

A Turning Point?

The meeting in Washington in December 1987 between the superpowers was an unusual event. It took place at one of those rare moments in history when two powerful leaders, previously hostile, were dependent on each other to achieve their own independent, larger purposes. There seems little doubt, in view of the many arms control proposals and concessions emanating from the USSR recently, that the principal force behind an accommodation between the superpowers was Gorbachev, the Soviet General Secretary, whose larger purpose is to rescue a failing economy through a broad restructuring—and for this he sees the need to free it from an overwhelming military burden. The American President too is on a rescue mission—to achieve a personal and popular triumph that can restore the power of his leadership in the final year of an administration which has recently suffered economic, political, and moral setbacks.

For these reasons the summit meeting both reflected and produced a significant change in the political atmosphere. If sustained, it could radically affect national priorities and the pace and direction of development for the world at large.

To separate reality from the euphoria generated by the event is admittedly difficult in a perspective limited by a few days' time elapse. This report, however, has had few positive features so far. Like an epilogue to an unhappy but unfinished biography, it can afford in these two pages to reach for some upbeat notes.

Official Actions

The agreement which was signed at the summit was a genuine achievement. When ratified, the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) will require both the US and USSR to dismantle or destroy within three years one entire class of nuclear weapons: all ground-launched missiles with a range of 300–3,400 miles. The significance of the agreement is larger than the 4 percent cut in the superpowers' nuclear weapons that it requires. The treaty breaks new ground in several respects:

- It calls for the elimination of existing weapons, not merely for their control;
- It specifies asymmetrical cuts, requiring the USSR to destroy 1,752 missiles and the US 859 missiles;
- It establishes the most ambitious verification provisions yet incorporated in a treaty, providing for on-site inspection in both countries of previously restricted areas.

All of these features set precedents for more far-reaching restrictions on the arms race than we have had to date.

The next item on the superpowers' agenda is a radical cutback in strategic offensive nuclear arms. A reduction of the nuclear forces by half, first proposed by Professor George Kennan in 1981 (*WMSE 81* and *82*), has been adopted as a goal by both countries. At the conclusion of the summit, Gorbachev reported that "considerable progress" had already been made on this agreement. If the complex provisions can be worked out in the coming months, it will be signed at a US-USSR meeting in 1988. The strategic arms reduction talks (START), according to NRDC estimates, will remove 21,000 of an estimated 55,000 weapons now in nuclear arsenals.

"The arms race is not pre-ordained and not part of some inevitable course of history. We can make history."

*President Ronald Reagan
United States, 1987*

While the summit produced no clear resolution of one controversial issue, the question of allowable Star Wars testing under the ABM Treaty, actions by the US Congress, blocking tests that go beyond a strict interpretation of the treaty, removed this as a current obstacle. Bowing to the continued Congressional ban on testing of anti-satellite weapons in space, the US Air Force has proposed discontinuance of the program in FY 89.

Besides the major breakthroughs in nuclear negotiations, there was some action in other areas, the chances of progress, in several respects, enhanced by the conclusion of the INF Treaty.

For both Afghanistan and Nicaragua, the USSR has proposed reciprocal US-USSR action and "national reconciliation." In Afghanistan, Russian troop withdrawal and the end of all military operations would be coordinated with the end of US military and financial support to the insurgents. Both sides would pledge non-interference with an Afghan government which would be non-aligned and non-socialist.

For Nicaragua the Soviet proposal calls for reciprocal US-USSR pledges to refrain from delivery of weapons. Presumably these pledges would be taken to give added strength to the Arias regional plan.

In the case of Iran, both powers seem to agree on the need for action, but the US wants a UN arms embargo, while the USSR, which in the past has not always been supportive of UN peacekeeping, proposes a UN naval force to patrol the Gulf, and national laws to prevent the secret shipment of arms.

On conventional weapons, both superpowers indicate that they plan to give added momentum to discussions of controls. The Russians hinted that they were ready to accept asymmetries in cuts: eg., to make deeper cuts in tanks, or to trade reductions in tanks against other weapons systems. USSR also favored a disarmed corridor in central Europe.

As for chemical weapons, there suddenly seems to be renewed hope for a verifiable ban. The negotiations, which have been underway since 1981, were bogged down in verification problems. Now the Soviets have accepted all of the major US-proposed provisions for international on-site challenge inspections without right of refusal.

While military budget reductions have not been the subject of negotiation for some years, fiscal deficits are now beginning, at least in the West, to have an effect on budget plans. The new US Secretary of Defense proposes to reduce the Department's budget by \$33 billion, or more than 10 percent in FY 89. In general, NATO budgets are reported to be headed downward in the next fiscal year.

"May December 8, 1987, become a date that will be inscribed in the history books, a date that will mark a watershed separating the era of mounting risk of nuclear war from the era of a demilitarization of human life."

*General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Soviet Union, 1987*

Peoplepower

Whether the positive changes in the political atmosphere created at the summit will in fact signify a real shift in priorities will depend largely on the role the western public and its elected representatives take in defending and promoting change in the months ahead. New pressures are at work. However, the momentum of an all-consuming arms race will yield to change only if the opposing drive by the public is strong and sustained. There are encouraging signs that this can happen, that the public is prepared and ready now to make its views count.

Weapons cuts can save money, which can be used by governments to promote economic development and meet the basic needs which can save lives. But the process is not automatic. Even large cutbacks in military forces do not necessarily reduce the burden of military expenditures. The eliminations of one category of weapons can lead to a build-up in others. An effort to “compensate” for prospective reductions in land-based nuclear weapons in military planning is already underway, for example: the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) proposes to replace nuclear weapons with high-explosive non-nuclear cruise missiles on a fleet of B-52 bombers; French and British officials are exploring possible joint development of a new air-launched nuclear missile usable in a stand-off mode; NATO explores modernization options emphasizing an increase in numbers and capability of fighter-planes. (Whatever Warsaw Pact plans are, they are not on the public record.)

