

support. The regime insists that the political majority, no matter how large, should be subjected to veto by minority political parties. Unless government is forthcoming with a firm commitment to full democracy based on internationally accepted principles, and an acceptance of a sovereign and democratic constitution making body, the process will not move forward.

But the Council meets today because this process has been brought to a halt by the carnage in the black townships. Over the last five to six years, at least 11 000 people have died as a result of this violence. During the month of June 1992 there have been 373 deaths and 395 injuries. 1 806 have been killed and 2 931 injured during the period January, 1992 to June 1992.

Control of state power by the National Party regime allows it the space to deny and cover up the role of the regime, its surrogates, the state security forces and the police in fostering and fomenting the violence. Our Memorandum of the 9th July, 1992 to Mr. F. W. De Klerk sets out the evidence of numerous instances, both of acts of omission and commission, which bear out government involvement in the violence. In particular, we draw your attention to the annexure entitled "Involvement of the Security Forces in the fomenting and escalation of violence", and Annexure 3 entitled "South African Government support for the Inkatha Freedom Party".

Mr. President:

Many years of struggle both inside and outside of South Africa brought us to the point in 1989 when, in its consensus Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, the General Assembly concluded that circumstances existed for a negotiated resolution of the South Africa question.

In that Declaration the General Assembly said that such negotiations should, as a result of agreements that would be entered into by the liberations movement and the government, be conducted in an atmosphere free of violence.

We were and are in full agreement with these positions. They were adopted by the General Assembly precisely because it was correctly foreseen that the process of negotiations could not succeed while a virtual civil war raged in the country.

Pursuant to this objective, in August 1990 the ANC decided to suspend all armed actions. We did this unilaterally as a demonstration of our good faith and to help create an atmosphere free of violence.

At the same time it was expected that, for its part, the regime would carry out various measures which would remove obstacles to negotiations, and that it would ensure that a proper climate for negotiations did in fact exist.

Instead we have been confronted with an escalating spiral of violence.

An independent socio-political and development agency known as Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) has prepared five reports with regard to the pattern of violence.

One of these reports comes to the conclusion that:

"The violence appears to be switched on and off at strategic moments."

It continues:

"Behind the scale of brutality ... is the clear evidence that the violence erupts at points when it most weakens the ANC and its Allies and dies down dramatically when it would most harm the government of F. W. De Klerk."

It then goes on to say:

"Two political parties have clearly benefited from the Reef violence. The first is the National Party government ... The second major beneficiary has been Inkatha ."

Another report deals with 13 attacks on funerals or funeral vigils which took place on the Reef between July, 1990 and July, 1991. This study concludes that there is "an overwhelming predominance of acts of aggression carried out by supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Those attacks, moreover, are carried out with the active or passive support of the South African Police".

It is more than clear to us that this violence is both organised and orchestrated. It is specifically directed at the democratic movement, whose activists, members and supporters make up the overwhelming majority of its victims.

It constitutes a cold blooded strategy of state terrorism intended to create the conditions under which the forces responsible for the introduction and entrenchment of the system of apartheid would have the possibility of imposing their will on a weakened democratic movement at the negotiations table.

However, as had been foreseen by this Organisation, this violence also has the effect of making negotiations impossible. Already in April, 1991, when this campaign of terror grew to new heights, we were left with no choice but to suspend the bilateral negotiations with the regime until it took various measures to address the question of violence.

It is now common cause that the agreements that the government reached with the ANC in May 1991 aimed at curbing the curbing of violence have not been carried out by the regime.

Faced with the horrendous escalation of the violence, as evidenced in the Boipatong Massacre, occurring in the context of the negotiations deadlock, the ANC has been forced to withdraw from the multilateral process of negotiations which had been taking place in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa.

The blame for this lies squarely at the door of the regime. It, and nobody else, has the law enforcement personnel and the legal authority to stop this violence and to act against the perpetrators.

As the governing authority, it has the obligation to protect the lives and property of all the people. It has failed dismally to do this.

The regimes actions, including its persistent efforts to shift the blame for the violence and the responsibility to act against it to political organisations, have served to ensure the escalation of the carnage.

Though the causes of the violence are many and complex it is important that we should all have a clear perspective. It is the regime which controls state power with the capacity to bring the violence to an end. Complicity of state security forces is established by the evidence which emerged in numerous court trials, inquests and commissions and is recognised in the Goldstone Commission as well as reports of international fact finding missions.

It is also clear that the central thrust of the violence is to weaken the ANC and the democratic movement of the country.

In the face of this situation, it is also true that there are instances of counter violence by members of the democratic movement. At the same time, it is a matter of public record that the ANC policy stands opposed to the promotion of violence. We remain firmly committed to this position. But our task of ensuring that this policy position is fully and completely adhered to is made more than difficult because of the practice of the state security forces, its surrogates and the fact that it is the police controlled by the regime who remain in charge of investigating the violence, in which the state security forces are implicated, and bringing the perpetrators to book.

The ANC maintains that government culpability for the violence extends to acts of commission as well as omission.

The International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International have blamed the government for failure to act against the violence. Amnesty International notes governments "failure to bring to justice all but a tiny proportion of those involved in human rights violations ...".

Judge Goldstone in his report dated the 6th July, 1992 complains of several instances where the authorities have ignored the recommendations of his Commission.

Not a single person has been convicted in connection with the 49 massacres that claimed the lives of at least ten people in each of the incidents that have occurred in the past two years.

Where there have been proper investigations and vigorous prosecution as resulted from the Trust Feed Massacre of December 1988, convictions have been secured. Those convicted were policemen.

In 1985 Matthew Goniwe and three other Eastern Cape leaders were murdered. In May this year a document, whose authenticity has not been challenged, a message from the SADF military intelligence chief, General C. P Van der Westhuizen (then a Brigadier) proposed to the State Security Council that the four authorise "the urgent removal from society" of Goniwe and the others. No move has been made to suspend Van der Westhuizen from his position.

