and its people. We are facing decisions taken at the highest level by the South African authorities. We are facing a very specific type of terrorism: State terrorism. Today there can be no doubt that the South African state is terrorist in the fullest meaning of the term.

A polemic about state terrorism is raging in western countries. International news agencies have given wide publicity to the measures, which go as far as the threat of military action and the application of economic sanctions, against states accused of responsibility for acts of terrorism.

The complacency with which the same western countries treat South African state terrorism is symptomatic".

UCIAS 11/2/1986.

Maputo provincial military command issues the following communique:

"On February 4 1986, a group of armed bandits infiltrated last January destroyed three posts on the high tension line (Ressano Garcia/Maputo) 4 kms from the border with South Africa.

It is stressed that this was carried out by a group specialised in the sabotage of high tension lines.

During the action the bandits were surprised by our forces who killed 6 armed bandits (including the head of the group) and the group then fled to South Africa."

© Citizen 16/8/1986.

Refers to reports from Maputo quoting unidentified "US

sources" as saying that the MNR is being supplied by cargo planes from SA. The planes land at bush airstrips prepared by the MNR. The source said that there was absolute certainty about five penetrations into Manica province.

The Citizen 20/9/1986.

Reports AIM statement on helicopter landings and a comment by a SADF spokesman. The latter reads, "The position of the SADF and South Africa as far as Mozambique and Renamo are concerned has been explained repeatedly at the highest level...this position has not changed".

Radio Maputo 22/9/1986.

A military spokesman told the Mozambican News Agency, AIM, that a helicopter had been spotted on September 12 landing on Mozambican territory near the border town of Ressano Garcia. Several men with rucksacks had alighted, after which the helicopter returned in the direction of South Africa. The same source said that members of South Africa's 32 Battalion were operating alongside the MNR in Zambezia province.

Noticias 11/10/1986.

Security Minister, Sergio Vieira, announced that a SA commando was recently detected infiltrating Mozambique with the objective of destabilising it.

20/10/86 death of President Samora Machel.

Noticias 19/12/1986.

Says the government possesses information that between December 24th and January 3 the South African racist regime is planning to resupply bandits in the centre of the country with 250 tonnes of ammunition. The operation was to be codenamed "Blockade". The supplies were to be airdropped and landed by submarine. This was decided on at a meeting in Sun City between officers of SA Defence and Security forces and heads of the armed bandits between 21 and 3s25 November. This was provoked by the Malawian decision to "precipitadely" send 4.000 bandits to Mozambique. On November 23 a bandit camp was captured in Musunta in Manica province. Here a document was discovered coming from "Gorongosa HQ" to "all commandants" referring to shortages of ammunition and imposing restrictions on its use. Communal villages should be burnt and agents of Frelimo have their throats cut. Another objective of the November meeting with members of Military Intelligence was to try to unite different factions of the bandits and give them the appearance of responsibility and political organisation. However this did not succeed. Expresso recently spoke of Evo Fernandes having embezzled \$1 million.

Noticias 25/2/1987.

Captain Quizito Fulai Charlito, Chief of General Staff of the Frontier Guards, told AIM that on the 5th, 250 armed bandits infiltrated from SA into the frontier regions of Chicualacuala and Massingir. In January another large contingent crossed from Phalaborwa. Other sources indicated to AIM that there was infiltration in Massingir last August. Violation of air space in the regions of Chicualacuala and Massingir have also occurred. On January 18 a SA helicopter penetrated 500 metres into Mozambican air space. Since December 1986 armed bandits have started concentrating on the frontier.

Guardian (London) 30/5/1987.

Reports raid by SA commandos on four targets Maputo early in the morning of the 29th. The ANC offices and three houses were attacked. Three Mozambicans were killed. Four cars with four men each were used and the attackers were picked up by boat at a nearby beach.

An SADF spokesman refused to comment on "unsubstantiated allegations of involvement in incidents in Mozambique". However, the attack came within hours of an ANC statement claiming responsibility for the attack in Johannesburg in which four members of the SAP were killed. The SAP swore to avenge the deaths of their colleagues.

AIM report 30/5/1987 (reprinted in MID News Review) 4/6/1987.

A Mozambican government communique describes the SADF attack as "a gross violation of the norms and principles of international coexistence". It was even more serious in the light of the fact that the two states have "a non-aggression accord which country has scrupulously respected".

Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi tells the diplomatic corps that "The facts in our possession, and the context in which the attack took place, prove that the act was perpetrated by Pretoria. He said the attack was "not only a violation of our sovereignty, but a flagrant violation of the Nkomati Accord".

The Guardian 15/6/1987.

Officials in Maputo say that about 1,000 MNR have infiltrated from SA into Gaza province in the previous two months. One reason for the reported infiltration may be to thwart the reopening of the Limpopo line linking Zimbabwe to the port of Maputo.

AIM 22/6/1987 (in MID News Review 16/7/1987).

SNASP announced the capture of a South African passport holder who admitted responsibility for a bomb blast in Matola on March 17. George Olimpio Nunes Alerson

confessed to being a member of a SA commando unit. Alerson was born in Angola and joined the SADF in 1976. In 1986 he was placed in a special commando unit. He and other members of the unit were sent to Mozambique to murder members of the ANC. He had difficulty doing this and left a suitcase containing a bomb outside the house of some acquaintances while he returned to SA for further instructions. The bomb exploded killing two people. When Alerson returned to Mozambique he was arrested. The security forces found a map of the apartment of an ANC member. Alerson said members of the group were infiltrated by sea and used land vehicles to cross land frontiers. Alerson said there were SAs, Angolans, Mozambicans, Zaireans and Portuguese in his unit. SA trading companies were used as cover. Members of his unit had also carried out missions in other Front Line States. The SNASP statement says that Alerson's testimony confirms the existence of a plan of aggression. It warns that other attacks can be expected and Mozambican leaders and cadres as well as ANC members will be targets. The SA regime will try to fool the international community by blaming such crimes on "internal ANC" or "internal Mozambican problems".

Another report by an MNR defector, Nhone Sabino Ngala, refers to continuing SA support for the MNR. He said had seen bandit leaders speaking to SA soldiers near the point where the SA, Mozambican and Swazi borders meet. Ngala said the South Africans sometimes threw crates of food over the barbed wire fence. Captured bandits also said that SA had supplied uniforms and foodstuffs by air. Another, Sebastiao Massitemba, confirmed the presence of SA troops inside Mozambique giving training and conducting some operations. Massitemba himself was trained in Manica province. The team of instructors included four white men.

The Guardian 4/7/1987.

Reports the arrest in Maputo at the end of June of an Angolan carrying a South African passport. The man, named George Alerson, admitted responsibility for a bomb attack in Matola earlier in the year. Alerson said he had joined the South African Defence Force after Angolan independence in 1975. For much of the time he had fought in support of Unita. But in 1986, he said, he had joined a special commando unit and was one of several men sent into Mozambique to murder members of the ANC. At the end of the same month, three South African military parachutes were discovered at Vilanculos in Inhambane province.

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The Guardian 29/6/1987.

In a speech over the weekend, Magnus Malan, has hinted at renewed SA support for the MNR. Although the MNR was not mentioned as such, it is clear from the context that it is one of the right wing groups which Malan said SA would consider helping. He said, "There are pro-Western groups that are confronted by Soviet expansionism in southern Africa, but which do not have the ability to survive on their own. Where such groups ask for South African assistance, it must be considered in principle". Malan said that SA could not remain passive merely because it would be accused of destabilisation if it took action. Malan's statement came on the eve of the expected release of the findings of the SA judicial commission of inquiry into the death of Samora Machel. Malan's statement included several references to the government of President Chissano, including an accusation that it was helping to orchestrate "intense efforts to discredit any possible findings of negligence on the part of the crew of the Russian-built presidential aircraft".

AIM 8/7/1987 (in MID News Review 16/7/1987).

The crew and passengers of a Mozambican coastal vessel, Chiloane - 2, report seeing a submarine in Mozambican coastal waters on July 4. It was 12 - 14 miles off the coast, in the region of Ampara, Sofala province. This is about 30 miles south of Beira.

The Guardian 22/7/1987.

More than 380 peasants - mainly women and children - have been massacred at Homoine in Inhambane province. Another 49 wounded have been taken to hospital. The attack by the MNR took place at 5-45 am on the 18th. It is the worst single incident of MNR action and recalls the Wiriamu massacre by Portuguese troops in 1973. The Homoine massacre takes place in the context of reports of stepped up infiltration from SA. The authorities say a "massive infiltration" has taken place in Gaza province in the last month. Captured MNR members and a recent defector have spoken of Portuguese and English speaking whites participating in recent engagements. There have also been reports of South Africans throwing food over the security fence to the MNR; SA parachutes (of US manufacture) were discovered in Inhambane; and on

May 8 a SA supply plane landed at Chitpe, Inhambane, on a resupply mission.