In the present situation a number of factors operate against successful end-runs around treaty limitations. One factor to watch is the official attention given to asymmetrical cuts in conventional forces in Europe. Soviet acceptance of asymmetry in the INF Treaty and their readiness to incorporate the principle again in conventional cutbacks are encouraging signs. Progress in this respect could allay NATO fears that nuclear reductions will weaken the balance in Europe because of the Pact’s preponderance of conventional forces.

Another factor is the budget crunch, which brought the superpowers to the negotiating table in the first place. Even the conversion of 150 existing SAC bombers to a conventional mission would mean a substantial new commitment of resources—at least \$3.3 billion, or about three times the inadequate Federal budget for the education of the country’s handicapped children.

Both of the above re-enforce the third factor, the public’s role, which can be the most important influence of all. In Europe as well as in North America, the public shows new sensitivity to the extravagance of military outlays. People do expect to see progress in disarmament yield concrete results in the form of budgetary savings and changing priorities. If Gorbachev can promise the Soviet Union that disarmament will “improve the level of living of our people,” they want that for themselves too.

Furthermore, in the US an anxiety has been created by the economic pressures of the new international competitiveness. People are tired of sustained antagonisms that not only drain the domestic economy but limit the broader international market in which the US can begin once again to compete effectively.

One affable Russian leader does not suddenly wipe away the fears and phantoms cultivated over half a century, but Americans respond to a new openness and are willing to listen. For a variety of reasons, neither military threats nor military defenses are the arcane subjects that they used to be. A growing cadre of public interest groups—physicians, businessmen, teachers, scientists, religious leaders, and many others—have been laboring together to pry open those secrets and bring them under democratic control. There is no reason why they should not succeed. After all, the constituency for human needs is thousands of times as large, even if not as rich, as the military-industrial complex. □

The Public Acts

Grass roots organizations have for years supplemented publicly-financed assistance for international development. In the 1980’s they have also become increasingly active in efforts to stimulate the peace process. Some of the innovative civilian actions for peace were summarized in *WMSE 86*. This edition looks briefly at a few of the newer approaches to development and collective security.

A trickle-up program, organized by private individuals, provides \$100 grants to start small-scale businesses in rural and urban areas. It has been responsible for 3,448 new enterprises throughout the Third World, replacing unemployment with self-employment at an average cost of 2 cents for every hour of self-employment.

Debt-for-nature swaps are a means of encouraging conservation while easing the debt burden of Latin American countries. Conservation International, a nonprofit organization, is taking a small slice of Bolivia’s foreign debt in exchange for the government’s commitment to protect more than 4 million acres of Amazonian rainforest.

Take Back the Budget, a campaign launched by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, provides a detailed yearly blueprint for reallocating 40 percent of the US military budget to social programs.

Cooperating for conservation brought together some of Vietnam’s and America’s leading conservationists in a 16-country conference this year to discuss cooperative programs for the control of soil erosion and the management of marine and forest resources. (During the US-Vietnam War, the country lost 5 million acres of forest and farmland to chemical spraying, land clearance, and napalm.)

Space for Health, a new project started by the highly successful international physicians organization, IPPNW, plans a satellite communication network to carry basic medical information to regions where it is not available. The Soviet Space Agency has agreed to cooperate and an advisory group has been formed in Boston to identify key health problems and basic information for their treatment.

Alternatives

Governments must continually make choices in the allocation of public funds. The decisions are seldom made in terms of a simple weighing of alternatives, particularly as between military defense and the public's welfare. But one purpose of a report of this nature is to give voice to the wealth of alternatives that nations do have in formulating budgets and, through them, national priorities.

Protection, for example, comes in various forms. At present one government in three spends more on weapons than on schools; two in three spend more to guard against external enemies than against all the threats to health and well-being that people face in their daily lives.

In this lop-sided world, it is time that the public in every nation was given an official annual accounting of how its money is being spent, what choices had to be made, and why. No flim-flam, no obfuscation, just a straightforward report to the taxpayer that lays it all out.

Pending the real thing we must make do with pieces of the jigsaw puzzle (see below). Can a nation really afford to buy another aircraft carrier if it cannot feed all its people, or to spend generously on Star Wars research when it has so little to invest in research against the AIDS epidemic? If the decision-makers have the answers to such questions, why are they not on the public record?

Costs of Protection

Weapons	Dollars	Other Options
50 MX "Peacekeepers"	= \$4,540,000,000 ^a	= Year's cost of US health program for long-term home care of about 1 million chronically-ill children and elderly.
Research on Star Wars <i>(fiscal year 1988)</i>	= \$3,900,000,000 ^a	= An elementary school education for 1,400,000 children in Latin America.
1 aircraft carrier (Nimitz class)	= \$3,900,000,000 ^a	= 1 solid meal a day for 6 months for the 20 million Americans who do not get enough to eat.
1 Trident submarine	= \$1,436,000,000 ^a	= 5-year program for universal child immunization against 6 deadly diseases, preventing 1 million deaths a year.
1 Trafalgar submarine	= \$423,000,000 ^b	= Cost to UK public of proposed fee of £10 for sight tests and £3 for dental tests, formerly paid by national health insurance.
2 frigates (F 30)	= \$280,000,000 ^c	= Cost of campaign for global eradication of smallpox, which created annual savings 10 times the investment.
1-year operating cost of anti-submarine warfare cruiser	= \$59,400,000 ^b	= Housing for 1 year for three-fourths of homeless families in London.
2 fighter aircraft (JA 37)	= \$45,000,000 ^a	= Installation in Third World of 300,000 hand pumps to give villages access to safe water.
1 tanker aircraft (VC 10)	= \$26,300,000 ^b	= 4 years of UK research on AIDS at current levels of government spending.
1-year maintenance of 100 armored wheeled vehicles	= \$16,700,000 ^a	= Employment of 500 unemployed teachers in W. Germany to assist Third World education programs.
1 nuclear weapon test	= \$12,000,000 ^a	= Training of 40,000 community health workers in the Third World.
1 twin-engined attack helicopter	= \$11,500,000 ^a	= Insecticide spraying of housing for African population of 8 million.
1 Leopard marine battle tank	= \$2,800,000 ^d	= 150-250 kms of protected bike lanes in W. Germany to reduce high death toll on highways.
2 infantry combat vehicles	= \$1,000,000 ^e	= Year's supply of nutrition supplements for 5,000 pregnant women at risk.
10 anti-tank missiles	= \$135,000 ^b	= Trained guide dogs for some of the 146,000 blind people in UK.
1-hour operating cost of a B-1 bomber	= \$21,000 ^a	= Community-based maternal health care in 10 African villages to reduce maternal deaths by half in a decade.
9mm personal defense weapon (military pistol)	= \$212 ^a	= Year's supply of vitamin A capsules for 1,000 pre-school children at risk.

