

Ea 68

Extracts from SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE

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F.Hellman: URBAN AFRICANS IN WHITE AREAS

Page 23: ".....postulating that, contrary to initial expectations the necessary territorial adjustments are made, the economic development of the homelands is dramatically speeded, and eight fully independent fledgling Bantu nations are born, what then? Will South Africa then be securely set on the road to a reasonably equitable racial accommodation? The facts allow of no answer but an unqualified 'NO': and that the emergence of a number of separate African states will in no way bring the resolution of South Africa's basic racial problems any nearer.

The total African population in 1970, according to preliminary census figures, was 14,893,000. Of these 7,975,000 (53,5%) were in the so-called White areas and 6,918,000 in the homelands."

Page 24: "In the vigorous drive to decrease the number of Africans in the White areas, 69 new homeland towns have been established, and more are planned. But despite what appears to be an impressive increase in the homeland population, the all-important fact is that there are eight million Africans in the White homeland as against less than four million Whites, a proportion of more than 2 to 1. And there are no grounds whatsoever to infer that this proportion will ever be substantially reduced.

'White' South Africa could not function for a day without the army of African workers to man its industries and commercial undertakings, its mines and services. In 1960, the number of Africans employed in the White areas was 2,342,371, excluding 548,317 employed in mining and quarrying (over 60% of whom were foreign workers coming from countries outside the Republic). Since then, in a period of massive economic expansion, the figures have risen sharply. In manufacturing, the number of Africans employed rose from 308,583 in 1960 to 615,700 by August 1970."

Page 25: "The Government spokesmen, headed by the Minister of Labour, continue to proclaim 'No economic integration.' If that means faithful obedience to the two basic South African commandments: Never shall a White man be subordinate to a Black man; and never shall a Black man get a job when a White man is available, it cannot be gainsaid. If it means that the South African economy

is not irrevocably dependent on a racially mixed labour force, then the visible reality of factory and shop provides the living refutation.

But despite the indispensability of Africans in the economy of the White homeland, despite the fact that a growing proportion of the urban African population - which now numbers over four million - are second and third generation townsmen, ethnically inter-married and strangers to the homelands, their status in the White homeland is that of rightless aliens."

Pages
26
to
31

"THE GOVERNMENT'S TREATMENT OF URBAN AFRICANS

"The National Party came into power in 1948 pledged to regard Africans in urban areas as migrant workers, to arrest the process of detribalisation, to control 'the entire migration of Bantu into and from the cities' by the State with the co-operation of local bodies, to return 'redundant Bantu in the urban centres to their original habitat,' to permit the entry of Africans into the urban areas only as temporary employees compelled to return to their homes on the expiry of their employment, and to introduce what its 1948 manifesto called 'a convenient identification and control system.' In the intervening 23 years the National Party has elaborated this policy and has applied it relentlessly.

.....But briefly the position is that no African may be in an urban area without a permit for more than 72 hours (onus of proof resting on him) unless he was born there, worked for one employer there for ten years or was lawfully resident in the area for 15 years, and in each case continued to reside there. The wife, son under eighteen years or unmarried daughter of such a qualified African may also be in the town provided he or she ordinarily resides with him and entered the area lawfully. This latter, obviously paradoxical, provision has over recent years been interpreted to mean that a married man whose wife is not already lawfully in the town will only be permitted to have his wife join him if she has herself acquitted these qualifications in an urban area. Even such a residentially qualified African may lose his right to remain in the town if unemployed for a specific period, or in terms of one or other of the numerous regulations which can be invoked.....
The ideal, it is bluntly reiterated by Government spokesmen, is that all African labour in the White areas should be there on a migratory basis.

.....The 1968 Bantu Labour Regulations provide for this. They lay down that no African man - women are virtually prohibited from coming to a town to work - may leave his homeland unless, after registering with his tribal labour bureau, he has been offered and has accepted a specific job in the White area.

Such contract workers are required to return to their tribal area on the expiry of the job or at the end of twelve months. Provision is made for the renewal of the contract, if employer and employee both so desire, but the continuity of residence necessary to qualify for the right to remain in a town is broken.

Page 28 Another means used to increase the proportion of migrant workers in the towns is the sharp reduction of loan funds for family housing to local authorities.

On the outskirts of Johannesburg, in an area 2,5 square kilometres in extent, the first few of the planned 12 barrack-like hostels are in the course of erection. Each hostel will accommodate 2,500 'single' workers, ten for men and two for women. Johannesburg has a housing backlog of over 13,000 for families of legally qualified Africans. In Port Elizabeth the shortage of family houses is 12,000, and slum conditions are developing in townships once regarded as models. And it must be remembered that unless accommodation is available even a legally qualified African is not permitted to have his family join him. But this process of deliberate break-up of families with its attendant disruption of family life and the other all too predictable social consequences grinds on inexorably.

There has certainly been no attempt to camouflage the policy being followed in the White areas. The Minister put it plainly enough. 'In White areas here,' he said 'the Bantu are not being granted equality or potential equality with the White man in respect of any single aspect of social life whatsoever; not as far as the say as regards the government of this country is concerned, not as far as proprietary rights are concerned, not as far as labour status is concerned, not as far as social amenities are concerned; they have no potential or actual equality.' Of actual equality the Minister need not have bothered to speak. There never was such. And the actions of his Department, both under his direction and that of his predecessor, have spoken louder even than his words in their systematic elimination of such potentiality for equality as existed.

Page 29: Freehold rights to land have been extinguished. Townships where Africans owned land since the turn of the century and built their own houses have either been zoned as White group areas, or, as in Alexandra to the north of Johannesburg, are being cleared of family housing to make way for hostels.

Three years ago a departmental directive ordered local authorities to stop the sale of houses on easy terms on leasehold land of the homw ownership scheme whereunder Africans in the higher-income group built their own houses on 30 years' leasehold plots- a body blow aimed at the emerging middle class, robbing them of incentive and escurity, and counteracting the stabilising influence of home ownership. Traders have been limited to a one-men-one-site principle in the municipal African townships, have had their right to erect their own premises on leasehold plots taken from them, have been denied the right to form companies or enter into partnerships, and prohibited from establishing new dry-cleaning establishments, garages and filling stations. Local authorities were reminded that 'trading by Bantu in White areas is not an inherent primary opportunity for them' and were told that Bantu traders must confine themselves to the provision 'of the daily essential domestic necessities.' 'Moneyed Bantu and Bantu companies and partnerships ought to establish themselves in the Bantu homelands.'

The quid pro quo is citizenship of a homeland.....

The only right this citizenship seems to give is the right to vote in a homeland with which these urban Africans have long ceased to have any connection.

Pages 30/31:

The theory that, by some means or other, the total African population can be attached to the homelands is nothing more than an extended exercise in make-believe. It is abundantly clear that the homelands, overcrowded and under-developed as they are, helplessly dependent on the export of labour, can never hope to do more than support their present population and its natural increase. Even this is a wildly extravagant hope, realisable only if extensive industrial development in the homelands and a vas acceleration in the establishment of border industries can be brought about. At this stage, ten years after the programme wast introduced, the border industries give employment to some 110,000 Africans.

But the real evil stems from the two riders to the initial theory: that aal Africans in the White areas are to become migratory workers, and that urban Africans are in the towns on a temporary basis. The harmful economic effects are obvious. To attempt to meet the requirements of a modern economy, which needs an increasingly skilled and stable labour force, on the basis of migrant workers is a practical impossibility. But the extent of the family disruption and social demoralisation eroding the very fabric of African existence in the towns and villages and farms of White South Africa is less visible. 'The convenient

-identification

identification and control system' pledged by the National Party in 1948 has over the years been moulded into a documentation and permit system of monstrous dimensions, administered by an ever-growing bureaucracy. Like a Kafka nightmare, it engulfs the eight million Africans in the White homeland, reaching into work and domestic life, governing the entry of a wife into a home of a child into a school. It has contributed to swelling the daily average number in prison, sentenced & unsentenced, to 88,979 for the year 1968/69. In the same year, 632,077 persons were sent for trial for infringement of the various Acts and regulations collectively known as the pass laws. They constituted 26,5 per cent of the total number of prosecutions of persons of all races, for all offences. This means that the number of prosecutions under the pass laws averaged 1,732 every single day of the year.

Page 33: The challenge to which the supporters of separate development have conspicuously failed to respond is to indicate how they visualise the destiny of the millions of Africans who will live their lives outside the Bantustans. The politicians in the National Party, who frame the laws, give no answer.

A CRITIQUE OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT : Joel Mervis

Page 68: It is not the homeland Africans which constitute the problem, but the vast, urbanised, integrated African proletariat in the White area. The homelands certainly have nothing to complain about in the new deal but they provide no more than an interesting auxiliary to the main issue. The complex politico-constitutional edifice being built on their behalf could almost as well be taking place in Australia for all the relevance it will have in solving the critical confrontation that is steadily building up in the White area.

Pages 69/70 Whatever people may say to the contrary, and whatever a policy may claim, it remains an incontrovertible fact that the White area, consisting of Whites, Africans, Coloureds and Indians, is now an economically integrated society. So deep-rooted is the integration that it has become permanent and irrevocable. The population consists of approximately four million Whites, eight million Africans, two million Coloureds and 600,000 Asians (preponderantly Indians). There are in fact about one million more Africans in the White area than in the homelands. The prospect of any substantial move of Africans to the homelands is remote, largely because the homelands cannot support their existing population and Africans in the White area are desperately needed where they are.

If the pattern of twenty years of National Party rule is any criterion, the number of Africans in White South Africa can be expected to rise rather than drop. For two decades the Government has used every means at its disposal - and it has powerful resources - to halt the flow of Africans to the White areas. These prodigious efforts have met with failure on the grand scale. During the sixties - a decade of intense activity to keep the Africans out - the African population in the White area rose by about one million. In the two decades of Nationalist rule the number of Africans in the White area rose from two million to eight million - a 300 per cent increase. The figure of two million was given by Dr. Verwoerd, speaking at Naboomspruit on August 4, 1952.

In the context of Government policies in general, and of separate development in particular, a vitally important lesson can be learned from this vast flow of people across the massive barriers created to halt them. The lesson is that policies, edicts, warnings, promises, threats and regulations are powerless against economic and sociological forces when these really get to work. In this instance we had the full weight of Government power thrown into the fight to reverse the flow of Africans. The campaign failed. This failure should serve as a warning to those who place their faith in confident Government assurances that White supremacy will be maintained. High-sounding guarantees which ignore facts can be dangerously misleading. We have already seen how the assurances about restricting African migration and integration were easily defeated by events. The influx of Africans supplies the proof that the Government - any government - is incapable of eliminating the economic and sociological forces that are unleashed in a developing, expanding society. Thus, that maintenance of White supremacy will not be guaranteed by forceful ministerial statements, but rather by a willingness to recognise change and the forces of change, and to make the adjustments needed to channel those forces along a peaceful course. The policy of separate development does not inspire confidence that the Government will be any more successful in maintaining White supremacy than they were in stopping the flow of migrants.

Page 73: The Africans will still remain in the White areas, but with their rights steadily eroded. They will gradually be transformed into a sullen, resentful proletariat, living in a country in which they have no stake and are deprived of the right to have a stake.

Page 74: About 2,000 Africans in the Transkei are employed in industry; and industries are sparse. They include three furniture factories, three bakeries, three vehicle repair shops, a brewery (for Bantu beer) and a meat-processing plant. Of the 1,600,000 Africans in the Transkei, about 42,000 are in employment. Of these, about half are employed in Government service. The Bantu Investment Corporation, since its establishment in 1959, has invested R13-million in the development of the homelands. It has been particularly active in the retail trade, enabling Africans to take over about 400 shops at approximately R18,000 a shop. Up to 1969 it had financed 1,100 businesses through direct loans and 1,300 by-trade credit on stock. It established 12 wholesale distribution organisations and 28 savings banks. The upshot is that, in ten years, after spending R13-million, the corporation has enabled 5,000 people to be employed in the homelands.

