

c.c.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(TRANSVAAL PROVINCIAL DIVISION)

CASE NO: 18/75/254

DATE: 12 Aug. 1976

In the matter of

THE STATE

vs

S. COOPER AND EIGHT OTHERS

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LUBBE RECORDINGS (PRETORIA)

THE COURT RESUMES AT 2,20 P.M. ON THE 12th AUGUST, 1976.

TED ROBERT GURR: still under oath:

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR REES: You were dealing with defensive organisations at one stage in your evidence-in-chief. -- That is correct.

What documents have you got in front of you now? -- I have a copy of my evidence-in-chief, the notes on it; I also have a copy of the transcript of the .. (intervenes)

Oh, yes, that is the thing you wanted to deal with for His Lordship. -- Yes. (10)

Would you deal with that now please? Unless your Lordship would prefer me to leave it over.

BY THE COURT: On this law and order point?

MR REES: Yes.

BY THE COURT: I think you first proceed with your cross-examination.

MR REES: Yes, then we can come to that. Thank you. You were dealing with the defensive groups at one stage. A particular kind of protest group is a defensive group. -- That is correct.

And I think you said the central characteristic (20) of a defensive adaptation is the presence of a few key values, this lends a keen sense of cultural integrity to the group - words to that effect. -- That is the quotation from Professor Segal's article.

Then you say violence, in particular defensive adaptation, never takes the form of revolution by violent means. -- That is also a quotation from Professor Segal.

Which you adopted. People who are organised defensively are less likely than members of weakly organised groups or persons to participate in temporary collectivities to (30) engage in violence. -- Yes, that is correct. That is a correct quotation/...

quotation of Professor Segal's article.

Did you intend to present this to the Court as a proved or a tested theory? -- The category which Professor Segal describes as a defensive group, is one whose existence he is convinced of. I am prepared to accept his claims and his specifications of the characteristics of groups of this sort here, as I think it is a valid, useful general category of organisations.

Let us have a look what he says himself and I am referring to the book, 'Violence in America' that you produced and (10) at page 743, 744 :

"In this paper I explore the essential features of a class of society whose members attempt to establish and preserve a cultural identity in the face of what they perceive to be threats to that identity from the environment."

That is what we are dealing with.

"The paper considers groups under stress, but apart from the general theme of this symposium in that it deals with the strategy of coping with stress that is basically non-violent in nature, but groups are of interest in the present context because they demonstrate that violence is only one among several strategies of social responses to environmental threat.

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Members of all the defensive

societies/...

societies with which I am familiar see their surrounding environment as hostile and the people in it as prepared to engage at any time in destructive or depriving actions against them."

Will it be correct to say that the groups that he has in mind is essentially minorities? -- The groups that he -- the examples that he cites are minorities, that is correct. He does not to my recollection restrict the category to groups which are (10) in minority.

Now, these groups that he deals with, I suggest to you, are groups that can be described as inherently too weak or small to be able to aspire, to taking over the reigns of government themselves. -- Does he make that claim?

No, I am asking you. -- I do not see that that is an inherent characteristic of such groups at all.

"Such groups have been difficult for the disinterested investigator to penetrate as an observer. Willing informants are few in number and are often subject to reprisal and disciplinary action. Individuals in defensive societies who do not readily submit to authority figures, are likely to lose their membership in the group and to be physically rejected." (20)

Is that correct?

"This analysis is mainly paradigmatic in that it is primarily concerned with specifying the structure of defensive adaptation/.. (30)

adaptation, its elements and their relationships. This is an inductive task where its aim is to generate some casual explanations about a variety of questions. What dimension of stress and prior conditions of the group are likely to have a defensive or some other outcome. Will groups that have adopted a defensive strategy in relation to the larger societies (10) have, because of their very nature, less likelihood of responding violently than those that have not. At present no definitive answer can be given to these kinds of questions, but it is possible to provide some informed speculation."

Isn't that the position in which he puts this whole of his propositions here? That it is no more than informed speculation?
--- Informed speculation based on the study of a number of (20) specific groups, correct.

Then he says, I put it to you that the example he gives shows that he is dealing here with clearly small minorities who are too weak to be able to take over a government themselves.
--- The examples he gives are of minorities. How small they are, requires evidence that he does not adduce. The inferences which you draw about the weakness with respect to government, I do not believe he addresses that question at all.

But the point is you have generalised, he did not generalise.
--- I generalised with what respect? I generalised yes, in (30) suggesting that SASO and BPC in so far as I am familiar with/...

with them, fit the characteristics that he describes here.

I put it to you that SASO and BPC do not fit these characteristics at all. --- In what specific respect?

They do not fit in size, they do not fit it in the type of organisation. --- He says nothing about the size, of the defining property of such groups.

Well, let us have a look here. He says - this is at page 744:

"For purposes of exemplification I

have confined myself to certain

(10)

groups in the United States that

appear to exhibit this pattern.

Investigations at Toas and Picuris

Indian pueblos of Eastern New

Mexico first provided insight into

the nature of this phenomena."

Now, this group of Indians, would you describe them as a large lot, or a very small minority in the United States? --- Both groups are small.

Small. Then we have got:

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"Further confirmation was provided

by studies of religious and ethnic

enclaves like Amish, Hutterits and

Mormons and the Black Muslims."

Aren't they all small groups? --- The last two are not. The Mormons happen to be the majority of the population of the State of Utah and the Black Muslims are one of a number of groups in a population that comprises the majority of the population of more than a few American cities.

What percentage of the population of the United States are

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the/...

the Mormons? --- My guess would be in the order of 1%.

1%. And the Black Muslims? --- I do not know. I have no idea of their - I do not know what their numerical strength is. Comparatively small? --- Comparatively small, yes.

"The roster of societies for which the defensive paradigm is relevant includes many other historically unrelated groups. The Jews who lived prior to World War II in compact villages called 'shtetls' in Eastern Europe. Certain villages of Japan and South-Eastern Asia, the Egyptian copts and village communities in the Alpine regions of Europe."

