

NEW WIDESPREAD TENSION IN THE FAR EAST

The H.A.T.O. decisions on the use of atomic weapons are not only applicable to Europe.

The discussion in the United States Congress and the full powers given to President Eisenhower to intervene in China prove that this policy was premeditated and that the use of atomic weapons would henceforth be possible everywhere.

For those reasons we give below the text of Eisenhower's speech and some extracts from the press.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ASKING FOR SPECIAL POWERS TO INTERVENE IN THE FORMOSA STRAITS (extracts)

'Clearly, this existing and developing situation poses a serious danger to the security of our country and of the entire Pacific area and indeed to the peace of the world. We believe that the situation is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its Charter, for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area. We would welcome assumption of such jurisdiction by that body.

'Meanwhile, the situation has become sufficiently critical to impel me, without awaiting action by the United Nations, to ask the Congress to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospects for peace. These measures would contemplate the use of the armed forces of the United States if necessary to ensure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

'The actions that the United States must be ready to undertake are of various kinds. For example, we must be ready to assist the Republic of China to redeploy and consolidate its forces if it should so desire. Some of these forces are scattered throughout the smaller offshore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons directly related to defending Formosa. Because of the air situation in the area, withdrawals for the purpose of redeployment of Chinese Nationalist forces would be impractical without assistance of the armed forces of the United States.

'Moreover, we must be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa, and be prepared to take appropriate military action.

'I do not suggest that the United States enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores as provided by the treaty now awaiting ratification. But, unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or the success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.

'Authority for some of the actions which might be required would be inherent in the authority of the Commander in Chief. Until Congress can act I would not hesitate, so far as my Constitutional powers extend, to take whatever emergency action might be forced upon us in order to protect the rights and

security of the United States.

'However, a suitable Congressional resolution would clearly and publicly establish the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to employ the armed forces of this nation promptly and effectively for the purpose indicated if in his judgment it became necessary. It would make clear the unified and serious intentions of our Government, our Congress and our people.

'Thus it will reduce the possibility that the Chinese Communists, misjudging our firm purpose and national unity, might be disposed to challenge the position of the United States, and precipitate a major crisis which even they would neither anticipate nor desire.'

President Eisenhower then stressed that a resolution by Congress would illustrate the unity of the Government, of Congress and of the people of the United States in the Formosa affair and would constitute a warning to the Chinese Communists.

'In the interest of peace, therefore, the United States must remove any doubt regarding our readiness to fight, if necessary to preserve the vital stake of the free world in a free Formosa...

'I believe that the threatening aspects of the present situation, if resolutely faced, may be temporary in character. Consequently I recommend that the resolution expire as soon as the President is able to report to the Congress that the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions, resulting from United Nations action or otherwise.

'Again I say that we would welcome action by the United Nations which might, in fact, bring an end to the active hostilities in the area. This critical situation has been created by the choice of the Chinese Communists, not by us. Just as they created the situation, so they can end it if they so choose.

'We are not establishing a new policy. Consequently, my recommendations do not call for an increase in the armed forces of the United States or any acceleration in military procurement or levels of defense production. If any unforeseen emergency arises requiring any change, I will communicate with the Congress. I hope, however, that the effect of an appropriate Congressional resolution will be to calm the situation rather than to create further conflict.'

(Associated Press, January 24, 1955)

Note - The powers asked for were granted by the House of Representatives on January 25, 1955 (409 votes for, 3 against) and by the Senate on January 29, 1955 (85 for, 3 against).

On January 30, 1955 the resolution conferring on the President the powers to use the armed forces for the 'defense' of Formosa was signed by President Eisenhower and thus became law.

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'THREAT OF AN ATOMIC ATTACK'

The news agency France-Press stated in a news item of January 25, 1955:

'The American government threatens to strike with the most modern weapons - including atomic and thermonuclear weapons - and even to attack objectives on the mainland of China.'

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'THE MESSAGE CAN BE READ AS THREATENING AN AMERICAN ATTACK'

The Manchester Guardian of January 25, 1955, described the 'message' as a 'gross blunder' and went on to say:

'Since concentrations of shipping at Foochow and Amoy and concentrations of aircraft at near-by mainland airfields may be regarded as "undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa," they are presumably the concentrations against which American forces must be ready to "take appropriate military action. Thus the Message can be read as threatening an American attack upon the mainland.'

'It does not help to declaim about "the free world's stake in a free Formosa." Nine-tenths of the free world has grave doubts about the kind of freedom provided by Chiang's regime.'