AIM 22/7/1987 (in MIO News Review 30/7/1987).

A statement issued by the Frelimo Political Bureau says, "The Pretoria regime is directly responsible for this massacre [at Homoine]". It adds that in the last few weeks SA has infiltrated bandits into the country and supplied them. The massacre was described as an act of "pure terrorism".

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 22/7/1987.

Politburo statement says that 16 bandits were killed by the FPLM during the attack on Homoine.

The Independent 22/7/1987.

Article by Karl Maier quotes Mozambican government sources saying 600 bandits landed in Inhambane by sea about 10 weeks ago.

The Guardian 13/8/1987.

At least 72 people were killed when a band of 600 MNR attacked the town of Manjacaze in Gaza province on Monday 10th. The town was defended by only nine soldiers, whose heroism was praised by the local administrator. The defenders killed 10 of the attackers and lost one of their own men. The General Staff of the Mozambican armed forces says infiltration over the SA border continued in the past week.

AIM despatch 18/8/1987 in MIO News Review 24/8/1987.

At least 92 died in the attack on Manjacaze in Gaza province. At the beginning of the year Gaza was the calmest province in the country. Now gangs of bandits up to 500 strong have smashed through local village defences. At least 133 people died in the past two weeks in attacks on Manjacaze, Chokwe, Guija, Mabalane, Xai-Xai, Chibuto and Chicualacuala. But "these figures only give a pale image of the reality of the terrorist offensive in Gaza. In various district capitals news is coming in regularly of attacks, with survivors being able to give no exact figures - just that 'a lot of people have died'". The Gaza military authorities say some of the bandits have moved south after the failed offensive in the central provinces. Others have come over the border from South Africa. Some of the latter are accompanied by specialist saboteurs. There have also been concentrations along the coast where they receive supplies from South Africa. However the offensive may not have been as effective as Pretoria hoped. Army units in Gaza have given vigorous pursuit and the bandits cannot remain in any one area for any length of time. Military sources say they tried without success to establish themselves in occupation of the towns of Manjacaze and Chibuto. Their instructions were to take

these two districts plus Chokwe by the end of May and cut off Maputo city.

Noticias 22/9/1987

Two children of 11 years of age and a youth of 23 told a press conference of their experiences as captives of the armed bandits operating in the districts of Homoine and Jangamo in Inhambane province. They were captured and then integrated into the armed bandit groups. One said the attack on Homoine was carried out by bandits operating from a base at Inhamungue. They spoke of supplies of equipment coming by helicopter from SA and were told that their president (Dhlakama ?) lived there.

Noticias 16/10/1987.

Says the new Louis Trichardt air force base, inaugurated by Magnus Malan, could be used to launch attacks against Mozambique. **Business Day** pointed out that the base is only 180 kms from the Mozambican frontier. It could be used not only for defence, but to launch raids, says **Business Day**.

Noticias 28/10/1987.

The armed forces radio programme, "Voz de Combate", has condemned plans to establish an operational base for the bandits in the vicinity of the Louis Trichardt airforce base recently inaugurated by Magnus Malan. The programme said that in February 1984 senior SA officials, led by Col Charles van Niekerk, and bandit chiefs inspected the site. van Niekerk was named as one of the principal liaison officers between the bandits and SADF in the Gorongosa documents. He is described by "Voz de Combate" as being among those closest to Magnus Malan. On February 14 one of the bandits sent a message to SA saying, "I went with Colonel Vaniker (sic) to Louis Trichardt to reconnoiter the new camp where we will live".

Southern Africa Report 16/10/1987.

