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# REFORM, SECURITY AND WHITE POWER: RE-THINKING STATE STRATEGIES IN THE 1980S

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[PLEASE NOTE: THIS PAPER IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT AND INCOMPLETE. THE SECTION ON THE NF HAS BEEN OMITTED AND SO HAVE THE FOOTNOTES AND CONCLUSION. ALL THAT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED HERE IS A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING THROUGH THE COMPLEXITIES OF STATE STRATEGIES IN THE 1980s. FURTHERMORE, NO SECTION OF THIS PAPER MAY BE QUOTED OR CITED WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR.]

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## INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of political conflict and change in South Africa are complex, manifold and diverse. At the centre of this process lies state power. Despite its power, sophistication and durability, very little is actually understood about the state and the polis it dominates.

The 1980s have been about reform, repression and resistance. But what are the connections between these processes? How has politics and society changed as the state has responded to successive waves of black resistance? How has reform and repression changed the material bases of resistance?

Answers to these questions hinge on how "politics" is conceived. How have the major social actors organised themselves into collectivities in the polis? A useful framework for making sense of politics in authoritarian societies has been developed by Alfred Stepan. He argues for an anlysis that takes account of the three arenas of politics: civil society, political society and the state.

Civil society comprises the innumerable base organisations that facilitate and coordinate social existence. People live by organising themselves into collectivities: clubs, sports associations, ratepayers organisations, civic associations, book clubs, recreational networks, churches, sub-cultures, ethnic associations, intellectual currents, women's groups, discussion groups, burial networks, street committees and a range of other formal and informal associations. Civil society is where people exist, interact and communicate. It is where their understanding of the meaning of society is reproduced. It is, therefore, the base of the polis where, in Gramsci's words, "hegemony is won".

Political society is built around collectivities organised to compete for public power. Political society, therefore, comprises the instruments of political struggle: parties, fronts, movements, political elites, leaders, alliances, elections, legislatures and the press. The components of civil society only act politically by constituting themselves through the structures of political society. If, however, the state prohibits certain sectors in civil society from acting politically, then a mass movement in civil society can rise up to destroy this authoritarian regime from the outside ("war of manuever").

The state is more than just government (e.g. parliament) or the arbiter of political society (e.g. the executive president). State apparatuses are the formal institutions of public power: the administration, bureaucracy, judiciary, police, military and intelligence organs. These institutions are coupled in various combinations depending on the state's strategic objectives and the power interests represented in government. In authoritarian societies, the security establishment (i.e. police, military and intelligence) is dominant. But precisely how this dominance is arranged and which element in this establishment plays the key role needs to be specified rather than asserted. To establish the precise meaning of "militarisation" means starting by examining the complex relationships between the institutions of state. Once this is clear, then wider relations beyond the state can be examined.

For a state to be legitimate, the right of its apparatuses to regulate society as a whole needs to be broadly accepted at the level of civil society. Only then will the struggle for public power in political society reflect general aspirations, grievances and interests. This condition of "hegemony" occurs when, in Gramsci's words, "spontaneous consent [is] given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group". However, in authoritarian societies, this hegemony is absent and therefore compliance is obtained by "the apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively."

Authoritarian societies are defined by the absence of democratic procedures in political society, i.e. the legally enforced negation of the right of sectors of civil society to constitute themselves politically in political society. In the South African case racial criteria define the oppressed sectors. How, then, do these sectors act politically to alter or seize state power? This is usually achieved through social movements constituted at the level of civil society. Power is mobilised at this level to (a) disrupt the workings of political society, and/or (b) make unworkable the state's task of governing the oppressed, and or (c) create an alternative power-base capable in the long run of destroying the state.

Resistance in civil society does not develop in an uni-linear direction outside the actions of the state and political society. It penetrates political society through intermediaries and so generates responses that force the state to meet the challenges in civil society. This in turn re-constitutes the material relations of civil society and hence alters the nature of resistance. The cut and thrust of the struggle for state power, therefore, is difuse, unpredictable and contingent.

The argument is this paper will be as follows: "total strategy", the state's response to the social movements of the mid-1970s, aimed to reconstitute access to political society without

re-organising civil society. This reformist response grew out of the security apparatuses of the state and became the agenda for the dominant agencies in political society. It failed when structural contradictions generated social movements in civil society that mounted a challenge that forced the state into a State of Emergency from mid-1985. Elements within the state attempted to extend the reform programme beyond its original parameters to dowse the flames of resistance with "more concessions". When these measures failed to achieve their objective, a struggle within the state resulted in the ascendance of the security establishment determined to implement a penetrating repressive reform strategy. The declaration of the second State of Emergency in mid-1986 saw the initiation of this "counter-revolutionary warfare" strategy aimed at reconstituting the fundamental bases of civil society prior to altering the rules of political society. The new strategy, therefore, starts from the realisation that Total Strategy failed because it left the fundamental bases of civil society intact. Learning from Latin America and South-East Asia, the security establishment is attempting to unite the state and political society around a long-term programme aimed at restructuring social hierarchies "from below".

## SOWETO, MULDERGATE AND THE RE-ORGANISATION OF THE STATE

By 1980 the state and National Party government were mobilised around what became known as the "total national strategy". Before this strategy could be initiated as the cardinal principle of state action, state structures needed changing. The laissez faire practices of the Vorster administration failed to respond to the deepening post-Soweto crisis with the requisite degree of precision, foresight and force. A new elite collected around PW Botha, the then Minister of Defense, emerged with a clear strategic-cum-organisational programme. However, to get control of the state itself in order to implement this programme, this aggressive political-security alliance needed to do battle within the National Party. Their route to state power, therefore, lay through the rocky terrain of political society. Luckily for them PW Botha was a consummate party apparatchik and already the leader of the Cape branch of the party. The subtle fusion of complex conflicts within state and political society reinforced tendencies that reached a head around the Muldergate scandal. By unpacking these conflicts in both these arenas, a crucial part of the explanation for subsequent political developments begins to emerge.

The state under B.J. Vorster was a vast ramshackle affair (fn Geldenhys and Kotze and Adam and Giliomee). Empire building, uncoordinated departmental action, the absence of an over-arching strategic plan, financial mismanagement and internecine conflicts were defining features of the pre-Botha era. Decisions about

state action were determined more by patronage networks within the National Party than by a coordinated plan of state action. Each Minister had his own fiefdom in his department and could act relatively autonomously. It was this state of affairs that led A.P. Stemmet of the State Security Council (SSC) to say to a researcher that central government during the last years of Vorster's premiership "fell to pieces" (in Stemmet interview).

