

SOUTH AFRICA & THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR

13/7/83

1) SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR POTENTIAL.

Generally recognised that SA has succeeded in developing advanced N industry which includes capacity to produce its own N weapons.

SA has 2 N research reactors at Pelindaba, nr Pretoria. A plant for enriching uranium to prepare its use as a N fuel or explosive started operation at Valindaba in 75. Further developments are planned on an ambitious scale. 2 large N reactors for generating electricity are sited at Koeberg, nr Capetown. (Four massive explosive hits by ANC guerillas have set back their planned operation)

SA has access to large reserves of uranium in SA & Namibia - nearly 300,000 tons, about 17% of world total. SA has access to the 2nd largest uranium reserves in the capitalist world economy, & accounts for about 13% of its annual uranium output. An important source of wealth & foreign exchange, but more importantly, these reserves are the basis for SA's N capacity.

In July 77, Sov spy satellite Cosmos 922 recorded structures in Kalahari desert. US officials were informed that SA N test was imminent. Information was made public. British & French govts conveyed their opposition. Vorster said no N tests & no development of N weapons would take place in SA - later denied.

SA at no time gave explanation for building of structures which US intelligence were 99% sure could only be used for N testing.

In Oct 79 US govt reported it had detected signs of small N explosion in the Sth Atlantic. Subsequent investigations revealed it was most likely caused by N warhead fired from the G5 155mm extended range artillery system.

SA N scientists wld probably b so confident o their design of 1st-generation N weapons tt they wld nt need to test thm. Bt their 2nd gen weapons wld probably require testng.

T SA Airforce operates abt 200 aircraft. Most o these cld deliver N weapons. Evn a 1st-gen N weapn constructd by SA wld probably weigh no more thn abt 1,000kg, far less thn t payload o a typical combat aircraft.

SA cld also manufacture ground-to-ground missiles wth a range o, say, a few hundred kims. And t technology o cruise missiles is becomng widespread - important components, sch as engines, are readily available. These missiles wld b ideal fr deliverng SA N weapns.

## 2) THE COLLABORATORS

T largest single uranium mine tt SA exploits is nt in SA bt in Namibia, ovr which SA retains illegal control. The mines is at Rossing, & is financd & run by an international consortium.

50% o shares are wth foreign shareholders, t largest being British based Rio Tinto Zinc, togethr wth Rio Algo, its Canadian subsidairy; othr shares are held by Minatome of France & Urangesellschaft o FRG.

Britain also largest purchaser o uranium frm Rossing. Othr major purchasers are France, FRG, Netherlands & Japan.

Under t Amercian 'Atoms fr Peace' program, SA hs receivd aid central to its developmnt o its military N potential.

In t 70s t inherent conne ctions btween civil & military N technology came to be more widely & clearly understood. It is t proliferation o N technological capabilities around t wrld which provides t basis fr t possible proliferation o N weapns.

OPT. MA

Crucial to SA has been the development of a technological infrastructure for N development. Research reactors would not be enough without scientists & technologists with practical knowledge. *Optima*

By mid-77 more than 155 US N technologists & scientists had visited SA to provide assistance & training, & 90 SAs had visited the US to receive training & practical experience. Britain has also played its part in scientific exchange.

Koeberg is being constructed by a French consortium; 82% of the finance has been put up by a group of French banks headed by the state-owned Credit Lyonnais & the Banque de L'Indochine et de Suez. In addition, France is training 100 SA technicians for about a year to operate Koeberg.

The dominant theme in the story of SA N technology is the collaboration the regime has received from foreign states, parastatal agencies & corps. Kalahari in 77 was a warning of what should have been clear through-out, that the collaboration was contributing to the development of SA N weapons. Some maintain their bit of collaboration does not have military applications, but this is misleading & irrelevant; external N collaboration with SA is a kind of jog-saw in which each piece has had a part to play.

THE COLLABORATORS are Belgium; Britain; Canada; FRG; France; Israel; Japan; the Netherlands; Switzerland; & the USA.

## 2) TOTAL STRATEGY

N weapons capacity does not arise independently, but is part of a whole programme with ramifications affecting the whole society.

It is part of what was expressed in a Defence policy white paper in 1977 when the call-up for white males was extended from 1 to 2 years to meet the SADF's growing personnel needs.

"The process of ensuring & maintaining the sovereignty of a state's authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from a purely military to an integrated national action. The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent & coordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc. We are today involved in a war . . . The striving for specific aims must be coordinated with all the means available to the state."

The coordination of this strategy is under a State Security Council, & this shift in defence policy to include political & ideological strategies marks the beginning of the rapid militarisation of SA society.

This intense militarisation is producing a state never seen before - combining features of advanced, modern economy with overwhelming military force, & intense oppression of a type that seemed to be the monopoly of backward S. A. states - 'disappearances', assassinations, kidnapping, torture, reprisals against any opposition.