Reports on what it describes as "the strongest of a series of warnings issued by [Magnus] Malan to Mozambique over the last year". Malan said the Mozambique government had never really stopped supporting the SACP/ANC alliance. It continued to allow the ANC to operate. "When it comes to freedom of action, the point is not whether the Frelimo government falls or Renamo takes over power". For SA the most important point is stability and good neighbourliness which serves our interests and also those of Mozambique. "Whoever provides this is acceptable. We do not prescribe who must form a government, but the export of revolution damages our interests and rights. This is the reality President Chissano should take cognisance of. It is in terms of this that we have to work out our options and determine our freedom of action. I wish to state clearly

that SA respects and recognises a sovereign state such as Mozambique as well as the Nkomati Accord. But it is in the interests of the region that the Soviet Union and its surrogates are not given a loose rein indefinitely on the sub-continent to create a so-called "people's democracy". **Southern Africa Report** comments that these remarks are a clear indication that SA plans a further attack on ANC bases in Mozambique and that this could occur soon. It continues that the tone and strength is in sharp contrast to the conciliatory mood SA has cultivated in the period leading up to the Commonwealth summit and US Congressional debate on sanctions. Either SA has been encouraged to believe that no further sanctions will be imposed or Malan believes appeasement of the far right has priority. The warning is also strange in view of the victorious claims by the police that they had broken up two ANC networks.

Says SA is using the Comoros to supply aid to the MNR. SA suspended Renamo aid (via the Comoros) two years ago, but the shipments were resumed recently. The Comoros has assumed a disproportionate importance following Frontline states' pressure on Malawi. **Indian Ocean News** claimed SA was preparing a plan with Bob Denard to overthrow Abdallah, who expressed reservations about the use of the islands in this way. Abdallah got wind of the plan and decided to work more closely with SA.

Noticias 17/10/1987.

Reports on the sabotage of the railway line between Maputo and Komatipoort. On the Bth a bridge at kilometre 61, was attacked five days after the repair of another bridge at kilometre B3. The latter was sabotaged in the third week of September, shortly before the floods in Natal. The floods disrupted traffic between the Rand and Durban. After they began attention shifted to the possibilities of using Maputo. A SAFTO delegation arrived and the same organisation published adverts saying, "Maputo keeps trade going". When the bridge at kilometre B3 was sabotaged a consignment of 60.000 tonnes was en route to Maputo. The repair of this bridge permitted 42.000 tonnes to be despatched, but the sabotage of the bridge at kilometre 61 prevented the remainder arriving in Maputo. This has created a serious situation, particularly for citrus exporters. The feeling in Maputo is that there are forces so wedded to destabilisation that they are prepared to jeopardise important sectors even of the SA economy. On the one hand the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and commercial interests have reiterated their interest in the port of Maputo. On the other hand, there are forces in SA that regularly order the sabotage of the railway line. For example, the bridge on kilometre B3 was sabotaged in February 1985 and repaired with help from SATS, only to be sabotaged again.

Domingo 1/11/1987.

Communique of the FRELIMO Political Bureau on the massacre in the Taninga region on October 29 says, "...The massacres now perpetrated joins with atrocities carried out by the armed bandits in Homoine, Manjacaze and other places in the south of the country. They prove that the mass murder of peaceful populaces, which was always the method used by the bandits, is now their principal tactic. This tactic is, obviously, conceptualised and operationalised by the South African racist regime, which in the past months has organised the massive infiltration of bandits into the south of Mozambique with the specific mission of practicing here this extreme and particularly horrible and inhuman form of terrorism, carried out indiscriminately against men, women and children. This tactic of the apartheid regime, applied on the ground by the hordes of armed banditry, follow the failure of the attempt to divide the country along the Zambezi, which was frustrated by determined action by the Mozambican armed forces - FPLM. It also follows a series of verbal aggressions, threats and insults against the People's Republic of Mozambique and its leaders by members of the racist South African regime, which have recently intensified. The objective of this tactic of pure terror is to sow fear and insecurity among the populace of the south of the country and cut off our capital from the rest of the country. This escalation of South African aggression against Mozambique comes, also, at a moment in which the international isolation of the apartheid regime is being reinforced and in which its attempts to promote internationally armed banditry as a legitimate opposition to the policy of our government are failing...The Political Bureau of the Frelimo Central Committee calls on the international community to reinforce still more the isolation of the apartheid regime and increase support to the People's Republic of Mozambique...Acts of barbarity such as those that have been committed reinforce the conviction of the Mozambican people, of their party and their government that the only dialogue possible with banditry is the dialogue of arms... "

A military source says that the bandit group responsible for the massacre had set up a camp in the Calanga zone on the coast, where they received supplies by sea from South Africa.

Noticias 16/11/1987.