Although it was probably an overstatement to say that the state "fell to pieces", there is no doubt that bureaucratic incoherence was a serious problem. There were 39 state departments and 20 cabinet committees each dealing with an aspect of policy (in Geldenhys and Kotze). These departments rarely cooperated and the cabinet committees had overlapping concerns and briefs. The Prime Minister's Office was heavily dependent on the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the supreme intelligence organ headed up by Vorster's personal friend, General Van Den Bergе. Key departments within the state like Defense, Foreign Affairs, Bantu Development and the police operated according to intra-departmental guidelines and policies and not state-wide strategic plans. Vorster himself was pragmatic and willing to see official ideology bend to suit new realities. But he was very reluctant to take bold initiatives for fear of upsetting the NP caucus (in D'Oliviera). In the end he was paralysed because to pull the state together he needed bold action, but such actions would have upset his position as mediator straddling widening rifts in the state and party. In the end it was the financial adventurism of his aides and officials in the Department of Information that was used by his opponents to take control of state power.

The most important intra-state conflicts emerged within the security establishment. Real power rested with Boss and Van Den Bergе. The Security Branch (SB) of the South African Police and the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) in the South African Defense Force (SADF) were very threatened by the enormous material and political power of BOSS. The SB resented BOSS intrusion into domestic police intelligence functions and conflicts arose when BOSS poached top SB personnel. DMI was distressed by the way BOSS was effectively in control of all security-related policy within the state - a position that was formalised when Van Den Berghe was made Vorster's Security Advisor in 1968 (in Grunt). At a time when DMI experts and top military men like Magnus Malan were impatient for more coordinated action, Vorster was using BOSS to keep control of the state and to juggle competing power-points in the NP.

PW Botha emerged as the intersection point for a number of diverse interests. Within the state he had the backing of the SB, SADF and reformist technocrats located in Departments like Finance, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs. Outside the state he had support amongst a "verligt" NP group, as well as amongst University intellectuals, clergymen, cultural organisations and afrikaner business. To take power, however, the Botha cabal needed to play the game through the party.

The NF is in reality a coalition of four provincial parties. Its national character is realised through five institutions: the Federal Council: the Federal Congress that is theoretically the highest policy-making organ: the parliamentary caucus (i.e. all NF MPs): the national leader elected by the caucus: and the cabinet (or highest organ of "government"). The provincial nature of the NF is reflected in the fact that in each of the four provinces the NF has a distinct style, social base, leadership, press and financial sources of support (fn O' Meara). This "federal" arrangement makes it very easy, therefore, for power struggles within the party to play themselves out as "inter-provincial conflicts". The two chief contenders in this conflict have traditionally been the Transvaal and the Cape with the other two holding at most a balance of power.

By 1977-78 the battlelines were clear. On the one hand there was the "verkrampte" wing collected around the Transvaal leader Dr. Connie Mulder who in turn was tacitly supported by Vorster and Van Den Bergh. This position reflected the interests of white workers, small farmers, small businessmen and employees in state enterprises. Advocating the retention of Verwoerdian apartheid, the Transvaal party was opposed to suggestions that labour controls, township administration, black property, trade union and trading rights should be reformed. The "verligtes" were arguing for reforms and they began to coalesce around PW Botha, the Cape leader. Botha had an extremely powerful support-base: afrikaner business, the military and police establishment and sections of the Transvaal party collected around the two Transvaal "verligtes", Pik Botha and Piet Koornhof. This alliance expressed interests rooted in large-scale Cape agriculture, big afrikaner business (e.g. Sanlam) and upwardly mobile afrikaner and english middle classes.

To cement the alliance between the "verligtes", afrikaner business and the military, Botha's cabal proposed an ingenious formula that has worked for him ever since: because South Africa is the target of a "total onslaught", it needs a "total strategy" capable of combining effective security measures with reformist policies aimed at removing the grievances that revolutionaries can exploit. In this simple formula the "verligte" and business demand for reform was linked to the security establishment's desire for more effective security measures. The 1977 Defence White Paper was a direct and unambiguous challenge to the Vorster administration because by arguing that defence is more than a military matter, the military and their political champions were laying claim to their right to have a say in all public policy making. All that was needed now was the right moment to strike for power.

The moment arrived when the Muldergate scandal broke. It is now generally accepted that Military Intelligence leaked the first reports about corruption and misappropriation in the Department of Information. As the scandal unravelled, the english press in

alliance with the Cape linked NP newspapers owned by Nasionale Pers set out to discredit the party's conservative leader, Dr. Connie Mulder. The Transvaal NP organ defended Mulder by blaming the affair on Eschel Rhoodie, the secretary for Information. As events reached a head, Vorster dramatically announced his resignation followed closely by Van Den Berghe's. Their hopes that this would allow Mulder to become party leader - a stronger position from which to fight the "verligtes" - were dashed when Transvaal heavy-weight Pik Botha broke all party protocol and put himself up as a candidate for national leader. This split the Transvaal vote enabling PW Botha with his unified Cape base to become party leader and the prime minister in 1978 (fn O'Meara). With Vorster, Van Den Berghe and Mulder out of the way, PW Botha and his colleagues turned their attention to the business of state restructuring. The NP had served its purpose by providing a vehicle for gaining control of state power. From this point on the party ceases to be a focal point for political struggle within the power bloc.

Confirming PW Botha's reputation as an organisational genius, it soon became apparant that he was determined to change things very soon after assuming power. He immediately embarked upon a three-phase "rationalisation programme" to re-organise the state (fn Botes, 1981 in Kotze and Gel.). The first and most important phase involved the dramatic re-organisation of the pinnacle of state power (fn Kotze and Gel). Four fundamental changes were introduced:

(a) as far as the prime minister's function was concerned, PW Botha enlarged and strengthened the Office of the Prime Minister by creating four "planning branches" accountable directly to him. These branches dealt respectively with security, economic, social and constitutional affairs.

(b) a cabinet secretariat was established for the first time to coordinate cabinet meetings and affairs.

(c) the twenty ad hoc cabinet committees were replaced with 4 permanent cabinet committees to deal respectively with constitutional, economic, social and security affairs. Each cabinet committee was chaired by the relevant Minister and comprised ministers, top officials and a permanent secretariat. The key officials in each committee were constituted as a "working group" to ensure effective follow-up of cabinet committee decisions. The chairmen of the working groups were also made the heads of the corresponding "planning branches" in the Office of the Prime Minister (see (a)).

(d) the transformation of the State Security Council (SSC) into the key decision-making body in the state (more on this later). In reality the SSC was one of the four cabinet committees, but it was the only one created by law (Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, 1972).

The second phase involved cutting down the number of state departments from 39 to 22. In the process, a new mega-department was created in August 1982, namely the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning under Minister Heunis. The economic, social and constitutional "planning branches" in the Office of the Prime Minister were transferred to this department when it was created.

The third phase involved the ongoing process of rationalising areas of authority. The most important example of this was how the old "Native Affairs" empire was dismantled. By 1985 the Department of Cooperation and Development (the empire's last name) was virtually defunct. The administration of blacks was now spread across departments: african education was transferred to the Department of Education and Training, labour bureaux to Manpower, commissioner's courts to Justice and homeland relations to Foreign Affairs. The Department of Constitutional Development and Planning emerged as the real power-centre involved in managing black affairs. By 1985 it controlled local authorities, Regional Services Councils, Council for the Coordination of Local Government Affairs, Provincial Executive Committees, Regional Development Advisory Committees, Regional Liason Committees, homeland consolidation, group area policy, urbanisation policy, regional development policy and a number of other related areas.

