

BACKGROUND TO THE "END CONSCRIPTION" CAMPAIGN. (ITEM 1 OF THE MINUTES)

There has been disappointment in, and rejection by the Churches of the 1983 amendments to the Defence Act which allow alternative service only to objectors who are religious pacifists. All other conscientious objectors will be sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

The Prime Minister consistently linked conscription of coloured and indian men to the inclusion of the coloured and indian communities in the Parliament set up under the 1983 Constitution Act. It seems inevitable that conscription for these groups will be gradually introduced.

South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal and when the Namibia question is settled the need for a massive military establishment in South Africa will be a direct consequence of the failure of the S.A. government to find political solution to political problems and to provide justice for all the people of this country. The war fought here will be a civil war.

These facts are grounds for many to object in conscience to fighting in the S.A.D.F.

For all these reasons the Black Sash decided at its 1983 National Conference to call for an end to all military conscription in South Africa. This call has been taken up by the Conscientious Objectors' Support Groups, some student organisations and some Church Organisations. Joint Working groups have been set up in Cape Town, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. More Church involvement is needed and it is hoped that Church assemblies and synods will eventually pass resolutions calling for an end to conscription. Much preparatory work needs to be done in the field of public education on the issue.

Justice and Reconciliation and Boards of Social Responsibility are urged by the Provincial Board of Justice and Reconciliation to involve themselves in this work. Some material is enclosed for your information.



# *The Process of Militarization of the South African State*

Since the late 60's the influence of the military on the State and on society has increased. This process of militarization has come to be seen as an acceptable and necessary solution to this country's problems. We therefore see an increasing influence of the military over political, social, educational and economic affairs of the state - one which is likely to grow as the struggle between the people and those in power intensifies.

## **The Growth of the Military and its Influence on the State**

The growth of the SADF occurred directly alongside the growth of the resistance movements. Thus in 1961, the year the armed struggle was launched, Defence Minister, Jim Fouché called on all white mothers "to give up their sons in defence of their land." In the four year period which followed, the defence budget increased by over 5 times so that by 1964/5 it was 21 percent of the total budget.

With the advent of liberation struggles throughout Southern Africa, the ballot system was insufficient to cope with the growing threat. So in 1967 universal conscription was introduced for all white males between the ages of 17 and 65 years.

Up until the late 1960's the SAP remained the major security force patrolling the South African and Namibian borders. However by the early 1970's it became clear that the SAP could not cope, so the transfer of control in Northern Namibia shifted to the SADF and was completed by June 1974. The SAP then patrolled the S.A. border and took responsibility for the growing internal conflict. Some units of the SAP were seconded to the SADF eg: Koevoet.

The victories of Frelimo in Mozambique (1975) and the MPLA in Angola (1975) were significant for they provided SWAPO, the ANC, ZANU, and ZAPU with inspiration and encouragement. In particular the defeat of the SADF by the MPLA in Angola in 1975, was partly instrumental in raising the political consciousness of many oppressed people in S.A. The country-wide resistance which began on June 16, 1976 was influenced by this defeat. Perhaps more importantly the MPLA and Frelimo victories offered the possibility of support for SWAPO and the ANC. These factors lead the government to increase the length of national service for all conscripts.

The nature of the "current" crisis" and in particular the changing balance of forces in Southern Africa necessitated a rapid expansion in the size and operational role of the SADF. The rise to power of the Minister of Defence,



(P.W.Botha) to premiership should not be underestimated. This process was seminal in strengthening the hand of the military and in institutionalizing its role within the Executive. Power has become centralized directly under the Prime Minister, with the Cabinet's role in decision making being reduced. Most of its functions have been assumed by six Cabinet Committees (State Security, Finance, Economics, Internal Affairs, Welfare and Legislation and Parliamentary Affairs.) which are answerable only to the Prime Minister. These committees are composed of the respective Cabinet ministers and an unspecified number of the Prime Minister's appointees including military officers and business men.

## The State Security Council

This council exists both as a Cabinet Committee and as a separate security council effectively above the Cabinet Committees. It has become the most influential body in political decision making. Since 1977 it has been responsible for co-ordinating all areas of State policy and since 1979 it has been responsible for planning, giving directives to and co-ordinating the activities of fifteen interdepartmental committees. In addition military advisors sit on all fifteen interdepartmental committees and on most public commissions, eg: Wiehan Commission. The militarization of the State is further indicated by the placement of military personnel in a number of key positions, eg: former Defence Minister P.W. Botha now Prime Minister.

former Chief of SADF, Magnus Malan, now minister of Defence.

former deputy minister of Defence, Koble Coetzee, now minister of Justice,

The country has been divided into nine military regions, each under the control of military advisors.

## 'Total Onslaught' and 'Total Strategy'

Together with the rise to power of the military in the Government, has been the development of the "Total Strategy" ideology.

According to "Total Strategy" South Africa is facing a "Total Onslaught" from Russia, Communists, Hostile States and International Terrorism. To counter the "total onslaught" - a total strategy is envisaged which involves everyone,

"South Africa is today involved in total war. The war is not only an area for the soldier. Everyone is involved and has a role to play."

General Malan.

and which covers every aspect of life:

General Malan explained :

"Total strategy should encompass the State, the private sector, private sector, diplomacy, commerce, industry and



# *The Conscientious Objectors' Support Groups*

COSGs exist in the major centres of South Africa. There are established COSGs in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town and new COSGs in Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg and Port Elizabeth.

COSGs were originally set up to support COs and to campaign, with the churches, for alternative service provisions for all COs. The new legislation provides alternative service only for religious objectors and in this way attempts to divide religious objectors from political objectors. The COSGs around the country have rejected this legislation because it is divisive and have begun to understand that they cannot simply limit their work to support of individual COs.

Over the last few years the COSGs have developed an increasingly clear understanding of the militarisation of South African society and have increasingly seen the need to oppose this in all its forms.

