

It should be obvious from our Declaration that we have always seen ourselves as an anti-apartheid organisation, even though the issue on which we focused mainly affected young white males, and inevitably resulted in most of our members being white. We are not unique in that respect, and the Black Sash springs to mind as another organisation which, in our strange, racially polarised society, attempted with a largely white membership to embrace the principles of non-racialism.

It is very tempting on an occasion like this to reminisce, and to review our successes and failures over the years. I am going to resist the temptation, partly because we have more exciting speakers here, and partly because there is a session tomorrow morning during which ECC's history will be reviewed, and there is a sort of variety show on Sunday night when a number of the performers who have supported ECC in the past will be appearing.

This is also the last occasion when thank-yous would be in order, to all of the organisations and individuals who have supported us over the years. These include our members, many of whom paid a high price for their involvement in the ECC. A word of thanks is due to our funders, without whom we could have not continued our work. Thanks are also due to the journalists, newspapers and radio stations who took a gamble and reported our point of view when it was unfashionable and even unsafe to do so. Our lawyers have always backed us up beyond the call of duty, and have taken on our cases even when they looked like losers.

Then there are all the individuals and organisations who helped and supported us behind the scenes, often risking their businesses or their own safety for us. So far I have avoided naming names, Otherwise I will be here all night. But I wish to mention one person who falls into the last category I have mentioned, and that is our printer Dougie, who faithfully churned out our posters and pamphlets when other printing houses wouldn't touch us. I think Dougie symbolises the kind of quiet support that we have received over the years, without which we couldn't have been successful.

Where does all this leave us? Clearly, although the end of the conscription system is in sight, peace continues to elude us. Vast numbers of people are poverty stricken, violence is endemic, and all sectors of the population are alarmingly militarised. There is a desperate need for initiatives to defend communities against violence, to create a truly impartial and effective peacekeeping force, and for the promotion of a culture of peace and tolerance. In the workshops and plenary sessions this weekend, we hope that some light will be shed on these issues, and that our festival will act as a catalyst for positive developments in at least some of these areas.

The End Conscription Campaign has had a unique character and a very specific focus, and we do not think that it is the ideal vehicle for addressing broader issues such as the demilitarisation of our society and the promotion of a culture of peace. We are hopeful that the organisations represented in our workshops will take these issues further in the future. There are also a number of groups and individuals who believe that there is a need in South Africa for a new, broadly based peace movement, and we encourage any one who is interested in such a movement to use this opportunity to set the ball rolling.

# Keynote Address by Nelson Mandela



*Nelson Mandela and ECC's Chris deVilliers at the festival.  
The poster was a birthday present from ECC to Mr  
Mandela who turned 75 on the weekend of the festival.*

## Comrades and Friends

I am very delighted to be here tonight, to open your historic peace festival, marking the 10th anniversary of the End Conscription Campaign.

I take this opportunity to salute you for your selfless contribution in the struggle to end apartheid. You are among those in this country who rejected the privileges of minority rule, and instead chose to fight for peace. You suffered detention, and other forms of harassment for refusing to do military service. Thousands of objectors fled the country rather than defend apartheid, and many more simply failed to report for military service each year.

The ECC's opposition to conscription is based on the fundamental belief that no person should be forced to take up arms, to kill innocent people.

Your campaign against conscription put you firmly on the side of the democratic forces, and contributed considerably to the overall efforts of the people of South Africa to overthrow racial oppression. It is your principled struggle, and those of the masses of the people of our country, and the international community, that forced the apartheid regime to negotiate.

The struggle for democracy in this country is also a struggle for peace. That is why the ANC and the broad mass democratic movement welcomed the establishment of the ECC, and derived much strength and hope from your stirring campaign.

Throughout its history the African National Congress used non-violent and peaceful means of struggle. But the response of the regime was to unleash the most brutal forms of racial oppression that this country has ever seen. It was for this reason that we embarked on armed action during which the youth of our country made the highest sacrifices. They paid for freedom with their own lives.

A combination of the operations of MK and ECC, and of other democratic forces inside

and outside our country, has brought us to the most exciting moment of our history; when we can say with confidence that victory is in sight.

The apartheid regime unleashed violence, not only against our people, but also against those in the Southern Africa region. The neighbouring states are struggling to recover from the devastation and intrigue of this regime. It spread weapons in the region which are being used today to massacre our people in the townships.

Only the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council and the holding of elections in April next year will eventually free South Africa from the corruption of the present regime.

# The lessons of war in Bosnia


Striking parallels can be drawn between the war in Bosnia and racial conflict in South Africa. This emerged from a lecture by award winning Guardian war correspondent Maggie O'Kane at the End Conscription Campaign's 1993 Peace Festival at Wits University.

Serbian leaders had engaged in a calculated campaign to create ethnic divisions in former Yugoslavia. Ethnic hostility was manufactured to provide the spark for conflict, said Ms O'Kane.

"Masked, armed men burst into houses and opened fire, indiscriminately killing women and children. These tactics caused insecurity and fear, and turned a united Yugoslavia into a killing field."