Page 75: The Tomlinson Report, published about fifteen years ago, envisaged the creation of 50,000 jobs a year. In fact, the average is at most 5,000 a year. Further, Tomlinson gave us until 1981 to create the jobs, because a population of 15,000,000 was projected by 1981. The projected 1981 population figure has already been reached, which places the number of jobs even further behind in the race for economic viability. The Tomlinson Report anticipated the creation of 1,250,000 jobs by 1981 at the rate of 50,000 a year. As we have already reached the 1981 population figure, and as only 75,000 jobs have so far been created, it could be said that we have already fallen behind by 1,175,000 jobs.

Page 76: Only an optimist can believe that the Black population of the White area will decrease. The probabilities are that the number of Africans (eight million at present) will have risen substantially by the end of the century. Demographers' projections are not always reliable, and these tend to vary from demographer to demographer. The projection of the year 2000 is that the African population in the White area will be at least 13 million. Some projections go as high as 20 million, but if we take the lower figure that is plenty to go on with, particularly as the White population is expected to be no more than seven million. These figures, in themselves, are a denial and a negation of 'separation.' They show that all the arts of influx control and other restraints are powerless to halt the inexorable increase of the Black population.

Page 79:

Dr.Muller at the United Nations said: 'Those who belong to the South African nation hold no brief for the domination of any nation over another This, Sir, is a principle fundamental in our policy of separate development - a policy which is profoundly different from the caricature of apartheid which is commonly presented by our critics....it is our objective to provide to every individual the fullest chance of development within his own nation and,where possible in his own national homeland.....respect for human dignity.'

Dr.Muller was able to make these observations because he was speaking specifically about nations and not about races. Whem, therefore, he spoke of granting 'every individual the fullest chance of development within his own nation,' he was excluding eight million Africans in White South Africa because they are not 'individuals within their own nation.'

When he spoke about 'respect for human dignity' he excluded them again because they are not a nation. This is a form of sophistry to make one blush, but at any rate it is the device by which denial of rights to Africans in the White area is being justified.

RACE RELATIONS & THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY

Page 275:

Non-Whites in the South African Economy : G.M.E.LEISTNER

Table 1: The Population of South Africa, 1904-1970

(Number in thousands)

	<u>1904</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
WHITES	1,117,2	1,521,3	2,003,2	2,372,0	2,641,7	3,080,2	3,750,7
BANTU	3,490,3	4,697,3	6,595,6	7,830,6	8,560,1	10,927,0	15,057,6

Per cent

WHITES	21,6	22,0	20,9	20,8	20,9	19,3	17,5
BANTU	67,5	67,8	68,8	68,6	67,6	68,3	70,2

Table 2: Urban Population, 1904-1970 (Number in thousands)

WHITES	599	908	1,367	1,793	2,089	2,575	3,258
BANTU	361	658	1,262	1,902	2,391	3,471	4,989

Urban population expressed as a percentage of the respective group
(estimates)

WHITES	53,6	59,7	68,2	75,6	79,1	83,6	86,8
BANTU	10,4	14,0	19,0	24,3	27,9	31,8	33,1

Table 3: Prospective Population Growth, 1970-2000

(Official estimates; H = High Estimates - L = Low estimate. Number in thousands)

	Estimate	1960 Census	1970	1980	1990	2000
WHITES	H	3,080	3,808	4,704	5,747	7,033
	L		3,736	4,420	5,152	5,948
BANTU	H	10,928	13,721	17,393	22,048	27,949
	L		13,521	16,644	20,489	25,222
<u>Per cent</u>						
WHITES	H	19,3	18,9	18,3	17,5	16,7
	L		18,8	18,0	17,1	16,1
BANTU	H	68,3	68,0	67,6	67,3	66,5
	L		68,0	67,9	68,1	68,4

Table 4: Estimates in respect of the Geographical Distribution of the Bantu Population 1960 and 2000

Numbers in thousands.

Area & Type of Population	1960			2000		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
<u>Urban Areas</u>						
Temporarily resident	825	2008	1,025	13,125	12,755	25,880
Permanently "	1,198	1,248	2,446			
Total present	2,023*	1,448*	3,471*	13,125	12,755	25,880

Figures marked by an asterick * have been taken from official reports. All other figures are estimated by the author.

Bantu Areas

Present	1,732*	2,338*	4,120*	4,208	5,792	10,000
Absent	704	150	854			
Total Population	2,436	2,538	4,974	4,208	5,792	10,000
<u>Other, mainly rural areas</u>						
Temporarily resident	246	131	377	2,200	1,800	4,000
Permanently "	1,511	1,449	2,960			
Total present	1,757*	1,580*	3,337*	2,200	1,800	4,000
Total Bantu Population:	5,512*	5,416*	10,928*	19,533	20,347	39,880

Page 281: Table 7: Average monthly earnings in various sectors, 1969

Sector	Month resp. Monthly ave average	Whites	Bantu	Bantu earnings related to earnings of other population groups (Bantu = 1,0)
				Whites
Mining	October	325,6	17,5	18,6
Manufac- turing	October	276,5	49,8	5,5
Construc- tion	October	303,9	46,5	6,5
Railways & Harbours	March	247,2	-	-
Central Government	January March	211,3	36,1	5,8
Provincial authori- ties	January March	198,1	31,9	6,2
Munici- palities	January March	230,2	38,0	6,1
Wholesale trade	July September	251,9	49,1	5,1
Retail trade	July September	134,7	39,3	3,4

Page 284: Table 11 : Development of the Border Areas

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Employment (in thousands)	76	128	133	138	145	176	163
of which Bantu (in thousands)	55	91	99	104	109	136	124
Estimate private investments (million rand)	-	177	221	296	314	400	429

D.Hobart Houghton : Apartheid Idealism versus
 Economic Reality

Pages
294/5:

The rapid expansion of the economy, particularly during the last decade when the real gross domestic product (at 1958 prices) rose from R5,139 million in 1960 to R8,768 million in 1969 (an increase of 70% in ten years), has led to an acute shortage of skilled manpower. The dilemma is illustrated by the fact that the Economic Development Programme (1965-70) a 5½% growth rate was expected to expand the demand for skilled labour between 1965-70 by 200,000, but the White labour force was only expected to grow by 155,000. The shortfall of 45,000 skilled workers could only be met by increased productivity, immigration or greater use of non-White labour in skilled occupations. The gross national product has continued to expand and the conclusion is that all three of the above possibilities have been operative. Although difficult to quantify, it is widely accepted that there has been considerable upward movement of non-whites and that many are now employed in jobs formerly performed by white persons. It is becoming increasingly clear to all that the continuing economic progress of the country requires a more rational deployment of South Africa's human resources, irrespective of race, if its greater potential is to be realised. Despite continuing pressure from the major employers' organisations the Government has shown little sympathy for repeal of restrictive colour bar legislation. This is perhaps explained by a recent statement by the Prime Minister who said that while we must recognise economic realities we must also recognise political realities. Nevertheless, if organised White labour successfully continues to oppose relaxation of restrictive measures that prevent full utilisation of our human resources it will be a major tragedy for South Africa; and it makes a mockery of the belief that White rule is most likely to promote the economic progress of the country.

Page 296: If Africans, who constitute so large a part of the labour force of the Republic (excluding the Bantu homelands), are to make their effective contribution, opportunities for vertical advance in employment combined with better education and technical training are essential. Moreover, housing, a stable social environment where normal family life can be achieved, and a sense of security and belonging to the community are essential in a modern industrial society which increasingly is demanding skilled rather than unskilled labour. The policy of separate development would seem to necessitate the continuance of the migratory labour system, and this system is destructive of normal family life and the building up of a stable community at the place of employment. It breeds social and economic instability in the labour force, which impedes

the evolution in workers of a lasting commitment to an industrial society and an incentive to improve their skills and productivity.

J.A.Grobbelaar : RACE AND LABOUR RELATIONS

Page 311: Restrictive Labour Practices as a cause of Racial Friction -

South Africa's restrictive labour practices and legislation, coupled with irresponsible political antics, will be the major factor for generating racial friction. Hardline racial attitudes by some worker groups and labour organisations are established solely through following the lead set for them by irresponsible politicians. Our integrated labour force is, up to the present time, not displaying frightening signs of immediate racial conflict in the place of work itself.

It is outside the environment of the work place, and beyond the practice of work, that our concern for racial harmony must be focussed. The responsibility for this lies squarely on the shoulders of Government, the leaders of commerce and industry, trade unionists, and all other opinion-makers and men of conscience. It must be remembered that our original industrial legislation was only introduced as a result of serious industrial unrest during 1922, which was confined to the white workers. There is no guarantee that further industrial unrest will not result if the non-white workers are not also given more of a say in determining their own destiny, and a more equitable share in the rewards of work. It is unrealistic to expect any work force in a modern industrial society not to demand improved conditions. The non-white workers in South Africa, who are becoming our industrial proletariat, who are the muscle and sinew of our production processes, are going to demand the removal of existing discriminatory practices.

It is a myth to believe that these workers will continue to remain docile, contented, and silent, particularly since their newly developing skills are making them ever more sophisticated. It is also unreasonable to expect that a less privileged class shall develop these skills, become more sophisticated, produce the major portion of the work, and yet have no desire to challenge the authority of the more privileged class. The mass of the working poor are also the mass of the racially under-privileged. This makes it vitally necessary to ensure that progressive removal of discrimination (particularly in the work place) becomes a fact. Non-white economic and status advances are essential if a political explosion is to be averted. Steps for improvement can be instituted without generating white reaction, or racial friction, if these steps are taken in a constructive, responsible and orderly fashion.

With my
compliments
Ellen.

INTERDENOMINATIONAL AFRICAN MINISTERS' ASSOCIATION
OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

JOHANNESBURG'S AFRICAN COMMUNITY

by

Dr. Ellen Hellmann

(at the Urban Areas' "Workshop"
held in Johannesburg from November
24 to 27, 1964)

Before I attempt to deal with my subject, I must make some preliminary observations which, however obvious, are necessary as a background. In the first place, I must stress the heterogeneity of Johannesburg's urban African community. "Urban" in itself carries the connotation of heterogeneity, and the larger the metropolis, the greater the variety we expect to encounter among its residents, not only in respect of their origin, occupation, family circumstances, status, but also in their style of life and degree of adjustment to the urban locale. This is equally true of Africans, and I spell out the obvious chiefly because it is not so long since it was customary to regard Africans, and to treat them in regard to housing and other amenities, as though they were all the same. Even though this is no longer the position, there is still a tendency to speak of "The Africans" as though they alone, in distinction to others, reacted to complex urban and industrial conditions in a uniform way.

Secondly, I have - at great cost to my parochial pride - to tell you that, apart from the statistics and data produced by an active research section of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department, the work done by the National Institute for Personnel Research, the investigation into patterns of expenditure conducted by the Market Research Section of the University of South Africa,⁽¹⁾ occasional papers like those of Mr. Mkohe's⁽²⁾ on the middle class, Miss Longmore's⁽³⁾ and Mrs. Brandel's⁽⁴⁾ work chiefly on women, practically no recent research has been conducted in Johannesburg. East London has the impressive work of Prof. Mayer⁽⁵⁾ and Dr. Pauw;⁽⁶⁾ Langa is sociologically on record in Prof. Wilson's and Mr. Mafeje's sparkling book;⁽⁷⁾ Durban has been the subject of a number of studies and soon Prof. Kuper's important book, An African Bourgeoisie, will be available. Hence what I have to say will be based on somewhat outdated work and will also necessarily be to some extent impressionistic. But I shall draw on these published works, which, in many basic respects, have yielded similar findings.

Thirdly, I draw your attention to the fact that African townward migration is a dual process. In addition to the familiar adjustments that transfer to town normally entails - epitomised in

the stereotypes of "country bumpkin" and "city slicker" -- Africans have, to a greater or lesser extent, to make a cultural transition and are subject to a cultural discontinuity which the white urban entrant does not experience. Even though the Republic is subject to a territory-wide modernization, a predominantly traditional form of life does still obtain in large parts of the rural areas. Towns in South Africa are the products of western culture. They are entirely western in structure and in ethos and, as such, the hothouses of change.