a United States b United Kingdom c Sweden d W. Germany e Spain

Background

Before World War II annual government expenditures for education in the United States were two to three times military expenditures. During the war they dropped below military outlays and in the years since then they have not caught up (*chart 18*). Between 1940 and 1986 the rise in US military expenditures was more than double the rise in education expenditures. Currently 45 percent more public money goes to military defense than to the education of America's children.


The sharp change in budget priorities is illustrative of the new role the US assumed in the post-war period as the world's preeminent military power. As the major foreign combatant in two big wars in Asia since the 1940's, a dynamic leader in nuclear and exotic weapons technology, and a heavy investor in a global navy and a world-wide network of military bases, the US has determinedly held its place as front-runner in the arms race, and volunteer policeman of world security.

The military role has been costly, even for a nation as richly endowed as the US. Since 1940 military expenditures in constant 1980 prices have amounted to \$6.8 trillion, eating up 8.4 percent of the GNP created during these years. The military burden on the economy in terms of the ratio to GNP has increased six-fold compared with the first four decades of the century.

Put in historical context, the 1980's surge in the military budget can be seen as a war-equivalent mobilization. Although US forces are not actively engaged in hostilities, military outlays in constant 1980 prices now exceed the peak spending years of both the Korean and Vietnam wars (*chart 18*). Despite a precarious fiscal situation, 1987 has seen no reduction in US military expenditures. A heavy burden has been put on the domestic economy at a time when major structural changes underway in the global economy are impacting on the US. An erosion of the American economy's traditional manufacturing base has already occurred, and increasingly the US position in high technology production is also threatened.

The official emphasis on a war economy at a time of radical change in the global economic setting has impeded the necessary adjustment process. Rather than providing the leadership needed to stimulate vigorous and equitable domestic development in a new competitive situation, government policies emphasize geopolitical maneuvers and undercover military operations in the Third World that have very little to do with defense against the real threats to America today.

Two economic deficits, in foreign trade and in the government budget, are now in the headlines but another deficit, the cancer of social neglect growing out of an overindulgence in military power, attracts relatively little public or press attention. While the priorities of government continue to protect bloated military budgets, the erosion of social equity in America is a growing threat to domestic security and to the nation's place in the world community.



US Rank Among 142 Countries

Military Power

Military expenditures	1
Military technology	1
Military bases world-wide	1
Military training of foreign forces	1
Military aid to foreign countries	1
Naval fleet	1
Combat aircraft	1
Nuclear reactors	1
Nuclear warheads and bombs	1
Nuclear tests	1
Arms exports	2

Social Development

Percent population with safe water	1
Literacy rate	5
Percent school-age children in school	6
GNP per capita	6
Public education expenditures per capita	7
Life expectancy	8
Public health expenditures per capita	8
Percent women in total university enrollment	16
Economic aid as a percent of GNP	18
Infant mortality rate	18
Population per physician	18
School-age population per teacher	20

The Arms Race and the Other Race

In the world's arms race the United States is easily the front runner. In the quality of its weapons and forces, and in the quantity where quantity counts, it has no equal.

This cannot be said of the economic-social standing of the country. On an average of statistical indicators (Table III, page 46), it ranked fourth among 142 nations and, according to preliminary measurements for later years, was sliding downward on the scale.

Contests are as old as humanity. Appealing to man's natural competitive spirit, they stimulate determined effort and raise the level of performance. It is all the more regrettable then that the only aspect of international security that has been elevated to a contest is the arms race. If there were a counterpart race in economic-social achievements, would the USA tolerate fourth place in the community of nations? Would any political leader accept a scale of priorities that put the world's richest economy in fifth place in the literacy of its population, in eighteenth place in the survival rate of its infants?

Military Superpower

World War II propelled the US abruptly into a superstar military role. Between 1939 and the peak of the US war effort in 1945, the number of men in the armed forces rose from 334,000 to 12,123,000, and military expenditures skyrocketed from under \$9 billion to \$380 billion a year (constant 1980 prices). Rapid demobilization followed the big war but neither forces nor budgets ever returned to the levels of the prewar years.

In 1987 there are six times as many Americans under arms as there were before World War II and military expenditures in real terms are twenty-five times as large. Several factors account for this radical change in the military profile of the country. In two major respects US post-war governments assumed military commitments which expanded its global role. One related to the containment of Soviet and Chinese expansionism in Europe and Asia; the other to activist anti-communist objectives in the Third World. A third influence, affecting both policy and the size of the budget, was the increased political power of the military-industrial complex. All three of these features, which are reviewed briefly below, are now receiving increasing public scrutiny.

Long arm of protection—Along with assistance for Europe's economic recovery after the World War, the US moved to provide protection against further Soviet territorial expansion westward. There may have been valid reasons for suspicion on both sides, but for America it was the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the blockade of Berlin in June 1948 which raised cold-war temperatures in the US and gave public support to a continuing American commitment to Europe's defense against communist encroachment. In April 1949 the US and Canada joined with western Europe in signing the North Atlantic Treaty which established the framework for a collective defense.

As a consequence, large US forces remained in Europe, and are there today. Demobilization at the end of the war had reduced their strength from 3,100,000 in 1945 to 391,000 in 1946. More than 40 years later, the number of American personnel on duty in the NATO area is still well over 300,000.

