

RED ARMS IN ATTACK ON SADF BUILDING

Changing the character of the ruling bloc (such that the military, English capital and 'non-white' middle class elements have had their influence increased) has coincided with a change in the semantic engineering being propagated in the media. A number of new themes are evident. Firstly there is the need to counter the Verwoerdian racism that has been taught to a whole generation of white South Africans. The Military realize the need to co-opt so-called 'moderate non-whites' in order to bolster white privilege. The Afrikaans press and the SABC in particular are trying to 're-educate' neo-fascist whites, who are resisting such moves, into a realization of the need to broaden the ruling hegemony's power base.

Secondly, a harking back on SABC (emphasised by PW Botha's 'pilgrimage to the Delville Wood Monument) to South Africa's participation in the Second World War occurred in 1985. The State President's Guard even changed its dress to look like the Second World War South African uniform. The now ruling National Party had opposed fighting 'for the English' and against the Nazi's in that war. The Second World War theme is (a) linked to the broader aim of generating a war-psychosis amongst South African whites in preparation for war; (b) linked to a desire to incorporate English-speaking South Africans more closely into the ruling alliance; and (c) suggesting that the current conflict in South Africa is similar to the West's 1939-1945 democratic struggle against fascism.

If the Military is to have unfettered muscle in deciding the resolution of conflicts on the sub-continent -- especially if it is to be in the name of 'orderly' economic development -- then the ideological terrain has to be bulldozed to make such development feasible. The Steyn Commission offered the means, the multinationals and capital the motive.

THE ANC: MOSCOW'S SERVANT

ANOTHER POLICE STATION ATTACKED

1985 (M) armed with automatic rifles and hand-grenades attacked Johannesburg police station in Lubbeka at about 7 pm on Friday night. The area remained in S.A.

Lieutenant-General says it's the

ANC

**'Attacks to avenge
Soweto, June 16'**

The frightening aspect of developing a pervasive ideology is the state's inability to redefine this 'willed' ideology when conditions warrant it. Although the discourse of 'total strategy' disappeared from political speeches and SABC reporting within hours of the Nkomati Accord, certain state agencies continued as if nothing had changed.

Nkomati set up a series of contradictions which were indicated by struggles occurring within the state (between the Police and the SADF, and between the Dept of Foreign Affairs and Information and the state repressive agencies). This was seen in the arrest of 16 members of the UDF during mid-February 1985, barely days after the State President announced a conditional reprieve for Nelson Mandela and other long term prisoners convicted of treason, and in the continued clandestine support of Renamo by elements of the SADF and government in the face of Nkomati.


'Total strategy' does not work when consensus breaks down at Cabinet and populist levels. This results in the application of contradictory strategies by different government agencies. A comparison of the violent police action in the Crossroads Squatter Camp during the same week as the UDF arrests when residents pre-empted a state attempt at forced removal with the approach of the SABC and other government agencies, is illuminating. The Police had over-reacted and embarrassed

capital. In contrast, the SABC deflected images of confrontation and ill-advised police repression with those of 'negotiation' between the Chief Development Board Commissioner and the Crossroads Residents Committee. A spokesman for the Committee was allowed to address the camera. This was the first time that **Television News** transmitted interviews with the **victims**, rather than only authority. This was followed by the Minister of Cooperation and Development on the need for consultation between the state and the Crossroads residents on removals. Although the Minister of Law and Order was briefly quoted, he was not interviewed. The Development Board was also shown to be at fault. It had not 'set the climate' which would have persuaded the residents of Crossroads to consent to their removal. The problem was framed as a **communication gap** between authority and the squatters, and not the result of 'communist agitators' as the Police allege.

It would appear that fissures within the state resulted in the application of conflicting 'solutions.' While enormously complex and expensive attempts are made to create the impression of democracy through the tricameral parliament, 'reform' is nullified by precipitous police action. This may represent a carrot and stick policy, or more likely, the Security Police may be out of control. The declaration of a State of Emergency on 17 June 1985 resulted in **troops** being moved into the townships on a large scale, suggesting that aggressive Police action needed to be complemented by a more benign military presence. The subsequent banning of cameras in areas of unrest was designed not only to prevent alleged distorted reporting, but to protect the 'image' of South Africa by covering up often brutal Police violence.

The position of the military is somewhat different. The implication for South Africa's permanent arms economy is that even if a lasting peace does occur in terms of an enduring capitalist order, it may have a marginal effect on the militarized character of South African society. A 'free enterprise' economy could not easily afford to abandon this sector of production, even if the times were not recessionary. However, such a state has to rationalise its continued defence expenditure in the face of peace. It does this by expanding its arms exports and building up its military arsenal. The legitimisation of the permanent arms economy is effected mainly through the media. Although the press is often critical of state and Police repression (as it was of continued post-Nkomati Renamo support by elements of the SADF and Cabinet), it is supportive of South Africa's belligerent stance against socialism and the Soviet Union. This belligerency has to be backed up with arms and forces.

After Nkomati, the abstract idea of 'total' war gave way to the traditional image of creeping communism. The 'total onslaught' idea has not been abandoned but, as Seegers notes, it has been de-emphasised and qualified (54). The shift in emphasis was necessary in the light of police statements that since Nkomati (until the end of 1985), the ANC terror and sabotage programme had significantly diminished. Following the Accord, charges of Russian expansionism reappeared in political and SADF discourse and Defence Force Generals warned of an impending conventional arms clash. These statements were made in the face of concrete evidence from a growing number of political scientists about the 'hands-off policy' of Russia at that time. Despite this, it was



not difficult for the state to persuade white South Africans of the 'truth' of the expected Soviet invasion.

The maintenance of this hawkish posture allowed the government to continue with its repressive legislation. However, the rift between the state repressive agencies about the nature of the current enemy continued to be a problem for government. The Defence Force tagged its continued need for high military expenditure on the threat of Soviet expansionism, while the police still chased the old enemy which they identified as agitators, trade unionists, community organisers boycotters and anybody belonging to the UDF and AZAPO. This fragmentation of the 'enemy' is problematical for the attempts by the reformists to explore new means of inducing consent with the willing cooperation of the subordinate classes.

