

regime argued that the United Nations is biased in favour of SWAPO; and, as such it cannot supervise free and fair elections in Namibia. In making this argument, South Africa did not tell the world that it was only the UN which was going to manage the proposed transitional progress to Namibia's independence. Pretoria could not let the world know that the actual administration of the entire transitional process will be in the hands of the South African civil servants in Namibia and that law and order would be a responsibility of the racist South African police force in Namibia.

Therefore, South Africa has a bigger responsibility to demonstrate impartiality than the United Nations whose team will go to Namibia only to supervise a South African administered electoral process. Because SWAPO is interested in finding a quick negotiated settlement for the Namibia problem, we did not want to waste time asking South Africa to be impartial towards our movement.

We know that to do so is to indulge in an illusion of hope. Pretoria can never be impartial to SWAPO.

Back-Trackings and Concessions

From the claim of UN lack of impartiality, racist South Africa cooked up another excuse that the proposed 7,500 UN troops to supervise the transitional process in Namibia was astronomically too high and, therefore, totally unacceptable.

Next, Pretoria rejected a provision in the UN plan that SWAPO guerilla forces inside Namibia at the time of the ceasefire should be given assembly points inside Namibia. All these back-trackings were conceded to by the five Western powers who did not hesitate to turn to SWAPO and the Frontline states for fresh concessions.

By 1979, Pretoria had succeeded to turn the negotiations around by making the five think that the threat to the implementation of Resolution 435 is that SWAPO will continue, even after the ceasefire has been signed, to infiltrate armed guerrillas into Namibia.

Hence, in order to accommodate
18 Pretoria's Blackmail, the Frontline States

put forward a proposal for a demilitarized zone whereby a large number of UN military personnel will be deployed along the Namibia/Angola and Namibia/Zambia border so as to ensure that there were no armed infiltration into Namibia from Angola or Zambia. Again, Pretoria simply made nonsense out of the whole proposal by demanding that it wanted 20 bases within demilitarized zone.

After rejecting the proposal for a ceasefire at the General Conference in January 1981 Pretoria came up with yet a new set of demands, namely, guarantees from SWAPO and the Frontline States, for the protection of the so-called white minority rights, guarantees for the protection of private property of the white minority settlers and multi-national corporations and commitments from SWAPO that the proposed constituent assembly would only adopt a constitution for independent Namibia and agree on independence date by a two-third majority of the members of the constituent assembly.

SWAPO and the Frontline States were prevailed upon by the Five Western powers to make all these unfair concessions.

However, after yielding to the pressure exerted on us by the Five, South Africa, again, has come up with a new demand that elections must either be on Bantustan principles or on electoral double standards of one man two votes or one man one vote, one vote two counts.

Again, the Five Western Powers, instead of telling Pretoria to be reasonable, are now busy pressurizing and arm-twisting us to make still more, fresh concessions; and when we say that we have now reached the limit of our capacity to make concessions, they are going around telling the world that SWAPO and the Frontline States are the obstacle to a negotiated settlement in Namibia.

Such is the problem we are facing with the Western mediated negotiations. The Five are reluctant to make the necessary efforts to convince South Africa to be serious regarding the negotiations or to let South

Africa face mandatory and comprehensive sanctions.

Pretoria, on the other hand, has used the endless negotiations to implement its own internal settlement and to further expand its military strength in the region—all aimed at destroying the nationwide support enjoyed by SWAPO and at subverting the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people.

Fear of SWAPO Victory

The Five know that it is precisely because Pretoria is afraid of overwhelming SWAPO victory at the polls that it is denying the Namibian people a free and fair election.

Pretoria believes that it can continue to use the Five to continue to extract concessions from SWAPO and the Frontline States until Resolution 435 is sufficiently diluted so as to allow South Africa and her Western allies instead of the UN supervised elections, and ultimately impose its own puppets on the Namibian people.

For us, it is clear that negotiations are now only about concessions to South Africa and nothing else.