COSGs particularly oppose:

- the SADF's illegal occupation of Namibia
- the SADF's role in carrying out the state repression, for example in removals, in cordoning off of townships like Lamontville, etc.
- the SADF's role in neighbouring countries which has led to allegations that it is responsible for destabilisation.
- the SADF's role in shaping the ideology of "Total Strategy" and its role in propagating this ideology by its involvement in schools and civic action programmes.

The way COSG understands 'opposition' to the militarisation of South Africa is by a) supporting objectors, and b) educating people about the role the military plays.

## *The Constitution and Conscription*

Recently the government announced the new constitutional plan for South Africa and November 1983 this plan was accepted by "white" South Africa.

The progressive organisations have clearly understood this plan to be an attempt to contain the crisis in South Africa by co-opting some sections of the population on to the side of the State. This co-option confers a few sham 'rights' and these are then used as justifications for extension of conscription.

Recently, it has become clear that one of the Government's aims in implementing the new constitution is to draw 'Coloured' and Indian people into the army.

A recent National Party Congress in the Transvaal (September 1983) discussed the extension of conscription to these groups. F.W. de Klerk, the Transvaal Leader of the National Party said: "You can't ask a man to fight for his country if he can't vote. Among the terms of the new dispensation is the guarantee that coloureds and Indians will get voting rights. It follows that their responsibilities will increase accordingly, which means they will hold obligations to defend these rights."



Because COSG believes that the so called external threat and the 'Total Onslaught' is in fact a civil war where South Africans are called to fight South Africans, it is calling for a campaign to end the conscription of whites and to oppose the forthcoming conscription of "Coloureds" and Indians.

In addition, COSG believes that people should choose whether they want to defend this country or not: in World War II South Africa relied entirely on volunteers and could do so because it was clear that the war was just.

The Black Sash resolution at its conference this year has stimulated a campaign to end conscription. This call to end conscription is being taken up by the COSGs who are in the process of inviting organisations to join "Anti-Conscription Committees" in the major centres. It is quite clear that the demand to end conscription will not be met by the state, but that does not mean that the demand should not be made. The campaign provides scope for education around the issue of conscription and for the extension of the oppositional support base. It is a demand that can be supported by liberal organisations, church leaders and church groups and by progressive organisations. The very fact that the demand can not be met can be used to demonstrate to people what conscription is there for.

The demand to end conscription is a demand for a profoundly changed South Africa, where people are no longer powerless and hungry. It is a demand for a society where young men are no longer called on to fight their brothers in defence of an unjust system - it is a demand for a society where the people shall govern.



"Total Strategy" is waged not only at the level of fighting but also at the ideological level. Military leaders have increasingly emphasised the non-military aspects of the war which has been described as 80% socio-economic and only 20% military.

"If we lose the socio-economic struggle, then we need not even bother to fight the military one"

General Boshoff

Part of this has meant launching a "hearts and minds" campaign to win the support of all sections of the population. Towards this end the SADF is projected as

" the neutral force which ensures that the internal policies of this country can be sorted out"

(Yet this attempt becomes more futile as the SADF takes on the tasks of the SAP in repressing internal conflict)

The "hearts and minds" campaign is waged through various avenues, such as:

- Civic Action Programme
- Bonus Bonds
- Southern Cross Fund
- the media.

## A Militarized Economy


In 1977 P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, proclaimed that part of SADF's strategy was to "guarantee ..... free enterprise." The nature of the SADF's tasks began to be seen as a provision of security for the economy, "free enterprise" and the private sector. Suddenly gone were the implications of the SADF upholding Afrikaner domination, white minority rule and Apartheid. Any form of resistance to South Africa's policy of Apartheid came to be seen as part of the "acts of aggression against the Republic". The well known example of calling for economic sanctions against South Africa, came to be seen not as an act of non-violent action against Apartheid, but as "Economic Sabotage".

From this point on a "co-ordinated strategy" started developing, "winning the hearts and minds" of the private sector and individual business entrepreneurs



Looking at certain aspects of our economy is a realistic way of examining how militarised SA has become.

The following graph gives some idea of the spiralling State expenditure on the Defence Force:



It will be noticed that the SADF budget has increased 860% over the past 10 years!

The 1983/84 Budget stands at a staggering R3,5 billion - over 15% of SA's total budget. The war in Namibia costs SA R320 million. This amount is DOUBLE what is allocated for HOUSING. In 1982/83 the SADF was allowed to overdraw its budget by R400 million.



## The Private Sector

In 1977 leading business figures and top ranking military persons as well as government officials met at a conference jointly chaired by Ian Mac Kenzie, Standard Bank Chairperson, and Major General Neil Webster. All delegates were asked to sign an agreement not to disclose details of the conference. (In accordance with the Official Secrecy Act)

However, in a statement on the intention of this conference it was stated that they "were brought together in an attempt to find solutions for the critical problems encountered by both sides in the field of manpower planning....."

The Defence Force also has ready access to business methods used in the private sector. Top industrialists like Gavin Relly (Anglo-Am.), Dick Goss (S.A. Breweries) etc serve on the Defence Advisory Council. In 1979 when it was rumoured then that all was not well with ARMSCOR's management, John Maree was seconded and now serves as the Executive Vice-Chairman.

Two pieces of legislation are important to understand how much the private sector has been drawn into co-operating with the SADF:

- National Supplies Procurement Act - which in a crisis situation puts industry at the disposal of the SADF.
  - National Key Points Act(1980) - this makes it illegal to publish information relating to security at these "key points". Certain industries are designated as "key points".
- 85% were fully co-operating with the Government by allowing the SADF to provide its security system.

## ARMSCOR

According to Cmdt. Piet Marais, Chairman of ARMSCOR, its aim is to "..... manufacture arms at the lowest possible cost"

It has assets worth over R12 billion and is the third largest industrial group in South Africa.

It is the biggest arms industry in the Southern Hemisphere and 10th largest in the world.

In 1982 it produced and sold arms worth R14 billion.