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IT COULD MEAN WAR

In the New York Herald Tribune of January 27, 1955, under the title of 'It could mean war', the well known columnist Stewart Alsop wrote:

'The extraordinary gravity of the decision which President Eisenhower has now taken is not yet fully appreciated in Congress or the country. The decision is, essentially, to bomb the Chinese mainland if this is deemed necessary for the defense of the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu.'

'Bombing the Chinese mainland means, of course, war with China. It could mean war with China's ally, Russia.'

'The Presidential decision to risk a major war in the defense of these two islands represents a great victory for Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Last October, Radford first proposed that the 7th Fleet should bomb the Chinese mainland. If necessary, to hold Quemoy. That time, Radford suffered defeat, when President Eisenhower ruled against it.'

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AN 'AUTHORISED' DESPATCH FROM ASSOCIATED PRESS

The usually well-informed American news agency Associated Press put out on January 29, 1955 a despatch which was published by the daily papers of different countries and which contained the following passage:

'From Alaska to the Philippines American aviation is ready for action. Then, on the basis of statements by eminent 'authorised' persons, it added: 'We are ready for war at this very moment. This war would inevitably be an atomic war, unless Washington decides not to use the atomic bomb... Spread out in a series of bases,' the agency says, 'American atomic bombers are ready to disperse Communist concentration in the Shanghai region...'

An article from Tokyo, similar in content and obviously inspired by the same sources, was printed in The New York Times on the same day. The paper added that South Korea ought to be used as a base for attacking China, being nearest to Shanghai.

ANY DECISION IS UP TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. James C. Hagerty, White House press secretary stated:

'The President made it clear that those forces were designed purely for defensive purposes and that any decision to use United States forces other than in immediate self defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would be a decision which he would take and the responsibility for which he has not delegated.'

An authorised source subsequently gave the following details:

1) It is the President himself who would take the decision and the responsibility for military action in the area of the Nationalist islands near the Chinese mainland, or even against the Mainland should the defence of Formosa require it.

2) The direct defence of Formosa and the Pescadores does not include Quemoy island.

(France-Press, January 28, 1955)

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INTRODUCTION

I

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMOSA QUESTION

1. Joint Declaration of all Democratic Parties and People's Organizations of the People's Republic of China
2. The special powers granted to President Eisenhower
3. The view of Mr. Attlee
4. U.N.O.'s invitation to the People's Republic of China
5. Mr. Molotov's statement to the British Ambassador
6. Chou En-lai's reply to the Secretary General of U.N.O.
7. An explanation by Sir Anthony Eden on the status of Formosa
8. The American journalists' interview with Mr. Khrushchev
9. Two statements by Mr. Foster Dulles
10. The opinion of the Soviet Prime Minister Mr. Bulganin
11. The Soviet proposal for a ten power conference
12. Statement by the British Foreign Office on the Soviet proposal
13. The position of the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru
14. A statement by the Indian President, Mr. Rajendra Prasad

II

PRESS REACTION

15. The People's Daily (Peking)
16. The New York Herald Tribune (Walter Lippman)
17. The New Statesman and Nation
18. The Times
19. Pravda

INTRODUCTION

Certain politicians still dare deny that Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pen-Hu Islands (Pescadores) belong to the People's Republic of China; there are others who claim that the question is not settled, that it is in abeyance. But the majority of reasonable and sensible people state honestly that there can be no possible dispute and that these island territories are rightfully an integral part of People's China.

From the historical standpoint:

It was China which, at the beginning of the third century, discovered Formosa and the archipelagoes in the Formosa Straits containing more than sixty islands. During the reign of Wu, navigation started between continental China and Mi-Chu, as Formosa was then called. (The name of 'Ilha Formosa', which means island of beauty, was given to the island by the Portuguese who, in common with the Spaniards, tried on several occasions to annex the island).

In the year 605, the reigning emperor of the Chinese Such dynasty began sending his representatives to the island and at the end of the 13th century the reigning emperor of the Yuan dynasty sent soldiers to Formosa. During the same period Chinese government bodies were established in the Pescadores. In reality, it was at that time that Formosa and the Pescadores officially became part of China.

Trading and other relations developed thereafter uninterruptedly between the islands and the Chinese mainland.

During the 16th century, the reigning emperor of the Ming dynasty was prompted by the threat of Japanese and Dutch invasion to strengthen the military defences considerably and in so doing he consolidated Chinese possession of these territories. Later on, in 1885 to be precise, Formosa became one of China's 23 provinces.

Formosa extends over an area of about 22,000 square miles; its population is at present about eight millions, of whom the overwhelming majority are of Chinese origin.

