

The two men were found guilty of treason and sentenced to death, according to law, by Cronje. After two days, given them to right themselves with their Creator, they were led out and shot by a squadron, (Weilbach en Du Plessis: Geschiedenis pp. 165, 184) (B.V.5: 'Dr' Woite to Maj Clarke 12.12.1880) one on the 31st Decembet, and the other on the 7th of January 1881. (The Royal Commission condemned these acts as unauthorised.

(Nixon J: The Complete Story of the Transvaal p.221)

Besides laying siege to Potchefstroom, the Boer forces also besieged six other British garrisons of Pretoria, Rustenburg, Lydenburg, Standerton, Marabastad and Marthinus-Wesselstroom.

On Sunday morning the 20th of December, Commandant Frans Joubert with 160 cut in 15 minutes a British force of 257 men under Col. Philip Anstruther at Bronkhorstspuit between Middelburg and Pretoria. Anstruther had received orders to proceed to Pretoria to strengthen the garrison. When challengers challenged on the road to stop he refused with fatal results to himself and his troops. He and 76 men were killed <sup>or</sup> mortally wounded and 81 others disabled. This was the beginning of British disasters in the Boer First War of Independence, disasters which were to include Laings Nek and Ingogo, and to culminate in Majuba on the 27th of February 1881. In this war of independence, disasters-which-were-to-include and arguments, Bronkhorst Spruit was also denounced by the British as an ambush and treacherous assault. Accounts about it differ. But Sir Evelyn Wood, the successor of both Sir Owen Lanyon and Sir George Colley who inspected the scene of the fight and studied the relevant reports, pronounced it a legitimate war operation, conducted, in his view, quite fairly. (Kotze J: Memoirs p.751)

Piet Cronje was the senior officer in charge of the operations in the siege of Potchefstroom, and was as such immediately responsible to the government of the S.A. Republic. He had authority to publish notices, to give publicity to proclamations, and to make agreements, pending the approval of the Triumvirate.

The strength of ~~his~~ his commando was originally 400 men. This strength was naturally reduced by casualties, and Cronje requisitioned the Government for more reinforcements. It was however later found that 200 men could easily have carried on the investment of Potochefstroom, and Cronje was more than once ordered by the Government at Heidelberg to send men to Comm-Gen Piet Joubert at the Drakensbergen. Rather than reduce the strength of his force, however, he ordered commander H.R.Lemmer of Makwas<sup>s</sup>i and Com<sup>an</sup>dant J.M.Wolmarans of Mooi River to find men from their commandos for Joubert.

There was always a grain of stub<sup>b</sup>bornness about Cronje, which more than once brought him into sharp collision with his superiors. On the matter of retaining too many burghers at Potchefstroom, when they were more urgently needed elsewhere, he was rebuked by Vice Pres.Kruger, but his answer showed anything but readiness to submit to authority (B.V.12: p.145-7) (Kopieboek van P.A.Cronje: Brief van Cronje aan Kruger)

He was a man who, when he had formed an opinion stuck to it against all advice and reasoning. This failing was a great stumbling block in his official career, and as he grew older, he became more obstinate, more incorrigible, and often expressed himself uncompromisingly, and in a manner that angered and antagonised those who wished to advise him. Often he did not even condescend to defend his opinion, but simply treated those who thought differently as if they were children, or people bereft of reason. So much did he believe in himself.

Naturally a man of few words, he expressed himself in few incisive sentences and phrases in an all-knowing manner and supercilious air, or he simply treated the would-be adviser with maddening contempt. His temperament was such that he could not brook opposition, and his exalted position as a military leader made him impatient of any criticism and interference, not only from his subordinates, but also from his superior officers, and even from Headquarters and the Government. At the same

time he was himself an unsparing critic of anything that was not done according to his way of thinking, and Kruger, who had a soft spot for Cronje even he was time after time compelled to pull him up, and reprimand him for over-stepping his authority, and doing things that did not concern him. Such for instance was the case when Cronje went out of his way to criticise the financial policy of the Triumvirate, and without authority tried to make arrangements with the Bank at Potchefstroom (Die Boere Nasionale Handelsvereniging) for a Government loan. On being reprimanded, he answered in such an off-hand and petulant manner that Kruger had to tell him it was not clear who were the responsible officers of the Government - Cronje of the Triumvirate.

Piet Cronje was also not always exemplary in his remarks and references about the Government. He was apt to be censorious and caustic in season and out of season. He nearly always referred to the Government as we would refer to the British Government as "West" or Triumvirate at Heidelberg shortly as "Heidelberg", very much as we would refer to the British Government as "Westminster" or "Downing Street", or to the American Government at "Washington" or "The White House", or to the Russian Government as "The Kremlin", or to the French Government as "The Quai D'Orsay" but in a contentuous vein. D/1

As military and civil authority of Potchefstroom during the period of its siege, Cronje had the final say in its commissariat arrangements and the chief responsibility for public monies from whatsoever source. Such revenue was required by the Government to provide provisions and war material, and other necessaries for use by the Government and the burghers in the field. The Republic was not by any means well off, and revenue had to be husbanded and stretched as far as possible. When Cronje was reminded was reminded of these obvious essentials and asked to pay to the treasury monies collected in his sector, he was not only reluctant or tardy to do so, but he was actually offensive in his observations, and he was again sharply chipped D/2

off by Kruger.

Generally speaking, discipline, as understood in European armies was conspicuous by its absence in the Afrikaner forces, except of course in the regular organisations like the S.A.Republiek Staats Artillerie and the O.F.Staats Artillerie and the Johannesburg Politie. Besides these it was only in Cronje's laagers that there was some semblance of discipline, at any rate during the First Transvaal War of Independence. Cronje was strict with his burghers, and demanded absolute obedience from them. He moved among them and mixed with them on terms of equality; they did not rise or touch their hats when he came among them, they shook him by the hand to greet him. He called them "kerels" or mates and they called him by his Christian name, <sup>Piet or</sup> "Oom Piet" as they called other generals. Only when there was military activity - an objective to reach, a point to defend, a stand to make did he stand out as leader <sup>to</sup> and issue commands, then he was commonly addressed as "General". His men responded more to his orders than did burghers under any ~~gax~~ other general. Possibly because Cronje was himself brave, fearless and successful, his burghers were attached to him. Some feared him others respected him, others were magnetised by him.

"Cronje is een man van groot door God geschonken verstand. Geleerdheid bezit de man niet veel, maar een eider die met hem slechts een eetlepel vol zout heeft opge<sup>e</sup>eten, zal hem eeren als een man van gezond verstand en zedelijkheid" (Cronje is a man endowed by Heaven with commonsense. He possesses no great learning, but whosoever has eaten a spoonful of salt with him will respect him as a man of understanding and honour")

*7m* *Z* Weilbach en Du Plessis: Geschiedenis van de Emigranten Boeren p.129) "Hij was een Afrikaner van uitnemende dapperheid, doch eenigszins voorvarend van geest, Daar hij Kommandant van zijn distikt was, genoot hij een aanzienlijken invloed, en maakte dan ook daarvan ruimschoots gebruik"

(He was an Afrikaner of exceptional bravery, if also of somewhat impulsive temperament. While Commandant of his district, he enjoyed considerable influence of which he made ample use). (Coardt van J.F: Paul Kruger p. 301)

*Mapudoc* The fatal folly, bustling restlessness and poor judgment of Sir George Colley early assured the Boers an easy victory over the British at Lang's Nek on the 28th of January 1881, in which that general sacrificed 200 men, and again at Ingogo or Schuin's Hoogte on the 8th of February where another one hundred and fifty British soldiers were immolated to his ineptitude. Inexorable fate then drew or drove Colley to the top of Majuba Hill, thence to survey, very much like old Moses of old from Pisgah, the beautiful land below, with its promise of the Boer laager, seemingly soon to be in the hollow of his hand, but which in reality he was destined never to win.

These battles were a remarkable feat of Boer courage and fortune, and Majuba was unique in its difference from and contradiction of the Boer traditional methods of warfare. Their dramatic and breath-taking victory was "indeed an achievement of which any army might be proud, a daring enterprise which should have ended once for all the talk of cowardice which some British levelled at the Boers." (Tilby A.W. South Africa 1846-1913 p.434-) but the Boers themselves, the victory was appropriately regarded as a manifestation and direct interference of Providence. It was like the British, <sup>miraculous</sup> escaping at ~~Majuba~~ Dunkirk in 1944.

By contrast, the defeat of the British at Majuba was regarded by them as a disgrace and humiliation comparable to the capitulation of Gen. Burgoyne with 6,000 men at Saratoga in 1777, and Gen Charles Cornwallis with 7,000 to George Washington in the American War of Independence.