The theoretical coherence of 'total strategy' no longer binds the state or capital (both local and international). The struggles going on within the Cabinet prior to the second State of Emergency were reflected at every level of the state, from the repressive agencies themselves to ideological apparatuses like the SABC. While the Police remain difficult to control, 'reform' will be sabotaged. If both the Police and the SADF are out of control, then no matter how much or what kind of reform is enacted -- it will be prevented from working in practice.

Reform = *CONTROL at any COST
PRIVILEGE at any PRICE*

Extract from the End Conscription Campaign's newsletter, *At Ease* [vol 2 no 4 July 1987]

Yanks like ECC


Laurie Nathan, last year's ECC National Organiser, has just returned from an eight week tour of the United States, sponsored by the War Resister's League. Here he talks about his experiences.

"I've just returned from an intense and extremely worthwhile speaking tour of the United States. In eight weeks I travelled to 30 cities, addressing about 60 forums and doing 70 interviews on the current situation in South Africa and ECC campaigns under the emergency.

"The response to the tour was overwhelmingly positive....."

BURYING THE TRUTH

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


Notes and References

1. This position was taken by Herman Giliomee, Stan Greenberg and Heribut Adam at the 1984 conference on Economic Development and Racial Domination at the University of the Western Cape.
2. Seegers, A.nd: "Extending the Security Network to the Local Level". Unpublished paper, Dept of Political Studies, University of Cape Town.
3. O'Meara, D. 1983: **Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934-1948**. Ravan, Johannesburg, has demonstrated the value of applying a 'class fraction' analysis to South African conditions. Thus, despite some theoretical problems with 'class fraction analysis' the writers of this paper believe the concept 'class fraction' remains a useful one when analysing South African conditions.
4. Saul, J.S. and Gelb, S. 1981: **The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution**. Monthly Review Press, New York; O'Meara, *op. cit.*
5. English capital refers to capital controlled by English-speaking South Africans.
6. The growing frustration felt by English capital with the State is reflected in its intermitent periods of tentatively being supportive of government (i.e 1980-86) and periods when it is extremely critical of state policies of repression.
7. **Sunday Times**, 13.12.1987.
8. **See Sunday Tribune**. 25.5.1986,p. 3.
9. Seegers, A. 1987: "The Security Establishment's Response to the Emergency in South Africa". Paper delivered at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, October; Tomaselli, K.G. 1984: "'Adapt or Die': Militarization and the South African Media", **FUSE**, Vol 7 No 5, pp. 215-218.
10. Tomaselli, R.E. and Tomaselli, K.G. 1986: "From News Management to Control", **Die Suid-Afrikaan**, Winter, pp. 53-55
11. **Government Gazette**, No 101, 1986.
12. The South African media are, of course, not the first to be influenced in so negative a way by a war situation. If anything, this sort of 'militarization' of the media is the norm in conflict situations. See Knightly, P. 1982: **The First Casualty**. Quartet Books, London.
13. See Interview with Major-General Meiring, **Indicator** , 3,3, 1986.
14. Frankel, P. 1984: **Pretoria's Praetorians**. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Chapter 2.
15. Frankel, *op. cit.* Chapters 2 & 3. The South African military and police academies teach what they call counter-insurgency warfare. Those in command of the military and police are clearly familiar with the theoretical texts of both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare. SADF actions, in particular, reveal the influence of the following: Beaufre, A. 1965: **An Introduction to strategy**. Faber, London; Clausewitz (see Rappoport, 1968: **Clausewitz on War**. Penguin, Harmondsworth), McCuen, J.L. 1966: **The Art of Counter-Insurgency Warfare - The Strategy of Counter Insurgency**. Faber, London; Thompson, R. 1966: **Defeating Communist Insurgency - Experience from Malaya and Vietnam**. Chatto and Windus, London; and Trinquier, R. 1964: **Modern Warfare - a**

- French View of Counter-Insurgency.** Praeger, New York.
16. Frankel, *ibid.* pp. 92-94; NUSAS, 1984: **In Whose defence? Conscription and the SADF.** NUSAS, Cape Town. This is obviously a problematical strategy for those trying to defend the existing order because black South Africans are well aware they are exploited and so the SADF 'hearts-and-minds' exercise (called "Burgersake" in the SADF) does not really have a 'saleable' message.
 17. Frankel, *op. cit.* pp. 95-100; NUSAS, *op. cit.* 1984, pp. 51-53; Tomaselli, *op. cit.* 1985; Seegers, *op. cit.* The Security Establishment's Response to the Emergency in South Africa.
 18. Frankel, *op. cit.* pp. 82-91.
 19. Defence White Paper, 1977.
 20. Seegers, A. 1984: Dimensions of Militarization: Separate Development, State Structures and the Rise of the Military in South Africa. Paper presented at the Economic Development and Racial Domination Conference, University of Western Cape.
 21. *Paratus*, 1983, No. 3, pp. 56-57.
 22. If one sees the white civil servants, military and police officials, as part of a 'patronage system' it becomes possible to understand why these fractions are personally interested in the maintenance of the existing order. If the present government falls these groups presumably believe they will suffer personal financial loss because the patronage system that supports them will be starved of funds.
 23. Seegers, *op. cit.* 1984, p. 32.
 24. *Ibid.* pp. 44-51; IDAF, 1980 p. 3.
 25. *Sunday Star*, 16.8.1986, p. 5.
 26. Shelton
 27. Seegers *op. cit.* Extending the Security Network to the Local Level.
 28. *Daily News*, 3.9.1986 p. 6.
 29. Fiske, J. 1981: **Introduction to Communication Studies.** Methuen, London.
 30. Louw, P.E. 1983: "The English and Afrikaans Presses: One Press or Two?" *Communicatio*, Vol 9 No 2; Louw, P.E. 1984: "The Libertarian Theory of the Press: How Appropriate in the South African Context", *Communicatio*, Vol 10 No 1.
 31. *Rapport*, 15.6.1986.
 32. See *Paratus*, Vol 36 No 10, 1986, p. 56.
 33. See Allison-Broomhead, M., Chetty, A., Prinsloo, J. and Daran, D. 1986: The Visual role of the 'Rubicons' as Part of the 'Reform' Strategy. Paper presented at the 1986 Conference of the Association of Southern Africa, University of Natal, Durban.
 34. Muller, P. 1986: "The Media and Security Forces: Is a Joint Strategy Possible?" *Communicare*, Vol 5 No 1, pp. 29-33.
 35. Pinnock, D. and Tomaselli, K.G. 1984: "Underdevelopment and the Progressive Press in South Africa", *FUSE*, Vol 8 No 4, pp. 19-24.
 36. See *Rapport*, *op. cit.*
 37. Mattelart, A. 1979: "Notes on the Ideology of the Military State" in Mattelart, A. and siegelaub, S. (eds.): **Communication and Class Struggle. 1. Capitalism, Imperialism.** International General, New York, pp. 402-430
 38. Beaufre, *op. cit.*