From the legal standpoint:

Japan annexed Formosa in 1895 and this occupation was recognised by the Shimonoski Treaty signed by the Chinese government of the decadent Manchu dynasty. Some international law specialists have tried to make this treaty a basis for contesting the right of People's China to Formosa. A discussion on these lines has taken place in the London Times for example. Here is what Mr. A. T. D'Eyo wrote in the February 9 issue in a polemic with the well-known lawyer Dr. Schwarzenborger:

'Dr. Schwarzenborger omits one vital but all-important fact; a fact which attacks and destroys the foundation of his whole argument, i.e., that China had ceded Formosa to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoski. On December 8, 1941, China formally proclaimed itself in a state of war with Japan. At the same time it solemnly declared the the abrogation of all treaties, including the Treaty of Shimonoski, between China and Japan. By so doing, from the point of view of international law, China recovered its sovereign rights over Formosa...'

(3)

This argument, which derives from an incontestable fact, is undoubtedly valid. To it must be added the fact that when Japan surrendered at the end of the Second World War she renounced all rights and claims to the island.

From the political standpoint:

The great powers gave commitments and took decisions on this question which are of such decisive political import that for all people of good faith discussion on the matter is rendered superfluous.

On December 1, 1945, the Cairo Conference between the heads of the United States, British and Chinese governments made a Declaration which said:

'....that all territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.'

This statement was subsequently endorsed by the Soviet Union.

Finally, there was the ultimatum to Japan issued from Potsdam by the great powers, which included the categorical statement that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out."

In fact, Manchuria was returned to China by the decisions of Cairo and Potsdam and no one would dare contest her right to it. Why then should it be otherwise with Formosa and the Pescadores? It is thus contrary to solemn international agreements that that can happen.

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To come to the more recent events which have led to the present tense situation, it is appropriate to recall a few concrete facts.

On January 5, 1950 President Truman found another opportunity for confirming, as his eminent predecessor had done, that Formosa belonged to China. He stated in particular that the United States had no intention of sending their armed forces to intervene in the Chinese conflict and that the United States Government did not wish to become involved in the Chinese civil war.

The then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson remarked during the same period that no one, not even a lawyer could dispute the fact that Formosa was a Chinese province.

But just a few months later, on June 27, 1950, Truman decided to send the American Seventh Fleet into the Formosa area to defend it from 'communist' attacks and to prevent Chiang Kai-shek's military formations from making attacks on the mainland. This act was described as the 'neutralisation' of Formosa.

On February 23, 1953, the new President of the United States, in his 'State of the Union' speech, announced the 'denaturalisation' of Formosa, while keeping the Seventh Fleet in the area. In practice, this meant encouraging the Kuomintang forces to indulge in all sorts of actions against the People's Republic with American arms and aircraft and under the protection of the American armed forces.

Finally, on December 2, 1954, the Mutual Security Treaty was signed between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. This treaty means direct intervention by the United States government in the internal affairs of China and the de facto occupation of Formosa by the Americans.

Since then there have been more and more hostile acts every day. Based on

Formosa and the islands lying off the coast, sorties, both major and minor, are a daily occurrence. Chinese towns have been bombed, with considerable loss of life, by many aircraft. They exceeded two thousand sorties a month. Armed groups have been landed on the mainland to blow up bridges, roads and factories. This was verified over a long period without a break.

On January 10, 1955 the People's Republic undertook the re-establishment of the sovereign rights of the Chinese state over these territories by taking possession of Yi-Kiang-Chan in the north of the Tachen archipelago and only 19 miles from the coast. It was one of the islands used as a base for raids against the continent and sheltered the American diversion centre, 'Western Enterprise'.

We have given the concrete facts relevant to the present situation in this part of the world, a situation liable to place peace in grave danger, as the following material shows.

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMOSA (TAIWAN) QUESTION

JOINT DECLARATION OF ALL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND PEOPLE'S ORGANISATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Signed by the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee and by all the democratic parties and people's organisations, a declaration on Formosa (Taiwan) was published on August 22, 1954 from which we give the following extracts:

'To safeguard the security and territorial integrity of the motherland and the peace of Asia and the world, the Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory. Its occupation by the United States cannot be tolerated; and it is equally intolerable to have it placed under United Nations trusteeship. To liberate Taiwan and to eliminate the traitorous Chiang Kai-shok group is an exercise of China's sovereignty. It is China's own internal affair, and we will brook no interference by any foreign countries. If any foreign aggressors dare to prevent the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan, they thereby interfere in China's internal affairs, infringe on China's sovereignty and violate her territorial integrity; they must therefore take all the grave consequences of such aggressive action.'

SPECIAL POWERS GRANTED TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

President Eisenhower sent a message to Congress on January 24, 1955 asking for the power to intervene if necessary by means of American armed forces in the Formosa (Taiwan) region and in the straits. (For the text of the President's message, see the previous issue of Documentary Material.)

