

some residents and removed some personal belongings of the Crossroads residents. Some AK-47 shells were later found on the scene.

49. The committee heard evidence from a number of witnesses, some of whom were survivors of the attack. It would appear that during 1990 there was some fighting at Crossroads between men of Zulu and Xhosa origin. It appears that after the fighting the Xhosa-speaking men left Crossroads to settle at Holomisa Park, Mandela Park and Kutalo Hostel, leaving Crossroads occupied overwhelmingly by Zulus. It would also appear that some of the Crossroads residents formerly lived at Mandela Park but that they had left Mandela Park and moved to Crossroads because of the fighting that took place at Mandela Park.

50. There was evidence that the attackers on 3 April were Xhosa-speaking, but there was not sufficient evidence for the committee to be able to come to any firm conclusion as to the identity of the attackers, the residential area or hostel from which they came, their political affiliation or the precise reason for the attack.

51. On 6 April 1992 at approximately 23:30 a group of some 50 to 100 people attacked the informal settlement of Zonkizizwe. Four people died during the attack. Ten were injured and numerous shacks, houses and cars were destroyed. In the course of the attack a number of shots were fired at a police vehicle and a policeman was injured and the vehicle damaged.

52. The committee heard evidence from a number of witnesses including several victims and a few police officers. From the evidence it is clear that Zonkizizwe is under the political control of the IFP, which does not permit any other political activity in the area or allow the emergence of any other political party.

53. It is also clear that Zonkizizwe, like many other settlements, hostels and townships in the area, has had a very traumatic history since its establishment in 1989. There have been a number of violent Zulu/Xhosa clashes. Originally the population of the settlement was mixed, but as a result of the clashes, and one on 11 November 1990 in particular, it was "purged" of Xhosas.

54. There was evidence that the attackers on 6 April spoke both Zulu and Xhosa and that at least one of them said that they came from Phola Park. There was also circumstantial evidence that they might have come from Phola Park. However, there was insufficient evidence for the committee to come to any conclusion on this issue, or to come to any conclusion as to the attackers' identities, political affiliations or the precise reason for the attack.

55. Although the police were on the scene of both the Crossroads attack and the Zonkizizwe attack very quickly, by the conclusion of the committee's hearings little progress had been made with the

investigation of the incidents nor had anyone been detained or charges laid in connection with the attacks.

56. Although the committee did not hear sufficient evidence to be able to come to any conclusion as to the actual identity of the attackers, their political persuasion or the precise reason for the attacks on Crossroads and Zonkizizwe, it is satisfied on the evidence which it did hear that the attacks fell within the pattern of attack, counter-attack, revenge and retaliation that has become an ongoing phenomenon in the area. It is almost certain that -

- the attacks involved at least an element of revenge by former residents who had been driven out of the settlements in the course of earlier feuds;
- the attacks were at least partly in the course of the political struggle between IFP supporters and the so-called Patriotic Front parties and the ongoing politicisation and rivalry for supporters and power in the area.

57. We would like to point out that a large number of people were killed and injured and considerable property damaged in the two attacks. Yet unlike the so-called Boipatong massacre these incidents have all but disappeared from the agenda and very little progress has been made in their investigation. This must leave innocent victims wondering whether there are different laws and different processes for groups affiliated to different political parties.

Phola park  
32 Battalion

The seventh incident (32 Battalion in Phola Park)

58. The committee has already submitted an interim report on this incident. We have nothing further to add to that report other than that, on evidence subsequently heard by us, it is clear that the shooting was started by members of the Phola Park SDU as part of a deliberate initiative to engage the Defence Force in a "war".

General

59. Before dealing with the causes and phenomenon of violence and our recommendations we would like to point out that since commencing our hearings three men who gave evidence, two of them fairly extensively, have been murdered in the course of the ongoing violence. We would like to pay tribute to the courage of the many people who testified before us, to record that without them we could not have made any progress at all, and to stress the importance of giving all possible protection to them and their families.

