

THE NATAL VIOLENCE: THE SADF AS A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE
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The subject on which I've been asked to speak tonight, is THE NATAL VIOLENCE: THE SADF AS A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

Most of what I intend to say tonight is based on my experience as an ECC fieldworker with the primary brief of monitoring the role of the SADF on the ground. However I intend to cover an area greater than just that, so some of what I say will involve inference, opinion and assumption. I assume for instance, that people - the public - have the right to know exactly how their brothers, lovers, husbands or fathers who are conscripted into the SADF, are being utilised in the townships. That was the basis on which the ECC created the position of fieldworker, and furthermore, that is the basis from which I have operated over the past year.

To begin with, I believe it is important to understand that any discussion around the role of the SADF in its present form, has to recognise the following: 1) the relative deprivatation and oppression of the broader black community under white minority rule,

2) the utilisation of state resources, including the armed forces, to sustain such rule, and  
3) the composition and accountability of these forces, to an unrepresentative government.

These and other issues relate fundamentally to the operation of the security forces in the present context, and it follows that any solution to the present crisis in South Africa will have to take cognaisance of these historical facts.

At the same time, I believe that we must also recognise that unless a compromise is reached during national negotiations on the question of an international peace-keeping body such as the UN, and until such time as the broader issues of oppression, poverty, representation and accountability are addressed on the national level, in a meaningful, substantial way, we are stuck with the present structures and institutions. My point here is that reality dictates that we must focus our attention on what we can realistically achieve now, as an immediate and tangible improvement to the status quo, and not on theories of academic perfection which may or may not, ultimately evolve at some point in the future.

As in many other places in the country, the level of violence in Natal has shown no real sign of abating, and the fact of the matter is that the Police, as the supposedly appropriate body, are not equipped, logistically or mentally, to deal with the crisis in a creative or even constructive way. Enter the SADF.

Now the SADF, by way of background, during the Namibian War, operating with a minimum of infrastructure and against considerable odds, was forced to implement a flexible and more sophisticated approach to

controlling the terrain. Unlike the police back "state-side" (as home came to be known), the army fought a far broader battle, a battle in which so-called "com-ops" or "psychological warfare" was every bit as important as the military struggle. The very same Special Forces divisions causing such an outcry at the moment, were themselves involved in the execution of hundreds, probably thousands of civilians in Namibia and Angola, and this they did in the guise of SWAPO operatives. The SADF learnt to paint a very pretty picture of itself at the same time, with food and medical services being provided to the "PB" 's (wat beteken "Plaaslike Bevolking"), and all assaults on such people by soldiers wearing SADF uniforms, were declared strictly prohibited. It is in the context of the 1986 "Hearts and Minds" campaign being imported to this country by senior military figures including Gens. Magnus Malan and Kat Liebenberg, and launched in Alexandra township that same year, that we must understand the present role of the armed forces, particularly the Defence Force, in the townships of this country.

I sincerely believe that the success of the "hearts and minds" campaign is one of the most under-rated military and political victories that the National Party has achieved during its 43 year power-binge. The ECC found out the hard way - we had our "Keep the Townships Clean" campaign squashed when communities themselves began to call for the SADF to be deployed in their areas. As much as this was a sad indictment on the SAP rather than a pat on the back for the SADF, there were also sound reasons for this expressed preference, most significantly the fact that in the majority of cases, the SADF reacted in situations of conflict, in a responsible and professional way. Another reason why the SADF was generally perceived as more impartial than the SAP, and this is particularly true in Natal, is because police have a long history of being associated with chiefs and councillors, who are generally supportive of one of the parties to the conflict, namely the IFP. The SADF, whose troops were drawn from elsewhere in the country, was not party to the cooperation that still occurs in Natal and Kwa Zulu, between on the one hand, the KZP and the SAP, and Inkatha on the other. A third reason for this perception was that the SADF is deployed as a secondary force, in support of the SAP, and while being highly visible in the townships, the SADF do not play as confrontational or contraversial a role.