Purpose o ths will b examnd in a moment.

Rise o t military: Defence budget rose frm R44-m i 1960 to R2465 -m in 81 - an increase o 860% in 10 yrs, & today is a staggering R3.2 billion.

Durg 50's & 60s, equipped primarily by Brit & US, today SA is wrld's tenth largest arms producer, & produces many othr military products, sch as napalm.

Numbr o troops under arms grew from 11,500 in 1960 to 250,000, & today estimatd strength is 500,000. All white males, 18 to 35, conscriptd fr 2 yrs national service follwd by a 35-yr commitmnt. Increasingly, blk men & white womn are also being recruitd.

There is an elite special force - Koevoet (like Selous)

In Nov 82, IMF approvd loan of \$1.1 billion to SA, despite wrld wide protests includng appeal frm majority o UN Genral Assembly. T multilateral form o aid givn by IMF masks t way it is used to serve Western interests. Major partners wth big stakes in t existng stability o SA & Ap are able to help it without becomng exposd politically as they wld by direct bilateral credits. At t same time, Af. Asian & Soc States tt are members o IMF are implicatd against their will - many receive less favourable treatmnt. IMF backng also acts as a powerfl boost to private investors whose role is crucial in developng apartheid.

### 3) HOW DOES TOTAL STRATEGY WORK?

Since 1974 the balance of power in Sthn Af shifted significantly against SA which has been forced to adjust to a new strategic situation. It has done so in the main by increasing internal repression, expanding its military arsenal, & unleashing armed attacks against neighbouring African states, & through the establishment of its nuclear capability.

SA plans for a constellation of states & for more than one decade has been at war with its neighbours. Varying effects, but incursions cause devastation, suffering & lay heavy burdens of arms spending on under-developed economies, widening fissures.

The results of its actions have been to produce an ever-deadening reaction so that acts that would have been unthinkable a decade ago, like the military occupation of other countries, & murderous incursions into neighbours such as Lesotho, <sup>Angola</sup> become part of what is acceptable to the world.

Examine briefly some of these actions.

*Mention*  
↓  
ANGOLA In 1975 joint military invasion of SADF & UNITA forces attempted to reach Luanda. SA suffered a humiliating & expensive defeat when Cuba came to Angolan governments' aid, & forced to withdraw. This followed by continuous strategy of repeated border violations & armed incursions, & in last 3 years again full-scale invasion; 2 brigades of regular SA army, totalling 5,500 men, continuously stationed on Angolan territory since Aug 81.

Most horrifying raid was Kassinga massacre. SA armed forces on 4 May 78, jet fighters & paratroopers killed more than 600 Namibian refugees during raid on Kassinga refugee settlement, 250 km inside Angola. Several hundred

refugees kidnapped, a few returned, but rest have disappeared, held in unknown jails, incommunicado, without charges

ZIMBABWE. Direct intervention dates from 67. Estimated 1700 SA troops assisted UDI regime, 77 jets in bombing raids killing 100s refugees. 81, explosion at Inkama barracks followed by incidents too numerous to mention, including individual murders.

ZAMBIA has been a target since 76 for military attacks.

MOZAMBIQUE is suffering most heavily from attacks, incursions, aggressions, with MRN. Matola raid characterized by Machel as act of war (saw houses in 81) Constant acts of sabotage, breaking crucial transport links, road, rail & oil pipeline with Zimbabwe, & sabotage of road & rail bridges.

BOTSWANA has suffered border violations, incursions & so-called 'counter-attacks' by forces operating from Namibia.

LESOTHO & SWAZILAND subject to kidnappings, killings, sabotage, bomb explosions & financing, arming & training of 'dissidents.'  
In Dec 83, 41 people were slaughtered in a raid, 12 Lesotho nationals, the rest SA refugees & visitors

SEYCHELLES Invasion of mercenaries arranged, equipped, prepared by SA

NAMIBIA Today, Nam is most militarized country in world, where 100,000 Ap troops occupy a country of 1.5 million citizens.  
SA has no intention of withdrawing from Nam, nor allowing UN-controlled elections. Tightened grip, increased terror, repression carried out by illegal occupying army. Afghan we hear about every day - what about Namibia? There are mass

detentions, deaths undr torture, wholesale massacres o civilians, & Nam hs become testng-ground fr SA military machine.

SADF Act o 57 exempts memhrs frm prosecution fr any acts carried out while suppressing 'terrorism'; ths includes indemnity fr detentions, deaths, torture & disappearances.

SA traing ethnically segregatd tribal armies startng wth Bushmn unit in Caprivi in 74. Lives, culture, everythng turnd completely around by t injection o arms & money into pastoral societies. These 'soldiers' bcome brutal gangs tt exist i many Af countries.

