

34  
whom he proposed to lead to rescue Marthinus Pretorius from prison. He and his companions were with difficulty persuaded by Paul Kruger to abandon their project, which might only complicate their otherwise just cause. He had hurried from his farm in the Rustenburg district to warn his infuriated countrymen in the Potchefstroom district against precipitate action. He told them that the time was not yet ripe for drastic action.

suggested the name of Piet Venter, who however declined the post on the score of diffidence. Willem Schoeman then proposed Piet Cronje to be the Principal prefect, as being the man in whose mind the idea had germinated.

Piet Cronje next called his <sup>together</sup> prefects, and also collected 350 burghers on the Mooi River → see attached continuation

Thoroughly in keeping with the haphazard policy of the British Governments of that day, a policy characterised by vacillation, by alternate coercion and conciliation, bullying and blandishments, Pretorius and Bok were soon released on bail, and the charge against them dropped. Pretorius was then offered a seat in the new legislature, but declined.

Since 1874, the Earl of Carnarvon, as Secretary of State for the Colonies in the second Disraeli's Ministry, had been convinced, from his Canadian experience that the federation of colonies and republics of South Africa was the one solution of their difficulties and dangerous divergencies in their dealings with indigenous African tribes. The very questionable treatment of the Hlubi chief Langalibalele, by Lt. Gov. Sir Benjamin Pine at this time had emphasised in his mind the need of a humane and uniform system of ruling Africans, by a confederation of states. and he urged that end with all his power. He was thus fore-shadowing the present Union of South Africa. He sent James A. Froude in 1874, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1876 and Sir Bartle Frere in 1877 to promote this scheme, but the Afrikaner Republics - Free State and the Transvaal, were opposed to it, partly from misconception, but chiefly from suspicion.

After the annexation of the Transvaal, <sup>the</sup> self-government in a S.A. Confederation was again offered (as a sop to it) by Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the successor of Carnarvon at the Colonial Office. But the Boers would have nothing less than absolute independence. When the Permissive Federation Bill was placed before the Cape Parliament the burghers of the Transvaal had three main concerns. They feared that its passage would greatly minimise their chances of regaining their independence; they feared that the Transvaal

might be represented in the Federal Parliament by British Government nominees like Sir Owen Lanyon, and they feared that the Federal Parliament might accord electoral franchise to black or coloured people. They therefore sent Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert and E.P. Jorissen to school the Cape Afrikaners to agitate against Confederation, a mission which they successfully accomplished and the Bill was rejected (May 1880).

In June 1880, the great Liberal statesman William Gladstone bitterly disappointed the Transvaal burghers and surprised the world by making a remarkable and complete volte face. While in opposition, he had in his famous Midlothian electioneering campaign denounced the annexation of the Transvaal as a "wrongful coercion of a free people". His words had been acclaimed by the Boers, who saw in Gladstone "a Daniel come to judgment". They therefore prayed for the success of the Liberals, and literally hung on the issue of the impending British election.

When the Liberals triumphed at the polls and Gladstone replaced Beaconsfield as Prime Minister of England in April 1880, the Boers congratulated him and called upon him to <sup>d</sup>redeem his implicit and explicit promise of restoring their independence as stipulated in the Sand River Convention. "Wij vertrouwen dat na ernstige overweging van al die documenten, UEd. de vrijheid zult gevoelen om de annexatie van ons arm land te herroepen, en in zijn volle kracht het Tractaat van Zandrivier van 1852 te doen herleven." (Oord van J.F. Paul Kruger p.297). Instead, the great liberal, <sup>statesman</sup> ate his words. He sent a telegram to Sir Bartle Frere dated 20th of May 1880 that "Under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be ~~relinquished~~ relinquished." This <sup>som</sup>somarsault caused consternation among the burghers of the Transvaal, and confirmed <sup>in them</sup> their long established belief in English perfidy. No epithet was then too virulent to hurl at Gladstone. The burghers redoubled their agitation against annexation; they again repudiated British suzerainty and resolved upon civil disobedience. They refused to pay taxes and prepared for war.

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## CHAP IX TAXATION WITHOUT LIBERTY.

The first serious protests were in Wakkerstroom, Piet Joubert's district, where 110 farmers refused to pay quitrent due by them. The Volkstem commended upon this in somewhat approving language, and its editor - Mr. Celliers was arrested and imprisoned.

Towards the end of the year (1880), many burghers in the districts<sup>s</sup> of Potchefstroom, Rustenburg, Middelburg, Wakkerstroom and Zeerust received final demands to pay their arrear taxes. Some paid, others paid under protest, while Piet Cronje and several others, especially in the districts of Potchefstroom and Wakkerstroom refused or neglected to pay.

On the 7th of October Piet Cronje at the head of about 130 burghers from the Schoon Spruit ward rode into Potchefstroom and handed in a letter to the landdrost Goetz, the tenor of which was their acknowledgement of receipt of demands for taxes, a denial of the British Government's right to tax them, <sup>and</sup> a declaration of their willingness to pay under protest provided the money would be paid over in time to their rightful Government, the S.A. Republic.

" Wij, de ondergeteekenden, burghers van de wijk Schoonspruit district Potchefstroom, erkennen de ontvangst van uwe aanschrijvingen tot het betalen der belastingen, welke door ons zouden verschuldigd zijn, en geven te kennen: Dat wij ten allen tijde bereid zijn eenige belastingen aan ons wettig Gouvernement verschuldigd te betalen; dat wij echter meenen dat gij handelende voor en ten behoeve van het Britische Gouvernement - hetwelk zich op een onwettige wijze, en tegen onzen wil van ons land heeft meester gemaakt, en zich aan ons opdringt - nie gerechtigd zijt die belastingen ten behoeve van dat Gouvernement van ons te eischen, daar het door ons niet als wettig Gouvernement wordt erkend, omdat wij tegen hetzelfde protesteeren en het nooit eerbiedigen zullen voor het ons, volgens recht en billijkheid, teruggeeft hetgeen het ons met verkrachting van alle rechten, wetten en tractaten heeft ontnomen, opdat de meerderheid der bevolking het erkenne waaraan wij ons dan zullen moeten onderwerpen. "

En om van onsen ernstigen wil een duidelijk en wettig bewijs te leveren bieden wij u de van ons gevorderde betalingen onder protest aan. Dat wil zeggen: dat wij bereid zijn, die gelden aan u te overhandigen onder u uitdrukkelijke voorwaarde dat gij ons daarvoor kwitanties af - geeft waarin duidelijk vermeld staat dat die gelden op heden aan u onder protest zijn betaald, en verder dat gij u verbindt die gelden zoolang onder zoodanige verzekerde bewaring te stellen dat het aan onszelfen of aan dat Gouvenement kan worden terugbetaald hetwelk wij - indien wittiggeconstitueerd -erkennen sullen waaromtrent spoedig nader zal worden beslist.

Ingeval u mocht weigeren aan dit billijk en rechtmatig verzoek te voldoen verklaren wij proteteerende burgers van de wijk Schoonspruit in het district Potchefstroom, Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, dat wij alleen voor geweld zullen buigen indien ons zulk een gruwel verder door u of uwe handlangers mocht worden aangedaan.

Wij hebben de eer te zijn uw dienstwillige dienaren

P.A.Cronje, Voorman en 127 anderen

(Oord van J.F: Paul Kruger pp 301,302).

Under these conditions the landdrost refused to accept the taxes, and reported the matter to Pretoria.

Piet Bezuidenhout, a farmer of the Potchefstroom district, said to be related to, <sup>Frederick</sup> Bezuidenhout of the Slachter's Nek episode (1816) was among those who received summonses for arrear taxes and costs to the amount of £27.5. 0 Bezuidenhout agreed to pay the capital in £14, but not the costs. His wagon was duly attached and advertised to be sold in execution on the 11th November 1880.

On that morning Piet Cronje and a hundred men arrived at the market place in Potchefstroom; Bezuidenhout climbed on the wagon to speak to the knot of people there collected, then Cronje spoke to the effect<sup>e</sup> that he had come to stop the sale. The sheriff - Moquette - then appeared, mounted the wagon, read the conditions of sale, and asked for a bid. Two of Cronje's

men then climbed the wagon and pushed off Moquette, and Cronje ordered his men to draw the wagon away. Moquette who was following was pushed into a cesspool by others. The wagon was later drawn by a team of oxen to Bezuidenhout's farm.

Goetz, the landdrost immediately reported this act of lawlessness to Sir Owen Lanyon in Pretoria, and the latter sent orders for the immediate arrest and imprisonment of Cronje and his accomplices 'for resistance to authority'. He also sent an armed police force under Commandant P. Raaff to restore order.

At this time the British had their hands full. Their troops were away from the Transvaal suppressing rebellions or else ~~now~~ maintaining the prestige of their empire. The 58th Regiment was away with Sir George Colley, watching the pent up Ponds, and the turbulent Tembuland and East Griqualand border; some troops were serving under Col Carrington in the Basotho War of Disarmament, while others were away in the Near East. The season was thus propitious for the Transvaal burghers.

Cronje sent Piet Bezuidenhout, the hero of the wagon incident with one or two other active participants to proceed at once to Rustenburg to report the events of the 11th November to Paul Kruger. It is quite probable that Kruger was privy to Cronje's activities, quite possible that the plan of campaign had been previously discussed and arranged between the two men, who were good friends.