ARMSCOR has a working relationship with private enterprise. Up to 60% of its production is contracted out to the private sector, with 50 main contractors, 400 sub-contractors and about 1500 firms which keep the war machinery running.



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Another aim of ARNSCOR is to "..... establish South Africa as a major arms exporter on the international market." At an arms exhibition in Greece in 1982 South Africa was fairly successful, and attracted considerable attention until the Greek Government intervened.

Keeping in mind that industry collaborating with the SADF goes into areas such as food, transport, communication, administration and training, we begin to realise the serious implication this has for SA society.

Most people cannot be assured that they are doing an ordinary bit of work. ARNSCOR's involvement in the private sector raises a deep moral question for the large majority of workers in SA. There can no longer be any doubt that the military wing of industry has spread its tentacles into all aspects of South African life.

### Western Support and Nuclear Implications

Sympathetic leanings toward S.A. and easy access to a substantial loan from the I.M.F. have enabled the government to further develop its military strategies and equipment. Evidence of this is the public displays of the latest strike craft, tanks, weapons and most recent revelation that it had acquired the plans and expertise to construct the revolutionary "EXOCET" missile.

Financial support will no doubt go a long way in assuring the completion of the Koeberg, Palindaba and Valindaba nuclear installations. Already SA has at its disposal the technique (bought from the Western world - U.S.A. & France) to build these nuclear posts. The West's expertise will also be available for a time ( $\pm$  30 years) to maintain these installations.

Valindaba, built to enrich Uranium (the material required for nuclear fission, of which SA has an abundant supply) is scheduled for completion in 1984 and will be ready to supply the essential requirement for nuclear power - AND nuclear weaponry!

As mentioned the expertise is available and could easily be used to enable production of a nuclear bomb. The possibility of harbouring nuclear weapon installations should no longer be seen as something remotely taking place in the US and Europe. When SA does produce these weapons there can be no mistake but these would be seen as a countermeasure to the "total onslaught."

aided by Argentina against Britain.



In the current world political climate SA would strongly be urged to defend herself - and the Western world. As yet SA is not subject to periodic inspection by a panel of nuclear experts. SA is a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Apart from the possibility of accidents in these installations, we must surely tremble at the thought of nuclear power in the hands of people whose approach has become as militarised as it is.

### Questions

- 1) What is the significance of the increasing links between the state and the military? Does this have any implications for you?
- 2) Have you seen the effect of total strategy in your organization? How?
- 3) How do you respond to the increasing Defence budget?
- 4) What do you think can be done to counteract the increasing militarization of our society?
- 5) What do you think the states position on nuclear armament is?

## *The SADF and Education*

Read the following two extracts from NEWSA (mouthpiece of the National Education Union of South Africa).

### Questions

- 1) Are you able to identify areas of SADF. influence within your experience?
- 2) How can your organization participate in demystifying SADF. propeganda?



## Putting the glory into dying for the fatherland: how white education prepares the youth for war

IN WHITE schools the military is operating on particularly fertile ground. Its role has not been to win 'hearts and minds' as in black schools, but rather to steer hearts and minds and bodies in the right direction.

White pupils live in an environment where television, radio, the press, bonus bonds, photo-stories, and advertising all tend to stress the virtues of the SADF. Many pupils have brothers and even fathers doing military service and are faced with this prospect themselves.

Even those from liberal families have the PEP's view that the SADF is a 'shield to protect South Africa from aggression and violence'. Few critical alternatives are presented and therefore most white pupils, whatever their feelings about the government, have attitudes to the SADF which range from unquestioning patriotism to resigned acceptance.

### Veld Schools

One area where the effects of militarisation have been felt is in the veld schools in the Transvaal. The veld schools' programme was initiated in 1972 and has expanded rapidly in the years since then. There are now 11 veld schools which cater for 70 000 pupils and teachers annually. The camps are for standards 5's and 8's and are divided by sex and language. Leadership camps are also run.

The schools have been widely criticised for ignoring environmental considerations and, instead, being used to propagate rightwing racist views. The paramilitary aspect of the programme has been particularly marked. Circulars are sent to parents telling them that they need not be afraid of their children being in the bush because, at all the veld schools, there are military units nearby to protect them.

The day's programme starts at 5.40am. The mornings and early afternoons consist of strenuous physical activities. The late afternoons and evenings are filled with lectures, discussions and films stressing the need for physical and moral preparedness. At night pupils have to stand guard duty.

A Johannesburg College of Education report on the veld schools noted: 'We observed the development of outdoor awareness and skills to be very much secondary to military-style survival at the expense of the veld, secondary also to the propagation of readiness against the envisaged total onslaught.' In all activities tight regimentation and discipline is maintained and pupils who do not are severely punished.

The high number of serious injuries, bad food, exhausting physical strain and excessive discipline have led a number of pupils, parents and schools to complain to the Transvaal Education Department. In addition, there has been vocal opposition from the press, the Transvaal Teachers Association and the Johannesburg College of Education, the PEP and even Congress National Front.

In response to this mounting pressure the TED has agreed to implement certain reforms which will decrease the military and political input and also improve safety measures.

### Guidance programmes

A report from the Human Sciences Research Council suggested in 1981 that guidance programmes could help pupils with problems relating to their national service.

In line with this suggestion, guidance centres have formed much closer links with the SADF. All white schools participate in the registration of pupils for the SADF. According to the University of Cape Town's Careers Guidance Unit, careers guidance, particularly at Afrikaans schools, aims to encourage pupils to take careers needed by the economy and the permanent force. At many schools the SADF has started participating in careers guidance evenings.

### Youth preparedness

Youth preparedness is a compulsory weekly subject at government schools in the Transvaal, the OFS and the Cape. The programmes stress civic duties, patriotism and moral preparedness.

They also increasingly involve a militaristic emphasis. For example, the Cape syllabus includes talks by former pupils on military service 'to inspire the boys' and discussions on the army, navy and airforce.

