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EDITORIAL: JUNE 16

It is six years since the Soweto uprising of June 16th, 1976. Many authors write about these incidents in the past tense as if everything is over and yet we know that though the unrest seemed to have been contained by tough police and army action — the Vonsterian spirit of "law and order" — the full price has yet to be paid: external bleeding might have been checked but internal haemorrhaging continues up to today with serious implications.

The irony with Bantu Education is that, instead of making the Africans docile, it has produced the worst kind of frustration, resentment and hatred. This is due to the fact that the philosophy of any educational system cannot be divorced from politics. The philosophy of an educational system is conceived and given expression by politicians and apartheid, by its very nature, provides unequal amenities and those in power arrogate to themselves the best things in life. Bantu Education is inferior and the black man is subjected to academic starvation. But black children have the same aspirations as children of other racial groups and there are no aspirations divinely set aside for one racial group; differentiation is artificial and unacceptable perpetuating servitude. Bantu Education perpetuates tribalism: it is aimed at developing a unique pride in a child's ethnic origin and ethnic future as a member of a unique "separate nation" and at preventing the African child from emerging from the insular tribal state and becoming a member of the world community in which the entire heritage of the world's past and present is accessible to him.

It was not only the school children who were affected — their teachers as well. It should be remembered that black teachers are themselves products of inferior opportunities and syllabuses offered by Bantu Education. This is not just a question of syllabus and/or an examination.

Education is an entire process, encouraging independent thinking — the emphasis should not be just accumulation of facts but also a development of critical skills. This is exactly what Bantu Education does not provide — there were many incidents of students asking questions and in most cases teachers did not know the answer. Bantu Education is an extension of apartheid policy rather than a process of learning.


What about the parents? Education is very expensive for Blacks. The lack of schools burdens the parents with the extra cost of sending children to homeland boarding schools for advanced education — an expense most cannot afford. This bites deep into the household budget and parents have to dip heavily into their pockets to keep their children at school each year. It was not only the pockets which were hard hit — the whole black community was affected.

Two things need to be said about the struggle of the students and pupils against inferior education:

First Blacks have never wanted the same education as whites as it exists in South Africa today — there are always the dangers of "cultural imperialism". What Blacks want is the improvement of the content of education, a reflection of black thinking and achievement in the syllabus, a direct say in what is being taught, how much money is being spent and what it is spent on.

Bantu Education is a system designed not by black educationists and black parents but by a white government in which Blacks have no say. Verwoerd's philosophy and motivation — which he enunciated so bluntly — has poisoned the entire system probably beyond repair. Bantu Education is closely linked with black poverty and jobs colour bar.

There is the other equally important question. Adequate finances for black education must be accompanied by 1



Soweto, June 1976

improved conditions in the education system; conditions which will be conducive to an increase in the percentage of students who are prepared and motivated to continue their studies to higher levels of education. The black workers are aware that they cannot get better jobs because they attended Bantu Education schools and they cannot give their children a better education because of the system of apartheid.

Until and unless conditions are improved in the primary schools, thus increasing substantially enrolments in the secondary schools, there can be little hope for a long term solution to the problem of insufficient numbers of qualified teachers. But even this is part of the solution.

Compulsory education for Africans can only be interlinked with the whole question of democracy — it is impossible to think of compulsory education without touching the question of substantially raising the wages of Africans and legislation for higher wages is not likely to come from the apartheid regime whose system is based on cheap, exploited black labour. A vicious circle!

2 What is the solution?

It is our conviction that an oppressed people cannot gain control of its own education without first gaining control over the economy of the country and this depends on the political arrangements in the country. Therefore it becomes clear that any talk about struggle against Bantu Education is essentially about political power because unrest will always erupt as long as the demand for political power is not met. A say in the educational decision-making ultimately means a say in political decision making. That is why the Soweto uprising started off as a reaction to the imposition of the Afrikaans language and developed to be a rejection of the whole system of apartheid.

As for the solutions to these problems they are all there in the Freedom Charter and that is why we regard June 16 as one of those many milestones in the history of our struggle towards national liberation; a half-way station in our long march to freedom; a pointer towards the Freedom Charter which was adopted on June 26, 1955.

MASS REMOVALS

by Shein

Demographic engineering is about determining and controlling where people live and work and how the population is composed. It is a key political and administrative instrument used to achieve policy objectives. Under apartheid it is used by the racist white minority regime as a weapon against the black majority in the bid to achieve their total dispossession.