In this connection, I would like to explain the catch behind the proposed combination of two different electoral systems. The choice of the combined electoral system is not as innocent as the Five Western Powers would like the world to believe. Otherwise there would be no need for South Africa and the Five to insist on it so unyieldingly.

South Africa has realised that SWAPO is popular and that its electoral strength cannot be undermined by conventional electoral procedures. Therefore, the combination electoral system is intended to serve as a double-edged sword intended to cut SWAPO's strength from two angles. The two elements to be used in this combination are racism and tribalism. First, there are the whites who are a minority and scattered throughout Namibia. These white settlers are expected to vote against SWAPO in defence of their own privileges.

As minorities in every community, white candidates have little or no chance to win any seats under single member constituency

system. But they can pick up some seats under proportional representation when all the white votes will be pooled as a block vote. However, this will not be enough to reduce SWAPO's electoral strength.

The single member constituency would, therefore, be necessary to make it relatively easy for the black tribal puppets to hopefully win some seats within narrowly demarcated constituencies centred around small tribal communities. In other words, under single member constituency system, South Africa aims at using tribal factors against SWAPO. While under proportional representation the racial factors will be brought in to full play. The combination of advantages which Pretoria hopes to gain from the use of electoral double standards is hoped to result in a situation where SWAPO will have no working majority and whereby the puppets can be used to engage in endless debate aimed at frustrating the adopting of a constitution and proclaiming the independence of Namibia.

In rejecting the electoral double standards, we are saying that every party must agree to live with the consequences of only one electoral system, that is, either proportional representatives or single member constituency system.

Besides the problem of electoral double standards, SWAPO is also disenchanted with phase by phase approach to the negotiations. We are convinced that this method leaves too much room to South Africa's delaying tactics.

We have, therefore, proposed that all outstanding issues be discussed and resolved as a package through direct negotiations.

Finally we wish to state that SWAPO is ready to positively consider any constructive suggestion by the Five. We are equally ready to continue and intensify the political and military struggle in order to ensure that the price of occupation by far surpasses its profits.

**THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES!
VICTORY IS CERTAIN!**

MANDELA - Man of the Resistance

by R.B.

July 1982 marks the 20th anniversary of the capture of Comrade Nelson Mandela. As the campaign to secure his release mounts in South Africa and internationally, a SECHABA journalist looks at the man, who after twenty years behind bars remains the most vital symbol of our people's struggle for freedom and human dignity.

Consider a man in prison for twenty years, on an island where there is nothing other than the prison, cut off from the world by sea, enclosed in silence, visited only at long intervals by a few permitted relatives. Consider that at the end of those twenty years—with uncounted more years there stretching out before him—that he has become the most talked about and quoted, the most respected and popular figure in his country. How is one to explain such a phenomenon? How to explain that thousands of young people who have never seen or heard the man acknowledge him as their guide and their leader; for no one under the age of twenty five can possibly remember hearing or seeing him, except in the frozen lifelessness of pictures in the press.

How to explain the phenomenon of Nelson Mandela? What can account for the fact that now, at the end of twenty years, still in prison, he stands at the peak of public popularity, its most important national and international political figure?

It is not enough to look to the man himself. For all his charisma and all his leadership qualities, who now remembers him clearly after all the years? For all his speeches and his writings, who now is able to read them after all the years of censorship and repression?

There must be something more to this phenomenon to make Mandela the central figure he is. Mandela, I am certain, is remem-

bered better for what he has done, than for what he said.

There are three episodes in his life the importance of which stamped their mark on South African history.

First, May 1961—his disappearance 'underground' to carry on the public campaign against the declaration of a republic by the white state. It was a time—like so many that our people have faced in the past, when everywhere leaders and activists were being



arrested, banned, banished—harassed into silence and ineffectiveness by an omnipresent police apparatus. If the harassment could not be beaten, the campaign would collapse. Mandela found the way to defeat the harassment—by going underground. From the underground he emerged unexpectedly, now here, now there, to address campaign meetings and disappear; to issue press statements and give radio and newsreel interviews. He became the most wanted—and yet the most fully publicised leader of the campaign.