These acts of terrorism echo indiscriminate killings in South Africa. O'Kane said she came to South Africa to explain how South Africans can learn from a war which could have been avoided.

— From a report in *The Sunday Times*, 8 August 1993.



*Opening night of the festival – Nelson Mandela and Maggie O'Kane.*

# THEME 1:

## PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTH AFRICA

### Plenary: THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD – CAN IT BRING PEACE?

This plenary looked at the National Peace Accord, its successes and failures, and how it can be strengthened.

*Chair – Bishop Peter Storey*

*Sydney Mufamadi (ANC Peace Desk)*

*Senzo Mfayela (IFP)*

*Laura Pollecutt (Lawyers for Human Rights)*

*Antonie Gildenhuys (Chair of the National Peace Secretariat)*

#### **Laura Pollecutt (Lawyers for Human Rights):**

Two years and thousands of deaths later the task of assessing the success of the National Peace Accord (NPA) is difficult. The NPA functions differently in each region, but has been most successful during rallies and marches where highly visible monitors have contributed to reducing violence. Peace is a collective effort, the NPA on its own can not solve our problems.

The two most important defects of the peace process are, firstly, that although the police are part of the NPA they are not held sufficiently accountable and secondly, that the NPA is party political based and therefore forces people in the community to identify with one of the perceived conflicting parties if they wish to be involved in the peace process. This implies that the violence is an ongoing feud between two parties and that all solutions will be reached through political parties making their supporters accountable to the NPA.

The area where the NPA is attempting to make a difference, but could make a bigger contribution, is by funding socio-economic reconstruction and development. This fund could help the victims of violence by; replacing damaged homes, assisting in the return of displaced people, assisting families where the provider has died, assisting those who have become disabled and providing counselling and medical care.

#### **Antonie Gildenhuys (National Peace Secretariat Chair):**

The Peace Accord has shortcomings, but it is effective and has gone a long way towards preventing violence. Since the NPA was signed in September 1991, 11 regional peace committees and 120 local structures have been established. These structures can only operate effectively if communities and police abide by the NPA's prerequisites; they must want, and work for, peace and the police must work impartially and enjoy the confidence of the community. The NPA can not bring about peace on its own. The NPA has facilitated leaders of warring factions and the police in taking decisions which have contributed to peace.

The NPA is a code of conduct for political parties and security forces. Even if these

groups abide by the NPA it doesn't mean that there will be peace. The NPA is planning to acquire 'teeth' to act against political parties and individuals who breach it. A special sub-committee of the Peace Committee is looking at strengthening the NPA. One of its jobs is to recommend an effective mechanism to deal with contraventions, which occur too frequently. The NPA must not be hijacked for political purposes.

**Senzo Mfayela (IFP):**

Provided that there is a common will amongst all South Africans to create peace, the NPA will bring peace. There has to be a realization that the NPA is only one link in the peace process. The NPA is an indication of the commitment of some political parties to work together to stop the violence, but there are many factors contributing to the present violence.

Decentralised structures of the NPA ensure involvement of all South Africans at all levels of political, social and economic activity. The NPA is not perfect. It is not a declaration of peace, but a contract between parties and organisations to work towards the normalisation of politics and the creation of a free political culture. The NPA lacks teeth and it must be empowered to ensure that parties who contravene it are made accountable.

Many people have been marginalised by apartheid and violence takes place in marginalised areas. Socio-economic reconstruction needs to be stepped up urgently, but people's expectations need to be rationalised to what the country can actually deliver.

For the NPA to succeed the following is required: the creation of a framework of commitment to peace, more resources for NPA structures, and for participants in NPA structures to be broadly representative of communities in which they operate.

**Sydney Mufamadi (ANC):**

The violence emanates from a society which we all say must be changed. Even in this period of transition our country continues to be decimated by the scourge of violence. Indeed the post-February 1990 period has seen incidents of violence happening with debilitating frequency leaving untold material destruction and a staggering loss of human life. The organisers of this festival have posed the question: Can the NPA bring peace? If they are looking for a simple answer, they will not get it.

The ANC is convinced that we need a multilateral instrument with which to combat violence. The ebb of violence in some areas is attributable, in part, to the efforts of the NPA. The NPA has succeeded in providing an opportunity for political rivals to work together. The NPA also provides for a role to be played by peace structures in socio-economic reconstruction.

The causes of violence are many and complex. We require a solution which takes into account that there are people who will resort to violence to forestall the advent of democracy and that there are people within the security establishment who have not necessarily changed their minds about apartheid.

The NPA should ensure that: the code of conduct of political parties is enforced; non-signatory parties desist from activities which are inimical to peace; incidents of violence are properly investigated and gross material disparities which have contributed to violence are addressed. I wish to emphasise that the question of the effectiveness of the NPA must be treated as part of the whole process of change.

## INTERVENING TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

This workshop looked at the roots of the violence in South Africa and focused on the use of monitoring as a tool to deal with the violence.