Mozambican armed forces say that two SAAF Impala fighter bombers violated Mozambican air space in the vicinity of Ponto do Ouro on the 11th. Violations of air space have increased in recent days.

Noticias 24/11/1987.

Two SA aircraft violated Mozambican airspace on the 22nd in the Matsequenha region north of Namaacha district. The planes were detected by a unit of the Frontier Guards at 12 o'clock and stayed in Mozambican territory for about 30 minutes. The general staff of the FPLM do not know the reason for this incursion which violates clauses in the Nkomati accord. Matsequenha is about 20 kms from the frontier.

Weekly Mail 27/11 - 3/12/1987.

Trish Hanekom tells how in 1983 she was part of a three person spy ring which obtained a trunk-load of top secret documents from the directorate of a special task force of the SADF. This had details of destabilisation operations in Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The others in the ring were Derek Hanekom and Roland Hunter. Hunter had been a personal assistant to Col Cornelius van Niekerk. van Niekerk headed "Operation Mila", the code name for SA support to Renamo. "Operation Mila" was the model project - regarded as effective and cost efficient - for other operations with the LLA, Unita and Zimbabwean dissidents. The group got hold of information documenting:

- * The use by a civilian organisation of the Hillbrow post office to broadcast propaganda for "The Voice of Free Africa";

- * Consignments to Renamo of new AK 47 rifles, with the serial numbers erased;

- * Military coordinates and dates for drops of arms and supplies to Renamo;

- * The use of a company, "Frama Intertrading" as a front to transport officials involved in "Operation Mila";

- * R 5.000 to fit out Dhlakama and other Renamo officials with clothing to attend a conference in West Germany;

- * The payment of wages to senior Renamo officials in camps, two near Phalaborwa and one north of Pretoria;

- * The payment of monies to Renamo officials in Malawi.

Other details cannot be published in SA. Much of this information found its way to Mozambique. Hanekom said the severity of the charges against the three were reduced because members of the State Security Council felt they could not risk releasing highly sensitive material even in an *in camera* trial.

Southscan 2/12/1987.

Reports on interview given by Trish Hanekom in Harare. In addition to the elements in the Weekly Mail report (27/11 - 3/12 above), she said Col Cornelius van Niekerk was head of "Operation Mila" (the code name for SADF support for the MNR). He was a senior officer in the Directorate of Special Tasks, which fell under the Chief of Staff Intelligence. van Niekerk worked out of the Zanza Building in Pretoria. The group had got hold of top secret documents showing details of the following (in addition to those things mentioned in the Weekly

Mail report):

* Consignments to the MNR of brand new AK 47 rifles, with their serial numbers erased. These came from a stock of such weapons kept in a warehouse at Voortrekkerhoogte;

* Military coordinates and dates of drops to MNR camps in Mozambique. Normally Dakota aircraft were used;

* The payment of money under civilian cover to MNR leaders in Malawi.

Moto (Zimbabwe) December 1987/January 1988.

Article on Trish Hanekom adds that in addition to arms, the SADF supplied fertilisers, propaganda leaflets and even pencils (with 'made in South Africa' stripped off) for an MNR 'hearts and minds' programme. Hanekom also reported that the killing of Orlando Cristina was carried out with SADF approval. "A decision was taken by the operation to eliminate him" amidst factional disputes within the MNR. Col Cornelius van Niekerk is described as the head of the Directorate of special Tasks.

Africa Confidential 2/12/1987.

Article on RENAMO links with Special Forces Command of the SADF, says that the key to RENAMO's political and even military strategy is to be found in military intelligence headquarters, Special Forces' command at SADF HQ, and in the operations room of Five Reconnaissance regiment at Phalaborwa. Special Forces' task is to run SA's secret wars using techniques developed by the Portuguese and perfected in Rhodesia. Special Forces are the operational arm of Military Intelligence. According to SA sources, RENAMO's operational centre is at Phalaborwa. It is here that recruits are trained and supplies organised and it is from here that members of 5 Recce travel to Mozambique to carry out sophisticated acts of sabotage. They receive air support from air bases at Louis Trichardt and Hoedspruit and the electronic eavesdropping centre at Mariskop. Special Forces are 5,000 strong, commanded by Maj Gen K. van der Waal. Each Recce has its own commandant, normally a Lt Col. The Special Forces have to operate with maximum discretion so as not to embarrass the government. A vital component is veterans of Rhodesian Special Forces and Selous Scouts. 5 Recce which supports RENAMO has about 750 people, including 500 blacks. It has its own air, sea, land and sabotage specialists. 5 Recce is not the only one which supports RENAMO. Another is led by Col Breytenbach (brother of Breyten) and operates out of Louis Trichardt. Thirty One Battalion based at Duku Duku also does. Special Forces circulate information on a "need to know" basis and