The creation of ghettos in towns and cities which separate black from white, and confine Indians, 'coloureds' and Africans to separate locations; the 'clearance of black spots and badly sited reserves'; the removal of labour-tenants and 'squatters' off the land and into 'resettlement' camps in the bantustans; the 'consolidation' of the bantustans — in fact the very creation of the bantustans — are all measures designed to determine where black people may live. To achieve the dispossession of 80% of the population and their confinement to less than 13% of the land for all, or most of their lives, has involved and is involving a massive programme of population relocation affecting millions of black South Africans. This programme has a direct effect on population composition — that is, its racial, age and gender structure. For the moment however, our attention will be directed to the question of population, relocation, more popularly known as forced removals.

Forced removals are a burning issue for the black oppressed majority as they disrupt millions of people's lives. Population relocation is not something which began with the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, but in South African history. The regime has set out in earnest to enforce the balkanisation of the country.

Whilst there are no comprehensive figures available for the number of people directly affected by removal schemes, calculations based upon official and other sources estimate that between 3 and 6 million people have been involved. The

large difference between the estimates given can be accounted for by a more extensive interpretation of what qualifies as forced removal. Those who put the figure at the 6 million mark take into account, for example, people removed under the Group Areas Act, those subjected to two, three and even more removals and the large-scale effects of 'planning' in the bantustans. The difficulty of calculating the number of people involved is further complicated because different categories of people have been subjected to population relocation at different times or at the same time under different laws and proclamations, in the relentless pursuit of policy objectives.

Removals in the Urban Areas

In the urban areas outside the bantustans, forced removals are carried out under the auspices of the Group Areas Act, the Urban Areas Act, pass laws and influx control regulations. The Group Areas Act applies to Indians and 'coloureds' and is used to systematically proclaim and deproclaim areas in which they are permitted to live. Since its enactment in 1950 to December, 1979 86,633 'coloured' families and 46,228 Indian families were disqualified from living in the areas where they resided and were subjected to or faced removal. By the end of 1979, 110,022 families (a conservative estimate of over 660,000 people) had already been removed. (1)

For some of these communities the threat of removal has hung like a cloud over their heads for more than a decade. In the case of Pageview, for example, proclamation as a white group area was made in 1963. By February this year only 93 of the original 1,200 families remained in rubble-blockaded streets.

Deproclamation has meant the breaking up of old, established communities to make

way for white luxury areas. The cost of changing Pageview from a predominantly Indian community to an all-white residential area is estimated at R55 million and has involved the removal of over 7,000 people, for the sake of 229 white households. (2) In the case of the Kliprug area of the Pasternoster 'coloured' fishing community on the West Coast, people are being uprooted because their presence "breaks the unity of the white-only beaches" that stretch from Pasternoster to Saldanha Bay. (3)

In breaking up these communities the process of racial segregation is made more complete. Many of them were comprised of different racial groups who have lived in racial harmony for decades. On removal they are separated and 'resettled' in areas designated their racial groups by the Pretoria authorities. Removals heighten social and racial tension, deflecting the anger caused by dispossession and over-crowding away from the real perpetrators of the crime and onto the victims. Already over-crowded areas are forced to accommodate newly-dispossessed people, increasing the burden on the grossly strained and inadequate housing and social facilities.

A striking example is the forced removal of the St Wendolins community near Pinetown, Natal. Composed of 1,300 African households, many of whom have freehold rights, it has been declared a 'blackspot' and thus all residents face removal to two townships in KwaZulu. It has also been proclaimed an Indian group area, and thus it is made to appear that Indians are dispossessing Africans.

The acute housing shortage that characterises all black communities has meant that 'coloureds' and Indians have sought refuge in areas designated white, where they live under the constant threat of arrest and removal. More than 7,000 Indians and 'coloureds' are believed to be living illegally in white areas.

For Africans a myriad of laws makes legal residence in urban areas a precarious, knife-edge existence. More than 200,000 Africans are arrested annually under pass laws and influx control regulations, thousands of whom are deported. Since the Riekert Commission reported, enforcement of influx control measures has become more stringent, increasing significantly the number caught in their web.

