

Europe, Mackenzie was making agreements with Bechuanaland chiefs, proclaiming their lands as under the Queen's protection, and hoisting the Union Jack. His admitted partiality to the Bechuana and his pronounced imperialism soon angered the Dutch-Afrikaners in the Cape Ministry and <sup>to please them</sup> Sir Hercules Robinson recalled him and replaced him in August by Cecil Rhodes, thus unwittingly jumping from the imperialistic frying pan into the imperialistic fire.

## 2. The Post of Commandant-General.

In August Commandant Piet Joubert was commissioned by the Volksraad<sup>d</sup> to proceed to the seat of disturbance on the south-western Transvaal border, to restore order, and to find a solution favourable to the South African Republic. He proceeded to the Land of Goshen, negotiated individually with Gey van Pittius, then with Rhodes and then with Montshiwa. He partially restored order and partially found a solution and was developing it, when, as if to imitate Sir Hercules Robinson, President Kruger suddenly ordered him to return to Pretoria in September (1884), and replaced him by the Reverend<sup>d</sup> Stephanus J. du Toit. "In Pretoria was er een gewildige intrigue aan de gang, eene intrigue waar-van zonder twijfel de oorsprong te zoeken is bij den Transvaalschen Superintendent van Ondewijs gesteund door eenige anderen. Deze partij schijnt op de eene of andere wijze President Kruger een gat in den kop gepraat te hebben, en hem te hebben verleid tot het nemen van een zeer onpolitiek en gevaarlijken stap die de hachelijkste gevolgen voor de Republiek had kunnen hebben." <sup>2</sup> (Cord van J.F.: Paul Kruger p. 436). (There was some terrible intrigue in Pretoria; an intrigue whose origin is to be sought in the Transvaal Superintendent of Education and some other accomplices. The party seems somehow or other to have overtalked President Kruger, and to have misled him into taking an impolitic and dangerous step fraught with the most calamitous results for the Republic.)

All Pretoria and most of the Transvaal knew that there was growing antagonism between Kruger and Joubert. They knew also that Du Toit was very much in President Kruger's good books, and that there was bitter hostility between Du Toit and Joubert. The reasons for these changes were therefore known to be a deliberate humiliation of the Commandant-General Joubert who was thus cut to the quick. The Reverend<sup>d</sup> Stephanus Jacob du Toit again<sup>1</sup>, thought he. Who was this Du Toit anyway? A highly educated man no doubt, and a writer of papers like the 'geleerde' (learned) De Patriot, and De Republikein tamelijk smeurig bladje<sup>3</sup> <sup>1</sup> (Cordt J.F. p. 440) (A somewhat disreputable leaflet) a Superintendent of Education, but also a man from the Cape, an outsider, and therefore an untried and unknown quantity, while he, Piet Joubert was a man of the people, a son of the soil, a fighter who had risked his life a hundred times and had practical knowledge and experience of the people and their needs. This was intolerable.

And...../



And now what was the result of President Kruger's listening to clerical Du Toit's advice, and falling into the toils of his intrigue. <sup>64</sup>  
 (F.N. Oerdt J.F.: Paul Kruger pp. 436, 438). Instead of soft pedaling the issue, Kruger had, without even consulting him rashly issued a Proclamation on the 18th September, 1884, annexing the territories of Moshete and Montshiwa to the South African Republic, in direct contra-vention of the London Convention, signed only six months before, and so disturbed a hornets' nest, reoused the indignation of the British Government and public opinion and provoked the Warren Expedition, and had made himself a laughing stock by having to perform an undignified climb-down by hastily withdrawing the Proclamation and Du Toit's annexation on the 13th October.

*ital* When Joubert saw the Proclamation in the Staats Courant, it was clear to him that the gap which had been widening between him and President Kruger for five years was now beyond bridging.

Piet Joubert was a normal human being, and as such was entitled to some ambition, and also to feel the pains and pangs of jealousy and the stings and arrows of man's ingratitude. In high dudgeon, therefore, he resigned his positions as Commandant-General, Vice-President and Superintendent of Natives. He was done with politics and their sordidness. He would return to his farm in the Wakkerstroom district, and devote his time to clean, honest hard work, and live his life in peace.

*ital* The resignation of Joubert occasioned some indignation and <sup>en</sup>spesation in the Government circles. There were secret sittings of the Volksraad, and a commission of enquiry, consisting of five members, was appointed to interview Joubert and determine the root and reason of his grievance, and this was found to be his opposition to the 'priest from Paarl' meaning the Reverend S.J. du Toit. Piet Cronje was one of this Commission. The country was critical of President Kruger and his capitulation to the politics of <sup>Dr</sup> Du Toit.

The Volksraad though reluctant to accept Joubert's resignation had no option but to place the matter before the country, and ask for nomination for the vacant position.

Meantime Piet Cronje was chosen as Deputy Commandant-General, and as such became automatically a member of the Executive Committee. The position of Vice-President and Superintendent of Natives was given to C.J. Joubert. Somewhat mollified by the general expressions of sympathy and confidence, Piet Joubert offered himself as candidate for election of Commandant-General in June 1885.

For the Presidential election in January 1883, there had been only two candidates, Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert, but for the post of Commandant-General in June 1885, there were no less than thirteen candidates. One of these was Piet Cronje, who because of his meteoric

rise...../



rise in public favour and esteem since the War of Independence in 1880, and because he was appointed one of the Senior Deputy-Commandant-Generals, had reasonable hopes of being elected to the vacant post. The results were, however, a disillusionment to him. Joubert who had been persuaded to stand for the position he had resigned obtained an over-whelming majority of 3915 votes against a paltry 396 votes for cast for Piet Cronje, 24 votes for Commandant H.P. Malan, and a miserable 14 votes, for D.J. Erasmus, and 13 for I.P. Ferreira.

The country thus gave its verdict unequivocally that next to President Paul Kruger, the man it trusted most was Piet Joubert. The election showed that Piet Cronje was the accredited national military leader. Was Joubert really so superior to him? The vacillating irresolute tempering Joubert!

Bitterly disappointed, Cronje thought and spoke of resigning his positions in the State. Like Joubert, of whom he was now so envious, he retired to his farm Laapfontein on the Schoon Spruit in July. Retreat and hard work on the farm cooled his choler and calmed his nerves, and after four months he allowed himself to be re-elected Commandant of Petchefstroom.

