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ANGLO-AMERICAN
CORPORATION

COMMISSION
OF ENQUIRY...
VAAL REEFS
EXPLORATION
& MINING CO.

COMMISSIONER:
ADV. D. A.
BREGMAN, SC.

JOHANNESBURG:
1987

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[MINUTES OF EVIDENCE] (August 6-7, 1987)

(Pages 4883-5095/missing from Reel 4)

Johannesburg: 1987

(REEL 6 of 6)






REEL 6

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(REEL 6 of 6)

MR CHAIRMAN : Good morning, this is the session
of 6 August 1987, DR MACNAMARA
being examined by MR PURCELL.

MR PURCELL : I think when we ended yesterday
DR MACNAMARA we were discussing
the ... initially the role and the authority of the
hostel manager within the hostel system and we had
moved on to the induna system which prevailed. Are
there any further points that have struck you in that
vein which might ^{be} of assistance to the commission? 10

DR MACNAMARA : No MR PURCELL.

MR PURCELL : EXHIBIT "L" before the commission
is a tribal analysis at Number
One Hostel over three specific dates. Unfortunately
I do not have ...

MR CHAIRMAN : No, I have got a ...

MR PURCELL : Have you got a spare?

MR CHAIRMAN : Well I have got it and I can
give it.

MR PURCELL : Thank you. The analysis is 20
broken down into thirteen

identifiable tribal groupings. For the purposes of
a smaller number of groupings would you, for example,
say that in the event of major intergroup conflicts
the Nguni speakers would be likely to ally themselves
together? In other words in this exhibit perhaps
you could say that the Pondos, the Pondomese,
the Xhosa, the Baca might form one group with perhaps
the Hlubi, and the Zulu, Swazi who are also Nguni?

DR MACNAMARA : I think it possible that there 30
could be/..

DR MACNAMARA : could be a combination, but I
could only point out that in
the past it is unusual for four or five of these
combinations to occur at once. In other words there
would just be a support given for example by Pondo
speakers to Xhosa speakers or Swazis supporting Pondos,
normally just a combination of two groupings. I
have not yet encountered a situation where there has
literally been every possible grouping with a remotely
Nguni label or a Sotho label, combining on a broader 10
basis. I have not really found that. I am not
saying it is significant, but I have not noticed that
in the past.

MR PURCELL : When we talk about the conflicts
based on power struggles or
based on induna power struggles, talking about a ...
the population with the highest proportion within the
hostel, in this case, from this exhibit it is apparent
that at material times the Sotho group had the highest
population during ... from the beginning of 1985, 20
certainly far higher than anybody else. By the
time we come to the 23rd of November 1986, the day of
the fighting, the proportion has dropped somewhat,
nevertheless Sotho speakers appear to be far in
excess of Xhosa ... the Xhosa group which is fifteen
percent, however if you add to the Xhosa group the
Pondos and the Pondomese and the Baca it comes up
to in the region of twenty-two percent which is a
fairly close percentage. If you add into that group
the Zulu and the Swazi and the Hlubi then we are 30
talking about/..

MR PURCELL : talking about an excess of ...
the Ngunis being more than the
Sothos, however the Sothos are likely to be possibly
going to be allied with Tswana speakers as being a
similar language group.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I think the reduction in
the number of men from Lesotho
is fairly clear, there is a fairly clear downward trend
which is not shed by any other group here. Conversely
there is a modest increase in the number of Xhosa speakers 10
but I notice that a substantial jump in the proportion
of Mocambiguans has taken place. I think the fact
that the population of Lesotho nationals appears to be
declining is, firstly, I would say that is not
unnoticed by the people, that those kinds of changes
in population are of immediate concern to employees
because it relates to their livelihood and the livelihood
of their fellow countrymen. So firstly I say that
would be noticed, secondly it could have ... it has in
the past had the effect of creating some anxiety on the 20
part of the induna of that particular group. I am
not saying that in every situation that would happen,
but we have noticed cases where that has happened,
that he then becomes concerned about, not only his
own personal status, but he then reflects the anxiety
of the group about its reduced numbers in the hostel.
There was a third point I was going to add, but I
do not recall it. I think that could constitute
some grounds for some of the apparent jostling that
appears to have taken place between indunas. I think 30
it certainly/..

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/ 4886

DR MACNAMARA : it certainly, without having
seen this evidence before, as I
did point out yesterday I would have looked for this
kind of information because it has been found to be
relevant in the past.

MR CHAIRMAN : When one has this sort of
mixture, where nobody, as it
were, is over fifty percent, but are proportions of
the order of fifteen, twenty, thereabouts, and there
might be some ten, twelve, others fifteen, eighteen,
do you find a dominant group exists and forms alliances,
perhaps not formal, or is the structure within the
hostel not lending itself really to the need for these
alliances? I mean one, hopefully, is not living
there in a state of conflict the whole time. What
is the position in the hostel in a normal situation?
A dominant group with others just shifting along, or
alliances and a state of tension as between groups?

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I think it is important
to note that we have attached
so much importance to these conflicts because they
are so severe and so on and the impression therefore
is that everyday life on the mines is a state of feud ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : I do not think that is the
case.

MR CHAIRMAN : Well that is what ... I would
like to hear you on that ..

DR MACNAMARA : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : What is the significance of
this?/..

MR CHAIRMAN : this? I mean you have referred to the anxiety on the part of the induna ...

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I think the change ...
Sorry.

MR CHAIRMAN : Reflecting an anxiety on his group.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I think ... it has been discussed and I have been involved in discussions in the research organisation about supposed appropriate balances to bring about stability, and one idea was that if you relate mines which have had this kind of conflict to the make-up of their population that the more peaceful mines appear to have a wider mix. 10

MR CHAIRMAN : Like this? Would you regard this as a wide mix?

DR MACNAMARA : By wider mix I would mean that there would be two dominant groups numerically, but that there would be at least a third that can balance those two. 20

MR CHAIRMAN : Well is this present here, or not?

DR MACNAMARA : Now this looks to me ... again we are playing a numbers game and it is very difficult, but I would have imagined that if I had not seen this information, I would have said a stable situation would have been where there would have been say at least a thousand Mocambiquans as well. In other words approximately a thousand from Lesotho, a thousand/.. 30

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4888

DR MACNAMARA : a thousand from Transkei, and
a thousand of a third force
and that there really is numbers that are creeping up
but there are only four hundred and fifty at this
stage. To me this is really still two groups with
a scattering of other groups which is, in some of the
very preliminary assessments that have been made, that
is not the most stable mixture.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, thank you.

DR MACNAMARA : I think one can get carried away with that, with the numbers' game, we are dealing with human beings here ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Certainly.

DR MACNAMARA : And it is how they perceive the situation that is going to be so vital and I would be prepared to say that on a mine where there was a fairly clear dominant situation, provided that it had prevailed for a long time, and it had not been changed, the people had become used to it and that they had lived with it. It is the change in those numbers and changes in the distribution of workers that start making employees nervous. They become nervous because they do imagine that there is some sort of selective recruiting going on. I am not saying there is that happening, but they do perceive that.

MR CHAIRMAN : Would that be the perception of a change, that it had come about because of selective employment or selective recruitment?

DR MACNAMARA ..

DR MACNAMARA : I put this purely as a perception.