In any case, Kruger at once sent a message to Piet Joubert in Wakkerstroom, and it was later arranged between the two to call an emergency meeting of the People's Committee for the 1st of December at Kaalfontein. Meantime he also gave warning to Cronje not to be rash, not to be hasty, not to shoot, except in self defence. Said he, "Cronje, ik is die laaste man op aarde om bloedvergieting aan te raai, als dit te mermij is, maar als hulle jou wil vang en jij kan nie los kom sonder om te skiet nie, skiet dan maar, maar laat jou nie vang nie." (Brandwag

"Alas hulle jou in hande kry dan sal jij nog miskien dieselfde lot ondergaan als die martelare wat aan die galg gestorwe is op Slagters Nek en op Boomplaats, and he added, "Die tyd is nog nie daar om die volk te wapen te roep nie" (Ibid, P.174)

In the meantime, Commandant Raaff with ten mounted police were on the lookout for Cronje and other disturbers of the peace. They found him at his farm on the Schoonspruit with 70 other burghers, armed to the teeth. Upon Raaff inviting Cronje to come with him to Potchefstroom, the latter answered that if the British Government wants him, they must take him by force, for he and his friends were prepared to resist, to defend themselves and to fight to their last drop of blood, and there were about 400 other men, armed and ready for eventualities.

These were no ambiguous words, and Comm. Raaff deemed it wise to return with his small police posse to Potchefstroom, and report to his Headquarters.

Under these circumstances, Sir Owen Lanyon at once directed Col. William Bellairs, Officer commanding the Transvaal Garrison, to detail a force to proceed to Potchefstroom to support Comm. Raaff, to guard the gaol, and to remove the rebels, when arrested, to Pretoria. Accordingly, the 21st Regiment, containing 140 men under Col. Richard Winsloe, moved from Pretoria to make a camp on the north side of Potchefstroom.

On the 1st December the People's Committee met at Kaalfontein, as previously arranged. Sir George Hudson, the Transvaal Colonial Secretary also came. He complained of the lawlessness of Cronje and others, and emphasised the majesty of the law. Kruger in answer said the British were to blame for all the disorder, which was the result of coercion. The patience of the burghers was now exhausted and they could no longer be restrained. (Ik kan het volk niet langer in bedwang houden, en de Engelsche Regeering is self oorsaak van den tegenwoordigen toestand van zaken....Julle is zelf de schuld van dit alles; ik kan niets meer doen." Oordt van J.F. Paul Kruger p.303)

Paardekraal

After Sir George Hudson had left, the People's Committee resolved to advance by a month the mass meeting that had been arranged for the 8th of January 1881. It was unanimously agreed to have this meeting at Paardekraal near Krugersdorp from the 10th to the 16th of December 1880. Letters and notices were then sent out to all the districts field-cornets advising them of the change of date of the great national meeting at PaardeKraalberg.

In the meantime, the Law was still struggling pathetically to assert itself. Summonses were<sup>e</sup> issued from the landdro<sup>s</sup>t's office at Potchefstroom against<sup>s</sup> Piet Cronje, Basson, Coetzee and others of Schoon Spruit, who had taken a leading part in the wagon incident at Potchefstroom. This was a belated step. History had long marched past that post, and the Dutch Afrikaners of the Transvaal were now thinking in terms of "bloed<sup>d</sup> en staal". Oncemore, pathetically, the decadent majesty of the law tried to make itself felt in Sir Owen Lanyon's Proclamation as late as the 6th of December 1880, that certain persons had challenged the Queen's authority by taking Piet Bezuidenhout's wagon away from the Court Messenger and warning all, especially the prefects against contempt<sup>f</sup> of the Queen's authority, that all must # pay their taxes else their farms will be sold; and that local authorities must do all in their power to uphold British prestige.

Too late: by the 8th of December, Piet Cronje with 500 burghers of the district of Potchefstroom, on horseback and armed to the teeth were on the dusty road north-westwards to Paardekraal whither all roads from the Transvaal led. By the 10th of December there were some 5,000 people here, and their numbers increased daily by hundreds, until, on the 13th, there were some 8,000 to 10,000 men, women and children present.

It was resolved unanimously that the Volksraad, interrupted by the Annexation, should forthwith resume its functions, and that Paul Kruger, Vice President, Piet Joubert, Commandant General and Marthinus Pretorius, should form a Triumvirate to

carry on the Government.

For each district a Commandant was chosen, and Piet Cronje was appointed Commandant of the district of Potchefstroom, and he was also made Assistant Commandant, <sup>General</sup> of the S.A. Republic.

A Proclamation of Independence was prepared by Eduard Bok and Dr. E. Jorissen. It was a wordy instrument of some thirty-eight clauses reviewing the Boer struggle, and re-iterating their independence established by the Sand River Convention of 1852, and recognised by European states; denying the charges of slave holding, repudiating the allegations of misgovernment and military inability to defend their borders against the surrounding savage and hostile African tribes; charging the British Government with bad faith in annexing the Transvaal, and subsequently breaking all the promises of self-government made to them at the time of annexation; rehearsing the futile attempts of their deputations to British authorities both in South Africa and in England, to arrive at an amicable settlement in the retrocession of their independence; and finally declaring to one and all, that on the 13th day of December 1880, they are taking it upon themselves to restore their rightful Government, and are appointing Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert and Marthinus Pretorius as a triumvirate to conduct the Government, and that the Volksraad resumes its sittings.

Each man of the 5,000 to 6,000 present then, in deep solemnity took the following oath "In the presence of Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts, and prayerfully waiting on His gracious help and pity, we, burghers of the South African Republic, have solemnly agreed, as we do hereby agree, to make a holy covenant for us and for our children, which we confirm with a solemn oath. Fully forty years ago our fathers fled from the Cape Colony in order to become a free and independent people. Those forty years have been forty years of pain and suffering. We established Natal, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, and three times the English



government has trampled on our liberty and dragged to the ground our flag, which our fathers had baptised with their blood and tears. As by a thief in the night has our republic been stolen from us. We neither may nor can endure this. It is God's will, and is required of us by duty to our fathers and by love to our children, that we should hand over intact to our children the legacy of the fathers. For that purpose it is that we have here come together and give each other the right hand as men and brethren, solemnly promising to remain faithful to our country and our people, and with our eyes fixed on God, to co-operate until death for the restoration of the freedom of our republic. So help us Almighty God."

At the same time, each man took a stone, carried it above his head, and deposited it on a heap as a witness to his solemn oath. The stones so deposited are contained in the national monument at Paardekraal near Krugersdorp.

On the 14th, Kruger, Joubert and Pretorius together with about 1,000 armed burghers proceeded to Heidelberg to occupy it as the temporary capital of the re-established Republic.

Hendrik Schoeman was sent to demand the keys of the Government offices from the Landdrost. On the same day, Piet Cronje in command of 400 horsemen of the Potchefstroom commando left Paardekraal for Potchefstroom. His orders were to have the Proclamation of Independence printed by T.P. Borrius, at the earliest possible moment and immediately to send the copies to the Triumvirate at Heidelberg.

<sup>c</sup> Cronje and his commando had to cover a distance of about 70 miles. They rested at the now historic Wonderfontein, then rode through the night and reached Potchefstroom at midday on the 15th December. Leaving their horses outside the town, Cronje and a few burghers went to give their orders to Borrius, Printer and Editor of the "Die Transvaaler". Cronje also carried a letter from <sup>the</sup> Triumvirate to Major Marshall J. Clarke, Special British Commissioner at Potchefstroom, informing that officer that the government of the S.A. Republic is established, and hoping he would not interfere with the printing of the Proclamation, as it was urgent,

and as the publication would prevent bloodshed, for, though the conditions and parties were reversed, this Proclamation differed in no way from Shepstone's proclamation of three years previously, which also was not accompanied with any bloodshed. (Brandwag 1/9/1913 p.203)

Maj. Clarke at once <sup>warned B</sup> warded Morrius against printing the Proclamation as being seditious material, but the indomitable Piet Cronje made Borrius print it. He divided his men, and so disposed the<sup>m</sup>, that some would watch and protect the printing press on the East, while others would watch the movements in the English camp on the North side, and others again would guard the south and west sides.

**CHAP. X WAR OF FREEDOM (Vryheids Oorlog 1881)**

**1. Hostilities Treasons & Treacheries**

On the 16th (December 1880) the first shot of the Transvaal War, or Eerste Vryheids-Oorlog was fired between the English Mounted Infantry and a patrol of Cronje's force under Commandant Robbertse of Rustenburg. and ever since up to this day there has been a heated controversy as to which side fired that first shot of the war. Each side blames the other, and writers and historians sift the evidence and decide according to their prejudice, the pro-English blaming the Afrikaner, and the pro-Afrikaner blaming the English (Lady Bellairs: The Transvaal War; Weilbach en Du Plessis: Geschiedeni van die Emigranten Boeren; Kotze. J.: Memoirs)

In any case, the fire was returned, and in this first clash, Comm Robbertse was wounded in the arm. During the next two days there was sharp skirmishing. Cronje opened fire upon the garrison and on the 18th ~~the~~ forced Maj. Clarke to surrender unconditionally. The terms of Maj. Clarke's surrender were reduced to writing, Cronje guaranteeing him and his garrison their safety as long as they were his prisoners. When the prisoners were searched by Buskes, Cronje's secretary, a letter of rather serious nature from one C.O. <sup>Waite</sup> ~~Waite~~ was found on Maj. Clarke's person. It read.

Paardekraal,

December 14, 1880.