39. Mattelart, *op. cit.*
40. Mattelart, *op. cit.*
41. *Ibid.* p. 406.
42. O'Meara, *op. cit.*;
43. **White Paper**, 1979
44. Giliomee, H. 1983: "The Militarization of Government Policy in South Africa", **Indicator**, (Political Monitor) Vol 1 No 2, p. 16.
45. See **Daily News**, 17.6.1986
46. Mattelart, *op. cit.* p. 417
47. Addison, G. 1980: **Total Strategy as Total Propaganda: The Socialisation of Danger.** Paper delivered at the 1980 Conference of the Association For Sociology in Southern Africa, Maseru.
48. Under military dictatorship, the state becomes a surplus value producing factory for the MNC's. It guarantees the conditions necessary for the penetration of foreign capital and the establishment of an economy directed towards foreign markets, either from the United States itself, or from its neo-colonial industry to non-American markets. See Mattelart, *op. cit.* p. 418.
49. See also F Van Zyl Slabbert in **Daily News**, 25.4.1986
50. See, eg. **Sunday Tribune**, 7.9.1986 which heads its editorial with "PW Botha a National Calamity".
51. See, eg. Hachten, W.A. and Giffard, C.A. 1984: **Total Onslaught.** MacMillan, Johannesburg.
52. Clutterbuck, P. 1981: **The Media and Political Violence.** MacMillan, London.
53. See Tomaselli, K.G. and Tomaselli, R.E. 1982: "'How To Keep Your House in Order': Read All About it in Steyn Commission II", **Critical Arts**, Vol 2 No 3, pp. 1-22
54. Seegers, *op. cit.*. Extending the Security Network to the Local Level.



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From the White House

1987 is an important year in the history of the SADF as it is our 75th anniversary this year.

In 1912, two years after the union between the British colonies and the Boer republics, the Union Defence Force was formed. Since then South Africans of all races have acquitted themselves excellently in two world wars, Korea and the struggle against the communist-backed ANC and SWAPO.

The history of the SADF is a history any country can be proud of, and even though the world powers have seen fit to place an arms embargo on us in an attempt to keep us down, we have risen above this hurdle and built up a massive industry.

Now South Africa is self-sufficient as far as are our arms are concerned and we are exporting some of our technology. More important than armaments is the support of the people and we as South Africans have every reason to be proud of our Defence Force which is still undefeated in any war.

1987 is also an important year for Natal Command as it is also our 50th anniversary.

There are a number of events to be held in Natal to commemorate both our anniversary and the SADF's. You will be informed of these events during the year. Our working slogan this year is "Efficiency and Effectiveness".

We must strive to be efficient in everything we do this year and we must also be effective as these are both streamlining processes.

Lastly, I wish you all everything of the best for 1987 may it be everything you wish it to be.



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THE FACE OF THE ANC

The face of the ANC, as portrayed by The Sunday Star of Johannesburg of 12 January 1986, after the organisation marked its 74th anniversary with threats to step up its "peoples' war".

2. Social Construction of the Enemy

This chapter focusses on the awesome challenge to alternative media posed by the power of the state broadcasting monopoly; the example of how the 'terrorist' archetype is perpetuated illustrates the more general pattern of dominant ideological hegemony.

Although dealing with a kind of medium to which the ECC has no access, and analysing the portrayal by such media of an organisation very different from the ECC, this analysis is relevant to the concerns of this report in that it deals with a powerful conditioning process operating on the population amongst whom the campaign operates.

Social Construction of the 'Enemy':

SABC and the Demonisation of the ANC-Terrorist


Television (and radio, for that matter) has been accused of encouraging terrorism, civil disturbances and the escalation of copy-cat violence. It has been described as a potentially dangerous medium for the disruption of the 'reasonable society'. However, at the same time it is a highly effective medium of reassurance and the propagation of political and ideological conformity. This the South African government is fully aware of. Because of the structural control the state has over the SABC, and more importantly, because of the congruence in the ideological outlook and policy between the Corporation and the state as a whole, the government is able to rely on the SABC to punt its point of view uncritically and effectively. Thus in the matter of the reporting on and the portrayal of the ANC, it comes as little surprise that the views of the government are the views of the SABC.

In an editorial **Comment** following Fredrick Van Zyl Slabbert's visit to Dakar in July this year, the SABC approvingly quoted **The Times** of London as opining that the ANC had "opted for a two-fold strategy of mustering international publicity against South Africa and promoting internal violence"(1). A corollary to the second is that the ANC is essentially a **terrorist**, rather than **political** organization. In response, it is around these two themes that the SABC has launched its counter-attack on the ANC.

Folk Devils - Stereotyping the 'Enemy'

The SABC has excelled in its stereotyping of the ANC as a demonic force. The ANC is almost invariably reported on in terms of **violence** and **terrorism**. The process of demonisation has been undertaken at all levels: in news reports both on radio and television, as well as in-depth current affairs programmes such as **Network**. However, the latitude for unsubstantiated 'opinion' offered by the editorial form of the five minute morning programme '**Comment**', has provided the greatest scope for dehumanising organizations and fronts opposed to the South African state. The ANC has been a prime target for their vilification. They have been portrayed as folk devils - incarnations of evil and inhumanity who are without conscience in their single-minded determination to overthrow the norms of civilized society who "were still responsible for so much bloodshed within South Africa, and were still committed to a revolutionary takeover of power" (**Comment**, 17.8.87). They have "dealt with callous inhumanity against hundreds of Black South Africans whose crime was that they held different political views" (**Comment**, 22.12.86):

Over the years the ANC itself has admitted being responsible for bombing, shootings and landmine explosions in which dozens of civilians have been killed. Time and again its cadres have struck out



PW says:

'I regard (discussions with the ANC) as unwise and even disloyal to the young men who are sacrificing their lives in defending South Africa's safety.'