Almost 9 million Africans have been made aliens inside their own country by the imposition of 'independence' upon the bantustans. In this process they have lost the few rights they had, including residential rights and driven to the reserves which are grossly overcrowded and where unemployment is endemic. The situation in the bantustans is so desperate that people are prepared to risk continued harassment, detention, arrest and deportation in their bid to secure a family life and income.

It has been state policy that family life for urban African workers would be to all intents and purposes a highly restricted privilege. Thus family housing for Africans has been frozen in most major and many minor urban areas for more than 10 years and the restriction of women to the urban areas has been applied throughout the country. They have been most stringently enforced in the Western Cape, hence the bitter battles that have been fought by the predominantly female squatter communities of Crossroads, Nyanga, and many others whose struggles have not reached public attention. In order to establish some sort of family life or in fact to secure a place to sleep, some have been forced to sleep in the single-sex hostels built to house migrant workers. Others sleep in boxes, disused pipes, dug-out holes and even in the open air as bulldozers repeatedly flatten the shelters they have built from the discarded waste of white society.

They are forced to be constantly vigilant and on the move in order to escape detection by the police, administration board officials, gangsters and anyone else who might reveal their presence and ensure their deportation.

Removals inside the Bantustans

Every time a bantustan is created, every time a boundary is redrawn, every new 'capital' city that is forced into existence, every single consolidation scheme implies population relocation. Witness to this is borne by the population increase that is being experienced in all the bantustans. In the Ciskei, for example, the population increased by 80,000 in the 7 years 1973-1980. QwaQwa increased its population by over 500% in the decade 1970-1980 and KwaNdebele increased its population by



Winterveld, outside Pretoria

more than 400% in the same period.

The overwhelming majority of people subjected to population relocation from the towns and cities and the farm lands outside the reserves are being resited in resettlement camps, villages and townships inside the bantustans. Little or no shelter is provided; food, water and fuel supplies are grossly inadequate and the only work available in the majority of these death-traps, is the construction of pit-latrines.

At the same time, within the reserves, people are being pushed off the land under the auspices of implementing 'planning schemes'. The physical replanning of the bantustans entails the division of all the territories into arable, grazing and residential areas. Homesteads lying outside the areas demarcated for residence are demolished and without compensation, their occupiers are forced to resite their homes in the prescribed areas. In this process the population is divided into a small number of people who are deemed to be bone fide farmers

and who are therefore provided with limited access to land, and the majority, who are not, and are robbed of the little access to land that they had.

In addition, communities are being broken up to ensure their correct ethnic location. Some are being given the 'choice' of taking out citizenship of the bantustan in which they live or being removed as they are of the 'wrong' ethnic group. Such a case in point is the Pedi-speaking community in the Ritavi area (Tzaneen) who were living on a Trust farm on which they had title deeds. The farm was incorporated into Gazankulu and they were told to take out 'Gazankulu citizenship' or move out. When they refused they were subjected to midnight raids and detention, and thereafter they were fined R90 or 90 days for 'squatting'. (4) Others have had their pensions stopped until they move out of the area and are subjected to continuous police and administration-board harassment.



"Welcome Valley" resettlement camp in Natal


The final category of people who are subjected to forced removals that this article will look at are former political prisoners and detainees and their families. On release from prison scores of political activists are banished to the remotest corners of the country, where they know nobody and are deprived of income and occupation. They are subjected to banning orders which deprive them of almost all social contact. After the uprisings of 1976, the regime has also subjected families of those detained to summary forced removal upon release of the detainee. All those condemned to internal political exile are guaranteed a workless future in the rural areas of the reserves.

Removals means force

The violation that this population relocation implies to the communities it is directed against, means that wherever resettlement is undertaken by the authorities, force and violence must accompany it. In the words of the Report of the Native Affairs Commissioner for 1946/7:

"It is all very well for a theorist sitting with a map in front of him to point out high veld areas where the surplus Native population of the Coast can be accommodated. But from a practical point of view there is no way, except by the application of direct force, by which Natives who have grown up under Coast conditions will cheerfully move en bloc to a totally different and distant area." (5)

The removal of 'surplus populations' is carried out by police and paramilitary forces armed with guns, teargas and dogs. Where people are living in permanent structures in 'blackspots' e.g., their homes are first numbered with whitewash paint. Then, on the designated day, government trucks and personnel arrive and carry out the 'voluntary' removal. For former labour tenants and 'squatters' the procedure is similar, except that frequently the farmer is involved in the operation. His tractor is used to demolish people's homes and his truck is used to transport them to the places allocated them in the veld. Squatters in the camps around Cape Town have had their homes bulldozed into the sand on





The demolition of Unibel, Cape Town

repeated occasions. They have been subjected to repeated police raids and have been arrested en masse on many occasions and trucked to the reserves. Others are picked up in saturation raids in the townships.