It was something new; a new way to fight

back, a new way to resist, a new way to out-flank the security police and the powers of the state. That new way inspired others. The struggle from the underground; illegal resistance, law-breaking fight-back had begun. Mandela had pioneered it. That is the first thing for which he is remembered, and for which he is respected amongst the people. Since then there have been others—Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, striking back from underground. But Nelson was the pioneer; and the new resistance has become one with the man.

Second, his fight-back from the courtroom, in 1962. Again at a time overlaid with fear and pessimism, the liberation movement under heavy attack with widespread bans, banishments and house arrests—all without trial. Umkhonto's early acts of sabotage diminished under the onslaught of the Sabotage Act and 90 day detention without trial, the press had been cowed into silence, the new illegal resistance went unreported, almost unseen amongst the people. Mandela was captured at a road block near Durban, and charged with the technical—almost 'non-political' offence of leaving the country without a passport. Trials on such a technical charge could well pass almost unnoticed in a country where half-a-million a year are convicted of technical offences. Mandela, who had pioneered the new resistance, seized the opportunity to carry it further.

Instead of a plea, he launched a counter-attack. It was a white court, appointed by a white state, staffed by white police, prosecutor and judge. It was, by its very nature, incapable of dispensing justice to a Black, because it had been established only to maintain the power of whites. He demanded the resignation of the judge, and a trial by his peers.


It was not a demand which could possibly succeed; it had never been intended to succeed. It had been intended, rather, to strip the mask of hypocrisy from the white judicial process, and reveal its naked face of power. When the court nevertheless decided to proceed with his trial, he proclaimed a refusal to co-operate in the exercise of white supremacy. Thus the lawyer who had spent

his life in the labyrinths of court, now used the court to proclaim yet again a new form of resistance—no co-operation with the white state! Another new way to fight back from outside the law had been pioneered. For this too, Mandela is remembered and honoured, even if his words in court have been forgotten. The new resistance was branching out into new areas of life, spreading.

Third, the Rivonia Trial of 1963, at which nine leaders of various segments of the liberation movement were charged with having launched a campaign of nationwide sabotage, and with preparing to overthrow the state by armed uprising and guerrilla warfare. Mandela, who had been in jail for a year, was brought from Robben Island to become No. 1 Accused. Alongside him sat the other pioneers of the new underground—Sisulu, Mbeki, Kathrada and others. It was a time of high drama; the state was claiming that the so-called 'National High Command' had been captured, Umkhonto's plans and materials seized, guerrilla warfare preparations disrupted.

But how were people to understand all this? What underground was this, with its unheard of 'National High Command'? What, for that matter, was Umkhonto, known more through vague rumour than by any hard information? Umkhonto and its acts of sabotage had been almost blacked out by press censorship, and by policemen tearing down posters and proclamations before the glue could dry. What was Umkhonto up to? And what was the ANC role in all of this? Whose guerrilla force was being assembled? And to what end? Was this trial in truth the end of the new underground fight back?

It was expected by the state that the accused, facing a death sentence, would deny the allegations and try to prove they were 'not guilty.' It was with that expectation in mind that the prosecution entered the court. But they had not yet begun to understand the new spirit of resistance, or the people who were campaigning for it and living it. Each of the accused stated simply: *'I am not guilty. It is the state which is guilty.'* Even then the prosecution did not under-



*Comrade Nelson Mandela in Addis Ababa
1962.*

stand. There was a massive recital of state evidence of sabotage, of men sent abroad for military training, of formation of embryo guerrilla units; and then it was time for the defence and for Accused No. One, Nelson Mandela.

22 Again, in full presence of the world's press and radio, he returned to the challenge.

From the dock of the court, he announced: *'I did it. I helped form Umkhonto. I went abroad and arranged for military training for our volunteers. I did it. I am proud and glad I did it. If I had my time over I would do it again. I have lived for liberation,'* he told the court, *'and if need be I am willing to die for it.'* The challenge of the new resistance was

complete. The challenge of armed struggle to overthrow the state was in the open, acknowledged and endorsed by the leadership of the ANC. The new era of violent struggle, illegal struggle, was truly and publicly launched.