In addition to the four permanent cabinet committees a fifth was created in 1983 to investigate the constitutional position of africans, particularly those living outside the bantustans. Known as the Special Cabinet Committee, this committee is chaired by Minister Heunis and has engaged in extended deliberations with a wide range of interests to investigate black political rights in general.

The most significant and outstanding feature of PW Botha's re-organisation effort is the central role that was given to the security system. In a rare public lecture, General Magnus Malan elaborated his understanding of the "total national strategy" and pointed to the SSC and its sub-structures as the key organ involved in executing this strategy. All the major writers who have studied this phenomenon have concluded that the SSC is the central decision-making body in the state:

> "Not only is the SSC the principal cabinet committee, but it is also a kind of inner cabinet (notwithstanding the presence of officials) led by the Prime Minister. Although the Prime Minister will as a rule inform the cabinet of major decisions taken by the SSC, this might be of little more than symbolic value." (Kotze and Gel.)
>
> "... militarisation means the centralisation of political power in executive institutions - such as the State Security Council - beyond legislative control and access." (fn Frnakel, 128)

"The decision-making process has been centralised, and placed firmly at the hub of the process is the Prime Minister, the SSC, and its secretariat." (Grundy, p.16)

"In South Africa, cabinet still holds the legal power to veto the decisions of the SSC, but in practice it is likely that this veto is rarely exercised." (Seegers, p.130 - Totemeyer and Heymenans book )

In reality the SSC was established to be an extremely powerful body with horizontal and vertical tentacles that embrace almost every aspect of public policy-making. It energises and directs state actions and ensures that policies are appropriately implemented. As the apex of the National Security Management System (NSMS), the SSC has in effect become a state within a state in order to control the state. The present structure of the NSMS is as follows:

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

Comprises a permanent staff of about 100. 56% drawn fromt he NIS, 16% from the SADF, 16% from the SAP and 11% from Foreing Affairs.

The 13 INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES:

each of these deal with a specific area of SSC functions that involves more than one department:-

(i) Manpower
(ii) Security Forces
(iii) Civil Defence
(iv) Transport
(v) Security
(vi) National Supplies and Resources
(vii) Government Funding
(viii) National Economy
(ix) Telecommunications and Electrical Power Supply
(x) Science and Technology
(xi) Community Services
(xii) Culture
(xiii) Political Affairs

NATIONAL JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRE

Chaired by deputy Minister of Law and Order, Roelf Meyer and includes the director generals of all departments plus other senior personnel.

11 JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES:

Sub-committees:
(i) Joint Intelligence Committee
(ii) Joint Operational Centres (GOS)
(iii) Joint Management Councils
(iv) Communications Committee
(v) Constitutional, Social and Economic Committee


(vi) Security Committee
The jurisdictions of the 11 JMCs correspond roughly to the development regions.
60 SUB-JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES:
4 sub-committees:
(i) Veikom (Security)
(ii) Semkom (Political, Economic and Social)
(iii) Komkom (Commuications)
(iv) GOS (Joint Operations)
(v) GIK (Intelligence)
350 MINI-JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES:
3 sub-committees:
(i) Veikom (Veiligheidskomitee)
(ii) Semkom (Staatkundige, Ekonomiese en Maatskaplike Komitee)
(iii) Komkom (Kommunikasie Komitee)
(iv) GIK
Area of jurisdiction approximates the local municipality.
LOCAL MANAGEMENT CENTRE
Headed by SAP station commander and SADF company commander and probably covers the area of jurisdiction of each police station.
COMMUNITY LIASON FORUM




The most important feature about the NSMS is how it effectively installed the security establishment as the primary binding force within the state. Tightly tied to the Office of the Prime Minister, the security establishment became, in effect, the institutional apparatus through which PW Botha consolidated his hold on state power. By security establishment is meant the various elements that have been welded together into an effective coercive, intelligence and intellectual machine. These elements include:

(a) the Department of Defence and the South African Defense Force (SADF);

(b) the intelligence organisations, i.e. DMI, SB and the revamped BOSS which was renamed the National Intelligence Service (NIS);

(c) the intellectual community based (mainly) at Afrikaans Universities in organisations like the Institute for Strategic Studies and in private concerns (e.g. the Terrorism Research Centre);

(d) Armscor, its links to the private sector and the 13-man Defense Advisory Board that includes business leaders;

(e) South African Police.

There is little doubt that the state was substantially transformed after PW Botha assumed power. Power was centralised into the executive; lines of command were clarified and institutionalised; the Office of the Prime Minister became the centre of organisational gravity and the security establishment became the primary coordinating and binding force within the state from central to local level.

The question this raises is whether the security establishment controls state structures and the primary policy-making mechanisms. To justify a positive answer to this question, two prior questions must be answered. First, is the security establishment dominant in the NSMS and the SSC in particular? Second, does the SSC dominate decision-making at central state level? As far as the first question is concerned, there is no doubt that the locus of state power in the state lies in the State Presidents' Office and that the president depends more on the security establishment for advice, information and strategic planning than on any other major state institution. Furthermore, the raison d'etre of the SSC is "security" and this is defined to include economic, political, constitutional and welfare issues. The SSC embodied, therefore, what Stepan calls the "new professionalism". Referring to Latin America but with direct relevance to South Africa, Stepan defines this military credo as follows:

> "Instead of increasing functional specialisation, the military [read: "security establishment] began to train their officers to acquire expertise in internal security matters that were defined as embracing all aspects of social, economic and political life. Instead of the gap between the military and political spheres widening, the new professionalism led to a belief that there was a fundamental interrelationship between the two spheres, with the military playing a key role in interpreting and dealing with domestic political problems owing to its greater technical and professional skills in handling internal security issues." (fn Stepan, p.137, in Lowenthal ed)

To pull a state together into a lean mean machine capable of precisely synchronised action is a complex and difficult task. But like in many Latin American countries the security establishment has the skill and capability to do this because of its own internally tight hierarchy of command and substantial resources that are mobile and deployable.

Kotze and Geldenhys (fn) argue that the SSC does dominate the decision-making process in the state. Using their arguments as a broad outline, the following reasons can be advanced to support this view: Firstly, the SSC was the only cabinet committee chaired by the Prime Minister/State President. This means that SSC decisions and policies bear his supreme approval and therefore carry far more weight than those emanating from the other cabinet committees and structures that he does not chair.

Secondly, given the hegemony enjoyed by "national security" ideology within the state, and given the central position of the top representatives of the security establishment in the SSC, it follows that SSC decisions and policies will be seen as representing the joint wisdom of the security and political establishments.