Some English schools continue to ignore the militaristic aspect of the syllabus, but this is increasingly difficult as inspectors are becoming more vigilant in ensuring that departmental guidelines are carried out.

Direct SADF input into Youth Preparedness programmes is considerable. For example, in June 1982, General Magnus Malan said that in the Cape Peninsula the SADF had visited 33 schools over the last five months at the invitation of school principals.

The SADF also organises national essay writing competitions for schools on topics such as 'Why I am in favour of National service'.

In most staffrooms and school libraries, it is compulsory to display editions of the army newsletter and uniform. The SADF also encourages schools to organise fundraising concerts for the 'boys on the border'.

### Cadets

The area where the growth of the military presence has been most marked has been in cadet programmes. In 1975, 56 300 pupils took part in cadets. Today there are nearly forty times this number enrolled.

Since 1978, the cadet syllabus has been closely linked to that of the Youth Preparedness programme. Greater emphasis has been placed on the 'philosophy behind cadet training'. This involves discussions on various forms of warfare, on the 'total onslaught', as well as the physical practice of drilling and shooting.

Uniformed cadets, now compulsory for boys at all government schools in South Africa, while most private schools also participate.

However, there are still considerable differences amongst schools in the implementation of the actual cadet syllabus. In some schools girls also participate in drill and shooting exercises. Many schools send pupils to cadet leadership camps which are run in the school holidays. These acquaint pupils with all aspects of army training.

One of the problems in the implementation of the cadet syllabus has been the shortage of leader cadet officers. However, the SADF is now taking measures to remedy this situation. Most male teachers, beginning their military service after they have qualified, are posted to the Infantry School in Outshoorn where they are trained in cadet leadership. Teachers are often keen to participate because this usually exempts them from camps after they have finished their military service.

The attitude of most pupils to cadets is acceptance. In 1980 at a Catholic high school, CBC, a group of black pupils were expelled for refusing to do cadets. In cases where Jehova's Witnesses refuse to do cadets, the authorities generally handle the matter more delicately.

Most boys have a fairly positive attitude to cadets. Their ideas about the military are governed by the increasingly militaristic milieu in which they live, while the fact that they will be liable for several years military service tends to condition their acceptance of cadet training as a useful, if sometimes unpleasant, exercise.

Despite the fact that concern is being expressed about the growing militarisation of the schools, the SADF and the education departments have shown no inclination to halt this process. Instead, they have made every effort to intensify its pace and to ensure greater national uniformity in its implementation.

The SADF sees this as necessary in order to increase the levy of military training so that boys, and later girls, will be able to undergo the rapid transition to being ready for combat.



## The Civic Action Programme and the SADF in black education

THE BASIC aim of Civic Action, apart from instilling the Black man in various fields is to project an image of the soldier as a man of iron, but who is nevertheless a friend of the sick man and who is prepared to defend him. 'We want the National Servicemen to perch the Black man whilst his rifle is leaning in the corner of the classroom,' (Major General Charles Lloyd).

Since 1980 the SADF's Civic Action Programme has expanded its activities by 300%. There are now nearly 1,500 Civic Action personnel in South Africa and Namibia. They work as teachers (approximately 300), doctors, dentists, agricultural advisors, university lecturers, sports trainers and vets.

The Civic Action Programme (Cap) was initiated in the early 1970s in Namibia, where publicity has been given to its activities in SADF propaganda and the commercial press. The collapse of civil administration meant that, despite opposition, the SADF's ability to control public facilities has been virtually unlimited.

Paratus, a SADF mouthpiece, described the SADF's Civic Action activities in Namibia as involving giving agricultural advice, providing teachers, fostering a love for sport and encouraging Christianity (June 8).

Despite limited success amongst the San (Bushmen) people in areas of Caprivi, the programme generally appears to have been a dismal failure in winning the 'Hearts and Minds' of Namibian people.

There are two reasons for this. Firstly, as Archbishop Hurley put it: 'Local communities do not want to co-operate with the policy which they distrust.' (Evening Post, July 17, 1983). Secondly, as Col Martins of the SADF expressed it (referring to Ovambo): 'I'm not sure the Hearts and Minds strategy does much good because of the large numbers of SWAPO there.' (Financial Times, Feb 12, 1982).

### Cap in Rural Areas:

In the rural areas in South Africa, the Cap's role is to 'secure the goodwill and cooperation of the local populace or minimise the success of guerilla incursions' (Lloyd). It is active in all the 'homelands' (independent or otherwise). Here the personnel also consist of teachers, agricultural advisors and medical officers.

Only in KwaZulu have there been reports of any resistance to the SADF from the 'local population'. There have also been a number of conflicts between the Cap and Inkatha. For example, in 1980 Inkatha protested against the enforced wearing of uniforms by teacher-teachers. According to Buthelezisi creates qualms of conscience for Blacks it appears that the propaganda value of the exercise is more of a priority than a genuine wish to help for humanitarian reasons' (Rand Daily Mail, Jan 21, 1980).

Other Cap activities in the rural areas include giving military exhibitions and distributing propaganda pamphlets. For example, in KwaNdebele recently, thousands of pamphlets were distributed attacking opposi-

tion with snakes coming out of his mouth with the caption, 'Don't listen to the evil talk of trouble-makers. It is poisonous', and promoting the SADF. Another had a picture of a soldier pointing to a mealie field with the caption, 'The South African soldier helps you grow them!')

Another important role of the Cap in the rural areas is to assist with the recruitment of African males into the SADF or bantustan units. In South Africa there are now 5 African battalions based in the rural areas. To meet its manpower needs and to promote its multi-racial image the SADF has relied increasingly on black recruitment. By 1982, 40% of its operational forces were black (Sunday Express, May 30, 1982).

### Cap in Urban Areas

It is in the urban areas that Cap now seems concentrated. Its roles include:

- Contributing to the ideological claims of 'Total Strategy'
- Promoting the idea of a 'Total Onslaught' against South Africa
- Improving the image of the SADF
- Performing an intelligence-gathering role

- Creating leadership groups sympathetic to the SADF's aims

- Softening the ground for the recruitment of coloureds and Indians.