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He clearly is dealing with people who can be described as insignificant minorities. They have got no option but to take defensive action when they are threatened. --- The judgment that they are insignificant, I think, may be subject to dispute. The Black Muslims do not believe themselves to be insignificant. But the more general point is that nowhere does he say that the category is limited to such groups. He says that he chooses these as examples for exemplification. I think it may also be argued that the number of Black university students in South Africa is quite a small set.

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Is your contention that SASO and BPC are confined to a few university students? --- I have insufficient information on that point to form a conclusive judgment.

And what do you say now to this writer, Segal's statement on page 744:

"At present no definitive answers

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can/...

can be given to these kinds of questions but it is possible to provide some informed speculation."

It is obviously not a tested theory. --- No concept can ever be a tested theory. It is a generalisation from observation. It has no theoretical side of itself. The question is whether the characteristics of a defensive group as you identify them, fit the characteristics of other groups.

And do you concede or not concede that the groups that are investigated are for practical purposes small groups who are not strong enough and cannot aspire to be strong enough to take over the reigns of government themselves? --- If they are small, yes. As to the other point, no, I dispute that. 10

Why not? Just answer please? --- In the case of the Mormons they have in fact succeeded in taking over the government of the State of Utah.

How big is the State of Utah? They have not succeeded in taking over the State of the United States, have they? --- That is not the relevant issue. For the people of the State of Utah what is relevant is the state of government. It happens to be a case in which they - would be characterised as a defensive group which has in fact been able to come to political power in their own domain. 20

If they come to political power then they cannot be a defensive group? --- They are no longer, but they were when they were established.

How big were they when they were established? --- A few thousands.

And they were then a minority group? --- And emigrated to the territory of Utah, attracted new adherents and over the course of the years they became sufficiently influential 30

that/...

that they were able to become the dominant political and social group in that State.

I have here an article written on violence "The Contagion of Terrorism; by one Phillip Derby, who is described as the senior lecturer in International Relations, University of Melbourne and the author of "British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947 to 1968" and I would like to put to you some of his comments and you tell the Court whether you agree with this or not. He is dealing with various aspects of violence, etc.

BY THE COURT: Do you know the gentleman? --- No, I know (10)
neither the gentleman nor the article in question.

MR. REES: He says here:

"The most significant feature of the unravelling of violence is one which in part underpins the others as being the waning prospects of guerilla warfare as traditionally conducted. The nub of the matter is that guerilla fortunes have always been closely tied to nationalist appeal. No one understood the point better than Mao (that is obviously a reference to Mao Tse Tung). After years of uphill struggle, attempting to mobilise the peasantry through the exploitation of specific grievances such as the land issue. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria introduced the nationalist factor into the situation and it proved decisive in mobilising the people." (20) (30)

What is your comment on that? Would you like to have a look at it/...

it yourself? -- Since a number of different claims are made there, I think I had better.

Yes, have a look at it. I marked it there small one on the side.

BY THE COURT: Isn't he really stating facts there?

MR REES: No, M'Lord, he is .. -- One question. I have no objections to commenting on it, I would like to know the date of the publication. It is not given here.

It was either 1973 or 1974, I ascertained that, but it is not very long ago. -- It refers here to - (10)

"the waning prospects of guerilla warfare as traditionally conducted."

How
/one could make that claim in view of the success of the Cubans in 1958/59 .. (intervenes)

He deals with them. -- Not in this paragraph. I have of course not had a chance to read the entire thing. Or in view of the success of the Cambodian revolutionaries, the North Vietnames or those in Angola and Mozambique or the one in Portuguese Guinea I do not know. I think the factual assertion is not supported in my judgment. (20)

You say that the guerillas have had great success in the past? -- No, I would not make that as a general claim, but guerilla warfare has always been a very risky enterprise with slim prospects of success. There has been no noticeable fall-off in the incidents of guerilla success in the past 20 years; if anything, in the past 3 years there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of guerilla successes.

Where is the increase? -- I have just cited five instances of success, that would be regarded as guerilla successes in the past few years. (30)

That is Angola? -- Angola, Mozambique.

Mozambique/...

"Either they have been fought to secure political independence as the First Indo-China War or military involvement by external state which enable revolutionaries to mount the charge of political independence as a sham as in the Second Indo-China War."

But now the question I am putting to you actually is:

"Apart from the special case of Cuba in the post-war period all successful guerilla wars have been nationalist wars." (10)

-- No, that is not correct.

What would you say? -- I can cite several examples that contradict his assertion.

Yes, cite them please. -- In 1960 the people of the Southern Sudan fought what was eventually a successful guerilla rebellion against the Khartoum government which came to a conclusion 3 years ago I believe when the Khartoum government made concessions which granted a measure of autonomy to (2) the Southern Provinces.

Didn't they fight it on a nationalist basis . . . -- No, sir.

Didn't it have a nationalist appeal? -- No, they did not.

What were they? What group was it then? -- They called themselves the Anyanya, the Cockroaches.

And? -- It is an unlikely basis for appeal.

What was their appeal? -- That they wanted a greater measure of autonomy from the people, from the government of the north.

What unifying philosophy did they have? -- Common identity. (30)

Due/...

Due to what? Oppression by the north? -- And their cultural distinctiveness.

So they had a cultural distinctiveness and a common sense of oppression by the Sudanese government. -- By the Khartoum government, yes. That is by no means the only example, but you may not want me to continue.

If you feel you must enlighten the Court further, please do so. -- Well, since I do not .. (intervenes)

BY THE COURT: What is the position with the Palestinian terrorists? They want territory, don't they? -- Of course (10) nationalism is a very strong - the binding force of that movement, but since I do not understand the relevance of the passage to my testimony, I see no point in adding additional examples with reference to the accuracy or I think inaccuracy of a general version.