And as in so many steps leading to it, Mandela had been the public spokesman, the pioneer—leading not by word alone but by example. It is that example which has made him truly the man of the South African resistance movement, the symbol and the spearhead of the freedom struggle.

It is twenty years since Mandela's arrest and 19 since the arrests at Rivonia. It would be appropriate at this time to review the whole affair, the whole trial and its significance. That is not the purpose of this article. But to leave the record merely as it is summarised above is not enough. There are many other aspects that need to be considered.

Why, it is sometimes asked, did Mandela make his statement from the dock, where he could not be cross-examined, rather than face it out from the witness box? Was he trying to avoid cross-examination? Yes, he was. Not to conceal the facts or to deny his part in the acts charged. All this was admitted and explained, defended on grounds of politics and morality—not of law. But neither for him, nor for his fellow accused, was the chief issue the court's decision on their guilt or their innocence, their conviction or discharge. The real issue was that the new resistance of Umkhonto, the new challenging struggle with illegal use of arms should be explained to the people, broadcast, defended. The trial must become an indictment of the state, and a manifesto of the resistance struggle; it must be a call to the people to rise and fight back!

Such a manifesto, they all believed, could only be obscured, distorted and its message lost if it was to be dragged out piecemeal through the halting, fumbling, impromptu question-and-answer of the witness box. The manifesto had to be delivered clearly, without incoherences and unclarities. It must then be delivered uninterrupted from the dock. And the man to deliver was, as always, this pioneer of the new phase of history, Nelson Mandela—first among equals.

Mandela proclaimed Umkhonto's manifesto from the dock. But by agreement Sisulu and Mbeki sought the frontal confrontation with the state from the witness box. Sisulu's was a classic confrontation between a white prosecutor representing the white police state and a black ANC activist for the majority of the people. On the prosecution side, a string of university degrees; on the people's side a man badly schooled, mainly self educated, carrying a sense of purpose and conviction, of dedication to a just cause. It was a battle of character and of principles; and after more than a week in the witness box, Sisulu's moral triumph was complete. Day by day the prosecution and the spectre of the state behind it seemed to shrink and diminish; Sisulu, Umkhonto and the ANC to grow and grow. The new resistance had come of age, and the Rivonia Trial was the forum of the public recognition of that fact.

From that time there has been no going back. The people had been made aware of what was being done by the ANC and Umkhonto and why; their support has grown from year to year; today no-one dare doubt that the new resistance led by the ANC, backed by its armed units of Umkhonto is truly the people's shield and spearhead. The challenge to white supremacy is now out in the streets, everywhere amongst the people. We are fighting back! Not only in the public arena, but from underground. Not just in the ways legally permitted by the state, but by illegal means; not just peacefully, but in arms. That is a message which the people of our country hear now, loud and clear.

And when they hear it, old men and young will recall that it was Mandela and his colleagues who pioneered it, and laid their lives on the line to do so. This is why, when they now urge 'Amandla! Power! in our lifetime' they remember and pay tribute to Nelson Mandela—the inspiration, the symbol and the power.

'The spectre of large-scale conventional attacks against independent Africa is a development of the most grave concern'

A *Sechaba* correspondent looks at the racist regime's build-up of a conventional military strike force

Ever since its inception the apartheid state has attempted to rationalise its actions through the argument that the primary threat facing its existence has nothing to do with the political, economic and social conditions in South Africa but comes from an external source - foreign aggression in the form of 'international communism'. The aim of this argument is twofold. Firstly it supposedly legitimises the actions of the most brutal and oppressive regime currently in existence. Secondly it attempts, in the most simplistic form, to reduce every issue into a global east-west context. Statements to the effect that the apartheid state is the world's bastion of 'christian civilisation' are common and are reflected in the regime's recently published 1982 White Paper on Defence: "The establishment of Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique as Marxist satellites has completed the link between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and this leaves the Republic of South Africa as the last stronghold of the West in Africa."