"nages
of a
violent society

THERE
CAN BE NO
COMPROMISE
TO
TERRORISM

HNP MP Mr
Louis
Stofberg: 'if
they kill our
people we
must kill
more of
them'

CONTROL at any COST
PRIVILEGE at any PRICE

THEY'RE
WATCHING US
... AND
WAITING FOR
THE MOMENT
TO STRIKE

blindly with regard for the identity of their victims
... (Comment 20.7.87).

The motifs of indiscriminate and ruthless killers is a repeated one. Consider the following description of the ANC's "armed struggle", which the SABC describes as:

ANC-speak for terrorism that consists largely in planting bombs and mines in public places and indiscriminately killing any who happen to be around when they go off. The movement refused even to condemn necklace murders and other such atrocities claiming that they were inevitable although they did not form part of the ANC (Comment, 14.7.87).

In the excerpt above we see a common (and usually effective) tactic of any propaganda campaign: the redefinition of contentious terms by the denigration and questioning of given meanings ('armed struggle'), and the supplanting and reinforcement of authorial meanings ('ANC-speak for terrorism'). Thus the SABC refers to the "ANC's ... terrorist violence - the so-called armed struggle" (Comment 31.7.87).

To complete the picture of the ANC as folk-devils, it is emphasised that their ruthlessness even extends to their own members who are treated with "casual indifference to life and elementary standards of human decency". In the television documentary seen on Network 17 December 1986, the purported conditions inside an ANC training camp 'eye-witness' accounts were given by 'former ANC members, concerning the 'atrocities' committed against 'dissident' members: "... young Black recruits (were) enticed with promises of further education, herded together in camps in which malaria, food poisoning and sexual diseases were commonplace. "

Diplomatic Sideswipes

In the international arena, it appears that propaganda and publicity are best fought with propaganda and publicity. Very little attention is given to the ANC's diplomatic initiatives. The so-called "Dakar delegations" of South African whites who met with ANC executives towards the end of 1986 - particularly those who were Afrikaans speaking, or part of the the Dutch Reformed Church establishment - were 'excommunicated' from the fold as outcasts, traitors or as having sinister motives, and whose "purpose must be questioned" (Comment, 20.7.87). When all other methods of exclusion were applied, they were "useful idiots who allow themselves to be exploited to further its (ie. the ANC's) purposes (Comment, 14.7.87).

Pik defends 'ANC attack speech' with a threat

Bruce Cameron
Political Correspondent
FOREIGN Minister Pik Botha came out firing all guns last night in the face of a welter of criticism of his handling of claims that the ANC was about to launch a terror campaign to disrupt the election.

would get away with disbelieving his warning of the threatened attack. Mr Botha repeatedly attempted to smear the PPP.

plot. Some gave credibility to the claims while other were dubious. None were prepared to...

of South Africa." Accusing Dr Treurnicht and Mr Eglin of cheap political propaganda.

ca". Addressing a National P... Mr Botha told a crowd...

In the international arena, it appears that propaganda and publicity are best fought with propaganda and publicity.

Faced with the problem of the growing acceptance of the ANC by the world's diplomatic community, the state needs to identify those who are on 'our side', and those who are not, and therefore need to be discredited. Generals, captains of sports teams and gang leaders are all aware of the mechanism whereby attack on one's own side is deflected by exploiting grievances and divisions among the enemy.

Foreign politicians who do recognise the ANC as a liberation movement are passed over as "opportunistically backing a possible winner" (Comment, 8.1.87). We are also left with now doubt that, left to the South African Government, the ANC will never be a winner! While diplomatic initiatives by the ANC are seldom acknowledged, any apparent division within foreign governments is given widespread broadcast coverage. The visit to Maputo (enemy territory) by Mr Michael Armacost, described as "a senior official of the American State Department" whose purpose it was "to speak to ANC leaders" was juxtaposed with a previous statement by one of his "colleagues" that "Any group that is supported by the Soviet Union does not have freedom as one of its objectives, so we would not agree that the ANC are freedom fighters" (Comment, 22.12.86).

Anti-ANC personalities (Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senator Jesse Helms) and conservative groupings such as the Coalition Against ANC-Terrorism in Washington, the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute for the Study of Terrorism in London, are well-known to the average radio-listener in South Africa, if not in America. It was with great satisfaction that the SABC's morning Comment (20.10.87) pointed out that Mrs Thatcher's denunciation of the ANC as 'another terrorist organization' effectively undermined the Congress' diplomatic recognition.

The theme of the ANC as a **terrorist**, rather than **political** movement is important, since this is the rationale for the continued refusal of the Government to negotiate with the ANC as a party to the future of South Africa on the grounds of the "continuing commitment of the African National Congress and its leadership to violence, terrorism and revolution" (Comment, 12.2.87). It is also important, since through a semantic sleight-of-hand, the state's strategists are able to put the ANC on a par with other terrorist organizations throughout the world. This in turn acts firstly to taint the ANC with the violent actions of these organizations, and secondly, to justify any

State challenged to 'come clean' on anti-ANC booklet
THERE are striking similarities between a Bureau for Information booklet on the African National Congress and an illegal and anonymous publication being issued in the police district of the Federal Progressive Party spokesman in the Pretoria Press. Both challenged the Government to come clean on its role in the counter-espionage unit in the counter-espionage unit. *Face to Face* with the ANC.
The publication is illegal because it does not carry the names of the printer and publisher. It also quotes and includes photographs of ANC leader Nelson Mandela.
By David Broder and Chris Whitfield
The two are almost identical. The Bureau for Information (BFI) published the booklet in the year for the Bureau for Information.
When asked to explain the similarities between the booklet and the illegal publication, Deputy Minister for Information, Louis Nel, categorically said the Bureau had nothing to do with the booklet and anyone free to lift from it. He said the publisher was quoted as saying the printer and publisher, he would not worry about copyright of the booklet.
This week it was reported that a Cape Town printer, who is believed to have printed the booklet, said "It would be fatal to say whether or not I printed the booklet and asked whether the Government should be allowed to put its case overseas."
Asked to comment, Mr Nel said he had never seen the printer concerned and did not know of him.
Police said this week they were investigating the publication but yesterday referred questions to the Bureau for Information.
He said there was no copyright on the bureau's booklet and anyone free to lift from it. He said the publisher was quoted as saying the printer and publisher, he would not worry about copyright of the booklet.