The powers asked for were granted by the House of Representatives on January 25, and by the Senate on January 29.

The first effects of this grant of special powers was the large-scale movement of sea and air forces for the 'evacuation' of the Tachen islands. This American intervention is considered by the government of the People's Republic of China and by other governments as an act of open aggression against People's China.

THE VIEW OF MR. ATTLEE

Commenting on the question of Formosa (Taiwan) in the House of Commons on January 26, the leader of the Labour Party said:

'It is, of course, clear that in this matter of Formosa and the islands there is an intervention in a civil war. It is clearly an action by the United States, and not an action of the United Nations. But in view of the need for preventing hostilities and trying to get some peaceful arrangement, is it not clear that the right thing would be that China should occupy her proper position

(6)

in the United Nations?'

A few days afterwards, on January 31, Mr. Attlee developed his views in an article in the Daily Herald:

'The Labour Party starts from the broad proposition that Formosa was recognised by the Allied Powers after the war as an integral part of China.

'It is clear that the Peking Government won the civil war against Chiang Kai-shok. It would then have occupied Formosa but for the intervention of the United States Fleet.

'The American action, taken at the same time as the United Nations action in Korea (in 1950), had nothing to do with the United Nations, but was dictated by the American policy of security.

'Since that time, the forces of Chiang Kai-shok have constantly attacked the Chinese mainland.

'But it seems to me quite unreasonable that, under the shelter of American forces, the Chiang Party should be able to carry on a civil war...

'It is, of course, obvious, as we have urged so often, that occupation of a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations should be given to the People's Republic of China.

'As long as that seat is occupied by the puppet Government of Chiang Kai-shok, negotiations are bound to be difficult.'

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THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S INVITATION
TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

On February 1, the New Zealand delegate presented a proposal for the Security Council agenda dealing with the military operations in the area of certain islands near the Chinese coast and stating that a representative of Chiang Kai-Shok should be present to discuss this question.

The Soviet delegate, Mr. Sobolev, also presented a resolution inviting representatives of the government of the People's Republic of China to take part in the discussion on the question: 'In connection with the aggressive acts of the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other Chinese islands.'

This proposal stated that the Kuomintang representative should be excluded from the Security Council meeting.

The members of the Security Council decided by a majority vote to place these two proposals on the agenda, but to give priority to the New Zealand proposal. Thus the invitation to the People's Republic of China was in fact formulated on the basis of the New Zealand proposal. And the New Zealand proposal took no account of the real responsibilities for a situation created by foreign intervention in a question which the government of the People's Republic of China considers to be of a strictly internal nature.

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MR. MOLOTOV'S STATEMENT TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR

The Soviet Foreign Minister received Sir William Hayter, British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., on January 28, 1955. On being informed of the move made by New Zealand, Mr. Molotov replied:

'As regards the statement of the British Ambassador, as well as Sir Anthony Eden's recent statement in the House of Commons, the question has been completely circumvented of the real reasons of tension in the area of Taiwan, which is an integral part of the national territory of China, as has already been pointed out in Cairo and the Potsdam declarations signed also by the Governments of Britain and the United States.

'At the same time it is perfectly clear that these causes reside in the gross interference of the United States in the internal affairs of China, the endeavour to separate Taiwan from China.

'The aforementioned actions of the United States represent aggression against the Chinese People's Republic which has every right to Taiwan and the Pescadores.

'On the other hand, the actions of the United States, and the Chiang Kai-shek clique which is being encouraged by it, lead to an intensification of international tension in the Far East and are full of menace of a new war.

'If the United States were to stop its aggressive actions in the area of Taiwan, this would facilitate the easing of international tension.'

At the same time Mr. Molotov drew the attention of the British Ambassador to the fact that if Britain were not supporting the United States in her aggressive actions in this area the United States would not have decided to undertake such actions.

In conclusion, Mr. Molotov told Sir William Hayter that the statement made by the Ambassador would be considered by the Soviet Government.

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Mr. Chou En-lai's reply to the invitation from the United Nations' Secretary General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld

(extracts)

'The United States aggression against China's territory of Taiwan has all along been the source of tension in the Far East. Recently, after it concluded the so-called "Mutual Security Treaty" with the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek, clique, the United States dispatched additional large units of naval and air forces to the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and openly made war threats and war provocations against the Chinese people in preparation for an extension of aggression against China, thereby further aggravating the tension in the Far East. In order to ease the tension in the Far East, eliminate the threat to the security of China, and put an end to the United States aggression, the

(5)

Government of the People's Republic of China fully supports the resolution submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union in the United Nations Security Council concerning the "acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China."