Furthermore, African townward movement was in its inception and still is today largely migrant in character. To commence with, African migrancy in Johannesburg was due partly to the reluctance of Africans themselves to leave their homes in the country for longer than necessary to earn the money required to pay for such limited needs as they then had, and partly to the doubt as to the permanency of Johannesburg itself, which came into being as a mining camp. Today migrancy is still to some extent voluntary. Mayer estimates that between one third and one half of the whole adult male working population in East London consists of Red Xhosa who are in town solely because of the necessity to earn money but who reject urban ways to the maximum extent possible and reject urban values. Mayer calls them a community in exile, living an encapsulated existence which is in fact an extension of their rural society. In Langa, Wilson estimates that probably one third of the population consists of migrants, School or Red, who do not accept town values and regard the country as their home. She states that the town-country cleavage over-rides all other bases of differentiation. Similar studies have not been carried out in Johannesburg, but it is my opinion, based on such work as has been done and on demographic data, that the proportion of migrants by choice is a much smaller one in Johannesburg. This would in fact be expected because Johannesburg is not located near to Reserves as is East London and because, unlike Capetown where the employment of Africans is a comparatively recent development, Johannesburg has been increasingly dependent on African workers for its burgeoning industrial and commercial activities. The normal progression from labour migrancy - of single men, which is the South African pattern - to permanent urban settlement, a process which was becoming increasingly evident from the 1930's onwards and was accentuated during and after World War 2 when such a marked impetus was given to industrialization, has been curbed by urban areas legislation designed to restrict family life in urban areas and to perpetuate migrancy. There is no doubt that this legislation has had the result, particularly since 1959 when women came under influx control, of increasing the proportion of migrants by compulsion - of so-called "single" men who want to bring their wives and families to live

with them in town and who desire to make their homes in the town where they work, but who are prevented from doing so by the laws of the land.

The number of Africans in Johannesburg at the end of June 1964 was estimated by the Non-European Affairs Department to be 611,512 - excluding 73,000 in the peri-urban areas and 22,000 mine workers accommodated in compounds which are situated within the magisterial area. Of the Johannesburg residents, a little over three-quarters (470,458) lived in the townships under conditions of family life. Women outnumbered men by roughly 8,000 in the age group over 18 years in the municipal townships. Africans living under single conditions in hostels, compounds or on their employer's private premises, amounted to some 87,000 men and 55,000 women. With men outnumbering women by less than 30,000 in a population of over 600,000, a position of near parity as between men and women has been reached. It must, in passing, be remarked that we have no means of knowing or even estimating how many of the 87,000 so-called "single" men are in fact married and involuntarily parted from their wives. This population distribution is very different from that which obtained in the past. At the beginning of the century, men outnumbered women by 10 to 1; by the outbreak of the war in 1939, the proportion had decreased to 4 to 1, and by 1946 it was just over 2 to 1. Whether the effect of the present strict application of influx control will be to increase the masculinity rate in the towns is for the future to show. It does, however, seem probable to me because, with the more rigorous administration of the pass laws, coupled with the practice of "conditional employment" which permits a man to be in the town only while he is employed by a specific employer, the number of men who qualify for the right to be in the town and therefore to have their rural families with them will decrease. Under present conditions, the growth of the permanent urban African population is likely to come chiefly from the natural increase of present urban residents, and already there are signs that a form of urban endogamy is being fostered.

Despite the fact that there has been over the last few years a very considerable diversification of occupations and earnings and a sector of Africans are today in comfortable circumstances, poverty still remains, to quote Mr. Carr, the Manager of Johannesburg's Non-European Affairs Department, the most important factor in the townships. Amidst the general pre-occupation with and emphasis on affluence and prosperity, this basic fact tends to be obscured. The average earnings of heads of families is R42-00 a month, and close on one half

of families (48%) are entirely dependent on this sole source of income. Even though average monthly family income is R58-00, 60% of the total number of families fall below the poverty datum line of R48-24 per month for a family of five. What these figures indicate is a much wider range of earnings and income than was formerly the case, but they also emphasize how misleading "averages" can be and how widespread the stark shortfall in earnings is. Over the years material standards have risen. I am referring here not to luxury consumption, but to rock-bottom standards of decent clothing - school uniforms for children as one example and a better appreciation of basic nutritional requirements.

The effects of poverty are far-reaching and involve far more than stringency, sometimes destitution, in the home. Among them are the compulsion on the wife and mother to go out to work at times when young children need her at home, parental inability to meet children's needs and consequent lowering of their esteem, creation of a social climate which condones trade in stolen goods in the consciousness that they come from an incredibly privileged section, the Whites, and which accords disproportionate admiration to the successful punter on horses and the fah-fee winner. These subsidiary effects of poverty take place within the framework of the all-pervasive change from a subsistence to a market economy, which in itself fosters individualism and acquisitiveness and makes possession of material goods the symbol of success and status.

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The major change, from which many others flow, in the transition from ruralism to urbanism, is from a closed social universe, in which a limited number of kinsmen and neighbours co-operated in a number of closely connected activities, to an unlimited social universe in which neither the people with whom a man co-operates nor the activities in which he participates, need, and seldom do, bear any relation to each other. It is a transformation, as Wilson puts it, from a "society based primarily on kinship to one based on association" (page 175). For the townsman, with whom this paper deals, this transformation is virtually complete though not, of course, for the migrant. Instead of living within a closed network of social relations with all the people an individual knows also knowing each other, the townsman lives in an open network in which, more often than not, the people he works with, prays with, plays with are entirely distinct.

In addition to the family, with which I will deal later, there are two new categories of grouping within the townships: the one,

Class.

the class structure, is intangible, without constitution or defined membership but nevertheless influential in moulding behaviour and, above all, a determinant of social status; and the other, the system of voluntary associations, is concrete and precise.

Mkele, who has written extensively on the emergent middle class, says that "class distinctions are now part and parcel of the African social system, and the forms they take do not depart in any significant fashion from those the Whites know". Education, occupation, economic position and being born into the right family, in that order, determine class status, and it is clear that acceptance of Western standards and values is associated with the attainment of middle class status. The degree of westernization is in itself an index of class position. Respectability and a somewhat meticulous concern for etiquette are characteristics of this middle class noted by Mkele, which have earned for it the appellation of "Ooscuse me". This middle class, consisting of individuals working on their own account, such as business men, independent professionals and entertainers, and what Mkele calls the serving middle class, that is, teachers, nurses, clerks, journalists, senior administrators, is still a small group. In Pretoria it was reckoned at 6%. But these are the standard-setters for the whole urban African population, the people who figure in the society pages of the African Press, the people whose success is acknowledged and whose example is emulated.

Wilson presents a much more detailed analysis of the stratification of the Langa community into three broad categories of migrants, the semi-urbanized or would-be townsmen, and the townsmen themselves who fall into four subsections. On the one hand, there are the "townees" who consist of a younger group, the tsotsis, and an older group, the Oomac, violent, boisterous, derisive of Christianity, the angry young men of the township; and another group of townees, potential recruits to the lower middle class, who are conservative and conformist. On the other hand there is an essentially middle class section, estimated to form one-third of the families in Langa, many educated, practically all supporters of the church though not all church-goers. The older group are on the whole the less well-educated, the traders, independent craftsmen, clerks. The upper ranks of this middle class, here also called "the ooscuse me", are a younger group, composed chiefly of professional people. Mkele and Wilson say in different language essentially the same about this middle class. Mkele says that the factors that make for class distinction among Africans can be summed up in terms of the degree of identification with the values of capitalist society: Wilson says those with the highest status in Langa are those who have absorbed most of western culture.

I stress this point because of its significance in any attempted assessment of the trend of cultural development. For these analyses of the African middle class indicate that, provided the aspirations of this middle class are not rejected, African cultural development will be along western lines. The African middle class has made it clear that it is prepared to uphold what is broadly called the western way of life and accept the values associated with it, on condition, of course, that this acceptance is not artificially restricted to certain aspects of total being.

It is not possible in this talk to do more than refer in passing to the multiplicity of voluntary associations based on common interest and common objectives that have been established in the townships. Membership of these groups is a matter of individual choice by contrast with membership of the family, which is determined by birth. There is a host of sports clubs, welfare and self-improvement societies, professional associations, economic organizations, cultural groups, choirs, bands, all adding to the variety and richness of life. There were too, until they were banned, political organizations which commanded from some individuals a total commitment. Anthropologists, as Wilson says, would likewise regard the church as an association, particularly in a community with a pagan background, where many people are not "born into" a church, but have chosen whether or not to become church members. In Langa churches are the dominant type of association numerically and in the influence they have exerted on the community. Whether this is true of Johannesburg, I do not know. My impression is that amongst the convinced adherents of the churches women predominate and that the hold of the church is stronger among older than among younger people. There is certainly no doubt that among the strongest voluntary associations are the women's manyanos, which call forth from their members, again chiefly women of maturer years, the most fervent support and add a quality of great worth to their lives, giving them purpose and status, spiritual solace and the warmth of dedicated companionship.

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The basic social unit, as in all human societies, is the family. But instead of a lineage segment, consisting of grandfather, father, sons with their spouses forming the domestic and residential unit, in towns it is the elementary, western type family, consisting of primary relations which forms the residential unit. This change is highlighted by the fact that in Soweto, the average size of tenant and sub-tenant families was found to be 5.3 persons (which does not

mean that this was the total family size, as urban parents often send their children to the country to avoid their being "spoiled" by the urban environment, because of poverty, to go to boarding schools and so on). A different sample, investigated by the Market Research Section of the University of South Africa, found the household to average 5.6 persons, of whom only .33 were not members of the elementary family.

This small urban family is the centre of conflicting pressures. On the one hand, its very smallness and isolation - one among thousands of others - make for greater interdependence among its members and throw on this small group, particularly the parents, educational and economic functions formerly borne by a whole circle of kin. On the other, the individual can, entirely at his own choice, throw off all responsibility and escape irksome obligations by simple vanishing into the mealstrom of humanity surrounding him. Both processes are evident, often within the same family at different times - for example, the son who leaves the parental home and is "lost" but returns in sickness or unemployment.

Within the family, behaviour patterns are changing slowly and inevitably - unevenly. The position of women has undergone a profound change due partly to their economic rôle and partly to the increasing responsibility for management of budget, home and children devolving upon them. The traditional pattern of male domination and female subservience is clearly inappropriate in these circumstances and many women are actively in revolt against male authoritarianism. Patterns of companionship, consultation and shared responsibility are emerging in some families. In others, the old forms continue. In yet others, men are reacting by casting off all obligation - in many cases limiting their financial contribution to payment of rent - and leaving all responsibility, economic and other, to the wife. I believe that the widespread instability of marriage and the high incidence of separations and divorces is certainly to some extent attributable to this conflict between the new responsibilities and outmoded status of the African townswoman. Her insecurity and difficulties are further heightened by her anomalous legal position whereunder, even though she functions as a western woman, she remains subject to Native law, unless married by civil rites and safeguarded by a written will - a situation that urgently requires the attention of a commission of enquiry in order to effect the necessary adjustments in the law.

The same difficulties of transition from a pattern of respect for seniority and of shared responsibility for child rearing among a body of kin, to a more democratic pattern with sole responsibility vesting in the parents manifest themselves in parent-child relations.

These, I suggest, seem to stem largely from the traditional Bantu conception of a child not as a person, but as a thing, which is part of the cultural luggage brought to town. In saying this I do not mean to imply any lack of love - far from it. I refer to what seems to be a lack of comprehension of the dignity of a child and the need to accord even a child a certain degree of respect. Mothers tell children, "send" children, scold children, threaten their children with the direst punishments. But they do not seek to win their friendship and confidence by discussion and trying to build up joint understanding. This failure in communication is one of the problems of which African townswomen are most acutely aware and unable to resolve unless given skilled and patient guidance. To many mothers "education" has come to be equated with "schooling". They make sacrificial efforts to see their children through school and yet find there is an unbridgable distance between them in the home. Fathers are authoritarian and aloof. "A father cannot be friends with his child", says a proverb. The distance between the generations is often widened by differences in education, the children educated and urban-sophisticated, the parents illiterate or near-illiterate and countrified. The long journey to work often curtails opportunities for father and children to be together. It has often seemed to me that rejection of parental authority fuses in many instances with repudiation of the discriminatory laws imposed by the white man to produce a complete rejection of all authority, of the very concept of law and order. Whatever the reasons - and there are many - the lack of parental discipline is evident, the incidence of juvenile delinquency high, and the emergence of gangs of tsotsi's, quick to draw the knives, a recurrent phenomenon.