Apart from direct physical force political and administrative measures are brought to bear. People are forbidden to cultivate their land; livestock is impounded; schools are forcibly closed; clinics are stopped; water supplies are withheld; drought relief is provided on condition of accepting removal; transport services are withdrawn; elected representatives of the people are detained and arrested; and pension and the other meagre benefits, which often are the only or are the major source of income for thousands of families, are withheld.

8

Resistance

Yet resistance is fierce. People under threat of removal have formed committees to defend themselves, resorting to every action which will help them resist the destruction of their families and homes and source of income. People who have been transported hundreds of miles return on foot, to their former homes. Others simply move off into the bush when the government trucks arrive. Just as fast as bulldozers flatten their plastic and cardboard homes, so new ones are being rebuilt in their wake. In all, the attempt to clear the so-called white areas of the black population is continually being reversed, as people pour back into the towns and cities in the desperate bid to escape the certain destitution and death that awaits them in the grossly overcrowded

camps of resettlement and the imposition of the bantustan solution upon them.

The teeming death-traps that are being created in the rural areas are a deliberate policy being carried out by the Pretoria regime for political, economic and military purposes. The planners of apartheid hope that by these measures the consequences of the system will be deflected away from them and onto the 'independent black states' they have conjured into existence. By these means they hope to achieve the total dispossession of the black majority and the entrenchment of white minority supremacy forever. These are the goals which govern the programme of demo-

graphic engineering under apartheid. That they are deadly earnest, and determined to achieve their ends by fair means or foul is revealed by proposals to introduce legislation to curb reporting on "homeland consolidation". (6)

NOTES

- 1) A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa. 1980. SAIRR. Jhb.
- 2) The SOWETAN. 17.2.82.
- 3) SOUTH AFRICAN OUTLOOK. Feb. 1981.
- 4) POST 9.8.79.
- 5) Report of the Native Affairs Commissioner. 1946/7. UG 15/49. Pretoria.
- 6) The STAR. 23.4.82.

ICSA Appeal

Southern Africa has become a focal point of the divide between war and peace.

The criminal apartheid regime is escalating its undeclared war of aggression, subversion, political and economic destabilization of the Frontline States and peoples - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and other countries in the region.

This extremely grave situation calls for urgent and immediate action by the international community to rally to the defence and in support of the Frontline States and of the peoples of Namibia and of South Africa, victims of the inhuman apartheid system.

Deeply concerned with this dangerous situation for international security and peace representatives of the Frontline States, the National Liberation Movements, the International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa (ICSA), the Afro-Asian

People's-Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), and European Anti-Apartheid and Solidarity Movements the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, the United Nations Council for Namibia and other national and international organizations, met in Lisbon in an International Preparatory Committee to convene an International Conference in Solidarity with the Frontline States, and for National Liberation and Peace in Southern Africa.

The Conference, scheduled for the 16th-18th July 1982, will be held in the city of Lisbon, Portugal.

Such an unprecedented gathering will address itself to mobilizing world public opinion and democratic forces for urgent moral, political and material solidarity with the peoples of Southern Africa, for the implementation of all relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the imposition of mandatory sanctions in accordance with the United

Nations Charter and the immediate withdrawal of South Africa's armed forces from the soil of Angola.


The Lisbon Conference is to be a milestone and an historic encounter in the development of cooperation and friendship between the peoples of Africa and Europe and the world at large.

The International Preparatory Committee appeals to Governments, political parties, trade unions, anti-apartheid and solidarity groups, national and international organizations churches and individuals to support

the objectives of the Lisbon Conference and work for its success.

The International Preparatory Committee is firmly convinced that the response of the international community to the menacing situation developing in Southern Africa will be positive and guarantee the territorial integrity and national independence of the Frontline States and the ultimate triumph of the forces of liberation and the establishment of a just peace.

Lisbon, April 18th 1982



"Solidarity is not an act of charity but mutual aid between forces fighting for the same objectives". These words of President Machel formed the banner under which five hundred Canadians participated in the first ever truly broad and national conference in solidarity with the liberation struggles of the peoples of Southern Africa held at the University of Ottawa on May 7-9, 1982.