MR REES: He also says:

"The troubles of ethnic minorities and groups which see new colonialism as the source of poverty and injustice in the Third World form part of what has been described as the rise of civil violence. By the late 60's it was no longer possible to such struggle in the old historical mould or confine them within geo-political boundaries. The new and broader phenomenon included general strikes, mass demonstrations, urban guerilla war, political kidnapping and the taking of hostages, aerial highjacking and a variety of forms of terrorism such as civilian bombing and the/...

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(30)

the killing of national representatives. It is set in the cities rather than in the countryside. It spans not only most of the third world, but extends to Europe and North America, long regarded as the models of peaceful change. The strategy of the strike and demonstration represents a distinctive form of revolutionary action which might be labelled mass mobilisation of a kind which defies governmental counter force. In theory such action involves a minimum of violence. The existing popular feeling is brought to bear against the government through organisations and consultation. In some respects it is akin to the mass strikes which, in the first decade of the century, Marxist and Socialists like Rosa Luxemborg, George Sorel and Jack London for as a prelude to and major instrument of revolution. In its modern manifestation however, it involves a wider stratum of the community and has a much broader orientation than the purely economic. The efficacy of mass mobilisation has been demonstrated over the past year in the very different circumstances of Thailand and Ethiopia. In Thailand mass demonstrations led by students and accompanied by rioting and attempted occupation, brought down the military

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(11)

(12)

government...

government on issues primarily relating to foreign policy and American penetration. In Ethiopia the Army mutiny sparked off wide-spread unrest and the first general strike in the country's history and resulted in major political changes, including a new government and a new constitution. Limits of this type of mass action remains to be charted, but potentially at least it is revolutionary and could come to challenge and perhaps displace them with the more violent strategies so far preferred by third world activists."

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I marked that passage (2) and it is the whole of the righthand passage. Would you like to look at it and give the Court your comments whether you accept what the writer says or not? --- The crux of his argument as I understand it, is that the use of a general strike and mass demonstrations are a distinctive form of revolutionary action and that is the central claim that I derive from your reading of it and I am sure if I read it I would come to the same conclusion as to his claim. I think that is nonsense.

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You say that is nonsense? --- Yes, the general strike and the mass demonstrations have been regular features of the political process in the majority of the countries of the world throughout the 20th century, and they have their origin in 19th century Europe. To say that they are a distinctive form of revolutionary action, or that these are revolutionary - inherently revolutionary - no, I think that is simply not supported by the historical evidence.

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But/...

But we have got this - we have had mass strikes here and we have had mass demonstrations that have led to violence in this country. There are these mass demonstrations going on now. How can you say it is nonsense the man is talking? -- His claim is that these activities are inherently revolutionary. Is it your assessment that the activities of this sort that are now under way in South Africa are revolutionary? Are we in the midst of a revolution?

LAUGHTER

You tell the Court. -- No, I do not think that is (10)
the case.

Are they violent? -- They are violent, of course they are violent. Those demonstrations which have - all these demonstrations involve the use of violence by the demonstrators, of course they are violent.

And a revolution involves violence, doesn't it? -- Yes, it does.

It is no good laughing and I think that .. -- Yes, revolutions do indeed involve violence.

Right. And they involve mass violence. -- Yes, on (20)
a very large scale.

And they are preceded by a preparation of the minds of the public to support them, isn't it? -- I have not made that claim.

I am asking you. -- No, not necessarily.

Not necessarily. How can you have a successful revolution if you haven't got the support of a large number of people? -- You can have the support of a large number of people without having made revolutionary appeal.

How would you get it? -- There are a number of (30)
historical circumstances in which revolutions have in effect
happened/...

happened without the existence of revolutionary organisations, without the existence of revolutionary appeal. It was certainly the case with the French Revolution of 1789 which involved a riot, a demonstration by Parisians over the shortage of food at the Bastille. They were fired upon, it turned into an attack on the Bastille, the government fell as a consequence. We have spoken ever since of the French Revolution.

And you say that is not a revolution? --- It was a revolution.

Well, there you have the mass demonstration, you have the (10) violent reaction and you have the revolution resulting. --- But that does not seem to be the question. Could you perhaps re-state your original question?

Well, what were you dealing with then?

LAUGHTER

The original question was..... --- The original question is whether, as this gentleman claims, the general strike and a mass demonstration are inherently revolutionary.

Yes? --- And that it is not so.....(intervention)

Did he say inherently? (The Court intervenes) (20)

BY THE COURT: He says distinctive. Didn't he use the word..... --- Distinctive, that is the word. They are a distinctive form of revolutionary action.

MR. REES: So, it is not inherently, so will you please deal with the matter as he spoke here? --- In iether formulation I do not agree with the statement.

Well, I want to know why not? --- Because the vast majority of general strikes and mass demonstrations with which I am familiar and those which I am familiar with - dealt with number oh, certainly over a thousand, probably in the order (30) of 2,000. Virtually none of them, virtually none -

I/...

I can cite half a dozen exceptions - involved or were part of or led to the revolutionary overthrow of a government.

But the big one you have just quoted, the French Revolution, is the basis of the whole lot of them, wasn't it?

--- In what sense? The basis? The model?

The model. --- It was a model which was much used by the French after 1789. Whether it was used as a model elsewhere(intervention)

BY THE COURT: You must look at the objective of the demonstration. If it was the destruction of the existing political, (10) economical or social system, well, then that is a revolutionary act. --- Yes.

Now, isn't it the same as the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia? Didn't they also then turn out in the streets and the object was to get rid of the Tzar? --- Yes, and the.....(inaudible - background noise).....

The point of distinction is there is the objective of the demonstration. --- Exactly. But to say that the general strike and a mass demonstration are a distinctive form of revolutionary action, is correct for those general strikes and mass demon- (20) strations which can be shown to have had revolutionary purposes on.....(intervention)

The objective was there. --- Yes, and if he is limiting his claim to that then I have no objection to it, but as stated he implies and perhaps I misread him, as stated he implies that the mere presence, occurrence of general strikes and mass demonstrations constitute revolutionary action and that is the inference that I.....(intervention)

Well, he seems to deal with it irrespective of objectives.