They would look at the increasing number of Mocambiquans and they would say "Well management wants to get Mocambiquans because they are more law abiding and they are prepared to work and maybe they are trying to get rid of people who are not prepared to work", that would be the perception among certain employees which would create a certain nervousness. The reduction in the number of Lesotho nationals here ... certainly I do not know what people are saying at the mine level, the question I would ask is, would they relate that to their threatened status as an employment group in this industry after the question that was placed over foreign labour recruiting during this very period. I cannot believe that they would not ... that would go unnoticed which would produce a certain anxiety. So we are talking about a wider set of anxieties about the future employment status of groups that are related to these changes, and a narrower set of anxieties which affect the balance of power in a hostel where the indunas are now involved, so there are almost two dimensions which we have to look at.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Could I just ask both MR MOSIME

and MR LETHOBANE, in your discussions with miners, you with the Sotho essentially and MR MOSIME perhaps with other groups, maybe Sotho as well, has this aspect been canvassed at all or raised, this feeling of insecurity arising out of the change of the mix in the hostel creating certain nervousness and/..

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MR CHAIRMAN : nervousness and concern?

MR LETHOBANE : I must be honest, I have never
come across such concern.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, I mean you did not
pertinently ask them, now that

there are fewer Sotho here than there were last year
why do you think that is so, do you feel less happy,
are you ... /That has never been raised pertinently?

MR LETHOBANE : It has never been raised.

MR CHAIRMAN : It might be something to ...

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MR LETHOBANE : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : Debate with them when you speak
to them next, just to find out.

And you MR MOSIME?

MR MOSIME : No, we have not MR CHAIRMAN.

MR CHAIRMAN : You have not raised it, and it
has not come back to you as a

feedback?

MR MOSIME : No.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

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MR LETHOBANE : Sorry, another thing that I
noticed is that much as there

are reductions in you know the numbers of different
tribal groupings, and there has been some rise in
the recruitment of other national groupings, there
seems to have also been a decline in the total
strength of the ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR LETHOBANE : Of the hostel intake as well.

So I do not know if DR MACNAMARA

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would not/..

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/489/

MR LETHOBANE : would not also want to take that
into account in trying to relate
the reduction in the recruitment of particular national
groupings as well as the overall reduction in the
labour recruitment process.

DR MACNAMARA : That is important. It means
that whereas it is fairly
clear that a number of mines are finding it necessary
to cut back on labour from a productivity point of
view, that the employees look and see who is going to
be first, who is it, which particular group is it is
going to suffer as it were under this reduction of
labour. If it was done on a completely one to one
basis, in other words, every group suffered a proportional
loss, then it would be clear that this was being done
across the board, but of course that is not how real
life is, and they would read into the increasing
reduction of a particular group as part of a strategy,
they would read that I believe, and it would make them
anxious.

MR PURCELL : I would just point out from my
point of view, October,
November, December are traditionally in the mining
industry a period where labour figures do reduce,
it coincides with a high demand for leave by the
majority of its workers during that period, it is a
seasonal labour fluctuation.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR LETHOBANE : Perhaps I may just add that ...
I do not know of how much
relevance this/..

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4872

MR LETHOBANE : relevance this would be to
the question that the Chairman
asked. The concern that was raised in relation to
the reduction in numbers was not necessarily that
people ... or the intake of labour from Lesotho had
already been reduced, no, it was that the cause of
the intergroup violence was in fact aimed at ... or
rather the basis of the whole conflict was to get rid
of certain other people who are not required at the
mines when it was felt that it could be that some other 10
people have already achieved, you know, long service
records that would entitle them to some terminal
benefits and in the event of a fight breaking out
and they going home they are not taken back because
they are said to have voluntarily resigned and in
the process they also lose their terminal benefits
which they would otherwise be entitled to; Secondly
it was also raised that some people are regarded as
being too active in Union activities to the dissatisfaction
of mine management and when the group is recalled 20
back, not everybody is called back, those who are
unwanted elements are left out, so the concern was
raised along these lines, not necessarily along the
lines of the already reduced number of recruitment
from Lesotho, but it was felt that somehow this could
be a way of bringing about more reduction of the
number of people that would be coming from Lesotho
... not necessarily from Lesotho alone, but also from
the Transkei.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. So the perception 30
amongst some/..

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4093

MR CHAIRMAN : amongst some of the workers is
that it is whether utilised
by management or instigated by management or management
has so arranged things that when there is violence,
either they create the violence or they take advantage
of the violence to avoid having to pay long service
benefits to certain individuals because those people
are leaving the employment because they feel they
cannot remain on at the mine, that is on the one hand.
And on the other hand when people leave the mine
under those circumstances and then come back there
is selective re-recruitment. That apparently
would be a perception of workers to be added to this
general feeling, or apart from it, it may be the
predominant feeling amongst the workers. We have
not spoken to them, it is the select number that you
happen to have spoken to who give that particular
feedback. Has that been your experience also

MR NGOMANE?

MR NGOMANE : Not really, I would say in
Transkei we have not noticed
any decline in the numbers recruited from there.
Actually it is the fighting which causes people not
to be re-recruited again, you know, because in
several other mines the pattern I have noticed is
that when there has been a faction fight the people
who were involved are sent home and they bring in
new recruits, and by then they do not necessarily
bring that whole number that asked to leave, they
recruit a few less. Actually they usually leave
the people/..

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4894

MR NGOMANE : the people who are perceived to
be troublemakers behind ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR NGOMANE : That is what we have been
observing these last few days.

MR PURCELL : I would confirm MR CHAIRMAN
that management has been

accused, particularly in the latter, the selective
re-recruitment, you are creating violence so that you
can get rid of troublemakers, that is a frequent
accusation levelled at management by employees and
employee representatives.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. Yes, I ...

MR PURCELL : The first one I do not specifically
recall as an accusation, but
the latter is certainly so.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. Yes, thank you.

MR PURCELL : Again, commenting on the fact
that at Number One Hostel

there has been ... there have been changes in the
numbers of employees per ethnic grouping over a period
1985 to 1986 which in your evidence yesterday you
outlined a number of events having occurred which
could give rise to anxiety and contribute to tension
amongst employees on mines. Again ... The point
I am getting to is we are outlining contributory
factors to tensions which exist or could exist. I
propose to put certain constructions or conclusions
which MR DICKS has - the Mine Manager of the East
Division - has drawn in his affidavit which was

EXHIBIT "V"/..

MR PURCELL : EXHIBIT "V" to you, perhaps you
could comment on what he says.

Paragraph 20 of his affidavit, he has been commenting
on wide-spread intimidation of senior black employees,
major industrial action in the form of short shifts,
bombing of RAMOROBBI's house, the blowing up of the
vehicles, and he says:

"A pervasive fear grew amongst the employees caught
between the threat of possible bodily harm or even
death for non-co-operation with the NUM and the
threat of dismissal for participating in illegal
activities. In my view this fear and tension
caused polarisation along tribal lines and the first
faction fights between Xhosa/Sotho occurred on 11th
of March 1986 leaving three dead at Number One, etc.
In addition the faction fighting was accompanied by
extensive looting, particularly of Xhosa rooms."

Can you comment on that conclusion that he has drawn?

DR MACNAMARA : I think on the first statement
that the various events on the

mine caused fear, of that I have no doubt, and it is
certainly clear that employees, many employees, would
be caught between their fear of dismissal and their
fear of being pressured into industrial action. I
am trying to recall the events that were put to me
yesterday in order to ask the question as to whether
those very things caused tension on tribal lines.

