

THE FUTURE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

23 - 27 MAY 1990, LUSAKA

OPENING ADDRESS

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Dear comrades, friends and fellow compatriots,

It is with a great sense of accomplishment that we welcome yet another delegation of fellow compatriots to what has become our second home, Zambia. The African National Congress is happy to be host to these brave honest men and women of our country. It is with a particular sense of gratitude that our venue is the city of Lusaka, an African city buried deep in the African sun, a city which bears scars of wars. These are not wars of her making but the price paid by those who abhor colonialism, racism and Apartheid.

There is a comical irony in seeing you and us so far from home, well beyond the Limpopo, trying to seek for each other and trying to find a common language to our problems. I can only put it down simply as: the quest for truth.

When I started I said you are brave and honest. We are abundantly aware that you decided to come here despite an avalanche of dissuasions, propaganda, threats and vilification by those in our country who are afraid of change, progress, truth and goodwill. They have not succeeded. They had forgotten that the treasure chest of the human quest for truth is insatiable for it is the good that cannot be destroyed by human evil designs.

Many delegations from home have been here before you in order to meet with the African National Congress. It all began as a trickle years ago. A trickle became a flood, the flood quickly became a powerful and steady river. This steady flow keeps on reminding me that Egypt was made over centuries by the steady flow of the Nile river. The Nile burst its banks, carried along with it its deposits and finally built one of the first civilisations of the world. Friends and comrades, we are convinced that we are about to build

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our own civilisation; in a united South Africa we are about to build a non-racial, non-sexist democracy. It shall be a civilisation that will stand its own, like the geometry of the Pyramids, among the galaxy of proud nations.

I know that both of us bear deep scars left by the bitter shrapnel of war, both of us limp from severed human limbs, I know that our country is covered in fields of tombstones - a grave testimony to the fact that Apartheid denied us a common platform and a common language to our problems. The war we are talking about is a result of political disharmony on which Apartheid is built and on which it thrives.

It has been said that "War is the continuation of politics by other means". Yes, by different and violent means. By other means because racism and Apartheid, by their very nature cannot harmonize free political expression and interaction of all our people.

Even as we bear scars, even as we limp we should delve into our deliberations with a sense of duty, responsibility and dignity. To all of us who know this conflict, every good word uttered in the next four days shall weigh an ounce of gold. There shall be points of agreement and points of difference. But through it all, agreeing or disagreeing, there should be a learning process. It shall be a learning process on all sides. We should learn to overcome irrational prejudices, dispelling myths and discuss openly and frankly.

There are many unique features about our country. This seminar is one of them. Certainly within our region of Southern Africa, prior to a political settlement, prior to the end of white minority rule, you will find absolutely no precedent for the kind of discussions we are about to embark upon. Portuguese settlers who smashed factory machinery with sledge-hammers, threw typewriters into the sea and fled hysterically from Angola and Mozambique would not have seen sense in doing what they did if they had bothered to talk to

the true representatives of the oppressed in those countries.

In many ways, the issues that will preoccupy us over the next four days go to the very heart of a political settlement in our country. Themes on our agenda are urgent and immediate. Good armies are not built in a day. This very period of transformations we are about to sail into in our country should be the period when the shape and content of our future army is moulded. An army that will reflect the rich diversity of our country, an army reconciled, unified and at peace with itself.

Certainly, our army should be a factor for peace in our country and our region. It should be equipped to defend the sovereignty of our country. It should be capable of defending and developing the non-racialism, unity and democracy that we shall have built. It should be a truly democratic army built on democratic principles enshrined in our cherished constitution. Those who make the mistake of driving democracy out of the army, often learn a bitter way. Democracy will find its way back into the army, but this time not through the door but through the window.

Conscription into the army impedes on the democratic principles. It is a practice of a state at war or seriously preparing for one. The sour irony for South Africa is that it is a country at war with itself. Preparing for war against itself.

What needs to be underlined is that the size, composition and structure of the future army should be determined by the tasks facing it and the extent to which it can draw on the resources of the country without undermining our commitment to a high level of overall economic, social, cultural and spiritual upliftment of our society.