"Taiwan, the Penghu Islands and other coastal islands are all inalienable parts of China's territory. The Chinese people's exercise of their own sovereign rights in liberating their own territory is entirely a matter of China's internal affairs and has never caused international tension, nor can it threaten international peace and security. But the representative of New Zealand proposed that the United Nations Security Council consider the "hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China" between the People's Republic of China and the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique. This is obviously to intervene in China's internal affairs and to cover up the acts of aggression by the United States against China, and is therefore in direct violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter.

"What is especially intolerable is the fact that the People's Republic of China, representing the 600 million Chinese people, is up to now still deprived of its legitimate position and rights in the United Nations, while the representatives of a small handful of remnants of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique, repudiated long ago by the Chinese people, continue to usurp the position of representing China in the United Nations. Such an extremely unjustified situation makes it impossible for the representative of the People's Republic of China to take part in discussions of questions concerning China in the United Nations.

"Therefore, the Government of the People's Republic of China cannot send a representative to take part in the discussion of the New Zealand proposal in response to the invitation of the United Nations Security Council.

"The Government of the People's Republic of China holds that only for the purpose of discussing the resolution of the Soviet Union and only when the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique has been driven out from the Security Council and the representative of the People's Republic of China is to attend in the name of China, can the People's Republic of China agree to send a representative to take part in the discussions of the Security Council.

"All genuine international efforts to ease and to eliminate the tension created by the United States in this area and in other areas of the Far East will receive the support of the People's Republic of China."

(New China News Agency,
4.2.1955)

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(9)

An explanation by Sir Anthony Eden on the status of Formosa (Taiwan)

In the House of Commons on February 4, Sir Anthony Eden gave the following reply to a written question from Mr. Shinwell (Labour):

'Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan by China in the Shimino-seki Treaty of 1895. In the Cairo Declaration of November, 1943, the allies stated that it was their purpose "that all the territories which Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China" This declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has in fact never taken place because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the difference among the Powers as to the status of these entities.

'The Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, laid down as one of the conditions for the Japanese peace that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese.'

(The Times, 5.2.1955)

The interview given by Mr. Khrushchev to the American journalists W.R. Hearst, Kingsbury Smith and F. Connif

Mr. Khrushchev, in the course of an interview he gave recently to the three American journalists, made the following observations on the question of Formosa (Taiwan):

'The declaration that Taiwan and the other Chinese islands were non-Chinese territory was at variance with existing international agreements and historical facts. This could not be called anything but perfidy. Could China really recognise that the United States had the right to claim Taiwan or could she agree that Taiwan was necessary to secure the defence of the United States? If one considered the distance between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan on the one hand, and between the United States and Taiwan on the other, it would become clear that no comparison was possible. In his opinion the current actions of the United States in the area of Taiwan were a disgrace to the American people. No sensible people, irrespective of their political views, would ever justify a conflict caused by the policy of the United States. As for future developments in that area, they would depend on the United States itself. Could China really recognise that the United States or its puppet, the scoundrel Chiang Kai-shek, had the right to Taiwan?...

(10)

'The Soviet people were shocked by the actions of the U.S. Government. They had known and respected Eisenhower as their partner in the war against Hitler. They failed to understand the United States policy on the question of Taiwan and felt that the American people themselves hardly understood this policy. The United States was carrying on unprecedented activity in the Far East and artificially complicating the situation, evidently under the influence of the most reactionary elements.

'If America showed common sense in this question, it would be possible, with the participation of other countries interested in the preservation of peace, to prevent a conflict in the Far East.'

(Pravda, 11.2.1955)

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TWO STATEMENTS BY MR. FOSTER DULLES

Speaking on February 7, 1955 at the meeting of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Mr. Foster Dulles said:

'To summarize, what the treaty would accomplish is this:

'It would give the Chinese Communists notice, beyond any possibility of mis-interpretation, that the United States would regard an armed attack directed against Taiwan and the Pescadores as a danger to its own peace and safety and would act to meet the danger - such action to be in accordance with our Constitutional processes.

'It would provide firm reassurance to the Republic of China and to the world that Taiwan and the Pescadores are not a subject for barter as part of some Far Eastern "deal" with the Chinese Communists.

'Taken in conjunction with the treaties which have already been concluded by the United States... this treaty rounds out the Western Pacific security system.

'It would be theoretically preferable if that round-out were accomplished by a multilateral regional pact. This may come as a future development. However, that is not practical at the present time, and in the meantime we need to act within the limits of the practical.