In South Africa, as in Namibia, there appears to be a contradiction between the SADF's repressive role in the urban areas (curbing 'unrest', manning roadblocks, conducting cordon operations and house-to-house searches) and its attempt to win people's hearts and minds. As the head of Civic Action in the Western Cape, Major Britz, put it: 'While apartheid is still around the credibility gap remains large and you can't work in isolation.' But this has certainly not prevented the SADF from forcing its hand.

In 1979 SADF teachers were first used in African schools on the Rand and since then they have filled shortages in African, coloured and Indian schools in most urban areas. There has been widespread opposition from principals, teachers and parent bodies, educationists and groups such as the Committee of 10, Cosas, Azaso and Azapo. Despite this and a number of school boycotts over the issue, Civic Action teachers are being used in a growing number of urban schools.

The Cap also distributes its publications in schools to promote its image and undermine community leaders. 'The Warrior', which is distributed in some Transvaal schools, carries attacks on Nelson Mandela and Bishop Tutu and has attempted to promote David Thebehali. In the Western Cape, 'Contact' promotes the SADF as the 'friend of the people' and includes frequent attacks on SACOS and Grassroots newspaper.

### SADF Youth Camps

Another Civic Action activity is to take schoolchildren on visits to SADF bases where they are given free meals, T-shirts and are told of the virtues of fighting communism and of being a soldier. They are also told to report the presence of trouble-makers to the SADF.

Since 1976 the SADF have been involved in running youth camps for black students. In 1982 in the Western Cape, 16 of these camps were held for coloured students and 5 for African students. These camps are free and usually last for 5 days. They vary in number, from 25 to 600 and are staffed by SADF personnel. Usually 'leadership elements' are selected by their principals. Activities include films, hikes, picnics as well as 'discussion sessions' and military demonstrations.

For younger children the Cap organises holiday programmes. Bright banners, loud music and free cooldrinks are used to draw

children to city council parks where games, film shows and dancing are organised by the SADF. In 1982 in Cape Town these were attended by over 8000 children. (Grassroots, January 1983).

### Cap and Sport

The Cap also involves itself in organising multi-racial sport both to counter SACOS support and to improve the image of the SADF amongst sportsmen and women.

The Government has made it compulsory for the implementation of the Constitutional Commission. One of the Cap's tasks is to prepare the ground for this. Meanwhile 'voluntary' sportsmen of coloureds and Indians is being encouraged. The Cape Corps now recruits over 2000 servicemen annually. Coloureds and Indians now make up 40% of the Navy personnel.

Some coloured schools have also started introducing cadets. As Sgt Elliott of the 2nd Command Cadet Department put it: 'Coloureds are going to be introduced for coloureds and Indians but it is not yet official. In fact, some schools have already started...'

But as the SADF is likely to become increasingly in the future, the success of its civic action programme does not simply depend on its implementation.

The more it tries to win the hearts and minds of the people the greater the opposition will be. In a recent survey in Cape Town, 90% of the respondents gave opposition to compulsory conscription as their first reason for rejecting the government's constitutional proposals. If this is anything to go by, the SADF can expect a rough ride in the black communities in the future.

From:  
NEWSA  
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  
1983



## *South Africa's Role in Southern Africa*

The states north of South Africa are all struggling to turn political independence into a more total independence\_ which includes economic independence. The economies of African countries are geared to the needs of the former colonising countries and to achieve economic independence they need to break their ties of dependency with the industrialised countries.

In this context the African states despite their differences, are united in their opposition to South Africa because of its attempts to create economic dependence in Southern Africa. They also want to rid Africa of the last system based on minority white rule.

Prior to 1974 South Africa felt secure in Southern Africa. The SADF were largely in control of Namibia; Angola and Mozambique and Rhodesia all had problems with resistance movements, but they were all controlled by governments that were sympathetic to South Africa; Malawi was ruled by a pro-South African right wing government and the economies of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were so linked to South Africa that they were totally dominated by it.

But in 1974 things changed for South Africa. Late in that year there was a left-wing takeover in Portugal, resulting in independence for Angola and Mozambique.

### **Angola**

In Angola the tri-partite agreement between the MPLA, the FNLA and Unita broke down, resulting in the internal conflict between the MPLA on the one hand and the FNLA and Unita on the other hand. The MPLA emerged as the strongest party and the South African state was confronted with the prospect of having a Marxist government in Angola.

In late '75, the SADF invaded Angola without consulting parliament and fought on the side of Unita and the FNLA to prevent a possible MPLA takeover. South Africa learnt of the invasion long after the rest of the world. Unita is still active in Angola today and the Sunday Tribune reports: "Assistance by the South African Government for Unita is no longer secret. Journalists are flown to the border to interview Savimbi or to report on the release of kidnapped foreigners."  
(12/12/82)

### **Mozambique**

In Mozambique there was only one resistance movement, Frelimo, which took power in 1975. Initially South Africa responded with a policy of 'Good Neighbourliness' possibly because of the strong economic ties that existed with Mozambique. This relationship has steadily deteriorated over the years.



## Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

In Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) at the time that the war intensified, South Africa played an important role by supplying arms and troops to Rhodesia. While Zanu was setting up bases in newly independent Mozambique, the Rhodesian government was setting up the MNRM (Mozambique National Resistance Movement).

When Rhodesia was finally pressurised to negotiate with guerilla leaders, South Africa encouraged it because South Africa believed that Bishop Muzorewa would win the elections. The South African and Rhodesian governments believed their own propaganda to such an extent that they were totally unprepared for the victory of the Patriotic Front, and had no strategy ready for it.

## The Present Situation

- Since 1975 SOUTH AFRICA has clearly supported Unita in Angola and there are indications that South Africa has a permanent military presence in Southern Angola.