The ultimate objective of our society should not be to build more barracks but more schools and more hospitals. It should not be to manufacture more AK's and more R1's but more tennis rackets and

more golf clubs. Not more tanks and Hippos but more tractors and harvesters. Not more nuclear weapons but more power stations in order to generate more electricity and ensure more effective irrigation.

Let me take this opportunity to reflect briefly on what General Magnus Malan said recently during a defence budget debate. When he was asked about the role of Umkhonto WeSizwe in the future security and defence of our country he replied by saying; "We are not on the road to using the army to keep unemployment off the streets". He went further to assert that MK cadres will not feel at home in the SADF because "The difference between the SADF and MK is not just the level of training. The SADF creates technology, MK is simply using it".

I would like to tell General Malan that thousands of MK cadres both inside and outside South Africa do not love their country less but love the truth even more. In his response Magnus Malan is not responding to the real issue.

If half of MK cadres happen to have less education than SADF personnel, who is the first to take the blame for it? If black MK cadres are not exposed to the elitist white education which produces technology for the SADF, who is the first to get the blame for it? Is it not Apartheid which has been declared by the United Nations as a crime against humanity? Truth is immense and splendid in itself.

In conclusion, we would like to place on record our deep appreciation to IDASA. We say to you, you are engineers of bridge-building across those troubled political waters of South Africa.

I would also like to thank His Excellency, President Kaunda and the people of Zambia for their on-going warmth and hospitality. Cde Kaunda is aware of our seminar and he holds out high expectations for our deliberations.

At the conclusion of the recent May 2nd to 4th Groote Schuur talks, our Deputy President, cde Nelson Mandela, described them as a victory not for black South Africa, not for white South Africa but for all South Africans. I hope at the end, our seminar will be described in similar terms.

Thank you Cde Chair. I thank you all.

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT ON THE IDASA-ANC CONFERENCE ON "THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA", MAY 23 - 27, LUSAKA

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The following press communique was agreed to unanimously by the delegates:

The five-day Idasa-ANC conference on "The Future of Security and Defence in South Africa" was regarded by all participants as an event of considerable importance, which helped open debate and provide ideas on the nature of a future defence force in South Africa and on the security needs of the country both in the present transition period and once a negotiated settlement is reached.

It brought together two delegations of South Africans who shared a common concern about the need for peace and security in a post-apartheid South Africa. The one delegation consisted of about 60 members and leaders of the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe, including 10 members of the ANC National Executive Committee. The other consisted of 46 South Africans from home, including SADF Citizen Force officers, former or retired officers of the Permanent Force, officers of the armies of Transkei, Ciskei and Venda, academics and researchers on military-related affairs, SADF conscripts, members of the End Conscription Campaign and church leaders. The home delegation was not homogeneous and included a range of views on the issues under discussion.

In the course of the five days the Conference topics elicited vigorous debate and some sharp exchanges. Differences emerged over questions such as the histories and roles of the SADF and Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed struggle, the military-industrial complex and the future of units such as 32 Battalion. In general, however, by the end of the final day, delegates arrived at a high level of consensus on most of the issues relating to a future defence force in South Africa. For example delegates expressed support for the need for the negotiation of a mutually-binding cessation of hostilities between the contending military forces, for the ending or phasing out of the present system of military conscription, for Umkhonto we Sizwe to return to South Africa as soon as negotiations permitted, and on the need for the eventual integration of the SADF, the "homeland armies, Umkhonto we Sizwe and any other military forces, in order to form a new defence force in South Africa. In addition there was consensus that a smaller defence force was needed and that it should be oriented towards protecting the territorial integrity of South Africa. There was also agreement that Nuremberg-type trials were inconsistent with the spirit of negotiations and should not be a factor in a future, non-racial South Africa, but that this commitment does not exonerate people from prosecution for future atrocities they may commit. There was also agreement the transition period in South Africa should, as far as possible, be managed by South Africans themselves.

Delegates further agreed that a future defence force should be accountable to parliament, should be politically non-partisan, non-racial in nature and should work towards a system of recruitment and promotion on merit alone. Unanimous support was expressed for the view that a future defence force required a programme of accelerated affirmative action, but that this should be carried out with due regard to the maintenance of standards.