Frontline States and the White Republic

This argument is now being taken a step further. According to numerous statements now being made by Minister of Defence General Malan and the chiefs of the armed forces, the independent states of Southern Africa today pose a conventional military threat to the white Republic. In the preface

to the 1982 White Paper, Malan states that it is "alarming that more and more sophisticated armaments are pouring into neighbouring countries" and that "serious consideration should now be given to the possibility of conventional warfare". What the military establishment is suggesting is that the front line states are preparing for a large scale invasion of South Africa.

That the independent states of southern Africa are in the process of building and strengthening their armed forces is obvious. A huge area of southern Angola is presently under South African military occupation and aggressive raids deep into the territory are a daily occurrence. Mozambique is presently fighting a war against South African trained, armed, supplied and led bandits. The governments of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Lesotho are aware of large numbers of their nationals currently being trained by the apartheid armed forces. The apartheid regime is waging an advanced unconventional war against these states and they are being forced to divert resources badly needed for economic development into their defence against racist aggression.

A clear example of the real situation surfaced in August last year in the days leading up to the South African Defence Force's (SADF) largest ever single attack on Angola. In its efforts to halt daily South African Air Force raids deep into Angola, the Angolan armed forces installed

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sophisticated surface-to-air missiles in their towns of Mocamedes and Lubango. These weapon systems had no possible role other than defending the air space in the vicinity of these towns. To the SADF, however, the introduction of these installations represented a major escalation in aggression against South Africa. When releasing news of this latest 'threat', General Malan stated that it was imperative "that we intensify our defence in South West Africa so as not to be caught unawares, should the situation escalate through direct aggressive intervention by Angolan forces or Cubans". Two weeks later over 10,000 South African troops invaded Angola.


Racist call for escalated aggression

The apartheid regime's aggressive actions and intentions in Southern Africa are a matter of fact. What is also on record is

that the regime's propaganda surrounding its actions reflects the exact opposite of the actual situation. The chilling reality is that the current rhetoric about the conventional military threat facing South Africa is in fact a rallying call for escalated aggression against the front line states on an unprecedented level. The evidence that is coming to light is alarming.

The majority of the apartheid armed forces, both military and police, are trained, organised and deployed for unconventional warfare. The maintenance of 'internal security' and counter-insurgency operations against mass-based political and armed struggle are, and will always be, the necessities for the maintenance of minority rule in both Namibia and South Africa. Since 1974, however, the SADF has been building up a conventional military force.

What does the SADF mean by



conventional war? The only published definition, given by the officer commanding the South African Defence College, is enlightening. He defines conventional war as "war in which large-organised bodies of men equipped with artillery, armoured vehicles and heavy infantry weapons and supported by air and naval forces operate in the fashion of the Six-Day and Yom Kippur Wars." (The apartheid generals' public admiration for Zionist expansionism and aggression is a reflection of the real military ties that exist between the two regimes.)

The rationale for the build-up of conventional forces was coyly spelt out in the 1977 White Paper on Defence: "As a counter to the possibility of an attack against the RSA by conventional forces it is considered that a credible deterrent is the best means of discouraging such intention on the part of any potential aggressor." The 'credible deterrent' is defined in SADF doctrine as the ability to carry out pre-emptive action. Commenting on the above 1977 quote, the SA Defence College commander elaborated as follows: "There are some shortcomings in the SADF which could affect the ability of the RSA to carry out pre-emptive action. If the SADF is compared to possible aggressors these shortcomings are, however, more of a theoretical nature than actual. The SADF has in the African context a very decided offensive capability."

Apartheid's conventional war machine

This offensive capability is currently primarily carried out by the South African Air Force and relatively small but highly trained army special-force units. It is clear, however, that this role is soon to be taken over by the apartheid armed forces' conventional war machine.