***Venitia Govender (Independent Board of Inquiry)***

***Sally Sealey (Independent Board of Inquiry)***

### **Background of the Violence**

The Human Rights Commission released a report in July stating that more than 9 300 people died in political violence between July 1990 and June 1993. The death rate is 259 people each month. The violence is not a historically based ethnic war! We need to move away from the perceptions that the violence is 'black on black violence' or 'tribal conflict'.

### **ANC's perception of the violence:**

The violence coincided with Inkatha changing from a cultural organisation into a political party along with an aggressive recruitment campaign initiated by Buthelezi in an attempt to become a major political player. Mondli Gungubele, ANC PWV regional executive member, explained that elements of a Third Force are using the 'ANC-IFP' conflict to start sporadic mini-wars.

### **Inkatha's perception of the violence:**

The violence in the Vaal stems from the ANC's campaign to make Sebokeng a 'no-go' area and the call by the ANC to disband the KwaZulu Police Force and reincorporate the homeland. Gertrude Mzizi, an IFP official who serves on the Transvaal Peace Desk, said "Attacks against hostels were done by fully trained people and," she said "we all know who has an army of trained cadres roaming the streets."

What is clear is that there is no single factor which can be blamed for the violence. The levels of violence rise and fall according to what is happening in the country politically. The question that people must ask is who actually benefits from the violence?

### **Violence Monitoring**

There are three types of violence monitoring namely:

1. Observer monitoring, involves looking for potential problems and recording details of incidents.
2. Investigative monitoring, involves follow up investigations such as collecting statements after the incident to try and determine why violence occurred, who the victims of the violence are and who is responsible for perpetrating the violence.
3. Preventive monitoring, involves negotiating with protagonists to prevent an escalation of conflict.

## COMMUNITY INITIATIVES AGAINST VIOLENCE

This workshop looked at what kinds of violence communities are confronted with and how best to defend them against it.

**Chair – Howard Varney (Legal Resources Centre, Durban)**

**Royal Lekoba (Peace Action Fieldworker)**

**Z (Anonymous Self Defence Unit member)**

**Gerald Williamson (Eldorado Park Centre for Peace Action)**

### **Royal Lekoba (Peace Action fieldworker):**

Royal Lekoba spoke about the history of the Self Defence Units (SDUs). SDUs were formed as a community response to harassment by the South African security forces. At first the SDUs acted as a civil police force, patrolling townships and warning the community of raids but the community lost control over SDUs. SDUs became an underground structure because they were easily infiltrated and members became targets of the security forces. SDUs were no longer accountable to the civic associations.

SDU members armed themselves and some SDU members began to terrorise the community. The Government tried to crush the SDUs by imposing harsh prison sentences on anyone caught in possession of an unlicensed, or stolen, firearm. The question now is how the SDUs can be incorporated into a new society.

### **'Z' (Self Defence Unit member – disguised by dark glasses):**

In 1985 Z joined the 'Youth of the Revolution', an SDU fighting 'tsotsies' (criminals). In 1987 the SDU launched a campaign to get the police out of the township. In 1991 Z joined an SDU which operated in Sebokeng and Evaton townships. This SDU functioned to defend the community against attacks by the residents of the KwaMadala Hostel who are mainly Inkatha members. The residents of KwaMadala Hostel were being protected by the police who had formed the 'Yankee' squad. The police then arrested or kidnapped SDU members.

SDUs were necessary because there was a war. Now the SDUs are no longer prepared to launch any attacks. The SDUs should be transformed into 'agencies of peace' as suggested by Chris Hani.

### **Gerald Williamson (Eldorado Park Centre for Peace Action):**

The Centre for Peace Action was formed in 1987 as a community based violence prevention project. We tend to discuss 'inter-organisational' violence but only a fraction of violent deaths are 'inter-organisational'; violence needs to be discussed more broadly. South Africa is a very violent society, the homicide rate is the highest in the world. Racial and economic inequalities produce violence. Thus social and economic reconstruction is fundamental.

The Centre has helped curb the violence in Eldorado Park. It has established 11 safe houses as sanctuaries for battered women and has also recruited youth leaders and trained them in counselling skills. The Centre emphasises community development and personal empowerment and has introduced the 'stokvel' concept in Eldorado Park. The Centre has been very successful, violence has dropped.



## A NATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE

The recommendation on the establishment of a Peacekeeping Force by the Technical Committee on Violence (a sub-committee of the current multi-party negotiations) reads as follows:

*The committee proposes the establishment of a peacekeeping force with a multi-party composition to function as the primary peacekeeping force for the election. Its function should be determined by the elected Government in consultation with relevant parties. The force should be specially trained, have legitimacy across the political spectrum and should fall under the control of either the Independent Electoral Commission or under multi-party executive control.*

This workshop looked at the establishment of a peacekeeping force (PKF) in the run-up to elections, how the PKF will be formed and how it will be used to protect the electoral process.

