

social effects of twenty years of development, this base was essentially proletarian in character. The process of proletarianisation was accompanied by the growth of an increasingly militant proletarian opposition which effectively questioned the structure of the system of exploitation, culminating in the 1946 strike — the severest challenge the system had received. The violent response of the state indicated that neither the ANC's constitutionalism nor the 'economic' opposition of the trade unions could confront it successfully on their own, pointing to the need for a united political movement. Thereafter proletarian opposition was channelled into the ANC which was itself transformed by its new class base, and emerged from the 1940s with a character very different from that with which it entered the decade. The trade union movement generated a class consciousness into which Congress could drop its roots, finally giving itself a secure political base, and which reacted in turn on the growing national consciousness propagated by the Youth League, raising it to a higher pitch. The 'African nationalism' and the goals expressed in the *Freedom Charter* of 1955 were very different in tone from the anti-socialist, individualist 'Africanism' of the original CYL Manifesto and early policy statements. Not only were they considerably more radical, displaying an enhanced concern with the material position of the proletariat, but they showed an increasing awareness of the role of the capitalist mode of production in itself producing and reproducing the system of exploitation. Yet by the time the ANC emerged at the head of a non-racial mass movement in the 1950s, the state was in the hands of another class alliance born out of the same structural changes, determined to maintain the high rate of capital accumulation in order to consolidate Afrikaner capital, and suppress or shift the contradictions in the system of exploitation through repression. Fully aware of the dangers of United African political and economic mobilisation, it acted ruthlessly to suppress them. The 1950s saw many legislative attacks on these organisations, Congress leaders restricted, and trade union officials removed from office. Finally, on 8 April 1960, the ANC was declared an unlawful organisation and forced underground. Ill-prepared for the sudden shift from a highly visible legal movement to a clandestine organisation, it suffered many defeats during the following decade and now operates largely as an exile movement.

NOTES

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1. For the debate on this issue, see, e.g., the proceedings of the Conference on the South African Economy and the Future of Apartheid, University of York, 30 March-1 April 1973.
2. This redistributive function of the state is discussed by David Kaplan, 'Class and State in South African Development. Some Preliminary Remarks', paper presented to the Conference on the State, University of Sussex, 14-16 June 1974.
3. This is an oversimplified outline of a theoretical formulation in H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid', 1 *Economy and Society* (1972).
4. See Colin Bundy, 'The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry', 71 *African Affairs* (1972), 369-88.
5. *Report of the Native Economic Commission 1930-1932* (UG 22/1932), paras. 69-73 *et passim*. All official reports on the Reserves stress these problems. For fairly detailed evidence, see *Report of the Witwatersrand Mine Native Wages Commission* (UG 21/1974, paras 114-238. See also Bundy, *op. cit.*, 384-7.
6. *Union Statistics for Fifty Years* (Pretoria, 1960), S-3. Unless otherwise noted, the statistics throughout this paper are drawn from this source. Until 1961 the South African £ = £ Sterling.
7. *Report of the Department of Labour . . . 1940* (UG 45/1941), 8. At its height, the poor white problem affected more than a sixth of the white population.
8. All contemporary Nationalist publications stress the need to prevent class mobilisation. Special organisations were set up to woo Afrikaner workers into the bosom of the volk, e.g. *Die Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond* and *Die Nasionale Raad van Trusteers*.
9. *Native Laws Commission of Enquiry 1946-8* (UG 28/1948), paras 18-28.
10. D. Hobart Houghton, in *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Vol II (Oxford, 1971), 34.
11. 'Possession' is used not to connote ownership but the capacity to put the means of production into operation.
12. UG 28/1948, paras 18-28, and UG 21/1944, paras 125, 212, 217 & 220.
13. *Ibid.*, Table XXXI, 20. Also W. F. J. Steenkamp, 'Bantu Wages in South Africa', 30 *South African Journal of Economics* (1962), 96. The ratio of South African to 'foreign' labour remained virtually constant between 1933 and 1941, declining only after 1942.
14. See G. Arrighi, 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianisation of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia', 6 *Journal of Development Studies* (1970), 197-234.
15. *Union Statistics*. The rise between 1921 and 1936 reflects state policy to return unemployed Africans to the Reserves in the depression.