MR. REES: I think you are misreading him. Would you just (30) have a look at it? --- Let me have a look at it? - PAUSE -

May/...

May I comment?

Yes, please. That is why I gave it to you. --- Here is what I take as the first key statement:

"The new and broader phenomenon includes the general strikes, the mass demonstration, urban guerilla war, political kidnapping..."

and it goes on to list other forms of terrorism. My point is that the first two of those phenomena, the general strike and the mass demonstration, have been historically very common (10) and only in a relatively small number of instances have they involved explicit revolutionary intention. Now, urban guerilla was is quite another matter. That is a new phenomenon, that is something new on the.....(intervention)

Entirely new? --- There are no analogies that are prior to - that I know of, prior to the mid 1960's. The use of political kidnapping, well, one can find historical examples but as a specific revolutionary objective political kidnapping also is a phenomenon that first appears in the 1960's. So, I agree with this part of his argument, but he lumps this (20) together indistinguishably with these two other forms of activity which are not usually revolutionary and are not in any sense historically new.

But they can be applied as a new method because you have always had the strike and you have always had the mass demonstration. It is a matter, a thing that has proved efficacious in reaching objectives in the past and it can be applied more intensively when directed by revolutionaries. --- Now we have common ground. They can be used by revolutionaries for revolutionary objectives. (30)

Thank you very much. I think that is the crux of the matter.

Empirically/...

--- Empirically they have not been very often so used.

We have had quite a lot of references to two of your fellow Americans I think, a Malcolm X and a Stokey Carmichael. Have you ever heard of these two persons? --- Yes, I have.

And what would you say is the political method advocated by these two gentlemen? --- Someone who has never read anything Stokey Carmichael wrote and gave up after two chapters of Malcolm X's biography, I really am not in a position to answer that question.

I find that most amazing because every one of the defence (10) witnesses I have asked, disclaims any knowledge of them.

--- Disclaims any knowledge of them?

Well, the same as you do, for practical purposes. As an American politician who is interested in violence, how is it that you do not know anything of the philosophies or the preachings of these two? --- I know something of them. I know something of the philosophies and tactics of the organisations with which they were involved.

What were their philosophies and tactics? --- In the case of Malcolm X, he was a member of the Black Moslems. (20)

What did they advocate? --- They advocated non-involvement with White society.

Yes? --- They established their own set of churches, mosques, educational institutions, self-help projects and generally kept Prof. Segal's definition of a defensive group, in fact they are one of the examples he used as a defensive group.

Were they ever involved in violence? --- Not to my knowledge. Certainly not during the past 20 years.

Was violence ever used against them or did they ever claim that violence was used against them? --- That was one of (30)

the/...

the basic arguments in the establishment of the movement by Elijah Mohammed. He claimed that all Whites were devils, that they had deprived the Black man of his rights, of his time and that the only way to - for the Black man to recover his sense of identity was to turn his back on White society and to organise what became the Black Moslem movement.

When were they first organised? --- I believe 1919.

And is that Malcolm X you have dealt with, or Stokey Carmichael? --- That is Malcolm X. Of course Malcolm X was a much later - he was not a founder of the movement, he was one (10) of its most articulate spokesmen in the 1960's. He, in fact, argued against the continuation of the policy of no involvement with Whites. He argued that the movement should move towards accommodation with White society.

And what happened to him? --- He was assassinated by another member of the group. It was never proven that the assassin was another member of the group, it was supposed that the assassin was a Black Moslem who disagreed.

And Stokey Carmichael? --- Stokey Carmichael was a Black student leader in the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee.(20) I do not know precisely what position he held in that organisation. The organisation was established in the early 1960's to co-ordinate civil rights activities in the South.

These civil rights activities led to lots of violence in America, didn't they? --- They certainly did not.

They did not? --- I beg to differ with you on that.

Didn't they have a lot of violence in America in consequence of this civil rights movement? --- No, we had a great deal of peaceful change in consequence of the civil rights movement. (30)

Weren't/...

Weren't they accompanied by any violence at all? -- The civil rights demonstrators in the South and in some northern cities were occasionally attacked by Whites, but the civil rights movement itself did not initiate violence under any circumstances.

I did not ask you whether they initiated violence. I asked you whether they were involved in violence. -- They were the targets of violence in some circumstances.

They were the targets of violence. You say they never initiated violence? -- Absolutely not. (10)

How do you know that? -- You will find in the book 'Violence in America' a considerable amount of evidence on the civil rights movement. In the process of studying that movement I collected data, I had the research assistant collect data on all of the activities reported in the national press organised by civil rights marches and organised these, and one of the things that I was especially concerned with, in addition to the numbers of people involved, was whether there had been any violence associated with these marches and activities and if and where so, how extensive the (20) violence was. I do not recall finding any single instance in which the civil rights marches initiated violence although it must be said that some of their activities were illegal and they sometimes took disruptive action which the courts judged to be illegal, but they did not themselves initiate violence.

What do you call disruptive action? -- Sit-ins. Occupying White only seats in buses, that was at an earlier stage; occupying restaurants, asking to be served at restaurants which served only Whites and then refusing to leave when (30) asked to leave by the proprietor. In some cases marching down streets/...

streets in such a fashion that traffic was obstructed.

So you say that is not initiating violence? -- No, I do not regard those acts as violence.

If you provoked another man and you stop the traffic from flowing, do you think that is not initiating violence? -- It is not an act of violence.

It is calculated to lead to violence, isn't it? -- No.

Not. But it did in fact lead to violence. -- In some few instances it led to counter-attacks by whites.

At least there you say counter-attack. What happened (10) to Stokey Carmichael? Didn't he flee from the United States? -- I am not familiar with his later history.