THE CAUSES AND PHENOMENON OF VIOLENCE IN THE TOKOZA AREA

60. The committee had the benefit of hearing several expert witnesses on the subject of the causes and the phenomenon of violence in the area - notably Julian Baskin of Planact, an organisation that has advised the Phola Park community over a

period of time, who has himself been personally involved in the Phola Park area for some time, Dr Chris de Kock of the Human Sciences Research Council, who gave extensive and very well-researched evidence on the phenomenon of violence, and Dr Mamphela Ramphele of the University of Cape Town, who gave evidence on the general causes of violence. At the outset we should point out that we are as a committee called upon to give our findings both as to the causes and the phenomenon of violence, and we have been careful to draw this distinction. In this respect we found the evidence of Dr De Kock and Dr Ramphele to be complementary and not contradictory. Dr De Kock himself acknowledged that he concentrated on the "geweldsproesesse" (processes of violence), while Dr Ramphele concentrated on the causes of violence.

#### 61. Causes

The committee does not find it either necessary or appropriate to describe the historic (and in some instances still current) policies and practices that have resulted in distortions in the structure and behaviour of society in the Tokoza area. It is only necessary to describe the main characteristics and consequences of those structural and behavioural distortions.

## 62. Structural distortions

### 62.1 Population density

The population density in the area is high. In a very limited area such as Phola Park there are approximately 4 000 to 5 000 very small shacks. There are very narrow access ways (which cannot be described as streets and which do not provide free vehicular access). There are no open spaces and an average of five to six people live in each shack. The hostels are also densely populated. The population density in all areas is being aggravated by very high rates of immigration from the rural areas because of the drought and poor economic conditions and from neighbouring states because of poor economic conditions, violence and war.

### 62.2 Homelessness

There is a high level of homelessness and intense competition for housing - particularly for family-type accommodation in close proximity to work opportunities. This is significant in the case of the Tokoza area because it is in very close proximity to the Alrode industrial area, which provides job opportunities. The high demand for family-type accommodation is a consequence of the abolition of the influx control regulations, and the desire of many migrant workers who previously lived in hostels to have their families living with them in the urban area.

### 62.3 Living conditions

The committee had the opportunity to visit both the hostels and Phola Park and there is a noticeable difference between conditions there and those in the formal residential area of Tokoza township proper. In the case of Phola Park there is no sewerage or sanitation system; there are only four water taps on the boundaries of the settlement; there are no schools or recreation areas or facilities; there is no electricity and there is no refuse removal system. We found the hostels in a thoroughly dilapidated condition; the sanitation and sewerage and sewerage system was effectively unusable; and the living areas were demeaning and in very poor condition. Since we commenced our hearings, however, a major hostel upgrading project has been undertaken for hostels 1, 2 and 3, and the living conditions in those hostels should improve. The formal residential area of Tokoza itself is served by a satisfactory sewerage system, water and electricity reticulation, good roads, open spaces, recreation facilities and schools.

### 62.4 Joblessness

There is a very high level of unemployment in the hostels and Phola Park. In both instances it appears that the unemployment level is in excess of 50% and according to one estimate

only 20% of the men living in Phola Park have formal employment.

## 62.5 Structural conflict

It became reasonably apparent during the course of evidence how much structural conflict exists between different groups living in close proximity in the Tokoza area. Significant amongst these examples were the following:

62.5.1 Within Phola Park itself there is a division between families who wish to remain resident in the urban area, single migratory labourers who have families in the rural areas, and non-South Africans who are probably illegal immigrants.

The families who wish to remain resident in the urban area have a keen interest in the development and upgrading of the settlement. While their income is obviously limited they are willing to pay more for the housing and facilities which they would enjoy in an upgraded environment.

The migrant labourers' concern is to minimise their living expenses while in the urban area so as to enable them to remit as high a proportion of their income as possible to their families in the rural areas.



The non-South African illegal immigrants are almost invariably excluded from benefiting from any development programmes (which are usually restricted in their application to South Africans), and in any event feel very threatened and vulnerable because of their "illegality". In fact, the more chaotic the environment in which they live the less likely they are to be detected and the better able they are to sustain themselves.