The conference was co-sponsored by ANC and SWAPO and was initiated in cooperation with ICSA, International Committee against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa, as part of the overall worldwide programme of ICSA.

The Hon David MacDonald, a member of the former Conservative Government in Canada, and Mr Robert Gaulin, a trade

union leader in Quebec, were the co-presidents.

"We welcome the liberation movements of Southern Africa: their struggle is our struggle", said George Erasmus, President of the Dene Nation in the NW Territories of Canada in his keynote address. Canadian Indians understand the struggle in Southern Africa. Today's institutions are based on the social, economic and religious institutions that promoted and justified colonialism in the first place. "Getting the vote (which the Indians only got in the sixties) will not finish the work". He drew parallels with the presence of Hudson, Falcon and other Canadian companies in the North West Territories, "Canada's Namibia", and the role these companies play in Southern Africa. He warned that



Prime Minister Robert Mugabe meeting Dr Silas Cerqueira and the ICSA delegation to discuss the proposed FLS Conference

people who support liberation struggles outside their own areas should never forget to do the necessary spadework in their own gardens as well.

Alfred Nzo led the ANC delegation and expressed his pleasure in meeting this other side of Canada which is opposed to the apartheid that takes part in maintaining apartheid. The Secretary General gave a thorough analysis of the current situation.

Hidipo Hamutenya, director of publicity and information, was the head of the SWAPO delegation. He brought the audience up to date with the latest manoeuvres engineered by the Contact group of Five, of which Canada is a member.

The conference was an inspiration to all who attended and renewed the commitment to increase solidarity with the ANC and SWAPO, leading the struggles for liberation in South Africa and Namibia. Canadian Churches, the Nigerian High

Commission in Ottawa, the UN Council for Namibia and many others contributed financially to make this important event possible.

Apartheid South Africa is getting worried. For their mission in Ottawa circulated a letter on a wide scale to many organisations imploring them not to take part in the conference, bringing up the worn-out bogey of a "Communist plot". The participation of so many people from all over Canada and Quebec, representing so many organisations and churches, made clear what the people of Canada think of apartheid.

(For further information see ICSA Bulletin No 19, 30A Danbury Street, London N1, UK)

TOINE EGGENHUIZEN, Administrative Secretary of ICSA.

THE SO-CALLED "MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE" (MNR)

by Paul Fauvet and Alves Gomes

This article first appeared in Agencia de Informacao de Mozambique - Supplement to AIM information bulletin No. 69)

To ensure its own survival, South Africa's apartheid regime is determined to maintain its grip over all the independent states in the region. Those independent states, working through the mechanism of the SADCC (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference), are equally determined to break the ties of dependence that bind them to Pretoria.

South Africa hectors, threatens and attempts to destabilise its neighbours. Out-right military attacks alternate with economic pressure, with funding subversive activities, and with the occasional shot at bribery.

This article looks at the main instrument now in use in efforts to destabilise Mozambique - the so-called "Mozambique National Resistance".

When the leaders of the six Front Line states met in Maputo in early March, they stressed in their final communique that the South African regime was resorting to "the preparation, training and financing of armed bandits to destabilize the independent countries of southern Africa".

The Front Line leaders can hardly not have had in mind the group calling itself the "Mozambique National Resistance", and its increased activities in recent months, directed particularly against Mozambique's transport routes, so vital for the whole project of SADCC (Southern Africa

Development Coordination Conference) to break with the regions dependence on South Africa.

The MNR presents itself to the outside world as a heroic nationalist organisation struggling against a "communist dictatorship". It speaks of a "second war of national liberation", and even misappropriates familiar Frelimo slogans for its own use. Thus its bulletin, duplicated in Lisbon, bears the title A Luta Continua - the struggle continues, the best-known of all Frelimo slogans. This publication is edited by Evo Fernandes, a former agent of the Portuguese fascist secret police, the PIDE. He was a student in Lisbon in the 1950s, where he used to spy on other students from the colonies for the PIDE. Later on, in Mozambique he was closely linked to one of the most powerful figures in the colonial set-up, Jorge Jardim. Jardim sat on the boards of dozens of companies, owned the newspaper Noticias da Beira, set up his own private armies to fight Frelimo, and had a direct link to the highest government circles through the fact of being a godson of the Portuguese dictator Salazar. Under Jardim's patronage, Fernandes rose to the position of business manager of Noticias da Beira. This part of his career came to an abrupt halt in mid-1974, when young journalists on the paper, supporters of Frelimo, took over and kicked him out.