Against Piet Joubert, Cronje entertained a feeling of jealousy and therefore dislike. It could hardly be otherwise in one of President Kruger's coterie of friends who was at the same an aspirant for Joubert's position as Commandant-General of the South African Republic; and Joubert further irritated Cronje by his vacillation and irresolution; by now resigning his position as Commandant-General, and giving Cronje the hope, nay the assurance of appointment to that highest military post of the Republic, and now withdrawing his resignation, and thus dashing Cronje's hopes to the ground, and now repudiating the withdrawal of his resignation, and now ratifying the repudiation of the withdrawal; tossing Cronje's feelings between hope and despair of becoming Commandant-General.

People generally are critical of their immediate superiors in office, and keenly alive <sup>to</sup> of their short-comings, and are apt to hold them in low esteem, and to feel that they can more efficiently discharge the duties of that office. This is natural, and Cronje was no exception to this rule. The nervous, shuffling unmethod and irresolution of Joubert provoked mixed feelings of contempt, anger and dislike in him. The bulky figure of Joubert stood in Cronje's light, and threw its massive shadow across his path of promotion. This fact became with Cronje a personal injury.

### 3. War against the Koranas of David <sup>Boer</sup> ~~Mossou~~ Mossou.

In November, a commando was called out to proceed against David <sup>Boer</sup> ~~Mossou~~ Mossou, the Korana chief at Mamusa, the self same pre-Boer David <sup>Boer</sup> ~~Mossou~~ Mossou who had frustrated the pre-British Mankurwane, and ceded his land to the Transvaal. <sup>Boer</sup> ~~Mossou~~ Mossou is said to have refused to pay 2

taxes...../



taxes . He took the stand that many Transvaal Afrikaners were his subjects and <sup>n</sup>taxpayers inasmuch as they had called him their chief and he had allowed them to occupy and use his country on the Harts River, and therefore, so far from being obliged to pay taxes to the Transvaal, <sup>he</sup> was by rights entitled to receive rent from the Government. <sup>65</sup> (MacKenzie ~~Austral Africa~~ Vol. 1 p. 205). <sup>as usual</sup> Mossou's people were also accused of having raided Boer farms in the western Transvaal, in particular they were said to have stolen the cattle of one Jan Hauwman. <sup>as usual</sup> Mossou vehemently repudiated this charge and said that it was in fact he and his people, who were sufferers from systematic cattle thefts by the white farmers living in adjacent territory, and the cattle Hauwman claimed as his were actually Korana cattle which had been stolen but had returned to their pastures. These assertions and attitude of <sup>as usual</sup> Mossou were regarded as undesirable symptoms of Korana truculence. First, Piet Joubert was sent up to investigate the matter, and then Piet Cronje with a commando of some 200 burghers followed up to give emphasis to the demands, which Joubert made on the 26th of November. On the 2nd of December, Joubert and Cronje and Kees de la Rey and ~~and~~ 800 men advancing from three different directions, stormed the Korana village on a rocky hill overlooking the Mamusa lake. There was a sharp skirmish in which 300 Koranas were slain, including David <sup>as usual</sup> Mossou himself, and his two sons. <sup>66</sup> (~~J. A. Theal: History of South Africa 1884 p. 175~~). 10 Dutch Afrikaners also lost their lives, among them Commandant Schweizer of the Staats Artillerie, <sup>and</sup> Field Cornet Reyneke, and 6 were wounded including Piet Cronje's brother - Hendrik. Cronje himself had a narrow escape, his horse being shot under him. On the following day, the Koranas, now without a leader, surrendered. 210 of them were taken to Pretoria to be imprisoned 'for rebellion' while 369 Korana women and children were captured and removed by Cronje and De la Rey to Petchefstroom and Lichtenburg there to be distributed or sold to Dutch Afrikaner farmers as apprentices or slaves. Fourteen hundred cattle, two thousand sheep and thirty horses were taken. The clan was completely blotted out, and the very name of its home 'Mamusa' was changed into Schweizer-Reneke'.

On his way to attack <sup>as usual</sup> Mossou, Joubert had called at Kunwana upon Moshete the other 'chief of the Transvaal volunteers' <sup>order him to</sup> to assist him, very much as in 1852 Pieter Scholtz had called upon Montshiwa <sup>order him to</sup> to assist him against Sechele. Very much as Montshiwa had refused because Sechele was his friend and he had nothing against him, so Moshete refused to give Joubert assistance. Very much as Montshiwa was threatened with pains and penalties for his refusal, so was Moshete. On returning from punishment <sup>ing</sup> and killing <sup>as usual</sup> Mossou, Joubert went to Kunwana and demanded from Moshete 2,000 cattle by way of fine for disobedience, and on failing to get them, he arrested ten principal headmen, and held them as hostages in Lichtenburg against the delivery of the fine. <sup>67</sup> ~~then~~



## CHAPTER XII

## TRANSVAAL PROBLEMS

The decade 1885 to 1895 was a period of comparative military quiescence in the South African Republic. There were no commandos against any African tribes within or around the Transvaal. The sword lay in its scabbard, and the burgher, for a short while diverted his attention to peaceful pursuits on his farm. Otherwise, however, this was a period of great discoveries, important developments, and the emergence of dynamic personalities who impressed themselves upon the South African <sup>scene</sup> ~~negative~~ and sometimes playing a noble part and at other times an ignominious role, they influenced the course of events.

← 1. Sir Charles Warren's Expedition.

The hoisting of the Vierkleur at Rooigrond by the Reverend Stephanus J. du Toit, and the 'provisional Proclamation on the grounds of philanthropy and humanity' whereby President Kruger sought to annex southern Bechuanaland in 1884 aroused the indignation of the British Government and loyal British subjects both in the Cape Colony and in England. They regarded it as <sup>a</sup> flagrant violation of the London Convention and a premeditated insult to themselves that a territory and people under the Queen's protection should be so violated. Under these circumstances, even the pacific Lord Derby decided to send a strong force to expel <sup>the Dutch</sup> Afrikaner adventurers from Mentshiwa's country, to uphold the cause of law, order and peace, as well as British prestige and protectorate in Bechuanaland. Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner, at the conclusion of the London Convention discussions recommended that Sir Charles Warren should be given the charge of the expedition, and Lord Derby in addition made him Special Commissioner.