62.5.2 At the time the influx control legislation was abolished there was a greater tendency amongst Xhosa men to want to have their families join them than amongst Zulu men. As a result it was the Xhosa men who tended to move out of the hostels and into shack and squatter settlements such as Phola Park with their families. The result was that because of the divergence in living styles, residential environment, language, culture and ethnicity, which was frequently aggravated by a tendency for the predominantly Zulu hostel dwellers to give their allegiance to the Inkatha Freedom Party and for the predominantly Xhosa shack dwellers to give their allegiance to the political parties constituting the so-called Patriotic Front (in other words mainly the ANC, but also the PAC,

AZAPO and other groupings), a gulf rapidly developed between the two communities. The committee heard evidence of the sensitivities, subtleties and intensity related to this gulf. So for example, the fact that circumcision is, for the one group, a prerequisite for "manhood", but not for the other, results in the latter being insultingly treated as "boys" by the former. When the "boys" then took to themselves wives of the former group because of cultural shifts, the antagonism was further intensified.

62.5.3 The residents of formal homes in Tokoza are living in significantly better conditions than those in Phola Park and the hostels.

### 63. Behavioural distortions

#### 63.1 Family breakdown

The committee heard evidence that in Phola Park itself families are very unstable. Both marriages and customary unions are breaking down at a very high rate and a good deal of any community organiser's time is devoted to resolving the consequences of these breakdowns. Family breakdown appears to be attributable to a whole series of factors that give rise to instability. Notable amongst these factors are poverty and the inability of the male to support the family, drug and

alcohol abuse, and the inversion of the normal age hierarchy within the family as a result of young people being pushed into the forefront of the "conflict". The migrant labourers living in the hostels are effectively living in a "no family" environment.

### 63.2 Violence within the community and within the family

Phola Park is by nature a very violent environment. There is a high level of child and wife abuse and also of conflict and violence within the community itself. The committee heard evidence not only of the cold-blooded murder of a community leader in the open by members of the SDU, but also of abductions, gun battles with the police and the Defence Force and "wars" with the hostel dwellers. There is clear evidence that there are a large number of weapons in Phola Park. There is also easy access to guns by hostel dwellers and the KAPTA squad, and gunfire is frequently heard.

### 63.3 A sense of persecution

From the very outset Phola Park was illegally established on land that was intended for industrial purposes. The residents of Phola Park were clearly conscious of this fact, and in the early stages there were attempts to move them or to resettle them. This resulted in a sense of persecution and the South African Police in particular were generally stereo-

32 Battalion  
-- claims incident  
stemmed from provocation

typed as the persecutors. The sense of persecution is clearly aggravated by the presence of a fairly high number of illegal immigrants in Phola Park and by the presence of a number of individuals involved in criminal activity who have for some time been sought by the South African Police and by the Defence Force. The security forces, by virtue of the "defensive" stance adopted by the Phola Park community, have been forced to adopt an unconventional approach to policing the settlement. The committee heard evidence that both the police and the Defence Force are frequently shot at from Phola Park, and the seventh incident was triggered by just such an incident when members of the SDU shot at members of 32 Battalion. Consequently if the police wish to search for arms or question anyone resident in Phola Park in relation to the multiplicity of criminal and violent incidents in recent times, a large number of security force members are thrown in a cordon around the settlement and the entire population is then affected by the "raid". Residents are unable to get to work and the sense of persecution is aggravated. Likewise, for example, the use of tear-gas (to avoid having to use live ammunition) affects all the community members, innocent and guilty alike.

The hostel dwellers are likewise suffering from a sense of persecution. They have in a number of respects been alienated and marginalised in the hostel environment, and are very clearly under the impression that it is the intention of the ANC and its allies to drive them out of the hostels and

either destroy the hostels or turn them into family-type accommodation. It is also clear that a large number of them do not want to bring their families to what they regard as a violent and undesirable urban environment.