1 SA Corps is the SADF's conventional formation. It consists of the 7th Infantry Division and the 8th Armoured Division. Each division comprises three brigades, approximately 7,000 troops in each brigade. Of the six brigades, one is armoured, one mechanised and four motorised. The

motorised brigades have recently been upgraded to 'semi-mechanised' status. (The distinction between types of brigades lies in their relative strength of heavy armour and artillery). These formations are composed of Citizen Force (part-time) units under Permanent Force leadership. Each brigade is currently mobilised at least once a year for training at battalion, brigade and division level. Their training takes place in the North West Cape at one of the SADF's largest bases which has been specifically built for their exclusive use. Large-scale field exercises regularly take place in an adjacent training area of almost 3,000 square kilometers.

When 1 SA Corps was established in 1974, units that fell under its command, while officially redesignated as conventional units, continued to be deployed in counter-insurgency (unconventional) operations. Operational conditions meant that these troops were indispensable and couldn't be withdrawn from the battle field. Today, however, when the SADF's manpower requirements are even more desperate, these troops have been withdrawn from counter-insurgency operations. What this means is that despite the SADF's current operational shortages, 40,000 troops are being maintained in a permanent state of semi-mobilisation for conventional operations alone. As explained above the SADF has no need whatsoever for conventional formations either in its military occupation of Namibia, or in its escalating operations in South Africa itself. 1 SA Corps has become the standard bearer of the apartheid regime's 'credible deterrent', the SADF's external strike force.

The Military-Industrial Complex

A further insight into the conventional build-up can be gained from a brief inspection of the regime's military-industrial complex. Over the past two decades the apartheid state has built from scratch the largest armaments industry in the southern hemisphere. Armscor, the state-owned section of this military-industrial complex, with assets of over R1 200 million is now



SA army headquarters in Windhoek, Namibia

rated second only to Barlow Rand (itself a major arms producer) among the country's industrial giants. With over R1 000 million being spent on armaments annually in recent years, Armscor has reached the stage of being self-sufficient in counter-insurgency weapons requirements as well as having completed its programme of intensive capital development to provide all the plants required for armaments manufacture.

It could thus be expected that weapons spending would now no longer require the massive annual boost in budget increases. In theory the industry needs only to 'tick over' to supply the armed forces with their basic requirements. This however, is not the case. Even greater amounts are being churned into the industry. According to the generals this continued increase is required for the development and manu-

facture of more sophisticated conventional weapons. An unconfirmed report from within Armscor claims that the arms industry is presently engaged in a five-year plan, culminating in about 1986, geared specifically to the requirements of maintaining a large conventional force in an extended operation.

Poised to attack

To date the apartheid generals have never admitted the deployment of any section of 1 SA Corps. Certain facts, however, can be pieced together. In February 1980 a deserter from the SADF revealed that 81 Armoured Brigade, the most heavily armed of 1 SA Corp's formations (including two tank battalions), had been put on top security standby in the days leading up to the

historic elections in Zimbabwe. The evidence clearly indicated that the SADF was prepared for a possible military intervention in the event of 'favourable international conditions' which never materialised.

In August 1981 two brigades, including 81 Brigade, were involved in Operation Protea striking deep into Angola in the largest military operation that has ever been conducted on southern African soil (twice the size of the 1975/6 invasion into Angola). Only one third of the SADF's conventional capacity was deployed in this blitzkrieg.

It has taken 7 years for 1 SA Corps to be built up to full operational strength and readiness. It is now an army in itself, standing poised to strike out at the African

sub-continent. Its intended role has further been coloured by recent unconfirmed reports that senior military officers in the apartheid war machine are currently receiving advanced training in the military administration of conventionally occupied territory.

The apartheid armed forces currently deployed throughout Southern Africa themselves represent a serious threat to world peace. The spectre of large scale conventional attacks against independent states that now looms on the horizon is a development of the most grave concern. A necessary condition for peace in southern African is the total destruction of the fascist war machine.