Thirdly, PW Botha widened the SSC's interpretation of its statutory obligation to formulate and implement "national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic" (fn reference to the Act). This has meant that the SSC deals with a wider range of policies than any other cabinet committee or central state structure. In his 1980 lecture Malan defined the areas dealt with by the 15 Inter-Departmental Committees as "areas of common interest in the national security field which would affect more than one government department". (fn Malan, 1980, p.15) It follows that the policy process in each state department must necessarily be subordinate to the the SSC's macro-policy making process.

Fourthly, the Secretariat of the SSC (SSSC) is larger and more powerful than any other secretariat attached to a central state structure (e.g. the other cabinet committees). Up until 1982 70% (fn Grundy, p.15) of the approximately 45 members of the SSSC were from the SADF (mainly DMI). General A.J. van Deventer - a military officer - was SSSC head (fn Kotze and Gel). After 1982 the NIS - a structure accountable to the Prime Minster's Office rather than just a Ministry - was made responsible for the running of the SSSC (fn Kotze and Gel). This led to a change in SSSC personnel: the number was increased to 100 and the SADF complement was drastically reduced to 16% and the number of NIS personnel shot up to 56% (fn evidence to prove that many top SADF people were transferred to NIS to give the appearance of diminishing military involvement is still needed).

Fifthly, it must not be forgotten that the enormously powerful role of the SSSC is reinforced by the support it enjoys from the 15 Inter-Departmental Committees, Working Group and JMCs at national, regional, sub-regional, local and sub-local levels. This horizontal and vertical extension of "joint committees" connected to the SSSC gives the SSC enormous powers to monitor, evaluate and control state policies and actions.

Sixthly, in SSC nomenclature, only 'primary members' can attend meetings and participate in discussion. A Minister or official can only become a "primary member" if he is invited or co-opted by the Prime Minister/State President. In contrast, Ministers can attend and participate in meetings of any of the other cabinet committees (fn Kotze and Gel).

Finally, unlike the other cabinet committees, minutes of SSC decisions and policies do not have to circulate as appendices to cabinet minutes. This means they are not subject to cabinet ratification and confirmation (fn Kotze and Gel).

Taken together, these reasons convincingly show how central the SSC and the NSMS became in state policy-making.

In short, because it can be argued that the security establishment is dominant in the NSMS/SSC and because it has been established that the SSC controls the primary policy-making mechanisms of the central state , it follows that the state qua state is effectively controlled by the security establishment. However, a critical caveat is necessary: the Head of State and the alliance he represented obtained power via political society, not by way of a coup d'etat-type process located exclusively within the state. The security establishment may dominate the state via the NSMS, but the lynchpin of its dominance is a leader elected by a political party not directly controlled by the state. It may control state power, but it is not the government. South Africa's state and government are not collapsable nor are they contradictory. They are, in fact, a hybrid that fuses party government based on a parliamentary process with a militarised state rooted in the security establishment. This hybrid suits both components: the state without the party would loose its source of legitimation in white society and the party qua government without a militarised state would be unable to defend white rule. This de facto limitation on the power of the security establishment explains the continued relative autonomy snf power of non-security state institutions (e.g. the considerable power of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning). It also points to where the fault-lines are and where future divisions might open up.

## TOTAL STRATEGY: RE-MAKING POLITICAL SOCIETY

After taking power by manipulating conflicts in the National Party, PW Botha and his allies in the security establishment effectively re-organised the state as the first step towards implementing the ambitious "total strategy" programme. Two conceptual frameworks underpinned "total strategy" thinking: French counter-insurgency theory and conservative american political science. The basic strategic objective was to modify the access points to political society so that certain sectors of the oppressed group could appear to be competing for economic resources and public power.

"Total strategy" planners in the early 1980s were riding the crest of a wave: the state had been re-organised, the 1979-81 economic boom created an atmosphere of prosperity and growth, unrest was under control, black moderates were coming forward to collaborate, business was cooperative and the right-wing was relatively quiet. It was in this context that grand visions of social change, reform and racial cooperation flourished. The planners genuinely believed it was possible to keep power and introduce reforms without disturbing social hierarchies and the capitalist economic system. Their theoretical framework was drawn from schools of thought that supported grandiose notions of what social engineers can do if they control state power - notions

with deep colonial roots and well tested in the Verwoerdian past. Two theorists in particular were very influential, Harvard Professor Sam Huntingdon and French military strategist Andre Beaufre.

Beaufre's primary aim (fn ref. Beaufre) was to provide governments with principles for evaluating the balance between coercive and consent inducing mechanisms. The basic argument is that because revolutionaries no longer rely primarily on force to achieve their objectives, incumbent states must change their strategies accordingly. Beaufre makes three essential points. Firstly, to be effective states must fuse their military strategic planning and political policy making into a single "total strategy". These two arenas can no longer be kept apart. Secondly, wars are not won on the battlefield, but in the "minds of men". It follows that non-military methods are more effective weapons than the crude instruments of coercion. Coercion, therefore, must be kept at a minimum. Thirdly, the best way to eliminate the enemy is to remove the grievances he exploits to win support. Hence the need for reform:

> "[The aim] must be to deprive the enemy of his trump cards. There are two facets to this: we must first maintain and increase our prestige, not merely by showing that we have adequate force available but also by showing that the future we hold out has possibilities (progress of our civilisation, international aid, etc); secondly, by thoroughgoing reforms we must cut the ground from under the feet of the malcontents." (quoted in Frankel, p.52)

With Beaufre as a starting point that linked security strategy and public policy, "total strategy" planners began putting together a game plan. It was at this moment that Sam Huntingdon made his critically important and influential intervention at the 1979 congress of the South African Political Science Association (fn Huntingdon ref). Borrowing heavily from the Brazilian experience of reform managed from above by a militarized state, Huntingdon argued that "unilateral reform" or "reform by imposition from above" was viable if the following could be achieved:

(a) lower expectations: no grand promises must be made that raise expectations beyond what reforms can accomodate;

(b) reform by stealth: the reform process must be "slow, gradual and sure" which means reforming one problem at a time in a piecemeal fashion and using "blietzkrieg tactics" when changes are finally introduced so that the left and the right have no time to organise;

(c) reform from a positon of strength: reforms must not be conceded when the state is on the defensive or in response to demands from radical movements;

(d) law and order: mass turbulence, revolutionary action, spontaneous violence, reactionary opposition and other forms of low intensity conflict will always accompany reform. This is why strict law and order measures must be enforced;

(e) expanded support base: a reform coalition of business groups, moderate blacks, "verligtes" and sections of the state apparatus must be created to carry the reform programme through.

Frankel makes the crucial point that Beaufre's obsession with the "minds of men" is "fundamentally idealistic" (fn Frankel, p.46). This is crucial because for South Africa's "total strategy" planners, this idealism gave rise to the view that grand reforms and visions would in and of themselves "win hearts and minds". A similar assumption is implicit in Huntingdon's game-plan. As will be shown later, "total strategy" failed precisely because it rested on this idealistic assumption and ignored material conditions of real existence in civil society. This, however, was not simply a conceptual problem. It reflected the internal limits of the general structure of South African power that the reforms were designed to leave basically intact, not alter (e.g. oppression, exploitation, politcal rightlessness, etc).