- After Zimbabwe's independence, the MNRM moved its radical station to the Northern Transvaal. MNRM attacks on Mozambican oil pipelines have affected Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia as well as Mozambique. One effect has been that Zimbabwe could not lessen its dependence on South Africa for petrol.

- The Zimbabwe Government has accused South Africa of repeatedly arming and training ex-Rhodesians and dissidents.

- Lesotho has given refuge to South African exiles and maintained an anti-apartheid stand in spite of its economic dependence on South Africa. The SADF raid on Maseru in December 1982 and the closing of Lesotho's borders in May 1983 were two examples of South African intimidation of Lesotho. The Sowetan reports that "the main accusation is that South Africa supports the Lesotho Liberation Army." (2/2/83)

Other South African acts of intimidation against neighbouring states include:

-the raid on Matola in Mozambique in which twelve ANC members were killed.

-the Maseru raid in which 42 died. Nineteen Canadian doctors say 30 ANC men claimed as dead by the SADF were refugees. RDM. (4/1/83)

-the raid on Maputo in Mozambique in which five civilians and one ANC member were killed.

There have been further allegations of South African aggression from wide ranging sources, although up to date South African authorities have denied any involvement in them. The government claimed that the senior officials of the SADF and NIS were involved in the Seychelles coup without its knowledge

Pretoria News 30/7/82

-UN officials claimed that South African commandos attacked an Angolan oil refinery at Luanda. (Cape Times 27/4/83)

-It was alleged by the CPSA Justice and Reconciliation Commission in northern



Namibia that units of the SADF notably Koevoet committed atrocities while dressed in SWAPO or MPLA uniforms. (Seek 12/3/83)

-The Zimbabwe government believes that Jos Gqabi was assassinated by professional South African assassins. Mozambiquan security officials say the assassination of Ruth First was similar in nature to others carried out in the region which were proved to be the work of South African secret services. (RDM 16/8/82) (star 3/8/81)

Petrus and Jabu Nzima were assassinated by a car bomb after the Paulpietersburg explosion.

At the fourth annual SADC conference this year, an Angolan spokesperson said that South African commandos or their surrogates had attacked energy installations in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho (Star 8/7/83) and that these countries as well as Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe "all feel more and more that they are being subjected to South African bullying." (Argus 11/7/83)

## Why is this happening?

When the South African government admits some of these events, they explain that it is necessary because these states support South Africa's enemies.

The reasons, however, are political and economic.

South Africa is economically dependant on the Southern African states. While it is more developed and industrialized than the rest of Africa, it cannot compete in the international market because its technology and economy are limited. So it needs to create new markets for itself. On the one hand the creation of a new black middle class is an attempt to expand the internal market, on the other and South Africa needs to create dependence on it to expand its market in the rest of Africa.

The attempts by these states to form the SADC, is an attempt to break their dependence on South Africa which is seen as a threat to the economic future of South Africa.

South Africa is also trying to decrease the political pressure it is facing. Internally, the new constitution is an attempt to win "coloureds" and Indians to their side of the government- externally South Africa would ideally like to be surrounded by friendly states (hence its support for Unita and MRRM) but that is not possible then it will threaten and attack neighbouring states to make sure that they do not give active support to the ANC.



## Conclusion

Destabilisation will continue because South Africa needs certain conditions for its survival and growth. It does need peace - but only on its own terms - i.e. peace with pro-South African governments installed in the neighbouring states.

## Questions

- 1) Why do you think South Africa is involved in military operations in Southern Africa?
- 2) How does South Africa feel threatened by the changes since 1974 in the front line states?

Are these genuine threats?

- 3) Mention has been made of some of the possible reasons why South Africa is trying to change the balance of power in Southern Africa. What else do you think contributes to this?



# The History of C.O.

The phenomenon of Conscientious Objection(C.O.) really only arises where there is conscription. Therefore it was not an issue in the Anglo Boer War, as conscription did not exist at that time. Conscription in S.A. began with the Defence Act of 1912 but because the ballot system was used its impact was eased. During World War II the process of conscription was rendered unnecessary by the large number of volunteers(half a million). However, there were many South Africans who opposed the role of the SADF in WW II and refused to fight. Many of these people were linked to political organizations such as the OssewaBrandweg and had political objections to partaking in the war.

Compulsory conscription was introduced for all white males in 1967, a year after SWAPO launched its armed struggle in Namibia. At the same time the war in then "Rhodesia" was intensifying. Many objectors left the country quietly in this early period of conscription.

In 1969 and 1970, there was an increased call-up with the abolition of the ballot(Sect.70 Defence Act). The repeated prosecution of Jehovah's Witnesses (JW's) for refusal to serve was much publicised in the media. As a result of this publicity, many churches took resolutions in 1971, calling for non-military alternatives for the JW's, and the individual churches conveyed their resolutions to the Government. In 1972 these were collated by the SACC and presented in a memorandum to the Select Committee on the Defence Amendment Bill. In 1974 the SACC adopted a resolution at its annual national conference calling on all its member churches:

"to challenge all their members to consider .....whether Christ's call to take up the cross and follow him in identifying with the oppressed does not in our situation, involve becoming C.O.'s."

The turning point which led to public resistance to the military can largely be attributed to the Soweto and country wide uprising of 1976/7. The brutality of the police response to the student protests and the role played by the SADF in quelling the unrest, brought home to many White South Africans, the evil of apartheid and alerted them to the fact that the war is a civil war. It was at this time that the first objectors from outside the traditional "peace churches" took a public stand and began to examine the nature of the war in which the SADF was engaged. ~~The objectors who have taken~~



The objectors who have taken public stands against service in the SADF have based their opposition on a number of different grounds:

Universal Pacifists - have argued that all wars are always wrong and that they would not join any army whatever the cause for which it was fighting. Some of them are religious others not. Universal pacifists were:

- Anton Eberhard : Presbyterian. Sentenced to 12 months in Detention Barracks(DB), with 10 months suspended; for refusing a 3 month camp. (December 1977)
- Richard Steele : Baptist. Sentenced to 18 months DB, 6 months suspended; for refusing his initial service. (February 1980)
- Charles Yeats : Anglican. Sentenced to one year in DB for refusing initial service, (May 1981) and then to a year in prison for refusing to wear the regulation uniform. (December 1981)
- Michael Viviers : Baptist. Sentenced to 18 months prison- reduced to one year for refusing his initial service. (Feb. 1982)
- Neil Mitchell : Catholic. Sentenced to one year in DB for refusing initial service (July 1982) and then to 6 months in prison for refusing to wear the regulation uniform (October 1982)
- Etienne Espory : No formal religious affiliation; Sentenced to 4 months in prison for refusing to do his third camp. (January 1983)
- Arling Ferguson : Anglican. Sentenced to 4 months in prison for refusing to do initial service.