The incidence of illegitimacy is likewise high, Wilson giving percentages from 26 to 47 of all births. Pauw, writing of East London, found that 40% of births were illegitimate, and goes on to say that, although deplored, illegitimacy has become a regular and accepted feature of the social structure, with the children usually integrated into the domestic family to which the mother belongs.

Pauw's study of urban-bred Xhosa in East London led him to the finding that while "the elementary family is a basic type, it shows a strong tendency on the one hand to lose the father at a relatively early stage and on the other to develop a multi-generation span" (page 149). Of the 109 families he studied, nearly one half (46) had female heads, unmarried mothers, widows, divorced, separated or deserted women. In Langa, the small family section of which appears to be a more stable and norm-directed community, Wilson also found close-knit groups of mothers and daughters similar, as she says, to those in the slums of Liverpool and London. In Johannesburg we

have no statistical evidence of the extent of fragmentation. The Market Research Survey showed only 197 female-headed families (14%) out of its total sample of 1,409, and a total of 258 (18%) broken families in all. I, personally, incline to regard this as an underestimate, necessarily so because of the difficulty of establishing precise relationships by normal survey techniques.

The three major sets of factors contributing to family instability seem to me to be the attitude towards sex; the indecisiveness as to what constitutes marriage; and, bound up with this breakdown in traditional patterns and norms, a breakdown in traditional sanctions, which in effect means a failure in restructuring the community.

Prof. Mayer says of the Xhosa philosophy of sex that sexual satisfaction is regarded as a normal requirement of every adult, whether married, unmarried or widowed. I believe that this is true likewise of other ethnic groups. The belief that adults become what is called "weak" if they do not have regular sex relations seems to be very prevalent. In tribal society, children, from a very early age onward played freely at sex games. After puberty young men and women were permitted among all Southern Bantu tribes to have lovers, but lovemaking was restricted to external intercourse and premarital pregnancy was strongly disapproved. Krige puts it this way: "To regard Bantu marriage as the culmination of sex love would be giving this institution the wrong perspective. It is the social, legal and economic aspects that are the most important. Further, marriage is primarily an affair between groups, involving the two families concerned even more than the individual" (page 111). In other words, as Pauw points out, sexual gratification is not necessarily associated with the conjugal bond - as it is in the ideal of Christian marriage. What were guarded were not exclusive sexual rights but rights to the procreative powers of a woman, i.e. the rights of the kinship group. Pauw argues that a woman's procreative powers were protected by marriage to guard the rights of the patrilineal kinship group, and that the increase in extra-marital pregnancies is related to the weakening of kinship ties. He finds support for this argument in his impression that illegitimacy is less prevalent among Red than School people, and that kinship bonds likewise persist more strongly among the Reds.

What has happened over the past half century, and more markedly in towns than in the country, is that while the belief in the necessity for continuous sexual activity has persisted, the taboo on full sexual intercourse between unmarried people has broken down. A new and misleading concept of romantic love has been introduced and gained a certain currency, marriage has increasingly become a matter of

individual choice with kin playing a lesser part in arranging it and consequently carrying very little, if any, responsibility for ensuring its continuance. A further complication is presented by the persistence of lobolo. Despite the fact that the rôle of kin in arranging a marriage has been so greatly diminished, once two young people have indicated their desire to marry and have obtained parental consent, it is obligatory, with negligible exceptions, for the groom to pay lobolo to the bride's parents. Lobolo is today money, even though it may be discussed in terms of cattle units, and the amount is related to the girl's education and occupation. A staff nurse's lobolo is not uncommonly £250. This insistence on lobolo payment often has the effect of delaying marriage, which not infrequently results in a break-up of the relationship, even if children have meanwhile been born. I regard lobolo as an example, par excellence, of a cultural trait which cannot appropriately be transferred into the new cultural situation, because with the change in the medium and the tendency to commercialisation, it loses its function. In traditional society, the right to the children depended on transfer of lobolo, and the lobolo cattle themselves, distributed among certain kin, involved these people in a joint concern to see the marriage maintained and the parties to it follow the correct behaviour. "Money melts", says the townsman, "and I cannot get it back even if my wife deserts me". Africans themselves are vehemently divided on the question. Partly it is the inertia of custom which comes into play, but the feeling of many girls that they suffer a derogation in status if their value is not acknowledged by the payment of lobolo is evident, and latterly, there has been an emphasis on cultural pride. "It is our custom, therefore it is good".

One of the great needs, crucial, I believe, for the future if stable marriages are indeed the aim, is to provide for formal definition and registration of a marriage by means of a valid document. At present Native Customary Unions are registered only in Natal: elsewhere, if "proof" of marriage is needed, as for example in applying for a house in a township, a man makes a declaration which is embodied in an affidavit in a Bantu Commissioner's office, (at a cost of one shilling) the so-called "shilling" marriage. Formal definition and legal recognition of marriage is necessary because of the change from a closed to an open network, and from purely personal to contractual relationships. Formal legal obligations, enforceable by the courts, have to replace reciprocal obligations buttressed by the closed network of kin and a face-to-face community. Furthermore, I consider that while obviously there must continue to be provision for Native Customary Unions, marriages contracted under the common law, i.e. Christian or civil marriages, should entail the consequences of the common law. I stress this

question of marriage, because strengthening the bonds between husband and wife is essential to stabilizing the elementary family. This is of over-riding importance, because, as the findings of the psychologists and psychiatrists have demonstrated so abundantly, unless the members of this family develop enduring affective relationships within the family, they are likely to have their ability to form stable personal relationships permanently damaged. It is unnecessary, I think, because I believe there is consensus on this point, to do more than mention that laws which prevent people from living under conditions of family life defeat this essential aim and harm the society. The story of the man who, denied the right to bring his wife to town, contracts a "shilling" marriage with a woman who is available to give him the home he wants, deserts his legitimate wife and drifts into a succession of temporary alliances, producing a number of children for whom he assumes no permanent responsibility, must be familiar to you all.

The fact that Christian and secular ideals of marriage coincide, no matter how great the present deviation in some western countries of practice from precept, gives the church significant support in one of its most vital tasks: fostering the concept of Christian marriage. Furthermore, it has already the support of accepted example within the African community. Wilson draws attention to the difference between Langa and the community Longmore describes in The Dispossessed, pointing out that the difference is due partly to a difference of category and class. In Langa, she says, the "decent people" are numerous and among them illegitimacy is a stigma. Likewise Pauw who, after discussing the break-up of marriages, says, "This is, of course, only one side of the picture. On the other hand Christian concepts of chastity and marital fidelity have been introduced and there are those of the urban Xhosa who genuinely and earnestly seek to order their sex and family life accordingly. We have seen, however, that the impact of Christian teaching on attitudes and norms pertaining to sex appears to be very restricted". He expresses the opinion that "the church has a definite task in relation to the prevailing moral situation among the Bantu. It has something to say to those who wield political influence, about the way in which social structure militates against moral norms, but it also has something to say to the urban Bantu themselves. Towards them its task is not only to proclaim those absolute moral norms relating to sex and the family, but more important, still, to proclaim a gospel of salvation from the powers, including forces exerted by a particular structural situation, which militate against conforming to these norms. Perhaps the reason why Christian teaching seems to have had so little impact on the sex life of the Bantu is that too much stress has been laid on norms, and too little on salvation and redemption" (page 164).

This leads us logically to some consideration, even if brief and hence superficial, of what is clearly the major problem of urban living: that of social control, which involves in essence defining certain approved standards of behaviour and ensuring their observance. It means broad agreement on values and a series of sanctions which will operate to promote conformity. Basically, there are three different forms of sanctions which, in a relatively stable society, re-inforce each other: these are, religious sanctions, the law with its threat of direct penalty, and public opinion. People conform or do not conform because they want to win public approval or do not want to incur public disapproval - "what will they say?"; because they do not want to be fined or imprisoned by a court of law; because they believe that certain forms of behaviour will cause the ancestral spirits to punish them or their family or, if they are Christians, that God may punish them; or because they have internalized the rules of conduct and would feel that they have sinned and could not live with that feeling of guilt even if their transgression were not public.

The fact that membership of a church in itself has little effect in regulating behaviour - a finding on which different investigators seem to be agreed - stems from many causes. Firstly, I suggest, because the majority of Africans do not interpret misfortune in terms of inscrutable Divine Providence or of impersonal causation, but in personal terms as being due to the manipulations of an enemy. While the belief in magic - that is, the control of supernatural powers through certain special substances to effect certain desired ends, good or bad - persists as strongly as it does, religion cannot exercise a decisive effect on behaviour. A widespread belief in the efficacy of magical practices, I suggest, promotes amorality rather than any specific code of morality. (I quote the rather extreme example of the belief that a magistrate can by appropriate substances be influenced to return a verdict of not guilty. The general resort to medicines to ensure "success", "popularity", promotes a mechanistic conception and certainly diminishes the element of personal striving, personal responsibility). Secondly, the fact that the Christian Church is part of the White world and therefore, despite its manifest strivings, part of the order of White supremacy which is rejected by all Africans, causes conflicts, weakens belief, and must diminish the influence of belief in moulding patterns of behaviour. It is undoubtedly true, as Wilson says (page 100), that "many of the younger generation consciously associate Christianity with White supremacy". Many of the tsotsi elements among the townsmen are supporters of national organizations and "as the national movement becomes more radical, it implies to some the rejection of Christianity". This is why church buildings are often set alight in a riot - it is a visible

manifestation of the rejection of White domination and of the African middle class which has accepted the values of and co-operates with those denying the Black man the equal status he seeks. Whereas formerly Christianity and western culture (or "civilization" or "modernism") were so closely associated as often to be identified, to many townsmen today they are distinct, sometimes opposed, concepts. These factors must undermine any religious control of behaviour, even though, in my view, secular and Christian values coincide to a considerable extent and the majority of even those African townsmen who question the church do not repudiate Christian ideals such as honesty, chastity, fidelity, truthfulness, etc. My main point is that, apart from certain small closely knit and authoritarian churches such as Bhengu's in Port Elizabeth, the churches in general are unable to make a decisive contribution to social control.

I have already, in discussing juveniles, referred to the effect of racial discrimination in our legal system. Laws like influx control, location regulations, pass laws, prohibition of the right to strike, which apply only to Africans, firstly do not command public acceptance and secondly undermine the respect for law and order as such and also tend, because the outcome of contravention is the same, namely imprisonment, to blur the distinction between statutory offences and crime. Legal prohibitions lose their moral force and may in fact make law breaking or law evasion a positive value if they fail to command public support. I remind you of the disastrous effects of prohibition in the U.S.A., when drinking in defiance of the law became a distinction, as also of the applause the successful pass-law evader earns in African society.

Within recent years a new dimension has been added to the concept of "unjust laws" and the reaction to these laws : namely, the deliberate resort to violence. There is a deep cleavage between those who claim that because until now all other methods of securing the abrogation of unjust laws have proved fruitless, violence is the only possible answer and those who hold that violence is unChristian, not justified, will cause intensified suffering, etc. I do not propose to debate these two approaches. My concern is to point out that in some groups violence has been made respectable and that this greatly complicates the problem of social control, for just as the distinction between statutory and real crime becomes blurred, so do the ends to which violence is directed: is it protest, is it national or personal gain? Once violence becomes a socially approved method of protest and opposition, the problem of restraining the forces unleashed when the crisis situation has ended, may well become formidable. There is undoubtedly a tendency to resort to violence to further opposition to the ruling group in countries to the north of us.