4  
Maj. Clarke,  
Special Commissioner,  
Potchefstroom.

Dear Sir,

Here at Paardekraal are about 4,000 bigmouthed cowardly Boers. Dont let the number frighten you, for I am sure that you could with 300 undisciplined troops chase them in all directions with less than half an hour's fighting. I have taken service under them as a doctor, so that I will be in a position to inform you from time to time regarding their movements."

Another letter of similar nature was found on the person of Comm P. Raaff, and was addressed to him by one Johannes van der Linden, and seemed to show that he was serving the British as a spy. / The two men were at once arrested and brought before the war council for summary trial. Advocate Buskes prosecuted, and Woite was defended by Advocate van Eck. 97

Evidence seemed to show that Christiaan O. Woite was a burgher of the S.A. Republic and a tailor by trade. He had gone to the meeting at Paardekraal on the 10th December 1880, and pretending to be a medical man was able to obtain confidential information which he passed on to the British authorities. He was sarcastically referred to as "Dr" Woite.

Johannes or Hans der Linden was also born in the S.A. Republic, and was a corporal in the burgher forces. He had also gone to the Paardekraal meeting, and was since in constant pay of 30/- per day by the British authorities for information which he gave them concerning Afrikaner movements and plans.

General Cronje confronted them with a copy of his speech at Paardekraal, where he remembered seeing them.

"Burghers and Friends: Now that we, as a nation have taken an oath to restore our Independence or to die, it is possible that some of you are sorry you have come here. If so, I ask you please to leave my camp and to return home, I shall see that no one hurts you. If you remain, then you are under military law, and it will be expected of you to do your duty as burghers until we get that which has been stolen from us. Please understand that if any of you, having joined my commando commit treason by working against me or our national welfare I warn you that such, when, and if caught, even though he may be my best friend, my brother or my father will pay the death penalty of a traitor as he will deserve." (Brandwag 1/9/1913 p.

The two men were found guilty of treason and sentenced to death, according to law, by Cronje. After two days, given them to right themselves with their Creator, they were led out and shot by a squadron, (Weilbach en Du Plessis: Geshiedenis pp. 165, 184) (B.V.5: 'Dr' Woite to Maj Clarke 12.12.1880) one on the 31st Decembet, and the other on the 7th of January 1881. (The Royal Commssion condemned these acts as unauthorised.

(Nixon J: The Complete Story of the Transvaal p.221)

Besides laying siege to Potchefstroom, the Boer forces also besieged six other British garrisons of Pretoria, Rustenburg, Lydenburg, Standerton, Marabastad and Marthinus-Wesselstroom.

On Sunday morning the 20th of December, Commandant Frans Joubert with 160 <sup>men up</sup> cut, in 15 minutes a British force of 257 men under Col. Philip Anstruther at Bronkhorstspruit between Middelburg and Pretoria. Anstruther had received orders to proceed to Pretoria to strengthen the garrison. When challengers challenged on the road to stop he refused with fatal results to himself and his troops. He and 76 men were killed or mortally wounded and 81 others disabled. This was the beginning of British disasters in the Boer First War of Independence, disasters which were to include Laings Nek and Ingogo, and to culminate in Majuba on the 27th of February 1881. In this war of independence, ~~disasters-which-were-to-include~~ and arguments, Bronkhorst Spruit was also denounced by the British as an ambush and treacherous assault. Accounts about it differ. But Sir Evelyn Wood, the successor of both Sir Owen Lanyon and Sir George Colley who inspected the scene of the fight and studied the relevant reports, pronounced it a legitimate war operation, conducted, in his view, quite fairly. (Kotze J: Memoirs p.751)

Piet Cronje was the senior officer in charge of the operations in the siege of Potchefstroom, and was as such immediately responsible to the government of the S.A. Republic. He had authority to publish notices, to give publicity to proclamations, and to make agreements, pending the approval of the Triumvirate.

The strength of ~~th~~ his commando was originally 400 men. This strength was naturally reduced by casualties, and Cronje requisitioned the Government for more reinforcements. It was however later found that 200 men could easily have carried on the investment of Potchefstroom, and Cronje was more than once ordered by the Government at Heidelberg to send men to Comm-Gen Piet Joubert at the Drakensbergen. Rather than reduce the strength of his force, however, he ordered commander H.R.Lemmer of Makwas<sup>s</sup>i and Command<sup>an</sup> J.M.Wolmarans of Mooi River to find men from their commandos for Joubert.

There was always a grain of stubbornness about Cronje, which more than once brought him into sharp collision with his superiors. On the matter of retaining too many burghers at Potchefstroom, when they were more urgently needed elsewhere, he was rebuked by Vice Pres.Kruger, but his answer showed anything but readiness to submit to authority (B.V.12: p.145-7) (Kopieboek van P.A.Cronje: Brief van Cronje aan Kruger)

He was a man who, when he had formed an opinion stuck to it against all advice and reasoning. This failing was a great stumbling block in his official career, and as he grew older, he became more obstinate, more incorrigible, and often expressed himself uncompromisingly, and in a manner that angered and antagonised those who wished to advise him. Often he did not even condescend to defend his opinion, but simply treated those who thought differently as if they were children, or people bereft of reason. So much did he believe in himself.

Naturally a man of few words, he expressed himself in few incisive sentences and phrases in an all-knowing manner and supercilious air, or he simply treated the would-be adviser with maddening contempt. His temperament was such that he could not brook opposition, and his exalted position as a military leader made him impatient of any criticism and interference, not only from his subordinates, but also from his superior officers, and even from Headquarters and the Government. At the same

time he was himself an unsparing critic of anything that was not done according to his way of thinking; and Kruger, who had a soft spot for Cronje even he was time after time compelled to pull him up, and reprimand him for over-stepping his authority, and doing things that did not concern him. Such for instance was the case when Cronje went out of his way to criticise the financial policy of the Triumvirate, and without authority tried to make arrangements with the Bank at Potchefstroom (Die Boere Nationale Handelsvereniging) for a Government loan. On being reprimanded, he answered in such an off-hand and petulant manner that Kruger had to tell him it was not clear who were the responsible officers of the Government - Cronje of the Triumvirate.

516/ <sup>(Van Colloer : Gen. Piet Cronje)</sup>  
 Piet Cronje was also not always exemplary in his remarks and references about the Government. He was apt to be censorious and caustic in season and out of season. He nearly always referred to the (Government as we would refer to the British) Government as "West" or Triumvirate at Heideleberg shortly as "Heidelberg", very much as we would refer to the British Government as "Westminster" or "Downing Street", or to the American Government at "Washington" or "The White House", or to the Russian Government as "The Kremlin", or to the French Government as "The Quai D'Orsay" but in a contemptuous vein.

87/ <sup>c</sup>  
 As military and civil authority of Potchefstroom during the period of its siege, Cronje had the final say in its commissariat arrangements and the chief responsibility for public monies from whatsoever source. Such revenue was required by the Government to provide provisions and war material, and other necessaries for use by the Government and the burghers in the field. The Republic was not by any means well off, and revenue had to be husbanded and stretched as far as possible. When Cronje was reminded was reminded of these obvious essentials and asked to pay to the treasury monies collected in his sector, he was not only reluctant or tardy to do so, but he was actually offensive in his observations, and he was again sharply chipped

off by Kruger.

Generally speaking, <sup>i</sup>discipline, as understood in European armies, was conspicuous by its absence in the Afrikaner <sup>f</sup>forces, except of course in the regular organisations like the S.A.Republiek Staats Artillerie and the O.F.Staats Artillerie and the Johannesburg Politie. Besides these it was only in Cronje's laagers that there was some semblance of discipline, at any rate during the First Transvaal War of Independence. Cronje was strict with his burghers, and demanded absolute obedience <sup>f</sup>from them. He moved among them and mixed with them on terms of equality; they did not rise or touch their hats when he came among them, they shook him by the hand to greet him. He called them "kerels" or mates and they called him by his Christian name, <sup>Piet or</sup> "Oom Piet" as they called other generals. Only when there was military activity - an objective to reach, a point to defend, a stand to make did he stand out as leader <sup>to</sup> and issue commands; then he was commonly addressed as "General". His men responded more to his orders than did burghers under any ~~gen~~ other general. <sup>f</sup>Possibly because Cronje was himself brave, fearless and successful, his burghers were attached to him. Some feared him, others respected him, others were magnetised by him.

"Cronje is een man van groot door God geschonken verstand. Geleerdheid bezit de man niet veel, maar een eider die met hem slechts een eetlepel vol zout heeft opge<sup>e</sup> eten, zal hem eeren als een man van gezond verstand en zedelijkheid" (Cronje is a man endowed by Heaven with commonsense. He possesses no great learning, but whosoever has eaten a <sup>spoon</sup> spoonful of salt with him will respect him as a man of understanding and honour")

<sup>FN</sup> Weilbach en Du Plessis: Geschiedenis van de Emigranten Boeren p.129) "Hij was een Afrikaner van uitnemende dapperheid, doch eenigszins voorvarend van geest, Daar hij Kommandant van zijn distikt was, genoot hij een aanzienlijken invloed, <sup>d</sup> en maakte dan ook daarvan ruimschoots gebruik"

(He was an Afrikaner of exceptional bravery, if also of somewhat impulsive temperament. While Commandant of his district, he enjoyed considerable influence of which he made ample use). (Oordt van J.F: Paul Kruger p. 301)

2. Majuba: The fatal folly, bustling restlessness and poor judgment of Sir George Colley early assured the Boers an easy victory over the British at Lang's Nek on the 28th of January 1881, in which that general sacrificed 200 men, and again at Ingogo or Schuin's Hoogte on the 8th of February where another one hundred and fifty British soldiers were immolated to his ineptitude. Inexorable fate then drew or drove Colley to the top of Majuba Hill, thence to survey, very much like did Moses of old from Pisgah, the beautiful land below, with its promise of the Boer laager, seemingly soon to be in the hollow of his hand, but which in reality he was destined never to win.