No action has been taken to suspend the head of the SAP forensic laboratories, General Lothar Neethling, after a Supreme Court civil case finding in January 1991 that his involvement in the poisoning of activists was on the balance of probabilities true.

Despite a judicial commission finding implicating several Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) members in political violence, none has been charged. At least 20 CCB members, and probably many more, remain on the SADF payroll. Others have been offered or received huge pensions. Several have demanded immunity from prosecution.

In February 1992 it came to light that local white policemen based at the Ermelo police station encouraged and actively helped a gang of vigilantes in Wesselton. No policemen concerned has been suspended.

In an official operation in 1986 the SADF gave military training in Namibia to 200 Inkatha members who were later absorbed into the Kwa Zulu Police. Several trainees in sworn affidavits, claimed to have been trained in offensive warfare. The regime has dismissed this incident on the grounds that they received VIP protection training. Some of the trainees have subsequently been implicated in the violence in Natal.

No action has been taken to control and limit the powers of the Kwa Zulu police. Extensive evidence exists of Kwa Zulu partiality and involvement in the violence in the Natal province.

However, as recently as July 1st, 1992 the powers of the KZP have in fact been strengthened. From that date the South African Police's Internal Stability Unit will only act on unrest in Kwa Zulu if called on to do so by the KZP District Commissioner.

In 1990 the Pretoria regime issued specific proclamations legalising the carrying of dangerous weapons in public. This repealed a prohibition which had been in force since 1891.

In other words, after the ANC and other organisations were unbanned in 1990, the Pretoria regime has created a situation in which hordes of men would spill out into the streets and enter public places with the most dangerous weapons. The government is unable to explain why it virtually gave people the license to kill and maim. It has never explained why its police and army regularly accompanied these killers after many murderous rampages and arrested nobody.

We charge, without equivocation, that there is a rational basis for these acts of omission on the part of the South African government. The hard facts of the matter are the South African government has never relented in its war against the democratic movement in our country.

Recently a covert police unit, operating in the area around Boipatong, came to public attention. It, and ten others operating in other regions of the country, exist for the purpose of suppressing the democratic movement which the government still regards as the enemy and a threat to so-called national security. Former officers and personnel of the Security Police have been redeployed into these clandestine networks.

There are persistent allegations that members of these units as well as those in Special Force units composed of foreign nationals, such as Angolans, Mozambicans and Namibians, are engaged

in covert operations that include the assassination of leaders and activists of the democratic movement. They are also implicated in carrying out acts of terror against the population at large.

In order to confuse the issue and evade its responsibilities the government insists that the source of the violence is rivalry between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party. The fact of the matter however is that the IFP has permitted itself to become an extension of the Pretoria regime, its instrument and surrogate.

Its activities have been financed by the South African government. Its members have been armed and trained by the South African government. There is an abundance of evidence that it continues to benefit from covert co-operation with the South African government.

It therefore becomes unclear whether its members act as an independent force or as an agency on behalf of the South African government. However, it is not an independent force with whom the ANC must enter into an agreement to end the violence as the Pretoria regime asserts.

The documentation we have given to members of the Council details all the points we have raised, all of which confirm the criminal failure of the government properly to address the question of political violence which has claimed too many lives already, is tearing our country apart and making the process of negotiations impossible.

We would like to recall earlier decisions of this Council to help the people of South Africa to transform their country into a non-racial democracy. We believe that commitment place an urgent obligation of the Council to intervene in the South African situation to end the carnage.

The very interest of the Council to see the negotiations resumed so that a peaceful solution can be found, in keeping with the democratic principles contained in the General Assembly Declaration on Southern Africa of 1989 and the resolutions of the Security Council, itself requires of the Council that it act on this matter of violence in South Africa firmly and with the necessary speed.

We believe that this violence like the system of apartheid itself is a direct challenge to the authority of the Council and a subversion of its global tasks of furthering peace and promoting the objectives contained in both the UN Charter and the Declaration on Human Rights.

Failure on the part of the Council to act firmly and decisively cannot but undermine its prestige and authority at a time when the Council and the United Nations as a whole are called upon to play an even more active role in the ordering of world affairs.

We would therefore urge that the Council should request the Secretary General to appoint a special representative on South Africa.

This representative should move speedily to investigate the situation in South Africa with a view to helping the Council to decide on the measures it should take to help us end the violence. The Council should then take the necessary decisions to implement such measures, including the continuous monitoring of the situation, to ensure the effectiveness of such measures as it would

have undertaken.

We would also like to bring it to the notice of the Council, for the purpose of its information, that we have required of the government that it also completes the process of the release of political prisoners as well as the repeal of repressive legislation.

Again these are concrete steps visualised in the UN Declaration to create a climate conducive to negotiations. That these matters remain on the agenda more than two years after we entered into a formal agreement with the South African government that they would be attended to, demonstrates the problem we face of the reliability of the government in terms of implementing agreements it has entered into.

We would also like to take advantage of this opportunity to reaffirm our own commitment both to the process of negotiations and to a genuinely democratic outcome.

In this regard, we would again like to inform you that we have still to convince the government that it also should be committed to such a democratic outcome, accepting such ordinary concepts of a democratic system as majority rule and the absence of vetoes by minority parties.

We therefore still to overcome these obstacles so that the process of negotiations itself, as conducted within the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, can succeed.

We would further like to assure the Council that we, who are after all the victims of the evil system of apartheid, are determined that the process of negotiations should lead to a democratic outcome as soon as possible.

We therefore need no urging regarding this matter. What we do need is the assistance of this august body to help us reopen the door to bona fide negotiations.