ANC scorns pamphlet
Political Correspondent
CAPE TOWN The African National Congress and its leaders should be unbanished or released from prison so the public could hear what it had to say, a spokesman for the ANC in Lusaka said today.
ANC spokesman Mr Tom Sibina was reacting to a Government-issued pamphlet. Talking with the ANC, which labels the ANC as a communist-dominated organization committed to a revolutionary takeover to implement a communist society.
The pamphlet is aimed at discouraging talks with the ANC.
Mr Sibina dismissed the document as being "distorted information".
He said the Government had claimed that only seven of the 30 members of the executive were non-communist.
He denied this, saying the Government had for years defined people as communists who did not have any idea of Marxism or Leninism.
Mr Sibina however refused to say how many members of the executive were South African Communist Party members. "I am not going to be their agent and help them with information."
The pamphlet he said was aimed at intimidating opinion formers in South Africa from visiting the ANC as well as misleading the public.
"The ANC has been banned for 25 years. We have not been allowed to put our point of view. Why don't they allow the newspapers to publish what the ANC has said."

Govt booklet gives ANC aims
Mercury 3/6/86
PRETORIA—The Bureau for Information has printed 70,000 copies of a 42-page booklet, talking with the ANC, for distribution among opinion formers in the country and overseas.
The Deputy Minister of Information, Mr Louis Nel, said at a news conference yesterday that 13 private groups from South Africa had visited Lusaka for talks with the banned organization.
The booklet was published because the Government had a date to ensure that debate with the ANC took place on an informed basis, he said.
"It is therefore important that South Africans should be properly informed on the nature of the ANC, its history, its ideological orientation, its composition and its policy."
The publication quotes extensively from ANC statements and documents and from the ANC's Radio Freedom.
It contains material which has been proscribed in South Africa but which is essential for a proper understanding of the ANC, Mr Nel said.
A senior bureau spokesman said newspapers could quote from it without fear of prosecution.
If the government had grant permission for the ANC to publish a document outlining its position—in reaction to the bureau's booklet—"we would consider it," Mr Nel said.
He warned of the "hidden agenda" of a communist state in South Africa and to dispense with the ANC members once the first phase of the revolution was achieved, namely the so-called national liberation.
The document was not intended to discourage relations with ANC members prepared to renounce violence and negotiate for a constitutional compromise.
After two decades in exile the ANC's leaders had lost touch with developing realities in South Africa. The ANC did not enjoy the support of black urban areas and developments in the black townships.
As long as the ANC remained affiliated to the SACP and committed to violence, there could not be negotiations with it, Mr Nel said. — (Sapa)

PW says:
'I do not believe the Press should be muzzled.'

As Minister of Defence, NP Congress East London
The Star
3 September 1975

excesses of 'control' the government wishes to meter out to alleged or convicted members of the ANC. These range from the use of detention without trial (justified by the example of the British government faced with the IRA), the summary use of arms against ANC-suspects (compared to the Israeli control of the West Bank) and even the "reconnaissance action against ANC terrorist facilities in Zambia", which was rationalised by a comparison to the actions of the US against Libya in 1986. In the latter case, Robert McFarlane was quoted as saying that "it had to be understood that a country had both a moral and a legal right to move pre-emptively against terrorists" (Comment, 30.4.87).

A related strategy is the definition of the ANC as Soviet surrogates through "the ANC's close ties with the South African Communist Party" (Comment, 12.1.87; 20.1.87). Referring to the leadership changes within the ANC in early 1987, in which the SACP wing was greatly weakened, Comment called on the authority of the Director of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism in London to tell us:

...that the changes are cosmetic, made in response to pressure from Western governments; that the Communists have taken over the ANC; that the Kremlin does not allow itself to shrugged off that easily; and that the African National Congress is not ready for negotiation because it has still not given up violence" (Comment, 12.2.87).

The importance of stressing the Communist/Soviet relationship is two-fold. Internally, it is a good scare tactic which plays on the inner-most apprehensions of the average middle/working class white South African. In this respect, it is part of the process of demonisation which defines the repugnant 'otherness' of the ANC, and welds a climate of public solidarity against them. Externally, it provides an easily graspable rallying point on which South Africa and conservative Western governments, particularly Thatcher's Britain and Reagan's America are able to

EXPOSED: the 'V' in revolt

Luke Zeeman

THE authorities have silenced all opposition and taken control of the media.

People disappear. Roadblocks ring the cities. Strict security measures are in force.

An experienced journalist becomes the official spokesman. Tyranny and oppression stalk the cities.

What's happening is a totalitarian suppression of the truth. They control the TV and now they've got the newspapers, too. We're under martial law.

Sound familiar? You're right.

You must be one of the hundreds of thousands of South Africans who have seen it happen on TV, courtesy of the SABC.


It's the serial 'V', which, coincidentally, hit the airwaves a week before our own State of Emergency was declared.

The SABC version may differ slightly from the home video, but only if "violent scenes are excessively long or the suppliers have cut it", a corporation spokesman said. This week a soldier became a flaming torch. The SABC did not cut it.

The eight-hour mini-serial has shocked some viewers and amazed others. One viewer called the production a "text-book for guerrilla warriors", designed to mobilise the masses. Some of the heroes are black.

On the surface 'V' is pure science-fiction. Disguised lizards ("Visitors") come to "help" Earth but their real intentions are to steal water and eat humans.

If the political overtones appear as far-fetched as the plot,



COUNTER-ATTACK... resistance fighters destroy an alien aircraft.



UNMASKED... one of the "Visitors" has the false skin ripped from his face.