MR PURCELL : Polarisation I think he said.

DR MACNAMARA : I think I am going to end up
giving a yes and a no here.

On the/..

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JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4896

DR MACNAMARA : On the one hand it is clear that
where anxieties are present in
a hostel situation that those anxieties can spill over
into so-called ethnic conflict and I spent some time
yesterday trying to explain this point, admittedly it
is a difficult one to convey, of how these hostel
tensions could encourage people to fall back to older
security groups as it were to protect themselves in an
environment which has no longer become easily
predictable. I think in that sense I would agree that 10
any tension of that magnitude could encourage people to
retreat into defensive groups and indeed to possibly
find it necessary to take action from the point of
view of those groups. Where I would raise a question
is that those tensions that were listed there
were alone the contributing factor to the inter-ethnic
conflict and I think it is also clear that all kinds
of tensions can lead to the same result on mines.
In other words even the fear of labour cut-backs or
of just selective recruiting could generate exactly 20
the same response in a group which then pulls back
and attempts by various means to consolidate its
position on the mine. So my impression is that I
am sure that those fears were ^a factor. My question
is perhaps there were other factors as well that
together accumulated in the minds of employees and
led them to find it necessary to take some of the
drastic steps that they did. I maintain that,
especially in conflict situations things get very
confusing and most residents eventually only know 30
one thing/..

DR MACNAMARA : one thing and that is that they
would not like to be caught in
the situation wherever it originated and whatever the
issue, and that they have a generalised response to
tensions in the hostel, and it could very well be that
the build-up of tensions preceding these events in
terms of some of the fears I outlined earlier about
future job security and so on, could well have also
contributed. So in that sense I would agree that
it is possible for those tensions to cause inter-ethnic
conflict, but it is also possible that an accumulated
set of factors have served the same purpose. 10

MR CHAIRMAN : You are talking about the
generalised response, are you
talking about falling back on what you call "the
old boy network"?

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, and that that generalised
response could feed off a
variety of tensions, not only the events that we have
here, but events that possibly even preceded this
and a general sense of insecurity on the part of
certain groups that they have more or less been
earmarked, or they think they have been earmarked
for reductions, all of these produce an overall
anxiety if I can put it that way. It would be
very difficult to say what specifically triggered
them. It would appear from the events that are
outlined that these specific actions did trigger a
response in a more direct time sense. The question
is why did it trigger such a profound response and such
violent conflict/.. 20 30

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4898

DR MACNAMARA : violent conflict on a number of occasions, and I would say we need to make sure that we have looked at all the factors that could have produced that sort of response.

MR PURCELL : Further down he comments in Paragraph 36 of his affidavit:

"The history detailed above indicates clearly that the tribal fighting was not the result of inter-tribal animosity per se, but an eruption of tensions built up over a period of time. At the East Division and One Shaft in particular these tensions were I believe instigated by NUM activists which were directed at disrupting established systems and intimidating those less amenable to change."

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Can you comment on that last sentence ...

DR MACNAMARA : Yes.

MR PURCELL : "Tensions instigated by activists which were directed at disrupting established systems and intimidating those less amenable to change"?

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DR MACNAMARA : Firstly, obviously the specific events I am sure you know and agree are a matter of evidence to demonstrate certain things and my own position here would be to try and make an interpretation. I think ... I am fully aware of the fact that prior to the advent of the Unions as I have outlined in my very first set of evidence that employees on the gold mines on the one hand are capable of organising themselves without the assistance of Unions, and they have done this

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for a/..

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4899

DR MACNAMARA : for a hundred years, and I think
we should not forget that.

Secondly that there are longstanding issues that
afflict or affect those employees, and the one that I
gave most attention to was the question of opportunities,
the resentment of the benefits of senior supervisory
employees and so on, and at best my hypothesis I
suppose would be that we are dealing here with an
inter-action between an older tradition and a newer
tradition, an inter-action between an older set of
issues and tensions which surface from time to time
which seem to emerge during and in the context of
Union organised activities. I would then imagine
that one could view it from two points' of view, on
the one hand a Union which would decide to organise
a liquor boycott could do that on fairly controlled
lines and then later find that it in fact went well
beyond their ability to control it. I think that
is not inconceivable. Of course it is just as
conceivable to suggest that the Union would be aware
that that would happen and that given the volatile
nature of the large scale labour force we have and
its history, that it would be just as conceivable to
argue that they would have known that would have
happened and possibly even have stimulated that to
happen.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Why? Why would they ..
What possible motive could
they have?

DR MACNAMARA : I think to put more pressure
on the/..

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JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4900

DR MACNAMARA : on the management with respect
to their own aims and objectives.

They are two possibilities, I am not saying either of
them have happened.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, they are hypothesis.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : On the one hand they have lost
control of something which has

a much older legacy than the Union's presence on the
mines, and which we have seen from time to time, we
have seen very violent conflicts in the past which have
had absolutely no Union involvement, and it has often
been my observation that the Union sometimes is riding
a large horse and one does not know whether the horse
takes the instructions from the rider or the other way
around. Quite frankly I would not know which way to
put an opinion on that, I think one ...

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MR CHAIRMAN : It would perhaps depend on the
Union present at a different

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shaft, at different stages of the Union's history, at
different stages of the relationship between the Union
and management.

DR MACNAMARA : The degree of control that they
had developed over time would
be a major factor.

MR CHAIRMAN : Or the motive to create a situation
of unrest.

DR MACNAMARA : It is very difficult to
question, to look at motives
and interpret/..

DR MACNAMARA : and interpret, one only has
peoples' actions to work from.

I think in general terms one is aware that a Union has a mandate to secure certain concessions if you like from the management and that various pressures are going to be brought to bear, both formal and informal. Formal in the context of negotiations and informal in the context of the labour situation. That those can get out of hand I think is recognised because of the unusual labour situation that prevails on mines with the ethnic mix, with the migrant character of the labour force, with the large scale of operations, I do not think anyone would be surprised to find that events like that can get out of hand, that they can in fact have the ripple effect that I described yesterday in the hostel environment and lead to generalised conflict which the Union may not have even been prepared to imagine would take place. On the other hand I think the Union is probably quite aware of ... has become fairly familiar with mines up to now, and I am sure would be aware that an action which was set up on a mine could grow and develop. I am afraid I could only rest the case there, I think the decision as to whether it is a situation that got out of control, or a situation which the Union was aware would get out of control and this served their purposes, becomes beyond my interpretation and setting up of these alternatives does become a matter of evidence. I personally am not sure. I am really not sure which way it ... what perspective/..

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JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4902

DR MACNAMARA : what perspective to adopt, it is
either one of these two.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR PURCELL : Thank you. I am going ...

I am starting at the end

instead of the beginning in MR DICKS' affidavit. I
refer to his Paragraph 8 where he comments on the
position of the supervisory class within the group
of employees we are largely dealing with as follows.
I would like to know what your reaction is to this
paragraph of his. 10

"1985 on the East Division saw the promotion of a
policy of opposition to certain facilities granted
to employees in supervisory and senior positions.
This was a movement against a class of employees
who had in general longer service, more experience
and were older than the average employee. It was
not uncommon to find such classes of employees to
be more conservative, resistant to change and
supportive of the established order. By nature of
their maturity position and experience these employees
would naturally be seen as opinion makers and leaders
and as such would present a stumbling block to the
ideologies and practices of the then rapidly
developing aggressive group of Unionised employees."