A further link between the MNR and the PIDE is provided by Casimiro Monteiro. Monteiro was a professional assassin

employed by the PIDE. He carried out the murder of Portuguese opposition leader Humberto Delgado in 1965, and there are strong indications that he was involved in the assassination of Frelimo's first President, Dr Eduardo Mondlane, killed by a PIDE parcel bomb in February 1969. After the fall of fascism in Portugal, Monteiro disappeared. He was tried in Lisbon in absentia for the murder of Humberto Delgado. Last August the Lisbon courts found him guilty and sentenced him to 18 years imprisonment, but made no attempt to discover his whereabouts. However, an enterprising journalist on the South African Sunday Times tracked Monteiro down to a private house in Johannesburg, where he was closely guarded by members of the MNR.

The PIDE agent most involved with the MNR is Jardim's former private secretary, Orlando Cristina. His connection with the foundation and development of the MNR can now be fairly well traced. Much of the murky history of the group has now come to light. Despite the veil of secrecy drawn by the Rhodesian UDI regime, and later by Pretoria, there are now enough sources available for the history of the MNR to be followed with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

Defectors from the MNR have told their story, as have MNR prisoners captured by the Mozambican army (FPLM). Former officials of the Rhodesian Special Branch have now loosened their tongues. Documents captured at the MNR base at Garagua, occupied by the FPLM in December 1981, give fascinating insights into the internal life of the group, and its dependence on South Africa.

Perhaps the most important conclusion about the MNR to be drawn from this evidence is that it has never been a Mozambican organisation in anything but name. It has always been a pliant weapon in the hands of foreign interests.

It was set up in 1976 by the Rhodesian secret services, with the knowledge of their South African counterparts. In his book, Inside BOSS, the former BOSS agent Gordon Winter gives the credit for forming the MNR to South African military intelligence. This appears to be a substantial exaggeration. Winter's own part in the affair was that of propagandist, writing


articles in the South African government-financed newspaper The Citizen in 1976 claiming MNR military successes, before there was any real MNR activity inside Mozambique at all. Fake photos were published, allegedly of "MNR guerrillas inside Mozambique", but in fact of black South African troops in the Transvaal.

The first real sign of MNR activity came when a new radio station first started broadcasting in June 1976 from Gwelo, Fort Victoria and Umtali. Calling itself Voz da Africa Livre (Voice of Free Africa), it was an obvious reply to the Zimbabwean radio programme Voice of Zimbabwe, which was beamed nightly into Rhodesia by Radio Mozambique. Voz da Africa Livre broadcast anti-Frelimo propaganda of a very crude nature in defence of the colonial past.

In its initial broadcasts it even used, as a kind of theme song, the notorious 'Mocambique - Terra Portuguesa' (Mozambique - Portuguese Land) by the colonialist songwriter, Joao Maria Tudela. This song contains the memorable line: "Yesterday it belonged to the blacks - today it's Portuguese territory".

But Voz da Africa Livre soon abandoned this approach, and adopted a rather more subtle line. The hand of Orlando Cristina seems evident in the new play that Voz da Africa Livre and the MNR came to use: they posited an opposition between the original 'real' Frelimo of Eduardo Mondlane, and the 'communist', 'totalitarian' Frelimo of Samora Machel, claiming to be the true inheritors of Mondlane's mantle.

In August and September 1976 the first MNR group received military training at Bindura just north of Salisbury. The operation was set up by the Rhodesian Special Branch, whose former head, Ken Flower, candidly admitted as much after Zimbabwean independence. "It was war," he explained to a Mozambican journalist, "and in war all things are allowed." Mozambique had closed its borders with Rhodesia in March, and provided crucial facilities for Zimbabwean guerrillas, who could use the entire length of the border to cross over into Zimbabwe. The illegal Smith regime considered itself at war with Mozambique, and hit back, not simply at guerrillas, but also at Mozambican economic and civilian targets. In this war, the MNR was used



as convenient fifth column.