With his staff and volunteers enlisted in England Warren left London on the 14th of November 1884 and arrived in Cape Town on the 4th of December. His orders were to remove the filibusters, from Bechuanaland, to pacificate the territory and to re-instate the Bechuanas on their lands.

As soon as preparations were complete, troops from England, transport, outfit, equipment, and men recruited and carefully selected from various centres in South Africa were sent north to Barkly West on the Vaal River by passenger and special trains. In six weeks everything was <sup>complete</sup> ready, and a force of 5,000 men was ready for the march into Bechuanaland. On the 25th of January, President Kruger accompanied by his State Attorney Dr. W.J. Leyds, and also Commandant Henning Pretorius and J.N. de Villiers arrived at Fourteen Streams from Rooigrond to meet Warren, who was accompanied by the Reverend John Mackenzie, Cecil J. Rhodes and J.M. Wright. This was probably the first occasion upon which Kruger and Rhodes met, ~~D. F. Williams~~ Williams:



61  
-720

Cecil Rhodes p. 84) certainly it was the first time that they ever spoke to each other.

After a long interview on Saturday and Monday, the President and the Special Commissioner agreed to clearly mark out the south western boundary of the Transvaal as defined by the London Convention. At the head of 5,000 men, Warren then proceeded north. On the way to Vryburg which he reached on the 7th of February, he met the pro-British Mankurwane, whom the soldiers humorously dubbed 'Macaroni'. Mafeking was reached on the 11th of March, amidst spontaneous acclamations of a huge concourse of people. On the 23rd of March, a Proclamation was issued by Sir Hercules Robinson declaring a British Protectorate over Bechuanaland territory from the western border of the Transvaal to the 20th degree of <sup>E.</sup> longitude, and from the northern border of Cape Colony to the 22nd parallel of south latitude.

From Mafeking, Warren visited the Bangwaketse chief Gaseitsiwe at Kanye on the 23rd of April, then the Bakwena chief Sechele at Melepolole, the Bakgatla chief Lencuwe at Mochudi, and finally the Bangwato chief Kgama at Shoshong on the 12th of May. At each of these Bechuana townships, Sir Charles Warren announced the Queen's protectorate and entered into <sup>a</sup> formal <sup>each</sup> treaty of cession with the chiefs.

## 2. German South-West Africa.

Under the controlling hand of her 'Iron Chancellor' Prince Bismarck, Germany was participating in the 'scramble for Africa', had a footing in South-West Africa and very much to the vexation of England, had consolidated her strangle hold on Damaraland and Namaqualand, and spread herself from <sup>the</sup> Orange River on the south to ~~the~~ Kunene River on the north, and from the west coast to the 20th meridian from Greenwich. She was now casting her eyes with necessitous longing across Bechuanaland, and whether by accident or design, Warren's march into, and annexation of Bechuanaland synchronised with, and forestalled Bismarck's plans to extend Germany's sphere of influence from Damaraland across the Kalahari to the western border of the Transvaal above Mafeking.

## 3. Cecil J. Rhodes.

A new force and star (or storm) of the first magnitude had arisen in South Africa when Rhodes, aged 28 years was returned in 1881 as member for Barkly West. He was the one man who fully realised the importance of Bechuanaland. In his picturesque way he called it "the neck of the bottle" or "the Suez Canal to the interior", and although the initial credit of check-mating Kruger and Bismarck, and securing the central plateau for the British must go to the humble clergyman John Mackenzie, Rhodes was later greatly to enlarge Mackenzie's work further north, and was the chief force and factor in securing Matebeleland, Mashonaland and Central Africa for his countrymen,

and...../



and in foiling and over-reaching the diplomacy of Germany and the South African Republic in the disgraceful race and shady hunting for concessions and <sup>the</sup> draughting of tarnished treaties.

Possessed of ambition, imagination, patriotism and courage, and endowed by nature with a keen intellect, simplicity of character and amiability, Rhodes was yet doomed, perhaps unavoidably, to be corrupted by the immense wealth that he amassed; wealth and its corollary of power. He became unscrupulous, arrogant, cynical and politically dishonest. For about eleven years from 1884 to 1895, he was the most powerful individual in South Africa, and a god unto himself.

Under his mesmeric, or monetary influence and thinly disguised system of bribery, which means also corruption, fell men in all walks of life, not excluding men of the highest intellect and men filling the highest positions - medical men, missionaries, journalists, politicians, judges, administrators, high commissioners and colonial secretaries. They one and all became his tools and satellites. His views on Africans were strangely un-English. He held black men in utter disdain, and preferred land to mere 'niggers'. "He's death on niggers is Mr. Rhodes", says one of Olive Schreiner's characters. Olive Schreiner, the greatest woman South Africa has produced, a person of the highest intellect and deepest humanity, first admired Rhodes as "the only great man and man of genius South Africa possessed", but began to doubt him when he voted for the "Strep Bill" which proposed to give white men the legal right to flog their African servants, then she despised him for his low friends and the swarm of sycophants that surrounded him, and when "she discovered below the fascinating surface the worms of falsehood and corruption creeping", she would neither shake hands with him nor speak to him. Rhodes attained his ends by dubious and cynical methods. He acquired Lobengula's concessions by ignominious tricks and then deliberately manipulated and provoked him to make war so that he could liquidate him and wipe out the Matebele. (F. H. Oliver: ~~The Anatomy of African Misery~~ p. 49). His troops must have killed hundreds of thousands of the Matebele between 1896 and 1899 according to his own advice in dealing with natives 'You should not spare them, you should kill all you can'. (F. H. Plomer W: ~~Cecil Rhodes~~ p. 131). All this of course detracts from Rhodes' claim to greatness - moral elevation and spiritual excellence, but it does not deny the fact that he served his times and kind faithfully as other men serve their times and kind. He won Central South Africa for the British whom he contended were 'the first race in the world' an expansionist, imperialist, herrenvolk creed, which still finds its devotees in many governments and "justifies all manner of abuse and piracy under the useful word 'expediency'".