16. In his *An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa* (New Haven, 1965). Leo Kuper erroneously equates the bourgeoisie (those who own the means of production and employ labour for profit) with fractions of the petty bourgeoisie (either employers who themselves provide part of the manual labour, or professional, administrative and other 'non-productive' workers, sometimes called 'the middle class'). On this point, see N. Poulantzas, 'On Social Classes' 78 *New Left Review* (1973), 37-9. While the African petty bourgeoisie may have been an aspirant bourgeoisie, their position vis-à-vis the South African bourgeoisie and the state differed from the usual clientelist relationship.
17. *Union Statistics*. Includes traders; professional, technical and related workers; managers, administrators and officials; and clerical and related workers.
18. K. Marx, *Capital* Vol I (London, 1970), 714. Italics added.
19. Steenkamp, *op. cit.* The post-1941 rise in industrial wages is explained below.
20. This is not to dismiss peasant protest. The primary thrust of African opposition, 1936-48, however, was proletarian. The important peasant revolts of the 1950s occurred after a new alignment of class forces had gained power and attempted to modify the system of exploitation.
21. D. O'Meara, 'Class and Nationalism in African Resistance: Secondary Industrialisation and the Development of a Mass Movement in South Africa 1930-50', unpublished MA Dissertation, University of Sussex 1973.
22. On the ANC 1912-52, see P. Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa* (London, 1970), and H. J. & R. E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950* (Harmondsworth, 1969).
23. The Industrial Legislation Commission claimed CNETU's figures were 'inflated', without disputing its very large membership in 1945, UG 62/1951, para 1534. See also para 1468; M. Horrell *South African Trade Unionism* (Johannesburg, 1961), 69; and H. G. Ringrose, 'Trade Unions in Natal', 18 *South African Journal of Economics* (1950), 271 and 283.
24. *Ibid.*; Simons, *op. cit.*, *passim*; and E. Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope* (Madison, 1964), *passim*.
25. Official statistics on industrial disputes do not differentiate between Africans, Coloured, and Asians.
26. These strikes were difficult to sustain, however. Unskilled African labour could be rapidly replaced and unions operated under severe financial restraints. Unless demands were met quickly strikers were usually forced to return to work or the Reserves. Thus, while total man-day loss in 'non-white' strikes consistently exceeds that of whites, the average per striker is lower.
27. *Department of Labour - Summarised Report 1944*, para 12; 7 *Race Relations News*, 2; UG 9/1947, 19.
28. *Report of Department of Labour . . . 1957* (UG 29/1958), 36. Previously African unions had applied successfully to the board in only three instances.
29. A. M. K. M. Spandau, 'Income Distribution and Economic Growth in South Africa', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of South Africa, 1971, Vol I, Table 47(b). Spandau's figures are based on Steenkamp, *op. cit.*, but begin earlier. Stimulated by the war-time shortage of skilled labour, the racial earnings gap temporarily narrowed in 1942-45 for the first and only time.

30. 9 *Race Relations Journal* (1942), 116.
31. Though with an officially estimated membership of 146,000 in 1927 (Official Yearbook No. 11 1928-29 — probably an over-estimation), the ICU was a disorganised, amorphous, largely rural, mass protest movement rather than a trade union in the accepted sense. Lacking organised roots amongst workers, confused over its aims, battered by ideological and personal leadership splits, and attacked by the state, it disintegrated in 1928-30.
32. *Guardian*, 5 June 1941, and *Race Relations News* (1941), 7.
33. Simons, *op. cit.*, 570.
34. *Inkululeko*, 10 July 1943.
35. *Report of the Witwatersrand Mine Native Wages Commission on the Remuneration and Conditions of Employment of Natives on Witwatersrand Gold Mines . . . 1943* (UG 21/1944).
36. *Ibid.*, para 99.
37. See F. A. Johnstone, 'Class Conflict and Colour Bars in the South African Goldmining Industry, 1910-1926', Institute of Commonwealth Studies University of London, Collected Seminar Papers No. 10, *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (1970) 112-26. Also *Landsdown Report, Table XXXI*.
38. *Ibid.*, para 65. 98 per cent were migrants. The fall in African mine labour in 1942 reflected the enlistment of over 100,000 Africans from South Africa and the High Commission Territories for military service. Hereafter, the 'foreign' labour ratio rose rapidly.
39. *Ibid.*, paras 80-82, Table IV, 87-88, and 238.
40. *Ibid.*, paras 201 and 203, and Appendix I.
41. Compiled from *ibid.*, Tables XXVII-XXX.
42. Chamber, quoted *ibid.*, para 110. This 'period of grace' was eight months for Mozambiqueans and twelve months for 'tropicals'.
43. Transvaal Chamber of Mines (TCM), *Fifty-Eighth Annual Report, Year 1947*, 64.
44. *Landsown Report*, paras 211-2, 287-317, 320-23, 466-67. Italics added.
45. TCM, *Fifty-Fifth Annual Report 1944*, 25.
46. *Inkululeko*, 26 August 1944.
47. Quoted in 'Report of the Trial of Communist Leaders in South Africa', *Freedom* (Double No 1 & 2), April 1947, 15. For Chamber policy on African trade unionism see its *Tribal Natives and Trade Unionism* (Johannesburg, November 1946).
48. Marks, quoted in Simons, *op. cit.*, 572; M. Benson, *Struggle for a Birthright* (Harmondsworth, 1966), 98; *Inkululeko*, 10 March 1945, 9 June 1945.
49. *Ibid.*, 28 January 1946; 28 July 1945; and 11 March 1946.
50. *Guardian*, 25 April 1946; *Inkululeko*, First Issue June 1946. *Freedom*, *op. cit.*, 30 and 10.
51. *Inkululeko*, No 99, August 1946; *Die Transvaler*, 13 August 1946; *The Star*, 12 August 1946; *Department of Labour Report 1946* (UG 62/1948); TCM, *Fifty-Seventh Annual Report, Year 1946*, 26.
52. Simons, *op. cit.*, 575; *The Star and Die Transvaler* 16 August 1946 and 12-15

August 1946; TCM, *Monthly Analysis of Gold Production in the Transvaal*, July and August 1946; *Annual Report*, 113.