The defeat and death of Sir George Colley at Majuba on the 27th of February 1881 was the turning point of the war. It was clear that one of the two things would happen. Either, the new British commander - Sir Evelyn Wood, with the large reinforcements which had arrived in Durban, and others still at

sea, would force his way across the Drakensbergen and relieve Pretoria and other British garrisons, or else a sudden cessation of hostilities, "with a view to stopping further and unnecessary bloodshed", (a discovery which invariably comes too late), and saving the belligerents' faces. This last hope of the last alternative was that which most responsible people cherished, and Gladstone was urged by his cabinet to conclude peace. He and they feared the entry of the Orange Free State and the Cape Afrikaners to help their kith and kin against the tyranny of England. The Boers, on the other hand, dreaded the increasing concentration of the British troops, and the well nigh certain danger of a turn in the fortunes of the war, were it prolonged a month longer.

In this way an armistice was arranged and peace concluded; a temporary peace of eighteen years, before the curtain was again rung up for the Second Act of the drama of the Anglo-Boer Struggle, in Die Tweede Vryheid's Oorlog 1899-1902.

## (3) THE ARMISTICE AT POTCHEFSTROOM.

*Sub-Chapter*  
 A matter which gave rise to a heated controversy<sup>S</sup> was the carrying out of the armistice conditions, concluded on the 6th of March 1881 between Sir Evelyn Wood and Comm-Gen Piet Joubert to enable them to discuss terms of peace.

One of the conditions was that Sir Evelyn Wood should be permitted to supply each of the beleaguered garrisons with provisions for the duration of the armistice. This was done with all the garrisons except Potchefstroom. It was afterwards said that Cronje purposely with-held the news of the armistice from his adversary Col. Richard Winsloe, and that the latter was forced to surrender on the 21st of March for want of provisions for his men.

This was charged against Cronje as brazen faced treachery. These allegations of treachery filled him with righteous indignation, and in his Memoirs, he vehemently repudiated them and their writers - the "English Jingo writers" who thus show him in very bad light, defame his character, and thus anger the British public and awake feelings of race hatred between the two races (Cronje's own words).

After long keeping quiet "hulle leugens en kwaadwillige aantijguigen met stilzwyghende minachting" and treating their deliberate and mischievous misrepresentations with silent contempt) Doch tans wil ik een waar verhaal van die geschiedkundige gebeurtenissen wereldkundig maken, zodat de onpartijdige en waarheid lievende geschiedskrijver van de toekomst de feiten naar waarheid zui kunnen boekstraven. De lezers kunnen zelf oordelen. Ik vrees de uitslag niet" (Now, however, I shall reveal the true facts of the famous incident, so that they may be available to the unbiased and objective historian of to-morrow. The reader can also judge for himself. I do not fear his verdict) (Brandwag 1/9/1913 p.216)

*7M*  
 Piet Cronje then goes on to show that on the 3rd of March 1881, he heard that Joubert had overcome George Colley, and that the latter was slain. On the 13th, he received official information from Paul Kruger of the armistice arranged between Joubert and Sir Evelyn Wood, and that the truce was to be for eight days from the

date of the arrival of the provision wagons for the beleagure and he was directed to inform Winsloe of these facts. At the same time Cronje received a letter from Pres.Brand, informing him about the truce, but as the directions in Brand's letter were slightly different from those in Kruger's letter Cronje and his krijgsraad or war council decided to carry on the <sup>g</sup>fight while awaiting more specific instructions from Heidelberg. Meantime Winsloe through his secret service heard of the armistice and its conditions, and wrote and met Cronje to ask him about it. But Cronje maintained that the truce would only commence when the provisions wagons should have arrived, and as <sup>t</sup>the latter had not so arrived, hostilities were to continue. Paul Kruger's letter had been emphatic on this point "De termen van wapenstilstand bepalden uitdrukkelijk dat de wapenstilstand van acht dagen niet eerder zou beginnen en in werking treden dan na de aankomst van de levensmiddelen. (The terms of the armistice specify clearly that the armistice of eight days shall not commence to operate till after the arrival of the provisions).

Upon Winsloe telling Cronje that the provision wagons, upon the arrival of which the commencement of the armistice depended had actually come, Cronje denied all knowledge of that fact. On the 23rd of March, Winsloe being reduced to sore straits surrendered to Cronje, and soon after heard that peace had been concluded on that day at LaingsNek between the belligerents. The provision wagons arrived only on the 9th of April, seventeen days after Winsloe's capitulation and the treaty of peace, and its signature under the grim shadow of the Majuba Mountain. by Sir Evelyn Wood on behalf of Britain and Commandant-General Piet Joubert, on behalf of the South African Republic.

*in*  
*Keionia*  
*convention*  
A Royal Commission, consisting of Sir Hercules Robinson, Sir Henry de Villiers and Maj.General Sir Evelyn Wood, was appointed to draw up a Convention with the deputies of the Transvaal, and their work was completed on the 3rd of August 1881, when a document known as the Pretoria Convention was signed.

*Copy*  
The Pretoria Convention: By this treaty the S.A.Republic was called the Transvaal State, and agreed to recognise the suzerainty



of Her Majesty the Queen of England. Subject to this suzerainty the Transvaal was to have complete control of its internal affairs, while Britain was to control all its foreign relations including the concluding of treaties, and the British resident was to guard the interests of the African tribes of the Transvaal, and no legislation affecting them was valid until approved by Her Majesty's Government.

After reading the terms of the Convention, one is forced to the conclusion that the Boer War of independence had not achieved independence for them. The Transvaal was still trammelled very much like a self governing colony. It was virtually still a dependancy of Great Britain. <sup>The Pretoria Convention</sup> It could not hold a candle to the Sand River Convention of 1852, which the Transvaal went to war to restore. <sup>(5) ~~Unhappy Boers in the West~~ Epistles of Cronje</sup>

During the Transvaal war, the African tribes both within the Transvaal as well as those whose territories adjoin<sup>ing</sup> the Transvaal, were divided in their sympathies, some favouring the Boers and others favouring the British. Among the former were the Koranas of David Taaibesch Massou at Mamusa, now known as Schweizer-Reneke, while among the latter were the Barolong of Montshiwa at Mafeking.

Throughout the war, Piet Cronje kept a sharp look out on the African tribes. He had a feeling, from previous dealings with them, that most of them were inimical to the Transvaal, and that if they did not actually fight and harass the Boers directly, they would at least give assistance to the British in <sup>mv</sup> many other ways, such as giving them information of Boer movements, helping them with provisions, and according them hospitality. Under these circumstances, early in the war, to wit on the 29th of December 1880, Cronje wrote to the Chief Montshiwa of the Barolong: "Monehua - Take notice that as soon as you, or any of your people are found armed fighting against the burghers of the South African Republic, which government is again restored, and where <sup>T</sup> of Paul Kruger, Marthinus Pretorius and Piet Joubert form the government; or lend assistance to our enemies, the English Government, whom we have nearly worked out every where, we will consider you and your people as our enemies, and treat you as such. We have always considered you and your people as friends

of the Boers, and we are willing to treat you as our friends, that is if you remain peaceable, because we along are able to work out the English. But you can send your people to help us work our corn and our farms, and for which we will pay your people well. (B.V.26 Briewe afgestuur deur Generaal P.A.Cronje 30 Des 1880 - a April 1881)

X Montshiwa's Answer 4-1-1881

Then there is another letter also addressed to Montshiwa and also written from Potchefstroom and dated the 11th January 1881.

"Aan Monchua, Kaptein der Barlongs, Sehuba.

Myn Vriend, I have your letter of the 4th January and Commandant Viljoen has reported to me that you have made peace with our people of the South African Republic, and that you sent a boy as a token of security. I am sending you our Government Gazette and a copy of a Proclamation to keep you informed. Write again and let us know if the refugees have gone back to their homes.

Ik verblyf, Uwe vriend

P.A.Cronje: Generaal.

*Follows* A letter of more friendly tone, written from Potchefstroom and addressed to "David Mashow,

*Montshiwa's Answer 21-1-1881*

Malmoesa aan Hart Rivier, warning him against mixing with such ill-disposed people as Christopher Bethel, and asking him if possible to arrest them. "Dar er sekere kwaad doeners rondgaan om andere kaffer stammen op te maken als mede valsche geruchten te vermelder om de menschen te verleiden zult jij uitvinden dat Bethel bij Monchua kwaad werk doet. Houw uw oog op hem, en vang hem."