Rhodes...../



Rhodes and Kruger each wanted the same thing for themselves and their kind, and were therefore jealous of each other. They were fanatics in their respective ideologies, and were therefore bitter antagonists. They feared each other, and hated each other. Kruger's assessment of Rhodes is interesting. — "That young man", said he, "will cause me trouble if he does not leave politics and turn to something else" <sup>71</sup> (~~J.N. Williams B: Cecil Rhodes p. 86~~) "He finds bribery a useful ally when fine speech<sup>5</sup> are insufficient for his purpose. "Rhodes is capital incarnate. No matter how base, no matter how contemptible the methods, be it lying, bribery, treachery, all and every means were ~~means~~ <sup>5</sup> were welcome to him if they lead to the attainment of his objects" <sup>72</sup> (~~J.N. Kruger: Memoirs p. 218-9~~) "That man is the curse of South Africa" <sup>73</sup> (~~J.N. Ibid 216~~).

It is only fair to give Rhodes' estimate of Kruger. "Kruger is an extraordinary man, and one of the most remarkable men in South Africa". Then triumphantly after out-witting him in Matebeleland — "I pity the man, when I see him sitting in Pretoria with Bechuanaland gone and other lands around him gone from his grasp..... with his whole idea of a Republic vanishing.....I pity the man, when I see a man starting and continuing with one object and utterly failing in that object, I cannot help pitying him." And finally, when Kruger snubbed him by requiring him to wait three days for an interview "The old devil! — I meant to work with him, but I am not going on my knees to him" <sup>74</sup> (~~J.N. Millin S.G. Rhodes p. 252~~).

#### 4. Gold

An event of stupendous importance in the economic development of South Africa was the discovery of its mineral wealth. In 1875 gold was discovered in the north-eastern Transvaal, a little to the south of Lydenburg, and there was a rush of diggers and speculators to the area. In 1884, richer deposits were discovered at De Kaap and in 1886 the still richer deposits of the famous Sheba Mine were discovered and the town of Barberton quickly sprang up and commanded a population of thousands. In the same year, gold was discovered in a rich conglomerate consisting of sand, gravel and gold in the Witwatersrand, and from that discovery date the city of Johannesburg, the financial prosperity, the economic ascendancy, the political unrest and the modern history of the Transvaal. This state which was in sore financial difficulties and could not raise a loan of £5,000 leapt from insignificance and poverty to prosperity and power as by the stroke of a magician's wand, and the President's salary rose from £800 to £8,000 per annum and farms that were valued at £500 fetched £50,000 or more. Fortune seekers naturally came from all over South Africa and from the outer world, especially from Great Britain and British colonies, and collected in Johannesburg like carrier birds do over a carcass.

When excited farmers had told Commandant-General Joubert  
the...../



good tidings of gold discovery and improvement in prices and prospects he said to them "Instead of rejoicing, you would do better to weep, for this gold will cause our country to be soaked in blood".<sup>75</sup> (F. N. Kruger: Memoirs p. 204), and Paul Kruger ascribed to gold the subsequent Raids and Wars.

### 5. Uitlanders.

From the date of the proclamation of the gold fields there was a steady incursion of foreign elements into the South African Republic and in 1887 their increase was already a disturbing factor to President Paul Kruger and his executive, and in ten years their numbers already constituted half of the entire population. It was clear that sooner or later, they would exceed the burghers. It was a hideous nightmare that these English people whom the Dutch-Afrikaner had run away from only fifty years previously should now be buzzing around and making all manner of audacious demands. If Kruger granted them full political rights, the Republic would soon be in their power, and once that happened what was to stop them from altering the Great <sup>50th</sup> Wet promulgating another "Fifteenth Ordinance", another Act of Emancipation of Slaves, and giving political 'gelijkstelling' to the Africans, and hoisting the Union Jack all over the dear Republic. At the very least, they might sweep the President from power and vote for his 'so-called progressive' rival Piet Joubert. Kruger therefore decided first ~~in the exercise of his~~  
~~executive power to~~  
~~declare the~~  
~~Republic~~  
~~to be~~  
~~in~~  
~~the~~  
~~possession~~  
~~of~~  
~~the~~  
~~Government~~  
~~and~~  
~~to~~  
~~deny~~  
~~the~~  
~~Uitlanders~~  
~~a~~  
~~share~~  
~~of~~  
~~the~~  
~~Government~~  
~~while~~  
~~receiving~~  
~~the~~  
~~proceeds~~  
~~of~~  
~~their~~  
~~industry~~  
~~for~~  
~~they~~  
~~contributed~~  
~~five-sixths~~  
~~of~~  
~~the~~  
~~income~~  
~~from~~  
~~taxation~~  
~~By~~  
~~various~~  
~~devices~~  
~~and~~  
~~sops~~  
~~such~~  
~~as~~  
~~by~~  
~~giving~~  
~~them~~  
~~the~~  
~~Second~~  
~~Volksraad~~  
~~Kruger~~  
~~kept~~  
~~political~~  
~~power~~  
~~away~~  
~~from~~  
~~the~~  
~~reach~~  
~~of~~  
~~the~~  
~~Uitlanders~~  
~~and~~  
~~steadily~~  
~~tightened~~  
~~the~~  
~~laws~~  
~~to~~  
~~this~~  
~~end~~  
~~Thus~~  
~~in~~  
~~1894~~  
~~Law~~  
~~No. 3~~  
~~was~~  
~~passed~~  
~~making~~  
~~the~~  
~~franchise~~  
~~more~~  
~~difficult~~  
~~for~~  
~~the~~  
~~Uitlanders~~.

Kruger and his burghers feared the Uitlanders as the Union Government and the white inhabitants fear the African, the 'native', the 'naturelle'. They refused to grant him political rights as the Union Government refuse to the African. They refused all forms of concession as does the Union Government, they lived in constant dread of being swamped and turned out so that their progeny would lose their rightful heritage, and they gave the Uitlander a Second Volksraad, and ineffective body and a farce like the Native Representative Councils <sup>and Banku Authorities</sup>. The result of this illiberal policy of systematic denial was discontent, hatred and finally war.

What have the Warren Expedition, German South-West Africa, Cecil Rhodes, Gold and Uitlanders to do with Piet Cronje? At first



sight very little or nothing. What have Imperialism or Republicanism, Rhodes or Kruger, Colonisation or the Rape of Africa, Slavery or Apprenticeship to do with Cronje? These things demonstrate the temper of the times in which they took place, when the conscience of the European people was either dormant or dead, when the piracy of imperialism and the robbery of republicanism were applauded as patriotism, and the slim ingenuity of ambiguous treaties, unintelligible to African chiefs was hailed as diplomacy and statesmanship.