These battles were a remarkable feat of Boer courage and fortune, and Majuba was unique in its difference from and contradiction of the Boer traditional methods of warfare. Their dramatic and breath-taking victory was indeed an achievement of which any army might be proud, a daring enterprise which should have ended once for all the talk of cowardice which some British levelled at the Boers. (Tilby A.W. South Africa 1846-1913 p.434-) but the Boers themselves, the victory was appropriately regarded as a manifestation and direct interference of Providence. It was like the British, <sup>miraculous</sup> escaping at ~~Majuba~~ Dunkirk in 1940.

By contrast, the defeat of the British at Majuba was regarded by them as a disgrace and <sup>h</sup>humiliation comparable to the capitulation of Gen. Burgoyne with 6,000 men at Saratoga in 1777, and Gen Charles Cornwallis with 7,000 to George Washington in the American War of Independence.

The defeat and death of Sir George Colley at Majuba on the 27th of February 1881 was the turning point of the war. It was clear that one of the two things would happen. Either, the new British commander - Sir Evelyn Wool<sup>d</sup>, with the large reinforcements which had arrived in Durban, and others still at



sea, would force his way across the Drakensbergen and relieve Pretoria and other British garrisons, or else a sudden cessation of hostilities, "with a view to stopping further and unnecessary bloodshed", (a discovery which invariably comes too late),<sup>87/</sup> and saving the belligerents' faces. This last hope of the last alternative was that which most responsible people cherished,<sup>and</sup> Gladstone was urged by his cabinet to conclude peace. He and they feared the entry of the Orange Free State and the Cape Afrikaners to help their kith and kin against the tyranny of England. The Boers, on the other hand, dreaded the increasing concentration of the British troops, and the well-nigh certain danger of a turn in the fortunes of the war, were it prolonged a month longer.

In this way an armistice was arranged and peace concluded; a temporary peace of eighteen years, before the curtain was again rung up for the Second Act of the drama of the Anglo-Boer Struggle, in Die Tweede Vryheid's Oorlog 1899-1902.

~~THE ARMISTICE AT POTCHEFSTROOM.~~

3 Armistice at Potchefstroom.

A matter which gave rise to a heated controversy<sup>s</sup> was the carrying out of the armistice conditions, concluded on the 6th of March 1881 between Sir Evelyn Wood and Comm-Gen Piet Joubert to enable them to discuss terms of peace.

One of the conditions was that Sir Evelyn<sup>y</sup> Wood should be permitted to supply each <sup>o</sup> of the beleaguered garrisons with provisions for the duration of the armistice. This was done with all the garrisons<sup>o</sup> except Potchefstroom. It was afterwards said that Cronje purposely with-held the news of the armistice from his adversary Col. Richard Wineloe, and that the latter was forced to surrender on the 21st of March for want of provisions for his men.

This was charged against Cronje as brazen-faced treachery. These allegations of treachery filled him with righteous indignation, and in his Memors, he vehemently repudiated them and their writers - the "English Jingo writers" who thus show him in very bad <sup>i</sup> light, defame his character, and thus anger the British public and awake feelings of race hatred between the two races (Cronje's<sup>je's</sup> own words).

After long keeping quiet "hulle leugens en kwaadwillige anti-jguigen met stilzwyghende minachting" and treating their deliberate and mischievous misrepresentations with silent contempt) Doch tans wil ik een waar verhaal van die geschiedkundige gebeurtenissen wereldkundig maken, zodat de onpartijdige en waarheid lievende geschiedskrijver van de toekomst de feiten naar waarheid ~~willen~~ kunnen boekstraven. De lezers kunnen zelf oordelen. Ik vrees de uitslag niet" (Now, however, I shall reveal the true facts of the famous incident, so that they may be available to the unbiassed and objective historian of to-morrow. The reader can also judge for himself. I do not fear his verdict) <sup>y</sup> (Brandwag 1/9/1913 p.216)

Piet Cronje then goes on to show that on the 3rd of March 1881, he heard <sup>h</sup> tyat Joubert had overcome George Colley, and that the latter was slain. On the 13th, he received official information from Paul Kruger of the armistice arranged between Joubert and Sir Evelyn Wood, and that the truce was to be for eight days from the

date of the arrival of the provision wagons for the beleaguered garrison and he was directed to inform Winsloe of these facts. At the same time Cronje received a letter from Pres. Brand, informing him about the truce, but as the directions in Brand's letter were slightly different from those in Kruger's letter Cronje and his krijgsraad or war council decided to carry on the fight while awaiting more specific instructions from Heidelberg. Meantime Winsloe through his secret service heard of the armistice and its conditions, and wrote and met Cronje to ask him about it. But Cronje maintained that the truce would only commence when the provisions wagons should have arrived, and as the latter had not so arrived, hostilities were to continue. Paul Kruger's letter had been emphatic on this point "De termen van wapenstilstand bepalden uitdrukkelijk dat de wapenstilstand van acht dagen niet eerder zou beginnen en in werking treden dan na de aankomst van de lewensmiddelen. (The terms of the armistice specify clearly that the armistice of eight days shall not commence to operate till after the arrival of the provisions).

Upon Winsloe telling Cronje that the provision wagons, upon the arrival of which the commencement of the armistice depended had actually come, Cronje denied all knowledge of that fact. On the 23rd of March, Winsloe being reduced to sore straits surrendered to Cronje, and soon after heard that peace had been concluded on that day at LaingsNek between the belligerents, The provision wagons arrived only on the 9th of April, seventeen days after Winsloe's capitulation and the treaty of peace, and its signature under the grim shadow <sup>o</sup> of the Majuba Mountain, by Sir Evelyn Wood on behalf of Britain and Commandant-General Piet Joubert, on behalf of the South African Republic.

#### 4. Pretoria Convention 1881

A Royal Commission, consisting of Sir Hercules Robinson, Sir Henry de Villiers and Maj. General Sir Evelyn Wood, was appointed to draw up a Convention with the deputies of the Transvaal, and their work was completed on the 3rd of August 1881, when a document known as the Pretoria Convention was signed.

The Pretoria Convention: By this treaty the S.A. Republic was called the Transvaal State, and agreed to recognise the suzerainty

of Her Majesty the Queen of England. Subject to this suzerainty the Transvaal was to have complete control of its internal affairs, while Britain was to control all its foreign relations including the concluding of treaties, and the British resident was to guard the interests of the African tribes of the Transvaal, and no legislation affecting them was valid until approved by Her Majesty's Government.

After reading the terms of the Convention, one is forced to the conclusion that the Boer War of independence had not achieved independence for them. The Transvaal was still trammelled very much like a self governing colony. It was virtually still a dependancy of Great Britain. <sup>The Pretoria Convention</sup> It could not hold a candle to the Sand River Convention of 1852, which the Transvaal went to war to restore.

During the Transvaal war, the African tribes both within the Transvaal as well as those whose territories adjoin<sup>ing</sup> the Transvaal, were divided in their sympathies, some favouring the Boers and others favouring the British. Among the former were the Koranas of David Taaibosch Massou at Mamusa, now known as Schweizer-Reneke, while among the latter were the Barolong of Montshiwa at Mafeking.

5. The Epistles of Cronje:

Throughout the war, Piet Cronje kept a sharp look out on the African tribes. He had a feeling, from previous dealings with them, that most of them were inimic<sup>i</sup>al to the Transvaal, and that if they did not actually fight and harass the Boers directly, they would at least give assistance to the British in <sup>m</sup>any other ways, such as giving them information of Boer movements, helping them with provisions, and according them hospitality. Under these circumstances, early in the war, to wit on the 29th of December 1880, Cronje wrote to the Chief Montshiwa of the Barolong: "Monchua - Take notice that as soon as you, or any of your people are found armed fighting against the burghers of the South African Republic, which government is again restored, and where <sup>r</sup>of Paul Kruger, Marthinus Pretorius and Piet Joubert form the government; or lend assistance to our enemies, the English Government, whom we have nearly worked out every where, we will consider you and your people as our enemies, and treat you as such. We have always considered you and your people as friends

of the Boers, and we are willing to treat you as our friends, that is, if you remain peaceable, because we alone are able to work out the English. But you can send your people to help us work our corn and our farms, and for which we will pay your people well. 'B.V.26 Briewe af-gestuur duur Generaal P.A.Cronje 30 Des 1880- April 1881).

Tot this letter Montshiwa replied :

Sehuba,

" To P.A. Cronje ,  
Commandant for District of Potchefstroom.

January 4, 1881

My Dear Friend,

I have received your letter of the 29th December 1880. I want to inform you that I found some burghers of the South African Republic going about in my country armed, and I was astonished about that, because I am not fighting with any one.

But about the work, I may say that I cannot force any one to go and get employment.

I do not know who are your enemies, but I consider all the people as your friends.

Tell your people not to come to my country with arms.

Yours,

Montshiwa,

Chief of the Tshidi Barolong."

Then there is another letter, also ~~written~~<sup>addressed</sup> to Montshiwa from Potchefstroom and dated the 18th January 1881 ;

" Aan Monchua, Kaptein der Barolongs, Sehuba,

Myn Vriend, I have your letter of the 4th January, and Commandant Viljoen has reported to me that you have made peace with our people of the South African Republic, and that you sent a boy as a token of security . I am sending you our Government Gazette and a copy of a Proclamation to keep you informed . Write again and let us know if the refugees have gone back to their homes.