And it's all by courtesy of the SABC...

just watch for the statement at the beginning: "To the heroes of all resistance fighters, past, present and future, this work is respectfully dedicated."

In "V", all broadcast facilities are taken over by the authorities to "avoid confusion". The journalist who becomes the spokesperson for the tyrants was chosen because "people have a lot of confidence in you - you're trusted and respected, qualities which are essential".

At first the authorities take violence as an excuse to declare martial law. The official

spokesperson appears on TV and announces: "Everywhere the visitors are making friends and keeping order. But the need for the measures still exists because of the terrorists."

"There were even fewer incidents of violence today. The people are co-operating and reporting all those who may be involved in conspiracies." Substantial rewards are given.

The hero is a freelance TV newsman, who becomes Public Enemy No 1. Much of the plot of "V" is revealed as the characters are watching television. It provides background, com-

mentary and becomes a frightening tool for propaganda.

A variety of responses emerge. There are those who go along with anyone in power - the collaborators. There are starry portrayers. Some do it for money, or fear, or the promise of a high office. Others to save their families.

To bury your head in the sand, hoping that everything will go away, is not acceptable in "V": you will only become a lizard lunch. The only hope for all is to fight, even if it means losing your life. Thus the resistance is born.

They are ordinary people, without military training, who learn how to organise, make petrol bombs, limpet mines and to infiltrate security areas.

The heroine "Julie", a young research chemist, goes underground and tells them where to begin. "We have to organise. Any complex structure is composed of a group of cells, like our bodies. Our cells will reproduce, expand and join with others."

"We are just a handful now, but I know there are more of us. We must find the others who feel the same and then go out and look for more. We need equipment, communications and a headquarters. Next time we meet each of us must bring another four."

One of the biggest obstacles facing those fighting for freedom is their lack of credibility. The authorities use the media to denounce them as terrorists and explain the disappearance of people as proof of their involvement in plots against society.

Families are divided: "You, who said it could never happen, woke up one morning in a fascist state," says the hero. Mother replies: "Those who respect law and order are free. It's criminals like you who call it fascist."

Not all the Visitors are bad but war makes no distinctions. One Visitor tries to attend the funeral of a young boy. "Your kind killed my boy, get away!"

Sixty-five million people in America have seen "V", and 10 million in Britain. If you've missed the beginning, you can still get it from Warner Home Video... unless the "Visitors" get there first.



THE VISITORS... the officers' first task was to make friends.

agree: a common international abhorrence towards the Red Threat. Warns **Comment**: "...Americans have learned - in Nicaragua, Cuba and elsewhere - what happens with broad coalitions in which Leninists have control. They establish Marxist Governments" (20.1.87).

Illustrating the Demon

Television **News** is the ideal place to illustrate the image of the demon-terrorist. The central question in the relationship between television and its portrayal of 'News' events is one of legitimation. In this respect, the value of language as an instrument of persuasion is paramount. The obvious corollary is that language should be controlled in ways that favour definitions issuing from the state. Language in this sense is not confined to the verbal level alone, but includes diverse para-linguistic conventions which are the building blocks of electronic communications. These sign systems are derived from pre-television 'real-life' linguistic codes, which work on a conventional and unconscious level. This is why stereotyping works so well on television. The codes reproduced here are those which are commonly used in other social interactions, and in turn, reinforce dominant readings of concepts and terms.

Consider for a moment an incident nearly two years ago, when the 'unrest' throughout the country was at its height. Under the Chromakey title: **POLICE/TERRS CLASH**, Michael de Morgan reads with a neutrality only proffered to newsreaders:


Two ANC terrorists were killed and two policemen wounded in separate incidents near Port Elizabeth this morning. Another terrorist was arrested.

Here we see immediately that **by definition**, armed members of the ANC are terrorists. Chris Olkers' narration confirms this for us:

Chris Olkers:


0249: The drama started shortly after midnight last night when two policemen on routine patrol in Zwede, the black township near Port Elizabeth, stopped a suspect in the street. The man suddenly produced a Russian made firearm and tried to shoot the police. The firearm refused to fire and the man was arrested.

0266: In his possession police found a Russian-made AK 47. After interrogation reinforcements were called.



VISUALS

0247: Olkers in front of police station building: Louis Le Grange Square.




0266: White cars on mud/water covered road lined with onlooking.

0269 Super: Courtesy
SAP video unit E


Cape
pulls forward to 1 yellow van with 10 policemen, some in pale blue shirts / blue caps - some in khaki / soft bush hats - 2 policemen (blue) near house. 2 X armed SADF with riot helmets stand behind van.

0274: Police surrounded a house in New Brighton, another township near the city. A Russian trained ANC terrorist opened fire on the police with an AK 47 rifle.



0287: During a wild gun battle, Captain Sakkie du Plessis was shot 4 times. The terrorist was also killed by police fire.

0291: In the house police found Marxist propaganda material, placards and weapons and ammunition of Russian origin.



0302: Captain Du Plessis was rushed to the provincial hospital in the city where he underwent an emergency operation. He is in a satisfactory condition. A suspect in the house was also arrested. Police then went to a house in Soweto. After calling on the inhabitant to come out a Russian made hand grenade was thrown at the police.

0319: Constable Andre Strydom was wounded during the incident. During the ensuing battle the terrorist was shot dead.

0324: The Constable is in a satisfactory condition in hospital. Police confiscated a large number of Russian arms and ammunition.


0331: The Police investigation is continuing.

0274: police / SADF men mingle in front of wooden house.

0276: CU of front door - interior gloom - see outline of kitchen unit.

0280: clothing / bed linen / newspapers scattered all over floor camera moves L to bed - white policeman removes mattress

0285: CU man removes blood-splattered plank.




0291: CU of book "Marx and Lenin on Communication", pans to wall posters reading "Boycott Wilson-Rowntree"; "Remember Steve Biko"

0298: exterior of house, CU of (white) hands opening leather wallet, exposing wads of notes in R5 and R10 denominations.

0302: CU white policeman digs through ashes of fire - light (looks like a torch beam) focusses on uneaten mielie cobs.

0312: exterior of building CU on foreground 5 red shells (bullets) - pulls back to exterior of wooden house - police at doorway.