While the European NATO members themselves provide the bulk of the Alliance's armed forces in Europe, the US has from the earliest years carried the major share of the overall financial burden of NATO defense. Comparisons of military budgets and of GNP highlight the exceptionally large share of NATO defense costs still borne by the US (*chart 19*). In the late 1940's the US budget represented slightly over 70 percent of the NATO total; in 1986 it was 68 percent of the total. Since western Europe's economic recovery in the intervening years has been highly successful, and its combined income last year was close to the US income, the disproportionate share of the military burden borne by the US has moved to the fore as a political issue. This is also true of the US role in Asia and the Pacific.

US occupation forces remained in Japan after its defeat in 1945, and in South Korea after the end of the Korean War. Throughout the Pacific area the US created a vast network of anti-communist military alliances to contain China and North Korea, as well as the USSR, and in general to maintain the balance of power in the Far East.

Currently there are still 54,200 US forces stationed in Japan, 42,800 in South Korea, and at least 45,000 in other locations in the Pacific area. With Japan's spectacular growth of the last two decades, the gap between Japanese and American financial contributions to military defense has become particularly pronounced (*chart 20*). In 1986 on a per capita basis Japan's military expenditures amounted to 11 percent of US expenditures and Japan's GNP to 68 percent of US GNP.

"In my judgement, the United States faces a far greater danger from the internal disruption of its national economy, caused by an unwarranted arms build-up, than from any foreign foe, real or imagined."

*Congressman Ronald V. Dellums
United States, 1983*

CHART 19

United States in the NATO Alliance

billion 1984 dollars





CHART 20

Per Capita GNP and Military Expenditures of Major Industrial Countries compared with United States

US = 100%



Interventions—An interventionist role is not new for the US, but in scope, variety, and in cost, the actions taken in recent decades are unprecedented. Earlier in the century, US marines occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and on several occasions, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Panama. Since mid-century, interventions have been geographically more wide-ranging—among them, Lebanon (1958), Zaire (1962), Vietnam (1961–73). Indirect forms of intervention (interventions not involving US forces directly) have also become more common, and more of them are covert.

Although not always successful, such operations did succeed in overthrowing some popularly-elected but leftist governments, such as Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964), and Chile (1973), governments which were then taken over by the armed forces. Under the Reagan Doctrine of supporting anti-communist insurgencies, current targets for destabilization are Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, where governments under communist control are under attack by insurgents armed and in some cases recruited and trained by the US.


Public disclosures, including those related to the Iran-Contra arms deals, give a clue to the variety and range of US covert operations. An official investigation, made public in 1976, indicated that the CIA, which was originally established for the collection of intelligence information, by 1953 was conducting major covert operations in 48 countries. Of several thousand individual covert operations reportedly conducted between 1961 and 1976, about 900 were said to be paramilitary in nature. The CIA budget is believed to have increased substantially since that time; recent press estimates put it at about \$25 billion in 1986. If roughly accurate that would make it as large as the total military budget of France or West Germany.

Foreign interventions that are hidden from public view are a triple threat to America's own security. It is a threat that goes well beyond the growing, uncontrollable drain on public funds. Since secrecy prevents public debate and oversight, these covert operations violate the very basis of democracy. They can also lead the country, unprepared and unwilling, into full-scale war.

Military-Industrial Complex—In addition to official policies emphasizing the global projection of military power, the US in the postwar period took on a new role as weapons supplier to the world. Aided by a strong increase in the government's investment in military research and development (R & D), the US vaulted to first place in the broadest range of weapons technology, including sophisticated conventional arms as well as nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It also became the leading exporter of arms.

Private enterprise as well as the government was behind the push in weapons technology in the postwar period. Prior to the war, arms production had been a relatively small element in the US economy and largely centered in government arsenals and shipyards. This changed abruptly in the war years as private industry, especially aircraft and auto manufacturing, contributed to the miraculous increase in weapons production required to defeat the Axis powers. At war's end the military-industrial complex continued in a dynamic partnership. The government wanted high-tech arms and airpower and the weapons makers needed contracts to survive. The solution was a steadily-rising military budget to ensure continuing technological advance and "warm" (ever-ready) production lines in the event of more war.

The result was a tightly knit group of multi-billion-dollar corporations, with the labor and management skills needed for high-tech production, and research talent with a capacity to find ever new ways to improve the products. Since only big corporations could build the increasingly complex weaponry, the number of contractors was limited, as was the competition for contracts. And since more complex and expensive weapons were also more profitable, prices kept rising (page 15), as did profits and political power. As it became increasingly apparent that higher budgets were buying less hardware than planned, a GAO study in 1986 showed that defense contracting had been 120 percent more profitable than commercial manufacturing from 1980 to 1983.



Government budgets for military R & D increased 85-fold between the end of World War II and fiscal year 1988, a period in which the general level of prices went up a mere 6.5-fold. As *chart 21* shows, the exceptionally rapid rise in official R & D for weapons has continued into the present. In fiscal year 1988, US spending for military R & D is projected at \$47 billion; ten years ago it was \$13 billion. By contrast, government R & D spending over the same period for all civilian research, including health, energy, environment, and general science, has increased modestly from \$10 to \$17 billion.

Economic-Social Deficits

The background on military trends is critical to an understanding of the US situation today in the non-military aspects of national security. The fact is that the US economy is ailing. The GNP growth rate has slowed, from 3.8 percent in the 1960's to 2.8 percent in the 1970's, and to 2.2 percent so far in the 1980's. The country's imports exceed its exports by a record amount, and its foreign indebtedness is high and rising rapidly. Workers' real earnings have dropped. Most of the economy's new jobs are in low-paying service industries; many are part-time and pay wages below the poverty level. The industrial base is shrinking, and manufacturing, traditionally the backbone of the economy, is of decreasing importance as a source of income.

Economic basics—The sudden collapse of the stock market in October 1987 has helped to move these and other signs of economic malaise to center stage. The federal budget deficit is now a major focus of political as well as economic concern. At \$221 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1986, the deficit was the largest ever recorded, having surged from \$40 billion in 1979. One-time reductions in outlays caused it to shrink in 1987 but it is projected to swell again in 1988.