Ik verblyf , Uwe vriend,

P.A.Cronje , Generaal ."

This letter provoked the following reply on the 21st January :

Sir, Your letter of the 18th duly to hand. With regards to peace repeatedly made by J.Viljoen I do not understand, for at the same time Hendrik Greef and Hans Coetzee are collecting a large armed force this side of Lichtenburg, and on good authority I learned that it was to make war with me. It got so bad that white people were coming in from

all quarters for protection , and last Sunday the Boers living in this district had written orders to trek to the camps in Marico at once, all to be there not later than Monday night. This finished it for now we have not a single white man living ~~here~~ between this place and Marico, or this place and Lichtenburg. This is the peace Carl Weyers and M. Joubert are to keep.

For the newspapers I thank you. The affairs of the little Kafir, I never gave one. It was J. Viljoen's doings. He poited out one and said that that child must grow up and have children before we should fight against each other . The child is still here. Viljoen promised to give the child a young heifer, so you can see that it was all his work. "

Then follows a letter of more friendly tone, written by Cronje from Potchefstroom, and addressed to "David Mashow , Malmoesa, aan Hart Rivier ",

~~A letter of more friendly tone, written from Potchefstroom and addressed to "David Mashow,~~

~~Malmoesa aan Hart Rivier,~~ warning him against mixing with such ill-disposed people as Christopher Bethel, and asking him if possible to arrest them. "Da' er zekere kwaad doeners rondgaan om andere kaffer stammen op te maken als mede valsche geruchten te vermelde om de menschen te verleiden zult jij uitvinden dat Bethel bij Monchua kwaad werk doet. Houw uw oog op hem, en vang hem."

And again to David Moshow (the identical addressee)

"I have read your letter to Adriaan de la Rey. I am glad of your sympathetic attitude to the burghers of the South African Republic. I am sending you a copy of the Proclamation to keep you informed. I hope you will be on the look out for our enemies and drive the "vuilgoed" out." <sup>A</sup> and finally, again to David Massou (the identical person)

"Wij vertrouwen dat jij te strengste waakzaam zyn zult ene op onse vyand acht <sup>geven</sup> en jaag die vuil goed uit, en als jij denkt dat het verrade's zyn, stuur hem dan hierheen. Laat mij dan weten wat uwen klagten zyn, en ik sal hem voor die krygstraad brengen omtte worden

gestraft. Laat mij gedurig weten wat bij u voorvalt, en hoe die andere kaffer kapteins van plan zijn. Men heeft mij berigh<sup>t</sup> dat jij en andere kapteins bij Monchua (Montshiwa) zijt geweest, en ek sal verblyd zyn te hooren wat jij en de andere kapteins hebben besloten. Intussenhoop en bed ik dat de Goede God van hemel en aarde u en onze vriende moge bescherm<sup>m</sup>en ons werk segene<sup>w</sup>

Ik verblyf, Uwe Vriend

P.A.Cronje Generaal. (Ibid)

(We hope that you be thoroughly alert to keep a watch<sup>f</sup>ful eye on our enemies and drive off that rubbish. And if you think that some of them are traitors, send them here. Let me then know what you charge them with and I shall bring them before the war council and have them accordingly <sup>punished</sup> punished. Keep me constantly informed of the events in your dist<sup>r</sup>ict, and of what the intention <sup>o</sup>f the other native chiefs is. I am told that you and other chiefs met together at Montshiwa's town, and I shall be pleased to know what you and the other chiefs resolved. In the meantime I hope and pray that the Good God of heaven and earth will protect you and our other friends, and that He will bless our work"

During the Transvaal war, there was a subdued struggle on the western Transvaal border between the African tribes who were pro-British and those who were pro-Boer.

Soon after peace was <sup>s</sup>igned on the 23rd of March 1881, this African struggle flared up. On the 2nd of May, the pro-British Montshiwa attacked the pro-Boer Matlaba at Lotlhakane or Reitfontein. H.A.Greeff, commandant of Lichtenburg at once sent the following urgent report of the matter to General Cronje

"Adries Machavie (Matlaba) reports that Montshiwa attacked him at Rietfontein yesterday. Montshiwa's people with about 60 whites surrounded him at twilight, put part of the stad in the east on fire, killed about 46 people including six brothers of Machavie<sup>a</sup> (Matlaba) and wounded 20 other people, 4 of whom seriously."<sup>y</sup> (Wilbach and Du Plessis: Geschiedenis van die Emigranten Boeren p.372)

Cronje himself had a bone to pick with those African tribes,

especially the Barolong of Montshiwa, and the Batlhaping of Mankuroane, who had been so demonstratively pro<sup>British</sup>, and had been a source of worry to him when his hands were tied up with the siege of Potchefstroom. Now however, he was free to reckon with them. He therefore lost no time in detailing a force to proceed to the western Transvaal border under Comm Greeff, to support the pro<sup>Boer</sup> Africans against their enemies and the enemies of the Transvaal. 81/

This minor war was actually in progress when the Royal Commission was sitting at New Castle and deliberating on the Pretoria Convention. *After the attack of Montshiwa on Rietfontein, Cronje came to Rooigrond with a commando of 150 men to avenge the mafla but was persuaded to withdraw by Commandant J.P. Snyman of Marico.* On the matter being reported, the commission at once deputed Comm-Gen

P. Joubert for Transvaal and Maj. <sup>E. Buller</sup> ~~R. Butler~~ for the British, to go and investigate the causes of the disturbance and to put a stop to the fighting. (Vide Mackenzie J. Austral Africal Vol. 1p.63; Weilbach & Du Plessis: Geschiedenis van de Emigranten Boeren p.372; Nixon J: The Complete Story of the Transvaal p.269)

The action of General Cronje and Commandant Greeff was viewed with great disfa<sup>v</sup>our by the Royal Commission, who summoned them both to New Castle to explain their conduct. The Commission accepted Cronje's evidence, supported by Comm-Gen Joubert's <sup>i</sup> view that Montshiwa had been incited and supported by some (English) loyalists <sup>s/s</sup> and refugges <sup>e</sup> (Weilbach & Du Plessis: Geschiedenis van de Emigranten Boeren p.372). 34/

The Commission also investigated the accusation <sup>s</sup> of treachery preferred <sup>f</sup> against Gen. Cronje by Sir Evelyn Wood in the matter of concealing the agreement of the armistice in March from Col. R. Winsloe, and unlawfully compelling him to surrender. Gen. Cronje <sup>c</sup> defended himself in that he had received somewhat conflicting orders from Comm-Gen Joubert, Vice-President Paul Kruger and President J. Brand. He quoted Kruger's emphatic letter to him "Het is uw plicht aan de Majoor Winsloe <sup>kennis te</sup> kenniste geven van de overeenkomst tusschen Wood en Joubert; maar de wapen stilstand begint bij u in Mooirivier, neit voordat de provisie aankomt, en in uwe handen is overgegeven ter bezorging. Voor dien tijd zijt gij vrij de krijgsoperatien voort te zetten." (Ibid pp 378-380) (See also pp herein) (It is your duty to give Major Winsloe notice of the agreement between Wood and



Joubert, but the armistice does not commence to operate with you in Mooi River before the provisions arrive and are handed to you your care. Before that you are at liberty to prosecute military operations)

General Cronje <sup>h</sup> wrd door een en ander in onzekerheid gebragt. Volgeens de instructies hem gezonden moest hij, ~~namens~~ <sup>h</sup> Comm-Gen Joubert die kennisgeving aan het garnizoen zenden, en uit den brief den Pre. van den Vrijstaat zag hij dat Gen Wood dezen uitnoodigde, die kennis geving te zenden. (Gen. Cronje was in a dilemma. According to Joubert, he had to notify the garrison, while according to the letter from President of the Free State, Wood he would perform that duty. (Ibid pp 380-381)

The Pretoria Convention was signed on the 3rd of August 1881 in Pretoria. Many chiefs from the northern, eastern and western Transvaal, and also from Griqualand West and Bechuanaland had come up with large followings of horsemen and imposing cavalcades to get first hand information of the proceedings and also to be near ~~to supply information if needed., but in true South-African tradition,~~ they were neither asked <sup>to</sup> speak, nor to attend the sittings. Instead, they were herded together in the open, in preparation for an address to be delivered to them, and in the meantime, the military band regaled ( or taunted ) them with the ravishing strains of "Ten Little Nigger Boys" <sup>y</sup> (Oordt J.F: Paul Kruger p. 354). Sir Hercules Robinson, the Chairman of the Royal Commission, ~~then spoke to them from the heights.~~ ~~Hercules Robinson~~ spoke to them from the heights, through the medium of interpretation by the Rev. John Smith Moffat. He told them what conclusion the Commission had come to respecting them. The Africans <sup>l</sup> listened intently to the verdict. Many were evidently disappointed that they should be placed under the discretion of the Transvaal ( <sup>y</sup> Kotze J. Memoirs p. 796) Some chiefs got very excited and expressed their disappointment in no ambiguous terms. "They asked whether it was thought that they had no feelings or hearts that they were thus treated as a stick or a piece of tobacco, which could be passed from hand to hand without question." (Mulder Ivan: Lord Milner ' S.A. p. 264)

One chief said, "I am not a man who eats with both sides of his jaw at once. I only use one side. I am English." Another said "We are in agony; our intestines are twisting and writhing inside us, just as you see a snake do which has been struck on the head" (Ibid p. 265)

On the contrary, an Afrikaans writer states confidently that if the 'Kaffers' had been asked to choose, they would have asked to be placed under the 'Boers', for they (de kaffers) know well that before the Boers came, they were wretched and poor; they know well that by their intercourse with and service under the Boers, they learnt to wear clothing, to eat bread, to ride on horseback, to shoot, to plough to drive etc, and that briefly, they owe to the Boers the progress they enjoy. (Weillbach & Du Plessis Geschiedenis van de Emigranten Boeren p.373).