An example of this is the situation in Hambanati township, near Tongaat, where I am liasing between a highly insensed community and the SADF who have relocated their base from that area, to an area which I am told by the Officer Commanding Group 10, is a "higher priority" than Hambanati. This community, which incidentally is a staunchly ANC supporting one, has demanded the return of the soldiers who were stationed there, and they are prepared to march through the town to demonstrate their feelings. In Bruntville near Mooi River, a contingent of Cape Corps soldiers were heroes of that community when they remained with residents in the face of an attack by hostel-dwellers. Police had earlier ordered all their personnel out of the area because "we have reason to believe that AK 47's are being used."

There are still serious problems with SADF personnel in the Natal

area however, with reports of assaults, thefts, unlawful searches and harrasment from all regions. In many cases such misconduct has been indiscriminate and random, with many innocent victims being beaten and hospitalised. In other cases, ANC members specifically appear to have been targetted for harrasment by the SADF, and this is a most worrying trend. But when one compares the numbers of recorded assaults to the number of troops deployed in the Natal region, I believe that such cases are relatively few. It is my considered opinion that the overt role of the SADF in the townships of Natal, and probably country-wide, is generally "above-board," ie. to whatever extent the armed forces are involved in destabilising activities, I do not believe that conscripts, or other "troopies" such as those patrolling the townships in their Buffels are playing that role. They may however, be unwitting participants in the covering up and disguising of an agenda that is being executed by other employees of the SADF, for instance, the Special Forces referred to earlier.

What we need to examine at this point I believe, is whether or not there is a "duality" in the aim and role of the SADF, ie. is there an orchestrated attempt by the "powers that be," to destabilise popular opposition to National Party objectives, through for example, the instigation of violence and the assasination of key activists? Let us examine the evidence.

Revelations by ex-5 Recce sergeant Felix Ndimene indicate, that members of that unit, all foreign mercenaries, were in fact involved in a number of train massacres on the Reef. Admissions by FW De Klerk at the time of Inkathagate revealed that some 150 kwaZulu civillians were trained by the SADF in the Caprivi prior to Namibian independence. The base where they were trained, a place called Fort Doppies, is in fact a Reconnaissance Regiment base, and is located in the middle of the bush where they were supposedly trained to be "urban bodyguards." Closer to home for us Natalians, is the Mkuze Camp in Kwa Zulu where additional training of civilians took place. The relationship of the SADF to the kwaZulu Bureau for Natural Resources has also yet to be clarified, and it was most disturbing to discover, as we have, that the Special Forces operators, many from 1 Recce here on the Bluff, were involved with the KBNR which consists of many ex-Rhodesian Selous Scouts, in a restricted area on the Mozambique border. What exactly went on there is a matter for speculation, but it is not insignificant that Renamo rebels continue to operate from that vicinity. This is the same area that David Webster was working in at the time of his murder.

The question of the CCB remains a relevant one in the light of recent statements by fugitive ex-National Intelligence Service operatives Adrian Maritz and Henry Martin. They claim that as of last year, the CCB was still in operation. My discussions with ex CCB operatives indicate that the CCB has simply relocated itself in the private sector, thanks to the R 11 million-plus in "golden handshakes" for members. There have been some most startling allegations of, for example, security companies being formed to "house" CCB operatives. Our own very favourite private-statalts have also come under fire from those who claim to be in "the know." ESCOM, which

endured allegations of RENAMO involvement in Mozambique in the past, is being investigated as a possible haven for reactionary agents on the Natal South Coast. ISCOR has now been accused of facilitating SADF call-ups of workers in their employ, and this has been confirmed by the SADF. We have received documentary evidence from an ex-ISCOR employee who was also recruited into an SADF training operation in Newcastle. If the introduction of a clandestine conscription operation is not reason for concern enough, then consider that all black ISCOR workers who have received SADF call-ups are exclusively Zulus, and all belong, with the exception of those who were prepared to speak to us, to one particular political party that has been accused of collaboration before.

To look at the question from another angle, does the state possess the resources and necessary motive to implement a double agenda of this sort on a national level? The answer to the first is that the state clearly has the resources to mount an operation on this scale. There is a R 4 Billion, Special Defence Account which is not subject to public audit, and a 4 man commission of enquiry, appointed by President De Klerk in the wake of Inkathagate, into expenditure of that budget, is apparently not going to be permitted to make its findings public. The question of motive is not as clear-cut, but ex-Military Intelligence Major Nic Basson, writing in the latest edition of W I P, believes that the Namibian experience is an accurate indication of the lengths to which this government is prepared to go in its quest for retention of control. He claims that the Namibian election process was used by South African state agencies as a trial-run for "the real showdown" here. Their brief was apparently two-fold: 1) to reduce an estimated 80% SWAPO victory to below the 2/3 's majority, and

2) to assess the viability or otherwise of repeating the process here. We know that much, and there is plenty evidence to substantiate that. For example, another CCB operative by the name of Jacques van der Merwe has confessed to assassinating DTA personnel under NIS orders, and making them appear to be SWAPO "hits." That campaign was another major victory for the National Party, with the figures reflecting a mere 56% majority for SWAPO in the final elections.