Three commissions sat on the fourth day of the conference:

1. Manpower Policy
2. The creation of a national defence force - what will happen to the existing military forces?
3. Internal security, the relationship with the police and the democratic political process.

The reports of these commissions are attached. They do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants in the conference or of the commissions themselves, and are rather expressions of consensus or majority opinion within the commissions. While the reports of the first two commissions did not attract controversy, several of the conclusions of the third were debated. In particular, the recommendation of the third commission with regard to 32 Battalion was controversial. The majority of delegates agreed that 32 Battalion should be withdrawn immediately from Natal, and that its disbanding should be investigated, though differences remained on what the conclusions of this investigation should be.

Delegates agreed that future contact between themselves and the organisations they represent should be promoted as part of the process of reaching a just and peaceful settlement to South Africa's problems.

A. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

There was acceptance that there will be integration of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), SADF and other forces at some time, in some manner.

1. Principles related to future, new SA Defence Force
 - a. non-racial, open to all citizens
 - b. primary role: protection of territorial integrity of SA
 - c. will uphold democratic values of SA and be fully accountable to parliament
 - d. appointments and recruitment must (ultimately) be based on merit alone
 - e. will adhere to the Geneva Convention and all other applicable international treaties and agreements that govern the conduct of warfare
 - f. SA shall be committed to develop a nuclear-free zone in Africa and the surrounding oceans
 - g. new Defence Force will be a professional-type organisation with high standards of efficiency

2. Structure

Army - conventional
counter-insurgency (coin)
Airforce
Navy
Special Forces

- a. substantial reduction (50%) in force levels
- b. leadership corps -> professional soldiers
- c. foot soldiers would serve on short-term basis and then be put on reserve
- d. commando system scrapped
- e. no conscription; system to be phased out

3. Steps to be taken towards integration (from now)

- a. reduction in defence expenditure
- b. reduction of Citizen Force (CF) and Commando commitments
- c. declaration of cease-fire
 - 1) MK: no guerilla actions/sabotage, etc
 - 2) SADF: troops out of townships; no search and kill operations
- d. process of political sensitising (information and education) in both armies
- e. commencement in SADF of affirmative action
- f. establishment of a joint commission on integration and nature of future Defence Force, (with SADF, MK and experts)
- g. training of black soldiers enhanced and recruitment of blacks with higher levels of education
- h. greater SAP liaison with communities
- i. reintegration of bantustan armies (linked to dissolution of homeland administrations)
- j. return of MK (timing depends on process of transition but should happen as quickly as possible)
- k. provision of facilities to MK (with SADF assistance and facilities)
- l. promotion of senior MK soldiers into senior command and control positions of new army
- m. formalisation of armed forces of other parties (eg PAC and AWB): either integration or demobilisation
- n. INTEGRATION
- o. new name, symbols, uniforms, etc

B. REPORT OF COMMISSION ON MANPOWER POLICY

First, discussion on name of commission: alternatives suggested were manpower, personnel, labour and personpower. Majority accepted personpower.

Commission homed in on a number of questions. Some were discarded as falling within the ambit of other commissions. The questions will be listed with answers.

1. Recruitment

- a. Present SADF, MK and other existing military forces asked to volunteer to continue serving in a new Defence Force
- b. A volunteer Defence Force was envisaged ie no conscription
- c. It was felt that there would be a shortfall of personnel. This would be overcome by active recruitment and other incentives.

- d. Deracialisation. A need to promote the Africanisation of the Defence Force was seen. Merit must also be a criterion.

2. Multi-racial or non-racial

- a. The new DF should be non-racial but consideration should be given to geographic realities.

3. Integration of SADF, MK, PAC, etc.

- a. The new DF is not only the product of integration of existing forces. It is seen as the start of a new DF. Consideration will be given to previous rank, experience and training.

4. Political Action in the DF

- a. The new DF members should not belong to any particular political party but are entitled to their own political opinions and the right to vote according to their conscience.
- b. Political orientation. A programme of personnel orientation with the objective of promoting, within the DF, a common nationalism and patriotism, must be implemented as a priority.
- c. Democracy within the DF. This is assured by the DF being under the firm control of a civilian authority, namely the democratically elected government. Acceptance of new rules and regulations to ensure the rights and protection of personnel, etc.