#### 63.4 Crime

There is a high level of crime both within Phola Park and generated from Phola Park. The reasons for this high level of criminal activity range from normal criminal elements that manifest themselves in all communities, to very high levels of unemployment and poverty, to a high proportion of illegal immigrants who have free access to weapons and who (being illegal) have no other means of maintaining themselves, to the cloak of political legitimacy that is used by members of the SDU to carry out quasi-political crimes - some of which were the subject of our investigation.

#### 63.5 Political, social and economic competition

Because of all of the factors mentioned and a number of others that will be discussed under the heading THE PHENOMENON OF VIOLENCE, political, social and economic rivalry are very intense at all levels in the community. Both economic and social resources (such as housing, jobs, decent living conditions, education opportunities and recreation facilities) are scarce and the competition for such resources translates into political rivalry. This political rivalry is

not necessarily of a party-political nature (although it is very clearly aggravated by the intensity of the party-political rivalry and rhetoric at all levels of our society at the present time). Significant in the context of this political rivalry are the following:

63.5.1 The most serious rivalry between the residents of Phola Park and the hostel dwellers. This rivalry appears to be based predominantly on the fact that the one group lives in shacks in Phola Park while the other group lives in hostels. There is however no doubt that this rivalry is in itself aggravated and coloured by -

- the fact that the one group is predominantly Zulu and the other group is predominantly non-Zulu with a heavy (but not predominant) Xhosa influence;

- the fact that the one group tends to be affiliated to the Inkatha Freedom Party and the other group to the so-called Patriotic Front, which is heavily influenced by the ANC although the ANC members do not appear to hold the majority of the leadership positions.

63.5.2 A high level of tension and suspicion between the security forces (and the police in particular) and the Phola Park community. On this issue it is

dangerous to generalise. A number of witnesses were outspoken in their compliments for the conduct and role that both the police and the Defence Force have played in the Tokoza area. On the other hand, largely as a result of the sense of persecution and the other factors discussed in paragraph 63.3 above, the residents of Phola Park (and other shack settlements show a deep sense of suspicion and sensitivity towards the security forces. This is illustrated by the following examples:

- When the Holomisa Park residents were required to lay down their weapons at the beginning of the Sam Ntuli funeral proceedings, and later in the day those residents were attacked on the soccer field adjoining the hospital, the residents immediately jumped to the conclusion that their weapons had been removed from them by the police so that they would be defenceless against the subsequent attack.
  
- None of the communities have rendered any substantial assistance to the police investigating the incidents that are the subject of this inquiry or the innumerable other unsolved crimes in the area.

- When a policeman in a Casspir fired at someone carrying an AK-47 on the open space adjacent to the Natalspruit Hospital at the end of the Ntuli funeral a hospital staff member who saw only the policeman over the top of the hospital wall immediately concluded he was shooting at the funeral-goers and spread a rumour to that effect.
- When there was a shooting incident in the vicinity of the Katlehong police station (in which we are satisfied the police were not involved) the funeral-goers immediately concluded that they were being fired at by the police, and spread a rumour to that effect.
- Black policemen living in the Tokoza area are so sensitive to suspicion of the police on the part of the community that they carefully conceal their identity as policemen.
- Members of the security forces are frequently fired at from Phola Park.

63.5.3 The Tokoza Black local authority lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the community, and consequently suffers from an incapacity to act as an effective local authority and conducts itself as yet another



contestant for power. As an example the Black local authority felt its authority to be threatened by the occupation of Phola Park (intended for industrial use) by the invading shack dwellers and adopted an aggressive stance on the issue. This resulted in a sense of persecution on the part of the Phola Park community and further political polarisation and disintegration within the community. A further result has been the disintegration of the formal "government" of the area into residents' committees and civic associations in the various shack settlements, hostels and formal residential areas. These different "local government bodies" are themselves in intense competition with one another.