Minister Pik Botha's admission that "well in excess of R 100 million" was spent in Namibia during that time leaves me with no doubt whatsoever that such an operation took place. What we do not know for sure is whether or not the decision to import that strategy and apply it locally - in much the same way as the Hearts and Minds Campaign of the 80's - was ever made, or if it was, by whom. Basson maintains that De Klerk is the Commander in Chief of the "third force."

From my own personal experience in the townships of Natal, I cannot be so sure. Aside from the generally undisciplined thuggery which raises its head from time to time in various areas where the SADF are deployed, I have seen little evidence personally, of another level of operation in the Defence Force's overall strategy. That is not to say that I have not been highly suspicious on a number of occasions. In Richmond for example, I discovered that the local chief of

Indaleni had a number of dealings with Military Intelligence personnel, and we also received information on the presence of a CCB operative doing "reconnaissance" in the area. Besides the numerous allegations of whites' involvement in attacks and killings of ANC supporters, the local Inkatha leader in the area, a Mr Ndodi Thusi, was shot dead by someone who was inside the car with him on his way from Ixopo to Bulwer, deep in the rural Midlands. In publicising these and other puzzling questions, I must have pushed the wrong button somewhere, because I was subsequently subjected to systematic harrasment by unknown persons who, sabotaged my car, followed me on occasion, and threatened to kill me. I was also accused by the police of leading an ANC attack into an Inkatha area, and warned that murder charges were being investigated against me. To date, no charges have been formulated.

The indications are there, but when we talk of conclusive proof, I'm afraid that we have to accept that either our paranoia is getting away from us, or we are dealing with highly efficient professionals.

To whatever extent the SADF is playing a "dual" role, we can do little else than maintain our vigilance and demand clarification of the numerous questions the National Party has answered with pathetic inadequacy. The ECC has requested to meet the Minister of Defence Mr Roelf Meyer to ask him to clarify questions around former Defence Minister Malan's continued presence on the all-powerful State Security Council and Cabinet Committee for Security Matters, and other questions. To date we have had no response. I believe it is imperative, and in the interests of peace, that public pressure on the government to disclose details of these types of activities, be maintained.

In the meantime however we are left with ongoing violence and people dying, every single day that goes by. And as I have said before, we need to look at creative ways of addressing this problem while we await answers from the powers that be. And since dismantling the present Defence Force and replacing it with one that is automatically impartial and perfect is in reality not a feasible possibility at the moment, attention will have to be given to existing structures, and the ways in which we can make the best of an admittedly far from ideal situation. Besides demanding clarity on the "third force" issue, and following that, the dismantling and cessation of whatever is occurring on that level, there are, I believe, some real and positive steps that can be taken immediately to tangibly improve both the role of the security forces - in particular the SADF - and the incidence of violence. I am not suggesting that we abandon our ideals or "opt out," I just believe that something has to be done very urgently, so let's look at what is possible now:

- 1) In the first place, the need for conscription by the National Party's own standards, has fallen away altogether. Its anomolous racial basis and its negative effect on the economy are mere additional points to the fact that there is no reason why a full-time professional army could not play the role that conscripts are being required to play at the moment. Arguments about the

"moderating effect" of civilians in the army fall flat in the face of assaults by National Servicemen on local residents in various communities throughout Natal.

2) Secondly the SADF needs to commit itself to a binding and enforceable code of conduct. Such a code is apparently in the process of being drawn up, although we have yet to see it. Such a code should be subordinate not to the hierarchical operation of that SADF, but rather to a value system based on universally acceptable human standards of conduct.