Mr President,
Distinguished Members of the Council,

We thank you for the opportunity you have given us to address the Council and hope that you will respond to our appeal to help us end the carnage in South Africa with the understanding of the gravity of the situation which we know you share. Our people look forward to your decisions with great expectation.

Thank you.

*** An Ecumenical-Interfaith National Day of Morning must be declared on the 27th of June - the day of the funeral.**

*** An International Commission of Inquiry must investigate the Boipatong massacre and all other acts of violence, and an international violence monitoring team be allowed to enter the country immediately**

We have reached a crucial time in the history of our country. The violence, the incompetence and callousness of this government is destroying our country. Boipatong is a national tragedy. All South Africans who are committed to peace and justice must now stand together and demonstrate their solidarity with the victims of this massacre.

Issued by:

Department of Information and Publicity

P O Box 61884

Marshalltown

2107

20 June 1992

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20 June 1992

ANC PWV REGIONAL PRESS RELEASE
TO: SAFA AND PR WIRE SERVICE
ATTENTION: NEWS EDITOR
FROM: ANC PWV (D. L. P)
REF: RONNIE MAMOEFA
DATE: 18 JUNE 1992

re: Boipatong Massacre

Statement read at the press conference after visit by senior ANC leaders.

The Boipatong community is seething with anger following the attack on it on Wednesday June 17 which has left more than 5 people dead. The attackers were brought into the township in police casspirs. There is evidence that the police also assisted in the attack. The numbers of dead is rising as more corpses are being discovered in the townships.

Scores of people were injured and either treated at Sebokeng hospital or were removed by the police. On Tuesday afternoon (June 16) ANC officials in the Vaal complex received information of a planned ambush by Kwamada hostel residents on buses returning from the rally. This information was communicated by the ANC PWV region to an officer at the head office of the Reaction Unit in Pretoria. The officer, a certain Captain Bothma, referred the ANC officials to the head of the reaction unit in the Vaal by the name of Captain Roos who was furnished with the same information.

Captain Roos's response was that he had already received that information and that he had already deployed his men. In a cynical tone he said "WE ARE NOT SLEEPING A IT IS ALWAYS SAID OF THE POLICE".

On Wednesday fresh information was received of an impending attack which PEACE ACTION amongst others conveyed to the police. At 21hoo police arrived in the township and forcibly removed residents who were patrolling the township in anticipation of the impending attack. The police used teargas and live ammunition in removing anyone in the streets including those who were returning from work.

Shortly after they had removed the residents from the streets police were seen escorting groups of armed men from Kwamadala hostel into the township. Later the police were seen offloading armed men at various points including the squatter camp. The armed men attacked the township with an assortment of weapons including fire arms.

In a number of instances the police were seen assisting the attackers. In those homes where the attackers could not gain entry police used casspirs to break

down walls and to enable the attackers to assault residents and to loot their furniture and other valuables. In some cases the attackers were seen loading their loot onto police vehicles some of these were identified as belonging to the

Vaal command of the SADF.

This morning there was sporadic shooting from the security forces throughout the township. An unknown number of residents were arrested in the course of the morning. Meanwhile attempts by representatives of the community to meet the police and discuss the situation were rebuffed. Police have acted throughout this situation with arrogance and in an intimidatory way.

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DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY

MEDIA STATEMENT: WE DEMAND ACTION, NOT DE KLERK'S CROCODILE TEARS

The African National Congress is shocked and dismayed at the planned visit of President F W De Klerk to the scene of the Boipatong massacre. It seems that his insensitivity to the grief our people knows no bounds. After having created the climate for this massacre with his statements about a plan to counter mass action and the mobilisation of the army and the police he now wants to indulge in a cynical public relations exercise. Where was he in the past when our people were killed at Swanieville a year ago? Not a single suspect has been apprehended for that massacre!

While De Klerk tries to create the impression that he cares, there is disturbing evidence that the violence is escalating. Yesterday the police arrested six youths in Boipatong. They were beaten up in front of their families and taken to Sebokeng police station. When their families went there to look for them the police told them that they can fetch them today at the mortuary. This is happening while the police haven't yet entered Kwa-Madala hostel where the attackers of the Slovo squatter camp came from. Last night attacks were carried out at Ratanda in Heidelberg where an IFP rally will be held there today. We fear it will lead to further violence.

De Klerk will try to enter Boipatong on a wave of bloodshed, fear and intimidation. **He is not welcome.** We demand action, not De Klerk's crocodile tears.

The African National Congress demands that:

- * Boipatong immediately be declared a National Disaster Area
- * A fund be set up for relief of all the victims
- * A thorough investigation must be conducted leading to the arrest and prosecution of all those who are directly or indirectly responsible
- * All local police commanders must be dismissed as demonstrably incompetent

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SAPS



On June 16 De Klerk goes to Ulundi!

On June 17 More than 50 men, women, children & infants are slaughtered in their sleep in Boipatong and Joe Slovo camp!

When De Klerk was celebrating June 16 with the warlords in Ulundi he probably never discussed Boipatong. There is no reason to believe that De Klerk planned any massacre. He didn't need to.

By choosing to appear at Ulundi on June 16, on the day that the ANC - led alliance launched a peaceful campaign of mass action, De Klerk sent a message to every war-lord, to every death squad, to every assassin and impi in our country.

It was exactly the same message that SAP captain Craig Kotze repeated on June 18th in response to the Boipatong massacre. According to Captain Kotze: "This is what happens when the ANC launches mass action."

With these chilling words Kotze was telling the death squads and war-lords "your actions are understandable". He was inviting a Boipatong 2 and a Boipatong 3.

Let us be very clear. The Boipatong and Joe Slovo Camp massacre was not some unfortunate spill-over from June 16 events. Even the SAP congratulated the organisers of the June 16 events for the discipline and peacefulness with which they were conducted. The massacre on June 17 had nothing to do with localised attacks and counter - attacks. The massacre was systematically planned and lunched in cold-blood.