As chart 22 suggests, the big culprit on the expenditure side has been the sharp rise in "national defense" budgets, which have actually increased more than the increase in the budget deficit. Between FY 1979 and 1988 defense outlays rose by \$175 billion, the overall fiscal deficit by \$143 billion.

As government borrowing to finance enormous deficits forced interest rates higher, the value of the dollar skyrocketed—and with it, the prices of US goods abroad. Between 1981 and 1987 the nation's position in world trade deteriorated rapidly. By 1987 the deficit on the merchandise account was six times greater than at the beginning of the 1980's (chart 23), and America's foreign debt was close to \$300 billion and rising.

In only five years, the military joyride, bought wholly on credit, had turned the world's largest net creditor into the world's largest debtor. The decline in America's international competitiveness had its beginnings years ago, but the abrupt growth of the trade deficit in the 1980's to a large degree can be laid at the door of excessive military expenditures. A few examples may help to illustrate the many ties between the loss of commercial markets and America's intense preoccupation with global military power.

- US government-supported research priorities, in their emphasis on weapons rather than commercial products, have been the exact opposite of policies pursued by America's major trading partners:

In the US, 25 percent of the government research budget relates to products for the civilian market; in Europe, 70 percent is civilian.



While the US under the Strategic Computing Initiative spends \$600 million for such specialized military applications of supercomputers as battle-management programs, Japan spends \$700 million on the commercial applications of supercomputers.

In cutting-edge technologies (eg. lasers and artificial intelligence) defense projects in the US account for 70-80 percent of R & D expenditures.

- The highly specialized weapons technology which public funds have supported in the US plays a relatively small role in international trade. Weapons research accounts for 75 percent of government-funded research, but weapons exports are no more than 4 percent of US export trade.

- When US defense does result in technologies with potential commercial spin-offs, other countries are often ahead of the US in marketing them. For example, Japan now has the lead in small machine tools and in ceramics applications, technologies originally developed through US military research.

- In the competition for public finances, US education has taken second



US foreign military transactions, which are not included in the merchandise trade account, added to the negative balance in the 1980's. Despite a strong drive on arms exports, which reached a peak in 1983, military sales abroad were more than offset by costs of military bases and other military outlays. By 1986 the deficit on those transactions amounted to \$4 billion a year.

place to military programs, starving the resources needed to train and maintain a high-quality, skilled work force. Currently, US expenditures on education are barely three-fourths of military expenditures. West Germany, by comparison, spends 40 percent more on public education than on military defense, Japan five times more.

The public's welfare—Both the longer-term structural changes in the world economy and, more recently, the country's own fiscal and economic policies have operated against an equitable distribution of the fruits of progress in the US. Even during the years of solid economic expansion, the US poverty rate did not drop below 11 percent. In 1986, the last year for which data are available, 13.6 percent of the population, or 32.4 million Americans, lived below the poverty line. For all children under 6 years of age, the rate was 22 percent; for blacks under 6 years it was 45.6 percent.

The benefits of growth in recent years have gone disproportionately to the highest income group. The income shift, particularly in the period since 1980, is dramatically summarized in the annual surveys of the Bureau of the Census (*chart 24*). Beginning in the mid-1970's, the share of aggregate income going to the poorest fifth of the US population began to slip; by 1986 it was down to 4.6 percent, the lowest it had been since 1954. The second and third fifths of the population, representing the lower middle class, also dropped to the smallest shares on record, while the fourth held relatively steady. By contrast, the sharp gain in the 1980's by the richest fifth of the population set a new record for rapid change and also a new all-time high, with 43.7 percent of the country's income going to 20 percent of the population.

Available information on other economies suggests that the income gap between rich and poor in the US may now be larger than in any other advanced industrial society. Tax benefits to corporations and to higher incomes, along with budget cuts in social programs, were major factors in the early 1980's in the transfer of income from the poorer to the richer sector of the population. A study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1984, for example, found that a typical family with income under \$10,000 would lose \$390 that year as a result of cuts in taxes and in social programs, while a family with income over \$80,000 would gain \$8,270.

While the comprehensive tax reform legislation enacted in 1986 is expected to make the income tax system somewhat more progressive, a CBO study this year shows that the poorer 10 percent of the taxpayers will see their total Federal tax liabilities (excise, Social Security, as well as income tax) rise by 20 percent in 1988 over 1987; the wealthiest 10 percent, however, will pay about 6 percent less.

Budget deficits incurred in the latest years now severely limit flexibility both in tax policy and in social legislation. With an enormous IOU overhanging the economy, budget choices to improve equity will be restricted, and politically very difficult unless public backing is strong.

Between FY 1980 and 1988, military expenditures grew from 5 percent of the GNP to an estimated 6.2 percent, while non-defense programs (excluding Social Security and interest) were squeezed down from 9.9 percent to an estimated 8.1 percent of GNP. The country bought more military power at the direct cost of family welfare. In the absence of bold moves now to cut military spending, the chances of righting imbalances and moving toward more constructive goals for the future are not favorable. What happens next will depend on the readiness of the public to support the ideals of economic as well as political justice under which this democracy flourished. □


"The basic test of economic justice is what happens to the most vulnerable groups in society."

World Council of Churches, 1987

**Shares of US Income
Among Fifths of the Population**

percent of total

CHART 24



Poverty's Progress

- A survey by the US Conference of Mayors found that demand for emergency shelter and food rose 20 percent in 1987.
- In New York, the world's richest city, there are now 30,000 homeless people in the streets; 70 percent of the city's black and Hispanic children live in poverty.
- An estimated 23 million Americans are functionally illiterate. Among mothers on welfare, one in three is illiterate.
- The Federal supplemental food program for those at nutritional risk serves less than half those eligible.
- 37 million Americans have no health insurance; when they are ill, they become health-care beggars.
- The minimum wage has dropped in real value since 1981. A full-time job at the minimum wage of \$3.35 per hour pays \$6,968 a year, or \$1,873 below the poverty line for a family of three.
- Real income per farm family is below the levels of the depression era.
- For mothers and children who live in poverty, welfare benefits in 1987 averaged about 11 percent less in real terms than 10 years ago.
- In 1986 there were 32.4 million people in the US living in poverty. One child in five is born into poverty.