Public opinion is invariably a less effective sanction in an urban than in a rural community, because of the size of the population and the nature of social relations. "We are all one another's policemen", Mayer's informants said of the rural community. In towns "nobody knows, nobody cares". Then there is the variety of behaviour patterns followed in a town and the extent of its permissiveness. Certain further factors characterize the urban African community: differences in the extent of adaptation to modern conditions and the conflict between traditional and western values, for instance the conflict between the individual's desire to "get on" and safeguard his immediate family and the claims made on him by kin, or between the professional requirement to make appointments or provide services on merit or need respectively and the traditional requirement that the interests of kin be promoted. Then there are tribal differences which appear to me to diminish in significance with length of urban residence and increase in class status. Official policy has, however, made tribal origin the main determinant of residential grouping, a criterion that I suggest is not relevant to permanently urbanized Africans and certainly not to the middle class, in whose case, in fact, it cannot be applied, as for instance, in Dube Township. The more stable a community is, the more likely is public opinion, both as an incentive or a deterrent, to be effective. It also appears that the clustering of people of similar educational and economic levels favours the acceptance of agreed norms of conduct and the manifestation of public disapproval, expressed in exclusion, loss of status, when these norms are flouted. That is one of the reasons why the institution of home ownership schemes, which made it possible for the middle class to become spatially distinct, was welcomed. There are indications that symptoms of social disorganization, such as tsotsim, illegitimacy are of lesser incidence in Dube. The spread of literacy and the growth of mass media of communication, such as the Press and the radio, assist in the definition of norms of conduct and could, I believe, be used to greater advantage in encouraging the emergence of shared and appropriate values, (e.g. the treatment the African Press accords to "fashionable" divorces makes divorce appear a desirable index of upper-class status).

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You will have noticed that although I spoke of the necessity for defining certain approved standards of behaviour and of ensuring their observance, I have elaborated to some extent on factors which promote observance and non-observance but not on the behaviour itself. What the African's style of life now is and what it is likely to be in the future takes us into the field of social change. You will, I hope,

bear with me if I here briefly outline my own approach, for time simply does not permit of any more detailed analysis. Briefly then, my own observations have convinced me that it is impossible to compartmentalize change, that the basic economic change from a subsistence to a market economy which no longer, because South Africa is committed to industrialism, lies within the realm of free choice, entails the general direction of change from tribalism to westernism. In saying this I am not attempting to evaluate. Bantu tribal culture had many values - the security of an "encapsulated" existence, leisure, especially for men, because women were hard worked, absence of inequality of wealth with the corollary that although none would starve while some feasted, all might starve - but the level of knowledge and skill it had attained left its members largely at the mercy of the forces of nature, and prey to the anxieties which the belief in magic and witchcraft generates. Whatever modern life offers or does not offer in the way of rigid work schedules, time consciousness, excessive pre-occupation with material values, personal insecurity and loneliness in a competitive and acquisitive society, its technological and scientific competence offers man a material basis which enables him largely to master the forces of nature, to lengthen his lifespan, to prevent starvation, immeasurably to enrich the content of life. Once the potentialities of western culture are comprehended, they are sought. All over Africa there is an urgent insistent demand to raise the standard of living - to provide hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, transport, consumer goods. All over Africa men are demanding of their new leaders that they realize forthwith the vision of the higher material standards implicit in the vision of Freedom. In South Africa this striving is much older and its realization further advanced. Economists in South Africa have calculated that we could - if we were to ignore racial ideologies and give economic forces their head - bring our total population by the end of this century to the level the British worker had attained in 1960. But this means instituting a western economic system in its entirety and for the whole population: a western economic structure necessarily involves a corresponding legal system, concentration of population in towns, a western educational system, the inculcation of a scientific outlook, a small-scale family structure. All these processes are already under way in South Africa.

In other words, I suggest to you that the direction of cultural development is not in doubt, that the future of South Africa must be envisaged in terms of a dominant western culture, within which there will be sub-cultures with different peripheral cultural traits, and that any efforts now being made to stem and divert this development are not only mistaken but dangerous. John Nkosi, writing recently in The Star (19/10/64) said, "Africans almost invariably prefer

Western culture - Western dress, manner, usages and speech - to their own. Western culture is associated with economic advantage as well as with status". And then he goes on to talk of the African's dilemma in that he has seemingly to make a desperate choice between becoming a forlorn imitator of the Whites or of retaining his African identity and abandoning all the symbols of progress. Why this choice? Until recently African leaders and writers did not speak of this choice. They made it clear that they accepted the process of acculturation. They did not - they do not - even demand the retention of their languages in the schools, recognizing that the languages of the West, and primarily English, offer entry into the cultural heritage of the West. It is a matter for neither cultural shame nor cultural pride that the most potent cause of cultural development on a global scale has been through the enriching process of borrowing and assimilation.

Unlike Africans in other countries, Africans in the Republic have set little store by the concepts of negritude or of African personality. Mpahlele, one of our distinguished voluntary exiles, said at a Congress of Negro Artists and Writers, "Negritude to us is just so much airy intellectual talk either in terms of artistic activity or a fighting faith". The danger facing South Africa is that if the aspirations to accept westernism are thwarted, let alone ridiculed or repudiated, then indeed the concept of African culture may become a tool in the service of the national struggle. A "fighting faith" based on a call to perpetuate Bantu culture has within it the potentialities of great mass appeal. It also has within it the possibilities of making the divisions already present in our South African society, which I continue to believe forms, and must eventually be recognized to form, one interdependent whole, deeper and more bitter. While I have no proof to offer and can base myself only on the evidence as yet available, I express my own deep conviction that this cultural struggle is not inevitable and that, in fact, if it should develop, it will do so because the African people have been driven to a repudiation of western culture by a despair born of repeated rejection.

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EH.16/5/67.

*With all good wishes - Ellen
You will notice how small
I am indebted to you*

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SOWETO - JOHANNESBURG'S AFRICAN CITY

An Address given by

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to the

Natal Region, in Durban.

To the South West of Johannesburg live today just over half a million Africans, who constitute numerically the fourth largest city within the Republic. It is a strange satellite-type of city in a symbiotic relationship with Johannesburg. It covers 26 square miles, at its nearest eight miles from Johannesburg's city-centre and at its furthest more than 20 miles away. It is not permitted to develop any industries of its own, the work opportunities it offers within its own area being estimated at some 6,000. Daily more than 180,000 of its citizens travel in over-crowded trains to the adjacent "white" city of Johannesburg which is as dependent on them for the labour to man its factories and business enterprises as they are on Johannesburg for their livelihood. It lives according to rules and regulations devised by the Central Government and administered by the Johannesburg City Council. Administratively and technically it is within Johannesburg but it is not of Johannesburg. Councillor Patrick Lewis, the Chairman of the Non-European Affairs Committee, called it a city within a city. And this, despite its abnormalities, is in fact what it is.

This was not always so. I remember what desperate efforts African families evicted from slums in the early 'thirties made to avoid going to Orlando, which was the first township to be established in this south-western area. The first houses were built in 1932. Rather than go to Orlando some families, unable to find a house in another of the then existing African townships in Johannesburg or a shack in a slum, opted to break up, wife and children returning to the country. Orlando represented loneliness, lack of amenities, something akin to exile. From bleak outpost in the veld to pulsating, vibrant community: this has been the transformation wrought since 1932. Today there is a waiting list of 9,000 families trying as desperately as they once attempted to avoid Orlando to find the means, overt or covert, to obtain houses in one of the 24 townships that constitute this African south-western area. And although, now that the once colourful Sophiatown has been removed and both its fame and notoriety are wistful memories only, there is no alternative, people seek to go there for more than housing alone. They go there too because it is an established community.

The technical, financial and administrative measures which made this development possible are in themselves an engrossing study which formed the subject of an address by Mr. Lewis to the University of the Witwatersrand last year.(1) They reflect South Africa's economic growth, the application of its political ideology of separate development in urban areas, and the inordinate ramification of the network of legislation framed to carry out this ideology.

(1) Patrick R.B. Lewis, "A 'City' Within a City - The Creation of Soweto", Address delivered to the University of the Witwatersrand on 6 September, 1966, fifth lecture in anniversary series.

One of the appendices to Mr. Lewis's address lists 96 Acts passed since 1945 which affect the administration of urban Africans. Officials have furthermore to master the numerous regulations issued by virtue of the enabling clauses contained in these Acts and the directives issued by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in terms of the regulations, a burden of onerous dimensions to the administrator and crippling to those administered.

Changes of policy there have been. At one time, just prior to the War in 1939, the City Council decided that all future houses would be built on a new pattern designed to meet family needs fully. They included separate kitchens, bathrooms in the house, and other amenities today regarded as extravagant. Circumstances soon forced a reversion to the austerity economy of the standard four-roomed house. Crises there have been, notably during the war years when industrialization increased, the need for African labour mounted steeply, no new houses at all were built and shanty-towns erupted - with 60,000 people in them - of a menacing squalor under increasingly despotic and unscrupulous leadership.

After the war, the housing backlog in Johannesburg exceeded 50,000. Then, in the early 'fifties, came the breakthrough in the housing impasse assisted by the introduction of the Native Building Workers Act of 1951 which made it possible for African builders to be trained and employed in the townships; the institution in 1952 of the Bantu Services Levy requiring employers who did not house their African workers to pay a weekly levy (30c. of which 5c. subsidizes transport) which is used to finance major services, for instance the 207 miles of macadamised road now laid in the whole South Western area; and the Site and Service Scheme. This Scheme which became state policy in 1953, required local authorities to layout 40 x 70 foot sites, provide basic services and have Africans requiring houses build a temporary shack at the back, leaving the front of the site available for a permanent home.

Many of us at the time viewed the Scheme with misgivings, fearing the emergence of new slums with the temporary shacks becoming permanent. It is a pleasure to record that these fears proved to be unfounded. 35,000 sites were surveyed, 35,000 shacks were put up. Today 68 shacks remain in Soweto. What proportions this breakthrough assumed can be gauged from the fact that at its height, from June 1957 to 1958, 11,074 houses were built. At this time, too, home ownership schemes of two types were introduced based on 30 years leasehold of the ground and not, as first intended by the Municipality, on 99 years leasehold; under the one scheme, houses built by the Municipality are sold on easy terms, repayments being slightly lower than rents; under the other, concentrated chiefly in Dube, residents build their own homes, often with the assistance of loans provided by the Council.

Before proceeding I must make it clear that, - as Table 1 shows, almost four-fifths of the Africans living in the areas South West of the city fall under Municipal control while the remainder are controlled by the Bantu Resettlement Board which from 1955 onwards undertook the removal of some 60,000 Africans from the freehold townships in Johannesburg's Western Areas, a compulsory transfer to which the Johannesburg City Council was opposed. Although Africans commonly speak of the whole complex as Soweto, the term Soweto (abbreviation of South Western Bantu Townships) introduced on 4 April 1963, and even today not officially recognized, strictly speaking applies only to the areas under Council control, and it is in this sense that I shall use the term. It is intended that ultimately the City Council will take over the Board controlled areas, Meadowlands and Diepkloof. There are a number of differences between the two areas, for instance, domestic brewing is permitted in the Board's areas but not in Soweto. Soweto has Advisory Boards and the other areas do not. Traders were at no time permitted to erect their own premises in Diepkloof and Meadowlands while this was permissible in Soweto until a Departmental directive prohibited it.

The City Council has raised the ceiling below which householders can qualify for a rent subsidy to R40.00 per month, paying the R160,000 that this costs from the Native Revenue Account. In the Board's areas the ceiling remains at the level of R30.00 determined by the government. Furthermore, in view of the fact that ethnic grouping only became compulsory in 1955, it follows that ethnic grouping has been more rigorously applied in the Board's areas. In Soweto the older townships were all mixed, though they have since been zoned so that when a house is vacated it can only be leased or sold to an occupier of the ethnic group for whom the area has been zoned. That this restricts the opportunities for resale of home-owners and particularly of traders owning their own premises is self-evident. (In 1963, the allocation of townships was 5 Sotho, 4 Nguni, 1 Venda/Shangaan/Tsonga, 7 Sotho/Nguni, 5 mixed.)

In 1935, Orlando had 3,000 houses and some 18,000 people. By 1935, there were in Orlando and 4 adjoining townships nearly 200,000 people, many of them living in emergency camps and breeze-block shelters. By 1966, Soweto covered an area of just over 21 square miles, housed 364,879 people under conditions of family life in 63,868 dwelling units, and 14,589 people in four hostels. Accompanying the growth in physical size and extent, there was a growth in the role of the Johannesburg City Council and a widening of its functions. The Recreation and Community Services Branch of the Non-European Affairs Department, to give one example, now has a staff of over 700 members and provides at a cost of R1.m. p.a. a large number of facilities and welfare services, ranging from control of 3 major stadia, 86 sportsfields, horticultural work for the beautification of Soweto to the running of a sheltered employment workshop, assistance to the aged, disabled, and destitute in obtaining pensions and other forms of relief. The Non-European Affairs Department itself instituted a Welfare Fund from which its social workers can provide emergency and special assistance in cases which fall outside the categories whose needs can be met through normal channels.