The message De Klerk and Kotze are sending to our people is this: **Do not dare think that you can have any part in determining the future of our country. While we will piously admit that everyone has the "right " to peaceful protest, you will be punished in blood for daring to exercise this right.**

- ***On June 16 - De Klerk goes to Ulundi!***
- ***On June 17 - The massacre of Boipatong and Joe Slovo camp!***
- ***On June 18 - The National Party announces the launch of its election campaign in the black areas - House to house!***



Central Committee

SACP statement on the Boipatong and Joe Slovo Camp massacre

It is with some hesitation that we comment on the massacre in Boipatong and the Joe Slovo Camp in the Vaal Triangle. It would be unacceptable to make cheap party political propaganda in the context of such horrendous suffering. On the other hand, given some of the public comments that have surrounded the event in the last few days, we feel we would be failing in our duty if we did not speak up now.

On June 16 De Klerk went to Ulundi.

On June 17 more than 50 men, women, children and infants were slaughtered in their sleep in Boipatong and the Joe Slovo Camp.

We are not suggesting that when De Klerk was celebrating June 16 in Ulundi he discussed Boipatong. There is no reason to believe that De Klerk planned any massacre. He didn't need to.

By choosing to appear publicly at Ulundi on June 16, on the day that the ANC-led alliance launched a peaceful campaign of mass action, ~~DE KLERK SENT A MESSAGE TO EVERY WAR-LORD, TO EVERY DEATH SQUAD, TO EVERY ASSASSIN AND IMPI IN OUR COUNTRY.~~

It was exactly the same message that SAP Captain Craig Kotze repeated on June 18th in response to the Boipatong Massacre. According to Captain Kotze: "This is what happens when the ANC launches mass action."

With these chilling words Kotze, intentionally or unintentionally (we leave that to his conscience), was telling the death squads and war-lords "your actions are understandable". He was inviting a Boipatong 2 and a Boipatong 3.

Let us be very clear. The Boipatong and Joe Slovo Camp massacre was not some unfortunate spill-over from June 16 events. Even the SAP congratulated the organisers of the June 16 events for the discipline and peacefulness with which they were conducted. The massacre of June 17 had nothing to do with localised attacks and counter-attacks. The massacre was systematically planned and launched in cold-blood.


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SACP

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ON JUNE 16 ... DE KLERK GOES TO ULUNDI.

ON JUNE 17...THE MASSACRE OF BOIPATONG.

ON JUNE 18...THE NATIONAL PARTY ANNOUNCES THE LAUNCH OF ITS
ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE BLACK AREAS
... HOUSE TO HOUSE.



Chris Hani, General Secretary

19 June 1992

MEDIA RELEASE MEDIA-VRYSTELLING

ISCOR LIMITED



YSKOR BEPERK

BOI-ISKOR

1992 06 19

BOIPATONG

Iskor is shocked by the massacre that took place on 17 June 1992 at Boipatong, and trusts that the full force of the law will bring the perpetrators to justice.

The company is aware of the allegations that the perpetrators of the murders are residents of its KwaMadala hostel. As yet, we could find no evidence confirming these allegations.

The South African Police are currently investigating the matter and until their task has been completed and charges brought, Iscor cannot comment on the veracity of the allegations.

The company will do whatever possible to assist the SAP in their investigations.

ends

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MEDIA RELEASE

MEDIA-VRYSTELLING

ISCOR LIMITEDYSKOR BEPERK

The Managing Director of Iscor, Mr Willem van Wyk issued the following statement in Pretoria: "It is a pity that industries which are large employers are being jeopardised by the political power struggle currently being waged and which is seriously impairing the economy. Iscor is of the opinion that the closure of hostels will not bring peace to South Africa. Peace will not be attained before all leaders in South Africa accept a win-win approach which will lead to a negotiated constitutional dispensation.

"The involvement of the residents of KwaMadala hostel, individually or as a group, in deeds of atrocity has as yet not been confirmed. However, there are members of the community who oppose the existence of KwaMadala hostel. For this reason, and to promote a win-win approach Iscor has decided to close this hostel as soon as the residents can be moved in an acceptable and humane way to KwaMasiza. This decision has not been taken in support of, or in opposition to any political groupings.

"We will try to obtain maximum co-operation from the trade unions and the residents of both hostels. Their needs will be taken into consideration in this move.

"Iscor accepts no responsibility for the unlawful behaviour of any of its employees."



2.7
HRC
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South Africa
Phone: (011) 403-4450/1
Fax: 339-1422

SPECIAL ALERT !!!

MASSACRE IN BOIPATHONG

The following reports have been received today:

ANC PWV REGION REPORTS :

Twenty-one people were hacked and shot dead on the night of the 17/06/92, when armed men from the KwaMadala Hostel, allegedly dropped off by police casspirs, randomly attacked residents in Boiphathong and the nearby Slovo informal settlement camp. It was also reported that property was looted.

PEACE ACTION REPORTS :

17/06/92

1. 7.30pm - first call received from Sebokeng, Zone 11. Caller expressing concerns of pending attack, after another resident had received a telephone call saying "don't use your car, there's going to be trouble". The caller had difficulty getting any positive reaction from the police in his area and therefore called Peace Action.
2. 2nd call received from Vaal area. Caller saying that she had been tipped off by somebody that had been told by the white counterparts of Inkatha that "the ambulances must be on standby. They are going to be used."
3. 7.44pm - Col. Gouws from the Witwatersrand division returned monitor's call. Monitor reported above calls to him, gave him first caller's name and telephone. He said he would take over the matter.