Statistical Sources

The principal data sources* used in Tables I–III and throughout the book are listed first under each topic. Organizations referred to in the text or notes are shown with their initials.

Area and Population	United Nations (UN), US Bureau of the Census, Population Reference Bureau, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
Education	UNESCO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), US Agency for International Development, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), US Bureau of the Census, World Bank, Population Reference Bureau, US National Center for Education Statistics.
Exchange Rates	International Monetary Fund (IMF), Joint Economic Committee of US Congress, World Bank.
Food	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), US Department of Agriculture.
Foreign Aid	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), UN Conference on Trade and Development.
Gross National Product	World Bank, Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, US Department of State.
Health	World Health Organization (WHO), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), US Department of Health and Human Services, US Bureau of the Census, Population Reference Bureau, CREDOC Division d'Economie Medicale, International Social Security Association, Urban Institute, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).
International Peacekeeping	United Nations (UN), International Peace Academy, School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins, United Nations Association of the US.
Labor and Productivity	International Labor Organization (ILO), US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Military	International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, <i>The Statesman's Yearbook</i> , International Labor Organization (ILO), US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Center for Defense Information, Comptroller General of the US, US Department of Defense, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Institute for Policy Studies, <i>Europa Yearbook</i> , Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Coalition for a New Foreign Policy.
Nuclear	US Department of Energy, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), US Department of Defense, US Department of State, <i>Nuclear News</i> , International Atomic Energy Agency, Union of Concerned Scientists, Nuclear Control Institute, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies of Princeton University, <i>Nuclear Engineering International</i> , Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Federation of American Scientists.
Prices	World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), US Department of Commerce.
Research and Development	National Science Foundation, Statistical Office of the European Communities.

*In addition to the sources named, data have been obtained from the regional commissions of the UN and from national statistical services.

References for pages 54–55

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STATISTICAL ANNEX

The statistics which follow have been assembled for the purpose of analyzing comparative progress on a broad front, primarily for the world as a whole or for groups of countries. It is believed that they are representative for this purpose.

Because of the interest in the national figures which make up these totals, we are showing them in full detail for 1984 (Tables II and III). It cannot be emphasized too strongly that caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions from individual national figures, and particularly in making comparisons between countries. Some of the reasons why this is so are outlined in the statistical notes following.

Table III shows the country rank on a per capita basis for indicators of economic and social development. It is hoped that the selection is large enough to offset some of the inconsistencies in the individual series and to convey a general impression of relative standing.