Selective Objectors - or "Just War" Objectors are not pacifist. They refuse to fight in the SADF because they believe that S.A. is fighting an unjust war and defending an unjust system. They would however fight in a war they believe to be just or in defence of a just system. Some selective objectors are Christians who use theological grounds to judge the war and the system, others are not religious and object on moral, ethical or political grounds. Selective objectors were:

- Brian Hall : Baptist. Sentenced to 18 months in DB, reduced to 12 months for refusing a 3 month camp. (December 1979)
- Billy Padlock : Anglican. Sentenced to one year in prison for refusing initial service. (October 1982)
- Primo Latheron : (Not religious) Sentenced to 2 years in prison- reduced to one year, for refusing initial service. (March 1983)
- Paul Dobson : (Not religious) Sentenced to one year in prison for refusing to continue his initial service, after having served for 14 months. (September 1983)



The issue of C.O. in S.A. was also taken up internationally. The first action by any United Nations body on Conscientious Objection had been the request by the Commission on Human Rights in March 1971 for the Secretary General to prepare a report on the status of C.O.'s and alternative service, including national legislation practices and procedures. In 1978, two non-governmental organizations, the Lawyers Committee for International Rights and the Quaker United Nations Association, introduced the idea of special recognition by the UN of C.O.'s in Southern Africa. On December 20, 1978 the General Secretary passed a resolution that 'recognized the right of all persons to refuse service in the military and police forces which are used to enforce apartheid' and urged member states to grant such persons asylum, safe transit, and the rights and benefits accorded to refugees. This action was the first international recognition of the concept that an individual, as a matter of conscience and for political reasons, has the right to refuse service in an armed force which is used in violation of international law.

Political objectors are recognized only in 5 countries; in Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and historically Britain. Since the purpose of recognizing C.O.' is to protect the right of persons to choose between right and wrong, and since in a democracy, the citizens are expected to be informed on political issues and to take responsibility for the political acts of their government, there seems no reason to treat claims based on political ideas differently from claims based on religious reasons.

**Questions**

- 1) What is the relevance of the C.O. issue being taken up internationally?
- 2) What other alternatives could one suggest for the Religious Objectors classified in the 3 categories?
- 3) How do you respond to the differentiation made between Selective Objectors and Religious Objectors (Pacifist) in terms of the Defence Amendment Act of 1983?
- 4) What provisions would you suggest for these objectors who are not recognised by this amendment of 1983?



# The Law and C.O.

1912 : SA Defence Act (No. 13 of 1912) ..... made every citizen liable to service in time of war (17-60 yrs) and every citizen(17-25yrs) liable to training in time of peace.

A Ballot system was provided for, to choose 50% to actually undergo training.

Only persons of "European descent".

WW I and WW II ..... conscription not enforced.

Volunteer Army.

1957 : Defence Act no.44 ..... consolidated Defence provisions and replaced the SA Defence Act of 1912 as amended in six subsequent acts.

Ballot still in use.(Sect.72)

1967 : Defence Act no.85 ..... Ballot system was repealed.

All White males did serve.

All persons who are bona fide members of a religious denomination who prohibits its members from participating in war were provided with non-combatant status within the military. (Sect.67 3 )

1972 : Sect.126A Of Defence Act(no.44) ..... amended to provide a once only sentence for objectors.Previously objectors could be charged and sentenced repeatedly.

1974 : Sect.121(c) of Defence Act(no.44) ..... making it an offence to suggest to any conscriptee that he should refuse his call-up. Maximum penalty - R5000 or 6 years imprisonment or both.

1977 : Defence Act no.44 of 1957 ....., amended to restrict the once only sentence to members of the traditional 'peace churches' which forbade their members from participation in war.Everyone else was subject to repeated call-ups and thus repeated jail sentences.

1983 : Defence Act no. 34(No.44 of 1957) ..... amended to include alternative service provisions for 'religious objectors'.

Only three categories of 'religious objectors' are provided for:

- (a) Persons who refuse to serve in a combatant role in any armed force but will wear the military uniform. ie: a non-combatant.
- (b) Persons who will serve in a non-combatant role within any armed force but who refuses to wear the military uniform.eg: teacher
- (c) Persons who refuse to serve in any capacity (combatant or non-combatant) in any armed force and therefore request service outside of that armed force.



# THE DEFENCE AMENDMENT ACT 1983

Below is a brief summary of Sect. 72 of Defence Act no.44 of 1957 as amended as Act No.34 of 1983 :

## 1. Boards for religious objection:

This board is not a military tribunal or court martial.

The function of the board is to determine the 'genuineness' of the person presenting himself on the basis of his evidence to this fact. The board will then decide into which of the 3 categories the person will be classified, if at all! ie: the board has the power to decide that the person can be charged under Sect.126A (1) (a). Refer to final para.

There may be one or more boards for religious objection 72A(1) (a)  
appointed by the Minister of Manpower.