And again to David Moshow (the identical addressee)

(I have read your letter to Adriaan de la Rey. I am glad of your sympathetic attitude to the burghers of the South African Republic. I am sending you a copy of the Proclamation to keep you informed. I hope you will be on the look out for our enemies and drive the "vuilgoed" out." <sup>A</sup> and finally, again to David Massou (the identical person)

"Wij vertrouwen dat jij te strengste wakkzaam zyn zult ene op onse vyand acht geven en jaag die vuil goed uit, en als jij denkt dat het verrades zyn, stuur hem dan hierheen. Laat kij dan weten wat uwen klagten zyn, en ik sal hem voor die krygstraad brengen omte worden

gestraft. Laat mij gedurig weten wat bij u voorvalt, en hoe die andere kaffer kapteins van plan zijn. Men heeft mij berigh dat jij en andere kapteins bij Monchua (Montshiwa) zijt geweest, en ek sal verblyd zyn te hooren wat jij en de andere kapteins hebben besloten. Intussenhoop en bed ik dat de Goede God van hemel en aarde u en onze vriende moge besêhermer en ons werk segene.

Ik verblyf, Uwe Vriend

P.A.Cronje Generaal. (Ibid)

(We hope that you be thoroughly alert to keep a watchful eye on our enemies and drive off that rubbish. And if you think that some of them are traitors, send them here. Let me then know what you charge them with and I shall bring them before the war council and have them accordingly <sup>punished</sup> punished. Keep me constantly informed of the events in your didistrict, and of what the intention of the other native chiefs is. I am told that you and other chiefs met together at Montshiwa's town, and I shall be pleased to know what you and the other chiefs resolved. In the meantime I hope and pray that the Good God of heaven and earth will protect you and our other friends, and that He will bless our work"

During the Transvaal war, there was a subdued struggle on the western Transvaal border between the African tribes who were pro-British and those who were pro-Boer.

Soon after peace was <sup>s</sup>igned on the 23rd of March 1881, this African struggle flared up. On the 2nd of May, the pro-British Montshiwa <sup>Montshiwa a sub chief under</sup> attacked the pro-Boer Matlaba at Lotlhakane or Reitfontein. H.A.Greeff, commandant of Lichtenburg at once sent the following urgent report of the matter to General Cronje

"<sup>n</sup>Adries Machavie (Matlaba) reports that Montshiwa attacked him at Rietfontein yesterday. Montshiwa's people with about 60 whites surrounded him at twilight, put part of the stad in the east on fire, killed about 46 people including six brothers of Machavie (Matlaba) and wounded 20 other people, 4 of them seriously." (Wilbach and Du Plessis: Geschiedenis van die Emigranten Boeren p.372)

Cronje himself had a bone to pick with those African tribes,

especially the Barolong of Montshiwa, and the Bathaping of Mankuroane, who had been so demonstratively pro-British, and had been a source of worry to him when his hands were tied up with the siege of Potchefstroom. Now however, he was free to reckon with them. He therefore lost no time in detailing a force to proceed to the western Transvaal border under Comm Greeff, to support the pro-Boer Africans against their enemies and the enemies of the Transvaal.

This minor war was actually in progress when the Royal Commission was sitting at New Castle and deliberating on the Pretoria Convention. *After the attack of Mafeking on Richards' Camp, a force of 150 men was sent to assist Mafeking, but was surrounded by Comm. P. Joubert's force of 1000 men and withdrawn.*

On the matter being reported, the commission at once deputed Comm-Gen P. Joubert for Transvaal and <sup>E. Buller</sup> Maj. R. Butler for the British, to go and investigate the causes of the disturbance and to put a stop to the fighting. (Vide Mackenzie J. Austral Africa Vol. 1p.63; Weilbach & Du Plessis: Geschiedenis van de Emigranten Boeren p.372; Nixon J: The Complete Story of the Transvaal p.289)

The action of General Cronje and Commandant Greeff was viewed with great disfavour by the Royal Commission, who summoned them both to New Castle to explain their conduct. The Commission accepted Cronje's evidence, supported by Comm-Gen Joubert's view that Montshiwa had been incited and supported by some (English) loyalists and refugees <sup>sk</sup> (Weilbach & Du Plessis: Geschiedenis van de Emigranten Boeren p.372).

The Commission also investigated the accusation of treachery preferred against Gen. Cronje by Sir Evelyn Wood in the matter of concealing the agreement of the armistice in March from Col. R. Winsloe, and unlawfully compelling him to surrender. Gen. Cronje defended himself in that he had received somewhat conflicting orders from Comm-Gen Joubert, Vice-President Paul Kruger and President J. Brand. He quoted Kruger's emphatic letter to him "Het is uw plicht aan de Majoor Winsloe <sup>kennis te</sup> kennite geven van de overeenkomst tusschen Wood en Joubert; maar de wapen stilstand begint bij u in Mooirivier, niet voordat de provisie aankomt, en in uwe handen is overgegeven ter bezorging. Voor dien tijd zijt gij vrij de krijgsoperationen voort te zetten." (Ibid pp 378-380) (See also pp herein) (It is your duty to give Major Winsloe notice of the agreement between Wood and

Joubert, but the armistice does not commence to operate with you in Mooi River before the provisions arrive and are handed to you your cars. Before that you are at liberty to prosecute military operations)

General Cronje <sup>e</sup> wrd door een en ander in onzekerheid gebragt. <sup>n</sup>  
Volgeens de instructies hem gezonden moet hij, ~~namens~~ <sup>namens</sup> Comm-Gen Joubert die kennisgeving aan het garnizoen zenden, en uit den brief den Pre. van den Vrijstaat zag hij dat Gen Wood dezen uitnoodigde, die kennisgeving te zenden. (Gen. Cronje was in a dilemma. According to Joubert, he had to notify the garrison, while according to the letter from President of the Free State, Wood he would perform that duty. (Ibid pp 380-381) 8/

The Pretoria Convention was signed on the 3rd of August 1881 in Pretoria. Many chiefs from the northern, eastern and western Transvaal, and also from Griqualand West and Bechuanaland had come up with large following of horsemen and imposing cavalcades to get first hand information of the proceedings and also to be near to supply information if needed. But in true S.A. tradition they were neither asked to speak nor allowed to attend the sittings. <sup>N</sup>  
When the Commission had concluded its work, its Chairman, Sir Hercules Robinson spoke to them from the heights, through the medium of interpretation by the Rev. John Smith Moffat. He told them what conclusion the Commission had come to respecting them. The Africans listened intently to the verdict. Many were evidently disappointed that they should be placed under the discretion of the Transvaal (Kotze J. Memoirs p. 796) Some chiefs got very excited and expressed their disappointment in no ambiguous terms. "They asked whether it was thought that they had no feelings or hearts that they were thus treated as a stick or a piece of tobacco, which could be passed from hand to hand without question." (Muller Ivan: Lord Milner ' S.A. p. 264)

One chief said, "I am not a man who eats with both sides of his jaw at once. I only use one side. I am English." Another said "We are in agony; our intestines are twisting and writhing inside us, just as you see a snake do which has been struck on the head" (Ibid p. 265)

On the contrary, an Afrikaans writer states confidently that if the 'Kaffers' had been asked to choose, they would have asked to be placed under the 'Boers', for they (de kaffers) know well that before the Boers came, they were wretched and poor; they know well that by their intercourse with and service under the Boers, they learnt to wear clothing, to eat bread, to ride on horseback, to shoot, to plough to drive etc, and that briefly, they owe to the Boers the progress they enjoy. (Weilbach & Du Plessis *Geschiedenis van de Emigranten Boeren* p.373).

When the Convention had been signed, the Vierkleur<sup>4</sup> was again hoisted at Pretoria on the 8th of August 1881 amidst great jubilation of the Afrikaaner people throughout South Africa. Absolute independence had indeed not been attained, but it was felt that the blood of patriotic men had not flowed in vain, and the Pretoria Convention was but a step to a fuller Magna Charta<sup>0</sup> in the lines of the Sand River Convention.

*6 Unnecessary Peace on the Western Borders*  
The end of the war between the Afrikaaner and the British was a signal for the commencement of armed rivalries between their African sympathisers and supporters on the Western Transvaal border. Montshiwa, chief of the Tshidi Barolong at Mafeking favoured the British or English, and was much lionised by them, while he disliked the Afrikaaners, and was equally detested in the Transvaal. His opponent was Moshete, chief of the senior (Ratlou) branch of the Barolong at Kunwana, whose sympathies were wholly with the Dutch Afrikaners, and was therefore disliked by the British.

Montshiwa's mind and attitude were shared by Mankurwane, chief of the Bathaping at Taungs, while David Taaibosch Mossou, the Korana chief at Mamusa (Schweizer-Beneke) sided with Moshete. Montshiwa and Mankurwane called themselves "Englishmen" while Moshete and Mossou called themselves "Dutchmen".