5. Language policy

- a. This would have to be the accepted policy of the state.

6. Welfare (preservation) of personnel

- a. Spiritual. Negotiations with various religious bodies to recommend what sort of chaplain service the DF should have to cater for the pastoral and spiritual needs of the members. Freedom of religion is assured.
- b. Cultural. Free cultural interaction should be promoted to show its richness.
- c. Provision of social welfare protection for personnel and their families.
- d. Medical benefits for members and families.

7. Training

- a. With regard to training and bearing in mind the need to maintain the highest of standards, systematic and intensive all-round training should be provided for all DF personnel. This is in line with affirmative action and will ensure that all South Africans from whatever language group or educational level can play their part and develop to top levels of the new DF. Special attention needs to be paid to the

development of female DF personnel.

8. Note 1

The question of conscientious objection and/or alternative service fell away with the accepted lack of conscription.

9. Note 2

Points discussed in the text were discussed fully. Agreement was not always achieved, but the text contains the majority view of the Commission.

C. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTERNAL SECURITY

It was agreed that

1. The true timetable of political change will be determined by political possibilities and expediency
2. Whatever the pace of change, there are real and serious threats to the negotiations process
3. These threats included Inkatha, white right-wing mobilisation and many speakers mentioned the police themselves
4. We considered mechanisms of containing these threats such as technical disarmament eg stopping issuing gun licences, outlawing the carrying of guns and disarming off duty police. However political disarmament was preferred.
5. On the basis of the Groote Schuur agreement, public intervention in policing had been accepted and we concentrated on the mechanics of this intervention
6. The joint monitoring of security forces was discussed. The view was expressed that the role of this monitoring agency could develop into an interim administration as more and more political decisions are jointly decided and implemented.
7. It was felt that the state of emergency indemnity for security forces should be immediately revoked
8. Both the police and the defence force have to be strictly subordinate to and controlled by civilian authority, such as a parliamentary committee.
9. Police should receive improved crowd control training with minimum force
10. The principles underlying joint monitoring include
 - a. the inclusion of as many groupings as possible
 - b. must reach to the lowest possible level
 - c. should have same power of enforcement
 - d. The commission was unanimously opposed to the creation of a paramilitary force for internal security
 - e. politically discredited forces should never be used to control unrest
 - f. responsibility for law enforcement should be devolved to the local, popular level
 - g. MDM marshals have gained much experience in crowd control. This experience should be drawn on to control political gatherings. The possibility of using returned MK soldiers in this process was

raised.

- h. Groupings like Nadel, Popcru and the DP are involved and their informal monitoring should be formalised.
- i. The police must be restructured. Some felt that in the short term individuals who have discredited themselves by brutality must be immediately withdrawn. It was generally felt that long term training must reinforce democratic values.
11. It was agreed that in the future SA some form of internal agency must exist but their powers must be severely curtailed and subject to a bill of rights.
12. The Commission was unanimous that 32 Battalion must immediately be withdrawn from Natal
13. It was agreed that legislation should be passed to restrict the carrying of any weapons. In the long run a process of disarmament must occur.
14. In the long term it was felt that communities must be involved in their own policing.
15. It was felt that in post-apartheid SA there should not be the same need for high levels of policing that there is now because
 - a. the society will be characterised by greater social responsibility and participation and
 - b. the social context of crime should have been addressed through the increased provision of jobs, houses and schools.

(UNOFFICIAL) MINUTES OF COMMISSION ON INTEGRATION OF ARMED FORCES

Initial premise

There will be an integration of forces, of some nature and at some time in the future.

Principles relating to the new Defence Force

It is necessary to first establish the principles that would ideally underly the role and nature of the future Defence Force. Then we know what we are working towards.

1. The Defence Force should be non-racial;
2. The primary role of the Defence Force should be the protection of the territorial integrity of South Africa;
3. The Defence Force shall uphold the democratic values of South Africa and be fully accountable to parliament;
4. Appointments and recruitment must ultimately be based on merit alone (but in the short and medium term a programme of affirmative action will be necessary);
5. The Defence Force should adhere to the Geneva Convention and all other applicable international treaties and agreements that govern the conduct of warfare;
6. South Africa shall be committed to developing a nuclear-free zone in Africa and the surrounding oceans; and
7. The Defence Force shall be a professional-type organisation with high standards of efficiency.