18/06/92

4. 4.00 am - caller reported attack, that police were teargassing the residents, general chaos in area.
5. 4.31 am - call received that about 50 people had been killed and that Inkatha was brought in with police casspirs. And some attackers were on foot.
6. 4.53 am - 2nd caller (no.2 above) telephoned again, reporting deaths and injuries.
7. 6.40 am - call reporting deaths and injuries was received.
8. 7.02 am - Col. Gouws reported to monitor that security forces were having difficulty in entering the townshp and had to go in armoured vehicles.

Commissioners: Mr. Geoff Budlender, Dr. Max Coleman, Mr. Chris Dlamini,
Mr. Pius Langa, Mrs. Joyce Mabudafnasl, Dr. Diliza Mji, Fr. Smangaliso Mkhathswa,
Mrs. Albertina Sisulu.

9. 7.50 am - first caller (no.1 above) confirmed that police had contacted him last night.
10. 10.00am - caller reported that police in casspirs moving around and shooting residents. Police confirmed, saying that they were returning fire at residents that were shooting at them.
11. At 10.30am - 2nd caller (no.2 above) telephoned again. Reported that police were at hospital and it was suspected that they may remove bodies to reduce the death toll.

RADIO REPORT :

Radio 702 reported at 1.00pm on the 18/06/92 that the death toll now stands at 34.

HRC COMMENT :

This horrifying massacre confirms that there are elements within Inkatha and the Security Forces that have an interest in fuelling the violence and fulfilling their own prophecy that the ANC's programme of Mass Action will raise the political temperature. The lives of people are as nothing to them in this criminal game of destabilisation.



28
BLACK SASH

THE BLACK SASH

51 ONG STREET · MOWBRAY · 7700 · TEL. 685-3513 · 9 a.m. - 1 p.m. MONDAY - FRIDAY

BLACK SASH NATIONAL STATEMENT ON BOIPATONG

Members of the Black Sash throughout the country have shared the widespread shock and horror over the massacre at Boipatong on 17 June. In particular those of our Southern Transvaal members who work with Peace Action and who were and are in contact with people in Boipatong, are filled with despair and anger at this tragedy. They have been told by eyewitnesses about the killings, about the way police in camouflage uniform had prepared for the massacre by clearing the streets of Boipatong in the morning (residents had erected barriers because of rumours of an attack). Residents told of township lookouts being shot at and people being driven indoors by the SAP immediately before the killings, of Zulu-speaking vigilantes being transported in hippos, of police not acting on the desperate warnings of monitors in the township immediately before the attack. There is overwhelming eyewitness evidence of white men being involved in the attack - in various disguises ranging from camouflage uniforms and blackened faces and hands to balaclavas and overcoats. The people of Boipatong have told of hippos carrying white and black attackers who used spotlights to light up houses in those areas where there was no streetlighting, of black men entering huts to do the killings and white men waiting outside with shotguns, shooting potential witnesses.

Members of the Black Sash were in Boipatong on the morning after the massacre, comforting the bereaved and searching for evidence. On that day, police arrested 22 youths in the township for "public violence, arson and illegal possession of guns" - once again turning victims into the accused. We are thus not at all surprised that the investigating police have difficulty in getting witnesses to come forward and give evidence. Black Sash members were also in Boipatong at the time of Mr de Klerk's ill-advised visit, and witnessed the extraordinary indiscipline and provocation of the police after his departure.

We have read the press reports, listened to the radio and watched the television, striving to sift the facts from the rhetoric. We mourn the deaths - these and the many which preceded and followed them. Most of all, we have sought to understand why and how they could have occurred. We ask who could possibly benefit from such destruction. We wonder why the Boipatong attack should have happened on June 17th - the day after the commemoration of 1976's Soweto Day. We noted that the stay-away from work on June 16 was widely observed, and that despite something of an hysterical overreaction by the authorities (using a massive call-up to generate anxiety about possible disturbances) the demonstrations passed off peacefully. We note that, in contrast, government

representatives continued to refer to "raised temperatures" and spoke of a "volatile climate" having been created by mass action. The government still wields enormous influence over the electronic media and this was frequently obvious in the tenor of the comments and interviews, as well as the amount of time given to government spokespersons.

Opponents of the government continue to allege that the Polpateng killings are part of a well-designed, absolutely coherent, deliberate programme of low-intensity conflict which is being pursued in order to increase the government's authority, and especially its power in the negotiations process. We in the Black Sash agree with this analysis.

The full truth about the cause behind our present tragic situation will be exposed when those who are determined to tell the truth gain access to material and evidence which, as yet, is being hidden from public scrutiny. Meanwhile, we can ask ourselves just what the government has gained from the violent conflicts which are rocking communities in many parts of the country and from the terror which has been spread by the sudden, organised and ruthless attacks on people in their homes, in the streets, in shebeens, at street meetings, at funerals and in commuter trains and taxis -- whoever has been responsible.

Various pressures forced the government to recognise that it could not continue with the ruthless imposition of apartheid and that one-person-one-vote elections would have to be held in the foreseeable future. In such elections the National Party would not succeed in winning a majority and forming a new government if the elections were truly democratic, free and fair.

Even a hold on the balance of power in a coalition would be unlikely because a majority party which failed to win overall support would be likely to look elsewhere among minority parties for a partner or partner.

The ANC, building on the strong base of the UDM structures - Unions, Civics, community and service organisations of various kinds - would have been able to organise itself into an efficient and grass-rooted electoral machine which would have brought people to the polls to vote resoundingly for its policies. It is undoubtedly the most powerful of all the National Party's political opponents.

BUT the violence has prevented the efficient organisation which is required for such a normal electoral process. Ordinary people are now too frightened to identify themselves as members of the ANC.

Where have all the logos gone on posters, taxis, tee shirts, the colours in women's clothing, the banners and the graffiti? They are now barely visible in the streets as people go about their ordinary business.