often do not inform civilian politicians of their work. SA agents captured in Maputo confirm the links. Jaime Mondlane, captured in March 1987, worked as an interpreter for Maj Andre van Rooyen, who was recruiting for RENAMO. A northern unit operating in Nampula and Niassa provinces is now based in the Comoros. French intelligence sources confirm the use of the Comoros.

Noticias 9/1/1988.

An "official source" in the government denounces as a "flagrant and gross violation of the Nkomati Accord" the illegal entry into Mozambique in the company of armed bandits of SA journalist, Cloete Breytenbach. Breytenbach published an article about his visit to bandit camps in Maputo province in the *Star* of January 7. The Nkomati Accord prohibits each party from making any propaganda inciting a war of aggression against the other and also obliges each party, individually and collectively, to prevent illegal border crossings. The source said that the "attitude of the SA authorities to this incident could only signify, at minimum, complicity". Breytenbach, who entered via Swaziland, is the brother of Breyten Breytenbach [and also therefore of Col Breytenbach, commander of a Special Forces' unit located at Louis Trichardt, which works closely with Renamo - see *Africa Confidential*, 8/12/1987].

Noticias 10/2/1988.

A bandit "sector commander", Modesto Sixpence, captured in Manica in January told the press that SA was continuing to resupply the armed bandits by air. He spoke of supplies arriving at night on planes piloted by whites who spoke English.

Noticias 2/3/1988.

One of the bandits who handed himself over to the authorities under the amnesty law, Abilio Jangane, who spent three years with the bandits in Tete province, said that there were 8 SA black military personnel in a bandit base in Furancungo zone. He said they were instructors who also planned operations.

Luis Tomas, another former bandit, said that the bandits had been ordered to intensify their attacks on power lines and roads, particularly in the centre of the country. This was based on several considerations, including the agreement on Cahora Bassa and an attempt to press the Mozambican government to recognise the bandits.

Weekly Mail 4/3/1988 - 10/3/1988.

Article by Phillip van Niekerk says "No one in Maputo, not even the western diplomatic corps, is in any doubt that South Africa is directing Renamo from across the border". Military sources in Maputo are quoted claiming

that the only territory which Renamo controls is a strip around Malanje (Milange ?) on the Malawi border and some land to the north of Gorongosa. The other critical war areas include southern Manica, northern Tete and the south of Inhambane. There Renamo strategy seems to be directed at assassinating local leaders and destroying infrastructure. A former bandit, interviewed during a visit to Niassa province, spoke about being taken to a camp in Malawi "where some white people - the head of the bandits, Bernado, told us they were South Africans - came and gave us a medical inspection and selected us according to age for training". The military commander of the province, Brigadier Manuel Manjiche, said "The South Africans are giving direct military aid to the bandits by air and by land. We know they are dropping supplies from airplanes". 90.000 people in Niassa - 20% of the population are displaced, but since September a train has been running to Lichinga.

Noticias 23/3/1988.

SA supplied large quantities of arms and ammunition to bandits operating in the central parts of Mozambique in December and January, according to a youth who was involved in unloading these supplies. Fernando Tepo, who handed himself over to the authorities in Beira, said the arms had been landed by sea on the coast between Beira and the Zambezi river. He said AKs, mines, ammunition and mortars had been offloaded. He said the comandant of the base called Macioambodza had said he had come from South Africa. Eduardo Manuel, another former bandit, said he had seen large quantities of armaments being transported to the same base. One loading, during the first week of January, had taken seven days to complete. He said that the presence of South Africans among the insurgents was not a secret to anyone.

The second part of this chronology covering the period to November 1988 will be published in a future "Southern Africa Dossier".

Each quarter, the CEA will publish a "Dossier" with updates of the material in the first two parts of this chronology. At the same time it is planned to issue at the beginning of next year a Portuguese and English edition of a chronology dealing with economic relations between Mozambique and South Africa since the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984.

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