#### 6. The Magnetic North.

The cruel deception and ruin of Lobengula was but a later <sup>setting</sup> of the grim massacre of Makapan and his clan. Rhodes and Jameson raid the South African Republic, and it is called a crime. ~~Rhodes and Jameson raid the South African Republic and it is called a crime.~~ Rhodes and Jameson raid Matebeleland and it is called a wonderful achievement.

A man like the Reverend John Smith Moffat, ostensibly and ostentatiously a servant of the Lord, a man whose father, the Venerable Robert Moffat was implicitly trusted by Mzilikazi, such a man allows himself to be used as an unfeeling tool to deceive Lobengula, the son of his father's friend. He goes to Bulawayo; what terrible untruths and half truths he must have told, even though the cock <sup>crowed</sup> and crew and crew again, even though the Lord whom he said he loved so much and would die for, looked <sup>at</sup> and him again and again. No, Moffat was there specially to do Rhodes' bidding. He had to undermine the South African Republic and destroy Piet Grobler's Treaty with Lobengula - morally and physically. Kruger had sent Grobler to renew the old treaties of amity and goodwill between the Boers and the Matebele, and thus to offset the British threat and extension upwards from Bechuanaland. Kruger with his hand <sup>76</sup> (~~in his Memoirs~~) had drafted a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance ~~alliance~~ with Lobengula. Unable to read or write, Lobengula had daubed his mark on the treaty unsuspecting that it committed him to place his warriors at the disposal of the Boer generals in case of their going to war with the British or the Bechuanas. Moffat had to enlighten Lobengula on all this, and to prove to him that the Grobler treaty was a snare and a fraud, and to advise him to repudiate it. This Lobengula could most effectively do by entering into another treaty with him - Moffat. A treaty drafted by Rhodes, in which Lobengula undertook not to enter into correspondence or treaty with any foreign state on any matter whatsoever relating to his country without first consulting and coming to agreement with the High Commissioner - that is to say Mr. Cecil Rhodes <sup>first</sup>, and then Rhodes' <sup>tool</sup> tell - Sir Hercules Robinson second. Having cajoled Lobengula, John Smith Moffat gleefully sent a telegram to his employers "The days of the Matebele are numbered". But Lobengula emphatically maintained that he had

signed...../



signed no treaty, he had not put his mark to any document, and he wrote to the Queen to apprise her of this fact. He says definitely that he refused to sign, and told the High Commissioner in a letter (also written by Meffat) that he did not wish to enter into any treaty with any body. Poor unlettered, unreading and un-writing Lobengula apparently put a mark on something. He thought it was the letter of refusal, while in fact it was the treaty of consent. This Treaty differs in no way from the much quoted letter of General Piet Joubert to the "Great Ruler Chief Lobengula, Son of Umzilikazi the Great King of the Matebele Natives." Both are full of empty protestations of "peace and friendship which are to continue for evermore from generation <sup>to generation</sup> etc." Both are tissues of falsehood and deception.

The crisis in this treaty making drama came in July 1888, when Grobler, returning to Pretoria from Bulawayo was stopped by Raditladi and Makhutshwane and a strong regiment sent by Kgama, from using a prohibited road. A scuffle ensued in which Grobler was wounded in the leg and died of sepsis sixteen days after. Kruger and the generality of burghers naturally believed that Kgama had been incited to this act by Rhodes, Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Sidney Shippard. Immediately after this the High Commissioner declared "Matebeleland exclusively within the sphere of British influence". Then there was the Rudd concession by which Rhodes obtained the exclusive right to search for minerals in Matebeleland, then in October 1889 the grant of a Charter to the British South African Company, which was to emulate the East India Company of a hundred years previous. ~~Then~~ Then there was a forcible violation of Matebele ~~violation of Matebele~~ territory by 700 men of Rhodes in June 1900 and the inevitable happened - a war between the English settlers and the Matebele. The Matebele were liquidated and the fugitive Lobengula died in exile. The amity and friendship that ~~was~~ <sup>were</sup> so loudly protested, and ~~was~~ <sup>were</sup> to continue for evermore ended in foul murder and bloodshed. Another primitive African tribe was immolated ~~and~~ <sup>at</sup> the alter <sup>a</sup> of gold and expediency.



## CHAPTER XIII

### THE JAMESON RAID

In 1895, the duel between the two South African giants, Kruger and Rhodes was nearing its climax, and was soon to culminate in the Jameson Raid.

Kruger was a stumbling block to Rhodes' ambition of British "all red" Africa, and Rhodes was an obstacle to Kruger's great South African Republic "from the Cape to the Zambezi". Whether it was the possession of Southern Bechuanaland with its 'Road to the North, or the Missionaries Road, or what Rhodes graphically called 'the neck of the bottle' or the "Suez Canal of the trade to the Interior"; <sup>W</sup>Whether it was the control of, and protectorate over Tongaland and Swaziland, whether the question of the construction of an inter-state railway, the Customs Union or the valency of the Vaal Drifts; <sup>W</sup>Whether the acquisition of Kosi Bay <sup>or some other</sup> outlet for the South African Republic on the East coast, the two men found themselves inescapable <sup>Y</sup>in bitter opposition. But now the Uitlander demand of the franchise was the faggot that lighted the magazine of discontent. Lionel Philipps, Charles Leonard, George Farrar, J. Hays Hammond, Francis Rhodes and other reformers, so-called, incubated and quickened the Uitlander grievances into a seditious plot and bloody revolution. Inspired by Dr. Starr Jameson and backed by Rhodes' millions and omnipotence, they ordered from Birmingham and elsewhere thousands of rifles and boxes of ammunition and smuggled them into Bechuanaland and Rhodesia.

~~FA.~~ In October 1895, Sidney Shippard, a creature of Cecil Rhodes and administrator of British Bechuanaland approached Silas T. Molema and asked him to sell or lease his farm Mabete or Pitsana Photleke to Dr. Starr Jameson, or to exchange it for two farms. <sup>7</sup>(~~P. H. Oordt~~ ~~J. F. Paul Kruger p. 623~~) Jameson then came in person, paid Molema three hundred gold sovereigns and gave him another farm 'Wolvehoek', in consideration for the right to occupy and use Mabete or Pitsana Photleke as a military camp. In December Jameson collected an army, armaments and provisions there, and a brisk <sup>but ephemeral</sup> trade sprang up between Mafeking and Jameson's kopje as the hillock on which the camp was formed is still called.