0319: 1W 1B white safari suited men with red rubber gloves carry out stretcher - body covered with blanket / green sheet over where (presumably) is the dead. Put stretcher down.



0331: stretcher dragged off by one man (disregard for human dignity) bare brown feet exposed. Head now covered with red covering.

Several themes raised above are evident in this piece. Most striking is the repeated insistence on the Russian origin of the the weaponry: "Russian-made firearm", "AK47 rifle", " "Russian made hand grenade", "Police confiscated a large quantity of Russian arms and ammunition".

The connection between the the origin of the weaponry (which may simply have been expedient, since the Russians were probably the only ones prepared to sell to the ANC), is implied as an ideological connection: "In the house police found Marxist propaganda material, placards and weapons and ammunition of Russian origin". It is worth noting, that the visuals give a different reading here. A close-up of an academic book on Marxist theories of communication, published in Paris and freely available at academic bookstores throughout the country, is followed by wall posters supporting the boycott of Wilson-Rowntree sweet makers, and a memorial to Steve Biko. Hardly "Marxist propaganda", but it serves well enough to scare the average viewer with unspeakably dark fears on the RED Menace, especially when followed by (uncommented on) display of (unaccounted for) money.

More sinister however, is the systematic dehumanisation of the those involved in the 'incident'. Only the policemen are graced with names: Captain Sakkie du Plessis, and Constable Andre Strydom. The black men are nameless: "a man was arrested"; " a suspect was also arrested". Without any cause or reason being given (other than the presence of Russian weaponry), the next 'suspect' we came across is promoted to "a Russian trained ANC terrorist". Note here again, how the 'ANC' tag is linked immediately with the 'terrorist' tag. Later the former is dropped, and we are simply told that "the terrorist was shot dead". The ultimate dehumanization occurs when the body of the dead 'terrorist' is dragged, not carried, out of the yard, two bare brown feet showing from under the blanketed form. This is however in keeping with the general tenor of the visuals, in which the bloodspattered remains of clothing, bedding, fire ashes and uncooked mielies are exposed for the grisly voyeur. The visuals for this piece of 'crime reporting' were supplied to the SABC by the SAP video unit in the Eastern Cape. The earlier reference to the congruence of interests between the various state agencies, including the SABC, could not be

THE REVEREND TRAN HUU THANH

In a letter written to a South African bishop by two Vietnamese refugees in the USA, the following experience of a Catholic priest (Reverend Tran Huu Thanh) was described. In 1973 he organised an anti-government movement in South Vietnam in an attempt to bring about reform. He helped to organise the masses to stage protest campaigns and infused members of the defence force and public servants with feelings of hatred. These campaigns helped to bring about the fall of the government and precipitated the communists' final onslaught.

After the communist victory the Reverend Thanh and his fellow workers were arrested and imprisoned. Many were killed.

(Excerpt from the State President's speech in Parliament, 17 April 1986)

In Cuba there was also a broad front, known as the July 26th Movement, including many democrats opposed to the Batista regime. At this stage of the revolution Fidel Castro promised his liberal allies that he would lead the country to genuine democracy with free elections. However, once he had seized power many of his former non-communist allies were imprisoned, exiled or executed.

Excerpts from:
"Talking to the ANC"

In this regard the comments of Sol Dubula, writing in the *African Communist* No 87, Fourth Quarter 1981, explain why it is correct that the ANC, and not the SACP, should lead the liberation alliance during the first phase of the revolution:

"If correct leadership of the democratic revolution requires the strengthening of the national movement as the major mass organisational force, then this is precisely the way in which the party exercises its leading and vanguard role in the real (and not vulgar) sense of the term. This is the way the Vietnamese Communists exercised their vanguard role in relation to the FLN during the liberation struggle, and it is also the way in which the early Cuban Communists related to Fidel Castro's July 26th Movement".

Here the SACP is admitting the nature of its leadership role in the ANC.

THE ANC IS A TERRORIST ORGANISATION

The armament of the ANC is, *inter alia*, land mines, limpet mines, demolition mines, explosives, hand grenades and AK 47 rifles. When mine warfare and motorcar bombs are used, the victim cannot be chosen and innocent civilians constitute the biggest percentage of the victims.

The onslaught by the ANC is, therefore, not primarily aimed at the Security Forces — as in the case of guerilla action but, as in the case of other terrorist organisations, ANC actions are directed at unidentifiable victims, with the aim to scare the population, thereby intimidating them.

In this regard, the ANC does not differ at all from the PLO, IRA and the Red Brigade.

ANC POLICY ON . . .

• VIOLENCE

It is necessary to look at a few important policy statements by the ANC on key issues. (The policy of the South African Government on these key issues is also given).

On 18 February 1985 Radio Freedom broadcast the following appeal:

"Enemy property must be petrol bombed or attacked in any possible way. Enemy agents and collaborators must also be isolated and attacked".

Earlier, on 20 January 1985, Radio Freedom had been more explicit about ANC targets and objectives:

"Puppets⁹ were killed, their houses burned, many were forced to resign and are still resigning today".

Later, on 7 October 1985 Voice of Freedom, broadcasting from Zimbabwe, expressed satisfaction with this policy as follows:

"The strategy of burning sell-outs of the system seems to have paid out well in the ultimate end".

During a meeting at California State University on 10 October 1985, ANC spokesman Alosi Moloi, justified this policy of violence as follows:

"Among us we have people who have openly collaborated with the enemy. You have to eliminate one to save hundreds of others".

His colleague, Tim Ngubane, told the same meeting that

"We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never think of it".

And on 13 April 1986 Winnie Mandela shocked the world when she said:

"... with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country".

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON . . .

• VIOLENCE

"I would however shirk my responsibility if I do not state clearly that the Government is adamant to maintain order. People who perpetrate violence must take note that if they do not renounce violence they will inevitably face the full power at the disposal of the State which has not nearly been applied to the full. In future there must be no misunderstanding about this.

"It is my deepest wish that senseless violence be abandoned now. I plead with the public media to assist in this regard.

— State President P W Botha 15 May 1986

From: "Talking to the ANC."

better illustrated.