'After the treaty was signed, there took place an exchange of notes, dated Dec. 10, 1954, between the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself. These were designed to insure that our two Governments will act in harmony and concert in relation to the present troubled state of affairs in that area. It was agreed that offensive military operations by either party from the territories held by the Republic of China would be undertaken only as a matter of joint understanding, because unilateral action of an offensive character by one party might throw heavy burdens upon the other party. Therefore, neither will act in disregard of the other.

(New York Times, 8.2.1955)

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Mr. Foster Dulles made a speech to the Foreign Policy Association on February 16, in which he made the position of his government even clearer. We give the following extracts:

'It has been suggested that Nationalist China should go further and surrender to the Chinese Communists the coastal positions which the Communists need to

(11)

stage their announced attack on Formosa.

'It is doubtful that this would serve either the cause of peace or the cause of freedom.

'The Chinese Communists have been the initiators of violence in this area. They have already formally declared their intention to take Formosa by force. If the Chinese Nationalists now oblige by making it easier for the Chinese Communists to conquer Formosa, will they be less apt to do so? I doubt it.

'The United States has no commitment and no purpose to defend the coastal positions as such. The basic purpose is to assure that Formosa and the Pescadores will not be forcibly taken over by the Chinese Communists.!

'We sincerely hope that this decision (to reject the Security Council's invitation, Ed.) of the Chinese Communists is not irrevocable and that they will abide by the principles of the United Nations rather than challenge by force the defensive obligations of this country. In any event, we believe that their attitude toward the United Nations Security Council has not ended the responsibility of that body which, by the Charter, has the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.!"

'If the non-Communist Asians ever come to feel that their Western allies are disposed to retreat whenever Communism threatens the peace, then the entire area could quickly become indefensible.'

(New York Herald Tribune,
17.2.1955)

THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET PRIME MINISTER, MR. BULGANIN

In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on February 9, 1955, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Bulganin, said the following about the Formosa (Taiwan) question:

'In Asia too, they (the United States, Ed.) are knocking together military blocs, and are organising military provocations against the People's Republic of China and interfering in her internal affairs.

'The American Government has embarked on the dangerous course of aggravating the situation in the Taiwan area. It has been reinforcing its military, naval and air forces there, and continues to pursue a policy of provoking war. Disregarding the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China and trampling international agreements underfoot, the United States has seized the Island of Taiwan - Chinese territory from time immemorial - and has made it a hot-bed of war provocation in the Far East.

'The stand taken by the United Nations Organisation in this matter is astonishing. To this day it has not condemned the aggressive actions of the United States against China, has not demanded of the United States the immediate withdrawal of its armed forces from Taiwan, and the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China.

'The policy of the Chinese Government in this matter has our full approval and support. The People's Republic of China enjoys the sympathy of the Soviet peoples and of all progressive mankind, because it is waging a struggle for a just cause, for the honour and independence of its country. In this noble cause the Chinese people can count on the help of their true friend - the great Soviet people.'

(Izvestia, 10.2.1955)

(12)

A TEN-POWER CONFERENCE PROPOSED BY THE U.S.S.R

On February 4, the Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. Molotov made a statement on behalf of the Soviet Government to the British ambassador, Sir William Hayter, in which he recalled the reasons which made it impossible to discuss the question of Formosa (Taiwan) in the Security Council and went on to put the following proposal:

'Aiming at the consolidation of peace and reducing international tension in the Far East, the Soviet Government considers that under the circumstances it would be expedient to try to explore other ways facilitating a settlement of the question concerning the situation in the above area.

'In the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be expedient if the countries particularly interested in normalizing the situation that has arisen in the area of Taiwan and other Chinese islands would discuss this matter at a conference,

'Besides the People's Republic of China and the United States, Britain, the U.S.S.R., France, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon could take part in such a conference.

'The initiative in this matter could, in our opinion, be taken by Britain, the Soviet Union and India, if the Government of Britain and the Government of India agree to this step.

'Such an initiative would accord with the wishes expressed by Mr. Eden concerning the need for joint efforts by Britain and the U.S.S.R. to solve outstanding international problems.

'As regards the time and venue of the conference the Soviet Government holds that the conference could be convened in Shanghai or New Delhi in February this year.

'The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of Great Britain will examine these considerations of the Soviet Government and give its opinion.'

(Tass, 13.2.1955)

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On the same day Mr. Molotov handed a similar statement to Mr. P. Kaul, the Indian chargé d'affaires.

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Statement by the British Foreign Minister on the Soviet Proposal for a Ten-Power Conference

The Foreign Office issued the following statement on February 13, as a comment on the Soviet proposal:

'Her Majesty's Government have received from the Soviet Government a proposal for the summoning of a conference to consider the situation that has arisen in the area of Formosa and the islands off the coast of China. H.M. Government have given the proposal serious examination. It was discussed with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, and the United States Government were informed. Pending further exploration of the proposal, H.M. Government made certain observations to the Soviet Government.

