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from the suspects indicated that they had acted alone and had travelled on foot. Brigadier Jonker in fact went so far as to say that they were sure of getting the convictions, and it would only be detrimental to the state's case if it was complicated by allegations of "outside involvement."

The ANC managed to defuse demands for an immediate march into Richmond, recognising (rightly I submit) that tension was running too high. But the suspension of peace talks by the ANC, while understandable, was surely playing into the hands of those who had timed the killing as they had. Mr Harry Gwala called for the removal of the Riot Police in particular, and the immediate bringing to book of those responsible. The police made 13 arrests, all of the suspects from N'kobeneni and many of them minors. Police also claim that they had found property allegedly stolen on the night of the attacks, at the homes of the suspects.

Again, the township settled into an uneasy quiet, with a minimum of incidents - again for about three weeks - until the ANC decided to try and re-open the schools in the area.

A meeting was held on Sunday, July 14, 1991, to discuss the details, and it was decided to call upon the teachers and pupils to begin attending school the following day.

That night (July 14) the mysterious attackers struck again. This time the comrades killed were sleeping in the still depopulated Magoda township, the house that they were in was the only occupied house of hundreds in the area. Residents allege that prior to the attack SADF and SAP searches had been conducted, in which security force members had been looking for weapons. The SADF confirm that they heard shooting around that time, but only knew of the "general direction" from which the sound came. Residents allegedly presumed that the security forces had known about the shootings, since some of the local people had heard the shots from where they were sleeping in Indaleni, even further away than the SADF camp in Magoda. They also responded angrily to allegations by the police that they (the residents) had been uncooperative in not reporting the killings (the police only discovered the news some 14 hours later, after the press had been). It later emerged that a number of statements had in fact been made to the police by residents who had heard gunfire that night.

This time the spent shells discovered at the scene were 308 cartridges, which are also a 7.62 calibre, but are privately manufactured, and of the sort used by many local farmers for hunting purposes. Also found on the scene were a bloodied axe and an ID document belonging to an N'kobeneni resident.

Another significant development has been the return of some comrades to Pateni and Smozomeni (those who fled months ago), although that attempt appears to have gone awry when comrades - after claiming that they had been attacked - attacked Mr Vezi's house in Pateni. Inkatha claimed that an SADF member had been involved in the attack against the IFP leader's house, but police deny this.

5. CONCLUSION

The only conclusions which one can definitely draw from the mass of information on the Richmond war are the following:

1) The N'kobeni and Pateni residents who participated in the attacks on Magoda to begin with, and later on Indaleni, must surely bear a large portion of the blame for the devastation which followed.

2) The ANC, while being at the receiving end of most of the attacks (around 90%), have to be criticised for excessive and vengeful retaliation on their part - to the extent that much of the moral high ground they held before March, was eroded by their actions immediately subsequent to their return. Sympathy for the ANC has increased since May however and perhaps some of the moral high ground has been regained.

3) Whoever is responsible for the killing - and it would appear to be more than the young boys from N'kobeni currently being held, since more murders have occurred while they were in prison, obviously have a (perceived) interest in the ongoing chaos and disunity.

4) The AWB emblems etc which have appeared on buildings would appear to indicate the involvement of whites other than the security forces, unless they themselves are responsible.


5) At the very least, the security forces have generally been negligent in the extreme, justifying even on this basis, calls for an independent enquiry. At the worst, they have been an integral part in the planning and execution of, if not the killings themselves, although this would be difficult to prove on the scant evidence available at present.

6) There has been some confirmed contact between the AWB and the police in the area, and although the nature of this contact remains unconfirmed, it has to be clarified without delay - in the interests specifically of those in the area who feel their interests are prejudiced by such contact, but also in the interests of the general public (who are unlikely to approve of this contact).

This report is in no way intended to be conclusive, and it is quite clear that what it does reveal is limited in many ways, particularly with regard to culpability or blameworthiness. In fact what is most evident from the information carried herein, is that there is much, much more than meets the eye."

Recent developments, such as a meeting between the police and the community - represented by the ANC - on 23 July 1991, to discuss the issue of security are a welcome improvement, as is the arrest of many suspects in the last few weeks (although no one has been arrested in connection with the killing of the 5 comrades on July 14, while 3 comrades have been arrested in connection with the Pateni attack).

In particular, the imposition of parameters of investigation by the police are worrying. Is it not strange that attackers have identified themselves as Inkatha people, that an ID document is found on the scene afterwards, and an axe? In short, are police suspecting, as many others are, that there IS more than meets the eye? My suspicion is that until such time as the police, or perhaps a more capable investigative authority (such as an independent commission of enquiry for example) broaden their investigation, and look beyond the front-line troops which appear so glaringly (and strangely) obvious, only then can there be hope for a lasting peace in the area. How long do we have to wait, and how much more evidence do independent bodies and organisations have to produce before such a step is taken? (44)



A ROUGH ILLUSTRATION OF FATALITIES IN THE WAR

(this includes 5 comrades and 3 IFP supporters killed in Pateni since 1 February 1991, and not mentioned in the above account).