**Chair – Abba Omar**

**Aubrey Lekwane (Lawyers for Human Rights)**

**Calvin Khan (MK)**

**Bishop Stanley Mogoba (National Peace Accord)**

**Jakkie Cilliers (Institute for Defence Policy)**

**Rocky Williams (Military Research Group)**

### **Bishop Mogoba (National Peace Accord):**

We need to establish a PKF due to the high level of violence and the fact that no single person is able to stop the violence. The existence of a number of armed forces, all operating under different command structures, with separate agendas is a recipe for disaster. One thing alone can save South Africa, a commitment to collective responsibility and joint action for peace.

The PKF would include all the armed forces and this would prevent the threat of isolating any political party or community. The PKF would be made up of 5 000 persons who would act under an agreed and experienced international command and would be accountable to the NPA structures. The PKF would have a clear identity with distinct uniforms and vehicles.

### **Aubrey Lekwane (Lawyers for Human Rights):**

In order to reduce high levels of violence there needs to be a strengthening of the 'powers of enforcement' of the NPA and an acceptance of its articles. The establishment of a PKF through existing structures should be considered. The building block should be the Internal Stability Unit (ISU) because of their skills in training. The ISU would be removed from the control of the SAP. The PKF would require international participation in command structures, and its size should be determined by its functions.

LHR recommend a force of about 20 to 40 000 and have motivated for the inclusion of members of SADF, SAP, MK, SDUs and the TBVC armies. A selection panel would include international participation. LHR believe that 'time is of the essence' and have urged the Goldstone Commission to make recommendations on a PKF guided by the principle of minimum force.

### **Calvin Khan (Umkhonto we Sizwe):**

The formation of a PKF needs to be placed in a political context. Elections would be

meaningless if they were not free and fair. The Government's security forces are seen as part of the problem and cannot fulfil the job of peacekeeping. The number of international observers for the elections will not be sufficient. The PKF needs to deal effectively in reducing the levels of violence. It needs to be acceptable to the majority of the population and should be made up of all elements party to the negotiation process.

The PKF should be placed under the authority of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) through a 'Peace-Keeping Committee', made up of local and international experts. The PKF should be established through legislation passed by the Transitional authority. The PKF should be between 7 000 and 10 000 'recruits', and training of these peacekeepers needs to be immediate. Although there are difficulties ahead the only realistic solution is the establishment of a PKF.

### **Jakkie Cilliers (Institute for Defence Policy):**

Is a South African PKF practicable? A number of problems are inherent in the process of a PKF being established by the negotiating forum. The consensus between the major negotiating parties on the question of a PKF appears to be based on political expediency rather than on a deliberate strategic vision.

The SADF has 7 000 soldiers deployed in the townships and if these soldiers are removed a PKF would require roughly 12 000 people. A PKF of 12 000 strong would be inadequate to deal with escalating violence in the absence of the SADF. The cost of the PKF would be enormous, at least R1 billion per year. I do not reject the notion of a PKF but it is not realistic or practical. Some alternatives:

- \* Complete multi-party control over the security forces by the sub-councils of Defence and Law and Order of the TEC.
- \* Insert international monitors into the command and control structures of the SADF.

### **Rocky Williams (Military Research Group):**

There must be exact clarity on the functions and role of a PKF. A PKF must be distinguished from the socio-economic functions of a peace corps, from peace monitors, from development brigades, from civic action and from community policing. The long term advantages of a PKF are immense; the police will be drawn to community policing, the defence force will be withdrawn from the townships and redirected to the traditional function of protecting the nation's sovereignty.

A strong unit would be instrumental in overcoming political differences. A PKF would need intensive training. We need to be cautious in using the ISU as a building block for the PKF but it is conceivable that it could be used. The PKF would need a small tactical intelligence wing.

## AFTER ELECTIONS IN ANGOLA – WHAT CAN WE LEARN ?

This workshop looked at the situation in Angola and the United Nations peacekeeping initiatives there.

***Cbair – Jeremy Cronin (South African Communist Party)***

***Albie Sachs (ANC)***

***Joe Hanlon (International guest speaker)***

### **Joe Hanlon (Observed the election process in Angola):**

South Africa can learn from the elections in Angola. A spirit of reconciliation was established on the ground. People believed that they were voting for democracy. Ninety percent of Angolans registered to vote and ninety percent of those who registered, voted.

Votes were secret, no one was permitted into the booth to assist the voter despite the possibility of spoilt ballot-papers. Monitors representing political parties and the international community were stationed at polling stations. There was a check on monitors to ensure that there was no misconduct. The election process was transparent, people were involved in the whole process.

UNITA got one third of the votes and had the process been allowed to continue, they would have been a forceful opposition. It was widely assumed that UNITA would win the elections. Savimbi himself assumed he could only lose the elections by fraud.

MPLA and UNITA armed forces were to be stationed at assembly points, as the first step towards creating a single new army. Prior to the elections however UNITA forces stopped going to the assembly points and started caching arms. The UN Representative also assumed that UNITA was going to win and decided that, despite the violations, the elections should go ahead. Thus the watchdog of the UN didn't bark. The MPLA also then stopped demobilising and formed a special riot unit. The election outcome was unexpected and UNITA instructed its military to capture strategic areas. South Africa urged Savimbi not to accept the election results.