DR MACNAMARA : Yes. I feel fairly
confident ~~on this one~~ in that
there has always been a sense of frustration about the
benefits awarded to those above those in lower
positions. The very first strike which this 30

industry experienced/..

JAH/6/8/87
PT131/4903

DR MACNAMARA : industry experienced in
contemporary times took place
in 1973, one in which there were in fact ... there was
in fact an inquest because certain Lesotho nationals
were shot during that strike, that it arose from the
dissatisfaction with the introduction of job
evaluation procedures which attached special importance
to the job of ... to the senior supervisory jobs, and
the pecking order if you like of jobs was altered as
a result of the implementation of that procedure which, 10
for those who are not aware of it, attaches special
significance to decision-making as a criteria in
awarding merit in somebody's job. So naturally a
person who shovels rock or drills holes in rock has a
fairly low decision-making requirement, whereas a
supervisor has high decision-making requirements and
he is paid accordingly. And it is my finding in
the conflicts I looked at that that principle is in
conflict, that the employees who do the more harder
strenuous work reject that principle. They rejected 20
it in 1973 and ten years later in 1982 the very same
issue resurfaced in the 1982 strikes, where the
employees complained that once again the supervisors
got the better wages and what about the machine
drillers and those who had exposed themselves to the
most difficult side of mining. So on the one hand
it is clear that they have great difficulty in
accepting the criteria upon which wages are awarded
in the industry, so that those policies if you like
do represent a stumbling block to the mass of the 30
workers. Now/..

DR MACNAMARA : workers. Now enters the
Union element and with the -
as I described yesterday - with the penetration of
Union membership down to the unskilled ranks, whereas
in Phase One it was more or less recruiting the
supervisory ranks. I think it is quite clear to me
that the Union was aware of the fact that it was now
attaching itself to a privileged class in its
membership and that it would have to deal with the
agenda of the unskilled sooner or later and that its
membership penetrated down to the unskilled. And it
is their interests which are now being articulated.
I am sorry MR PURCELL, I am not sure if I have wandered
off the question. Were you looking for a comment on
how the Union has utilised that situation or ...

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MR PURCELL : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : I think the Union read that
situation, I think they read
that they had to attach themselves to a much more
fundamental agenda to do with basic wages of the
unskilled, to do with basic service conditions of the
unskilled, the health and safety programmes for
example and the pressure placed by the Union on health
and safety in the industry over the last couple of
years bears witness to that. The question then
arises, having supported that new agenda if you like,
are they accountable I suppose ~~for some of the~~
actions that were taken against supervisors? I
think once again my sort of general analysis falls
short where one attempts to establish a matter of

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evidence./..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4981

MR CHAIRMAN : Good morning this is the session
of Friday, 7 August 1987,

DR MACNAMARA was being questioned by MR LETHOBANE.

MR LETHOBANE : Thank you MR CHAIRMAN.

DR MACNAMARA when we parted last night ... or yesterday afternoon, I had just asked for your opinion as to how in your view it has happened that of late violent clashes have tended to concentrate on two specific groups, that is the Basotho on the one hand and the Xhosas on the other, and if I recall well you had indicated that in your view some of the underlying causes could be the persuasion on the part of the Lesotho Government on the Basotho workers in the mines which has resulted in the progressive withdrawal of the Basotho miners from active involvement in Union activities. And you also indicated that the reports in ... or the overthrowal of CHIEF JONATHAN's regime could have resulted in the loss of interest from the Basotho ... or on the part of the Basotho to continue to be actively involved in the Union. And thirdly you said it has occurred that the Basothos were confronting problems in respect of identifying with the wide agenda of the Union as well as its umbrella body, COSATU, and most probably the apparent lack of solidarity on the part of Basotho miners with their fellow-workers could have resulted in what I have seen as the concentration of violent clashes between these particular two groups, that is Basothos and the Xhosas. And if I have summarised your answer properly I must say that I appreciate that/..

MR LETHOBANE : appreciate that response, and
yet I may just make a mention
that it has not occurred to me, at least as an
individual, I do not know what the views of other
delegations here would be, that the clashes have occurred
between the Basotho speakers on the one hand and the
Xhosa speaking on the other as such. It seems the
beginnings of the clashes have been between the Sotho
speaking and a particular section of the Xhosa speaking
people and these are Pondos. And I am not aware that 10
Pondos have got, what one could regard as a renowned
history of active involvement in Union activities
such that they could be seen as enthusiastic enforcers
of Union decisions to the extent that they could even
think of physically punishing those who do not honour
the decisions of the Union. So in a sense this still
leaves a gap, at least as far as I am concerned, in
the answer, or rather the ... yes, the answer to the
question that you have given. Why is it that the
clashes which begin with Pondos versus Sothos, and even 20
if Xhosas would join, the other Xhosa speaking people
would join, it would only be in a later stage, but
the beginnings of the clashes tend to concentrate
between the Sothos and a particular group of Xhosa
speaking people, in this case these are Pondos, and
as I have said we are not aware that this particular
group has got such a good history of being you know
outright activists of the Union to the extent that they
could be seen as the enforcers of Union decisions.
I hope I have made my question clear. 30

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4983

DR MACNAMARA : Yes you have. And you are
to
referring a contradiction in
that if the conflict is between pro-Union and anti-
Union sentiments we should imagine that the two groups
that we can perhaps consider as possibly not being
highly involved or having withdrawn from Union
activities would be the Sotho speakers and the Pundos
and yet one would expect them to in fact have joined
forces if it was the case that, on the one hand, the
Pundos were reluctant for some time to be involved in
these matters and Sotho speakers according to the
analysis had found themselves having to withdraw to
some extent from Union activities.

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MR LETHOBANE : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : I am not aware of any instance
where the Sothos and Pundos
have in fact combined, so I do understand your question.
I am just going back through the events in question
which this enquiry is attempting to get to grips with,
the initial events in February/March from the notes
that I have, it was not clear that the Pundos really
had an involvement at the very beginning. There was
an attack on Sotho speaking team leaders, yes, but the
identity of their attackers is not clear to me that
they could be defined as being of, certainly of Pondo
basis.

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MR LETHOBANE : You are referring to the Number
Five Shaft incident at

VAAL REEFS?

DR MACNAMARA : At Number Five Shaft.

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MR LETHOBANE..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4984

MR LETHOBANE : Yes, I agree with that.

DR MACNAMARA : I see the involvement of the
Pondos coming in in November
for the first time ...

MR LETHOBANE : Well it started in 1980.

DR MACNAMARA : Is that correct?

MR LETHOBANE : It started in 1980 at
Carletonville.

DR MACNAMARA : Okay, I am being hoisted here.
That of course was on another

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mine.

MR LETHOBANE : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : I find it interesting to notice
here that in November, and you

queried this in terms of MR PURCELL's outline, there
was some certain suggestion that Sotho and Pondo had
in fact combined to enter the liquor outlet. Are
we questioning that as a matter of fact then? Because
that would in fact lend more support to this
combination idea of two groups who should, theoretically,
share the same interests, but I agree there may be some
dispute about whether that actually happened or not
and the difficulty in identifying who is entering a
liquor outlet.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Perhaps I could just mention
another factor here. There

was some evidence of a report of a meeting between
the Pondo group that led the attack on the shaft
stewards and were going to move that attack to the
BMQ to search for shaft stewards in the BMQ. There

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was a/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4985

MR CHAIRMAN : was a report that just before
that there was a meeting between
the Pondo and certain Sotho, we are not sure yet which
segment, it looks like the ... well a segment of Sotho,
where the Pondo were asking the Sotho, or that segment
of the Sotho to join them. And at one stage there
was going to be a joint action, but it collapsed.