3) Thirdly, and finally, the accountability of SADF structures on the ground, let us say on the Natal North Coast for example, to a comparatively arbitrary authority in Pretoria is a factor which residents of violence affected communities justifiably have difficulty in accepting. Troops are ostensibly deployed to serve communities in a law-enforcement capacity, and yet such people have no recourse other than the courts - a long and expensive procedure itself - to address grievances. While the National Peace Accord has initiated steps in the right direction, the formation of Local Dispute Resolution Committees does not go far enough in providing a forum for community/security force relations to develop.

The press is abuzz with talk of a "new-improved" defence force which will apparently be "defending democracies throughout Africa by the year 2000." If that is the case by that time, then the SADF will have travelled a long way from its present role of reporting to an unelected government on matters of life and death for local people. I believe that the SADF has to become accountable to the people it is purporting to serve, and since a national settlement lies ahead of us somewhere in the future, SADF structures should be made accountable now, to democratically constituted bodies at the local level. There is no reason other than the possibility of a conflict of interests on the part of the National Party, why the command structures within the security forces cannot be devolved onto local bodies which are directly answerable to the communities concerned. This is already occurring to a limited extent; for example during the Richmond War, I facilitated SADF consultation with the community of Indaleni in identifying strategic positions for the location of SADF bases. If this type of ongoing consultation and accountability could be formalised and implemented on the local level, it is my firm belief that the level of violence would be more than halved. People need to be in control of their lives, and failing that, at least involved in trying to regain that control. The helplessness that affects communities wracked by violence is not helped by the SADF's autocratic modus operandi. In the context of the Natal violence, the SADF are in many respects, the means by which people can return to normality. It is in the case of the failure of the security forces that people resort and are resorting to "defence committees" and vigilante groupings. The introduction of mechanisms by which members of a given community can play an active role in deciding how to use various resources, military and otherwise, towards bettering their lives, is an urgent necessity. And the fact that such a system is attainable in the short term, makes its continued absence inexcusable.

Regardless of the motives for the apparently positive contribution that the SADF is making towards peace, it is important to realise that that strategy has its dividends for peace. There are positive aspects and standards of behaviour which the SADF itself has set as precedents for itself and other law-enforcement agencies; in particular the SADF's apparent impartiality has created expectations which we can now justifiably demand be fulfilled. In so doing, we will be building on what is good while discarding that which does not satisfy those expectations. I believe that while we may yearn for the day when such force will be unnecessary, those of us concerned with peace - including ECC supporters in the days following the abolition of conscription - can continue to make a contribution to that end by firstly recognising that in the context of a violence-ridden society such as ours, resources such as the armed forces are a necessary reality in the short to medium term at least, and secondly, corresponding to that acceptance, ensuring that such resources are expended and utilised in the most responsible and constructive way possible. Our future depends on it. Thank you.

## SUMMARY OF THE NATAL VIOLENCE FOR 1991 - for THE NEW AFRICAN

by HB OSBORN

The year 1991 cannot be viewed as a particularly favourable one for peace in Natal and South Africa. While steps towards negotiation and peace were taken at a leadership level, and amid much fanfare and jockeying during these events, people in Natal were dying at an average rate of four per day. There is not a single political party or government department, and very few newspapers which can truthfully say that they have accorded the violence and the killings the attention that is required to bring it to an end. White people manage mostly, to pretend that the violence doesn't exist, or that if it does, it doesn't concern them. For their part, township residents of communities which are wracked by violence, are so bewildered and traumatised by the horror they witness on a daily basis, that they can only barricade themselves in their houses at night, or flee. There is little hope for them; the structures of the National Peace Accord are some 6 months away from being set up in most areas of Natal, their worst suspicions about the role of the security forces appear borne out by the confessions of an Inkatha Freedom Party official (Weekly Mail, 13/12/91), and an average of some 5 to 7 township residents have to be murdered to warrant the same space that most main-stream, commercial newspapers accord the story of one white victim.

This analysis intends to highlight a number of trends - some positive, others less so - in violent conflict in Natal during 1991. However one of the major factors to emerge this year was the affirmation of the conflict as a "nation-wide" struggle for political supremacy between primarily, the ANC, IFP and the NP. As such, it should be noted at the outset, that the regional dynamics revealed below, are linked, fundamentally and causally, to developments in the national political arena. In fact it is this extension of the battle lines beyond the boundaries of Natal, to the Reef and elsewhere, that has placed Inkatha, a previously regional force, at the national negotiating table, and led to its increased prominence and dubbing as one of the "big three."