5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost my thanks go to the residents of Indaleni and Magoda who have endured so much, yet still always found time to talk to me about what they know. The ANC, both the local (Richmond) and the regional (Natal Midlands) branches have always been most helpful to my investigations, as was the Inkatha Institute, specifically Kim Hodgson, Siya Nkehle and Senzo Mfaeyela.

To other organisations, such as PACSA, IDASA and the Black Sash who helped at every opportunity, either through monitoring the situation or providing resources. The Centre for Adult Education, particularly John Aicheson, who although never called upon for help directly, has played a large part in educating many of us in the dynamics of the region through his publications and general research, and as such deserves mention. Also Pierre Cronje, who through his tireless efforts and diplomacy has managed to help avert many crises, should be commended. John Green of the Anglican Church has also been closely involved in the conflict and his calm presence, message of peace and ability to remain neutral is remarkable.

But the Hudsons of the Indaleni Mission, who moved out to the country to promote agricultural and academic skills, and found themselves in the thick of a vicious war, for me - and thousands of the residents of the area - will always typify the best in humankind. Their courage, strength, humility and hospitality are an example which we would do well to emulate. To them and all the others at Khayalemfundo - you have managed to preserve a little bit of heaven in hell (Ed's quote), and this paper is dedicated to all of you.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Centre for Adult Education at the University of Natal has followed developments as they have been reported in the press - compiling a most useful dossier of reports. Various other organisations such as PACSA, IDASA, Black Sash and the Inkatha Institute have become involved at different stages.
2. The Sunday Tribune (July 7, 1991) for instance, ran a column by Joanne Shepherd-Smith, entitled "They're Rebels Without A Cause," and which attempted to explain the participation of the youth in the conflict. The only sources she quotes in the 4-column report, are SAP and SADF officers.
3. Fighting between various "wards" in the area goes back at least to 1986, with the beginning of the Pateni/Msmozomeni conflict.
4. Mr Ndodi Thusi, the IFP leader for Indaleni, informed me on Monday, June 24, that the Inkatha Institute had instructed him not to talk to me (or any other "independent monitors") unless I (or they were) was accompanied by someone from the Inkatha Institute.
5. On the basis of both support in numbers and control of geographical area, the ANC appears by most accounts to be the dominant party in urbanised and semi-urbanised areas of the Natal Midlands.
6. The "Sphere of Influence" theory does not take account of rearguard battles being waged by reactionary forces within this "sphere." There are exceptions, such as Table Mountain and Inkatha strongholds ieven in the builtup areas such as Edendale. As such, the sphere of influence theory only claims to be a generalised interpretation.
7. Details of the overlap between so-called "muti murders" and political assassinations are beginning to emerge.
8. Refugees were unanimous about this when I interviewed them the following day.
9. The Natal Witness, January 25, 1991.
10. Mr Cele was speaking at the Methodist Mission during an Albert Lutuli Trust tour of the area by the press and other interested parties, in May of this year.
11. The Natal Witness, February 5, 1991.
12. The Natal Witness, ebruary 7, 1991.
13. As of 1 July this year, there were still unmarked police vehicles in the area - with no number-plates on them.
14. The Sunday Tribune, April 7, 1991
15. The Sunday Tribune, April 7, 1991.

16. The Natal Witness, February 15, 1991.
17. The Natal Witness, February 5, 1991.
18. He communicated this to Mr Nkabinde in person.
19. The Natal Witness, March 8, 1991.
20. See no. 4. supra
21. The Natal Witness, March 8, 1991
22. From interviews I conducted with several refugees.
23. An survey of opinion among 500 refugees and residents of Indaleni reveals an interesting division of opinion. See graphic on pg.
24. Mr Vusi Cele, Kehlo Mtolo and Mr Shelembe are some of these.
25. 500 people were canvassed, and each was simply asked "who do you think is to blame for this state of affairs?."
26. In the early February (3rd) attack on Magoda, the impis were able to continue their burning rampage (150 houses) for more than 4 hours. They had disappeared by the time the police arrived.
27. The Natal Witness, March 3, 1991.
28. The Sunday Tribune, April 7, 1991.
29. The Natal Witness, March 27, 1991.
30. Ibid
31. The Natal Witness (Echo), March 28, 1991.
32. The Natal Witness, March 28, 1991.
33. Sfiso Nkabinde, in a video-taped interview.
34. See point 2, on map on Pg.
35. See point 3 on the map, Pg supra.
36. I counted 11 SADF buffels, 10 SAP Casspirs and numerous vans.
37. Police informed me that they could not disarm this group as they were legally licenced (by Kwazulu authorities- who had also issued them) to carry the weapons.
38. Notably the Revoger Hudsonof the Indaleni Mission.
39. Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness.

40. The Daily News, May 31, 1991
41. Mr Ndodi Thusi, speaking to Mr Sfiso Nkabinde, Thursday, June 20 at the Magistrate's Court in Richmond.
42. See Southern County News, June 1991
43. The Natal Witness, June 27, 1991
- 44.. And how many more death threats do I have to receive before the authorities (or those that don't already know) realise the extent, complexity and depth of the issue.

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