The movement is riven with dissenting groups. The young (60% of the black population is under the age of 25) are especially angry, but so also are their parents who have to travel to and from work each day in terror of a sudden attack. It was not only the youth who reacted so strongly to the State President's visit to Boipatong on 20th June.

The residents of informal settlements and established townships carry the burden of fear all the time. No one knows when or whence the next attack will come.

Communities who do not feel themselves to be African seek protection from those they have been taught to fear in years of TV projection of an image of an enemy which was always a black image. These communities have internalised government propaganda to such an extent that they are now aligning themselves with the dominant white group - and with its fears.

Some see Mr de Klerk as saviour and friend who is the only person strong enough to protect them. Some remain loyal to the ANC but very critical of its ability to protect them. Some are joining other parties who offer a more militant approach. Some are going underground into revolutionary structures. Some will "join" other groups and take party cards because they are forced by fear to do so and hope a new affiliation will keep them safe.

Proper organisation of branch structures by any political party is now wellnigh impossible in the townships.

Free and fair elections cannot take place without an end to violence and an international peace-keeping and monitoring team.

The international community has been seduced into seeing "black on black" violence as just another indication that Africa is corrupt, savage and irredeemable and sympathises with Mr de Klerk as a strong, sincere free marketer who can lead South Africa into a secure future as the "power house" of Southern Africa - to the profit of the industrial north.

All this adds up to the fact that the National Party government is undoubtedly benefiting from the destabilisation of its major political opponent. It has no intention of losing power or, indeed, sharing power. It intends to remain in charge by constitutional manoeuvring, a tight hold on economic power, management of the process of transition, and the discrediting of its political opposition. This was clearly demonstrated in the demands which led to the breakdown of CODESA II.

One has only to look at the flood of legislation presented to Parliament in the last weeks of this session which was enacted, long before it even reached our desks or the newspapers, to see the way in which detention without trial is being reintroduced, the national assets being privatised - to be protected in a Bill of Rights enshrining the right to private property and new laws being put into place at a time when there should be no new laws other than the essential Appropriation Acts and agreed measures arising from the negotiation process.

The tragedy of Boipatong and its aftermath may yet prove to be the moment when South Africans come to recognise the reality of the powers that seek to subject them and begin to move together towards a just and democratic future in united opposition to our present corrupt and illegitimate rulers.

What are we to do to contribute to the speediest possible resolution of the critical situation that the country now faces? We called immediately for an international monitoring force - a truly impartial one, with powers to act and with wide credibility.

We wonder what else we could do to rouse the public from their general apathy and to try to counteract the appalling media manipulation of public consciousness. The proposals made by Archbishop Tutu and others to put a brake on international sporting contacts until realistic demands are met seem a powerful strategy - one which we endorse.

We also demand that those who are guilty are brought to justice - not only those who effected the killings, but those who bear the ultimate responsibility. We also call for the resignation of the Minister of Law and order and of the Commissioner of Police. We furthermore demand that the security forces should be brought under multiparty control and should submit to international monitoring.

P.P. K. Chubb & Jenny de Jager.

THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE
29 June 1992

W/M 5/5/92

ERNEST SOTSU is a slightly-built, wizened man who laughs a lot and looks much older than his 64 years. A humble-looking veteran in a houndstooth jacket, he's the picture of vulnerability. But looks can be dangerously deceptive.

Sotsu is a shrewd and powerful man who, by all accounts, commands the support of several thousand African National Congress-aligned hostel-dwellers in Sebokeng and is at the centre of a raging battle between rival defence units jockeying for power in the Sebokeng and kwaMasiza hostels.

A resident of Boipatong township in the Vaal since 1956, Sotsu went underground as an Umkhonto weSizwe operative after being bounded by the police for his involvement in the 1984 Vaal uprisings. He was detained in 1986, charged with terrorism in 1988 in Transkei where he was active, sentenced to five years but was released from Robben Island a year later.

When his wife and two children were killed in a gun ambush in July last year while he was attending the ANC congress in Durban, Sotsu was taken into Sebokeng hostel by workers loyal to him. Now he seems to lord over the hardened fighters that make up the original defence units.

In part, the power struggle in the two hostels, and in ANC and civic structures in the Vaal Triangle, stems from conflict between some 200 MK members returned from exile who support Sotsu, and existing leaders within the local ANC and civic structures. The latter are apparently threatened by the skills the MK members acquired abroad and are attempting to isolate them for fear of losing their positions.

Such tension may have been defused were it not for the fact that

defence groups, loyal to either side and both armed to the teeth, have entered the fray.

Confusion reigns, with "comrades" grouping themselves around those with the most ammunition, fearing each other more than those they're supposedly defending their supporters against — Inkatha and the security forces.

"Bernard", a commander of one of Sotsu's units, says the situation has degenerated into one of "defence units of comrades fighting other comrades. This has only diverted the attention of the defence units against the real enemy".

The divisions are murky and complex and not even those in the defence units seem to know who, if anyone, is fuelling the rivalry. Neither does anyone seem to know what the defence units in the rest of the township are doing, or who supports them. All liaison between the units seems to have broken down.

But Sotsu is adamant that the rival defence group is led by a core cell of National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa shop stewards who have been bribed by a "third force" of Iscor management and the security forces to sow the seeds of conflict in the two hostels.

Together, the hostels constitute a potentially powerful ANC stronghold of 8 000 men.

The new defence unit, apparently led by a Numsa shop steward, is supported by several ANC branch leaders, apparently anxious to isolate the MK returnees. The unionists deny this claim.

Accompanied by a motley group of his defence unit commanders seated around a steel table in a sparse hostel room that is now his home, Sotsu describes the

The perfect gentleman at the centre of a battle



It was the murder of his wife in July that turned Ernest Sotsu into a general at the centre of a bitter war

By PHILIPPA GARSON

anarchic rivalry raging between the defence units.