"Total strategy" had four component parts: (i) the legalisation of black trade unions - Wiehahn Commission, (ii) the recognition of the permanence of urban blacks in line with the recommendations of the Riekert Commission, (iii) the formulation and implementation of a new constitution that brought Indians and coloureds into parliament as junior partners, and (iv) the introduction of a new regional development policy premised on the division of South Africa into 8 (eventually 9) development regions and managed by a highly complex so-called "multi-lateral" decision-making system.

Writing in March 1986, Mike Hough of Pretoria University's Strategic Studies Institute articulated the relationship between reform and repression in these terms: "Reform and unrest are not totally contradictory situations. Reform creates rising expectations and counteraction by those who do not want reform, but revolution. Hopefully the longer-term effects of credible and meaningful reform will lessen revolutionary and unrest potential, as will economic recovery. In the interim, the maintenance of law and order, within limits, is crucial. Reform alone will not cause the ANC to disappear." This was the framework that dominated the conceptual map of the "total strategy" planners.

The internal logic of "total strategy" was coherent and premised on a specific perception of South Africa's social reality. The Riekert Commission's assumption was that bantustans could be retained but that "urban blacks" must be recognised as permanent members of the cities and towns. Responding directly to the urban unrest of 1976-77, this concession contradicted a cornerstone of

urban policy that was originally formulated in 1921 by the Stallard Commission, i.e. blacks are "temporary sojourners" in white South Africa and must be allowed in only if their labour power is required by white employers.

Once "urban rights" had been conceded by the Riekert Commission, then a range of other complementary rights necessarily followed: rights to form trade unions, purchase property, sell labour on a "free urban labour market" without a contract, and trade. The municipal franchise was seen as the ultimate embodiment of the new "urban identity". Blacks were given, for the first time ever, fully autonomous municipal institutions, the so-called Black Local Authorities. These were given extensive urban powers (e.g. allocation of housing and trading sites) and the state expected these authorities to defuse black grievances because a semblance of black "self-government" had been conceded.

The new urban policy rested on two critical problems that underlay black protest later on: first, because it wanted to create a priviledge elite of "urban insiders" divorced from the poverty of the rural masses, it required an intensification of influx control - hence the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill of 1982. Secondly, the Black Local Authorities were inadequate for two reasons. Because they were supposed to be a form of political self-government, they were also designed to be financially self-sufficient. Furthermore, the bantustans were their only link to higher forms of representation.

The new labour dispensation introduced in 1979 had two objectives: first it wanted to limit trade union rights to "urban insiders" in line with the Riekert framework; and second, it wanted to use legalised unions to control the urban-based working class.

The constitutional reforms were premised on the consociational theory that "group identities" in multi-cultural societies must be protected but that structures for "co-determination" and "joint decision-making" must also be created. In other words, moving from the belief in total separation and white domination, the state conceded that at least some segments of the non-white majority should be incorporated into the constitutional framework. The result was the creation of what may be called a new "consociational contract" for whites, coloureds and Indians. This manifested itself in the 1983 Constitution and the creation of the tri-cameral parliament.

Finally, the new regional development policy and the complex "confederal framework" it underpinned (i.e. the mini-version of the original Constellation of States idea) was premised on the assumption that bantustans would proceed to independence and then enter into a supra-state agreement to form a "confederation of Southern African states" - a vision that was equated with the European Economic Community. Like the "consociational contract",

this policy represented a softening of the meaning of separate development because it rested on the principle of "economic interdependence and political independence" or what the Buthelezi Commission called the "soft-borders approach".

In summary, "total strategy" may have left certain fundamentals of apartheid intact (e.g. bantustans, influx control and constitutional exclusion of africans from central government), but it did introduce significant modifications to some basic institutions of political society. These institutions regulated access to three social arenas: the city, the factory and government. As far as the city was concerned, the Riekert reforms gave "urban insiders" new access to elements of the urban system. With a view to using this "protected" social group as a basis for stimulating a "black middle class with a stake in the system", the state's objective was to channel grievances and urban politics in general into the local government structures. By creating these new access points to political society, the state hoped to legitimise its right to rule the townships. Complementing the desire to channel urban grievances into local government was the attempt to incorporate workers into the industrial relations system by legalising trade unions. Trade unions are in theory part of an elaborate statutory system designed to control the factory and regulate conflicts between management and labour.

As far as "government" was concerned, the 1983 Constitution provided for coloured and Indian participation in the parliamentary system as junior partners. This effectively gave previously oppressed sectors of civil society formal, albeit inadequate, access to central government.

Finally an attempt was made to make bantustan independence seem more attractive by linking these "states" through a comple regional development programme supervised by the "multi-lateral" system.

Together, these modifications were relatively bold reforms as far as white society was concerned. They were seen as substantial moves away from grand apartheid and to that e tent the oppressed majority were expected to applaud and cooperate. In realit, the maximum the white minority was prepared to concede in the earl 1980s fell far short of the minimum the blac majority was prepared to accept. In the end "total strateg" failed because its intentions were thwarted b a sustained period of black resistance.

## SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE RISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The centralisation of state power under the auspices of the security establishment and the subsequent top-down re-organisation of political society could not be directly countered by the black majority. The oppressed and exploited communities and classes faced the combined logics of sophisticated statist power, a thriving increasingly monopolised capitalism and a mass communications system entirely controlled by the state or monopoly capital. Except for the trade unions, the new access points to political society created by "reform" offered meagre quantities of power and hence suggestions that these should be "used to destroy the system from within" were rejected. With the black majority completely isolated from state power, excluded from political society and alienated from the mass media, where did the resistance to reform come from?

Reform was resisted by social movements created and built in the twilight zone of civil society. The reasons for this are not specific to South Africa. According to Castells:

> "All over the world, the state developed a voracious, independent machinery, technologically sophisticated, and bureaucratically self-reproductive. In most nations, this state repressed the people, coercing them through the policing of their souls and torturing of their bodies." (p.330)

Ordinary people and citizens have in recent decades on all continents responded to this global capitalism, informationalism and statism by receding back from the national to organise the local. Disempowered and alienated, they retreat to what they can control and hence where they are strongest - the workplace, the community, the sports club, the church, the school, the street and the home. Embedded in layers of culture and informal networks, these institutions become the well-springs of social movements that express the deepest aspirations, interests and values of the oppressed groups and classes. It was from these inner cores of civil society that South Africa's social movements emerged in the 1980s. Combining rich idealism with a deep rage, these reactive challenges from below blew the fuses of "total strategy" leaving behind a stalemate that no-one controlled. As we shall see, in one sense the social movements succeeded in making reform unworkable. But this victory had a high price. By late 1986 it was clear that the social movements were not going to coalesce into a revolution because of the state's brutal determination to extinguish the organisational substructure that underpinned the 1984-86 insurrection.