We cannot get at this stage direct evidence of that
meeting, but the way in which the report was given
lends credence to the fact that there was such a
meeting. Why it collapsed, how it collapsed, what
the demands made by either party for support were
we do not yet know. This is something that possibly
by general discussion and gaining of confidence of
people we might get some background information to that,
but we have not got it yet. But on the basis that
there was an approach for a meeting, it supports a
possible line-up because of the, I will not call it
anti-Union alignment which is perhaps putting it too
strongly, but an annoyance with the conduct of some
of the shaft stewards because of the imposition or
perceived imposition of the liquor boycott.

DR MACNAMARA : Right.

MR CHAIRMAN : It may have broken down for the
other reasons which have been
mentioned, a lack of desire to get involved in an
issue which was perhaps more of a South African context
than a broad context. I am just putting that forward
to you ...

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, that is interesting.

MR CHAIRMAN ..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4986

MR CHAIRMAN : As additional ... well ammunition
is perhaps the wrong word, as
initial ingredients which you will put into your dough
to bake the bread.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I do not ...

MR LETHOBANE : Yes, maybe with that information,
that additional information that

you have just been given I could just restructure the
question very briefly so that I perhaps simplify it
even further. You see the point I am trying to get 10
at here DR MACNAMARA is to see if, in your experience,
you can be in a position to draw any parallels in the
conduct of these two groups. Their cultural back-
ground, traditional values which might in a sense be
regarded as some form of ... well, should we say
extremist attitude, that should in a sense inevitably
either make these two groups see eye to eye, or
alternatively make them clash because ... I must
tell you that my philosophy is that if two separate
groups tend to have similar extremist tendencies 20
they are subject to either one of two things.

Either they would be friends or they would be the
worst of enemies that you can think of. So what ...
the point I am trying to get at here by asking you
your view as to why these two particular groups tend
to clash more often than clashes that occur between
any other groups, is to find out from you if you can
strike any parallels between these two groups that
make them either antagonistic to each other, or could
as well, make them see eye to eye? 30

DR MACNAMARA ..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4117

DR MACNAMARA : The groups being the Pondos
and ...

MR LETHOBANE : The Pondos and the Sothos.

DR MACNAMARA : If I can put one piece of
information to assist the ...

If we go back and we count up all the number of clashes that we have records for from 1973 up until last year the most common form of clash is in fact between Sotho and Xhosa, I think we know this. So clashes between Sotho and Pondo are rarer than that occurrence, although Pondos have often figured in supporting Xhosa speakers against Sotho speakers. But I just put that one perspective that invariably we are dealing with what appears to be a long-standing antagonism between Sotho and Xhosa speakers proper. But that of course is a statistical statement based on fourteen or fifteen years of developments, the question is what are the trends. And it is the case that in 1985 and 1986 Pondo speakers featured more frequently than ever before, that is also a fact. Whether they were directed at Sothos as such is a matter for some discussion because if one looks through the records of events, and unfortunately it would mean looking at them in quite some detail in order to establish this, and I am now recalling, the general pattern is that the Pondos were involved in the breaking of liquor outlet boycotts against whoever stood in their way in that respect, that included - and I referred to this earlier - attacks on Xhosa speakers at WEST RAND CONS in July of last year. So whatever group figured/..

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DR MACNAMARA : group figured in the support of
a boycott became involved in a
clash with Pondo speakers. You know I am thinking
very carefully about your question about the existence
of possible ... a deeper animosity between Pondos and
Sothos. I can only give you those observations and
to suggest that ... I really cannot think of a
specific reason, and I do not see that as becoming a
major cause, or a major conflict inter-action between
the two groups, I do not see it emerging. I see the 10
Pondos, if anything, finding themselves conflicting
with a variety of groups who may have attempted to
bring a liquor boycott into operation. That would be
my view of that.

MR CHAIRMAN : And I wonder ...

DR MACNAMARA : I do not want to ... Sorry.

MR CHAIRMAN : No, carry on.

DR MACNAMARA : I do not want to intrude on
ADVOCATE LETHOBANE's questions,
but I think I would even like to add to his query, 20
which I believe is in his mind, is what we are dealing
with is this confusing relationship between the issues
at hand, the boycotts, the industrial issues, and the
emergence of ethnicity, and there is not a clear-cut
relationship all the time between these. And I
could even in contradiction of my own case, because
I am really anxious that we try and pursue these
matters, the Xhosa speaking group at VAAL REEPS also
showed contradictory attitudes. On the one hand
they clashed with Sotho speakers early on after the 30
murder of/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4989

DR MACNAMARA : murder of the team leaders
ostensibly because the Sotho
team leaders were not involved, or not interested in
participating in Union activities, and yet later on
in the same series of events during the year in that
mine we find the Xhosa speakers turning around and
hunting with the Pondos for shaft stewards. And
these are contradictory tendencies. On the one
hand they appear to be part of the support for certain
Union activities and the next minute they are joining 10
in a hunt against shaft stewards and I am very aware
of these contradictions. The analysis I tried to
present very briefly yesterday was that it ... what
we are dealing with is the ripple effect of a
conventional dispute on existing relationships and
wider relationships in a hostel which throw up
older conflicts between the groups, that is the argument
that I am finding is the only way to explain these
contradictions because they are there.

MR CHAIRMAN : I am going to ask MR NGOMANE ... 20
MR NGOMANE if you do not mind?

MR NGOMANE : Yes MR CHAIRMAN.

MR CHAIRMAN : You have more than a theoretical
interest and understanding of
the Pondo and the Xhosa, can you throw any light on
this problem, as a personal observation on your part?

MR NGOMANE : Well MR CHAIRMAN all I can say
is that where we come from,
Transkei, Pondos and Xhosas are regarded as one to
such an extent that all in all they are Xhosas, but
there is/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4990

MR NGOMANE : there is ... well I would say
because the Xhosa tribe
comprises of Pondos, Hlubis, Bacas, Tembus, Bomvanas
and ...

MR NGOMANE : We are all called Xhosas.
But because of ... And the
language is the same really except certain dialects
especially Pondos would speak in a sort of different ...
taking it from the Zulu language, there is a lot of affinity 10
with the Zulu language, but we speak Xhosa, we ...

MR CHAIRMAN : You know, even within any
nation or people or group
there are elements which regard themselves as representative
of a particular attitude, they might regard themselves
as the warrior section or the intellectual section
or the farming section or the section that mixes or
goes to the big white cities, and over the course of
a generation or several generations a certain
consciousness develops within the Xhosa community, the 20
total Xhosa community "Oh that man is of that type,
I would like my daughter to marry him, or that man
is of that type, I would not like my daughter to
marry him". Not judging the man on his basic
intrinsic worth, that is a separate issue, but from
the point of view of a consensus within the group,
these are the superior element, this is the aggressive
element, this is that element and so on, has there
developed amongst the Xhosa such a thinking, which
we know certainly is developed amongst white 30
communities throughout/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4991

MR CHAIRMAN : communities throughout the world.