This growth in services and amenities would not have been possible without a corresponding growth in the profits from Bantu beer, which are now in the region of R2 million p.a. In 1962 the law prohibiting the sale of European liquor to Africans was changed and local authorities were given the monopoly of the sale of European liquor in the African townships. In Soweto profits now amount to just over R200,000 p.a. of which one-fifth is paid into the Native Revenue Account and four-fifths has to be paid to the Department of Bantu Administration for homeland development. Despite the profits on beer and liquor and the considerable relief the proceeds from the Bantu Services Levy brought to the Native Revenue Account, expenditure has consistently outrun income and Johannesburg has since 1941 met the deficit from general rates. Johannesburg is, I believe, the only city which subsidizes its Native Revenue Account. While this has earned it commendation from some, it has also provoked sharp attacks from others who condemn any departure from the principle of making the Native Revenue Account self-balancing. Estimated expenditure for 1966-67 on the Native Revenue Account is R9,691,349 and the estimated shortfall is R851,649.

I have tried to give you briefly some facets of the administrative framework of Soweto. But while framework affects the quality of the lives of the people within it, it tells us nothing of the people themselves. To talk of the people of Soweto is, obviously, an overweening undertaking. As little could one hope to talk of the people of Durban or of Johannesburg. But that is precisely what we do, compressing and hence over-simplifying, trying anxiously to maintain the correct perspective but knowing in advance that imbalance is inevitable. I have moreover to tell you that very little research indeed has been carried out in Soweto. What data there is derives largely from the active research section of the Non-European Affairs Department. Hence what I am doing is to clothe the skeleton of ascertained fact with the flesh of my own impressions and deductions.

The first thing that must be stressed in talking of the people of Soweto is their variety. They range from unskilled labourers to highly trained professional men and women, sophisticated businessmen and executives in personnel departments. There are washerwomen and models, artisans and artists, but mostly they are ordinary working people. In Chiawelo, the Venda/Tsonga/Shangaan ethnic township, can be found homes furnished with little more than sleeping mats, a bench or two, a few kitchen utensils, and in them sit women with leisure on their hands and nothing to do. Their husbands, who spend their lives chiefly outside their homes, inhabit a world in which their wives are aliens. In Dube, predominantly owner-built and the Mayfair of Soweto, are beautiful modern homes which would grace any suburb of this or any other town. In them are people who would be "middle-class" in any suburb with the appropriate patterns of behaviour, the women economically and socially active and busy. Every gradation from the near-traditional to the ultra-contemporary exists.

A survey(2) of 1409 households conducted in 1962 showed 2.5% with incomes below R20 a month and 9.4% with incomes above R100. Although some people are very well-off, sheer poverty and actual destitution far outweigh such prosperity as there is and the majority of people battle throughout their lives to make ends meet. The 1962 Survey showed (see Table 6c) that average expenditure exceeded average household income of R58.79 by R3.90 per month. The average income of household heads was R42.05, which meant that where there was no additional wage-earner and a family had to be supported, that family could not live on a level which would provide for physical efficiency. The Survey showed average monthly household expenditure ranging from R44.69 (R8.93 per person) in Jabavu, a township in which many pensioners, broken families and low-income earners were accommodated in low-rent homes when the emergency camp was removed, to R80.68 (R14.49 per person) in Dube. All this variety in circumstances and style of living there is, quite apart from the broad human spectrum of personality types.

Many of the people living in Soweto were born in a homeland or rural area, conditioned largely by traditional behaviour. An as yet unpublished sample survey of 175 households by the Research Section of the Non-European Affairs Department conducted in Soweto last year showed that 15% of the respondents were born in Johannesburg, although the average length of residence was 22 years. They are hence predominantly a people in transition in transition from country to town. And they are a people whose traditional culture is being changed by the impact of industrialization^{and} modified by modern urban conditions.

Recurrent themes in Soweto are conflicts between traditional and western forms of behaviour, between, as one example, the continuing patriarchal tradition of male dominance and those influences stemming from economic necessity, educational advancement, and Christian ideals which are emancipating modern women. There is the conflict precipitated by acceptance of monogamous marriage and the persistence of polygynous attitudes based on the belief that a man is entitled to access to a plurality of women. In point of fact, polygyny is of negligible incidence in Soweto-- 3 of 151 marriages in the Soweto Survey were polygynous and in no case was more than one wife present in Soweto - but its place is being taken by a system of concubinage, and extra marital liaisons which is a contributory cause to the prevailing marital instability. There is the conflict between Christianity and resort to magical practices - a conflict which caused the interviewers in the Soweto Survey to report that informants considered it "non-U" to admit to observing magical practices, although more than half, the majority professing to belong to a Christian church, stated that they did go to witch-doctors.

(2) Income and Expenditure Patterns of Urban Bantu Households, South Western Townships. Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa, Report No. 6 /1963.

In many cases the conflict is resolved by some form of synthesis. Lobolo, an essential element in traditional marriage without which the father's family cannot claim the children of the marriage, is a case in point. It has been incorporated into marriage by Christian and civil rites, in the majority of which lobolo is also transferred. In a study of fertility⁽³⁾ carried out in 1963, of 1,514 marriages, 36% were customary unions, 52% were Christian and civil marriages with lobolo, and only 12% were carried out by Christian and civil rites without lobolo. At one time, some fifteen to twenty years ago, this issue was hotly debated. African newspapers carried scores of letters on the subject, the pro's as vehement as the contra's. Now the subject seems seldom to arise in debate. Partly this seems to be due to the new emphasis on retaining what the government so ardently exhorts the Bantu to regard as "their own" - it is our custom, they say. Partly it is due to a continuing belief by women that their worth as women is not recognised and that their dignity is affronted if lobolo is not paid. Partly it is due to ~~their~~ ^{the} commercialization of lobolo: parents consider they are entitled to monetary compensation for rearing and educating a daughter. In Soweto, though lobolo may still sometimes be spoken of in terms of cattle, today it is usually money, and the scale rises with the education and occupation of the woman concerned.

Another example of synthesis is that of ancestral worship with Christianity. Soweto, today, it appears to me, is more conscious of the dead ancestors than it was twenty years ago. The degree of observance varies greatly, ranging from not more than a general awareness of the ancestors and the holding of a feast with meat purchased from a butcher on the occasion of termination of mourning, to a recurrent and meticulous setting aside of home-brewed beer for the ancestors and sacrifices of goats on all the appropriate occasions. If any generalization may be attempted, then I would suggest that it has today become more general to regard the ancestors, who represent a limited social universe, as the intermediaries between the Christian God, who holds sway over all people, and the individual. As in the past, so today the witchdoctor is frequently the agency whereby people are brought back to a consciousness of the influence of the ancestors, for when they consult him in a time of difficulty, he may well diagnose it as arising from neglect of one or more ancestral spirits and prescribe sacrifices to appease the angered spirits.

By the end of 1966 Soweto itself had 137 completed church buildings, all but one belonging to government-recognized denominations, 12 under construction, with 137 further sites allocated. In addition, there are hundreds of separatist sects, meeting in houses and rooms, led by ex-ministers of recognized churches, by laymen who have felt the "call", by prophets, all practising different forms of worship with varying degrees of syncretism between Christian beliefs, ancestral worship and magic. One of the many factors leading to this situation is the feeling that the Christian church and white Christians have failed the African, and another is the desire and the pressure to reaffirm the African's own cultural worth.

The basic social unit in Soweto, as elsewhere, is the family. There are close on 71,000 families in Soweto, as Table 2(a) shows. But, as the average size of 5.16 persons indicates, this is not the extended family of tribal society. Unfortunately, the detailed research required to analyse the actual composition of the household or the family has not yet been undertaken. The very fact that the 1962 Survey found that an average of only .33 persons were not members of the conjugal family of the household head tends to confirm the impression that the majority of Soweto families are of the elementary type, consisting of mother, father and children. I, myself, am inclined to believe that these scanty figures are somewhat misleading and do not reveal the true extent of family, particularly marital, instability. Pauw, who

(3) Joan Verster. "The Trend and Pattern of Fertility in Soweto: An Urban Bantu Community". African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3-4, 1965.

subject for research

carried out an intensive study of 109 urban-born or reared families in Port Elizabeth, found that while "the elementary family is the basic type, it shows a strong tendency on the one hand to lose the father at a relatively early stage and on the other to develop a multi-generation span".(4) Nearly one half of his families had female heads. In Soweto the female-headed families form, according to available figures, a much smaller proportion - 14% of the 1962 Survey, 18% according to 1966 Departmental tables. Very possibly the lower proportion of female-headed families in Soweto is related to its more recent growth. This is supported by the fact that in the very much older Eastern Bantu Township - Johannesburg's only other African township - 41% of its 660 families are female-headed. I also believe that the bare figures of family size do not reveal the numbers of families which are in fact three-generational, by reason of having living with them an unmarried daughter and her child or children or caring for these children while the daughter works.

Whatever may be the validity of these considerations I have tried to lay before you, the main characteristics of the Soweto household are clearly that it is, compared with the traditional homestead, small in size (2/3 of the 1962 Survey households consisted of 6 or fewer members), that in composition it is approximately the modern family of mother, father (whatever his legal status as discussed later), children type, and that it is, above all, a single, isolated unit among many thousands of other such units and not part of a larger kinship group accommodated in a single or adjacent homesteads. It is on its own, dependent on its own resources in fulfilling all the emotional and other needs of its members. Every requirement has to be paid for in money, which has become the basic determinant of Soweto living. All responsibilities, educational and other, traditionally shared within a larger group, are vested now within this small unit, primarily in the mother and father.

Obviously this entails great changes in the traditional rôles of the members of this unit, primarily between husband and wife and between parents and children. In some families, particularly in those cases where husband and wife are educated and there is no marked disparity in educational levels, new patterns of consultation, companionship, shared decision-making have evolved. These new forms of conjugal companionship are more frequent in Soweto's middle class, though even here many men are jealous of their authority. A man, for instance, who allows his wife to drive his car is regarded askance by most men even in the exclusive group of the elite. In some cases, but these seem to be a few in number, this democratic pattern of personal relationships also extends to the children. Even, however, in such cases, the pattern of paternal aloofness yields seldom and comradeship grows mainly between mother and child, especially daughter.

For the rest, it is difficult to generalize. It is, I think, beyond doubt that behaviour rooted in the strong patriarchal tradition of tribal society continues to be prevalent, behaviour based on the principle of male dominance and female subservience. Where the wife herself follows traditional behaviour, this causes no difficulty. Where, however, she has, through economic necessity or inclination become a wage earner herself, assumed, as so many mothers do, responsibility for paying the children's educational costs, and been invested with the function of sole household management and budgetting, this may cause acute friction. This, indeed, is often the case, particularly if the wife is educationally ahead of her husband, or if she earns more than he does. Men allege that women, in their desire to assert themselves, "shed the yoke" tactlessly in a manner bound to cause offence and disruption. With a range of new factory jobs opening up for women which offer higher wages than their husbands can earn, they deliberately go out of their way to make their husbands feel inferior. So say some men. Women, on the other hand, are bitterly resentful of the way men opt out of responsibility, particularly in regard to money. It is common, one is frequently told, to find men making the wife an allowance of R5 per week for all household requirements, regarding the balance as their own, to be spent solely on their own entertainment and amusement. Other men pay only the rent and nothing more. By and large, it seems to me the difficulties of transition

(4) B.A. Pauw, "The Second Generation", Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1963, p. 149.

bear more heavily on the woman, who has to meet a set of new demands and is yet frequently treated in terms of her traditional rôle. Legally, too, her position is anomalous. Although she has to function in terms of the responsibilities of a woman in the western world, unless she has contracted a marriage under the common law and is safe-guarded by a written will, she remains subject to Native law, which regards women as perpetual minors. From these stresses economic, legal and social, stems a great deal of marital discord, widespread marital infidelity, and what appears to be a rising incidence of divorce* and desertion.