The explosion of black resistance was fueled by the contradictions of "total strategy" and triggered by rapid politicisation of popular consciousness in the black communities. As resistance expanded out from its origins in the schools and affected ever-wider layers of black society, so the "total strategy" fell to pieces. To summarise a costly and violent process, the story in the end is quite simple.

As far as urban policy was concerned, the attempt to drive a wedge between "urban insiders" and "rural outsiders" by intensifying influx control was challenged and made unviable by two social movements. The first and most important was the squatter struggles. Displaying desperate and relentless determination to escape grinding rural poverty and live in urban areas, squatter communities broke through the urban wall and illegally invaded land to secure their right to urban existence. Despite ongoing attempts to forcibly remove these communities, by 1985 the state conceded that influx control was simply unworkable.

The unions also helped undo the "rural-urban" divide. By organising migrant workers and urban proletarians into single industrial trade union organisations committed to joint wage demands, the attempt to create two labour markets - one urban and priviledged and the other rural and cheap - was severely undercut and eventually abandoned.

The local government system that was supposed to bind the new urban system together was soon in ruins. Because the state insisted that councils should raise their own finance for development, councillors were forced to increase rent and service charges. Their low levels of legitimacy meant suspending development was simply not an option. They needed to demonstrate the benefits of participation. The increases, however, triggered a nation-wide popular rebellion that began in the Vaal townships in September 1984 and spread across the country. By mid-1985 most Black Local Authorities had collapsed because of mass resignations or because councillors had been killed by residents. By the end of 1985 government officials echoed the words of one top planner who said "if we had given the Black Local Authorities resources of magnitude, there would not have been so much of the current unrest".

Fiscal unviability not only affected local government and urban service provision. Withdrawing support for local government was also part of a general strategy to privatise housing provision. By withdrawing from direct housing construction, the state was leaving the highly charged problem of shelter to the mercy of the private sector. However, the profit structure of low-income housing schemes soon revealed that the private sector was unable to provide large-scale low-income housing to end-users who did not even earn a living wage. This contradiction between state housing policy and capitalist profitability gave rise to significant housing struggles throughout the country. The civics that led these struggles rejected state housing policy and called for some sort of subsidisation of the costs of shelter for the poor.

Fiscal unviability was not the only problem. The root cause of the depth of popular protest was the fact that the local franchise was not tied to a programme for granting full political

rights to blacks. This facilitated the emergeance of national political organisations like the United Democratic Front and National Forum committed to the total dismantling of Apartheid and the creation of a non-racial democracy. The local community organisations that articulated urban grievances produced by urban policy soon coalesced into national movements coordinated by the national political organisations. The mass rebellion of 1984-86 was largely shaped by the politicisation of local urban grievances: a process facilitated by an urban policy that started from the assumption that urban rights were a substitute for political rights.

The new labour dispensation failed to achieve its objectives. When the unions threatened to opppose the legislation because migrants were excluded from the right to join unions, the state backed down and extended the definition of "employee" to include migrant workers. This reversal occured within months of passing the first legislation in 1979 and was the first clear example of how popular organisation could pressurise the state into policy shifts that contradicted the assumptions of urban policy. More importantly, however, the new labour regulations failed to bring the burgeoning union movement under control. Instead, because the state had conceded industrial citizenship without committing itself to full political rights for blacks, workers naturally took their newly won industrial power into the fight for political change. The result was the rapid politicisation of the unions culminating in the formation of politically committed national union federations like the Congres of South African Trade Unions and National Council of Trade Unions.

Finally, the consociational contract foundered on the rocks of popular resistance expressed through the election boycotts of 1984. Even the government has admitted that excluding blacks was a mistake and that much of the subsequent nation-wide rebellion can be ascribed to this. PW Botha summed it up in parliament when he said: "I think we went too far with certain measures under the Apartheid principle. We made a mistake."

The confederal scheme also began to come apart at the seams as black protest strengthened the resolve of the bantustan leaders to resist "independence". Even some leaders of "independent" bantustans came out in support of a federal as opposed to a confederal plan for the future. The steady political and fiscal decline of model bantustans like Ciskei, Transkei and Bophutatswana made it abundantly clear that separate development, independence and hence the grand vision of a Confederation of States was turning into a nightmare.

It is important to note that the state's response to the effects of resistance was crucially affected by the structure of the social movements. The social movements were rooted in local strongholds of power in civil society. For reasons related to the political strategy of the dominant organisations and the de facto powerlessness of the new institutions for black participation,

the social movements impacted on the state from without because they never penetrated the institutions of political society from within. Boycott strategies, therefore, were highly effective in making existing state policy unworkable. But it meant that social movements had absolutely no say in and/or control over the mechanisms that controlled the formulation of alternative policies. Just because policy was made unworkable, this did not force the state to capitulate or negotiate a transfer of power. Contrary to popular views, the most the social movements achieved was the negation of state policy and not the overthrow of state power. Nor could these movements proactively intervene to shape alternative policies after previous policies had been made unviable. Instead, progress was made through reaction and negation.

## BEYOND "TOTAL STRATEGY": GLIMPSES OF TRANSITION

Proceeding from the assumption that more concessions would satisfy black demands and legitimise state strategies, reformers in the state responded to black rejection of reform by extending the reform programme. There were five critical moments in the extension of this programme. In November 1984, Minister Heunis announced that Black Local Authorities were to be included into the proposed Regional Services Councils. In May 1985 Stoffel Van Der Merwe published his National Party pamphlet entitled "... and what about the Blacks?" which argued that homelands were a failure. In September 1985 PW Botha announced that citizenship would be restored to all africans residing permanently in "South Africa". In late 1985 PW Botha conceded that the tri-cameral parliament was not the final solution, merely a step in a process. And finally, in September 1985 the Presidents Council published its report on urbanisation which culminated in the December 1985 statement by Heunis that blacks will be given freehold property rights and in the 1986 Abolition of Influx Control Act.

All these extensions of the reform programme were ad hoc responses to the deepening sense of crisis. One ex-advisor to Heunis said that he and many of his colleagues genuinely believed that the challenges facing the state by the end of 1985 were such that there was widespread doubt about whether the state could withstand the pressure. It was in this context that reformist sections of the state began flirting with civil society. All over the Eastern Cape government officials began entering into tentative discussions with UDF affiliates and these same officials were behind the shifts and reversals that extended the reform programme.
These seemingly unrelated policy shifts had two things in common: firstly they were all ad hoc responses to popular pressure from political movements, business organisations, trade unions,

squatters and township organisations: secondly, they unintentionally undid existing policy positions without being coupled to a coherent set of alternatives.

The point is that by extending the scope of consessions, the reformist sections of the state were widening access to political society. Abandoning homelands, re-granting citizenship, abolishing influx control and including BLAs into RSCs - these were all aimed at widening the access points beyond what the original "total strategy" formula had envisaged. This needs further elaboration.