On Sunday the 29th December 1895, at the hour of sunset, 372 armed horsemen under Jameson, Sir John Willoughby and Major Robert White with six Maxims and one 12½ Pounder and several wagons left the Pitsana camp, crossed into the Transvaal at Jagersfontein fifteen miles to the south-east, and arrived at Ostersheep, another fifteen miles <sup>further</sup> south-east at sunrise the following day. Here they were joined by Major Raleigh Grey with 123 men armed and mounted, with two 7-Pounders and two Maxims. There were now 508 men and officers besides 75 mule drivers and leaders, quite a respectable expedition, bound...../



bound for Johannesburg, <sup>t</sup>acquainted by the lofty ideal to get by force the 'equal rights' they could not obtain by diplomacy.

One of the first acts of the Jameson filibusters was to cut the telegraph wires, but the commandants and field-cornets who saw the raiders <sup>had</sup> at once reported Jameson's march to Pretoria and to other commandants at Zeerust, Lichtenburg, Rustenburg, and all along the line. On their second scoff or stage, the raiders were overtaken by a messenger from Zeerust, carrying a letter from Commandant J.D.L. Botha Commandant of Marico, warning Jameson against trespassing in the Transvaal. The warning was disregarded. At sundown, Monday 30th, they reached the Lead-Mines, seventy miles from Pitsana Photlōke, and three miles further on they halted for another rest, being just missed at the Lead-Mines by 300 Beers from Lichtenburg. The raiders marched during the night reaching Doornpoort, the farm of Commandant H.F. Malan early on Tuesday morning the 31st. Another rest. A few miles further on, at Elands River the column was overtaken by Segeant J.T. White of the Bechuanaland Border Police, who had been sent by the Resident Commissioner Newton at Mafeking to take letters to Dr. Jameson, Sir John Willoughby and Colonel Robert White, commanding them to return forthwith. Again no notice was taken of this order, and no answer was given.

In the evening of Tuesday the 31st, they were accosted by Commandant Sarel Eleff of Krugersdorp, at the head of a small police force. They arrested Eleff, disarmed him and detained and later sent him off in a direction opposite, along which, by a happy accident Eleff met Cronje and was able to direct him to the exact position of Jameson's column. Late on Tuesday night, as they were passing through some wooded hills, the advance party of the raiders was fired upon. There was a slight skirmish, and the Beer patrol retired. Early on Wednesday morning, the 1st of January 1896, as Jameson's men halted at Van Oudsheern's farm for rest, two messengers brought a letter to Dr. Jameson from the High Commissioner - Sir Hercules Robinson, transmitted through the British Resident Sir Jacobus De Wet, ordering Jameson and his men to turn back. This order was disregarded like the previous ones. The Rubicon had been crossed and in any case "Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad".

It was on the 30th of December 1895, and Piet Cronje was sitting peacefully on the steep of his farm house on the Schoenspruit when an express messenger brought him a telegram from Pretoria announcing that an armed force from the direction of Mafeking had crossed the Transvaal border at Ottosheep. The telegram conveyed urgent orders for Cronje to call out a commando forthwith, and to stop the progress of the raiders. The Afrikaners having been prepared for such developments since November, this was quickly done and on Tuesday the 31st, Cronje at the head of a small commando, including his four sons - Piet, Hercules(Klaas) Frans and Andries,

hastened...../



hastened to Ventersdorp, reaching that town a little before noon. Here he was joined by about 70 men. He then pushed eastwards towards the Mooi River, and was there joined by Commandant D. Bodenstein with his commando. After resting the horses and men for a short time, and at the same time making inquiries among the surrounding farmers whether Jameson had passed on or not, the combined commandos headed for Krugersdorp as fast as their horses could carry them through the night of the 31st. All along the road, Cronje's commando was joined by excited burghers, some fully armed with guns and ammunition, and others armed only with willing hearts. Jameson and Rhodes came in for a good share of hearty malediction.

Cronje did not reach the vicinity of Krugersdorp until the early morning of Wednesday the 1st of January, and his scouts soon sighted the raiders, who also became aware in the early forenoon that they were being shadowed and gradually surrounded by Boer commandos marching parallel to them at a distance of about three miles, while others were hanging on to their rear, and others again retreating before them. In the afternoon, from the crest of a hill on which is situated Queen's Mine, and from the valley below it and the surrounding mine pits, about seven miles from Krugersdorp, Cronje attacked the advance and rear guards of Jameson's column, and stopped its progress. In the late afternoon, there was a sharp skirmish, but the raiders, now considerably out-numbered, as more commandos came in to re-inforce Cronje, were helped by the gathering and kindly shadows of the evening, and the commandos could do no more than pour in one or two fusillades, and take positions around the trapped enemy. In the dusk of the evening, Cronje's son Hercules or Klaas as he was popularly called, was wounded, being mistaken by his comrades for one of the enemy, and fired upon. (F. A. Brandwag 15/9/1913).

In the early morning, (Thursday 2nd January) the raiders, not without heavy losses extricated themselves from the valleys and cuttings of the dumps into which they had been forced, and from the ridges <sup>on</sup> of which the Boers under the personal direction of Cronje kept up an incessant fire. They were shepherded along the direction of Randfontein, then turned north-east towards Deornkop a rocky hillock 400 feet high and about fourteen miles from Johannesburg. Here about 1,000 Transvaal burghers had taken strong positions and, well sheltered in prepared trenches and behind boulders, inflicted severe punishment on Jameson's raiders, whose position was exposed except for the stone wall and farm house of Vlakkfontein.

When the Staats Artilleries arrived to reinforce the 6,000 to 8,000 already in the commandos under Cronje, the raiders realised the hopelessness of their predicament, and hoisted a white flag at 9.30 a.m. (Thursday 2nd January). Says General Kemp "Na'n half uur se geveg, hulle het 'n kaffermeid se vuil voersket omhoog gehou om hulle oorgawe aan ons kommandos te ke<sup>te</sup>ne te gee" (F. M. Kemp J.C....)



3.11. G.: Vir Vryheid en vir Reg. p.77). (After an hour's fight, they hoisted a Hottentot maid's dirty pinafore to signify their surrender to our commandos.) They had already lost 18 killed, and 40 wounded, besides 25 fallen by the roadside from fatigue (F.W.). Nearly all writers differ as to figures of casualties).