#### 4) ~~WHAT MAKES TOTAL STRATEGY POSSIBLE? SA'S NUCLEAR COLLABORATORS~~

~~Record o collaboration, p.19 SA8s Nuclear Capability.~~

#### APARTHEID IN WORLD CONTEXT

Put Ap into world context. People recognise it is evil, bt fail to understnd it is nt simply a moral question o racist or oppressive laws.

SA is country o extreme exploitation, whose aggressive stance rests on its determination to retain control o its own & neighbourng labr & othr resources. Despite its acknowledged threat to international peace & security & its aggressive & destructive interference in FL states, major Western powrs remain determind to continue collaboratng wth Pretoria in nuclear field. This long partnershp in developng & enhancng SA's nuclear capability is said to involve only 'peaceful' nuclear collaboration (like arms) Bt it is thru t transfer o N technology, expertise, equipmnt & othr forms o support tt Ap SA hs acquired its nuclear weapon capability. In a real sense it is precisely thru their partnership in SA N programme & t information gained therefrom tt these powrs hve convincg evidence about Pretoria's N capability.



What are SAs N ambitions? Hve we any doubts tt Pretoria wld hesitate to use N weapons, eithr against its own people, or neighbourng states? Some people in W wrld regard possession o N weapns as 'preventng' war - deterrent. Fr Sa, <sup>where</sup> possession is means o retainng A at all costs, we enter t politics o uncertainty. (The US military wld love to test out low-level N military weapons - t Kalahari wld serve sch a purpose)

White SAs myth o invincibility was sorely tried in 76 in Angola, & its lack o reliable personnel mass resources forces it to turn to othr means. Its solution seems to lie wth N weapons.

It is likely t regime hs specific targets i mind. It might consider t N destruction o major guerilla camps & bases wld b a dramatic demonstration o its determ. It might b expectd to bring an abrupt end to aid frm FL states. More importnt, t regime might expect tt t threat, whethr explicit or implicit, o N bombardmnt wld deter shc states as Angola, Moz, Tanz from aidng guerillas.

Indirectly, N deterrence wld hve othr objectives. T threat tt it might use N weapons might b expectd to deter international allies frm jettisong SA. Britain, France, the FRG & US might be deterred frm any pragmatic action to 'drop' support o Aporegime

### 5) YOUR NEED TO ACT

I undrstnd very wll t practicl politics o an org. tt concentrates on a single burng issue, & sch simplification hs great advantages in gettng mass support.

Bt while you gaze at t dangrs in Europe, t conflagration is flarng in anothr cornr o t wrld. You see t 2 gret pwrz confrontg each othr. Bt t N war disastr we all so long to prevnt may nt begin wth Reagan or ~~Andropov~~ <sup>Andropov</sup> pressng buttn, cann't only b seen in terms o wipng out Londn or Moscow or New York.

It cn just as easily - perhps more likely - start wth 'small' N weapons, wth 'limitd' destructive capacities, 5,000 miles away. And do you see eithr US or SU standg by & watchng, ~~if~~ if, eg, Maputo is blastd by Ap regime? Or t profits o Rossng, RTZ, & t whole Ap apparatus stand i dangr?

Behind our burng desire to prevent world war, to prevent t wipng out of everythng creatd by nature and by humans, there must b more thn t longng to preserve t status quo. The mass support you draw in must come in response to simple & true slogans. But those of you organisng tt support, leadng t fight fr world peace, must hve a strongr grasp on the politics; (quote wmn peace-campaigner at peace meetng)

Ap is yr real concern. On trial is capacity o wrld community to act; at risk is world peace; in the balance is our capacity to build a civilisation i n which humns are nt judgd by skin colour, but tt rests on justice & human dignity.

Whn considerng full implications of an Ap atomic bomb it is poss to see t monstrous gravity o t crime committed by all those outside powrs which hve helpd create a N Frankenstein i Af. It is no use pretendg they eithr made a series of consistent mistkes in encouragng N coll wth SA or were nt aware o Pretoria's ambition to acquire N weapns; they hve been warnd repeatdly by t SA lib movemnt. by Af & by internat. A-A community.

Whn SAs N weapn capability is seen in wider context o tt country being recognisd by t major Western powrs as a major regional powr i t Southn hemis, t dangr is increasd manifold. Overall West policy to SA is basd on givng priority to SA interests i t region, commitment to preservng 'stability' & 'security' o SA wth all 'reforms' bwing encouragd exclusively WITHIN A regime.

Western powrs advocate full recognition o SAs potential role as regional powr & propose various methds o incorporatng it into overall West. defence system. At same time it bcomes reasn fr abandong Af lib struggle, as its prosecution wld only lead to increasd violence wth catastrophic consequences.

Thus, i t growng confrontation within SA, t A rulrs hve been heavily armd wth modern conventional weapns frm West. countries to protect t white powr system; & nw t regime hs acquired thru yrs o collaboration a deadly N weapn as well.

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