The armed strife that went on between Montshiwa and Moshete from 1880 to 1884, as well as that between Mankurwane and Mossou was at first purely African, but afterwards, each of them employed European 'volunteers', Montshiwa and Mankurwane being assisted

by Englishmen from Griqualand West and Kimberley, while Moshete and Massou were helped chiefly by Dutch Afrikaners from the Transvaal. Naturally, the sympathies widened until the Moshete-Massou axis got its inspiration and ammunition from Pretoria, while the Montshiwa-Mankurwane alliance received its blessings and good wishes from London.

Though it is not conspicuous, the name of Piet Cronje appears now and then in these conflicts, and it is certain that his burghers - men from the Potchefstroom district, and especially from the Schoon Spruit ward - were among the 'volunteers' under Nikolaas Gey van Pittius, their leader who tried to annex Montshiwa's country, and found a Republic of Goshen at Rooigrond, of which he became the 'Administrator'.

At the same time that pandemonium reigned in the Western Transvaal border, disorder broke out in the Northern Transvaal. When Sekukuni was captured by Sir Garnet Wolseley and imprisoned in 1879, his half brother-Mampuru - was appointed chief in his place. The Royal Commission set Sekukuni at liberty in 1881, reinstated him, and deposed Mampuru for seditious behaviour. Full of vengeance, Mampuru on the 13th of August 1882 attacked Sekukuni, slew him and fourteen relatives, burnt his village, captured his <sup>+</sup>cattle, and then fled for refuge to the Mabogo (Mapoch) tribe under chief Njabel.

As Njabel would not surrender Mampuru, Com-Gen Piet Joubert led 2,000 burghers against him on the 30th of October 1882. In this campaign, the Potchefstroom commando was not at first well represented, as Cronje and his burghers from the Schoon spruit did not heed the call, <sup>e</sup>excusing themselves, now with preoccupation on their farms, and now with incapacity owing to an epidemic of measles. Ultimately, however, Cronje and the Schoon Spruiters arrived in the middle of November, took active part in all the engagements, and gave a good account of themselves under their fearless and resourceful 'Commandant of Potchefstroom', who was now looked upon as one of the aces of the Dutch Afrikaner leaders

of the Transvaal, whose word <sup>d</sup> an opinion in the war councils carried weight.

Cronje took charge of the operations in the eastern flank, built a fort at Steenkampsberg where he installed a cannon by which he opened a heavy bombardment upon the enemy fortress. On the 13th Cronje at the head of 300 burghers and 200 Bapedi warriors tried to dislodge a strong force of Mabogo's people from a strong position, but had to retire with a loss of some men. As the tribe had ensconced themselves in the caverns with which the mountains there are honeycombed, Joubert surrounded them, and tried to smoke them out, but without success. An attempt was next made to blow up some caverns by <sup>y</sup> dynamite, but although the explosions caused panic, and much damage to foodstuffs, and loss of life, the effect was not what was anticipated. Finally, it was decided to blockade the Mabogo tribe and reduce it to starvation, after the manner of Hendrik Potgieter to subdue Sekwati's tribe in 1852, <sup>and that</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~Marffhuw~~ <sup>Paul</sup> and M. Pretorius and P. Kruger to annihilate Mokepo in 1854.

This method, though slow and atrocious, produced the results desired by the besiegers, and was the least costly to them. On the 10th of July 1883, after eight months siege and occasional desultory fighting, Mampuru surrendered to Comm-Gen Joubert, and a few days later, Njabel also, with 8,000 warriors surrendered. Mampuru was tried and hanged in November 1883 for rebellion and the murder of Sekukuni, while Njabel was sentenced to imprisonment for life.



## CHAPTER XI

## THE VOLKSRAAD.

This is a representative assembly, and supreme authority in the Dutch Afrikaner republics, and consists of one or more elected members for each district. An important branch of it is the Executive Council or Uitvoërend Raad, consisting of the President, the State Secretary, the Commandant-General, the Superintendent of Natives, and other members appointed by the Volksraad. It is a parallel of the cabinet.

Piet Cronje's name had now been before the public for many years, since the prominent part he had played in the opposition to Taxes in 1860. He had proved himself a worthy patriot, and had been elected successively Assistant Veld-Cornet, full Veldcornet, Commandant, <sup>General</sup> and Assistant Commandant-General. He had attracted attention by his address at the National protest meeting at Paardekraal, and by his resourcefulness in surmounting the obstacles in having the Proclamation of Independence printed in December 1860, he had earned for himself a name as the 'Lion of Potchefstroom' by his utter fearlessness, and by his successful operations against the British garrison in that town. He was known to be a friend and supporter of the national idol Paul Kruger. His father had been a Veldcornet and a commandant, and a member of the Volksraad and was now still and 'oudeling' (elder) in the National church. He and his father were held in high esteem (<sup>h</sup>Hoog in aansien) as successful farmers on the Schoon Spruit. When therefore there was an election for the Volksraad in August 1861, and the name and meritorious deeds of Piet Cronje were still fresh in people's minds, he was returned as member for the district of Potchefstroom. He and C.J. Bodenstein and R.H. Lemmer being elected to represent Potchefstroom town and district.

This honour led to other honours in <sup>and i</sup>civil/official life, and Cronje was next appointed to serve on the Triumvirate Committee. In 1862, he was appointed as one of the Commission of five men to report on the Finances of the Republic, and its Debt to

England in connection with the War of Independence of 1880 to 1881. This was a duty of some difficulty, demanding great care and diligence inasmuch as many documents had to be perused, demands or compensation assessed, and expenses and accounts<sup>s</sup> of the Royal Commission analysed. It was work, in fact, which required some training in business methods, and knowledge of accountancy, and it is no small credit to Piet Cronje and his colleagues of the Finance Commission, that they accomplished it successfully, and were able to report within four months time (July 1882)

In May 1882, Piet Cronje was appointed on another Commission on the South-West Boundary of the Transvaal, under the chairmanship of Commandant-General Piet Joubert. With his intimate knowledge of the country and people in the Western Transvaal, Cronje was entirely in his element in the investigations of this Commission, and he was in position to shed much light and give advice which so facilitated the work of the Commission, that it was able to report in June 1882, within a month of its appointment.

The findings of the Commission were in effect identical to the report which had been submitted to the Royal Commission in 1881. They took the stand that the lawlessness and disorder in the Western Transvaal, were ~~prictn~~ principally if not wholly due to the uncertainty of the real boundary line which had existed since the Keate Award in 1871. The Commission reiterated the view that land truly belonging to the South African Republic had been unlawfully expropriated and given over to African tribes. To regain some of such land, Pres. Thomas Burgers had then taken steps in 1873 to form alliances with some of the African chiefs like Moshete and Matlaba (Machavie) and David Massou in the Western Transvaal, and subsequently induced them to cede their territorial rights to the South African Republic, but as there were no recognised boundaries between the tribes themselves, the territorial right these chiefs were willing to cede often encroached upon other tribal domains and provoked quarrels which the S.A. Republic as assigns became involved in.

In August 1881, Col. Moysey was deputed by the Royal

Commission to mark off the boundary line of the Transvaal as determined by the Pretoria Convention. The chiefs who had ceded their territorial rights to the Transvaal were highly *Transvaal, while their opponents were as they said in the other* displeased when they found themselves included within the 'free' country of Bechuanaland. Captain Hourse was now sent by the British Resident at Pretoria, to accompany Commandant Hendrik Greeff and Capt. Raaff of the South African Republic to report on the condition of the border, but their mission bore no useful fruit, as war broke out again between the rival pro-Boer tribes and the pro-British tribes soon after the end of the Transvaal War of Independence, and went on intermittently for three years 1881 to 1884.

These were matters which Piet Cronje, generally as member of the Volksraad, and especially and particularly as member of the Commission on the South-West boundary of the S.A. Republic had to study minutely, and be thoroughly conversant with, and for which he had to find a solution.

In the Volksraad session of 1882, it was decided to terminate the rule of the Triumvirate and have a Presidential election in the following year. This was duly held in January and February 1883. There were two contestants - Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert. Kruger was elected by a clear majority of 3,431 votes against Joubert's 1,171. In May, Piet Cronje was chosen as one of the Committee of four members who had to administer the oath of office to the new President. (Joubert and Kruger were the two outstanding men of the Republic, and his anger and frustration were viewed with concern by the Volksraad and many burghers.

Since the Presidential election, a growing antagonism had been noticeable between Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert. The latter's defeat at the polls added bitterness to his feelings, and his election as Vice President and Commandant-General did not mollify him. He hankered for nothing less than the presidency.

In all these committees, Piet Cronje was remarkable for the freshness and originality of his views, for his diligence and earnestness, and for punctuality and devotion to duties *Waco*

*before him*

placed before him.