BY THE COURT: What was the difference between Stokey Carmichael's activities and those of Martin Luther King? -- Dr King was dedicated to the principles of non-violence and I think that in all of his public pronouncements emphasised a concern for peaceful change brought about by lawful means. Stokey Carmichael at the beginning of his career, a bit later, became impatient with peaceful change and advocated more militant techniques and tactics. Having done so, he was (20) not only subject to - and my memory on this is quite vague - I believe he was charged with various kinds of incitement. I do not remember the trial specifically. And he lost much credibility in the eyes of the Black community. That is an interpretation, not something that I can cite substantiating evidence for, but there was very little mourning in the Black community on his passing from the scene.

MR REES: Did I understand your evidence correctly now that it is your contention that the violence that occurred in connection with this civil rights demonstrations, etc., was caused (2) by the Whites in America? -- May I also repeat that on only about/...

about.....(intervention)

Did you say yes? --- Insofar as there was violence connected with the civil rights movement, with the civil rights marches, it was due to attacks on them either by Police or by private White citizens.

You wanted to say something else? --- The other point I wanted to make is that the vast majority of civil rights demonstrations were peaceful in all respects, but the number - the proportion in which violence occurred is very small; probably no more than one-twentieth. (10)

How many of these marches did you personally attend?

--- None.

Did you act as adviser to anybody there? --- No.

I would like to refer you to a book called "Modern Guerilla Warfare" by Franklin - at least the editor is Franklin Mark Osanka, and he deals with an article by Colonel Virgil Ney, United States Army (retired). The heading is "Guerilla Warfare and Modern Strategy." At page 32 of the book he says this:

"While the modern guerilla depends increasingly upon the international community for military aid and diplomatic support, he must rely almost exclusively on the local community for all the immediate necessities of war, food, clothing, shelter, funds, cover and intelligence. Lawrence of Arabia pointed out decades ago that community support need not be an actively friendly one." (20)

Now, before I proceed, do you know who Lawrence of Arabia is? (30)

I/...

--- I do indeed.

Could you tell the Court briefly who, or what he was?

--- He was the leader of an insurgent group in Arab Palestine during World War II - I am sorry, during World War I.

World War I. And he succeeded in making it extremely difficult for the Turks, is that so? --- Yes, indeed.

And to continue the quote in which he says:

"Lawrence of Arabia pointed out decades ago that community support need not be an actively friendly one. It, the rebel movement, must have a friendly population. Not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2% active in a striking force and 98% passively sympathetic."

(10)

Do you go along with that? --- Is the 2% - 98% a quote from Lawrence, or is that General Ney?

That appears to me to be Lawrence, but will you satisfy yourself please? --- The communist guerilla theoreticians?

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No, first deal with that? --- No, I want to say that the communist theoreticians would not agree with this. I have not yet formulated my own judgment on the matter. Mao argues that the guerilla must swim in the sea of the people and the Chinese argument is that there must be positive support by more than 2%. The Latin American guerilla argument also is that a greater measure of popular support is needed than Lawrence would suggest. What do I think? It depends on the scope of the guerilla's operation. If the guerilla has to operate over a wide area, then he would need something more than 2% active in the way of support. It also depends on the government's

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counter/...

counter-reaction. If governments are capable of a very swift and strong counter-action, then a greater measure of support is needed for the guerilla to sustain himself. In other words, there are circumstances where I think Lawrence of Arabia is correct, but I do not think he is absolutely correct. It is not in all circumstances.

The basic point is that for the guerilla to be successful he must have support of the population? --- Yes.

BY THE COURT: But doesn't that depend on the circumstances? I think if you go to Burma where you have jungle, then the (10) guerilla could disappear into the jungle. If you have flat country like South West Africa, the guerilla cannot disappear into the jungle, then he must have a sympathetic community which can absorb him and prevent him from detection. It really depends on circumstances. --- It depends on the terrain in particular. If the guerilla is operating from uninhabited terrain then he can survive without having populace support, except then the question arises where he gets food, medical supplies, shelter and those can be brought in from the outside, but generally some safe rural base or some safe rural population (20) is needed by effective guerilla movement, even in the most hostile terrain. I may even say especially in the most hostile terrain because then the need for food and the difficulties of getting it are greater.

But his greatest enemy is the trail, isn't it? --- Yes, that is one of the things that guerillas fear most and have to be most on the guard against, the possibility of the trail from those whom they rely upon.

MR. REES: So, that it would be politics for him, for the group to build up - take action to build up a support among sections (30) of the population. --- Yes.

By/...

BY THE COURT: Isn't the phenomenon now that the guerillas treat the indigenous people very harshly to terrify them so that they do not betray, and that is the reason why I think in Africa you find that they kill so many of the indigenous people? --- Yes, that is a distinctive feature of a number of African guerilla movements. I might say that in the Chinese Manual for Guerilla Warfare and also in the Latin American Manuals of the same sort, that tactic is explicitly rejected and the argument is made that one must treat the local population with the greatest consideration and justice. But the point is merely that there are different attitudes and different models and different theories of guerilla warfare as to how one should treat the host population. (10)

MR. REES: I would like you to refer again to your book "Why Men Rebel." At page 353 you have set out a strategy for revolutionaries. Have you got it? --- Yes.

We will deal with that, the strategy of revolutionaries, you say:

"The revolutionary motive assumed here is the violent destruction of the old order." (20)

Would you read that passage and deal with each particular proposition that you have got? --- I would like to preface this by explaining to His Lordship that this is in the conclusion of the book and what I do is illustrate the processes of political violence by proposing three alternative strategies. One, a strategy for incumbents, that is to say the strategy most likely to maintain order. A strategy for revolutionaries which I will address in a moment and a strategy for the discontented, that is for people who have grievances, but who are not revolutionaries. (30)

Would/...

Would you deal specifically with the strategy for revolutionaries? -- Since we are dealing here with nearly three pages of text, do you want me to read the entire?

Well, do it step by step. -- Witness reads:

"The 'revolutionary' motive assumed here is the violent destruction of the old order, a motive that is almost always rooted in an irreconcilable hatred of the old that is best satisfied by violence."