When the Convention had been signed, the Vierkleur<sup>T</sup> was again hoisted at Pretoria on <sup>Monday</sup> the 8th of August 1881 amidst great jubilation of the Afrikaner people throughout South Africa. Absolute independence had indeed not been attained<sup>i</sup>, but it was felt that the blood of patriotic men had not flowed in vain, and the Pretoria Convention was but a step to a fuller Magna Charta<sup>o</sup> in the lines of the Sand River Convention.

*6. Uneasy Peace on The Western Border;*

The end of the war between the Afrikaner and the British was a signal for the commencement of armed rivalries between their African sympathisers and supporters on the Western Transvaal border. Montshiwa, chief of the Tshidi Barolong<sup>o</sup> at Mafeking favoured the British or English, and was much lionised by them, while he disliked the Afrikaners, and was equally detested in the Transvaal. His opponent was Moshete, chief of ~~of~~ the senior (Ratlou) branch of the Barolong at Kunwana, whose sympathies were wholly with the Dutch Afrikaners, and was therefore disliked by the British.

Montshiwa's mind and attitude were shared by Mankurwane, chief of the Batlhaping at Taungs, while David Taaibosch Mossou, the Korana chief at Mamusa (Schweizer-Beneke) sided with Moshete. Montshiwa and Mankurwane called themselves "Englishmen" while Moshete and Massou called themselves "Dutchmen".

The armed strife that went on between Montshiwa and Moshete from 1880 to 1884, as well as that between Mankurwane and Massou was at first purely African, but afterwards, each of them employed European 'volunteers', Montshiwa and Mankurwane being assisted

by Englishmen from Griqualand West and Kimberley, while Moshete and Massou were helped chiefly by Dutch Afrikaners from the Transvaal. Naturally, the sympathies widened until the Moshete-Massou axis got its inspiration and ammunition from Pretoria, while the Montshiwa-Mankurwane alliance received its blessings and good wishes from London.

Though it is not conspicuous, the name of Piet Cronje appears now and then in these conflicts, and it is certain that his burghers - men from the Potchefstroom district, and especially from the Schoon Spruit ward - were among the 'volunteers' under Niklaas Gey van Pittius, their leader who tried to annex Montshiwa's country, and found a Republic of Goshen at Rooigrond, of which he became the 'Administrator'.

At the same time that pandemonium reigned in the Western Transvaal border, disorder broke out in the Northern Transvaal. When Sekukuni was captured by Sir Garnet Wolseley and imprisoned in 1879, his half brother-Mampuru - was appointed chief in his place. The Royal Commission set Sekukuni at liberty in 1881, re-instated him, and deposed Mampuru for seditious behaviour. Full of vengeance, Mampuru on the 13th of August 1882 attacked Sekukuni, slew him and fourteen relatives, burnt his village, captured his cattle, and then fled for refuge to the Mabogo (Mapoch) tribe under chief Njabel.

As Njabel would not surrender Mampuru, Comm-Gen Piet Joubert led 2,000 burghers against him on the 30th of October 1882. In this campaign, the Potchefstroom commando was not at first well represented, as Cronje and his burghers from the Schoon spruit did not heed the call, excusing themselves, now with preoccupation on their farms, and now with incapacity owing to an epidemic of measles. Ultimately, however, Cronje and the Schoon Spruiters arrived in the middle of November, took active part in all the engagements, and gave a good account of themselves under their fearless and resourceful 'Commandant of Potchefstroom', who was now looked upon as one of the aces of the Dutch Afrikaner leaders

of the Transvaal, whose word an<sup>d</sup> opinion in the war councils carried weight.

Cronje took charge of the operations in the eastern flank, built a fort at Steenkampsberg where he installed a cannon by which he opened a heavy bombardment upon the enemy fortress. On the 13th Cronje at the head of 300 burghers and 200 Bapedi warriors tried to dislodge a strong force of Mabogo's people from a strong position, but had to retire with a loss of some men. As the tribe had ensconced themselves in the caverns with which the mountains there are honeycombed, Joubert surrounded them, and tried to smoke them out, but without success. An attempt was next made to blow up some caverns by dynamite, but although the explosions caused panic, and much damage to foodstuffs, and loss of life, the effect was not what was anticipated. Finally, it was decided to <sup>k</sup>blocade the Mabogo tribe and reduce it to starvation, after the manner of Hendrik Potgieter to subdue Sekwati's tribe in 1852, *and that* of <sup>Marthinus</sup>M. Pretorius and <sup>Paul</sup>P. Kruger to annihilate <sup>Mokopane</sup>Mokopane in 1854.

This method, though slow and atrocious, produced the results desired by the besiegers, and was the least costly to them. On the 10th of July 1883, after eight months' siege and occasional desultory fighting, Mampuru surrendered to Comm-Gen Joubert, and a few days later, Njabel also, with 8,000 warriors surrendered. Mampuru was tried and hanged in November 1883 for rebellion and the murder of Sekukuni, while Njabel was sentenced to imprisonment for life.

This is a representative assembly, and supreme authority in the Dutch Afrikaner republics, and consists of one or more elected members for each district. An important branch of it is the Executive Council or Uitvoërend Raad, consisting of the President, the State Secretary, the Commandant-General, the Superintendent of Natives, and other members appointed by the Volksraad. It is a parallel of the cabinet.

Piet Cronje's name had now been before the public for many years, since the prominent part he had played in the opposition to Taxes in 1880. He had proved himself a worthy patriot, and had been elected successively Assistant Veld-Cornet, full Veldcornet, <sup>c</sup>commandant, <sup>g</sup>general and Assistant Commandant-General. He had attracted attention by his address at the National protest meeting at Paardekraal, and by his resourcefulness in surmounting the obstacles in having the Proclamation of Independence printed in December 1880, he had earned for himself a name as the 'Lion of Potchefstroom' by his utter fearlessness, and by his successful operations against the British garrison in that town. He was known to be a friend and supporter of the national idol Paul Kruger. His father had been a Veldcornet and a commandant, and a member of the Volksraad and was now still and 'oudeling' (elder) in the National church. He and his father were held in high esteem (<sup>h</sup>Hoog in aansien) as successful farmers on the Schoon Spruit. When therefore there was an election for the Volksraad in August 1881, and the name and meretorious deeds of Piet Cronje were still fresh in people's minds, he was returned as member for the district of Potchefstroom. He and C.J.Bodenstein and R.H.Lemmer being elected to represent Potchefstroom town and district.

This honour led to other honours in <sup>and</sup> civil, official life, and Cronje was next appointed to serve on the Triumvirate Committee. In 1882, he was appointed as one of the Commission of five men to report on the Finances of the Republic, and its Debt to

England in connection with the War of Independence of 1880 to 1881. This was a duty of some difficulty, demanding great care and diligence inasmuch as many documents had to be perused, demands or compensation assessed, and expenses and accounts<sup>5</sup> of the Royal Commission analysed. It was work, in fact, which required some training in business methods, and knowledge of accountancy, and it is no small credit to Piet Cronje and his colleagues of the Finance Commission, that they accomplished it successfully, and were able to report within four months ~~time~~ (July 1882)

In May 1882, Piet Cronje was appointed on another Commission on the South-West Boundary of the Transvaal, under the chairmanship of Commandant-General Piet Joubert. With his intimate knowledge of the country and people in the Western Transvaal, Cronje was entirely in his element in the investigations of this Commission, and he was in position to shed much light and give advice which so facilitated the work of the Commission, that it was able to report in June 1882, within a month of its appointment.

The findings of the Commission were in effect identical to the report which had been submitted to the Royal Commission in 1881. They took the stand that the lawlessness and disorder in the Western Transvaal, were ~~pricin~~ principally if not wholly due to the uncertainty of the real boundary line which had existed since the Keate Award in 1871. The Commission reiterated the view that land truly belonging to the South African Republic had been unlawfully expropriated and given over to African tribes. To regain some of such land, Pres. Thomas Burgers had then taken steps in 1873 to form alliances with some of the African chiefs like Moshete and Matlaba (Machavie) and David Massou in the Western Transvaal, and subsequently induced them to cede their territorial rights to the South African Republic, but as there were no recognised boundaries between the tribes themselves, the territorial right these chiefs were willing to cede often encroached upon other tribal domains and provoked quarrels which the S.A. Republic as assigns became involved in.

In August 1881, Col. Moysey was deputed by the Royal

Commission to mark off the boundary line of the Transvaal as determined by the Pretoria Convention. The chiefs who had ceded their territorial rights to the Transvaal were highly displeased when they found themselves included within the 'free' country of Bechuanaland. Captain Nourse was now sent by the British Resident at Pretoria, to accompany Commandant Hendrik Greeff and Capt. Raaff of the South African Republic to report on the condition of the border, but their mission bore no useful fruit, as war broke out again between the rival pro-Boer tribes and the pro-British tribes soon after the end of the Transvaal War of Independence, and went on intermittently for three years 1881 to 1884.