It was not the voters who determined the outcome of the elections but those who were in the military. If the military is not disarmed they always have the option of rejecting the outcome of elections. In preparation for elections one needs to disarm as much as possible and also have a strong will to enforce the outcome of the elections.

### **Albie Sachs (ANC):**

The Cold War had a devastating effect on Angola. It caused a civil war and Angola became an international battlefield. We need to learn from the failures of the MPLA.

Civil society must play a role in the elections to prevent the military undermining their outcome. It is crucially important to give publicity to restrictions on the access of political parties to areas for canvassing. The best weapon of one's opponents is one's own failure to allow them political access.

In South Africa the major political parties have been working together for a longer period of time and the outcome of the elections is not a winner-take-all situation. Certain constitutional policies have already been agreed on. A government of national unity will ensure that, no matter the election results, all political parties will still have a say. This means that hopefully the run-up to elections won't be as fierce in South Africa as was the case in Angola.

# THEME 2: ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION

## Plenary: Ensuring Free and Fair Elections – Control of the Armed Forces

This plenary examined some of the lessons that can be learnt from the elections in Angola, Cambodia and Namibia and some of the difficulties that we might face in South Africa in the run-up to elections, and after.

***Chair – Albie Sachs (ANC constitutional lawyer)***

***Randi Erentzen (Centre for Development Studies UWC)***

***Joe Hanlon (Noted author and expert on Southern Africa)***

***Mojo Matou (ANC – Umkhonto we Sizwe)***

### **Randi Erentzen (Centre for Development Studies):**

In Angola and Cambodia it was the armed forces which determined whether the elections were successful. Democratic elections do not guarantee democracy. The United Nations sent missions to monitor the Angolan, Namibian and Cambodian elections. In each case the UN was there to facilitate the demobilisation of the armed forces and facilitate the holding of free and fair elections.

In Cambodia there were four different armed formations. One of them, the Khmer Rouge, refused to participate in the elections. During the build-up to elections all the parties systematically disrupted the election process, for instance, by assassinating opposition members. For there to be free and fair elections it is important to demobilise and contain all armed formations.

### **Joe Hanlon (Editorial Director – Panos Institute, London):**

For elections to be “Free and Fair” the whole process must be transparent and self-checking. The elections in Angola were run extremely efficiently. The armed forces were supposed to be confined to barracks and disarmed but they were not. The UN monitored the elections but did not publicize violations during the build-up to them. The elections were judged free and fair but did not represent the beginning of a democratic dispensation. The voters in the end were powerless to determine the outcome of the elections.

South Africa has more armed forces and less ability to control them than any other country in the region. Monitors must ensure that the armed forces are restricted to base and that all sides are disarmed. People who have been involved in destabilisation are in South Africa and there is little that can be done to prevent them from disrupting the elections.

### **Mojo Matou (Umkhonto we Sizwe):**

Violence is likely to increase before the elections. Integration of the armed forces before

elections is no guarantee that the outcome of the elections will be respected. Joint control of the security forces will be preferable to integration.

The Government must relinquish control of the security forces. There needs to be multi-party political control and in addition, a Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee which oversees the deployment and day to day management of the security forces.

## Integration and Recruitment Policy

This workshop focused on the process of the integration of the armies and the demobilisation of military personnel.

**Chair – Greg Mills (University of the Western Cape)**

**Calvin Khan (Umkhonto we Sizwe)**

**Laurie Natban (Centre for Intergroup Studies)**

**Jakkie Cilliers (Institute for Defence Policy)**

### **Jakkie Cilliers (IDP):**

Integration is a process involving a number of sequential steps which will culminate in the amalgamation of previously opposing military forces into a single organisation. There needs to be an assessment of what exists, what will be needed, where the finances will come from and what are the criteria for joining a new defence force. Integration should be finalised after elections.

'Absorption' of all the armed formations into the military needs to be avoided. There needs to be a demobilisation programme for those people who are not integrated into the new army. The demobilisation of members of the various armed forces should occur directly from these forces, prior to any amalgamation or integration.

Control points need to be established countrywide, staffed by the ANC/MK and PAC/APLA but with permanent representation, (in a monitoring capacity only), by the government and the international community. These collection points would serve as temporary centres from where selection will occur for either demobilisation into civil society, or the provision of preparatory training for integration into a future defence force. SADF bases should serve a similar purpose, also with international and ANC or other representation.

The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) should co-ordinate the training and integration of the various armed forces.

### **Calvin Kahn (MK):**

We need to look at controlling the armed forces during transition, thus the debate around integration is political. The ruling classes have been in control of the armed forces; even if we have formal democracy, the ruling class will still control the armed forces. It is therefore essential that the process of integration and the control of the armed forces reflects the democratic process. The Council of Defence under the TEC must initiate this process.

MK must not be absorbed by the SADF. The structuring of a new defence force must be based on a new threat analysis. Integrating the armies is a step towards restructuring our society.