MILITARY AND SOCIAL TRENDS

World, Developed,¹ and Developing² Countries, 1960, 65, 70–86

TABLE I

	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Military Expenditures^{3,4}																			
billion 1984 US \$																			
World	345	421	523	519	534	539	551	571	574	586	597	622	645	671	708	737	769	803	825
Developed	321	385	464	454	463	461	470	474	467	480	486	503	533	552	575	596	619	650	666
Developing	24	36	59	65	71	78	81	97	107	106	111	119	112	119	133	141	150	153	159
% of GNP ⁴																			
World	6.4	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.2	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.7	5.7
Developed	7.0	6.5	6.2	5.9	5.8	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.3	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.7	5.7
Developing	3.1	3.5	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.5	5.1	5.2	4.9	4.9	5.0	4.5	4.7	5.2	5.5	5.6	5.5	5.4
per capita, 1984 US \$ ⁴																			
World	121	131	147	143	142	140	141	142	140	141	141	145	147	150	156	159	163	168	167
Developed	353	399	459	444	450	443	448	449	439	448	451	463	486	500	518	533	550	574	585
Developing	12	16	23	25	26	28	28	33	35	34	35	37	34	35	39	40	42	42	42
per soldier, 1984 US \$ ⁴																			
World	18,600	21,568	24,353	23,923	24,982	24,785	25,066	26,139	25,656	25,287	25,083	25,443	25,683	25,975	27,708	27,869	28,494	30,629	32,000
Developed	31,628	38,584	44,459	44,780	46,995	47,017	47,813	48,204	47,599	48,863	49,644	51,262	52,482	53,734	55,610	56,797	58,882	63,400	65,800
Developing	2,854	3,744	5,383	5,619	6,162	6,525	6,673	8,074	8,491	7,945	7,909	8,119	7,468	7,662	8,722	8,841	9,105	9,572	10,200
Arms Exports																			
billion US \$																			
World	2.5	3.8	5.8	6.4	10.4	14.3	12.2	13.3	17.3	20.3	24.3	28.0	30.1	37.3	39.5	39.9	41.4	28.8	***
Developed	2.4	3.6	5.6	6.1	9.5	14.0	12.0	12.6	16.6	19.3	23.2	27.0	28.8	34.7	35.0	36.5	36.4	27.5	***
Developing	.1	.2	.2	.3	.9	.3	.2	.7	.7	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.3	2.6	4.5	3.4	5.0	1.3	***
Arms Imports																			
billion US \$																			
World	2.5	3.8	5.9	6.4	10.3	13.2	11.8	12.2	17.3	20.2	24.3	28.1	30.2	37.3	40.0	39.5	41.4	28.6	***
Developed	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.0	3.4	4.0	4.6	4.5	5.8	5.8	5.7	6.0	7.4	9.0	8.2	9.2	9.4	8.2	***
Developing	1.1	2.1	3.9	4.4	6.9	9.2	7.2	7.7	11.5	14.4	18.6	22.1	22.8	28.3	31.8	30.3	32.0	20.4	***
Foreign Economic Aid Given																			
billion US \$																			
World	5.1	7.0	8.6	9.5	11.4	12.9	17.4	21.8	21.6	23.4	29.8	32.5	40.1	37.7	37.4	36.2	36.9	37.0	46.4
Developed	5.0	6.8	7.9	8.6	10.2	10.3	12.5	15.4	15.4	17.3	21.7	24.9	30.0	29.0	31.2	30.9	32.1	33.1	41.4
Developing	.1	.2	.7	.9	1.2	2.6	4.9	6.4	6.2	6.1	8.1	7.6	10.1	8.7	6.2	5.3	4.8	3.9	5.0
GNP																			
billion 1984 US \$ ⁴																			
World	5,431	6,974	8,859	9,200	9,640	10,265	10,490	10,630	11,094	11,551	12,004	12,421	12,664	12,916	12,902	13,150	13,717	14,088	14,530
Developed	4,619	5,927	7,416	7,672	8,027	8,526	8,642	8,701	9,040	9,371	9,715	10,023	10,168	10,352	10,323	10,557	11,019	11,315	11,600
Developing	812	1,047	1,443	1,528	1,613	1,739	1,848	1,929	2,054	2,180	2,289	2,398	2,496	2,564	2,579	2,593	2,698	2,773	2,930
per capita, 1984 US \$ ⁴																			
World	1,821	2,124	2,433	2,475	2,542	2,654	2,662	2,647	2,714	2,776	2,838	2,885	2,892	2,898	2,844	2,850	2,911	2,942	2,992
Developed	5,081	6,140	7,336	7,514	7,789	8,201	8,244	8,236	8,495	8,742	8,998	9,217	9,280	9,382	9,294	9,444	9,795	9,996	10,182
Developing	392	452	549	567	584	615	639	652	679	706	727	745	760	765	753	742	752	758	788
Population																			
millions																			
World	3,039	3,346	3,707	3,785	3,863	3,939	4,014	4,089	4,161	4,233	4,306	4,382	4,457	4,535	4,615	4,695	4,776	4,856	4,941
Developed	909	965	1,011	1,021	1,031	1,039	1,048	1,057	1,064	1,072	1,080	1,088	1,096	1,103	1,111	1,118	1,125	1,132	1,139
Developing	2,130	2,381	2,696	2,764	2,832	2,900	2,966	3,032	3,097	3,161	3,226	3,294	3,361	3,432	3,504	3,577	3,651	3,724	3,802
Armed Forces																			
thousands																			
World	18,550	19,529	21,484	21,680	21,391	21,730	21,973	21,839	22,367	23,184	23,818	24,466	25,101	25,844	25,556	26,461	26,982	26,209	25,752
Developed	10,151	9,991	10,430	10,133	9,859	9,799	9,824	9,831	9,815	9,826	9,801	9,824	10,157	10,273	10,348	10,499	10,510	10,253	10,115
Developing	8,399	9,538	11,054	11,547	11,532	11,931	12,149	12,008	12,552	13,358	14,017	14,642	14,944	15,571	15,208	15,962	16,472	15,956	15,637
Physicians																			
thousands																			
World	1,588	1,913	2,233	2,320	2,421	2,558	2,636	2,737	3,140	3,317	3,425	3,652	3,906	4,066	4,305	4,445	4,606	4,760*	***
Developed	1,182	1,408	1,620	1,684	1,756	1,835	1,898	1,976	2,158	2,228	2,285	2,408	2,504	2,539	2,669	2,751	2,829	2,910*	***
Developing	406	505	613	636	665	723	738	761	982	1,089	1,140	1,244	1,402	1,527	1,636	1,694	1,777	1,850*	***
Teachers																			
thousands																			
World	14,631	18,194	21,535	22,674	24,004	25,116	26,370	28,206	29,017	29,892	30,663	31,483	32,016	32,449	32,982	33,430	34,227	35,120	35,930*
Developed	6,795	8,085	9,000	9,151	9,288	9,496	9,687	10,181	10,128	10,180	10,233	10,254	10,203	10,133	10,188	10,200	10,241	10,288	10,330*
Developing	7,836	10,109	12,535	13,523	14,716	15,620	16,683	18,025	18,889	19,712	20,430	21,229	21,813	22,316	22,794	23,230	23,986	24,832	25,600*

*** not available e estimated

1. *Developed countries*, 29 in number, are those identified by a small ■ in Tables II and III. They include countries listed in North America, most of Europe, Oceania, Israel, and Japan.
2. *Developing countries*, 113 in number, are the countries listed in Latin America, six in Europe (Albania, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia), Asia except Israel and Japan, all of Africa, Fiji and Papua New Guinea in Oceania.
3. Data for Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam not available for many years during the period shown.
4. Values expressed in 1984 prices and in general converted to dollars at 3-year average exchange rates (1982–84). Percentages and per capita data are adjusted for any differences in country coverage between the two series.

COMPARATIVE RESOURCES (continued)