But obviously Flower and his men could not provide the Mozambicans who were needed if the MNR was to take on substance. It was here that Orlando Cristina played a crucial role. His former employer, Jardim, had organised elite military units to fight against Frelimo, units consisting mainly of black troops, better paid than the regular colonial army, and soon gaining an unenviable reputation for brutality and atrocities. These were known as GEs (Special Groups), GMEs (Very Special Groups - used for cladenstine operations in Tanzania and Zambia), and GEPs (Special Paratroop Groups). These units' primary loyalty was to Jardim.

Shortly before Mozambique's independence Cristina disappeared. So did all the files on the special groups. There seems no doubt that these were taken by

Cristina to Salisbury, and formed the basis for the initial recruitment to the MNR. People named in these files received letters threatening exposure if they refused to join the MNR.

For the next four years Cristina was to be based in Salisbury as the eminence grise behind Voz da Africa Livre.

Figureheads were also needed - men who were not too blatantly connected with the colonial regime, and could give a veneer of credibility to the claim that the MNR represented the "real" spirit of Frelimo. So Andre Matsangaiza was elevated to the role of "commander-in-chief" of the MNR. Matsangaiza had been in the FPLM, but after his appointment as a quartermaster in 1975, he had been caught with his hands in the till. Arrested for theft, he was sent to a reeducation centre from which he managed

to escape in 1976. The Rhodesians then groomed him as MNR leader.

The man who took over the job after Matsangaiza's death, Afonso Dhlakama, has a similar history. He joined the FPLM only in October 1974, after all the fighting was over. Prior to 1974 he had been a conscript in the Portuguese army. In 1975 he too was found guilty of theft and dishonourably discharged from the Mozambican army. A year later he was with the infant MNR in Rhodesia.

Initially the MNR acted in the border zones in the Mozambican provinces of Manica, Tete and, to a lesser extent, Gaza. They concentrated on attacking villages and kidnapping civilians, and disrupting commerce. There was never any serious attempt to take on the Mozambican army, much less to bring down the government. The Rhodesians' aims were much less ambitious. They were simply destabilising the zones used as a rearguard by the Zimbabwean guerrillas.

In 1979, as the war escalated, the Rhodesians ordered the MNR to move deeper into Mozambique and set up permanent bases there. These would be supplied by helicopter from Rhodesia. The most important of these was set up in the thick bush of the remote Gorongosa mountains of Sofala province.

Here Matsangaiza formed an alliance with the local 'feiticeiros' (witch-doctors), who provided him with information on the movement of Mozambican troops (information which Matsangaiza then attributed to supernatural forces). But the Gorongosa feiticeiros became fed up with the MNR, due largely to its undisciplined men abusing local women. They took their revenge by feeding Matsangaiza a piece of fatally false information. They told him the town of Gorongosa itself was unguarded and would easily fall to a surprise attack. So several hundreds swept down to loot Gorogosa in October 1979, only to find not simply a strong contingent of Mozambican troops, but also tanks. When the tanks opened fire on the closely-packed MNR, Matsangaiza himself was one of the casualties. Mortally wounded, he was evacuated by helicopter, but died on his way back to Rhodesia.

A few days later the Mozambican army launched a major offensive to clear the MNR out of the Gorongosa region. Their

main base was seized, and in disarray the survivors fled back to the border.

The death of Matsangaiza provoked an enormous crisis within the MNR. Dhlakama later admitted that the group had been "on the way to total destruction". Lacking any ideology, the MNR had been built round the personality cult of Matsangaiza, and once he had gone it all began to fall apart. A bitter power struggle broke out. The Rhodesians, oblivious to the fact that their own regime was in its death throes, tried to solve the problem by suggesting that the MNR be divided into two commands, one under Dhlakama and one under Matsangaiza's second deputy, Lucas M'lhanga.

This was not at all according to Cristina's liking, and he decided to patronise Dhlakama. Stealing a march on the Smith regime, Cristina had photos of Dhlakama published in the South African press, proclaiming him the sole leader of the MNR. Reverting to his former trade as an assassin, Cristina tried to remove M'lhanga from the scene, but bungled the job.

The conflict came to a head at an MNR camp at Chisumbanje in southern Zimbabwe in June 1980. A gun battle erupted in which Dhlakama's followers overpowered M'lhanga's. M'lhanga himself was probably killed in the shoot out. His supporters fled to Mozambique where they handed themselves over to the FPLM.

