

(3) vigilantes. Opposition leaders have been eliminated through the use of extra-legal means. Vigilantes have been active in East London, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Cape Town, Tembisa, Bloemfontein, Soweto, Alexandra, and many Vaal and Natal townships.

(4) forced removals. Some of the most militant symbolic strongholds of resistance have been destroyed as entire communities have been relocated. I am referring to the great tragedy of Crossroads, but also to what happened to Langa outside Uitenhage, Duncan Village, Dukasie outside Brits and many other politicised squatter camps in the PWV.

(5) rent boycott evictions. In response to the spread of the rent boycott amongst communities who had no other way of protesting against the Emergency, hundreds of people have been evicted from their homes throughout the country.

(6) army occupations. The Army has occupied many of the public spaces previously used by communities to hold meetings, such as stadiums, halls and schools. Furthermore, barbed wire has been used in some townships to symbolically carve communities up into discreet units thus disrupting the unity forged by street and area committees.

In short, the JMCs are using their power to rip communities apart, extract the leadership from the hearts of these communities and put together the pieces again in a way more acceptable to the state's objectives. This cannot, however, be achieved without making concessions to meet at least some of the demands that the now crushed civic associations articulated during the heyday of popular organisation. These concessions comprise the reformist dimension of state strategy. Some of these were articulated by the civilian reformists before 1986, but they have been appropriated and recast by the "low-intensity warfare" strategists. Referred to as "soft war" responses, a combination of strategies are being used to "win hearts and minds":

(1) infrastructural upgrading. Key target areas have been identified and marked for special attention. Major General C.J. Lloyd referred in the speech already cited to Mamelodi outside Pretoria, Alexandra outside Johannesburg and New Brighton outside Port Elizabeth. These areas are referred to by security officials as "oilspots" into which massive resources will be poured to upgrade services. The logic being that this is the best way of "winning the hearts and minds" of the masses. 34 oilspots have been identified for special attention and a further 200 odd townships have been earmarked for upgrading projects. The Directorate of Urbanisation in the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning hopes to acquire R16 billion from the proceeds of privatisation to spend on socio-economic upgrading. This will be used to complement private sector initiatives such as the SA Housing Trust and Urban Foundation.

(2) housing development. By way of special grants through the South African Housing Trust and National Housing Commission, the state, in conjunction with the private sector, is embarking on the most extensive housing construction programme since the 1950s.

(3) local government reform. In 1982 Piet Koornhof introduced the Black Local Authorities by arguing that if black townships want self-government, they must also be self-financing and promptly recommended the withdrawal of certain key state subsidies to townships. This meant that in order to upgrade township conditions to bolster their meagre support-bases, the councillors were forced to increase rent and service charges to raise revenue - a move which effectively triggered off the nation-wide township revolts starting with the Vaal Uprising in September 1984. Officials now admit "it was a mistake not to give the BLAs resources of magnitude." Now, Minister Heunis is introducing Regional Services Councils by arguing that townships cannot be expected to pay for themselves.

(4) scrapping of influx control. This effectively means that the hundreds of thousands of people who were previously excluded from the right to reside in the urban areas, may now do so on condition they have access to employment and "approved accomodation".

(5) legitimation of state structures. This involves massive expenditure on propoganda for radio, TV and pamphlets to convince people to pay rent, service charges and bus fares. In addition, this propoganda boosts the image of the security forces and the role of JMC personnel who, unlike the "comrades", are helping the people. These so-called "moderates" get extensive TV and radio coverage and have been given material resources to form new political parties.

(6) populist cooption in squatter camps: emulating their counter-parts in Latin America, JMC officials have realised that squatter camps provide invaluable opportunities for cooption. By granting local populist "warlords" (like Johnson Ntobongwana) control over the allocation of all resources (including employment), it is possible to buy cooperation by providing basic urban services.

(7) the National Council Bill. Finally, to carry through to higher levels of government the inclusion of Africans into multi-racial government that has already taken place at RSC level, the National Council is being formed to hammer out a post-tricameral constitution.

(B) "Bothanomics": this may mean a repressive version of inward industrialisation premised on wage freezes, de-regulation, lowered but quantitatively extended reproduction costs, uncontrolled regional/metropolitan labour markets and reckless privatisation.

In short, the state is meeting key popular demands, but on its own terms and while the popular leadership are in jail. These demands include housing, better services, financial support for local government and some form of political representation at central government level. This is what Sam Huntington, the American Political Scientist with influence in government circles, calls "unilateral reform", i.e. "reform by imposition from above".

It must be noted that for security officials, the reformist concessions are just as important as the repressive measures although less effective in the short term. The time lag between the promise of concessions and their effect on the communities leads to rising expectations which, for those who subscribe to the conservative explanation of revolution, can fuel revolutions.

Reformist concessions, therefore, must be coupled to harsh repression in order to forcibly lower expectations and eliminate the revolutionaries. The delicate balance between using just the right amount of repression without triggering a counter-reaction and identifying the most explosive grievances that need to be addressed, is a task fulfilled by the JMCs. Their coordinated control of intelligence, coercion and developmental resources equips them very effectively for the task of restructuring and remoulding civil society.

THE NATIONAL PARTY: FROM WHITE PARTY TO POLITICAL SHELL

[STILL TO BE COMPLETED]

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