### 63.6 Development

Attempts have been made to undertake socio-economic development and upgrading in the area. Of particular significance was the initiative of the Independent Development Trust (IDT) to undertake a "100%" upgrading of Tokoza. Evidence was led that this was of particular significance because the IDT had agreed to undertake the development on the basis that every member of the Phola Park community would benefit and not only a selected portion of the community (as is normally the case in this type of upgrading). Evidence was led that this type of development can in itself result in an intensification in

the rivalry and conflict between the different groups for power and control over the development process. Because socio-economic conditions in the area are so bad, the presence or availability of large sums of money raises suspicions and doubts as to who is benefiting by the development initiative. So for example it appears that the IDT initiative was at least one of the factors (even though at a perceptual and emotional level and not factually so) that led to the over-throw of the Phola Park Residents' Committee by the members of the SDU in April 1992. This is particularly disconcerting because it means that instead of socio-economic development alleviating the tensions and difficulties in the area, socio-economic development itself runs the real risk of intensifying or aggravating such tensions.

63.7 Because there is no single community, but in fact many fractured communities that are frequently in keen political rivalry with one another for power and control over scarce resources, it is extremely dangerous for any agency, whether Governmental, security, developmental or even welfare, to try to interact with those communities on the basis or assumption that they are one community or even that they have common interests. To do so only intensifies the rivalry. Moreover, because there is no open system of democracy there is more than ample scope for individuals to elevate themselves to positions of power without any accountability to any constituency. This further aggravates the development environment, and frustrates the endeavours of those working to change the

dispensation. This state of affairs is unlikely to improve until formal, legal and legitimate local government is established in the area.

64. The phenomenon of violence

64.1 The committee found no reason to disagree with Dr De Kock's analysis of the phenomenon of violence, and what actually triggers that violence, as opposed to the underlying causes of that violence. To summarise very briefly, the phenomenon of violence may be attributed to the following factors:

- Intensification of the horizontal and direct rivalry for political power and scarce resources;
- repeated and escalating expectations and the non-realisation of those expectations;
- a lack of democratic values - for example respect for the right of free political affiliation and political expression;

- a culture of violence; .
- fear;
- criminal activity under the cloak of politics;
- a breakdown of social control (whether that breakdown be real or merely perceived by the communities); and
- intimidation and reaction to that intimidation.

These factors are aggravated by ongoing aggression and counter-aggression, rumour, the easy availability of weapons and the existence of "private armies". The only real qualification that we would make to Dr De Kock's analysis is that the factors which actually trigger the violence cannot be considered solely as causative factors. A number of them are actually consequences of the real causes discussed in paragraphs 62 and 63 above, and in many respects the parties to the conflict are as much victims of circumstances as the architects or cause of such conflict.

64.2 There are however a number of factors that appear to be purely causative:

#### 64.2.1 Political conflict and rhetoric

We are satisfied that in the Tokoza area, where there is inevitably a high level of rivalry for the reasons discussed above, aggressive and inflammatory statements made and positions adopted by national leaders immediately further intensify the conflict within the area. By adopting stances of confrontation and conflict those national leaders are making the situation worse where they could, by adopting a constructive and conciliatory stance, improve the situation.

#### 64.2.2 The easy availability of weapons

There was some evidence that the source of AK-47s in Phola Park is Mozambique and that there is a channel via Daveyton. However, there was also evidence that weapons are readily available in the hostels and amongst both the KAPTA squad members and a number of the KAPTA taxi drivers.

#### 64.2.3 The SDU of Phola Park

From the evidence before the committee there were no occasions during the period in question in which the SDU played a defensive role in protecting the lives and property or interests of the residents of

Phola Park. However, there were several incidents that were the subject of this inquiry (notably the first, fourth, probably the sixth and the seventh) and also a number of other incidents both within Tokoza and beyond the boundaries of Tokoza in which the SDU or members of the SDU played a very aggressive and outright criminal role. This type of unit playing such a role cannot claim to fall within the ambit of paragraph 3.7.1 of the National Peace Accord, which reads as follows:

"The law accords all individuals the right to protect themselves and their property and to establish voluntary associations or self-protection units in any neighbourhood to prevent crime and to prevent any invasion of the lawful rights of such communities. This shall include the right to bear licensed arms and to use them in legitimate and lawful self-defence."