*Hand 1. The London Convention 1884.*

Third Deputation.

In August 1883, a Deputation of the S.A. Republic was elected and sent to the Colonial Office in London to seek amendments to the Pretoria Convention. This was the third delegation <sup>to</sup> in the British Government in six years. The first one had been in May 1877 to protest to the Earl of <sup>Carnarvon</sup> Carnarvon against the Annexation of the South African Republic. Its members were Paul Kruger and Dr. K. P. Jorissen, with Eduard Bok as secretary. The second delegation was in July 1878 to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, to protest again against the Annexation. Its members were Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert, with Eduard Bok again as secretary. And now, again in August 1883, there was this third Deputation to the Earl of <sup>+</sup> Derby, and its members were Paul Kruger again, General Nikolaas J. Smit, and the Rev. Stephanus du Toit, while Dr. Jorissen also went in an undefined role. Commandant Piet Joubert was not even mentioned.

He asked himself - Why? Why Kruger very late, and why - Jorissen a Hollander, a foreigner, twice? And why Nikolaas Smit? a brave man no doubt. but junior to himself, Joubert; but above all why the Rev. Stephanus du Toit, a Cape man, and not him - Piet Joubert - a former Triumvir, an Ex-Judge, a member of the Location Commission - a ~~tax~~ <sup>e</sup> vice President and Commandant-General, a patriot who had fought and faced countless dangers for the Republic? .

Having reached London, the Deputation at once (November 1883) commenced negotiations with the Earl of Derby, the new Colonial Secretary in the Gladstone Ministry. He was assisted by Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner of South Africa, who had gone to London especially for the purpose, and also unofficially by the Rev. John Mackenzie, the <sup>Missionary</sup> London Society missionary of Kuruman, who, unfortunately for the Deputation happened to be in England at this time.

The negotiations were protracted over four months, from November 1883 to February 1884, during which the Deputation found

Lord Derby patient and sympathetic.

They objected to the Pretoria Convention (1881) especially to its provisions <sup>of</sup> on a British Resident, the Imperial veto on legislation affecting Africans, and the south-west boundary of the Transvaal. They demanded:

1. <sup>The request</sup> That part of their debt of £300,000 to Britain should be remitted.
2. They demanded the recognition of their former name - South African Republic instead of 'Transvaal' and asked for a 'Treaty' formulated on the lines of the Sand River Convention.
3. They objected to the 'suzerainty' of the Queen, the continuance of a 'British Resident's' and the Imperial veto in their legislations affecting Africans within, and the relations with those without the Transvaal.
4. They demanded that the south-western boundary of the Transvaal should be carried westwards into the Kgalagare (Kalahari) so as to include the whole of southern Bechuanaland within its limits.

Lord Derby was far from being an energetic guardian of Imperial interests (Walker E. Cambridge History of the British Empire; S. Africa, p. 501) and was described as a "cold water engine", indolent, urbane, cordial and generous. He gave them almost all they requested, except a new Sand River Convention and Bechuanaland.

The question of Bechuanaland, which also meant the western trade route, or as it was also called the Great North Road or the Missionaries Road was unquestionably the most important item of the Deputation's demands. Upon it revolved the decision whether the Boers or the British were to possess South Africa, and three of the four months spent upon negotiations were taken up with it. The Rev. John Mackenzie, admittedly an uncompromising Imperialist, was also undoubtedly the best informed man then in England about Bechuanaland and its people, and he traversed the Deputations argument, and foiled their strategy, and for this Kruger could never forgive him afterwards. Giving a report of their negotiations to the Volksraad, President Kruger stated inter alia that "he could

not say the British Government had not been willing to hear him, yet it had been induced to withhold justice from the Deputation by lies and fraud on the part of traitors and intriguers, of whom Mackenzie was one.....If it had not been for Mr. Mackenzie and the High Commissioner, everything would have been right. These liars had stirred up the people to stand in the way of the Government.....The whole ministry had listened to them with attention....yet he agreed that the liars and intriguers whom he had mentioned were the reason that everything was not settled as they wished. The High Commissioner and Mackenzie were the origin of the opposition experienced. (421, p.42 as quoted Mackenzie J: Austral Africa Vol.1 p.166)

70/ Sir Hercules Robinson also plucked up enough courage to resist the Boer claims to Bechuanaland, and there was a nasty scene which nearly ended in a fight between him and Kruger in the Council Chamber. (Memoirs 199) *Paul Kruger*

Spurred by Mackenzie and the Missionary Societies, adamant, and refused to include <sup>The</sup> Missionaries Road within the limits of the Transvaal but even then were agg. he compromised. Although he excluded the pro-British Bechuana chiefs Montshiwa and Mankurwane from the Transvaal, he included Moshote and Massou in that State. *Lord Derby 1880*

The agreement, which bears the name of the London Convention, was finally signed on the 27th of February 1884.

Before returning to South Africa, the Deputation first toured the continent. In Germany, where they met the Kaiser Wilhelm and Bismarck 'the man of Blood and Iron', they were welcomed as brethren and co-descendants of the eldct Teutonic German-Dutch stock, while in France, their French strain in the Hugenot descent of the Boers was emphasised and exploited.

The Deputation at last returned home, in July 1884, to find an unsatisfactory state of affairs existing on their eastern and south-western borders. In the east, Zulu inter-tribal war had followed the return of Cetshwayo from custody at Capetown, and after his death in February 1884, his son Dinizulu had carried on the struggle, and was assisted <sup>againt his Kinsmen.</sup> by the Transvaal Afrikaners, who

87  
 proclaimed him 'king of Zululand' and received 1½ million morgen  
 of land as a reward against his kinsmen to form an independent "New Republic"  
 in August 1884.

91  
 On the south-western border, a state of war, with intermittent  
 skirmishing had existed between the Barolong of Montshiwa and the  
 Afrikaners of the western Transvaal since 1861. The Dutch-Afrika-  
 ners were so far successful that after besieging the Barolong,  
 they dictated through Commandant Jacobus P. Snyman, rather harsh  
 terms to them in October 1882, expropriating four fifths of  
 Montshiwa's land, and compelling him to pay a war indemnity of  
 £16,000 within one month (Theal: History of S.A. 1873-1884 p.  
 152) The land so taken by conquest from Montshiwa, together  
 with land taken by 'reward' from Moshete, was formed into a huge  
 block with defined boundaries, and named "land of Goshen", with  
 Nikolaas Gey van Pittius as Administrator. In 1883 Montshiwa  
 repudiated this treaty, and hostilities between him and  
 van Pittius's volunteers were resumed. Such was the state of  
 affairs when the Transvaal/<sup>Third</sup> Deputation left South Africa in August  
 in 1883 to seek amendments to the Pretoria Convention, and the  
 quarrel grew in vindictiveness, and deeds revolting to humanity  
 were perpetrated on both sides.

When Mackenzie got to England he was able to give a clear  
 recital of these sordid events in his numerous addresses and  
 articles on South Africa.

After the signing of the London Convention, Lord Derby,  
 at the advice of Sir Hercules Robinson appointed Mackenzie  
 Special Commissioner and sent him to restore order in Bechuanaland,<sup>and</sup>  
 and while the Transvaal Deputation was receiving addresses and  
 acclamations in its triumphal progress through the capitals of  
 Europe, Mackenzie was making agreements with Bechuana chiefs,  
 proclaiming their lands as under the Queen's protection, and  
 hoisting the Union Jack. His admitted partiality to the Bechuana  
 and his pronounced imperialism soon angered the Dutch-Afrikaners  
 in the Cape Ministry and forced Sir Hercules Robinson recalled

him and replaced him in August by Cecil Rhodes thus unwittingly jumping from the imperialistic frying pan into the imperialist fire.

2. The Post of *Comm-Gen*

In August Commandant Piet Joubert was commissioned by the Volksraad to proceed to the seat of disturbances on the southwestern Transvaal border, to restore order, and to find a solution favourable to the South African Republic. He proceeded to the Land of Goshen, negotiated individually with Gey van Pittius, then with Rhoes and then with Montshiwa. He partially restored order and partially found a solution and was developing it, when, as if to imitate Sir Hercules Robinson, President Kruger suddenly <sup>o</sup> ordered him to return to Pretoria in September (1884), and replaced him by the Rev. Stephanus J. du Toit

"In Prétoria was er een gewildige intrigue aan de gang, eene intrigue waar-van zonder twijfel de oorsprong te zoeken is bij den Transvaalschen Superintendent van Onderwijs besteed door eenige anderen. Deze partij schijnt op de eene of andere wijze President Kruger een gat in des Kop gepraat te hebben, en hem te hebben verleid tot het nemen van een zeer onpolitieken en gevaarlijken stap die de nadeligste gevolgen voor de Republiek had kunnen hebben (Oord van J.F. Paul Kruger p. 436).