The new Defence Force will ultimately be shaped by the new government. The new government will make its decisions on the basis of policy considerations and the existing realities (ie the nature of the SADF and MK).

Structure

The new Defence Force would consist of:

- an army with a conventional and a coin capacity;
- an airforce;
- a navy; and
- special forces.

Comments on structure, role and composition

1. There was general agreement on the need for special forces (without much debate on the nature and role of these forces).
2. There was substantial support for the possible internal deployment of special forces in the event of a 'rebellion against a democratic government'. However there was a strong counter-argument that the internal deployment of the army would inevitably politicise it.
3. There was heated debate on the future of 32 Battalion. There was general agreement that the unit should eventually be disbanded, but some participants felt that its members should

be reintegrated into other units (because they have served the SADF loyally and because they have acquired South African citizenship).

4. There was agreement on the need for a substantial (50%) reduction of current force levels. However this reduction should be gradual because of both the potentially high level of conflict and the presence of many serving career soldiers.
5. The leadership corps of the Defence Force would consist of professional soldiers.
6. The foot soldiers would serve on a short-service basis and then be put on reserve.
7. The commando system should be scrapped.
8. There should be no system of conscription in the future (but the current system needs to be phased out rather than simply ended).

Steps towards integration

A) The current period (ie pre-negotiations)

1. Continued reduction of defence expenditure.
2. Reduction of Citizen Force and Commando commitments.
3. Declaration of cease-fire\mutually-binding cessation of hostilities.
 - in the case of MK this would mean a suspension or ending of the armed struggle;
 - in the case of the SADF this would mean the withdrawal of troops from the townships (with the possible exception of Natal, being a special case) and the ending of 'search and kill' operations against guerillas\suspected guerillas;
 - (the question of how other armed forces would be party to or affected by a ceasefire was not discussed.)
4. Process of political sensitising in the SADF and MK.
 - both armies would need to initiate programmes to reduce antagonism and prepare their soldiers for the process of integration.
5. Commencement in the SADF of affirmative action.
6. Establishment of a joint commission on the future Defence Force.
 - this commission would include SADF and MK leadership and some experts to look into the process of integration and the nature of the future Defence Force.
7. Training of black soldiers in the SADF enhanced and the recruitment of blacks with higher levels of education stepped up.
 - at the point of integration special educational and training courses would have to be offered to MK soldiers in the new Defence Force.

8. Establishment of a joint-monitoring force.
- the idea would be to set up an all-party agency to monitor the security forces during the period of transition. In reality though the most that might be possible would be greater and improved SAP liason with the communities.

B) The period of negotiations

9. The integration of the bantustan armies into the SADF.
- these units would be incorporated into SADF coin units;
- since the bantustan armies are an integral part of the bantustan administrations, the timing of their dissolution would have to be linked to the dissolution of the administrations.
10. The formal, organised return of MK to South Africa.
- the timing of this would obviously depend on the process of transition but should happen as quickly as possible.
11. The provision of SADF facilities to MK.
- the SADF would make available to MK bases and logistical support that would be under MK control.
12. The promotion of certain MK soldiers to senior command positions in the new Defence Force.
- this would ultimately be a political decision made by the new government.
13. Formalisation of process with regard to other armed forces.
- other armed forces (such as those of the PAC and AWB) would have the choice of being formally integrated or demobilised.

C) Post-negotiations

14. Integration of armies.
- soldiers currently serving in any armed force would not be compelled to join the new Defence Force.
15. Development of new character of Defence Force (ie new uniforms, symbols, name etc).
16. Long-term reduction in the size of the arms industry.
- there was debate over whether this should happen through political intervention or market forces.

[The possible integration of MK soldiers into the SAP was not discussed in this commission but was frequently referred to in other sessions. There was general agreement during the conference that the role and composition of the police, both during and after the period of transition, presented a far more urgent and difficult problem than the formation of the new Defence Force.]

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