(10)

That is an assumption for the purpose of dealing with the following argument.

"There may be good utilitarian reasons for such a motive as well:"

I suggest what some of those are.

"The tactics outlined here for revolutionaries are those most likely to ensure that destruction."

You say:

"There may be good utilitarian reasons for such a motive as well:"

(20)

-- Yes.

I would like you to put:

"some ruling elites are adamantly opposed to change,"

That is what you say. -- I am quite prepared to read it all.

That is what I wanted you to do. -- Fine.

"There may be good utilitarian reasons for such a motive as well: some ruling elites are adamantly opposed to change, responding with unmitigated repression

(30)

to/...

to expressions of popular discontent."

Is that correct? That is your basic assumption? -- For the purpose of constructing this argument.

Yes. -- Witness reads:

"In such circumstances dissidents are likely to have only two options: acquiescence or revolution. The regime that responds to their demands only with suppression will intensify their hostility, and is thus likely to speed its own destruction. The tactics outlined here for revolutionaries are those most likely to ensure that destruction. (10)

If discontent is intense and widespread in a society, revolutionary tasks are simplified; if not, there are means by which it can be increased. Ideological appeals offer the best means, to the extent that their content is designed to justify new aspirations and specify means toward their attainment." (20)

Would you just pause there and explain that passage please? -- Right. To intensify discontent the - you may recall this morning's discussion of the principle that the ideological appeals which are most effective are those which specify opportunities, specify how one can get them here to the Utopia laid out in the ideology. What I am saying here is simply a more literate expression of that principle. Any relatively .. (intervenes) (30)

But now - yes, go on. -- I was going to go on with the ... (intervenes) /...

(intervention)

Oh, no, no, I want you to deal with this. You say:

"If discontent is intense and widespread in a society, revolutionary tasks are simplified."

--- Yes.

"...if not (you say) there are means by which it can be increased."

--- Yes, and here I cite the advocacy of certain kinds of ideological appeals.

Well, just tell us what are the certain kinds of ideological appeals? --- Those which describe a new Utopia and specify the means by which it is to be obtained. (10)

Are those the only ones you have in mind? --- Yes, that is what I said here and previously.

Yes, carry on please? --- Sorry, I temporarily lost my place.

Well, start again with "...ideological appeals offer the best means..." --- The sentence after that:

"Any relatively disadvantaged group is a potential audience for such appeals. The existence of objective deprivation is far from being a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of appeals, however. The groups most likely to respond are those that already have been exposed to change and are already discontented with some aspects of their lives. One of the best indicators of a potential for conversion to revolutionary expectations (20) (30)

is/...

is group experience of absolute decline in value position; such a decline indicates more certainly the existence of discontent than a neo-Marxian judgment that group members ought to be discontented because they have less than others."

The point here is that people who are on the bottom in the distribution of goods in a system are not necessarily the most discontented members of that system nor are they the (10) ones who are necessarily most susceptible to revolutionary appeal. Those who have personally, as I say here, experienced some absolute decline in their well-being are the ones who are most susceptible.

"Relatively disadvantaged people who have recently begun..."

.. (intervenes)

Bear with me a moment. May I hand to Your Lordship, if the Defence has no objection, the book itself, then Your Lordship can follow what is happening. There are one or (20) two little passages underlined. Just to refresh His Lordship, we are on page 353, is it? -- Yes.

Would you carry on please? -- Beginning with the very last word on that page 'relatively'.

"Relatively disadvantaged people who have recently begun to interact with more prosperous groups, or who have been regularly in contact with such groups and regularly subordinated, also are susceptible to conversion. The (30) closer their association with more advantaged/...

advantaged groups, and the less their objective (and subjective) opportunities for improving their own status, the more easily they can be persuaded, of the justifiability of aspirations for a better life and the necessity for revolutionary action to attain it.

Subordinated urban classes, new migrants to cities, and people on the margins of expanding modern economies make better potential recruits for revolutionary movements than rural peoples still caught in the unchanging web of traditional life."

(10)

There is nothing you want to comment on that? --- No.

Good, next piece. --- (WITNESS READS)

"The most effective revolutionary appeals offer means and justifications that are compatible with the discontents and cultural experience of their potential audience. They facilitate revolutionary violence insofar as they convince their listeners that the ruling elite is responsible for discontent, unwilling and unable to alleviate it, and committed to policies that victimize the oppressed."

(20)

Do you stand by all those propositions you have put there?

--- With the general contention that when this was written, the model on which it was based had not been tested.

Have you any reason to - are you now disclaiming that?

Is this what you say? --- No, I am simply saying that

(30)

this/...

this does not have the status of theory, this has the status of opinion derived on tested theory.

Was this your - did you intend this seriously when you wrote it? --- I intended it - well, as one of the readers of the manuscript said, it was obviously written with tongue in cheek. I will not say that I wrote it with tongue in cheek but I did say - what I am saying here in effect is if all of the preceding argument is correct and one wanted to achieve any of these three purposes, then this is what one would do.

Yes, carry on please? --- Now, at the middle of page 354: (10)

"The symbolic and manifest demonstration that revolutionary violence can be carried out and can be successful reinforces appeals' effectiveness. The revolutionary cause is enhanced if the regime can be induced to take repressive action that confirms such ideological assertions. The fact of violent revolutionary agitation often impels such action. Media may be censored, civil liberties restricted, dissident leaders jailed and their organisations suppressed, public benefits diverted from dissident followers. The short-range effect of such policies may be to minimize the dissident capacity for action; the more enduring effect is to confirm the accuracy of revolutionary appeals, thus justifying more intense opposition in the future."

(20)

(30)

Those/...

Those were your conclusions or your recommendations. -- My statement of the policy implications of the theory.

For revolutionaries. -- For revolutionaries.

In other words, that is the principle they should follow or the factors they should take into consideration if they want to be successful in revolution. -- If the theory is correct.