"The present differences said to be existing are merely the enemies' way of doing things. They are trying to divide our people. The workers are calling upon the intransigent shop stewards to step down, as they are not satisfied with them," he says vehemently.

Always articulate and politely formal, Sotsu runs the interview. "I do not advocate any division within the ANC. I'm all for unity. It's wrong for any member of the ANC to turn a gun against another."

Colbert King, a Numsa shop steward was gunned down in the grounds of the kwaMasiza hostel on May 5. Sotsu denies any part in his death: "It's unfair for these accusations to be levelled against me. Firstly, I'm not a worker at Iscor, and neither am I a member of Numsa. I only came to the hostel after my family was wiped out and my house burnt down. I have the sympathy of the people in the hostels who, having seen my fate, decided to look after my interests and see to it that I am safe."

His commanders, preparing for their dusk-till-dawn guard of the hostel, time and again bow to his experience and dominant personality. Everyone speaks at length about how the other side has an endless supply of the latest AK-47 model — a weapon which MK apparently does not possess and which proves they are being backed by some other force.

"We believe MK is not supplying them with guns. The mystery is, who is supplying them?" asks Sotsu.

But when asked whether "this" side has guns, one commander, wearing a Texan-style felt hat, smiles haltingly. "No," barks Sotsu. But, according to another source, Sotsu's defence units have plenty of AK-47s and other weapons brought from Transkei.

"Bernard" is finally given the floor to describe how his and the rival defence units were formed: "We established defence units after September 4 last year, in order to defend ourselves against attacks by Inkatha and the police. In recruiting we decided that each block should have 20 people. We mainly recruited the young, who were still fresh and trainable."

Training at that stage centred around crude weapons like assegais and spears, says Bernard.

But early this year rivalry set in when an MK initiative to co-ordinate the defence units in the Vaal under the Defence Co-ordinating Committee, to ensure they were made accountable to the communities and kept under control, met resistance from the emerging rival defence unit.

Says Sotsu: "These new units boycotted this initiative. MK was prepared to give skills. But they rejected the MK cadres. We called them to meetings and they didn't come."

Then the battle began in earnest, with the new defence unit aligning under local union leaders and allegedly backed by local ANC leaders Shaka Radabe and Lucky Kamulane and supported by "misguided" sections of the youth.

Before, matters of defence were more simple, says Bernard. Members of a defence unit would stand posted at hostel block entrances from dusk until dawn, knowing whom to look out for. Until now "the enemy" was easily identified as inhabitants of the Inkatha-supported kwaMadala hostel, who would quickly be encircled and repulsed when they entered the ANC hostel grounds.

Now, the "enemy" is all around and

standing guard is doubly dangerous; there's more chance of being gunned down by an insider, approaching from behind with an AK-47.

According to an MK source, the leader of the rival group drives around with a fold-up AK-47 on his lap; the shop stewards, he says, operate from a house near kwaMasiza, the scene of a gun attack two Sundays ago. The shop stewards deny allegations that they are running a rival defence unit.

But, for the worried MK cadre, tensions are about to explode. "We have told the ANC leadership that people will die inside this hostel. If they leave this thing there will be war."

Sotsu's men seem to have control of the kwaMasiza hostel and all except two blocks of Sebokeng hostel.

Both sides have brought in reinforcements from Phola Park, where a similar internal power struggle, rooted in the defence units, is at play.

The MK source believes the Vaal ANC and aligned structures have been infiltrated to the core. He says the rival's defence cell is being supported by "mafia-like" leaders of the local ANC branches, who have shadowy dealings with the police, Iscor and Inkatha. Others say that this faction enjoys the support of Winnie Mandela.

"When we say the ANC is highly infiltrated, we are not playing," says the MK source. "Everyone in the (other) unit is armed and we don't know who's arming them. Sebokeng hostel is so well armed it's like a training camp. This war going on in the Vaal is not an open war. It's a secret intelligence war. The other side has money and someone is financing them."

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NEGOTIATIONS/THE MASS ACTION CAMPAIGN

First Day Largely Successful As Most Black Workers Observe Stayaway Call

By Raphael Banda

JOHANNESBURG June 16 Sapa

Black workers stayed away from work in most major centres in South Africa on Tuesday to commemorate the bloody 1976 student revolt, giving the African National Congress an emotional setting for the launch of its mass action programme.

The management committee of Codesa reportedly adjourned proceedings for a day to observe the unofficial holiday, "Soweto Day".

ANC president Nelson Mandela unveiled a memorial tombstone symbolising the death of student Hector Petersen, said to have been the first person to die on June 16, 1976, and honouring more than 600 people killed in violent confrontations with police since that day.

Defying calls on his organisation call off its mass action campaign, Mr Mandela also led a march by about 2000 supporters through Soweto to the memorial site at the Regina Mundi Church.

Amid a rising death toll in political unrest, black workers stayed away from work in the Transvaal, Natal, Eastern Cape, and to a lesser extent in Cape Town.

Many employers said they granted their workers June 16 as a paid holiday.

In the latest violence, police said two people died in Soweto's Dube section on Tuesday after being stabbed and set on fire, taking the death toll in less than 24 hours to at least 27.

Spurred by the violence, the National Party stepped the war of words over the ANC campaign, calling on the movement to call off the mass action.

"Already innocent South Africans are paying with their lives for the ANC's arrogant and intransigent strategy," a party statement said.

Troops and police patrolled potential trouble spots on Tuesday and police said they had seized two firearms, several rounds of ammunition, spears and axes when they searched a train carrying ANC supporters bound for a mass rally.

The extent of the nationwide stayaway was not immediately clear and the South African Chamber of Business said it was assessing the situation and a statement would be issued later.

The Chamber of Mines said more than 98 per cent of the industry's workforce reported for work.