64.2.4 It is important in this regard to record that although there was some evidence of communication between the SDU and the leaders of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), there is no evidence at all that -  
- MK was in any way involved in the establishment of the SDU;

- the SDU was in any respect under the command of or acted on the instructions of MK; or
- MK in any way sanctioned or in fact knew about the criminal activities of the SDU.

64.2.5 On the evidence the SDU "adopted" MK and not vice versa. It is also probable on the evidence that the majority of the members of the SDU were as individuals neither members of the ANC or of MK. Several members of the SDU are or were Mozambican immigrants, and others are or were members of the parties making up the so-called Patriotic Front.

64.3 Rumour and speculation have clearly played a role in fuelling and sometimes triggering violence. So for example rumour at least played a part in the involvement of members of the Phola Park community in the attack on the hostel dwellers in the first instance and the involvement of members of the Phola Park community in the attack on the minibus transporting workers of the Rand Water Board in the fourth incident. Totally inaccurate information, that is often blatantly false, and rumour circulate freely. For example, one of the leaders of the Phola Park community was actually at the hearings of the committee in Pretoria on the morning of 27 February 1992 when he received information via a paging device that "Phola Park was under attack from White members of the AWB firing at Phola Park from the Old Vereeniging

Road". This "fact" was based, at best, on the random circumstances described in paragraph 44, but quite probably also on the deliberate initiation of such a rumour as a cover for the murderous intentions of the Phola Park SDU.

65. Maintenance of law and order

65.1 Clearly the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order lies with the State, acting through its security forces and the police in particular.

That Tokoza is subjected to such a high level of violence inevitably raises the question of why the security forces are not able to maintain order. Two observations should be made at the outset:

- First, the committee could find no evidence whatsoever of any "third force" activity or involvement of the security forces or any member thereof in any of the incidents, apart from the 32 Battalion incident (on which we have already furnished an interim report).
- Second, as has been reported in relation to each of the incidents in question, the conduct of both the police and the Defence Force at the time of the incidents in question cannot be criticised and should in many respects be complimented (with the solitary exception of the seventh incident).



65.2 The real question is therefore why the security forces are unable to solve the crimes successfully, have the criminals prosecuted and maintain a much higher general state of law and order. Again we found the evidence of Dr De Kock persuasive. The security forces are in many respects "victims" of past policies and practices or of attitudes of the communities in question towards the security forces (which attitudes are themselves a consequence of those past policies and practices). They are, however, also party to aggravating the tensions between themselves and the communities in question by the type of conduct described in paragraph 18. They could be more careful and protective of that relationship.

65.3 As a committee we came to the conclusion that the inability or failure on the part of the security forces to maintain a satisfactory level of law and order and to satisfactorily investigate and subsequently prosecute in respect of crimes committed derive from a very considerable and complex range of factors. However, we believe that this can be summarized in terms of the following four broad factors:

65.3.1 A lack of integration into the community. This is implicit for example in the fact that none of the crimes in question are being investigated by police officers who are either Black or fluent in any of the indigenous languages used by the inhabitants of Tokoza. Nor, obviously, do they live in the Tokoza area.

65.3.2 Polarisation and a combative attitude between the communities in question and the security forces. There is a regrettable lack of respect on the part of the communities in question both for the law and for law enforcement officers. This is a result of historical structures, policies and practices, and instead of the security forces being seen as agents for the protection of the communities and the individual citizen's rights, they are generally perceived as being oppressors.

65.3.3 The resources at the disposal of the security forces. It became evident to the committee, for example, that the security forces were stretched to the limit in policing the funeral procession of Sam Ntuli. They did not have enough men or vehicles to be everywhere, as was necessary if violence was to be prevented. The overall impression gained by the committee was of security forces that are over-extended by the circumstances with which they have to cope, and that would benefit by greater and more appropriate training.