### 1.1 These will consist of:

A judge or retired judge as chairman  
Three theologians of different denominations 72A(2)  
One military chaplain  
One SADF representative  
One co-opted theologian of applicant's own denomination  
if none of appointed theologians or chaplain are of  
that denomination

### 1.2 Rules for hearings:

No legal representation 72C(4)  
Witnesses allowed 72B(2) (e)  
All decisions final 72D(5)

### 1.3 Powers of the boards:

Granting of applications 72D(1) (a)  
Allocation to other categories 72D(1) (b)  
Refusal of applications 72D(1) (c)  
Referral to an exemption board 72D(2) (3)  
Reviewing of cases 72F

### 1.4 Applications to boards need: 72B

To be made in writing and signed by applicant  
To state the category required  
To set out facts and grounds for application  
To state the 'books of revelation and the articles of faith upon which the religious convictions of the applicant are based'.  
To include affidavits from any supporting witnesses.  
To be received by the board within 30 days of delivery of notice to render service.



# THE UDF RESOLUTION:

## 7. RESOLUTION ON MILITARISATION

### NOTING:

1. the increased militarisation and massive defence budget of our country while our people are deprived of the basic necessities for living
2. the continued acts of aggression perpetrated by the SADF against our neighbouring states
3. the growing instances of young people resisting conscription into the S.A. army
4. the SADF is involved in a campaign to win the hearts and minds of young children in communities through the organisation of youth camps and believing:
  1. that the SADF is being used by the S.A. regime to uphold white domination
  2. that the government intends through its constitutional Bill to compel Indians and Coloureds to join the army to defend Apartheid.

### Hereby resolves

1. to resist all forms of militarisation

# he Black Sash resolves:

## CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

*Statement in regard to the Defence Amendment Bill and proposed legislation concerning conscientious objection.*

During World War II the South African Government respected the conscience of individuals and there was no conscription. The country is even more seriously divided now than it was then.

South Africa is occupying Namibia illegally and this is cause for many in conscience to refuse military service. When South Africa withdraws from Namibia there should be no need for a massive military establishment unless there has been a political failure to respond to the desires of the citizens.

If a conscripted army is necessary it will be because of the political failure to respond to the desires of the citizens, and that army will be engaged in a civil war which is good cause for many to refuse military service. In such a civil war if the state has to rely on conscription to man its army the war is already lost.

Therefore the Black Sash demands that the South African Government abolish all conscription for military service. We maintain that there is no total onslaught against the people of South Africa and the total strategy required of us is not the military defence of a minority government but the all-out effort of all South Africa's people to bring about democratic government and the relief of the poverty and deprivation suffered by the majority.



**W**HEN Mr P W Botha became Prime Minister in 1978 he needed (not least for political reasons) to assert control over BOSS, over what remained of Dr Connie Mulder's empire and over what he correctly regarded as an upper- and middle-level bureaucracy that might well be loyal to Mr B J Vorster.

Mr Botha announced sweeping administrative reforms in 1979.

Although it has taken until 1983 for the full intent of these changes to be realised, South Africa's method of operation and its ability to accomplish its business have been transformed by the shift from 20 to four Cabinet committees, the primacy given formally and informally to the refurbished State Security Council (SSC), the concomitant expansion of the Office of the Prime Minister and the creation of a Cabinet secretariat, the distribution of agendas and the keeping of minutes, the punctiliousness with which the paper flow is regulated, and the role which the military now plays in the entire process.

The Westminster model presumes the sovereignty of parliament, with a cabinet and a prime minister responsible to and acting on behalf of parliament. Nominally South Africa's new arrangements adhered to such democratic principles, but their practise deviates markedly from them.

**A**s it has developed, the system as reshaped under Mr Botha bypasses the Cabinet and Parliament to a degree which is new even for South Africa. Info included.

The untidiness of the past has been replaced, certainly formally, by a new accountability and tightened organisational flows. But if this process serves South Africa well, it does so by elevating the goals of bureaucratic achievement and policy coordination above those of meaningful political participation and development of a national consensus.

**By ROBERT I ROTBERG**

of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

# How PW tidied up after Vorster



**BEFORE 1980, especially during the 12-year prime ministership of Mr B J Vorster, the South African government's decision-making process was less than methodical.**

Within conformity to overall policy, Ministers were encouraged to run their departments without interference by the Prime Minister. Such autonomy spawned political rivalry among Cabinet Ministers and among government departments.

Starting from these observations, Professor Robert I Rotberg of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, analyzes the changes made by Mr P W Botha to the machinery of government in South Africa.

Professor Rotberg is a frequent visitor to South Africa, and the author of several books on the region. This article has been excerpted from the December 28 issue of Africa Notes, published by the Georgetown University Centre for Strategic Studies.

and membership did not give the SSC a pre-eminent status in the government, it would still be able to achieve significant leverage by virtue of its size, organisation and bureaucratic resources.

Lieutenant-General Andries van Deventer, secretary of the SSC, commands the 'working committee' (which corresponds to the 'working groups' of the other Cabinet committees) of the

drawn from the military, 20% comes from the NIS and 10% from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Gen van Deventer's deputy is General G J F van Rensburg.

Below the secretariat, and also subordinate to the working groups and the working committee, are 15 inter-departmental committees. Organisationally, they emanate from and report to the SSC, and are the originators of nearly all police recommendations.

**M**embership of the inter-departmental committees consists principally of heads of departments and of their senior deputies, legal advisers and so on. A representative of the Defence Force sits on each committee and reports to Gen van Deventer. Foreign Affairs is represented on only four of the inter-departmental committees; other ministries are represented on no more than and usually less than that number.

Gen van Deventer (now 53) was chief of staff of the finance division of the Defence Force before 1979. He worked closely with the Prime Minister when Mr Botha was Minister of Defence under Mr Vorster, and regards himself as the person chosen because of this long association to bring a military-style order to a hitherto unco-ordinated government.

Gen van Deventer thinks of himself as a careful planner, as a facilitator, as a good manager of paper flow on behalf of a Prime Minister who appreciates meticulous, precise management, good staffing and appropriate follow-through.

**T**he Prime Minister insists on fully researched options before decisions can be contemplated. However the extent to which "fully researched" means "objective







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