Commuter trains ran almost empty in Johannesburg, minibus taxis stayed off the streets, taxi ranks in townships were deserted and

buses virtually halted services to black townships.

The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industries said more than 89 per cent of city employees stayed away from work.

At least 80 per cent of black workers stayed away from work in Pretoria on Tuesday and attendance in and around Durban city varied between 20 and 90 per cent. In and around Pietermaritzburg attendance was between zero and 90 per cent.

Durban trains were 50 per cent full on Tuesday morning and on the South Coast and North Coast line trains were carrying only 25 per cent and 40 per cent of their normal passengers.

In the Eastern Cape buses were not running to the townships and no refuse removals were being carried out.

In Cape Town, Spoornet reported normal train service, although there was a 60 per cent drop in passenger number on its Mitchell's Plain and Khayelitsha line.

The Cape Town Council said about 2000 workers failed to turn up for work.

In other highlights on Tuesday:

-- A Cape Town policeman who referred all people seeking information concerning their safety on Tuesday to the ANC faced disciplinary action, Western Cape Regional commissioner Maj-Gen Wick Acker said.

-- More than 400 general assistants, representing about 60 per cent of this category of the workforce, did not turn up for work at Durban's King Edward VIII Hospital.

-- An estimated 2000 mechanical construction workers at the Mossgas plant near Mossel Bay were granted a paid holiday on Tuesday but 1000 civil construction workers arrived for work.

-- Off-duty policemen were called in to reinforce police activities in Johannesburg.

-- The South African Bus Operators Association bus patronage varied widely countrywide.

-- An estimated 10000 ANC supporters under close scrutiny by a massive security force contingent marched peacefully through Durban's city centre.

'Maritzburg Companies Declare June 16 A Holiday

PIETERMARITZBURG Jun 16 Sapa

Many Pietermaritzburg companies declared Tuesday -- Soweto Day -- a holiday and employee attendance at major chain stores varied from nil to 90 per cent, according to the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The Chamber's deputy director, Mr Vic Davis, said a quick survey had produced the following employee attendance figures in the city: Woolworths -- 90 per cent; OK (two stores) -- 0 and 60 per cent; Pick 'n Pay (two stores) 10 and 20 per cent; Checkers -- 50

per cent.

Mr Davis said many Maritzburg companies had declared Tuesday a public holiday.

"The city is very quiet and taxis are not running in their usual numbers."

He said municipal buses were running a skeleton service.

Mr Davis said employees in the city would lose R1,2 million in wages on Tuesday while there would be an estimated loss in production of R2,4 million.

Eastern Cape Services Unaffected

PORT ELIZABETH June 16 Sapa

Essential services in the Eastern Cape were apparently unaffected by the mass action campaign organised by the African National Congress and its alliance partners on Tuesday, SABC radio news reported.

Employees at Port Elizabeth Provincial Hospital all turned up for work after an agreement between the hospital authorities and their trade union.

Health workers are usually exempted from work stayaways.

The two motor manufacturers in the area consider Tuesday a public holiday -- Soweto Day -- and not budgeted for production. This was confirmed by Midland Chamber of Industry director Brian Matthew.

Bus services are not being disrupted to most parts of Port Elizabeth, but no buses are running to the townships.

There were no refuse removals in the city on Tuesday morning.

Police said no cases of intimidation or violence had been reported.

The Port Elizabeth city centre was unusually quiet as thousands of workers stayed at home.

Mossgas Workers Granted Paid Leave

CAPE TOWN June 16 Sapa

An estimated 2000 mechanical construction workers at the Mossgas plant near Mossel Bay were granted a paid holiday on Tuesday but 1000 civil construction workers arrived for work.

The information comes on the first day of mass political action planned by the African National Congress/Congress of SA Trade Unions/SA Communist Party alliance, coinciding with the commemoration of the June 16, 1976 Soweto revolt.

A spokesman said there had been no disruption of the construction programme or of operations at the refinery, and police said there had been no incidents related to the mass action in the Southern Cape.

No Incidents Of Violence Reported - Police

EAST LONDON June 16 Sapa

No incidents of violence or intimidation were reported during protest marches in the Border region on Tuesday, the police liaison officer in East London, Lieutenant-Colonel Christo Louw, said.

Accompanied by journalists, the police authorities flew over East London, King William's Town and Stutterheim to assess the impact of the stayaway.

By 11am, small groups were seen coming from all directions to join the East London crowd.

The aircraft then flew to Stutterheim, where no activity was readily visible at 11.10am, although Col Louw said later it had been reported an estimated 200-strong crowd had conducted an incident-free protest march through the town.

Col Louw said three boys, aged about 11, 12, and 13, were arrested for allegedly setting fire to some veld, but police were unsure if this was related to Soweto Day activities.

King William's Town was quiet, with no marches reported or seen from the air.

When the aircraft returned to East London at about 11.40pm, the crowd of marchers had swelled remarkably, and Col Louw estimated it was 5000 to 6000 strong.

The marchers were seen proceeding along Fleet Street and the old bridge across the Buffalo River before going to the prison where they presented their demands for the release of political prisoners.

A strong security force presence could be seen from the air and roads had been blocked off by police vans and army vehicles in East London and Stutterheim.

Col Louw said this was to stop splinter groups from straying off the route and going into the towns on their own.

Riot vehicles were also seen patrolling the township adjoining Stutterheim.

In King William's Town, banks and shops remained open throughout the day, but there was a marked difference in the number of people visiting the town.

Bisho and Umtata were both quiet as both Ciskei and Transkei had declared June 16 a public holiday.

In Queenstown, the central business district was relatively quiet and supermarkets reported a drop in trading of between 30 and 50 per cent.

Staff turnout was mostly poor, but casual labour had been employed for the day and stores were coping.

Clothing stores appeared hard hit, however, with one store

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