In addition to the trends which have occurred at a regional level, there have been significant events and surprises at a national level, which have naturally played themselves out or effected repercussions at local and regional levels elsewhere.

The signing of the National Peace Accord in Johannesburg on the 14 September of this year, and the subsequent CODESA meetings, are examples of such events. But by far the most significant occurrence in the South African political arena, has been the exposure of the National Party's duality of roles; ie. the reasonable, enlightened, aspirant liberal approach which is manifested in the rhetoric of negotiation, versus the clandestine, sinister and brutal application of a programme which hinges on acts of terror and murder to achieve its objectives. This duality was called "the New Total Strategy" by the Human Rights Commission, and it has led to the coining of the phrase "the Pen and the Sword," by researchers such as Nathan and Phillips.

"Inkathagate # 1" (in August) and its sequel this month (the funding of Inkatha to the tune of R 7 million plus, and the training of Inkatha hit squads by the SADF), are significant not only in terms of



their demonstration of the S A government's bias, but more importantly in that they have shattered any illusions we may have had about the latter's bona fides within the negotiation process. These revelations have relegated the National Party from a position of apparent moral high ground, to the more realistic position and image of a common player prepared to play dirty.

The relationship is entirely reciprocal however, and there is no doubt that the elevation of Inkatha and particularly its President M. G. Buthelezi, from a position of regional influence to a national one, could not have been accomplished without the active assistance of highly-placed government and NP figures. The simply appalling arrest and conviction record of the SAP is now revealed as the mere outward expression of a relationship which runs far deeper, and involves officials of a much higher level than originally thought. For President De Klerk to now say that he was unaware of the sums of money being paid, or the activities engaged in, is increasingly unbelievable. For Chief Minister Buthelezi to continue to deny that sums of this magnitude (now in excess of R 10 million) came from a source that was unknown to him, is laughable.

These revelations are also significant insofar as they expose the involvement of leadership echelons in the planning of violence, demonstrating that such violence and casualties arising therefrom, are not due merely, as some would have us believe, to the undisciplined and chaotic behaviour of those on the ground. Not only will the Weekly Mail revelations result in a levelling (to an extent) of the political playing field, but all analyses henceforth will have to take cognisance of that cooperation. Even more importantly perhaps, it is likely to have the effect of forcing the government and Inkatha to acknowledge their commonalities and parallels, and to begin to conduct their political activities on a level which is conducive to the frankness and honesty that any negotiation about the future of our country deserves.

This cooperation between the state and Inkatha took place on many levels, but nowhere was it more apparent, than at the level of operation of law-enforcement agencies such as the kwaZulu Police as well as the SAP and SADF. For example it revealed itself in discrepancies in reaction time on the part of the various law-enforcement agencies (Richmond, January 1991; Empangeni, November 1991; Mooi River, December 1991, to name but a few examples), depending on which party was being attacked. As mentioned above, it was also evident in the SAP and KZP's arrest and conviction rate; in particular the discrepancy in efficiency depending on the political affiliation of the victims and suspects. Furthermore, this relationship was recorded in a number of court cases, hearings and commissions of enquiry (eg. The Kwa Shange hearing in Pietermaritzburg, the murder convictions of IFP leaders Ndlovu and Jamile).

One of the most damning indictments on the government (in fact on the State President himself) is the Natal Supreme Court decision which questioned the reasoning of Mr De Klerk in relaxing the prohibition on the carrying of dangerous (cultural) weapons, at a time when the violence was already rampant throughout Natal.

A report on the kwaZulu Police, published jointly by the Human Rights Commission and the Legal Resources Centre in Durban, concludes in the face of abundant evidence, that the KZP are an "obstacle to peace" in the region. This follows on the heels of the commissioner of the KZP,

General Jac Buchner conceding that his police force may be biased in favour of Inkatha. We are given to understand that the Chief Minister, who doubles as Minister of Police, was not amused. The latest revelations by the Weekly Mail's "source" in the IFP claim that the KZP are under standing orders to release all suspects arrested if they can show that they are members of Inkatha.