After the inauguration of the tri-cameral parliament, the state committed itself to extending the consociational contract to the local level, i.e. to a new local government structure for whites, coloureds and Indians. The result was the proposed Regional Services Councils. Black Local Authorities were excluded from this contract because it was assumed that they would be coupled to "independent" bantustans, i.e. blacks would exercise national political rights at bantustan level. This was all consistent with the over-arching confederal plan to link bantustans to the tri-cameral state. When, however, Black Local Authorities were included into RSCs at local level in direct response to township protest, the consociational contract was in effect being extended out to blacks <u>at local level without simultaneous provision for how they could be included at higher levels</u>. This anomoly was recognised by some top officials leading in March 1985 to Gerrit Viljoen's statement that "there is a need for going higher than the local level up to the highest level".

In May 1985 Stoffel Van Der Merwe's pamphlet formally admitted that homelands were unviable bases for a future stable constitutional dispensation that would incorporate blacks. By doing so, Van Der Merwe had effectively removed a crucial foundation of traditional Apartheid policy. His alternative mish-mash of consociational theory and race federation provided a much more opaque vision of the future than the cleaner race-space policies of Grand Apartheid.

During the NP Congresses of August and September 1985, the principle that blacks were to be incorporated into "all levels of decision-making up to the highest level" culminated in PW Botha's statement that he is committed to "the principle of a united South Africa, one citizenship, and a universal franchise". This, he later argued, would mean going beyond the tri-cameral parliament and proposed that the "informal non-statutory forum" he announced in January should be charged with this task. Flowing from the Special Cabinet Committee formed in 1983, this forum was turned into the National Council in 1986. By forming such a body, and instructing it to commence investigations into a new constitutional framework, the state had effectively admitted the

failure of the 1983 formula. By 1988, the National Council had not moved beyond first base because no legitimate black leaders had agreed to participate in it.

As far as citizenship is concerned, the announcement that it was to be restored to those who lost it when "their homelands" took independence revoked once and for all the classic Verwoerdian dream that all africans would eventually be de-nationalised leaving "South Africa" with no "black citizens".

Finally, the Presidents Council Report on Urbanisation effectively admitted influx control should be scrapped because the regulations could no longer be properly implemented. This was couched in technicist jargon that referred to the organic "inevitability of black urbanisation", but in reality the unworkability of the pass laws was due to the resistance of thousands of squatters. Despite claims that this was all part of a cynical well planned "orderly urbanisation policy" to remove pass laws and then control urban populations with a new set of stringent controls, the reality was more complex. Top officials in the Directorate of Urbanisation cannot provide a coherent explanation for the current chaotic mix of race zoning, land-use planning, squatter regulation and privatised housing. The Abolition of Influx Control Act ended a previous phase of urban policy without establishing a new one. In the final analysis, by admitting blacks were permanent members of the cities, state planners were jettisoning the 1921 Stallardist principle which argued that to ensure blacks did not demand the vote, they should be defined as "temporary sojourners" in urban South Africa. Those who had struggled for the city had won a battle. The war, however, was far from over.

In short, the reformers were removing some Apartheid fundamentals that the initial "total strategy" package left intact: homelands, exclusion of africans from central government, influx control, citizenship, freehold title and total self-determination for african local government.

To argue these policy shifts were ad hoc responses to popular pressure emanating from black communities and liberal white sectors (e.g. big business) is to question our previous assumption that they flowed from a coherent policy package worked out by a cabal of top-level reformers in the state and business (see Cobbet et al). The pressures, contradictions and incoherencies produced a series of policy reversals that were reactive rather than proactive in character. They may have been part of an overarching "regional federal" programme in the minds of some, but there is no evidence of a hegemonic consensus. If these shifts flowed from the intellectual paradigms of reformers or the coherent plans of ruling class think-tanks, then we could have expected proactive strategies that were far more sophisticated at co-opting popular demands. In the end it was not

the reactive reversals of the reformers that the state turned to, but the counter-insurgency strategies of the security establishment.

## STRUGGLES WITHIN THE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE SECUROCRATS

Up until April-May 1986, the political initiative within the state was in the hands of an influential group of advanced reformers located largely in Heunis' Department of Constitutional Development and Planning but also to some extent in Manpower, Finance, Foreign Affairs and the National Party itself. This was so despite the ascendending importance of the military reflected in the way "total strategy" was formulated. The early formulation of "total strategy" rested on the essential argument that for security policy to succeed, the reform programme must succeed. This formulation made it possible for the reformers to retain control of the pace and content of the reform programme. However, as the so-called "revolutionary climate" intensified, the top echelons of the state came to rely increasingly on the security establishment for advise, policy proposals and straight repressive power. Popular protest, therefore, produced two responses within the state: reformers who believed it was possible to extend the reform programme to widen the access points to civil society, and securocrats who were itching to implement a counter-insurgency programme framed by the principles of "low-intensity warfare".

The heydey of the Heunis empire followed the cabinet reshuffle in early 1985 that destroyed Koornhof's old Department of Cooperation and Development and put Constitutional Development in control of virtually every aspect black life. This is why this state-within-a-state could shift the reform programme as adeptly as it did. Coupled to this were explorations by Foreign Affairs into the possibility of negotiations during the EPG mission.

However, in April-May 1985 the reformists lost the initiative to the securocrats as a result of two key developments. Firstly, in April an open rift appeared between what PW Botha and Malan were saying and doing and what Heunis and his group were calling for. Whereas the former were referring to "city-states" and independence for bantustans and defending the detention/imprisonment of political leaders, the latter were proceeding with the inclusion of Black Local Authorities into RSCs, backpeddling on bantustan independence, undoing influx control and supporting negotiations between senior government officials and UDF leaders in places like Port Elizabeth, Oudtshoorn, Worcester, Cradock, Uitenhage, Port Alfred and St. Wendolins (Pinetown). Certain sources explain this rift in terms of a clash in the cabinet after PW Botha refused to accept criticisms emanating from Heunis' department.

Secondly, the collapse of the EPG initiative after the State Security Council decided to bomb the capitals of the Frontline states represented the final break between the reformers and securocrats. Significantly, whereas now PW Botha argues that the "renunciation" of violence by the ANC is a pre-condition for talks, before EPG collapsed the government conceded that "suspension" of violence would be sufficient (see letter to EPG in appendix of mission's report). When EPG indicated the ANC would accept this, PW Botha and the generals were struck with the sudden realisation that the chips were now down and they had to make a choice.

What followed was the activation of a counter-revolutionary option whose objectives were clearly expressed in a speech Vlok made in May 1986: 1. "bomb the enemy in its bases", 2. "re-establish law and order" - i.e. mass detentions; 3. "bring government down to the people" - i.e. RSCs; 4. redistribute resources "from white areas to upgrade black areas".