### **Laurie Nathan (CIS):**

Two themes have dominated public debate on military matters: multi-party control over armed forces in the run-up to elections, and the integration of government, homeland and guerilla armies. Integration revolves around the need for a new defence force, a new defence

policy and disarmament. It isn't a mechanical process and it needs careful planning. A defence force which has legitimacy will need a new doctrine and culture. None of the present armies were set up to serve democracy.

The new defence policy will be to defend the country against external aggression and will not play any role internally. The defence force should be placed under civilian control. Since there is no realistic external threat a new government should limit the defence budget.

## Disclosure and Intelligence Organisations

This workshop focused on Military Intelligence (MI). What is MI? What should our policy be with regard to MI in the long term?

**Chair – David Bruce (ECC)**

**Mojo Matou (MK)**

**Rocky Williams (Military Research Group)**

**Willem Steenkamp (Ex-Presidents Council member)**

### **Rocky Williams (Military Research Group):**

In the past Military Intelligence (MI) was autonomous and had the authority to eliminate 'the enemy'. The enemy was identified as anti-apartheid organisations such as the Black Sash, the Trade Union movement, UDF, ECC, NUSAS, etc. MI was deployed in the townships and involved in hit squad activity. It protected the interests of the National Party.

MI comprises 'tactical intelligence' and 'strategic intelligence'. Openness with regard to MI should be institutionalised and MI should be tactically orientated. Civilians, not the military, should analyse politics and economics.

South Africa is not being threatened, and there is no need for a large MI. Ideally there should be a balance of power within the intelligence family rather than a particular organisation dominating. MI needs to be reigned in and transformed. A number of measures can be undertaken for this purpose. A technical committee should be formed under the Transitional Executive Council to look into the intelligence community, start rationalisation and the disbanding of contentious units. A code of conduct should be instituted and there should be a public debate on the ethics of intelligence. A truth commission could be instituted to look into past abuses as has been done in El Salvador. One needs to take care to guard against measures which will unleash random elements into the community.

### **Willem Steenkamp (ex-President's Council member):**

The problem with MI has been its degree of autonomy; it's not power which corrupts so much as the knowledge that one is immune from prosecution. Politicians did not want to know details of what MI was up to, so MI has not been accountable to anyone. There has been too much secrecy. Now there needs to be openness. However this openness can only be limited.

A future intelligence organisation should comprise a joint internal intelligence service interlinked with an external intelligence service and a military intelligence service.

### **Mojo Matou (Umkhonto we Sizwe):**

The South African security forces and intelligence organisations abused their powers. We do need military intelligence to survive but it must not be used violently and its role should be properly defined. MI supplied intelligence to the SADF but their role was never defined which gave them unlimited power.

Future intelligence instruments must not have unlimited power. Strategic units eventually end up running the country. There needs to be a system where checks and balances on intelligence organisations are ensured.

## **The Police as Peacekeepers – The need for local accountability**

This workshop looked at the transformation of the SAP into a force which is relied on and trusted by the community.

***Cbair – Audrey Coleman (Peace Action)***

***Colonel Alf Dyke (South African Police)***

***Gerald Williamson (Eldorado Park Centre for Peace Action)***

***Alfred Woodington (Congress of South African Trade Unions)***

### **Col. Alf Dyke (South African Police):**

The SAP is not as inflexible as many people think. Its members come from the community to serve the community. The police force needs to be made acceptable to the community in order for it to be accountable to the community. The attitudes of all police officers need to be changed. The first step is to change the syllabus of the training programme with an emphasis on community relations. Personnel, already trained, need to be retrained. Those who are not willing to change will have no place in a future police force. A joint operational communication centre has been set up to address problems in dealing with the violence.

### **Gerald Williamson (Eldorado Park Centre for Peace Action)**

The Eldorado Park Centre for Peace Action has initiated a project to reconstruct the relationship between the police force and the community. Community policing must meet community needs. In South Africa the police are not viewed in a positive light. The whole police force needs to be changed. Although the SAP have been corrupt they can be transformed into a police force which is accountable and trusted by the community.

### **Alfred Woodington (COSATU):**

Policemen are workers and need to be protected as workers. The police force must observe the recommendations of the NPA. The notorious 'Yankee Squad' has been disbanded but policemen from this unit have been incorporated into other SAP units. The investigations of the police force happen behind closed doors. A future police force must be politically aware but independent of political influence. The police force must be accountable to the community and not the government.

The police force needs to gain the respect of the community. There needs to be a purge of the security forces. The community must be involved in crime prevention. The problems that face the police force must be seen in a broader socio-economic context.

### **Recommendations arising from the discussion:**

Police should be part of the community. Officers must be re-trained. The police force must be kept and those who have acted unlawfully must be prosecuted. Local officers should be used to investigate, rather than outsiders. These investigations should include members of the community. Basic resources must be available in police stations e.g. working telephones. The Police and Prison Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) should have official recognition by the SAP. The police staff should be restructured so that more staff could be deployed in the field. A peace keeping force will alleviate some of the pressure on the SAP.