Have you got any doubts about your theory now? -- I would modify this in some detail, some of its details, but I do not think it is my place, I do not want to be in the position of recommending revolution, of prescribing detailed strategies for revolution. (10)

How would you modify this? -- That is something I would have to spend quite a bit of time thinking through.

You haven't thought of how you would modify it? -- No, I haven't thought in fact of this particular passage in the book for quite some years.

Carry on please. -- The last paragraph on page 354:

"Unless a regime is very weak, it is incumbent on revolutionaries to organize for group defense and eventual assault. Organization should be flexible enough to adapt to and survive regime repression, broad enough in scope so that it can mobilize large numbers of people for action or at least make it difficult for them to support the regime." (20)

Could you explain the meaning of that passage please? --

Witness reads:

"Organization should be flexible enough to adapt to and survive regime repression.." (30)

Yes, ordinarily that would mean that the organisation should

be/...

be clandestine, that is secret; that is one of the best ways to maintain - to survive in the face of oppression.

There is another way, you do not say - you say they must be flexible enough. You do not say they must clandestine, you say they must be flexible enough. Explain that to me. -- They must be able to adapt to whatever tactics are directed against them.

If the leader is chopped off, somebody else must step into his place? -- I was thinking of flexibility more in terms of, yes, that would be included. In terms of being (10) able to survive from various kinds of retaliatory action against them.

In other words you must definitely have a system of replacement. That is the basis of the whole thing, isn't it? -- One basis but certainly not the only one.

What else? Isn't that the fundamental to your survival? If they catch the leaders you must have other leaders to step into their place. -- Yes, of course, I cannot take exception to that. I agree.

Then you said they should be - (20)

"broad enough in scope so that it can mobilize large numbers of people for action or at least make it difficult for them to support the regime."

Would you explain that please? -- I fail to see what it is that needs explaining. I should think it is clear as stated.

All right. Carry on then please. -- Witness reads:

"Organizational resources should be devoted primarily to coercive means and to agitational activities rather (30) than the satisfaction of the material deprivations/...

deprivation of leaders and their followers. Dissident organisations otherwise tend to become ends in themselves, providing intrinsic satisfactions that blunt the revolutionary impulse."

This is a particular application of the general principle I was discussing before the lunch interval.

"Participation in revolutionary organisation should provide sufficient interpersonal values - especially the sense of comradeship and shared purposes - to ensure the enduring commitment of followers but require enough sacrifices in the service of its long-range purposes to justify and intensify continued opposition to the regime. It must also provide, of course, some minimum of security for its followers; they must feel that they have a fair chance of survival as well as of success. The coercive capacities of revolutionaries can be enhanced by subversion or demoralisation of regime forces, (the general principle was discussed earlier) solicitation of external support, and establishment of isolated base areas among sympathizers - to the extent that such tactics are feasible."

What do you mean by the "solicitation of external support?" --- Obtaining foreign military assistance and aid.

That/...

That would include economic aid? --- Money for the sake of supporting the organisation in part, yes, that is one form such aid can take.

"The trump-card of revolutionaries is violence itself."

--- Right.

"Even if their coercive capacities are low relative to the regime, selective terrorism can be used to demonstrate the incapacity of the regime to defend its citizens. Such terrorism is dysfunctional to the revolutionary cause if it affects neutral or innocent people; it is more effective if directed against those who are widely disliked."

(10)

The point that was discussed just a few moments ago.

"Violence is most effective if it invites severe but inconsistent retaliatory responses by the regime, which have the effect of alienating those who might otherwise support the elite. Open revolutionary warfare is the final tactic of revolutionaries, but is difficult to organise in the modern state, extraordinarily costly and uncertain of success. It is a last resort against strong regimes, an unnecessary one against weak ones, a first resort only when regimes are already weakening and revolutionary capabilities high."

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(30)

I/...

I might add as a kind of editorial judgment that anyone with revolution in mind who read that, I suspect would probably be discouraged from ever making the attempt because obviously the steps involved are extremely numerous, demanding and very uncertain of success.

Now, you have also dealt with the strategy for the discontented? --- Yes.

Would you deal with that please? --- To the extent that my voice will hold out, yes.

"Most discontented men are not revolutionaries. They may be angry, but most of them probably prefer peaceful means for the attainment of their goals to the privations and risks of revolutionary action. Assuming that their primary motive is to increase their well-being rather than to satisfy anger through violence, their optimum strategy lies intermediate between those of elites who would maintain order and of revolutionaries who would destroy that order to establish a new one. The discontented are not likely to be concerned with minimizing or equalising rates of group progress, tactics that regimes might choose to use, or with intensifying discontent. Their objective is to improve their own lot as much as possible. To do so they must seek new means and resources. Political violence is not thereby excluded from their repertory of tactics towards that

(10)

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end/...

end; given their circumstances, some violence may be necessary. But one of their primary tactical concerns, whether or not they resort to violence, is to minimize retaliatory action in response to their actions."

Yes, dealing with this portion, you say :
"Political violence is not thereby excluded from their repertory of tactics..."

(10)

-- Yes.

Exactly what does that mean? -- Some of the groups that I have characterised as reform groups, do sometimes engage in or put themselves in situations where political violence is likely to occur, that can serve the fact of drawing attention to their demands, to their existence.

A sort of where you have the threat of violence or the occurrence of violence to draw attention to their grievances pertinently and it induces a reaction from the other side. Is that the crux of the matter? -- Yes, it may be that they hope that the occurrence of violence will be taken as evidence of the seriousness of the problem and will increase the likelihood that the government will deal positively. But there are a number of rationalisations for the occurrence of political violence in reform movements.

(20)

Yes, thank you. Would you just carry on please? -- Witness reads:

"Given the existence of a potential for collective violence, the optimum policy of the discontented is not to increase the potential for political violence/..."