142 Countries, 1984

TABLE II

	PUBLIC EXPENDITURES													HUMAN RESOURCES			
	Population		Area			GNP	Military		Arms Imports	Int'l. Peace Keeping ³	Education	Health	Foreign Economic Aid ⁴ Rcd.		Armed Forces	Physicians	Teachers
	1,000	% Urban	1,000 sq. km.	% Arable ¹	Density ²	million US \$	million US \$	% of GNP	million US \$	million US \$	million US \$	million US \$	million US \$	million US \$	1,000	1,000	1,000
AFRICA⁶	501,854	28	28,995	6	17	386,120	15,154	3.9	5,730	.477	13,648	3,845	119	8,248	1,381	66.2	2,357
Sub-Saharan Africa ⁶	15,171	24	23,022	6	18	198,005	5,839	3.0	3,070	.246	6,331	1,891	51	7,579	921	30.7	1,649
• Other Africa	86,683	50	5,973	6	14	188,115	9,315	5.0	2,660	.231	7,317	1,954	68	669	460	35.5	708
• Algeria	21,368	43	2,382	3	9	53,386	967	1.8	525	.033	2,509	747	48	125	130	8.2	182
Angola	7,415	25	1,247	3	6	6,970	988	14.2	1,100	.003	365	84	—	101	43	.5	26
Benin	3,911	39	113	16	35	1,087	25	2.3	5	.003	55	15	—	78	3	.3	16
Botswana	1,036	22	600	2	2	961	32	3.3	0	.005	81	22	—	103	3	.1	8
Burkina Faso	7,714	8	274	9	28	1,139	31	2.7	20	.003	31	9	—	189	4	.2	7
Burundi	4,467	5	28	47	160	1,117	39	3.5	20	.003	38	9	—	141	5	.1	7
Cameroon	9,467	42	475	15	20	8,549	170	2.0	70	.009	300	87	—	186	7	.7	40
Cent. African Rep.	2,484	42	623	3	4	718	14	2.0	0	.006	39	8	—	114	2	.1	4
Chad	4,429	27	1,284	2	3	604	63	10.4	40	.003	11	4	—	115	4	.1	6
Congo	1,875	48	342	2	5	2,153	57	2.6	90	.003	116	42	—	105	9	.3	12
Equatorial Guinea	320	60	28	8	11	130	6	4.6	0	.003	***	***	—	15	2	***	1
Ethiopia	42,113	11	1,222	11	34	4,742	442	9.3	575	.003	141	66	—	534	306	.6	62
Gabon	981	41	268	1	4	3,701	78	2.1	20	.005	155	50	—	75	5	.3	6
Gambia	707	21	11	14	64	229	1	.4	0	.004	10	7	—	54	1	.1	3
Ghana	12,609	32	238	12	53	6,373	38	.6	10	.009	94	54	—	216	13	1.9	91
Guinea	6,073	22	246	6	25	1,924	59	3.1	5	.003	64	23	—	126	10	.1	13
Ivory Coast	9,600	43	322	12	30	6,544	81	1.2	20	.008	327	83	—	128	6	.6	46
Kenya	19,717	16	583	4	34	6,357	258	4.1	5	.004	383	131	—	411	14	2.1	142
Lesotho	1,537	17	30	10	51	864	25	2.9	0	.012	29	11	—	101	2	.1	7
Liberia	2,161	40	111	4	19	977	25	2.6	10	.003	44	18	—	133	6	.3	11
• Libya	3,626	76	1,760	1	2	28,615	3,700	12.9	1,800	.066	1,062	381	20	5	73	5.6	70
Madagascar	9,784	22	587	5	17	2,857	70	2.4	10	.006	110	63	—	160	21	1.0	57
Malawi	6,775	12	118	20	57	1,323	22	1.7	0	.004	35	31	—	158	5	.1	16
Mali	7,753	18	1,240	1	6	1,218	60	4.9	20	.006	40	19	—	322	5	.3	13
Mauritania	1,710	35	1,031	0.2	2	763	50	6.6	20	.003	56	10	—	172	8	.1	4
Mauritius	1,021	42	2	58	510	1,132	3	.3	0	.007	48	25	—	36	1	.7	10
• Morocco	22,612	43	446	19	51	13,627	762	5.6	190	.013	976	141	—	351	144	1.4	141
Mozambique	13,435	13	802	4	17	5,667	273	4.8	260	.003	109	45	—	317	16	.4	22
Namibia	1,149	51	824	1	1	1,776	***	***	***	—	46	11	—	—	***	.3	9
Niger	6,349	16	1,267	3	5	1,565	12	.8	0	.003	45	16	—	162	2	.2	9
Nigeria	99,889	28	924	34	108	76,660	1,375	1.8	480	.072	1,510	460	51	38	133	8.9	449
Rwanda	6,120	6	26	41	235	1,687	25	1.5	5	.003	52	10	—	165	5	.2	15
Senegal	6,458	36	196	27	33	2,493	71	2.8	0	.003	123	33	—	368	10	.5	17
Sierra Leone	3,607	28	72	25	50	1,740	12	.7	0	.003	45	20	—	63	3	.2	15
Somalia	7,298	34	638	2	11	1,759	168	10.0	70	.003	29	11	—	363	63	.4	12
• South Africa	32,031	56	1,221	11	26	83,626	3,387	4.0	5	.105	2,251	451	—	—	83	18.4	260
Sudan	21,500	20	2,506	5	9	8,680	283	3.3	110	.003	413	20	—	623	58	2.4	66
Swaziland	655	26	17	8	38	655	10	1.5	0	.003	38	12	—	18	2	.1	6
Tanzania	21,327	18	945	6	23	6,999	230	3.3	20	.003	235	98	—	564	40	1.1	95
Togo	2,933	22	57	25	51	712	18	2.5	0	.005	44	16	—	110	5	.2	14
• Tunisia	7,046	53	164	29	43	8,861	499	5.6	140	.014	519	234	—	188	30	1.9	55
Uganda	14,187	10	236	28	60	6,402	68	1.1	5	.003	83	10	—	165	18	.7	60
Zaire	29,671	34	2,345	3	13	8,746	106	1.2	10	.003	304	38	—	312	26	2.2	153
Zambia	6,530	43	753	7	9	3,440	140	4.1	10	.010	186	73	—	240	14	.9	30
Zimbabwe	8,404	24	391	7	21	6,592	411	6.2	60	.008	497	147	—	298	41	1.3	69

■ Developed country • Other Africa — none or negligible *** not available

- Includes permanent cropland, land under temporary crops, and land temporarily fallow.
- Population per square kilometer of surface area.
- Because peacekeeping expenditures have been relatively small, they are listed in fractions of millions of dollars in order to show the maximum number of national contributors. National and regional totals are rounded to millions if they are \$1 million or higher. Numbers are added before rounding.
- See page 00 for reasons for major differences in totals between aid given and aid received. Aid is net except aid from communist countries, which is gross. In countries marked with footnote number, significant portion of aid received is gross.
- Represents aid to Israel, which is classified as a developed country in this report.
- Egypt is shown with the political grouping of Middle East states, rather than in Africa.
- Estimates by World Bank and OECD Secretariat.
- Not including South Africa, which is included with "Other Africa".

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