## The Right Wing

This workshop looked at the white right wing and what the right wing means in relation to the question of finding peace in South Africa.

***Chair – Anton Roskam***

***Carl Niehaus (ANC Spokesperson)***

***Cas Human (ANC regional executive)***

***Note: A number of rightwingers were approached but none agreed to be on this panel.***

### **Cas Human (ANC):**

Human gave insight into the psyche of the right wing. He gave examples of his experience living amongst right wing farmers. If the security forces act against violent right wing action, the right wing will not threaten the peace process. Following the inaction of the police when the right wing invaded the World Trade Centre, there is potential that elements within the security forces will aid and support right wing aggression. Right wing Afrikaners would not be a threat in South Africa once they get to know what the ANC stands for.

### **Carl Niehaus (ANC):**

If the right wing are included in the multi-party talks, they would be co-responsible for ensuring that the results of the negotiations are respected. The ANC is strongly opposed to a volkstaat because the creation of a volkstaat would mean displacing other groups. We must not forget that the purpose of the negotiations is to address black liberation and not Afrikaner self-determination.

The Afrikaner Volksfront's General Constand Viljoen, (who is retired from the SADF) still commands support from members of the SADF. However, the real threat is the military strategist, Gen. Groenewald. Groenewald is believed to be developing a plan for secession by armed struggle as a means of winning an Afrikaner homeland. The plan is called "Plan C"

The AVF are calling people to arm themselves and the government is doing very little to curb the mobilisation of right wing forces. The AVF believe that 100 000 men could be mobilised at short notice who would side with 'the volk'. These would include members of the South African Police, the South African Defence Force, and the AWB Wenkommandos.

It is not only the white right wing which is a threat to the peace process. Conservative black elements such as Inkatha seek some type of secession. The AVF demand a sovereign volkstaat inside South Africa, and Inkatha demand autonomy for KwaZulu/Natal.



# Inter-Faith Prayers for Peace

**Facilitator: Cedric Mayson, SACC**

Excerpt from the inter-faith prayer service at the ECC's 1993 Peace Festival:

## INTRODUCTION

*Our meditation uses the holy scriptures of human religions to direct our thoughts to the things which make for peace. Oppressors have often manipulated religion. They have made it a disruptive, divisive force which disturbs peace. Today we seek to reclaim the spiritual coherence at the heart of all humanity, which is the tool kit for peace.*

## PEACE AND JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA

*We seek a vision of a new land, where the evil men who promote violence will have been forced to reveal themselves, and the people who want peace, justice and reconstruction will have been vindicated.*

He will wield authority over the nations and adjudicate between many peoples; these will hammer their swords into ploughshares, their spears into sickles. Nation will not lift up sword against nation: there will be no more training of war. O come, let us walk in the light of the Lord.

Hold fast all of you, to the cable of Allah, and do not separate. And remember Allah's favour unto you, how ye were enemies and He made friendship between your hearts so that you became as brothers by His grace; and how ye were on the brink of an abyss of fire, and He did save you from it.

Without the right men, their government decays and ceases. With the right men the growth of government is rapid, just as vegetation is rapid on earth ... therefore the administration of government lies in getting proper men.

What does the Lord require of you but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly before your God.

Lo, I am setting you today over nations and over kingdoms, to tear up and knock down, to destroy and overthrow, to build and to plant.

I am setting you an example ... If I, the Lord and Master, have washed your feet, you should wash each other's feet.

*May the Lord of peace himself give you peace all the time and in every way. The Lord is with you all.*

# THEME 3: DEVELOPING A PEACEFUL SOCIETY

## Mini-Plenary: Developing a Human Rights Culture

This session looked at building a society which is based on the recognition of Human Rights. Albie Sachs discussed the draft Bill of Rights proposed by the sub-committee on fundamental rights set up by the multi-party negotiations. He examined the question of the right to conscientious objection in this.

*Chair – Mandy Taylor (ECC activist)*

*Albie Sachs (ANC constitutional expert)*

In introducing the speaker, Mandy Taylor quoted the revised ANC draft Bill of Rights which makes specific mention of Conscientious Objectors. She pointed out that this improvement on the first draft was a result of lobbying by the anti-militarisation movement.

Albie Sachs explained that various draft Bills of Rights had been produced by all the main negotiating parties. He used as a base for his discussion the current draft drawn up by the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights during the Transition. Sachs said the human rights debate should include representations from, among others, women, homosexuals and the disabled. Sachs explained that the draft Bill is deliberately wide and non-specific on the question of 'secondary' rights which include the rights of special groups.

Clause 2.(2) reads:

“No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, on any ground whatsoever and, without derogating in any way from the generality of this provision, on the ground of race or gender in particular.”

Clause 8 (1) reads:

“Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”

These are the only two clauses that relate directly to Conscientious Objection. Sachs seemed to think that it was unlikely that anything more specific would be inserted at this stage, but he pointed out that there is still space for lobbying. The current draft Bill of Rights will form part of the Transitional Constitution and will therefore be for the transitional period only; the final Bill of Rights will be enacted by the elected constitution-making body. Sachs also raised the possibility that a conscientious objector could use the right to freedom of speech and expression (Clause 9 of the draft Bill) as an argument in support of the right to conscientious objection.