This was followed by the national State of Emergency and the full-scale activation of the NSMS at local and regional level. The security police and sections of the military promised the State Security Council that township protest, "alternative structures" and ANC support could be eliminated by applying a sufficient degree of force in a relatively short space of time. This is what underlay Craig Williamson's remark in a June BBC interview that the South American "rugby stadium" option could work in South Africa. This would then restore the state's "position of strength" and refute the claim that Zwelake Sisulu made at the March NECC conference that "the state had lost the initiative to the people." Only after that, they argued, could negotiations be considered. Not surprisingly, this armed procrastination alternative was attractive to Botha who was still reeling from the consequences of the Rubicon I and Rubicon II fiascos.

More importantly, the decision to scuttle EPG and regain the initiative was taken largely by an inner power elite of cold war warriors that had surrounded PW Botha by early 1986. This group did not share Johann Coetzee's soft repression strategies that emphasised limited coercion and espionage to control low-intensity conflict. Instead, a new group emerged represented most clearly by Major-General Charles-Lloyd. Borrowing heavily from "low-intensity warfare" theory as developed and applied in Malaya, Algeria and South America, this group re-defined the problem and advocated radical solutions. By 1986 their position had won out against the reformist option in Constitutional Developement and Planning and the soft war strategists like Coetzee. It was, in fact, the 1984-86 insurrection that ensured the hegemony of the "counter-revolution" position. This is how a General in the State Security Council put it:

"We learned our lessons from Malaya that you must let the civilians continue to run the country while operating the counter-insurgency strategy. The civilians and the military must work hand-in-hand. We passed on the knowledge of revolution and counter-revolution to the civilian administration. They are very much in favour of fighting a counter-revolutionary fight. The impetus is no longer just from the military. Its now accepted by the civilians. It took a bit of education. But they learned very quickly after 1984."

These struggles within the state were directly about how to respond to the challenge from black civil society. Whereas the reformers in various of the civilian departments wanted to respond by extending the restructuring of political society beyond the original "total strategy" parameters, top securocrats and politicians decided the most effective response would be from within the state itself. This decision to fight the battle directly through state institutions resulted in the activation of all levels of the National Security Management System (NSMS) and in the process gave this massive highly centralised bureacratic-cum-military machinery the right to coordinate the implementation of both security and political policies.

## "WHAM": RE-MAKING CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE STATE'S IMAGE

The counter-revolutionary theory that has come to infuse state strategy revolves around the desire to "win hearts and minds" - the so-called WHAM programme. The fundamental difference between "total strategy" as conceived in the early 1980s and the WHAM programme that has been implemented since 1986, is that the latter is no longer concerned primarily with restructuring the access points to political society. Instead, the emphasis is on recasting the foundations of civil society. Realising how Beaufrian "idealism" limited the impact of "total strategy", the state has now turned to strategies aimed at completely restructuring the moral, cultural, religious, political and material underpinnings of civil society in the black townships. This shift from grand visions of reform from above to rebuilding new foundations from below is the single most significant feature of current strategic thinking in the state. This is also why the idealism of Beaufre has been replaced by the machiavellian materialism of Colonel J.J. McCuen.

Major General Wandrag summed up the objective of current strategies when he said: "Drastic action must be taken to eliminate the underlying social and economic factors which have caused unhappiness in the population. The only way to render the enemy powerless is to nip revolution in the bud by ensuring there is no fertile soil in which the seeds of revolution can germinate." This view was echoed by a high ranking State Security

Council official: "We have studied counter-revolutionary tactics in Malaya, Chile, El Salvador. We're using the same hearts-and-minds techniques here. First we neutralise the enemy, then we win over the people so they will reject the ANC."

In a recent speech to the senior management of a chemical company, Major-General C.J. Lloyd - recently appointed as the secretary of the State Security Council - said the counter-revolutionary strategy involved three things: (i) the countering of planned subversion on all fronts: (ii) the "elimination" of the revolutionaries: and (iii) the reform of the environment. This is the logic Willie Breytenbach refers to when he points out with deep scepticism: "where once there could be no security without reform, now there can be no reform without security."
The NSMS is the structure that coordinates the implementation of this strategy. Although originally set up as part of the original "total strategy" programme, the NSMS was never fully activated and turned into the nerve centre of state action that it has now become. Instead, the NSMS was created as a fall-back in case the formal civilian structure collapsed or failed to carry out its tasks. Prior to 1985-86 the officials in the NSMS, to quote one ex-government official, "were just keeping the seats warm". When the moment came, to quote an ex-security policeman, "all we needed to do was flick the switch".

It is important to note the following key features of the NSMS:

(1) the JMCs at regional, sub-regional and local level are chaired either by a policeman or military man:

(2) the officials who work in the NSMS are there on secondment from other departments:

(3) there is an extra-ordinarily high proportion of intelligence personnel;

(4) although government now acknowledges that this system exists, the precise functions, strategies and personnel who serve on the hundreds of committees remains a secret.

The Security Committees of most JMCs meet once a month and involve officials from the army, navy, air force, police, security police, riot police, CID, traffic departments, local fire departments and the prison service. The Political, Economic and Social Committees (or Staatkundige, Ekonomiese and Maatskaplike Kommitees - SEMKOMS) usually involve officials from the departments of manpower, transport, national education, population development programme, water affairs, and provincial administration. The Communications Committee involves officials from the Bureau for Information, Civil Defense, SABC and certain government media.

It is claimed by some officials that access to the State Presidents' office can be obtained from any level in the JMC within hours.

The Sub-JMCs meet monthly and consist largely of the same departments as the JMC. Connected to the sub-JMC is a Daily Monitoring Committee that meets daily to discuss immediate issues and problems. The members of this committee are ready for action at any time and are on standby 24 hours a day.

Mini-JMCs are usually staffed by military, police and Bureau of Information personell. At the most grassroots level, the Community Liason Forum brings together local officials from the traffic police, local authorities, city and public transport companies, township administrators, various private organisations and cooptable black elements.

There is another structure concerned with labour that has some links to the JMC system, but precisely what these are has not been ascertained. These are the so-called DEMALCOMs, i.e. Defense Manpower Liason Committees. Set up originally to coordinate conscription so as not to damage management structures, these structures are now reported to be coordinating strike information. They are chaired by military personnel and include representatives from the Chamber of Mines, AHI, SEIFSA, FCI, ASSOCOM and others.

What concrete strategies have been pursued by the state as part of its counter-revolutionary strategy? These can be divided into repressive and reformist strategies.

The repressive measures include the following:

(1) press restrictions. These effectively eliminate the most important link between the township movements and the South African public - a link that was becoming increasingly important in forcing whites to re-think their support for the government and helped publicise the alternative structures of self-government that community organisations established in the townships. It was these embryos of an alternative form of social organisation that captured the imagination of people like Molly Blactburn, Jan Van Eck, Wynand Malan, Van Zyl Slabbert and thousands of other whites who have joined new movements of white democrats such as the Five Freedoms Forum and the National Democratic Movement.

(2) mass detentions. With over 50 000 people having been processed through the detention cells since 1985 for their political activities, there is no doubt that the state still stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that leaders are there to be spoken to, not incarcerated.

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