MR NGOMANE : If I may continue MR CHAIRMAN?

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, please.

MR NGOMANE : Well let us say, using the Xhosas in Transkei, in Transkei

Pondoland, the eastern part of Transkei well it is notorious about faction fighting. These are inter-tribal clashes within the Pondos themselves, maybe feuds over settling old scores, grudges, maybe one takes my woman from that side then there is a faction fight they develop. Pondos are known for their fighting prowess and stubbornness. Well if they stick to a decision they abide by it. If they make a resolve they will not change, they are prepared to fight it to the bitter end. And furthermore, well it is just to throw some more light, during the wars, the Chaka wars when the tribes from the north were driven down towards Pondoland Chaka was defeated in Pondoland in actual fact so that is why his impi returned. And when the Pondos settled in that area they put certain trends at various strategic points to defend Pondoland. So these are the people who came from the north from the Zulus, from the ... I have forgotten many of the tribes, but they came from Natal mostly. To add more on the issue of Pondoland and Pondos in their in the mines, I have been involved in situations where I have mediated in cases of faction fighting I think about seven cases during 1984 and 1986, WESTERN DEEP LEVELS, VAAL REEFS, LESLIE

BEATRIX, you/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4992

MR NGOMANE : BEATRIX, you will find that there is a clash between Basothos and Xhosas. Invariably when the fighting takes place the Pondos will take the lead. Or the fighting has been a result of a Pondo being wronged about a woman or a Xhosa being wronged by one of the Basothos about a woman then the Pondos decide to take action. When they take a lead in a fight then a lot of wrongs happen, well there are usually many casualties. They do like fighting.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Can you tell us, within the Transkei experience is there a particular clan or set of clan alliances, sub-tribal alliances which say are more engaged in political activity, comprise the Government, the civil service and so on, or is it spread throughout the country?

MR NGOMANE : Do you mean the alliance?

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. I mean would you ...

I mean you have mentioned five, six Xhosa speaking groups, is the Government and the civil service representative of all of them or do they mainly come from one, two or a few of the groups? ... The university lecturers, the professionals and so on.

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MR NGOMANE : Well Pondos are more in numbers in Transkei, they have got numerical domination of Transkei ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR NGOMANE : But the political power was resting with the western Tembuland

so/..

MR NGOMANE : so the result was that
the Fingos have formed an
alliance with the Western Tembus for political
strategic reasons leaving the Pondos out in the cold.
But as things go, I mean there is a balance - there is a
shift in power now. Well in the civil service
it is all Transkeians, but you will find that probably
the people from Pondoland, not by design really, they
seem to be occupying certain prominent positions in
the Government.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Prominent posts?

MR NGOMANE : Prominent posts. And well
the other side of Transkei,
that is the west and the south, are always, not really
fearful of Pondos, not really suspicious, I do not know
the right term, but they know the challenge, they know
they are faced with a challenge from Pondos in many
respects.

MR LETHOBANE : They treat them with mistrust.

MR PURCELL : Respect.

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MR NGOMANE : Well it is some form of respect.
This I understand that they
would not like to ... they always say "Oh we will give
it to Pondoland". And well one of the fears they
entertain, if you can recall the 1960 disturbances,
Pondoland was heavily involved in that, that was the
region which boycotted ... which was in the forefront.
Well if I may just mention on the sideline ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR NGOMANE : Well even the leader of the ANC

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comes from/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4994

MR NGOMANE : comes from Pondoland.

MR CHAIRMAN : Sorry?

MR NGOMANE : The leader of the ANC comes from Pondoland.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, this is what I wanted to ask you, the political ...

the black political awareness in South African and the ANC and so on, one knows about the whole Fort Hare complex, Transkei, Ciskei and so on, and many Xhosa speaking people have been prominent in the black political movement in this country over the years, from the earliest days, do they come from any particular part of Transkei, ~~ex~~ are they spread throughout Transkei or are they mainly from one or two areas, if one can generalise at all?

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MR NGOMANE : Is it on record MR CHAIRMAN?

MR CHAIRMAN : Would you prefer it not to be?

MR NGOMANE : At least I would like to mention just one little part

Sir.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Thank you.

MR NGOMANE : Sorry, there is another point I would like to add you know ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR NGOMANE : It is said that Xhosas have been more unionised - this is the claim of course - that they are ^{more} unionised in the mine, and I think the Pondos, it is a twist of irony that they would be after shaft stewards because the Pondos they are really unionised, they support

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the Union/..

MR NGOMANE : the Union strongly, even those
dismissed wherever there have
been surveys conducted in Transkei, they are all
unionised, those who have been dismissed from the
mines and never taken back, etc, etc, and to such
extent they have been involved in lobbying for
Transkei to accept trade unionism to operate.

They I mean people coming from Pondoland.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR NGOMANE : I think that is about all for 10
the time being.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. No, thank you.

MR MOSIME : MR CHAIRMAN there is just one
thing I am recalling, after
the dismissal of twenty-three thousand workers by
IMPALA PLATINUM MINES last year, December, a group
of Pondos, members of our Union, came together and
they wanted the Union to sponsor them to form a
movement that would go to Rustenburg and fight
against the people who had taken their jobs. I 20
think it is supportive of MR NGOMANE's view that many
Pondos are more unionised than any other group and
they are even prepared to ...

MR LETHOBANE : To fight.

MR MOSIME : Yes, to step up the fight
against anybody who is working
against the interests of the Union.

MR CHAIRMAN : I suppose the cross interests
and the various alliances
make Byzantium reasonably simple and straight-forward 30
and it..

MR CHAIRMAN : and it reminds of the statement,
not an original one, that was
said, you know a man who is my enemy's enemy becomes
my friend, and it may be very short term, long term,
medium term, so one no doubt is going to have changing
allegiances and alliances depending on the exigencies
of the moment almost one could say.

DR MACNAMARA : It does draw into question
the ... I am asking MR MOSIME,
how the liquor outlet boycotts can in fact ... do not 10
seem, just as a personal observation, do not seem to
be the right strategy because they alienate a fairly
strong membership group.

MR CHAIRMAN : Well look there are two ways ...

MR MOSIME : Yes, it seems so.

MR CHAIRMAN : There are two ways of looking
at it, there is that, on the
other hand it could be an attempt to whip everybody
into line if one feels strong enough. I do not know,
there are all sorts of possible strategies involved in 20
this ... Sorry?

MR MOSIME : I agree with DR MACNAMARA
that it seems like the liquor
boycott strategies is riddled with contradictions
because it isolates the people on whom the Union may
depend if it wanted any decision to be implemented,
but I wanted to ask him, when my chance came, whether
he notes a ripple between the communal factor and the
political factor which he discussed with us earlier.
I am saying this because many of the shaft stewards 30
are of/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4997

MR MOSIME : are of the view that management sponsored the hunt for shaft stewards and they point out reasons such as the fact that the Pondos were saying their hunt for shaft stewards and their killing thereof was legalised and also pointing out a remark made by the security in the hostel that they should hunt and kill the shaft stewards.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR MOSIME : Now does he not find that an interesting point where management itself may have realised that the liquor outlet boycott was going to isolate the militant section of the Union which can be used you know to phase out the Union and you know by ^{means of} eliminating shaft stewards. I wonder if my question is put clear. 10

MR LETHOBANE : Perhaps before he answers ...