'Their first comment related to the composition of the conference which, as

proposed by Mr. Molotov, does not appear to be representative. In particular, they note that the Chinese Nationalist authorities in Formosa are to be excluded. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that a conference that did not include both of the two parties most directly concerned could not have a useful result. Their second comment was that the position of the United Nations should not be overlooked. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it is desirable that any meeting for the discussion of the situation in the area of the coastal islands and Formosa should be organised in a form acceptable to the United Nations.'

(The Times, 14.2.1955)

MR. NEHRU'S POSITION

Before leaving London to return to India, Mr. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, commented on the Soviet proposal for a Ten-Power conference on Formosa. Concerning India's attitude to the proposal he said:

'Certainly we have not rejected it. It was addressed to us, too.'

'We have pointed out that while the conference is desirable and will have to be held some time or other, it requires a great deal of preparation beforehand, and if I may say so, informal approaches before the formal conference is held...'

Asked for his comments on the world situation, he said:

'I think I am on the whole more hopeful. The main reason for this hope is the success of the Geneva Conference last year.'

'I think we should be able to find some way out of the present difficulties in the Far East.'

He spoke in a similar vein to journalists at Orly aerodrome near Paris, saying that the proposal was a good one which should be taken up.

At Cairo, where he met the Egyptian Prime Minister, Col. Nasser, he made these observations:

'Nonrecognition of Communist China by the United Nations and "other nations" was blinking at the "patent fact" that China has a strong and stable government controlling hundreds of millions of human beings, the Indian leader said. This policy makes it difficult to settle Asian problems around a conference table as they ultimately must be settled, he added.'

(New York Times, 17.2.1955)

A Statement by the President of the Indian Republic, Mr. Rajendra Prasad

'President Rajendra Prasad opened the budget session of the Indian Parliament with a warning that "the threat of war again darkens the future of humanity."

'The President pointed to the Formosa crisis as "the most serious of the present moment" which he said he hoped would "be solved peacefully and by negotiation."

'"My Government recognises only one government of China and considers that the claims (on Formosa) of this republic are justified," he said.'

(New York Herald Tribune, February 22, 1955)

PRESS REACTIONS

The question of Formosa occupies a prominent place in the news and comments appearing in the international press.

We are limiting ourselves here to giving only a few comments taken from the press of the countries which are most involved in this question at the present time.

Comments by the People's Daily (Peking)

Referring to the various moves which had been made, and in the first place to that of the New Zealand delegate at the United Nations, the People's Daily wrote on January 29:

'For the Chinese people a cease-fire would mean that it must submit to the United States' threats to war, tolerate the division of China by the United States and allow the United States to draw its lines of defence across Chinese territory by using it as a military base and as a springboard for extending its aggression against China and unleashing a new war.

'Neither the United Nations nor any country has any right to interfere in the question of the liberation of Formosa which is essentially within China's internal jurisdiction. The liberation of Chinese territory, Taiwan included, by the Chinese people derives from the exercise of its sovereign rights. So long as there is no armed interference from outside, no international tension will ever result.'

On February 5, i.e. after Chou En-lai's reply to the UNO Secretary-General, the same paper wrote:

'The Soviet proposal is genuinely aimed at eliminating tension and the war menace created by the United States in the Taiwan area whereas the New Zealand proposal is obviously for the purpose of intervening in China's internal affairs and violating the U.N. Charter.

'The Chinese people, in exercising their sovereign rights and liberating their territory, which is a domestic affair, never has created and never could create international tension. The tense situation in the Taiwan area results from the United States seizure of Taiwan and interference in China's domestic affairs.

'At the latest Security Council meeting, however, the proposal of the delegate of the Soviet Union to drive out the representative of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shok clique was again rejected. The Chinese people will not tolerate this. The United Nations Security Council must drive out the representative of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shok clique, which has been repudiated by the Chinese people, and have the representative of the Government of the People's Republic of China speak on behalf of China in the discussions concerning the Soviet proposal. Only thus can the discussions of the Security Council be conducive to the easing of tension in the Taiwan area. This is the firm, just stand of the Chinese people.

12

It is fully in accord with the desires of all peace-loving people and those who sincerely wish the relaxation of Far Eastern tension.

'In line with their consistent stand to work for the relaxation of Far Eastern tension, the Chinese people will support all genuine international efforts to ease and eliminate the tension created by the United States in the Taiwan area and in other areas in the Far East.'