Obviously any discussion of the family in Soweto and the problem of marital instability must take account of influx control and the increasing stringency and rigidity of its application. My talk deals only with the families living in Soweto and not with the total African population of Johannesburg (see Table 1) which consists, excluding the peri-urban areas, of 490,844 people living under conditions of family life and 132,779 so-called "single" Africans, of whom some 80,000 are men. How many are in fact single, how many are voluntary migrants in the sense that they have their homes in a Bantu area and do not want to bring their families to Johannesburg is not known. That there are many men who would like to have their wives join them but are prevented from doing so by the pass and influx laws is incontestable.

The law, briefly, is that Africans only qualify to remain in Johannesburg if they were born there and continued to live there, have worked for one employer for ten years or have been legally resident (which usually means in continuous employment) for 15 years. Under a recent directive of the Department of Bantu Administration if a man who qualifies in this way for urban domicile marries a woman who is qualified to live in any town (i.e. a "prescribed area"), he is unlikely to experience any difficulty in obtaining the requisite permission to introduce her into Johannesburg. If, however, she comes from a homeland, his chances of obtaining this permission are negligible. If she comes from a "white" rural area, his chances cannot be rated at more than 50 per cent.

Only married men qualified to live in Johannesburg are entitled to obtain houses in Soweto. This means men who are permitted to have their wives with them. If this permission is not forthcoming, then, if the man is married by Native customary union, the inducement to contract another customary union with one of the many women as anxious to obtain a house as he is must obviously be great. In the past, divorced men and widows who had qualified for Johannesburg domicile could obtain houses in Soweto. Now there is a new directive from the Department of Bantu Administration - a directive one fervently hopes will be modified - which prohibits this and lays down that they are only permitted to be sub-tenants of a registered occupier, that is, provided they can solve the difficult problem of finding a registered tenant willing to have them and their children as sub-tenants in his own small four-roomed house. A widow or a divorcee, in other words, must remarry if she nowadays wants to obtain a house.

These regulations put a premium on marriage as a means to ^{one}end, namely housing. There seems to be no doubt that there is an increase in the number of customary unions being contracted, marriages of convenience only, to meet official requirements for obtaining a house. They call them "shilling" marriages in Soweto because this is the cost of completing the formalities for this type of "marriage" at the Bantu Affairs Commissioner's office. The existence of this type of union, though obviously the extent to which it occurs cannot even be estimated, must be borne in mind in any assessment of the factors which affect urban African family life detrimentally.

* The number of summons issued by the Central Bantu Divorce Court (which deals with cases from the Witwatersrand, Western Transvaal, Orange Free State and part of the Northern Cape) was 779 in 1954: 1,027 in 1959: 2,220 in 1966. This Court deals only with divorces under the Common Law and the very rare appeal from the Bantu Commissioner's Court which deals with customary unions.

The necessity for some form of influx control may be debatable. But there cannot be any debate about the gross injustice of denying a man who is legally qualified to be in Johannesburg the right to have his wife join him. A country that does this gives the lie to its professed concern for the sanctity of family life. Nor can there be any justification whatsoever for denying a woman who has qualified for urban domicile the right to rent or own a house because her husband has died or she is divorced. The human tragedies caused by these regulations can be seen and heard daily at the superintendents' offices in Soweto and at the central office of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department. Formerly one could also see the harshness of the law being tempered by the exercise of official discretion. Now, with the reins ever more tightly held by Pretoria, the local Department is left with very little discretion of its own to exercise.

Present registered occupiers in Soweto are obviously not affected, because if they are not qualified to be in Johannesburg and are not married they could not have a house. But a large proportion of the 80,000 "single" men working in Johannesburg are affected, as are many widows and divorcees supporting their children who are unable to obtain a house. And let no Soweto son wish to marry a girl he met at a boarding school in the country or at one of the ethnic university colleges unless she comes from a "prescribed area". A new and passing strange form of urban endogamy is being made obligatory.

Relations between parents and children also suffer from the conflict between old, i.e., traditional, roles and attitudes and new demands. Parents, especially fathers, expect from their children a deference and respect embedded in traditional society which emphasized the principle of respect for seniority. Urban bred children, not all but many of them, simply do not recognise this principle. Soweto parents have to carry out the educational functions formerly exercised by a whole group of kin, but many are not trained or prepared for it: neither are they aware of the new needs. "School" has to many become synonymous with "education". I have seen mothers who make sacrificial efforts to keep their children at school but who, nevertheless, have no means of communicating with their own children as persons. This lack of communication, of not knowing how to talk freely about the trivia of everyday life as well as about the important decisions that have to be made, between parents and children as also between many husbands and wives is one of gravest and all-pervading factors affecting African family life. There are, moreover, a host of practical difficulties. Mothers have to work and leave children on their own. Parents may be illiterate and children educated, which may make children look down on their parents. Parents are frequently unable to fulfil the material demands of children. Added to this is the obvious lack of status of every black man in a white dominated society. These factors, together with others too numerous to mention, add up to the syndrome "loss of parental control" of which Soweto parents are acutely and generally helplessly aware.

Schools there are in Soweto, 113 in all with a total enrolment of 82,936. (There are 105,934 children aged 5 - 14 years, and assuming that the under-age children of 5 and 6 not in school counterbalance those over 14 years at school, this might mean that some 80% of children aged 7 to 14* are at school at any one time.) There are, I consider, few Soweto children who never go to school, but the key questions are: how long do they stay at school and what do they get from school? There are 69 lower primary, 29 higher primary, 10 lower and higher primary, and only 5, with an enrolment of 4,573, post-primary schools. This does not mean that no more than 4,573 Soweto children attend secondary and high schools, for a number of children, particularly from the better-off section, go to boarding schools in the Bantu rural areas. But it does mean that the overwhelming majority of children do not proceed beyond Std. 2, many in fact leaving before. As elsewhere, the local authority is responsible for the provision of buildings for lower primary schools,

* African children are not permitted to attend school before the age of seven years.

(for which an amount of 18 cents is added to the Soweto monthly rental in all townships built since 1955), but the provision of all other schools depends on the Bantu School Boards, which have to raise half the money required, whereupon they qualify for a R for R grant from the Bantu Education Department, provided the funds are available. The need for higher primary and particularly secondary schools is acute, The Johannesburg English-language Press has been featuring the crisis situation in Soweto this year - poignant pictures of children waiting vainly for admittance, of children at over-crowded desks or lacking desks altogether. The Boards struggle to raise money, not only for buildings but to pay the extra teachers not yet on subsidized posts. One school board has 48 privately paid teachers to run extra sessions in the afternoons in an effort to deal with the accommodation problem. It has collected R4,600 towards a secondary school, not one of which exists in its large area containing 72,000 people. The public is responding generously to various appeals - for bursaries and for desks: individuals and trusts are making larger contributions. But the bottleneck remains.

The result is that thousands of children leave school before they are of working age. Unemployment among juveniles does not appear to constitute as acute a problem as it did in former years, although the problem of suitable employment is far from resolved. The City Council's Vocational Training School and its youth employment centres in Soweto, its assistance to youth clubs and recreational centres are of great value. And in June a Technical High School, for which there has long been a great need, is to open.

All these measures matter and are a great advance on the situation as it existed in the early Orlando. But the problem remains. The problem of idle and purposeless youth, of youths not attracted by or not able to go to the schools and too young for employment or, having reached the age of employment, of youths who find work a more tedious and less rewarding way of acquiring money than other ways they have learnt on the streets and from gangs. The problem of young people who have grown up in a moral no man's land, by which I mean that they have grown up in a society in which traditional sanctions do not and cannot operate to control behaviour, in which new norms are as yet in the process of development, and in which the racial laws to which they are subject not only command no respect but constitute a challenge to circumvention. I am unregenerate in the opinion I formed many years ago that a system of discriminatory laws - making one section of the community subject to a series of laws carrying a criminal sanction which do not apply to other sections - must have the effect of undermining the respect for law as such. Analysts of social change have advanced the general principle that the larger and the more diverse the industrial community or city, which assembles people from many different social backgrounds, the greater is the likelihood that "informal" social controls will be radically weakened and consequently the need for formal agencies to maintain order increases. In other words, as the pressures deriving from a system of inter-personal reciprocities, from the force of public opinion, from the sanction of common religious beliefs diminish, so legal sanctions and the penalties they impose become increasingly important. But unless the community by and large supports the legal rules and the individual to some extent internalizes them and accepts them as a standard of behaviour, laws in themselves are an imperfect system of effective social control. In Soweto, as elsewhere, pass laws and influx control, all the restrictions on freedom of movement and of the right to seek employment, the recurrent raids to enforce them, command no acceptance. Tens of thousands of people pay fines and go to gaol because they transgress them. As they do for other crimes; actions regarded as real crime by the community. The inevitable outcome is a merging of attitudes towards statutory and "real" crimes. In this teeming community, how do you differentiate between a man who went to gaol for committing a technical offence and the man who served a sentence for robbery or assault?

And how do you obtain the overall acceptance of the system of law from youths who regard many aspects of it as outright oppression and flagrant injustice? How do parents, who share this attitude, induce children to respect what is commonly called "law and order"?

Of course, many of Soweto's teenagers and young people acquiesce and adjust within the system. But many do not. Tsotsi-ism is rife. Youthful gangs terrorise whole townships. As do adult gangs, of whom not enough is known to say whether they emerge from the youthful tsotsis or not. Crime and violence flourish in Soweto, and the respect for life itself is diminished. During the four years 1962 to 1965, 1,192 cases of murder were reported to the police - an average of 400 murders a year in Soweto. Convictions totalled only 247 - which is partly a reflection of the peoples' sheer fear of coming forward as witnesses - and of these convictions more than one half, 130, were of people under the age of 21. The ordinary Soweto citizen is afraid to be abroad at night, and Friday night, when people come home with their pay, is dreaded. Even the libraries close at 6 on Fridays - two hours earlier than other nights. What Soweto's ordinary, law abiding citizens need most urgently is protection for themselves from assault and for their property from theft and robbery. This requires far more than providing an effective police force, necessary as this is. In effect it requires the emergence of a new system of values, that is, collective goals, to set the norms for the new society that has come into being. Partly this is a challenge confronting the people of Soweto themselves, and their leaders are aware of it. Their discussions of civic guards, improvement associations, family life, show this concern. There is mounting interest in sex education and a desire to come to grips with the problem of the high incidence of illegitimacy resulting from the breakdown of traditional sex morality. But it is as much a challenge to the people of the Republic as a whole, especially the whites who have exclusive political control, to release Soweto - and all the other Sowetos - from their burden of insecurity, to cease the make-believe that Soweto is a temporary camp, and to give the people a permanent and fair place within the total society.

Earlier on, I stressed, that the individual family in Soweto is in the majority of cases small and that it is an alone-standing unit, not part of a co-operative group of kin and neighbours as was the tribal pattern. Professor Wilson found the main change in Langa to be that from a "society based primarily on kinship to one based on association"(5). This is likewise true of Soweto. But although kinship ties have weakened, they are more evident than among the majority of Whites in the cities of the Republic. Ties with relatives in the same area are obviously reinforced by proximity and they are quickened always by adversity but many of these ties are today based more on personal likes and compatibility than on the sole fact of kinship. In reply to the Soweto Survey question, "Who visits you", 78% of the respondents included amongst the categories they gave "Relations". In addition to kin, there were many other categories of friends, those made at work, at school, at church, there were neighbours who were friends and home-boy and home-girl friends.

Common tribal membership seems to be a category of growing irrelevance in Soweto, even though the government is endeavouring to re-awaken tribal consciousness and loyalty by ethnic grouping, mother-tongue education and the appointment of tribal representatives. The opposition to ethnic grouping in Soweto does not appear to have abated, nor to be confined to the leadership. The Soweto Survey showed 83% of the respondents against ethnic grouping, many supporting their answer with statements as unsolicited as they were emphatic affirming the oneness of the African people in the Republic. Moreover, ethnic grouping found no greater support in a Chiawelo, where it might have been expected, than in a mixed township.

(5) Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, Langa, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1963, p. 175.