Building solidarity with the women of Namibia and South Africa

by ANC delegate

Mobilised by the suffering created by apartheid policies and aggression in Southern Africa, and inspired by the courageous and determined resistance of the women of South Africa and Namibia, delegations from many countries met in Brussels from May 17-19 1982, to promote world wide assistance for the women and children of Southern Africa.

Governments, international agencies, non governmental organisations, trade Unions, church groups, and solidarity movements met with the liberation movements in the European Parliament at the International Conference on Women and Apartheid sponsored by the UN Special Committee against Apartheid in co-operat-

ion with the International Committee of Solidarity with the Struggle of Women of South Africa and Namibia.

H. E. Madame Jeanne-Martin Cisse, Guinea Minister of Social Affairs presided over a distinguished gathering which in addition to the members of the International Committee included UN Assistant Secretary General Leticia Shahani; HE Lise Ostergaard, president of the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women. H.E. Gisele Rabesahala, Minister of Culture and Revolutionary Arts of Madagascar; H.E. Yvette Roudy French Minister of Woman's Rights; Marie Eugenia Neto of Angola; and Mrs N.K. Asinobi, Nigerian Minister of State.



Solidarity meeting at the conference, from l to r, Comdes P. Appolus, Deputy secretary general of the Pan-African Women's Organisation; Gloria Mtungwa, ANC delegate and Gertrude Shope, head of the Women's Secretariat of the ANC.

The ANC delegation of six members was led by Comrade Gertrude Shope, member of the NEC and Head of the Women's Secretariat. The delegation presented a number of papers on the conditions of women in urban and rural areas, on the present situation in South Africa and the participation of women in the liberation struggle, and the effects of militarisation and nuclearisation of racist South Africa. Four members of the delegation: Comrades Joyce Boom, Joyce Dipale, Gloria Mtungwa and Violet Weinberg gave testimony on their experiences in the struggle and torture in prison.

In addressing the plenary session, Comrade Gertrude Shope drew attention to the conditions of war that now prevailed in Southern Africa, and said that the condition of women and children, and their

needs must be examined in this context: In its report the Conference agreed with the ANC assessment, that the suffering of women of Southern Africa is caused by apartheid and Pretoria's aggression and terrorism and concluded:

'This suffering cannot be ended without the independence of Namibia, the total elimination of apartheid, and the establishment of a democratic non-racial South Africa. So long as apartheid persists, the violence and conflict in Southern Africa will continue to escalate.'

The conference had before it the report of a Mission, headed by Madame Jeanne-Martin Cisse, which had visited the Frontline states for consultations with governments and liberation movements and to assess the needs of the women and children.

In Angola the Mission was able to see at first-hand the magnitude of the problems created by the constant and continuous acts of aggression by the racist regime. The latest invasion and occupation of parts of the southern region of Angola bordering on Namibia had resulted in an influx of dis-



ANC delegation in the foreground of the Conference.

placed persons from the southern provinces towards the north. These displaced persons, many of whom are women, children and elderly required emergency relief in terms of food, clothing, shelter and general medical assistance. The Mission was told that the flood of refugees from the south has had a great impact on the social and economic life of the inhabitants of the area, thus aggravating the already critical situation created by the influx of refugees from Namibia.

The Angolan Minister for External Relations, Comrade Paulo Jorge, told the Mission that the damage and destruction caused by the racist aggression in the period 1975-80 was estimated at US 7 billion dollars. To this figure must be added all the social and human losses which could not be measured in monetary terms. These include the forced displacement of people in affected areas, the interruption of education, unemployment caused by the destruction of means of production, inevitable deficiencies in social services in affected areas,

unfinished projects and other social and economic programmes in these areas with the consequent repercussions on the national economy as a whole. The Minister added, that the escalation of aggression had forced the Government to allocate more resources to the defence of its borders and sovereignty to the detriment of the country's economic development.

In Lusaka the Mission met with the leaders of the ANC Womens Secretariat. Comrade Florence Mophosho explained the heavy responsibility the ANC had shouldered in looking after the growing number of people who had taken refuge in the Frontline states as a result of the increasingly barbarous repression in South Africa. To meet these problems, the ANC had begun self reliance projects in the various centres where these people had taken shelter.