Walter Lippman in the New York Herald Tribune

On February 8, 1955 the New York Herald Tribune published an article by the well-known columnist Walter Lippman. This article gives the position of certain sections of American opinion and does perhaps constitute the index of the contradictions existing between different circles in America. We give here two short extracts from this article as follows:

'On the one hand, there is the decision not to support an attempt by Chiang to return to the mainland. This decision carries with it the unavoidable conclusion that Chiang's government in Formosa is not the government of China, and that it is not entitled to the Chinese seat in the United Nations.

'On the other hand, there is the desire to keep Formosa out of Red Chinese control, and the assumption that the only way to do this is by supporting the Chinese government in Formosa.

'Chou En-Lai's hopes are based on the belief that the Chinese in Formosa can be induced to come over to his side. We are not sure that they cannot be induced to do that. It is not a comfortable situation and that is why everyone who is serious about this business feels that he is standing on very uncertain ground.

'We have staked a lot on the reliability of Chiang's regime. Yet in deciding, as our own vital interests require, against supporting his return to the mainland, we have done what is most likely to sow fatal doubts within his regime. To offset these doubts, to preserve the morale of the Chinese of Formosa, we have felt compelled to become entangled in the Chinese civil war on the offshore islands. So we find ourselves unable to draw a clear line or to take an intelligible position that can command the support of world opinion.'

Comment in the British Press

A leading British weekly, the New Statesman and Nation, in its editorial of February 5, thus defines the responsibility for the situation which has been created in the Far East:

'The British people is convinced - and in our view rightly convinced - that the main responsibility for the Formosa crisis lies in Washington, not in Peking. If the Seventh Fleet becomes involved in hostilities, no one will be able to persuade the average Englishman that the U.S. has not brought this on itself by its blindness and folly in intervening in the Chinese civil war and seeking to reverse the Asian revolution. Maybe Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles now see the folly of the "liberation" policy which they trumpeted so loudly when they first took office. Maybe they regret their decision, two years ago, to reverse Mr. Truman's policy and actively assist Chiang Kai-shek in his subversive operations on the Chinese mainland. It is even possible that the whole of this aggressive American strategy was a piece of irresponsible bluff, undertaken not with any serious hope of restoring Chiang to power but merely in order to appease the China Lobby, and that

(16)

the purpose of the present diplomatic and naval manoeuvres is to provide a smoke-screen under which Chiang's forces can be withdrawn to Formosa and confined there.

As for the British daily press, the Times makes this comment on Mr. Dulles' speech of February 16:

'Certainly Mr. Dulles did nothing to reduce the dangers over Formosa. What is most regrettable is that he should still oppose so strongly any Chinese Nationalist withdrawals from the offshore islands opposite Formosa. As though acknowledging the doubts among America's own allies, he says that the United States does not propose to defend these islands "as such". It is hard to read any practical meaning into the qualification. As such, or not as such, the islands remain islands, the guns remain guns, and the dangers remain dangers. Mr. Dulles is chiefly concerned with the defence of Formosa, and many are with him there. But, even on the score of defence, it is surely better to put a hundred miles of sea between the two sides than leave provocative and exposed outposts on China's doorstep.'

A Pravda Editorial

On February 14, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance, Pravda published an Editorial from which we quote the following:

'Recently, the United States armed forces have increased their military provocations in the area of Taiwan and the other islands which they have criminally seized and which are an integral part of China. In this connection the position of the United Nations Organisation cannot but arouse amazement in that up till now it has not condemned American acts of aggression against China, nor requested the United States to withdraw its armed forces immediately from Taiwan and other Chinese islands which they have seized, nor demanded the restitution to the People's Republic of China of its legitimate rights.

'The endeavours to intimidate the Chinese people by cynical military demonstrations by the American armed forces in the area of the Taiwan Straits are doomed to complete failure. Is it possible to intimidate a people which has won its freedom after many years of bitter armed struggle, and inflicted serious defeats on the imperialists? There is nothing timid about the Chinese people; they are firm in their determination and they are fully aware of their strength. No one will ever succeed in wounding their national interests with impunity...

'The Soviet Union's position on Taiwan is clear and well-known. The Soviet Union considers that the question of Taiwan is an internal Chinese question and that the United States' acts of invasion and their threats of war are acts of aggression. The Soviet government has submitted to the Security Council for its examination the question of United States aggression against the People's Republic of China. Within the last few days it has proposed the holding of a conference of the countries particularly interested in the settlement of the situation created in the Taiwan area.

'The policy of the government of the People's Republic of China, which is defending its sovereignty and its national honour against the aggressor, arouses the sympathy of the Soviet people and of all progressive mankind.'

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