At about the same time, the MNR's 'political commissar', Henrique Siteo, also defected. He had been appointed to the post a few months earlier by Dhlakama despite the fact that, on his own admission, he knew nothing about politics. Siteo deserted with three others, one of whom described himself as a 'company commander'. The second was a skilled radio operator. These represented heavy losses for the MNR. Speaking at a press conference in Maputo, these defectors said they had no idea what they were fighting for. Being in the MNR was just "waiting for death".

Dhlakama himself confirmed this sorry state of affairs in a speech to his men in November 1980. "In the past year," he said, "many fighters, including commanders and chiefs, have been killed." He feared that the same fate awaited him: "Some people," he said, "are preparing drugs to assassinate me so that they can take over my position."

In early 1980, things were looking extremely bleak for the MNR. On top of their internal problems, they were now faced with the likelihood of losing their base. With the Lancaster House agreement and the resumption of British authority in Salisbury, the MNR was forced to adopt a much lower profile.

The British ordered Voz da Africa Livre to stop broadcasting, and it went off the air in February 1980.

With the overwhelming Zanu victory in the March election, it was clear that the MNR's days in Zimbabwe were numbered. But help was on the way. The Rhodesians had passed Cristina to the South African embassy in Salisbury, and arrangements were quickly made to switch the MNR base from Zimbabwe to the Transvaal.

The South Africans had earlier assisted in training the MNR, and South African personnel had been stationed at the Gorongosa camp in 1979. Now the South Africans took over the entire task of supplying the MNR bands. Boxes of ammunition dropped to the bands in Manica were marked in English and Afrikaans, leaving no room for doubt as to their country of origin.

A transmitter was quickly rigged up in the northern Transvaal, and by the middle of the year Voz da Africa Livre was back in business. The evacuation of the MNR from Zimbabwe took a bit longer but seems to have been completed by October.

Dhlakama's men were accommodated at two camps in the Transvaal, one at Phalaborwa, and the other at Zoabastad. The documents captured at Garagua date from this period of transition. They indicate that a liaison officer from the South African Military Intelligence was allocated to the MNR: he crops up in the documents as 'Colonel Charlie', and on one occasion as 'Colonel van Niekerk'. There is, of course no way of knowing whether this is his real name. Notes from meetings in October and November contain fulsome praise and gratitude by Dhlakama for his South African patrons. "We can't do anything without you," he is on record as saying, "you are like our parents."

Whereas the Rhodesians had kept Voz da Africa Livre organisationally distinct from the MNR, the South Africans preferred to centralise the entire operation. The radio station was integrated in the MNR, and all

was subordinate to Dhlakama who now referred to himself as "Supreme Chief".

The MNR had lost their major base inside Mozambique, in the Sitatonga mountains in Manica, close to the Zimbabwe border, in June 1980. Mozambican artillery moved painstakingly into position over difficult terrain, pounded the hideout into dust. But Sitatonga was soon replaced by a new base, some 300 kilometres further south, at Garagua, near the Save river which forms the boundary between Manica and Gaza provinces.

This base, two kilometres in diameter, included an area set aside for South African 'specialists', and a helicopter landing strip. From the large quantities of aircraft fuel discovered when Mozambican soldiers stormed Garagua in December 1981, it clearly also functioned as a refuelling depot for supply flights to MNR bands further north.

The presence of South African 'specialists' with the MNR inside Mozambique was one of the matters discussed between Dhlakama and 'Colonel Charlie'. The latter promised that South African experts would accompany the MNR to teach the use of heavy weapons and sabotage techniques. These 'specialists' would not simply have a back-seat role, but would participate directly in attacks.

The change in rear base also entailed a change in strategy. The targets to be hit now were no longer those which suited the defunct Smith regime, but ones which fitted in with South Africa's strategy of destabilising the Front Line states. 'Colonel Charlie' gave Dhlakama a list of targets for the MNR's 1981 campaign. These included the Beira-Umtali pipe-line, the railways linking Zimbabwe to Mozambique's ports, and the roads in the centre of the country. The border areas with Zimbabwe had lost their previous importance, and the stress was now laid on disrupting the economies of both Mozambique and Zimbabwe by hitting at their most vulnerable point, their communications.

During 1981 Dhlakama's men did their best to carry out their new instructions 'Colonel Charlie's' emphasis on sabotage techniques paid off. In October the road and rail bridges over the Pungwe river

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