Sir John Willoughby then sent a laughably ingenuous note to "the Commandant of the Transvaal Forces" - We surrender provided that you guarantee us safe conduct out of the country for every member of the force."

To this Cronje answered:

John Willoughby,

Ik erken uw schrijwing. Antwoord is dienende: als gij in staat voor de kosten, die u de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek aangedaan heeft, te batalen en uw vlag en uwe wapens wilt afleggen, dan zal ik de levens van u en de uwen sparen; gelieve mij antwoord te zenden binnen den tijd van 30 minuten.

P.A. Cronje

Kommandant, Potchefstroom.

"I acknowledge your letter. The answer is that if you will undertake to pay the expense which you have caused the South African Republic, and if you will surrender with your flag and arms, then I shall spare the lives of you and yours. Please send me a reply to this within thirty minutes.

P.A. Cronje

Commandant Potchefstroom.

Willoughby naturally accepted these accommodating terms, and answered accordingly.

9.11. After the surrender of Jameson's men, Cronje, accompanied by Commandant Potgieter, veld-cornets P. Kruger, Van Vuuren, De Kock and about 500 others came to Jameson's camp, and discussed further the terms of surrender, M.J. Adendorff being the interpreter. Later on commandant Malan joined them, and at once expressed his opinion that no terms could be made, and that the surrender of the raiders must be unconditional. He repudiated Cronje's terms concerning the guaranteeing of the raiders' lives. Several other commandants came up, and there was an altercation before the raiders whether or not Cronje had the authority to guarantee them their lives, that being a matter which most of them thought, rested with the Commandant-General and his war council. It is said that on this point, a quarrel arose between Cronje and Malan to the extent of mutual recriminations of treachery and neglect of duty, made in the public press. (F.W. Fitzgerald J.P. The Transvaal from within p. 187).

The...../



The dispute that subsequently arose over the terms of surrender and their implementation seems to have been unnecessary. Cronje's words "I shall spare the lives of you and your men" could surely have only one meaning. He could manifestly spare the lives of the raiders only as long as they were in his charge, and only so far as he had authority. He could not very well guarantee their lives against any action by the higher authorities, by the supreme krygsraad or war council, by the law courts, or by thunder and lightning.

On the 4th of January, Cronje was called by telegram to Pretoria, and he arrived there with his officers on the 5th. Naturally pleased with himself and proud of having spectacularly crushed the audacious raid upon the South African Republic, he expected a hearty greeting and unstinted congratulations at the Head Quarters. To his surprise, however, he received a chilling reception from Commandant-General Joubert, who behaved as if nothing momentous had happened, and was for some occult reason, rather curt with Cronje. But on the latter meeting President Kruger and General J.H.M. de Kock, he was effusively congratulated by them and hailed as a hero and a worthy son of the fatherland.

At this time, President Paul Kruger also received a wire from the Emperor of Germany "I tender you my sincere congratulations that without appealing to the help of friendly powers you and your people have been successful in opposing with your own forces the armed bands that have broken into your country to disturb the peace, in restoring order, and in maintaining the independence of your country against attacks from without" Wilhelm R.I". This telegram unleashed a furious storm of patriotic indignation and criticism in England and almost led to mobilisation.

#### ← 1. Trial of the Raiders.

After surrender, the raiders were marched to Krugersdorp under strong escort, and thence to Pretoria, where they were locked up in gaol until they were handed over to the British authorities three weeks later. Jameson and 13 of his senior officers were removed to London by the troopship Victoria, and brought before Sir John Bridge at the Bow Street Police Court on the 25th of February and subsequent days. Six of them, Jameson, Willoghby, Grey, Robert Henry White and Conventry were committed for trial, the other nine being discharged.

On the 20th of July, Jameson and others were put upon their "Trial at the Bar" in the Court of Queen's Bench Division of the High Court before Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of England, and two puisne judges, Mr. Justice Hawkins and Baron Pollock and a special jury, for contravention of the Foreign Enlistment Act. Both the Crown and the defence were each represented by six of the most distinguished lawyers in the country. They<sup>raiders</sup> were found guilty

and...../



and ~~and~~ sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment ranging from five to fifteen months, the longest being that of Jameson and Willoughby, 15 months each, Robert White - 7 months, Grey and Henry White, 5 months each.

Throughout South Africa, Wednesday the 1st and Thursday the 2nd of January 1896 had been days of great excitement in which hope and despair, fear and frustration had alternated among the inhabitants. With nervous energy the Reform Committee in Johannesburg had unsealed hundreds of cases and distributed guns and ammunition among the Uitlanders, unmuffled the concealed Maxims and placed them in position, galloped and clattered up and down, and moved their forces from one point to another, and urged their African workers to dig trenches in the outskirts of the town. The streets were one mass of clamorous milling puzzled humanity, the railway stations were full, and the trains were crowded with men, women and children wishing to escape from some vague impending doom. Johannesburg was pandemonium. In Pretoria, President Kruger was restless. His horse stood saddled, in its stable, and his gun loaded ready for him, either to go to a place of safety or to go on commando. (F. V. Nathan M. Kruger p. 347), while official members of deputations and members of the Executive Council, came and went, either to ask or give advice. In Capetown W.P. Schreiner, the Cape Attorney General, Cecil Rhodes, the Prime Minister, Sir Hercules Robinson the High Commissioner and Jan Hofmeyr were all in the throes of turbulent and conflicting emotions in which thought was difficult and action almost impossible.

## ← 2. Trial of the Reformers.

Lionel Philipps, George Farrar, Francis Rhodes and John Hayes Hammond and sixty other members of the Reform Committee were arrested on the 9th of January. Among them were professional men - lawyers, medical men, captains of commerce, leaders in the mining industry, newspaper editors, and retired army officers. Many of them were wealthy, and all were men of education.