These were matters which Piet Cronje, generally as member of the Volksraad, and especially and particularly as member of the Commission on the South-West boundary of the S.A. Republic had to study minutely, and be thoroughly conversant with, and for which he had to find a solution.

In the Volksraad session of 1882, it was decided to terminate the rule of the Triumvirate and have a Presidential election in the following year. This was duly held in January and February 1883. There were two contestants - Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert. Kruger was elected by a clear majority of 3,431 votes against Joubert's 1,171. In May, Piet Cronje was chosen as one of the Committee of four members who had to administer the oath of office to the new President. Joubert and Kruger were the two outstanding men of the Republic, and his anger and frustration were viewed with concern by the Volksraad and many burghers.

Since the Presidential election, a growing antagonism had been noticeable between Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert. The latter's defeat at the polls added bitterness to his feelings, and his election as Vice President and Commandant-General did not mollify him. He hankered for nothing less than the presidency.

In all these committees, Piet Cronje was remarkable for the freshness and originality of his views, for his diligence and earnestness, and for punctuality and devotion to duties placed

before him

placed before him.

1. *The London Convention 1884*  
Third Deputation.

In August 1883, a Deputation of the S.A. Republic was elected and sent to the Colonial Office in London to seek amendments to the Pretoria Convention. This was the third delegation <sup>to</sup> in the British Government in six years. The first one had been in May 1877 to protest to the Earl of Carnarvon against the Annexation of the South African Republic. Its members were Paul Kruger and Dr.E.P.Jorrissen, with Eduard Bok as secretary. The second delegation was in July 1878 to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, to protest again against the Annexation. Its members were Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert, with Eduard Bok again as secretary. And now, again in August 1883, there was this third Deputation to the Earl of Derby, and its members were Paul Kruger again, General Nikolaas J.Smit, and the Rev.Stephanus du Toit, while Dr.Jorrissen also went in an undefined role. Commandant Piet Joubert was not even mentioned.

He asked himself - Why? Why Kruger <sup>e</sup> every time, and why - Jorissen-a Hollander, a foreigner, twice? And why Nikolaas Smit? a brave man no doubt, but junior to himself, Joubert; but above all why the Rev.Stephanus du Toit? - a Cape man, and <sup>why</sup> not him - Piet Joubert - a former Triumvir, an Ex-Judge, a member of the Location Commission - a ~~former~~ <sup>e</sup> vice President and Commandant-General, a patriot who had fought and faced countless dangers for the Republic? .

Having reached London, the Deputation at once (November 1883) commenced negotiations with the Earl of Derby, the new Colonial Secretary in the Gladstone Ministry. He was assisted by Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner of South Africa, who had gone to London especially for the purpose, and also unofficially by the Rev.John Mackenzie, the London <sup>Missionary</sup> Society missionary of Kuruman, who, unfortunately for the Deputation happened to be in England at this time.

The negotiations were protracted over four months, from November 1883 to February 1884, during which the Deputation found



Lord Derby patient and sympathetic.

They objected to the Pretoria Convention (1881) especially to its provisions on a British Resident, the Imperial veto on legislation affecting Africans, and the south-west boundary of the Transvaal. They demanded:

*They requested*  
1. That part of their debt of £200,000 to Britain should be remitted.

2. They demanded the recognition of their former name - South African Republic instead of 'Transvaal' and asked for a 'Treaty' formulated on the lines of the Sand River Convention.

3. They objected to the 'suzerainty' of the Queen, the continuance of a 'British Resident' and the Imperial veto in their legislations affecting Africans within, and the relations with those without the Transvaal.

4. They demanded that the south-western boundary of the Transvaal should be carried westwards into the Kgalagare (Kalahari) so as to include the whole of southern Bechuanaland within its limits.

*34* " Lord Derby was far from being an energetic guardian of Imperial interests" (Walker E. Cambridge History of the British Empire; S. Africa p. 501) and was described as a "cold water engine", indolent, urbane, cordial and generous. He gave them almost all they requested, except a new Sand River Convention and Bechuanaland.

The question of Bechuanaland, which also meant the western trade route, or as it was also called the Great North Road or the Missionaries Road was unquestionably the most important item of the Deputation's demands. Upon it revolved the decision whether the Boers or the British were to possess South Africa, and three of the four months spent upon negotiations were taken up with it. The Rev. John Mackenzie, admittedly an uncompromising Imperialist, was also undoubtedly the best informed man then in England about Bechuanaland and its people, and he traversed the Deputations argument, and foiled their strategy, and for this Kruger could never forgive him afterwards. Giving a report of their negotiations to the Volksraad, President Kruger stated inter alia that "he could

not say the British Government had not been willing to hear him, yet it had been induced to withhold justice from the Deputation by lies and fraud on the part of traitors and intriguers, of whom Mackenzie was one.....If it had not been for Mr. Mackenzie and the High Commissioner, everything would have been right. These liars had stirred up the people to stand in the way of the Government.....The whole ministry had listened to them with attention....yet he agreed that the liars and intriguers whom he had mentioned were the reason that everything was not settled as they wished. The High Commissioner and Mackenzie were the origin of the opposition experienced. (421, p.42 as quoted: Mackenzie J: Austral Africal Vol.1 p.166)

7K/ Sir Hercules Robinson also plucked up enough courage to resist the Boer claims to Bechuanaland, and there was a nasty scene which nearly ended in a fight between him and Kruger in the Council Chamber. (Memoirs 199) *Paul Kruger:*

Spurred by Mackenzie and the Missionary Societies, *Lord Derby was* adamant, and refused to include <sup>the</sup> Missionaries Road within the limits of the Transvaal but even then more suo, he compromised. Although he excluded the pro-British Bechuana chiefs Montshiwa and Mankurwane from the Transvaal, he included Moshete and Massou in that State.

The agreement, which bears the name of the London Convention, was finally signed on the 27th of February, 1884.

Before returning to South Africa, the Deputation first toured the continent. In Germany, where they met the Kaiser Welhem and Bismarck 'the man of Blood and Iron', they were welcomed as brethren and co-descendants of the elect Teutonic German-Dutch stock, while in France, their French strain in the Huegenot descent of the Boers was emphasised and exploited.

The Deputation at last returned home, in July 1884, to find an unsatisfactory state of affairs existing on their eastern and south-western borders. In the east, Zulu inter-tribal war had followed the return of Cetshwayo from custody at Capetown, and after his death in February 1884, his son Dinizulu had carried on the struggle, and was assisted <sup>against his Kinsmen</sup> by the Transvaal Afrikaners, who

proclaimed him 'king of Zululand' and received 1½ million morgen of land <sup>as a reward</sup> (against his kinsmen) to form an independent "New Republic" in August 1884.

On the south-western border, a state of war, with intermittent skirmishing had existed between the Barolong of Montshiwa and the Afrikaners of the western Transvaal since 1881. The Dutch-Afrikaners were so far successful that after besieging the Barolong, they dictated through Commandant Jacobus P. Snyman, rather harsh terms to them in October 1882, expropriating four fifths of Montshiwa's land, and compelling him to pay a war indemnity of £16,000 within one month (Theal: History of S.A. 1873-1884 p. 152) The land so taken by conquest from Montshiwa, together with land taken by 'reward' from Moshete, was formed into a huge block with defined boundaries, and named "land of Goshen", with Nikolaas Gey van Pittius as Administrator. In 1883 Montshiwa repudiated this treaty, and hostilities between him and van Piitus's volunteers were resumed. Such was the state of affairs when the Transvaal/<sup>Third</sup> Deputation left South Africa in August 1883 to seek amendments to the Pretoria Convention, and the quarrel grew in vindictiveness, and deeds revolting to humanity were perpetrated on both sides.

When Mackenzie got to England he was able to give a clear recital of these sordid events in his numerous addresses and articles on South Africa.

After the signing of the London Convention, Lord Derby, at the advice of Sir Hercules Robinson appointed Mackenzie Special Commissioner and sent him to restore order in Bechuanaland, and while the Transvaal Deputation was receiving addresses and acclamations in its triumphal progress through the capitals of Europe, Mackenzie was making agreements with Bechuana chiefs, proclaiming their lands as under the Queen's protection, and hoisting the Union Jack. His admitted partiality to the Bechuana and his pronounced imperialism soon angered the Dutch-Afrikaners in the Cape Ministry and (forced) Sir Hercules Robinson recalled

him and replaced him in August by Cecil Rhodes, thus unwittingly jumping from the imperialistic frying pan into the imperialistic fire.

## 2. The Post of Commandant-General

In August Commandant Piet Joubert was commissioned by the Volksraad to proceed to the seat of disturbances on the southwestern Transvaal border, to restore order, and to find a solution favourable to the South African Republic. He proceeded to the Land of Goshen, negotiated individually with Gey van Pittius, then with Rhoes<sup>d</sup> and then with Montshiwa. He partially restored order and partially found a solution and was developing it, when, as if to imitate Sir Hercules Robinson, President Kruger suddenly <sup>o</sup>ordered him to return to Pretoria in September (1884), and replaced him by the Rev. Stephanus J. du Toit

"In Pretoria was er een geweldige intrigue aan de gang, eene intrigue waar-van zonder twijfel de oorsprong te zoeken is bij den Transvaalschen Superintendent van Ondewijs <sup>g</sup>gesteudd door eenige anderen. Deze partij schijnt op de eene of mandere wijze President Kruger een gat in den kop gepraat te hebben, en hem te hebben verleid tot het nemen van een zeer onpolitieken en gevaarlijken stap die de hachelijkste gevolgen voor de Republiek had kunnen hebben (Oord van J.F. Paul Kruger p.436).