Of a less well-known and documented nature, is the rise of key "white" figures in the kwaZulu/Inkatha Establishment. This is to be distinguished from the relatively long-standing presence of whites in ANC-aligned organisations, in that it is a recent trend, corresponding with the conversion of Inkatha from a Zulu cultural organisation, to a non-racial political party. This trend is made increasingly noteworthy by two primary facts:

- 1) The undertaking by senior security force officers that the government was prepared to help Inkatha with its transition - as revealed by a senior IFP official in the Weekly Mail (13 December);
- 2) the fact that many of these rising stars in the kwaZulu/Inkatha establishment have themselves had links in the past and in some cases, ongoing links with the government's security organs. For example, Mr Walter Felgate who has recently found himself in the number 3 position in the IFP, has a theological background, but his association with the South African Council of Churches in the late 70's is alleged to have ended on a sour note. The head of the Inkatha Institute, Dr Gavin Woods, has denied allegations that he is a police informer, but has conceded that he has worked closely with the security police. Others in the Institute also have suspect pasts, most notably the new, very vocal head of the Violence Portfolio, Mr Kim Hodgson. Mr Hodgson while attending Rhodes University in Grahamstown was leader of the local NSF (this is the security police funded project which was launched on the so-called "liberal" (generally English) campuses to counter the influence of the more radical National Union of SA Students [NUSAS]). Mr Hodgson has done sterling work in countering what he calls "anti-Inkatha propaganda," and to date his public statements have amounted to little more than alternative explanations for Inkatha excesses (eg. the massacre of 17 people in Bruntville). A previous colleague of his, in fact one of the founders of the NSF and a known Security Branch operative during the 1980's, Mr Phillip Powell, is now the kwaZulu representative for the Natal Midlands. He has recently been linked to the faxing of IFP Youth Brigade press statements received by a number of newspapers, from Security Police offices in the Midlands.

## THE VIOLENCE

The conflict in Natal (as on the Reef, and increasingly in the Cape too) during 1991 demonstrated a continuing tendency to manifest itself in the murky realms of hit-and-run, terror tactics. Not surprisingly (in the light of what has been said), the vast majority of "statistics" were ANC supporting or aligned individuals, and correspondingly, the vast majority of cases implicate either elements of the security forces, or members/supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party. This is not to say that ANC member/supporters have not been guilty of ghastly atrocities as well, and the mere fact that theirs' number less than those atrocities committed by IFP supporters, is a poor claim to innocence.

In contrast to the mass confrontations and battles of the past, the emerging trend towards anonymous attacks and killings is a sinister development which creates a number of problems, not least of which is the obvious question of law-enforcement, and the space it creates for perpetrators to avoid the police. This trend appears to follow on the heels of peace initiatives in many Natal townships, and is almost always found to occur in areas where the ANC has established itself within a local power base.

The more rural or semi-urban townships such as Port Shepstone's Murchison for example, and Richmond's Indaleni displayed the same trends, ie. in the earlier part of this year, many battles occurred between massed opponents, and as the ANC began to establish itself in terms of popular support, an uneasy silence descended on these areas. Predictably this silence was broken during the latter part of the year, and continues to be interrupted by the types of attacks mentioned already, which are usually committed by well-equipped and presumably well-trained individuals who are able to effect maximum destruction of life and property in a relatively short time, before disappearing.

January of 1991 saw the ongoing mobilisation of the youth in many areas of Natal, by the ANC and affiliated organisations (the presence of industry in some of these areas (eg Port Shepstone and Mooi River, also enabled progressive groupings to make use of unionised workers to mobilise support for the ANC). The difference this year however, was that the growing politicisation of the youth spread further afield, outside of the metropolitan areas of Natal, and deep into the rural areas. While many of the townships around Pietermaritzburg enjoyed their quietest year since 1985, pockets of violent fighting exploded at Mooi River, 50 km's to the north, at Richmond, just 30 km's to the south, and at Table Mountain, 20 km's to the east, resulting in a combined death toll of almost 300 people. The same applies to Durban, with the ANC prevailing in the three major "metropolitan" townships of Inanda, Kwa Mashu and Umlazi, with a dwindling support base around the out-lying, fringe areas, and with the exception of a few out-breaks in those areas, the more centrally situated black residential areas around Durban also enjoyed a relatively quiet year. The same cannot be said for the areas beyond greater Durban; beginning at Umgababa and rippling southwards through Umzumbe to Port Shepstone and beyond, the fighting spread like wild-fire. To the north too, first Ndwedwe, then Tongaat and finally Empangeni and Eshowe also erupted into fighting. In each of these areas, the growing sphere of ANC influence and support, carried most notably by the school-going youth in those areas, began to come up against a surprisingly vicious resistance to that trend.