DR MACNAMARA : I do not know MR CHAIRMAN whether I should answer that now, I ... 20

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, well ...

MR LETHOBANE : Yes, definitely I think you should because I was actually coming to that same question. All I can do now is to make some additional information on which perhaps you are going to be responding over and above what MR MOSIME has already said.

MR CHAIRMAN : This is all being recorded I take it? ...Yes.

MR LETHOBANE : I was actually going to say that there/.. 30

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4998

MR LETHOBANE : that there has been that
evidence that in fact the
Pondos were alleging that what they were doing was
known by management, and there has been an allegation
that also still remains to be tested that in fact these
Pondos were given a green light deliberately by
management to conduct these murders. Now taking that,
this is the information that we have, there has also
been the information that has been given before this
commission to the effect that in March when fighting 10
broke out at Number One the Basothos were in fact
given a green light to conduct the killings. So
you see this still goes back to that question that
I asked about the parallels that you can draw between
these two groups, that we have these two groups that
tend to fight between themselves more often than they
can fight with any other groups, at least of late, and
here are allegations of both these groups, though at
different times, having been authorised to conduct
killings. Now what I want to find out is, do we 20
not still go back to - that is if we are treat this
information as correct, you know, representing the
correct view, would we not sort of find some kind of
a parallel that we can draw between these two groups.
Why should somebody decide to pick on the Basothos
to say "Okay go out and kill these people because
they are troublemakers". And later on when he
realises that the Basothos, once again as I said
please I am just saying this thing as an assumption,
that if we are to treat the information as correct. 30

Now later/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/4999

MR LETHOBANE : Now later on when he realises that perhaps the Basotho have not done a proper job, now he switches over to the Xhosa speaking people, he says "Hey, kill these ones". Why necessarily these two groups? We have got Zulus in the mine, we have got Tswanas. I have looked at the tribal analysis of the mine as at November 1986, it appears to me as if the Botswana was still a fairly large number, over a thousand I think. I mean why necessarily pick on these two groups?

DR MACNAMARA : Can I ask ... rephrase the question that appears to be said between yourself and MR MOSIME? That, as I understand it the allegation or the argument is that the Pondos were instigated by the management to break the liquor outlet boycott so as to isolate the Union's militant Union element for security action, was what you were saying.

MR CHAIRMAN : Not for security action, just to isolate the militant Union element for hostel action, so that the hostel residents would take a revenge, or a segment of the hostel residents. There would be a tacit support of the hostel residents for the hunt of the shaft stewards, I think that is really the story. Management only came into it at an earlier stage, I think it was in March, when there was some evidence which would support the inference that they egged on the Sotho to have a go at the Xhosa.

DR MACNAMARA : And then you are also offering an explanation/..

DR MACNAMARA : an explanation for why the
Xhosas should suddenly feature
in November against shaft stewards is that management
shifted its attention to them and persuaded them to
undertake certain actions. Yes, obviously this kind
of question now refers to evidence to a large extent.
Are you asking me to comment on the feasibility of it?

MR LETHOBANE : Yes, just your views, analytical
views that you can help us with.

MR CHAIRMAN : Well have you had instances in 10
South Africa of management in
fact having had a ... where it has ever been established
that management ~~has sought~~ to divide groups or set one
group against another?

DR MACNAMARA : I think the only way I could
answer this question, because
I myself personally, I am intrigued as to whether that
is the case or not, it is a matter of evidence for me
as to whether that really happened, as in my own
capacity all I can do is provide you with background 20
information which may lead you to a conclusion.

MR CHAIRMAN : Just on this point, when we
are talking about management
I think one must bear in mind that management operates
at a large number of levels ...

DR MACNAMARA : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : From Head Office in Johannesburg
all the way down to a security
officer in a Casspir or in a hippo ...

DR MACNAMARA : Yes.

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MR CHAIRMAN/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/5001

MR CHAIRMAN : From the point of view of the
evidence, we have not got much
beyond the mine security, perhaps the next level
situation of management.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes. In fact one could argue
that there are certain members
of management all the way down to the lowest levels who
may act as persons and act without the kind of authority
that I think even the Union would see some of its own
members acting.

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MR CHAIRMAN : No, well the point is, that is
a different issue, where does
responsibility lie? If is something that we were
discussing with MR GOLDING, and it is another point, we
may have to discuss it with some senior management
representative, but from the point of view of parallels
and analogies has this situation got a parallel in
your experience in any other mine disturbance?

DR MACNAMARA : That is a lot easier to answer.

Up until the founding of the
Union which is unfortunately the limitations in terms
of the most detailed information that I do have and
that I have looked at, there was only one instance in
that ten year period that I looked at where an
allegation had been made of management's complicity
in an event of this kind. It concerned, very briefly,
events on a West Rand mine where the black Rhodesians
that I referred to earlier had become ... clearly
become unpopular with not only the management because
the black Rhodesians demonstrated substantial

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sophistication and/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/5002

DR MACNAMARA : sophistication and criticism
of their service conditions,
but also unpopular among the other residents because
they adopted a ... or allegedly adopted a superior
attitude, they dressed well, they spoke fluent English,
they regarded themselves as superior to many South
African blacks and this aroused the resentment of the
residents themselves and in a clash in a hostel on the
West Rand between residents and the Rhodesians the
TEBA Liaison Division that was called in to deal with
it reported, and that report exists, that the mine
security and the management failed to intervene in the
conflict. In other words their negligence was
allegedly a passive one, they allowed time and
opportunity for the other residents to deal with the
Rhodesians, that was the allegation. There was the
looting of ... one of the more substantial examples
of looting, the Rhodesian rooms were apparently looted
in broad daylight without security action to prevent
this from happening. That is the only instance
that I was able to find, and it was a passive
complicity in the sense that certain events were
allowed to continue.

MR CHAIRMAN : Up to which level of
management did it go, the
Mine Manager?

DR MACNAMARA : That the report did not say.
It simply mentioned that the
mine security forces did not act speedily to stop the
looting of the Rhodesian rooms, and that there was
some intransigence/..

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JAH/7/8/87
PT133/ 5003

DR MACNAMARA : some intransigence, there was
some lack of active response
to TEBA's requests that action be taken to stop this
looting.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : I think I believe that they
appealed ...

MR CHAIRMAN : What year was this approximately?

DR MACNAMARA : It would have been either 1976 or
1977 because the Rhodesians

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had ... those were the years when they were at their
highest numbers.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : So it was a passive action,
if that helps in any way.

Since that time with the unionisation I do find it
difficult to comment because I do not have the same
control over the information as I did on the earlier
period. I can only say that it is clear that
unionisation is a major event in this industry, it is
one with which the management has had to adjust ...
to which the management has had to adjust. I think
it is well known that the management sometimes sees
the Union as adopting a threatening stance which
they are threatened by. I just cannot help of
course but remember that the liquor outlet boycott
in itself was a Union initiated action in the very
first place.

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MR LETHOBANE : Okay thank you. You see
I appreciate and would like
to say/..