(30)

violence as such but to put the potential to constructive purposes. The symbolic appeals of dissident leaders should be of two kinds, one set designed to mobilize potential followers, another to justify their claims to the regime and the social groups from which they are most likely to gain concessions. Limited political violence in such a context has several uses. It can dramatize claims, provide an outlet for the hostility of followers and thereby enhance institutional support for dissident organizations, and may signal to the regime the threat of more disruptive violence if claims are not met."

(10)

Yes, I think that is what we dealt with just now. -- Yes.

"But it is a risky tactic, more risky in some political systems than others.

Violence tends to stimulate counter-violence, a principle that applies to both dissidents and their opponents. The threat of violence has the same effect. A regime to challenged may consequently devote more resources to coercive control than to remedial action. The obligation on dissident leaders is therefore to be as careful and judicious in the use of violence as elites must be in their use of counter-force. Perhaps the best tactic of leaders of dissident

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(30)

groups/...

groups, if violence occurs at all, is to represent it as the excesses of their followers, whom they are capable of controlling if provided with concessions."

That is obviously a Machiavellian tactic but it is one that has been used.

"The extent to which leaders can in fact control the actions of their followers, and make effective use of whatever means and resources they obtain, is determined by their degree of institutional support. Whereas the first task of revolutionaries is to intensify discontent and focus it on the political system, the most essential task of pragmatic dissidents thus is to organize: to expand the scope of their organizations, elaborate their internal structure, develop the sense and fact of common purpose, and maximize the use of their collective resources, not for violent action but for value-enhancing action. The establishment of such organizations can provide many intrinsic satisfactions for members: a sense of control over their own affairs, a feeling of community and purpose, status for leaders and security for followers. Such organizations are much more likely than unorganized collectivities to take effective/...

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(30)

effective political action, to get whatever can be gotten through conventional political bargaining processes. If token violence is to be used in a calculated risk to increase bargaining power, it can be most effectively used if institutional support is high. Most important, whatever value opportunities and resources are obtained, through bargaining or otherwise, are most efficiently used to satisfy discontents in a well-developed organizational context."

(10)

Do you stand by what you have read so far? -- In all essential respects, yes.

I will assist your voice by reading the last paragraph. -- Oh, let me read it please, I like the last sentence.

LAUGHTER

Good, carry on. -- Witness reads:

(20)

"If dissident organizations are effective in devising means and obtaining resources for remedial action, they will seldom remain long in opposition. They are likely to become firmly fixed in the existing political order, their leaders incorporated in its ruling elite. But if regimes are adamantly hostile and repressive in the face of the claims of dissident organizations,

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as/...

as they are in too many nations,
those organizational capacities
can be turned to revolutionary ends.
If revolution is accomplished, the
result is ultimately the same:
dissident leaders become the elite of
the new order they have established,
their organizations the backbone of
that order, and their followers, those
who survive, the new loyalists. The (10)
dissidents can best judge if the costs
of such a course are worth the gains;
their are the lives at stake."

I think you can take that - I intended that last passage as
reflection of my own distaste for and desire to discourage the
use of violence in such situations.

Is there anything else you would like to add or qualify
in connection with these passages that you have dealt with?
That is the strategy for the revolutionaries and the strategy
for discontented. -- I should not like any reader to (20)
think that these in fact are viable strategies for accomplishing
these objectives. In other words, I would repeat the qualifi-
cation I introduced at the beginning.

What is that qualification? -- I said assuming the
accuracy of the - all the theoretical propositions that precede
that .. (intervenes)

You do not know whether it will work in fact. -- Exactly.

This is what you believe is the tactics that .. -- These
are the tactics that are implied by the theoretical argument.
BY THE COURT: Don't you give it in the first ten lines (30)
of your conclusion? Page 357. -- Yes. In the conclusion I

make/...

make no further reference to those three strategies and these strategies are a kind of afterthought. They do not contribute to the theoretical argument, they simply show what certain implications of the argument are and the conclusion deals not with those strategies but with the theory in general.

MR REES: Here you say on the bottom of page 357:

"Men and women of every social background, acting in the context of every kind of social group on an infinite variety of motives, have resorted to violence against their rulers. Nor is political violence "caused" by pernicious doctrines, or at least by doctrines alone. Discontented men are much more susceptible to conversion to new beliefs than contented men. Not all new beliefs provide justifications for violence, .."

-- .. (intervenes) I am glad you quoted that portion.

"and most that do are derived from people's own cultural and historical experience rather than alien sources. The belief that some kinds of social arrangements or political institutions are intrinsically immune from violence or capable of satisfying all human desires is only a partial truth. Disruptive violence can and has occurred in every twentieth-century political community. No pattern of coercive control, however intense and consistent, is/...

is likely to deter permanently all enraged men from violence, except genocide. No extant or utopian pattern of social and political engineering seems capable of satisfying all human aspirations and resolving all human discontents, short of biological modification of the species."

Is that correct? -- Yes, it is. I wish my students were (10)
as careful and assiduous in their study of my writings as you
have been.

Then there is another piece:

"Political violence is not uniformly and irretrievably destructive of human well-being. Many groups have resorted to political violence at one stage or another in their historical development with positive long-range results: the resolution of divisive conflicts, de- (20)
fense of threatened interests, and attainment of means by which their members could work effectively and peacefully toward their own security and well-being. There is even less support for the revolutionary view that violence has a special efficacy unmatched by other means, or for the precisely comparable contention of conservative authoritarians that (30)
massive force is the best means for

maintaining/...

maintaining order. Violence inspires counter-violence by those against whom it is directed. It consumes scarce resources that could otherwise be used to satisfy aspirations. Worst of all it consumes men, its victims physically, its practitioners mentally, by habituating them to violence as the means and end of life. The more intense and widespread the use of force the less likely are those who use it, rebels or regimes, to achieve their objectives except through total victory. In view of the resources available to modern governments and modern revolutionary movements, total victory is highly likely to be pyrrhic victory."

(10)

Now, I think we both agree with that. -- Yes.

THE COURT ADJOURNS.

(20)

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