#### 65.4 Rumour and criticism

The committee is satisfied that at least some of the rumour is deliberately initiated as part of the power struggle and

as a cover or to raise the level of suspicion and hence of polarisation. This provides a ripe opportunity for the different groupings to mobilise support. The rumour is a consequence of the first three features of the relationship between the security forces and the communities in question, but is also clearly a cause of the deterioration in the relationship between the security forces and these communities.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Unlike other specific incidents that have been the subject of inquiry by committees of the Commission, this inquiry developed into an inquiry into the general malaise of violence in the area in question. Only in respect of the first, fourth and seventh incidents are we able to find a particular grouping responsible for the attacks, and even then neither we nor the investigating officer have been able to say with any certainty which individuals were responsible (with the exception of Ndebele in the third incident).

The evidence was extensive and yet singularly unhelpful in "solving the crime". Moreover, since we found ourselves addressing the general malaise, and since we ourselves had neither the mandate nor the expert evidence nor the expertise to address such broad topics, we came to the conclusion that it would be appropriate for us to make certain broad recommendations in the hope that they will constitute a platform from which to proceed in

addressing the general malaise of violence in this and perhaps other areas where a similar phenomenon exists.

## 2. The phenomenon

2.1 In view of our conclusion that political rivalry is the primary trigger for the violence, political leaders should take cognisance of the fact that they bear a heavy responsibility to alleviate and not aggravate political tensions at their respective levels. The following points are emphasised in this regard:

2.1.1 It is clear that in the Tokoza area the political rivalry between hostel dwellers and shack dwellers, Zulu-speakers and Xhosa-speakers, Zulus and Xhosas, and migrant workers and those who have their families with them, all tend to resolve themselves into a very simple IFP/ANC tension. The political leaders add fuel to the fire of this tension by the use of political rhetoric, by blaming each other, by hurling insults at each other, and by refusing to be conciliatory towards each other, whereas they could reduce the tension if they were moderate in their language and conciliatory in their behaviour.

2.1.2 The tensions and conflicts between political leaders as perceived at the local level are then

acted out at the local level within the context of the political conflict and the socio-economic deprivation and rivalry that prevail there.

2.1.3 The media, both electronic and written, constitute the primary vehicle for the mass communication of the conflict at the national level. Without that vehicle the conflict at the national level would not be so widely communicated. While we abhor the idea of censorship and are totally opposed to it, it is important that the media are made, and at all times remain, conscious of the fact that they are the disseminators of information which is frequently the trigger for violence and that they bear a heavy responsibility in this regard.

2.2 The ready availability of firearms, and of AK-47s in particular, is clearly a severely aggravating factor in the area. No effort should be spared in identifying the source and distribution routes of such firearms and in removing them.

2.3 The Phola Park SDU has little or nothing to do with defence and much more to do with blatant aggression and also serves as a guise for criminal activity. It does not fall within the ambit of paragraph 3.7.1 of the National Peace Accord. It and any other self-defence units, squads or private armies in the area that act similarly to the Phola Park SDU should

therefore be dissolved and their members who have been involved in violence or crime arrested and charged.

2.4 National political parties and movements and their armies and defence units (such as Umkhonto we Sizwe) should be conscious of the fact that even though they played no part in the establishment of the self-defence and other units described in paragraph 2.3, and even though those units are not subject to their orders, they bear a heavy responsibility in relation to those that "adopt" them. Either they must publicly distance themselves from and disown such units if the units act criminally or violently, or the national organisation or party must accept responsibility for those criminal and violent acts. They cannot have it both ways.

2.5 Rumour is clearly a trigger for violence. Where rumour is deliberately and maliciously started, and is false or is based on a negligently unsubstantiated allegation, it is potentially much more dangerous than a bomb threat, which does in fact carry criminal sanctions. We therefore recommend that urgent consideration be given to imposing criminal sanctions on anyone acting in that way.

### 3. The socio-economic circumstances

3.1 While political rivalry is the primary trigger for violence, it is clear that the general socio-economic circumstances in the area are the primary cause of violence. It might be

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