There was some terrible intrigue in Pretoria; an intrigue whose origin is to be sought in the Transvaal Superintendent of Education and some other accomplices. The party seems somehow or other to have overtalked President Kruger, and to have misled him in <sup>to taking an unpolitical and dangerous step fraught with the most</sup> calamitous results for the Republic.)

All the Pretoria and most of the Transvaal knew that there was growing antagonism between Kruger and Joubert. They knew also <sup>Du Toit</sup> that <sup>that</sup> was very much in President Kruger's good books, and there was bitter hostility between Du Toit and Joubert. The reasons for these changes were therefore known to be a deliberate humiliation of the Com-Gen. Joubert was cut to the quick. The Rev. Stephanus Jacob du Toit again, <sup>thought</sup> though he. Who was this Du Toit anyway? A highly educated man no doubt, and a writer of



papers like the 'geleerde' (learned) De Patriot, and De Republikein<sup>2</sup> temelijk smeerig blaadje" (Corat J.T: p. 440) (A somewhat disreputable leaflet) a Superintendent of Education, but also a man from the Cape, an outsider, and therefore an untried and unknown quantity, while he, Piet Joubert was a man of the people, a son of the soil, a fighter who had risked his life a hundred times and had practical knowledge and experience of the people and their needs. This was intolerable.

And now what was the result of President Kruger's listening to clerical Du Toit's advice, and falling into the toils of his intrigue (Corat J.F.: Paul Kruger pp 436, & 438). Instead of soft pedaling the issue, Kruger had, without even consulting him rashly issued a Proclamation on the 16th September, 1884, annexing the territories of Moshete and Mentshiwa to the South African Republic, in direct contravention of the London Convention, ~~signed only six months before, and so disturbed a hornets' nest~~ signed only six months before, and so disturbed a hornets' nest; roused the indignation of the British Government and public opinion and provoked the Warren Expedition, and had made himself a laughing stock by having to perform an undignified climb-down by hastily withdrawing the Proclamation and Du Toit's annexation *on the 13th Oct.*

When Joubert saw the Proclamation in the Staats Courant, it was clear to him that the gap which had been widening between him and President Kruger for five years was now beyond bridging.

Piet Joubert was a normal human being, and as such was entitled to some ambition, and also to feel the gains and pangs of jealousy and the stings and arrows of man's ingratitude. In high dudgeon, therefore, he resigned his positions as Commandant-General, Vice President and Superintendent of Natives. He was done with politics and their sordidness. He would return to his farm in the Wakkerstroom district, and devote his time to clean, honest hard work, and live his life in peace.

The resignation of Joubert occasioned some indignation and

sensation in the Government circles. There were secret sittings of the Volksraad, and a commission of enquiry, consisting of five members, was appointed to interview Joubert and determine the root and reason of his grievance, and this was found to be his opposition to the 'priest from Paarl' meaning the Rev. S. J. du Toit. Piet Cronje was one of this Commission. The country was critical of President Kruger and his capitulation to the politics of Doctor.

The Volksraad though reluctant to accept his resignation had no option but to place the matter before the country, and ask for nomination for the vacant position.

*Deputy Comdant Gen* Meantime Piet Cronje was chosen as Deputy Commandant General, and as such became automatically a member of the Executive Committee

The position of Vice-President and Superintendent of Natives was given to C. J. Joubert, *somewhat mollified by the general expressions of sympathy and confidence Piet Joubert offered himself as a candidate for election of Commandant-General in June 1865*

For the Presidential election in January 1863, there had been only two candidates, Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert, but for the post of Commandant-General in ~~October~~ <sup>June</sup> ~~November~~ 1865, there were no less than thirteen candidates. One of these was Piet Cronje, who because of his meteoric rise in public favour and esteem since the War of Independence in 1860, and because he was appointed one of the Senior Deputy Commandant-General, had reasonable hopes of being elected to the vacant post. The results were, however, a disillusionment to him. *who had been persuaded to stand for the position he had resigned* Joubert, obtained an overwhelming majority of <sup>3915</sup> 3,260 votes against a paltry 396 votes for cast for Piet Cronje, <sup>24 votes for</sup> Commandant H. P. Malan, and a miserable <sup>14</sup> (24) votes, 24 for D. J. Erasmus, and 13 for I. P. Ferreira.

The country thus gave its verdict unequivocally that next to President Paul Kruger, the man it trusted most was Piet Joubert. The election showed that Piet Cronje was 'a lion' only in the district of Potchefstroom, and that Piet Joubert was the accredited national military leader. Was Joubert really so superior to him? The vacillating, irresolute temporising Joubert!

Bitterly disappointed, Cronje thought and spoke of resigning his positions in the State. Like Joubert, of whom he was now

so envious, he retired to his farm Leapfontein on the Schoon Spruit in July. Retreat and hard work on the farm cooled his chol<sup>e</sup>ar and calmed his nerves, and after four months he allowed himself to be re-elected Commandant of Potchefstroom. / Against Piet Joubert, Cronje entertained a feeling of jealousy and *therefore* dislike. It could hardly be otherwise in one of President Kruger's coterie of friends who was at the same an aspirant for Joubert's position as Commandant-General of the South African Republic, and Joubert further irritated Cronje by his vacillation and irresolutions; by now resigning his position as Commandant-General, and giving Cronje the hope, nay the assurance of appointment to that highest military post of the Republic, and now withdrawing his resignation, and thus dashing Cronje's hopes to the ground, and now repudiating the withdrawal of his resignation, and now ratifying the repudiation of the withdrawal; toying Cronje's feelings between hope and despair of becoming Commandant-General.

People generally are critical of their immediate superiors in office, and keenly alive to their short comings, and are apt to hold them in low esteem, and to feel that they can more effeciently discharge the duties of that office. This is natural, and Cronje was no exception to this rule. The nervous, shuffling unmethod and irresolution of Joubert provoked mixed feelings of contempt, anger and dislike in him. The bulky figure of Joubert stood in Cronje's light, and threw its massive shadow across his path of promotion. This fact became with Cronje a personal injury. //

### 3. War against the Koranas of David Massou:

In November, a commando was called, to proceed against David Massou, the Korana chief at Mamusa, the self same pro-Boer David Massou who had frustrated the pro-British Mankurwane, and ceded his ~~xxx~~ land to the Transvaal. Massou is said to have refused to pay taxes. He took the stand that many Transvaal Afrikaners were his <sup>Subjects</sup> tenants inasmuch as they had called him their chief and he had allowed them to occupy and use his country on the Harts River, and therefore, so far from being obliged to pay taxes, he <sup>to the Transvaal</sup>

was by rights entitled to receive rent, <sup>from the Government</sup> (Mackenzie <sup>Austral</sup> Inst. Afr. Vol. 1 p. 205). Massou's people were also accused of having raided Boer farms in the western Transvaal, in particular they were said to have stolen the cattle of one Jan Hauwman. Massou <sup>re</sup> vehemently repudiated this charge and said that it was in fact he and his people, who were sufferers from systematic cattle thefts by the <sup>+</sup> while farmers living in adjacent territory, and the cattle Hauwman claimed as his were <sup>actually</sup> Korana cattle which had been stolen but <sup>had</sup> were returned to their pastures. These assertions and attitude of Massou were regarded as undesirable symptoms of Korana truculence. First, Piet Joubert was sent up to investigate the <sup>Piet Cronje with a command of some 200 burghers followed up to go on</sup> matter, and then <sup>emphasis to</sup> demands, which Joubert made on the 26th of November. On the 2nd of December, Joubert and Cronje and Koois de la Rey <sup>and</sup> 800 men advancing from three different directions, stormed the Korana village on a rocky hill overlooking the Mamusa lake. There was a sharp skirmish in which 300 Koranas were slain, including David Massou <sup>theol. History of S.A. 185-1894 p. 175</sup> himself, and his two sons. 10 Dutch-Afrikaners also lost their lives among them Commandant Schweizer of the Staats Artillerie, <sup>Field Command. Repulse</sup> and 6 were wounded including Piet Cronje's brother - Henrik. Cronje himself had a narrow escape, his horse being shot under him. On the following day, the Koranas, now without a leader, surrendered. 210 of them were taken to Pretoria to be imprisoned 'for rebellion' while Be-la-Rey-to-Potchefstroom-and-Lichtenburg-there-to-be 363 Korana women and children were captured and removed by Cronje and De la Rey to Potchefstroom and Lichtenburg there to be distributed or sold to Dutch Afrikaner farmers as apprentices or slaves. Fourteen hundred cattle, two thousand sheep and thirty horses were taken. The clan was completely blotted out, and the very name of its home <sup>was</sup> 'Mamusa' changed into 'Schwäizer-Reneke'. <sup>at Khammanor</sup>

On his way to attack Massou, Joubert had called upon Moshete the other 'chief of the Transvaal volunteers' to assist him, very much as in 1852 Pieter Scholtz had called upon Montshiwa to assist him against Sechele. Very much as Montshiwa had refused because Sechele was his friend and he had nothing against him, so Moshete

refused to give Joubert assistance. Very much as Montshiwas was threatened with pains and penalties for his refusal, so was Moshete. On returning from punishing and killing Massou, Joubert went to Kunwana and demanded, <sup>from Moshete</sup> 2,000 cattle by way of fine for disobedience, and on failing to get them, he arrested ten principal headmen, and held them as hostage in Lichtenburg against the delivery of the fine.