The Mission visited the ANC farm project outside Lusaka, and in Tanzania they visited the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College and the Charlotte Maxeke creche and children's centre. The Missions report states that it was impressed by the organisational efficiency, discipline and the ex-

tent of self sufficiency in various fields (carpentry, architectural unit, teachers training department and agricultural projects) at these centres.

Among the projects which the ANC is currently seeking support are establishment of bakeries, a garment factory, a weaving shop and craft training centres as well as club houses for the Masupatsela (Pioneers), and educational, vocational and technical training for women.

Having considered the various proposals for assistance and support the Conference stressed the importance of mobilising support not only from governments but from popular mass organisations. Trade Unions have a special concern and responsibility as the struggle in South Africa and Namibia is mainly a struggle of working people. The Womens section of trade union, in particular, should do their utmost to publicise the dispossession and humiliation of working women in South Africa and Namibia, and the inhuman persecution of women trade unionists. All non-governmental organisations should not only promote public action in solidarity with the oppressed women of Southern Africa, but should exert maximum influence on the governments to act.

Throughout the conference reference was made to the necessity of mobilising womens organisations to provide material assistance and solidarity. It was considered that such assistance would not only alleviate in a concrete way the suffering of women and children and provide moral support, but would lead women to a better understanding of the situation and to a greater involvement in the struggle against apartheid.

The failure of the mass media particularly in some western countries to give publicity to the shocking crimes against

women and children committed by the apartheid regime and to the heroic resistance of the women was deplored. Several specific proposals designed to promote publicity and knowledge of the situation were put forward. These include a request to the UN, UNESCO and other organisations to prepare educational materials for schools, the production of films, exhibitions and other audio and visual material, and the organisation of national and international essay competitions. Assistance to the liberation movements in their own propaganda was also recommended.

Whilst concerned primarily to consider the promotion of assistance to the women and children in Southern Africa the Conference did not ignore the political reality. The conclusion was unambiguous:

The international community can most effectively contribute to the struggle for liberation of South Africa and Namibia by imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the Pretoria regime under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including a cessation of military and nuclear collaboration an oil embargo and an end to trade and investments in South Africa.

The governments which have not implemented the UN resolutions should be pressed to do so, and to end all collaboration with apartheid.

Governments which are unwilling to take action in the absence of mandatory decisions by the UN Security Council which continue to be blocked by vetoes of Western Powers should be persuaded to take unilateral action.

Organisations committed to freedom can and should take active measures.

In this respect they should, in particular, mobilize public opinion and publish the votes and records of their government.

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SUPPORT SWAPO OF NAMIBIA



Fight to free Ya Toivo

Dairymen on strike



Dairy workers on strike in Johannesburg

regime. The problem facing the genuine trade unions in South Africa is how to respond to changing labour legislation so as to ensure that they organise in this way.

The new situation

Under the Labour Relations Amendment Act, the controls which went with registration have been extended to all unions. The regime realised that any definition of a union which placed restrictions on membership would exclude the very organisations it is seeking to coopt, from the category 'union' and thus these unions would still fall beyond the regime's control. For this reason, the words restricting membership of unions to particular racial groups and to workers with 'residence rights' have been removed. In practice the pass laws and the vast network of security laws will continue to be used to weaken the militant unions.

Now, all unions can register. For what reasons, given that controls are extended to all unions, is the distinction between registered and unregistered unions made? The regime is conscious that whatever controls are extended over unions, the problem (of the regime) of strong democratic shop-floor organisation still remains. It is this organisation which the regime seeks to undermine through the Industrial Council system.

In SACTU's memorandum to the International Labour Office (ILO) meeting, held in Geneva in June 1982, Comrade John Gaetsewe, SACTU General Secretary, says: 'At the core of the official bargaining lies the Industrial Councils. These Councils constitute the basic organisational foundation of the anti-worker, inter-class collaboration strategy introduced by the Industrial Conciliation Act. The Industrial Coun-

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