## A Future Defence Policy

This workshop looked at the future of the armed forces and the question of what type of threat scenario will underline a future defence policy.

***Chair – Roddy Payne (ECC)***  
***Laurie Nathan (CIS)***

The armed services are potentially a highly destructive instrument if abused by the government for partisan ends. Put more negatively still, the military may acquire its own political agenda and seek to manipulate the political process.

New circumstances in South Africa are profoundly different and this necessitates a radical redefinition of security and the role of military power. The situation is complicated by the fact that there are eight military formations in the country. These are aligned to political parties and will have to be merged or disbanded. A new defence force must be structured to serve democracy in a non-partisan manner.

Defence policy is constructed around conceptual and philosophical assumptions. These assumptions have to do with the way in which 'security' and 'threats to security' are conceived. Security is traditionally viewed in terms of preserving state sovereignty. The apartheid security policy was concerned with the security of the racially exclusive state and the white community. Security strategy was formulated by a select group of cabinet ministers and military officers, excluding parliament and the public from effective participation.

Modern alternative theories of security motivate for security policy to go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development and social justice. In addition to this philosophical framework these principles of defence could be endorsed in the post-apartheid constitution:

- ◆ Security shall be sought primarily through meeting the needs of the people.
- ◆ South Africa shall pursue peace with neighbouring states.
- ◆ The defence force shall have a defensive doctrine and should reflect the ethnic composition of the country.
- ◆ South Africa shall adhere to international law governing the conduct of warfare and shall be bound by the principle of civil supremacy.
- ◆ The formulation of national policy on security and defence shall be subject to public scrutiny and debate.
- ◆ The defence force shall respect the rule of law, human rights, non-racialism and democracy and shall be politically non-partisan.

Threat scenarios identify actual and potential threats to national security; as such they constitute an essential component of defence planning and national strategy. A balance needs to be found between too broad and too narrow a determination of security threats. Four policy measures would help to achieve this balance. (1) A clear distinction should be drawn between constructing threat scenarios and formulating security policy. (2) The intelligence community and the design of national strategy should be subject to multi-party review. (3) There should be transparency and public debate around threat scenarios. (4) Non-military solutions to conflict should be sought.

Three broadly defined conflict scenarios for South Africa can be plotted along a continuum. Firstly, the "Namibia option", where democracy ushers in stability and confidence in the political process. This option would facilitate military disengagement from internal operations.

At the other end of the spectrum is the “UNITA Option”, where certain actors reject the settlement and destabilise the new government through organised violence. This option might result in the exercise of a counter-insurgency capacity.

In the middle option the negotiated settlement is broadly acceptable, but socio-economic conditions give rise to violence and the state is unable to provide effective institutional means of conflict resolution. This option might lead to the army performing a policing function.

Over the past three years the political environment in Southern Africa has undergone substantial change. Most of the major historical conflicts have been resolved, or are in the process of being settled: Namibia has attained independence; Cuban and South African troops have been withdrawn from Angola; Frelimo and Renamo have concluded a cease-fire and are preparing for internationally supervised elections; and South Africa is engaged in multi-party negotiations to end minority rule.

Two major threat implications can be drawn for South Africa. First, from a political perspective there is little possibility that South Africa will be confronted by external military aggression. Antagonism between Pretoria and the Frontline States will be replaced by political co-operation under a democratic government.

Secondly, many Southern African countries will experience on-going instability over the next decade, with negative political and economic implications for the neighbouring states. These problems might become more serious with: the spread of Aids and other diseases; an influx of refugees and cross border drug and arms trafficking. These circumstances may require the defence force to patrol our borders but there is little that an army can do to protect a country against social problems. The solution lies in national strategies and regional co-operation at political and economic levels rather than in the military sphere.

The role of the military in a democracy is defence against external aggression. The deployment of troops against sections of the citizenry would undermine efforts to build national unity. The defence force must be controlled by elected civilians. This principle is endorsed by excluding the military from political decisions, passing legislation which governs the role, conduct and responsibility of the defence force and by parliament appointing a military Ombudsperson.

## Healing the Wounds of the Past in South Africa

This workshop explored some of the ways in which we can heal ourselves and others around us, so as to contribute towards a lasting peace in our country.

***Chair – Venitia Govender (Independent Board of Inquiry)***  
***Ntshabiseng Magola (Trauma Clinic)***

Over the years there has been a vast range of human rights abuses in South Africa. Years of repression which served to sustain apartheid, together with the active dehumanisation of black South Africans, have left a country filled with hatred, fear and violence. The effects of years of apartheid rule will not be eradicated with a change of government.

The group identified numerous wounds, such as those resulting from detention without trial and torture in detention. People from all sectors of South African society have been wounded. Those who in the past, consciously or unconsciously, were responsible for inflicting wounds on others, now may find themselves with guilt feelings, which can also be regarded as wounds.

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