CHAPTER XII

The decade 1885 to 1895 was a period of comparative military quiescence in the South African Republic. There were no commandos against any <sup>African tribes</sup> within or around the Transvaal. The sword lay in its scabbard, and the burgher, for a short while diverted his attention to peaceful pursuits on his farm. Otherwise, however, this was a period of great discoveries, important developments, and the emergence of dynamic personalities who impressed themselves upon the South African negative, and gave a new direction and meaning to history.

Sir Charles Warren's Expedition: <sup>and sometimes playing a noble part and at other times an ignominious role, they influenced the course of events</sup> The hoisting of the Vierkleur at Roogron by the Rev. Stephanus J. du Toit, and the 'provisional Proclamation on the grounds of philanthropy and humanity' whereby President Kruger sought to annex southern Bechuanaland in 1884 aroused the indignation of the British Government and loyal British subjects both in the Cape Colony and in England. They regarded it as flagrant violation of the London Convention and a premeditated insult to themselves that a territory and people under the Queen's protection should be so violated. Under these circumstances, even the pacific Lord Derby decided to send a strong force to expel Afrikaner adventurers from Montshiwa's country, to uphold the cause of law, order and peace, as well as British prestige and protectorate in Bechuanaland. Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner, at the conclusion of the London Convention discussions recommended that Sir Charles Warren should be given the charge of the expedition, and Lord Derby in addition made him Special Commissioner.

With his staff and volunteers enlisted in England Warren

left London on the 14th of November 1884 and arrived in Cape Town on the 4th of December. His orders were to remove the filibusters, from Bechuanaland, to pacificate the territory and to re-instate the Bechuanas on their lands.

As soon as preparations were complete, troops from England, transport outfit equipment, and men recruited and carefully selected from various centres in South Africa were sent north to Barkly West on the Vaal River by passenger and special trains. In six weeks everything was ready, and a force of 5,000 men was ready for the march into Bechuanaland. On the 25th of January, President Kruger accompanied by his State Attorney Dr.W.J.Leyds, and also Commandant Henning Pretorius and J.N.de Villiers arrived at Fourteen Streams from Rooigrond to meet Warren, who was accompanied by the Rev.John Mackenzie, Cecil J.Rhodes and J.M.Wright. This was probably the first occasion upon which Kruger and Rhodes met

*7u* *y* (William<sup>s</sup> Cecil Rhodes p.84) certainly it was the first time that they ever spoke to each other.

After a long interview on <sup>s</sup> saturday and Monday, the President and the Special Commissioner agreed to clearly mark out the south western boundary of the Transvaal as defined by the London Convention. At the head of 5,000 men, Warren then proceeded north. On the way to Vryburg which he reached on the 7th of February, he met the pro-British Mankurwane, whom the soldiers humorously dubbed 'Macaroni('. Mafeking was reached on the 11th of March, ~~amid~~ amidst spontaneous acclamations of a huge<sup>r</sup> concourse of people. On the 23rd of March, a Proclamation was issued by Sir Hercules Robinson declaring a British Protectorate over Bechuana territory from the western border of the Transvaal to the 20th degree of longitude, and from the northern border of Cape Colony to the 22nd parallel of south latitude.

From Mafeking, Warren visited the Bangwaketse chief Gaseitsiwe at Kanye on the 23rd of April, then the Bakwena chief Sechele at Molepolole, the Bakgatla chief Lenchwe at Mochudi, and finally the Bangwato chief Kgama at Shoshong on the 12th of May. At each of

these Bechuana townships, Sir Charles Warren announced the Queen's protectorate and entered into formal treaty of cession with the chiefs.

2. German South-West Africa Under the controlling hand of her 'Iron Chancellor' Prince Bismarck, Germany was participating in the 'scramble for Africa', had a footing in South-west Africa and very much to the vexation of England, had consolidated her strangle hold on Damaraland and Namaqualand, and spread herself from Orange River on the south to Kunene River on the north, and from the west coast to the 20th meridian from Greenwich. She was now casting her eyes with necessitous longing across Bechuanaland, and whether by accident or design, Warren's march into, and annexation of Bechuanaland synchronised with, and foretalled Bismarck's plans to extend Germany's sphere of influence from Damaraland across the Kalahari to the western border of the Transvaal above Mafeking.

3. Cecil J. Rhodes: A new force and star (or storm) of the first magnitude had arisen in South Africa when Rhodes, aged 28 years was returned in ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 1881 as member for Barkly West. He was the one man who fully realised the importance of Bechuanaland, In his picturesque way he called it 'the ~~in~~ neck of the bottle' or the 'Suez Canal to the interior', and although the initial credit of cheek-mating Kruger and Bismarck, and securing the central plateau for the British must go to the humble clergyman John Mackenzie, Rhodes was later greatly to enlarge Mackenzie's work further north, and was the chief force and factor in securing Matebeleland, Mashonaland and Central Africa for his countrymen, and in foiling and over-reading <sup>er</sup> the diplomacy of Germany and the South African Republic in the disgraceful race and shady hunting for concessions and draughting of tarnished treaties.

Possessed of ambition, imagination, patriotism and courage, and endowed by nature with a keen intellect, simplicity of character and amiability, Rhodes was yet doomed, perhaps unavoidably, to be corrupted by the immense wealth that he amassed; wealth and its

corollary of power. He became unscrupulous, arrogant, cynical and politically dishonest. For about eleven years from 1884 to 1895, he was the most powerful individual in South Africa, and a god unto himself.

Under his mesmeric, or monetary influence and thinly disguised system of bribery, which means also corruption, fell men in all walks of life, not excluding men of the highest intellect and men filling the highest positions - medical men, missionaries, journalists, politicians, judges, administrators, high commissioners and colonial secretaries. They one and all became his tools and satellites. His views on Africans were strangely un-English. He held black men in utter disdain, and preferred land to mere 'niggers'. "He's death on niggers is Mr. Rhodes" says one of Olive Schreiner's characters. Olive Schreiner, the greatest woman South Africa has produced, a person of the highest intellect and deepest humanity, who first admired Rhodes as "the only great man and man of genius South Africa possessed", but began to doubt him when he voted for the "Strop Bill" which proposed to give white men the legal right to flog their African servants, then she despised him for his low friends and the swarm of sycophants that surrounded him, and when "she discovered below the fascinating surface the worms of falsehood and corruption creeping", she would neither shake hands with him nor speak to him. He attained his end by dubious and cynical methods. He acquired Lobengula's concessions by ignominious tricks and then deliberately manipulated him to make war so that he could liquidate him and wipe out the Matebele (Oliver: The Anatomy of African Misery p.49). His troops must have killed hundreds of thousands of the Matebele between 1896 and 1899 according to his own advice in dealing with natives 'You should not spare them you should kill all you can (Plomer W: Cecil Rhodes p.131) All this of course detracts from Rhodes' claim to greatness - moral elevation and spiritual excellence, but it does not deny the fact that he served his times and kind faithfully as other men serve their times and kind. He won Central South Africa for the British whom he contended were the



first race in the world" an expansionist, imperialist, herrenvolk creed, which still finds its devotees in many government and 'justified<sup>s</sup> all manner of abuse and piracy. *under the useful word expediency,*

Rhodes and Kruger each wanted the same thing for themselves and their kind, and were therefore jealous of each other. They were fanatics in their respective ideologies, and were therefore bitter antagonists. They feared each other, and hated each other. Kruger's assessment of Rhodes is interesting. "That young man", said he, "will cause me trouble if he does not leave politics and turn to something else"<sup>y</sup> (Williams B. Cecil Rhodes p.86) "He finds bribery a useful ally when fine speeches are insufficient for his purpose. "Rhodes is capital incarnate. No matter how base, no matter how contemptible the methods, be it lying, bribery, treachery, all and every means were welcome to him if they lead to the attainment of his objects (Kruger: Memoirs p.218-9) "That man is the curse of South Africa."<sup>y</sup> (Ibid 216)

It is only fair to give Rhodes' estimate of Kruger. "Kruger is an extraordinary man, and one of the most remarkable men in South Africa" Then, triumphantly after out-witting him in Matabeleland - "I pity the man, when I see him sitting in Pretoria with Bechuanaland gone and other lands around him gone from his grasp.. with his whole idea of a Republic vanishing....I pity the man, when I see a man starting and continuing with one object and utterly failing in that object, I cannot help pitying him."