(There was some terrible intrigue in Pretoria; an intrigue whose origin is to be sought in the Transvaal Superintendent of Education and some other accomplices. The party seems somehow or other to have overtalked President Kruger, and to have misled him <sup>into taking an impolitic and dangerous step fraught with the most calamitous</sup> (in) clamitous results for the Republic.)

All the Pretoria and most of the Transvaal knew that there was growing antagonism between Kruger and Joubert. They knew also that, <sup>Detail</sup> was very much in President Kruger's good books, and, <sup>that</sup> there was bitter hostility between Du Toit and Joubert. The reasons for these changes were therefore known to be a deliberate humiliation of the Comm-Gen. Joubert, <sup>who thus</sup> was cut to the quick. The Rev. Stephanus Jacob du Toit again, <sup>thought</sup> though he. Who was this Du Toit anyway? A highly educated man no doubt, and a writer of

papers like the 'geleerde' (learned) De Patriot, and De Republikein"  
 tamelijk smeurig bixtixm bladje" (Oordt J.T: p. 440) (A  
 somewhat disreputable leaflet) a Superintendent of Education,  
 but also a man from the Cape, an outsider, and therefore an  
 untried and unknown quantity, while he, Piet Joubert was a man  
 of the people, a son of the soil, a fighter who had risked his  
 life a hundred times and had practical knowledge and experience  
 of the people and their needs. This was intolerable.

And now what was the result of President Kruger's listening  
 to clerical Du Toit's advice, and falling into the toils of his  
 intrigue (Oordt J.F.: Paul Kruger pp 436, 438). Instead  
 of soft pedaling the issue, Kruger had, without even consulting  
 him rashly issued a Proclamation on the 18th September, 1884,  
 annexing the territories of Moshete and Moutshwa to the South  
 African Republic, in direct contravention of the London Convention,  
~~signed only six months before, and so disturbed a hornets' nest~~  
 signed only six months before, and so disturbed a hornets' nest,  
 roused the indignation of the British Government and public opinion  
 and provoked the Warren Expedition, and had made himself a laughing  
 stock by having to perform an undignified climb-down by hastily  
 withdrawing the Proclamation and Du Toit's annexation on the 18<sup>th</sup> Oct.

When Joubert saw the Proclamation in the Staats Courant,  
 it was clear to him that the gap which had been widening between  
 him and President Kruger for five years was now beyond bridging.

Piet Joubert was a normal human being, and as such was enti-  
 tled to some ambition, and also to feel the pains and pangs of  
 jealousy and the stings and arrows of man's ingratitude. In  
 high dudgeon, therefore, he resigned his positions as Commandant-  
 General, Vice President and Superintendent of Natives. He was  
 done with politics and their sordidness. He would return to his  
 farm in the Wakkerstroom district, and devote his time to clean,  
 honest hard work, and live his life in peace.

The resignation of Joubert occasioned some indignation and

sensation in the Government circles. There were secret sittings of the Volksraad, and a commission of enquiry, consisting of five members, was appointed to interview Joubert and determine the root and reason of his grievance, and this was found to be his opposition to the 'priest from Pearl' meaning the Rev. S. J. du Toit. Piet Cronje was one of this Commission. The country was critical of President Kruger and his capitulation to the politics of <sup>Du Toit</sup> Doctor.

The Volksraad though reluctant to accept <sup>Joubert's</sup> his resignation had no option but to place the matter before the country, and ask for nomination for the vacant position.

Meantime Piet Cronje was chosen as Deputy Commandant General, and as such became automatically a member of the Executive Committee. The position of Vice-President and Superintendent of Natives was given to C. J. Joubert. <sup>Somewhat mollified by the general expressions of sympathy and confidence, Piet Joubert offered himself as candidate for election of Commandant-General in June 1885</sup>

For the Presidential election in January 1883, there had been only two candidates, Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert, but for the post of Commandant-General in <sup>June</sup> ~~October-November~~ 1885, there were no less than thirteen candidates. One of these was Piet Cronje, who because of his meteoric rise in public favour and esteem since the War of Independence in 1880, and because he was appointed one of the Senior Deputy Commandant<sup>s</sup>-General, had reasonable hopes of being elected to the vacant post. The results were, however, <sup>who had been persuaded to stand for the position he had?</sup> a disillusionment to him. Joubert obtained an over-whelming majority of <sup>3915</sup> 3,260 votes against a paltry 396 votes for cast for Piet Cronje, <sup>24 votes for</sup> Commandant H. P. Malan, and a miserable <sup>14</sup> 24 votes, <sup>14</sup> 14 for D. J. Erasmus, and 13 for I. P. Ferreira.

The country thus gave its verdict unequivocally that next to President Paul Kruger, the man it trusted most was Piet Joubert. The election showed that Piet Cronje was 'a lion' only in the district of Potchefstroom, and that Piet Joubert was the accredited national military leader. Was Joubert really so superior to him? The vacillating, irresolute temporising Joubert!

Bitterly disappointed, Cronje thought and spoke of resigning his positions in the State. Like Joubert, of whom he was now

so envious, he retired to his farm Laapfontein on the Schoon Spruit in July. Retreat and hard work on the farm cooled his cholera and calmed his nerves, and after four months he allowed himself to be re-elected Commandant of Potchefstroom. / Against #/ Piet Joubert, Cronje entertained a feeling of jealousy and <sup>therefore</sup> dislike. It could hardly be otherwise in one of President Kruger's coterie of friends who was at the same an aspirant for Joubert's position as Commandant-General of the South African Republic; and Joubert further irritated Cronje by his vacillation and irresolutions; by now resigning his position as Commandant-General, and giving Cronje the hope, nay the assurance of appointment to that highest military post of the Republic, and now withdrawing his resignation, and thus dashing Cronje's hopes to the ground, and now repudiating the withdrawal of his resignation, and now ratifying the repudiation of the withdrawal; <sup>tossing</sup> Cronje's feelings between hope and despair of becoming Commandant-General.

People generally are critical of their immediate superiors in office, and keenly alive to their shortcomings, and are apt to hold them in low esteem, and to feel that they can more effeciently discharge the duties of that office. This is natural, and Cronje was no exception to this rule. The nervous, shuffling unmethod and irresolution of Joubert provoked mixed feelings of contempt, anger and dislike in him. The bulky figure of Joubert stood in Cronje's light, and threw its massive shadow across his path of promotion. This fact became with Cronje a personal injury.

### 3. War against the Koranas of David Massou:

In November, a commando was called <sup>out-</sup> to proceed against David Massou, the Korana chief at Mamusa, the self same pro-Boer David Massou who had frustrated the pro-British Mankurwane, and ceded his ~~own~~ land to the Transvaal. Massou is said to have refused #/ to pay taxes. He took the stand that many Transvaal Afrikaners were his <sup>Subjects' and</sup> tenants inasmuch as they had called him their chief and he had allowed them to occupy and use his country on the Harts River, and therefore, so far from being obliged to pay taxes, <sup>to the Transvaal</sup> he

was by rights entitled to receive rent, <sup>from that Government</sup> (Mackenzie <sup>Austral</sup> Inst. Afr. Vol. 1 p. 205). Massou's people were also accused of having raided Boer farms in the western Transvaal, in particular they were said to have stolen the cattle of one Jan Hauwman. Massou vehemently repudiated this charge and said that it was in fact he and his people, who were sufferers from systematic cattle thefts by the white farmers living in adjacent territory, and the cattle Hauwman claimed as his were <sup>actually</sup> Korana cattle which had been stolen but <sup>had</sup> were returned to their pastures. These assertions and attitude of Massou were regarded as undesirable symptoms of Korana truculence. First, Piet Joubert was sent up to investigate the matter, and then <sup>Piet Cronje with a command of some 200 burghers followed up to give emphasis to</sup> demands, which Joubert made on the 26th of November. On the 2nd of December, Joubert and Cronje <sup>and</sup> and Koos de la Rey, 800 men advancing from three different directions, stormed the Korana village on a rocky hill overlooking the Mamusa lake. There was a sharp skirmish in which 300 Koranas were slain, including David Massou himself, and his two sons <sup>of [Theal: History of S. A. 187 1884 p. 175]</sup> 10 Dutch-Afrikaners also lost their lives, among them Commandant Schweizer of the Staats Artillerie, <sup>J. C. Reyneki</sup> and 6 were wounded including Piet Cronje's brother - Henrik. Cronje himself had a narrow escape, his horse being shot under him. On the following day, the Koranas, now without a leader, surrendered. 210 of them were taken to Pretoria to be imprisoned 'for rebellion' while Be-la Rey-to-Potchefstroom-and-Lichtenburg-there-to-be 369 Korana women and children were captured and removed by Cronje and De la Rey to Potchefstroom and Lichtenburg there to be distributed or sold to Dutch Afrikaner farmers as apprentices or slaves. Fourteen hundred cattle, two thousand sheep and thirty horses were taken. The clan was completely blotted out, and the very name of its home <sup>was</sup> 'Mamusa', changed into 'Schwéizer-Reneke'.

On his way to attack Massou, Joubert had called <sup>at Kunoana</sup> upon Moshete the other 'chief of the Transvaal volunteers' to assist him, very much as in 1852 Pieter Scholtz had called upon Montshiwa to assist him against Sechele. Very much as Montshiwa had refused because Sechele was his friend and he had nothing against him, so Moshete



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