They were brought up for a preliminary examination on the 8th of February; this lasted about 12 days, during which the State Attorney Dr. Costa called 119 witnesses. The accused were all committed for trial before the judge. On the 24th of April, their case came before Judge Reinhold Gregerowski, former judge, now Attorney-General of the Free State. It was opened in the Market Hall before a seething crowd of 2,000 excited people. The State-Attorney Dr. Costa was assisted by Advocates Lehman, Hummel and Krause, while Advocate J.W. Wessels, assisted by Advocates Sauer, Dickson, Muller, Solomon and De Villiers conducted the defence. The four leaders, Philipps, Farrar, Francis Rhodes and Hammond were charged with High Treason, Conspiring with Dr. Jameson to make a hostile invasion with intent to endangering the independence of the South African Republic, supporting him in inciting the people of Johannesburg; issuing arms and...../



and ~~and~~ taking other hostile measures to undermine the Government and usurping the functions of Government. The prisoners pleaded guilty to the charge of 'High Treason' and were each sentenced to death, but the death sentences were afterwards commuted by the South African Republic Government to fines of £25,000 each. The other sixty prisoners pleaded guilty to the charge of 'treason' or 'gekweste majesteit' and were sentenced to 2 years imprisonment and a fine of £2,000 each, or 5 years in default of payment of the fine, also to banishment from the South African Republic for 3 years.

CHAPTER XIV...../



## CHAPTER XIV

## "NATIVE AFFAIRS"

On account of its fertility and natural fortifications, the northern Transvaal has from the earliest times attracted and supported comparatively dense populations, consisting of tribes of different ethnic origins, and clans of various affiliations. The diversity of these tribes has, in historic times been due to the bloody campaigns of Tshaka and Mzilikazi. After the advent of the Dutch-Afrikaners, some of these tribes, especially those in the Zoutpansberg, inevitably came into collision with them for various reasons like mutual cattle thefts, attempts at kidnapping, trespass into hunting grounds, mutual contempt etc. provoking several raids by Africans and 'punitive' expeditions by Europeans. The end result was the defeat of Africans in one district after another, until all African tribes of the Transvaal, as elsewhere, were subjugated, and segregated in tribal allotments called 'locations' and 'reserves' in various districts. Now, for purposes of administration, all these African tribes in such 'locations' were placed under government officials. Military authorities being the earliest and natural, and in fact the only officers of the early Boer republics, were appointed to be government representatives and agents, and so the field cornet and the commandant became the natural liason between the republican government and the African tribes which fell within their conquered territory or sphere of influence. As early as 1853, instructions were issued to Field-Cornets making them responsible for supervision of 'native' villages generally. (K. V. Agar Hamilton: Native Policy of the Voortrekkers p. 75) and for local native affairs, under their respective commandants of districts, who were answerable to the "krijgsraad" or war council. Thus the Commandant-General became the natural "Superintendent of Natives", the 'Chief Native Commissioner', or the Minister of Native Affairs'. This dual office of Commandant-General and Superintendent of Native Affairs was filled by Piet Joubert since 1880.

All matters affecting African tribes in the Transvaal came under him. The tribes were in some twenty districts - Pretoria, Rustenburg, Middleburg, Zoutpansberg, Waterberg, Standerton, Piet Retief, Utrecht, Ermelo, Vryheid, Kalkbank, Bloemhof, Marico, Gopane, Lichtenburg, Lydenburg.

African villages were supposed to be occupied by them and by their descendants on perpetual lease for which they had to pay a tax called quit-rent, labour-tax or hut-tax. The Europeans thus claimed to be suzerain, and gradually created a complex of subservience in the African.

For the department of Native Affairs, a large staff was necessary, and it was filled by officials called 'native commissioners, assistant...../'



and assistant native commissioners, also by secretaries, clerks, interpreters, police constables, messengers, book-keepers, both at head quarters and scattered over the districts. <sup>It</sup> cannot be said that Joubert showed any remarkable qualities as Superintendent of Native Affairs, whatever energy and ability he might have displayed in the other 'portfolio' as Commandant-General of the South African Republic. We know that besides accompanying Major E. Buller at the command of the Royal Commission in 1881, to investigate and report on the anarchy in the south-west border of the Transvaal, he later tried to arrange a modus vivendi between Montshiwa and the Moshete's volunteers' of Land Goshen; that he wrote a sharp letter to Chief Gaseitsiwe of the Bangwaketse at Kanye, warning him against trespassing, stealing cattle and burning houses and killing people in the Transvaal (P.N. C. 3419). We know also that he imposed a fine of £516,000 or equivalent value in cattle upon Ikalafeng (known as Calbyn among the Transvaal burghers) Chief of the Bahurutshe at Linokana, for making 'schanse' or fortifications, and because <sup>he</sup> suspected him of sympathising with and secretly supporting Montshiwa, the troublesome and incorrigible enemy of the South African Republic. ~~P.N. (Joubert Verslag in Sake Kalafyn 21/4/1882 S.S.R. 2407/82 by R. 6019/84 T.A.)~~ But perhaps, the most notable thing Joubert did as Superintendent of Native Affairs was his restoration of Dinizulu Cetshwayo the Zulu Chief, to <sup>his</sup> position in 1884.

Now Piet Joubert, being a typical Boer gentleman of the old school had no animus against Africans. No Boer of the old school had. None of them had any moral views about black people. They were just forgetful or careless about them. They did not hate them, any more than you can hate an ox or a dog, unless the one gores you, or the other bites you. But as you can be thoughtless or unkind or cruel to animals without actually hating them, so were some Europeans to Africans, and some Native commissioners were thoughtless and others tyrannical in their conduct towards Africans, and did much to poison and embitter the feelings of these defenceless people, not only against the offending officials, but against Europeans in general, for the officials were regarded as typical of their race. Now it is clear <sup>that</sup> when an official is guilty of such conduct, the harm he does to race relations is incalculable. He creates a sullen suspicion, a seething discontent in a tribe, and this develops into a loathing for him and his kind.

#### 1. Cronje Supersedes Joubert

Towards the end of the year 1896, President Kruger managed something like a re-shuffling of portfolios in the Executive of the South African Republic by separating the hitherto combined posts of Commandant-General and Superintendent of Native Affairs. The alleged desirability of this step had been expressed in a sudden

inundation...../



**Collection Number: A979**

## **Silas T MOLEMA and Solomon T PLAATJE Papers**

***PUBLISHER:***

*Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand*

*Location:- Johannesburg*

**©2012**

***LEGAL NOTICES:***

**Copyright Notice:** Copyright for all materials on the Historical Papers website is owned by The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and is protected by South African copyright law. Material may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

**Disclaimer and Terms of Use:** Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only.

People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate, distorted or untrue. While these digital records are true facsimiles of paper documents and the information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand has not independently verified their content. Consequently, the University is not responsible for any errors or omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the website or any related information on third party websites accessible from this website.

This document is part of a collection owned by the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and deposited at Historical Papers at The University of the Witwatersrand.

---