And finally, when Kruger snubbed him by requiring him to wait three days for an interview "The old devil - I meant to work with him, but I am not going on my knees to him"<sup>y</sup> (Millin S.G: Rhodes p.252)

<sup>701</sup> Gold: An event of stupendous importance in the economic development of South Africa was the discovery of its mineral wealth. In 1875 gold was discovered in the north-eastern Transvaal, a little to the south of Lydenburg, and there was a rush of diggers and speculators to the area. In 1884, richer deposits were discovered at De Kaap and in 1886 the still richer deposits of the famous Sheba Mine were discovered and the town of Barberton quickly sprang up and commanded a population of thousands. In the same year, gold was discovered in a rich conglomerate consisting of sand, gravel

and gold in the Witwatersrand, and from that discovery date the city of Johannesburg, the financial prosperity, the economic ascendancy, the political unrest and the modern history of the Transvaal. This state which was in sore financial difficulties and could not raise a loan of £5,000 leapt from insignificance and poverty to prosperity and power as by the stroke of a magician's wand, and the President's salary rose from £800 to £8,000 per annum and farms that were valued at £500 fetched £50,000 or more.

Fortune seekers naturally came from all over South Africa and from the outer world, especially from Great Britain and British colonies, and collected in Johannesburg like carrion birds do over a carcass.

When excited farmers had told Commandant General Joubert the good tidings of gold discovery and improvement in prices and prospects he said to them "Instead of rejoicing, you would do better to weep, for this gold will cause our country to be soaked in blood." (Kruger: Memoirs p.204), and Paul Kruger ascribes to gold the subsequent Raids and Wars.

5. Uitlanders: From the date of the proclamation of the gold fields there was a steady incursion of foreign elements into the South African Republic, and in 1887 their increase was already a disturbing factor to President Paul Kruger and his executive, and in ten years their numbers already constituted a half of the entire population. It was clear that sooner or later, they would exceed the burghers. It was a hideous nightmare that these English people whom the Dutch Afrikaner had run away from only fifty years previously should now be <sup>33</sup> bussing around and <sup>making</sup> king all manner of audacious demands. If Kruger granted them full political rights, the Republic would soon be in their power, and once that happened what was to stop them from altering the Grand Wet promulgating another "Fifteeth Ordinance", another Act of Emancipation of Slaves. and giving political gelijkstelling to the Africans, and hoisting the Union Jack all over the dear Republic. At the very least, they might sweep the President from power and vote for his 'so called progressive' rival Piet Joubert. Kruger therefore decided

to deny the Uitlanders a share of the Government while receiving the proceeds of their industry, for they contributed five-sixths of the income from taxation. By various devices, makeshifts and sops, such as by giving them the Second Volksraad, Kruger kept political power away from the reach of the Uitlanders, and steadily tightened the laws to this end. Thus in 1894, Law No.3 was passed, making the franchise more difficult for the Uitlanders.

Kruger and his burghers feared the Uitlander as the Union Government and the white inhabitants fear the African, the 'native', the naturelâe. They refused to grant him political ~~rights~~ <sup>rights</sup> as the Union Government refuses to the African. They refused all forms of concession as does the Union Government, they lived in constant dread of being swamped and turned out so that their progeny would lose their rightful heritage, and they gave the Uitlander a Second Volksraad, an ineffectve body and a farce like the Native Representative Council. The result of this illiberal policy of systematic denial was discontent hatred and finally war. // What have the Warren Expedition, German South-West Africa, Cecil Rhodes, Gold and Uitlanders to do with Piet Cronje? At first sight very little or nothing. What have Imperialism or Republicanism, Rhodes or Kruger, Colonisation or the Rape of Africa, Slavery or Apprenticeship to do with Cronje? These things demonstrate the <sup>d</sup>temper of the times in which they took place, when the conscience of the European people was either dormant or dead, when the piracy of imperialism and the robbery of republicanism were applauded <sup>d</sup>as patriotism, and the 'slim' ingenuity of ambiguous treaties, unintelligible to African chiefs was hailed as diplomacy and statesmanship.

6. The Magnetic North

A-man-like-the-Rev:Jeh

The cruel deception and ruin of Lobegula was but a later setting of the grim massacre of Makapan and his clan. Rhodes and Jameson raid the South African Republic, and it is called a crime. Rhodes and Jameson raid Matebeleland and it is called a wonderful achievement.

*Dissembling and*

A man like the Rev. John Smith Moffat, abstentatiously a servant of the Lord, a man whose father, the Venerable Robert Moffat was implicitly trusted by Mzilikazi, such a man allows himself to be used as an unfeeling tool to deceive Lobengula, the son of his father's friend. He goes to Bulawayo, what terrible untruths and half truths he must have told, even though the cock crewed and crewed and crewed again, even though the Lord and would die for twined and looked at him against again - No J.S. Moffat was 1852-1870  
 he said he loved so much to do Rhodes' bidding. He had to undermine the South African Republic and destroy Piet Grober's Treaty with Lobengula - morally and physically. Kruger had sent Grobler to renew the old treaties of amity and goodwill between the Boers and the Matebele, and thus to offset the British threat and extension upwards from Bechuanaland. Kruger with his hand (Memoirs) had drafted a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Lobengula. Unable to read or write, Lobengula had daubed his mark on the treaty unsuspecting that it committed him to place his warriors at the disposal of the Boer generals in case of their going to war with the British or the Bechuanas. Moffat had to enlighten Lobengula/ could most effectively do by entering into another treaty with

*at the disposal of the Boer generals in case of their going to war*  
 with the British or the Bechuanas. Moffat had to enlighten Lobengula on all this, and to prove to him that the Grobler treaty was a snare and a fraud, and to advise him to repudiate it. This Lobengula could most effectively do by entering into another treaty with him - Moffat. A treaty drafted by Rhodes, in which Lobengula

gleefully sent a telegram to his employers "The days of the Matebele are numbered" But Lobengula emphatically maintained that he had signed no treaty, he had not put his mark to any document, and he wrote to the Queen to apprise her of this fact. He says definitely that he refused to sign, and told the High Commissioner in a letter (also written by Moffat) that he did not wish to enter into any treaty with any body. Poor unlettered, unreading and un-writing Lobengula apparently put a mark on something. He thought it was the letter of refusal, while in fact it was the treaty of consent.

This Treaty differs in no way from the much quoted letter of General Piet Joubert to the Great Ruler <sup>C</sup> chief Lobegula <sup>n</sup> son <sup>S</sup> of Umzilikazi the Great King of the Matebele Natives. Both are full of empty protestations of "peace and friendship which are to continue for evermore from general <sup>time</sup> to generation etc." Both are tissues of falsehood and deception.

The crisis in this treaty making drama came in July 1888, when Grobler, returning to Pretoria from Bulawayo was stopped by <sup>and Mokolobane</sup> Raditladi and a strong regiment sent by Kgama, <sup>from</sup> for using a prohibited road. A scuffle ensued in which Grobler was wounded in the leg and died of ~~the~~ sepsis sixteen days after. Kruger and the generality of <sup>Burgers</sup> Brughers naturally believed that Kgama had been incited to this act by Rhodes, Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Sidney Shippard. Immediately after this the High Commissioner declared Matebeleland exclusively within the sphere of British influence". Then there was the Rudd Concession, <sup>by</sup> which Rhodes obtained the exclusive right to search for minerals in Matebeleland, then in October 1889 the grant of a Charter to the British South African Company, which was to emulate the East India Company of a hundred years previous. <sup>T</sup> When there was a forcible violation of Matebele territory by 700 men of Rhodes in June 1900 the inevitable happened - a war between the English settlers and the Matebele. The Matebele were liquidated and Lobengula died in exile. The amity and friendship that was so loudly protested, and was to continue for evermore ended in foul murder and bloodshed.

*Another prominent African tribe was inundated at the altar of expediency and gold and the progeny of the despoiled tribe was trained to hostility against those who had done them wrong and taught to regard the Dutch Boers as enemies.*

**Collection Number: A979**

**Silas T MOLEMA and Solomon T PLAATJE Papers**

***PUBLISHER:***

*Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand*

*Location:- Johannesburg*

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