It is the bonds based on association that today form the chief links of the people of Soweto, cutting across tribal origin, bridging what once used to be the divide between Christians and unbelievers. The new associations, the rapid proliferation of which is one of the features of Soweto life, form the growth points of today and tomorrow. It is their development which is, I suggest, giving Soweto the "feel" of a community rather than that of the haphazard, unconnected aggregation which it once had. Their variety is as great as one would expect to find in a city, ranging from tribal associations, few in number, to the many manyanos (church women's groups), the school committees, the African Chamber of Commerce. There are sports clubs and choirs and drama clubs, churches, trade unions, professional associations. There are stockfets and informal drinking groups and a great and, so they tell me, glorious variety of shebeens. Social welfare organizations are in the process of development, fostering the concept of service: service divorced from personal considerations of reward or kinship. There are trade unions, alumni and old boys' clubs, Zenzele and other women's groups multi-purpose in scope aiming at self-improvement and welfare work. Once there were political parties, but these are no more.

There are ten Advisory Boards, each consisting of four elected and two nominated members. The Joint Advisory Boards meet once a month with the Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department and appropriate officials. At one time, Advisory Boards and their members were held in scant regard, - just talking shops people said - and participation in the elections was minimal. Now membership of the Boards appears to be more highly regarded and candidates of greater stature are being attracted. The percentage poll at elections depends on the amount of organization and the activity candidates put into their election. It varies from 12 - 15% in some townships to 30% in others. The Board members themselves are pressing for the establishment of an Urban Bantu Council, the regulations for which have been drawn up, providing for 41 elected and 17 nominated councillors - the latter presumably to be tribal representatives. The new Council building will be completed by August.

Throughout this talk I have stressed differences and variety. In the open society of Soweto with its relative scope for individual mobility and the manifold choices it offers the individual to develop different interests and join different groups, individualism has become a feature of urban existence. But equally distinctive of Soweto is the emergence of a new category of social differentiation: that of class. In its simplest terms, social ^{class} means the grouping of persons having essentially the same social status in a given society. We all know what is meant by class, vague though the concept is. People self-rank themselves by class, even though no one has a class membership card, and other ranking may not be the same as self-ranking, although often they do coincide. Classes exist in Soweto. How many classes exist, I do not know. But that there is a middle class, clearly distinct from any other class or classes - possibly an upper and a lower working class - is indisputable. Within the middle class itself, there is a small number of families of particularly successful professional men and wealthy traders whom some observers regard as forming an elite at the apex of the middle class. Money, education and occupation are the attributes that give entry to this middle class. Furthermore, it is clear that acceptance of western standards is associated with middle class status: the degree of westernization is in itself an index of class status. The white middle class has clearly become the reference group for Soweto's middle class.

The class distinctions that are now part and parcel of the African social system do not depart in any significant fashion from those the whites know, says Nimrod Mkele, (16) whose observations derived largely from Soweto. In earlier years, it seems to me, education was the attribute conferring the greatest status. Education remains important, but I believe that today money counts more than any other factor.

(6) Nimrod Mkele, "The African Middle Class", address delivered to The Institute for the Study of Man in Africa, 1961.

Obviously education and money are linked, education often opening the way to a well-paid occupation. But education does not necessarily lead to affluence, and certainly education is not the only path to affluence.

In Soweto, class manifests itself in style of living - in recreation, entertainments and celebrations, weddings and funerals par excellence, and above all in house and furnishing, clothes and car. The consciousness of class exists in Soweto, the correlation between class and church exists there, as does the tendency for marriage to be class bound. The life chances of the children of the middle class are better than those of others. They are more likely to stay at school longer, to be sent to boarding school. Likewise it appears that the incidence of tsotsism and juvenile delinquency is lower. The leaders of the voluntary associations are more likely to be drawn from the middle class. I have found the same over-lapping and interlocking leadership in African Soweto as in white Johannesburg. "Keeping up with the Dlamini's", is the equivalent of the "Keeping up with the Jones" syndrome. While the Soweto middle class is not limited to Dube, its greatest concentration is there - as the term "Dubenheimers" indicates. I do not know what proportion the middle class forms of the total population of Soweto. Clearly it is the minority group, but its importance far outweighs its numbers. For what Mkele calls the serving middle class, the teachers, nurses, journalists, senior administrators, together with doctors and lawyers and ministers of recognized churches, with successful traders and entertainers and all the people The World and Post call "socialites", are the pattern-setters of Soweto as a whole.

I have tried to give you an impression of the manifold facets of Soweto, what it is and what its people are. Some matters, like transport and the difficult problems connected therewith, I have not touched upon at all. Of actual administration I have spoken little, for it is a subject too large to be dealt with here. To a Johannesburger like me, it has been painful to watch the ever tighter curbs the Central Government has imposed on the local authority, preventing the fulfilment of what appears to me to have been the endeavour of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council to give its black citizens a squarer deal. The framework within which the Council has been forced to operate has grown more rigid by the year.

Now the Council, responsibly cognisant of the City's future labour requirements and the population projections for Soweto which show an anticipated increase of some 150,000, bringing the total to just over half a million by 1980, is planning in an area of six square miles new townships with higher density accommodation in flats - necessary because available land is limited. And already hostile critics are attacking, choosing the time-hallowed tactic of offence because they have no rational defence to offer in the fact of relentless figures(7) showing that the growth of Johannesburg will continue and that its need for African workers will not decrease at the behest of ideology but that it will increase under the compulsion of economic expansion. Apart from Cape Town, a city presently beset by problems stemming from the enforced reduction of its African labour force, Johannesburg, the largest industrial centre in the Republic, is the only one which has no conveniently near homeland, not even the tip of a homeland jutting out to which a Soweto could be attached. Pretoria with its mushrooming Rosslyn border industries and a nearby GaRankuwa on the edge of a homeland to take in the expanding African labour force certainly won the luckiest of all lucky sweeps.

(7) "The Bantu Population and Its Housing and Other Requirements", Interim Report No. 4, contained in the Minutes of the City Council of Johannesburg, March, 1967.

What the future of Soweto is, I do not know. That it could be a future which made it possible for its people to develop their potential more fully, a future which enabled them to raise their standard of living, to develop norms of behaviour and standards of value necessary for social order and stability, I do not doubt. There are formidable administrative problems and formidable human problems to be faced. But problems are part of the human condition, and their resolution is the more encouraging aspect of the human condition. Moreover, the problems Soweto poses are not such as to outwit human ingenuity. By comparison with those with which many other parts of the world have to wrestle, these are manageable.

But when I read, as I have of recent months and more particularly of recent weeks, what Mr. Blaar Coetzee, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration has to say, I am stricken with fear. How can he, in view of a record of urban administration that certainly does not redound to our favour, warn local authorities which are trying to meet what are no more than the needs of their African workers not to provide "bigger, better, more attractive, more luxurious facilities". He makes it sound as though all the new five-star hotels were arising in the Sowetos of South Africa.

Mr. Blaar Coetzee said, "But when these facilities tend to cause the urban Bantu residential area to compete with the Bantu's own homeland and to have the effect not only of making the Bantu accustomed to a foreign taste, but to enslave him to luxury which his homeland cannot afford and thereby alienate him from what is his own, then it is time to revise our sense of values"(8). I agree with Mr. Coetzee on one point. It is time we revised our sense of values. And these should include our realization that people who have no homeland - and never will have a homeland other than as a government-fabricated myth - should nevertheless have a home. And our sense of values should include the realization that the Bantu has been alienated from what was his own in the process of contributing to what is our own - the common good and common heritage of our total society.

(8) Sunday Times, 2 April, 1967.

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APPENDIX.

TABLE 1.

JOHANNESBURG'S AFRICAN POPULATION - (30 June, 1966).

(i)	City Areas South West of City		No. of Africans
+	(a) Council-controlled areas - Family conditions	364,897	
	(b) Bantu Resettlement Board - Family conditions	122,170	
	(c) Council-controlled areas - Hostels (including 125 women)	14,589	
	(d) Bantu Resettlement Board - Hostels	4,294	505,950
+ (These fall in the area known as Soweto)			
(ii)	City Areas		
	(a) Municipal hostels and compounds (including 139 women)	20,315	
	(b) Privately housed - licensed	41,941	
	(c) Privately housed - unlicensed	51,640	
	(d) Eastern Bantu Township	3,777	117,673
(iii)	Housed by Mines		16,132
(iv)	Africans living in Peri-Urban Areas		93,584
			<u>733,339</u>

TABLE 2.

DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES AND POPULATION - SOWETO (at 30 June, 1966).

	Total No. of Persons - Family Conditions	Male Heads	Female Heads	Total Families	Persons per Family.
Registered tenants	328,760	50,696	11,500	62,196	5.29
Boarders/Sub-tenants	32,365	6,968	1,320	8,288	3.89
Boarder's Cottages	1,149	218	21	239	4.80
Total :	362,274	57,882	12,841	70,723	5.16

Plus 2,623 single persons.

TABLE 3.

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION - SOWETO (30 June, 1965).

Age Group years	Males		Females		Total.	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
0 - 9	56,175	31.9	57,779	30.9	113,954	31.39
10 - 19	42,791	24.3	42,073	22.5	84,864	23.37
20 - 29	22,365	12.7	31,040	16.6	53,405	14.71
30 - 39	19,899	11.3	25,056	13.4	44,955	12.38
40 - 49	18,666	10.6	16,082	8.6	34,748	9.57
50 - 59	10,742	6.1	7,293	3.9	18,035	4.97
60 +	5,459	3.1	7,667	4.1	13,126	3.61
Total	176,097	100.0%	186,990	100.0%	363,087	100.0%
%	48.5%		51.5%		100.0%	

TABLE 6.

(a) ESTIMATE OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE, SOWETO (AUGUST, 1966).

INCOME:

Average minimum wage (5 trades)	:	R35.62 per month
Average estimated family income (1.3 earners per family)	:	R46.31 per month

EXPENDITURE:

Poverty Datum line (family of 5 persons)	:	R55.57 per month
Effective Minimum Level (family of 5 persons)	:	R83.35 per month

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(b) CASH STARTING WAGES OF 35,561 WEEKLY-PAID AFRICAN MEN PLACED IN EMPLOYMENT IN JOHANNESBURG - JULY TO DECEMBER, 1965.

<u>Wages per Week</u> (R)	<u>Equivalent per month</u> (R)	<u>Percentage</u> (of total placed in employment)
1.00 - 6.00	4.33 - 26.00	2.03%
6.01 - 8.00	26.01 - 34.67	29.13%
8.01 - 10.00	34.68 - 43.33	52.23%
10.01 - 12.00	43.34 - 52.00	9.47%
12.01 plus	52.01 plus	7.14%
AVERAGE STARTING WAGE PER MONTH = R38.14		100.00%

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(c) SAMPLE SURVEY OF 1409 FAMILIES IN SOUTH WESTERN TOWNSHIPS, JOHANNESBURG, BY BUREAU OF MARKET RESEARCH, UNISA, 1962.

(AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME PER HOUSEHOLD BY OCCUPATION OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD AND NUMBER OF EARNERS PER HOUSEHOLD)

<u>Occupation of Household Head</u>	<u>% of Households</u>	<u>Average No. of Earners</u>	<u>Average Income (R)</u>
Professional	1.8	1.72	92.35
Proprietor or Managerial	4.8	1.83	74.56
Skilled Labour	1.1	1.69	87.40
Semi-Skilled Labour	22.2	1.63	70.21
Unskilled Labour	56.8	1.76	52.58
Administrative & Clerical	3.9	1.85	82.44
Pensioner	1.9	2.07	36.79
Housewife	2.5	1.60	44.10
Unemployed	3.4	1.38	39.06
Unemployable	1.6	1.83	50.53
All Occupations	100.0	1.73	58.79

Calculated that cash income of all households in these townships (including Bantu Resettlement Areas) in 1962 was R47,880,000.

Household heads contributed 67.4% of Total Household Income (average R42.05 per month).

Wives of household heads contributed 10.8% of Total Household Income.

Other earners contributed 21.7% of Total Household Income.

Average expenditure per household per month	-	R62.69
Average expenditure per household per month on Poverty Datum Line items only	-	R45.78

SOURCES

- Table 5 : Councillor P.R.B. Lewis, "A 'City' Within a City - The Creation of Soweto", Anniversary Lecture, 6 September, 1966.
- Table 6(a) : Sheila Suttner, "Cost of Living in Soweto, 1966" S.A. Institute of Race Relations.
- Table 6(c) : "Income and Expenditure Patterns of Urban Bantu Households (South-Western Townships) Johannesburg", Research Report No. 6, Bureau of Market Research, UNISA.
- All other tables: Reports of the Research Section of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council.
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