Since this particular episode, the state, frightened by what it sees as the power of television in the propagation of dissention, banned all pictorial evidence of anything which may fall under the rubric of 'unrest'. Thus a similar incident to that of February, 1986, was reported in October, 1987, in more sober, but equally chilling terms:

Adrian Steed: There was a shootout with police over the weekend in a coloured township near Bloemfontein. The latest police unrest report says shots were fired at the security forces with an AK47 rifle, as they were approaching a house in the residential area. The police retaliated by throwing hand grenades, and a man was killed. A trained terrorist, three accomplices and another man were arrested. An AK47 rifle with three magazines and two Makarov pistols were found in the house.

VISUALS;

News reader; confiscated weapons on display table.

News reports of this nature help reinforce the SABC's editorial perception of the ANC as demonic figures.

The state, and the majority of the white community which supports it, when faced with what it perceived to be an attack on the basis of institutional arrangements, needs to find a scapegoat that will attack the public's imagination, and provide an ethos of common revolution. The folk devil portrayal of the ANC-terrorist, a blood thirsty, ruthless killer, backed by Soviet masters, is just the thing. The national broadcasting corporation, which is congruent with the state in both its policy, ideological mindset and political loyalty, is just the medium through which this stereotyping can be propagated, and become part of the National Consciousness.

PW says:

'While my people were oppressed as a minority group, we fought for our rights.'


As Prime Minister, NP Meeting Knysna 7 November 1980



3. Countermanding the Parade Ground:

This chapter gives the broadest overview of *At Ease*; it introduces our methodology and constitutes the context in which the following chapters will be presented.

The author has chosen to link comment and analysis by connecting them to a set of theoretical concepts which examine the topic from different angles. Attention is given to the content of *At Ease* in terms of subject matter, language and symbolism.



from AFRAPix




Countermanding the Parade Ground: At Ease and Counter-Conscription

End Conscription Campaign

AT EASE is the newspaper of the Durban regional branch of the ECC. This analysis (1) will attempt to locate the paper in the South African socio-political context and examine the methods by which its content is determined, as well as showing how the language and logos used contribute to At Ease's message.

Because the state has set itself against opposition to compulsory military conscription, At Ease has to operate within narrow legal confines to survive. At the same time, the state's control over the commercial media and the SABC network enable it to establish the ideological parameters of public communication and to attack counter-ideologies. While the common sense within the white population may differ from current state discourse, the two are mutually supportive -- after all white civil society provides the government's support and power base. At Ease's content can be analysed as a response to this context. This does not necessarily mean that At Ease's response is always consciously constructed. Since aspects of semiotic analysis tend to be inductive, semiotics refers to selected evidence which might not be accurately representative of processes beyond the text under consideration. Nonetheless, we can identify the textual ideology encoded in At Ease in terms of three definitions of ideology offered by Raymond Williams(2).

The first definition of ideology offered by Williams defines ideology as a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group(3). This can be as easily applied to National Party discourse as to the contents of At Ease(4), for both reveal attitudes organised into a coherent pattern. The fundament of state discourse, for At Ease's purposes, is the belief in the need for conscription. One need only glance through a military publication, whether state or commercially published, to be made aware of this. The official National Service booklet, for example, published by the Allied Building Society, tells conscripts that: "the onslaught against the Republic of South Africa is a continuing onslaught which the enemies of South Africa are waging with every means at their disposal"(5).




End
Conscription
Campaign



**WE DEMAND
THE RIGHT
TO SPEAK!**

Conversely, the attitudes found in *At Ease* are based on a rejection of such state policy. *At Ease* argues that conscription is wrong, for instance by discussing the harmful consequences of pervasive militarism in white society. In a column headed "High Price" (Vol 2 No 2, 1987), "According to behavioural and clinical psychologists, the growing militarisation of our society tends to create people who are regimented, unquestioning of authority ... less tolerant of others' beliefs, are conditioned to respond to 'threats' with 'violence'... (be) moody, aggressive, withdrawn ... (and) prone to violence", in addition to a host of other problems(6). In addressing these social problems and blaming them on the state, *At Ease's* writers seem to be aware that, in the words of Brockreide, "attitudes have homes in ideologies"(7).

Williams' second definition of ideology is as a system of illusory beliefs - false ideas or consciousness which can be contrasted with true or scientific knowledge (8). The role of ideology in maintaining state dominance has already been referred to with respect to the function of media in legitimising state policy. *At Ease*, in line with ECC consensual policy, does not reject a country's right to militarily defend itself from outside attack. Instead, it specifically opposes the local role of the armed forces in oppression of citizens of the country who oppose the apartheid policy of the state, and in occupying and destabilising neighbouring states(9). "Hooliganism by certain township elements" ,maintains *At Ease* in an editorial campaign article, "should be dealt with by the South African police and not by the SADF, whose internal role has led to a severe crisis among conscripts for whom it is clear that the solution to this country's problems are political not military ..." (10). It is thus argued that conscription is intolerable, specifically in the context of civil war and neo-colonialism(11).



WHAT IS ECC?

ECC is based on the fundamental belief that individuals should have the freedom to choose whether or not to participate in the SADF.

The main thrust of the Campaign is directed at government, in order to bring about a change in the law so that military service is no longer compulsory.

ECC is not an organisation as such but an umbrella body comprising a number of different organisations. It is not affiliated to any other organisation and is not aligned with any political grouping.

The organisations represented on the ECCs in the 9 regions include church, women's, student, political and human rights organisations e.g. Black Sash, the Catholic Justice and Reconciliation Commission, and NUSAS. Although these organisations have varying policies on a wide range of issues, they are united in their opposition to conscription.

From a work point of view, each region has a regional general meeting every week or second week at which all major practical and policy decisions are made. The bulk of campaign work is carried out by various subcommittees, namely: churches, schools, culture and media.

Until such time as conscription is ended, ECC calls for certain interim measures to be adopted:

1. The definition of conscientious objection to be broadened to include selective and universal, secular and religious conscientious objectors;
2. Alternative service to be available in non-state as well as state bodies;
3. The period of alternative service to be reduced to the length of military service;
4. Troops be allowed to choose whether to serve in the townships or not, or in Namibia or not.

Collection Number: AG1977

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN (ECC)

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