53. Details from: *Inkululeko*, No 99 *Star* and *Die Transvaler*, 12-17 August 1946; *Freedom*, *op. cit.* and Vol V, 5, October-November 1946.

54. TCM: *Proceedings at the Special Meeting Held in Johannesburg, Friday 25th October 1946*; *Tribal Natives and Trade Unionism*; *Gold Mining Taxation*, PRD Series No 1, 1945; *The Native Workers on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines*; PRD Series No 7 (1947); *Native Laws Commission of Enquiry: Statements of Evidence submitted by the Gold Producers Committee* (Johannesburg, April 1947).

55. *The Present Economic Position of the Union* (Johannesburg, 1949), 11-12, and *The South African Economy and Future Policy* (1949), 8.

56. *Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Social, Health and Economic Conditions of the Urban Natives* (Pretoria, 1942), paras 37-39, 47-48, 305-06 and 423.

57. UG 65/1948, paras 1803, 1822, 1854-57 and 1869.

58. *Report of the Native Laws Commission of Enquiry 1946-48* (UG 28/1948), paras 18-28, and 61.

59. *Department of Labour Reports 1945* (UG 9/1947), 8, and 1947 (UG 38/1949), 20-21.

60. S. Van Wyk, *Die Afrikaner in die Beroepslewe van die Stad* (Pretoria, 1968), 207-10; *STATS*, 15 December 1968; B. Bunting, *The Rise of the South African Reich* (Harmondsworth, 1969), 378; and *Union Statistics*. . . S-3.

61. E. P. Du Plessis, 'n *Volk Staas Op* (Pretoria, 1964). The use of the term 'Afrikaner Capital' is not to introduce 'Ethnic' analysis, but points to a fraction of the bourgeoisie (in 1946 largely an aspirant bourgeoisie) which self-consciously maintained a temporary exclusivity as a strategy both of accumulation and to undermine the metropolitan oriented fraction(s).

62. This is not to argue that they favoured unaltered retention of labour in the face of the dissolution of its economic base but that labour controls were to be extended to maintain a high rate of exploitation. Apartheid is best explained as the attempt by these groups to retain a system of cheap labour in a different form. See Wolpe, *op. cit.*

63. *Die Transvaler*, 13 August 1946, on the strike, and 21 April 1948 for the NP election manifesto written by Dr Malan, entitled 'Waarheen Suid Afrika. Allesoorheesende Kleurevraagstuk sal die toekoms bepaal' (Whither South Africa. The all embracing colour question will determine the future).

64. UG 62/1951, paras 1491-1500. The strike and the failure of CNETU's 'general strike' broke the Council's back. Many of its leaders were prosecuted and moved into the political arena. The African Trade Union Movement did not pick up again until the emergence of the non-racial South African Congress of Trade Unions in the 1950s. see Horrell, *op. cit.*

65. Walshe, *op. cit.*, 402-03.

PART V:

Monopoly Capitalism in the Apartheid Era, 1948-1980

Introduction

In the immediate post-World War II era, the manufacturing sector in South Africa expanded greatly, in part due to the stimulus provided by the Allied war effort and in part the result of massive foreign investments. During World War II, black workers had flocked to the principal urban industrial areas. Despite the protestations of mining and agricultural capital about labour shortages, the state administration turned a blind eye as "shanty towns" sprang up everywhere and urbanized black workers were "promoted" to semi-skilled positions that had previously been the exclusive preserve of white wage-earners. According to Davies and Kaplan,

It was evidence that in the post-war period there would be strong demands for a vigorous state policy designed to restructure the relations of exploitation. White agriculture was particularly vociferous in its demand that something be done to eliminate its labour shortage and White wage-earners were fearful that their privileged positions were being infiltrated by Blacks. Industry, on the other hand, was taking advantage of lower Black wages and was hence desirous of some easing of the restriction in the employment of Black labour even indicating a willingness to a very limited recognition of Black trade unions which had enjoyed considerable growth during the war and immediate post-war periods. Thus, the demands of "White Society," the different capitalist classes and White labour, revealed some degree of contradiction over the precise nature and form of the exploitation of Black labour.¹

Put bluntly, the ruling United Party was divided over how to solve

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