While there is little doubt that youths and other ANC-supporting individuals were sometimes aggressive and brutal, often provocative and confrontational and virtually always in contempt of traditional structures and authority, no one was prepared for the reaction that was unleashed in many of these areas. In many ways the ANC and its supporters share the blame, in failing to recognise the devastation that these traditional and current structures themselves were capable of creating, and for giving individuals associated therewith, little choice to do other than resist forcibly. The ANC appears to have also failed to recognise the strategic significance that the State or elements thereof, attached to the rural areas of Natal. More specifically, the way in which this perception on the part of

the Sate dove-tailed with the IFP's critical need to win over that constituency (after being forced to concede the more metropolitan areas) was overlooked by those who mobilised for the ANC. and more specifically, how that perception dove-tailed with the IFP's critical need to win over that constituency after being forced to concede the more metropolitan areas.

Each of the flash-points themselves also demonstrated similar dynamics to this regional trend - on a microcosmic scale. For example, if the (white) village of Richmond can be taken to be a built-up area (which it is, relatively speaking), then the black residential areas immediately surrounding and closest to that centre, those of Indaleni and Magoda, generally emerged as ANC-aligned strong-holds, while the more out-lying areas (Mkhobeni and Pateni) are powerful IFP support bases. The same can be said of Port Shepstone on the Natal South Coast, and Empangeni, and Hammarsdale, and even Mooi River (which is confusing because the IFP supporters who are drawn from the rural country-side in the Midlands, are resident in Hostels inside Bruntville township; but they nevertheless originate from the out-lying areas where deference is paid to the chief and his indunas, and to white people for that matter). The more "urbanised" black residential areas in Natal, where traditional authorities were replaced some time ago by the now discredited township council system, have generally fallen into the hands of the ANC and aligned civic organisations. Despite some obvious exceptions (such as Mshayazafe in Inanda, Lindelani in Kwa Mashu, Enjobokazi near Mpumalanga and others) the ANC has gained control (mostly legitimately and on the basis of popular demand, but also forcibly on occasion) of these areas with relative ease. In contrast to this, the intensity of the resistance by a combination of forces, including both the considerably capable traditional Zulu war machine, and powerful, resourceful government security organs was however, unexpectedly swift and harsh.

At every point of conflict in rural areas mentioned thus far, security forces have been implicated in either assisting local IFP efforts to retain control, or in targetting the ANC and key local figures themselves.

## THE CONDUCT OF THE SECURITY FORCES

It would be appropriate under this heading to look at the security forces in relation to the requirements of the National Peace Accord. However the proposed code of conduct for SADF members has failed to materialise to date, despite promising beginnings, while the KZP have registered no intention whatsoever to be bound by such restrictions. Hence it is only the SAP which can technically be held to that code. However as an indication of a standard of acceptable behaviour for law-enforcement bodies, the current Peace Accord plays a useful role.

Here a distinction must be made between the VISIBLE role of the security forces, and the clandestine role discussed in brief earlier. The distinction is not always clear however, with SADF troops being accused in many instances of depraved behaviour, SA Police of interrogations and detentions, and the KZP of outright murder. An interesting development is the merging of clandestine and overt actions on the part of the KZP, a more distinct, but still overlapping double agenda on the part of the police, and the almost

total separation of roles on the part of the SADF, with a minimum of cooperation between overt and covert levels of operation.

The in-depth report on the KZP by the HRC and LRC, concludes that the overlap of IFP and kwaZulu Police structures has resulted in a single mission to promote Inkatha. The kwaZulu police have been directly implicated in many murders, and this figure refers to the constables who are based at police stations in kwaZulu, not to covert units in that police force.

The police in Natal, even the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and not just the Riot Unit and Security Branch, have a long history of association with both the council system and traditional structures, both inside and outside kwaZulu areas and have always been treated with mistrust and contempt, and while communities generally prefer their presence to that of the KZP, there has also been a widespread preference expressed for the SADF as opposed to the SAP. This image of the SAP is unfortunate in the light of an emerging number of individual policemen, some highly placed, who do appear to be concerned about peace and the people they are purporting to serve. However in the light of the behaviour and activities of many policemen, including at least one who earned popular credibility as a peace-maker (Maj Deon Terreblanche of Mpumalanga fame) the suspicion with which the SAP are regarded by many communities throughout Natal is entirely understandable, and in many cases, perfectly justified. A positive trend which was displayed during 1991, was the noticeable improvement in the level of impartiality practiced by the police - on a visible level at least. There are some notable exceptions to this however, particularly in the Midlands areas such as Bruntville and Ndalen. Despite the fact that these policemen may only be attempting to project an more acceptable appearance, and the fact that other policemen are possibly engaged in less visible and palatable activities at the same time, the dawning realisation by the powers that be, that the SAP has to present a professional and universally acceptable face, is beginning to create expectations on the part of previously subdued and undemanding communities as well as wider observers such as the media. Whether or not the morally correct motive is present or not, this apparent impartiality has certain dividends for peace.

The SADF has undoubtedly employed the most sophisticated approach in its new-found capacity as a law-enforcement agency, but the success of what we will call its "dual" approach, and the level of secrecy it has managed to maintain for so long, indicate a significant concentration of brain power in that aspect of the security establishment. It was the SADF which honed its "Com-ops" or psychological warfare skills in Namibia, it was the SADF (virtually by its own admission at the time of Inkathagate) which handled destabilisation programmes throughout the sub-continent, the most ambitious being the one executed in Namibia during the run-up to that country's independence elections. It was also the SADF which employed mercenaries and specialist soldiers in the CCB and other divisions in its Special Forces, to carry out this twisted agenda of devastation. And yet it is the trooper in the buffel in the township (often national servicemen) who has come the closest to endearing himself to residents. Despite the End Conscription Campaign's lengthy documentation of numerous instances of SADF related assaults on township residents, the SADF remain the favourite of many communities (for example, the ANC-supporting community of Hambanati near Tongaat, has called for the return of SADF troops which were based there until

November of this year, when they were relocated to a higher priority area). And yet it has now emerged that the SADF was responsible for the larger sponsorship of Inkatha (R 7 million-plus versus the SAP's approximately R 5 million). It is clear from this evidence that unwitting conscripts and many Permanent Force members, many of whom are black incidentally, are being inadvertently used to conceal another list of objectives so foul and distasteful, as to warrant the going to unprecedented lengths to keep it secret. In confirmation of this, the SADF has been exposed in recent newspaper articles, as the security agency responsible for the training of Inkatha or anti-ANC hit squads.

All branches of the security forces have broken the letter and the spirit of the National Peace accord, though only the SAP can technically be brought to book by virtue of its having signed a code of conduct.

In conclusion it may be said that while the year 1991 was inarguably a bleak one, the future - in the light of the recent revelations in the media about the secret role of branches of the security forces - does not look to be any more promising. However we must not ignore the potentially positive aspect of these revelations. In particular the fact is that the truth has emerged, and that we as South Africans are consequently better informed and thus better equipped to deal with the problem. It is a matter of the utmost urgency that the possibility of an international, peace-keeping force to monitor the violence and the state's response, be pursued vigorously. Failing that, or in the mean time, South Africans have to accept that as imperfect as they are, the present security forces are all that we have. Accordingly, means by which these law-enforcement agencies can be made and held accountable to both the people they are purporting to serve, and to any agreements involving a commitment to a standard of behaviour. It is in this respect that independent observers have to be deployed in the townships, and public attention has to be focused on them. Until a lasting political settlement is found, and the socio-economic disparity in the country is addressed, there does remain a constructive role for the security forces to play, and as South Africans become more knowledgeable about what services they are by right entitled to demand of the security forces, and as the SAP and SADF (and hopefully the KZP) are forced to conduct themselves in a professional manner by virtue of public scrutiny of their activities, as public pressure on the government to abandon its double agenda mounts, as all of these begin to evolve, and the trends are there, so the chances for peace improve. To sustain these positive trends however, demands that every South African recognise that the violence does in fact affect them and generations to follow. It is our problem, and rectifying it requires the cooperation of all of us.

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