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JAH/7/8/87
PT133/5004

MR LETHOBANE : to say that I am satisfied that

you have tried to distinguish

between the particular incident at the West Rand and the later incidents that followed the advent of the Union in the mines because in the later incidents it would appear that the argument follows this line that management seems to be banking on the balance of power, or support within the Union at any one time that if it comes out that a certain group seems to be backing down at any one stage as a result of dissatisfaction with certain things that may have done and in the case of the Basothos it would appear that they were not happy with the killings of the Number Five Shaft team leaders; they were not quite happy with the spate of strikes that followed thereafter, and that resulted in a Masotho team leader deciding to go underground against a resolution not to go to work on that particular day. And all these were

followed by the bombings of the indunas' cars and their flats and it appears that it was apparent that the Basothos, or a certain section of the Basotho, were apportioning the blame (1) for the strikes; (2) for the bombings of the properties of the indunas to a certain section of the workers, the Xhosas in this case. And in this regard it would appear

management was in a position to say "Okay this is the group that can be used". Now at a later stage it seems evident that the Pondos are not the group of people who would be satisfied with interference with access to liquor, and management having realised

that on/..

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JAH/7/8/87
PT133/3005

MR LETHOBANE : that on the 6th of November
the Pondos were not happy with
the boycott of the liquor outlet, they probably were
still aware that even on the 19th the Pondos were not
going to be happy, so after the second breaking of the
liquor outlet boycott by the Pondos, and the subsequent
throwing of that petrol bomb which resulted in a group
of people who were patronising the bar rushing out of
the liquor outlet area searching for the ... whomever
the culprit was. Now management was once again aware 10
that the balance of support within the Union is shifting,
the Pondo seems to be dissatisfied with this particular
incident, and they seem to be apportioning the blame
to the shaft stewards, and to that extent he said
"Okay let them go on and butcher them". So as I
am saying these are just observations that have been
based on the information that this commission has
heard and if you could have an idea or an opinion on
it one would appreciate if you could comment, but
once again I would appreciate if you are not in a 20
position to comment to just simply tell us that you
are not in a position to comment. I do not think
we will force you to say.

DR MACNAMARA : Thank you. Really I feel
as concerned as you in an
effort to unravel these events, and if there was that
management complicity I am sure it will come out at
some point. We have just heard from MR MOSIME that
the Pondos are actually very strong Union supporters,
despite all of this, and certainly it has changed my 30
understanding of/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/300b

DR MACNAMARA : understanding of the situation
to hear that. The only way
I can assist you to consider this is to ask how feasible
it would be that the management would be able to talk
the Pondos into this action. We have also heard
that Pondoland has got a fairly long history of political
consciousness, would they easily be swayed by a white
mine management to undertake these actions, that is
the question I would ask, how likely would it be that
they could be talked into this? 10

MR LETHOBANE : You see the point is the
information we have heard does
not at any stage reflect that any one of the white
management of the mine ever came to the group of
Pondos and said "Kill ..." and organised the hunt for
shaft stewards, but it seems more apparent that there
was complicity with the hunt than that there was an
instruction for Pondos to conduct the hunt.

DR MACNAMARA : You mean on the lines of the
example I gave earlier of a 20
passive attitude?

MR LETHOBANE : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : That would of course ...

MR LETHOBANE : Well they ... perhaps their
vocal expression of support
for the hunt for shaft stewards seems to have come at
a certain level of management, once again according
to information that we have heard, and that is at the
level of security.

DR MACNAMARA : Well that - I am commenting - 30
that is/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/3007

DR MACNAMARA : that is obviously more possible
than the other alternative.

MR CHAIRMAN : I did not hear you? .

DR MACNAMARA : It is more possible that ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Oh, yes.

DR MACNAMARA : That there was a passive
attitude from the management

than that they did something actively to promote the
conflict. I find it difficult to believe the latter,
I find it easier to accept that they may have been slow
in reacting possibly, but that is just in an effort to
understand the question. 10

MR CHAIRMAN : Let me throw another factor or
a series of factors into the
melting pot. We are talking about 1976, in June 1976

a state of emergency was declared in South Africa.
Prior to that there was a lot of, what I will call,
political activist operations in the country, widespread
publicity. On the one hand there was a growth of
the trade unions and shall I say the consolidation 20

within COSATU as a strong block. On the other hand
there was a resurgence to an extent of, I will call it
Afrikaner fundamentalism, call it more right-wing
Afrikaner movement, the development of the AWB; the
mine is situated in what could perhaps not unfairly
be described, if not a stronghold of AWB and the
Conservative Party section, but where they have a
very strong representation. We have had an incident
of one complaint of a white miner on his helmet having
the letters AWB on it. Nothing flowed from that 30

incident, but/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/5008

MR CHAIRMAN : incident, but it is representative
of a thinking. Could this
allow for an atmosphere where there would be a more
receptive feeling to allow for intergroup violence to
take its course rather than ... and perhaps even be
egged on, rather than to step in very strongly?

DR MACNAMARA : That is I think an interesting
question. I can put two
pieces of information forward that might help you to
consider that. The first is that the Stilfontein/
Klerksdorp area has for long been regarded as a
conservative white area. I know on a neighbouring
mine, not the VAAL REEFS mine, in fact STILFONTEIN
mine that the management experienced an interesting
problem with what appeared to be an AWB presence on
their mine. I forget when, I think about eighteen
months or two years ago. When the manager attempted
to get his manpower manager to stand for election in
the local council he made this decision to ask his
manpower manager to stand in the local council elections
because he felt there was a need for representation
on the local council with respect to housing programmes
that affected black employees, and the idea being that
if infrastructure was to be developed it should favour
the mines, and should favour that mine because one
would not want to see all the infrastructure going
in a different direction, one would want good roads
and transport from an area where black employees are
housed to the mine. And at the election I was told
by the manager that the ... a large contingent of
white employees/..

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DR MACNAMARA : white employees on the mine
led informally by a certain
employee whose AWB values were strongly evident, he
wore an AWB tie to work most of the time, and they
had flocked to the election to vote the manager manpower
out of contention. So that will give you some idea
of the kind of activities which have taken place in
that very same region. The second piece of information
which I am again drawing from the background work of
the CHAMBER's Research Organisation which I am quoting 10
here because I believe it helps the enquiries, is that
they have started to interview white employees on
mines. For many years only black employees were
interviewed.

MR CHAIRMAN : Sorry, who is interviewing
white employees?

DR MACNAMARA : The CHAMBER's Research Organisation.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : In fact it is the Human Resources
Laboratory, they do this kind of 20

labour work, and they ... It was in fact under my
own direction, we developed a procedure for interviewing
white employees, including the same mine that I have
just quoted to you. And the feeling among the
white employees was that management had become totally
cowed by the presence of a black union on the
property; that they had started to neglect white
employees as a legitimate group of employees; and
that in that sense white employees had been left out
in the cold, and that management was doing everything 30
in its/..

DR MACNAMARA : in its power to appease the
black Union, and that
relationships were not the way they were in the past,
that black employees no longer took instructions from
them but simply laughed at them, and that they had
lost control over the work place. There is no
doubt that the white employees feel threatened, they
feel that too much attention is being paid to black
trade union developments and that they also see this
in a political light. They see this as one of the
steps in the direction towards which the country will
be given to the blacks, etc, etc. That is the set
of attitudes that prevail. I think that is all I
could really offer as information in terms of that.

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MR NGOMANE : Sorry MR CHAIRMAN, if I may
add to what DR MACNAMARA is
saying. I had this same question to him when my
round came, well it was ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Your round still will come.

MR NGOMANE : Yes I know, but ... This
tendency of a hardening
right-wing attitude, it is manifesting itself in
other areas of industrial relations even in the mines.
I call it white backlash where they feel they have
got to react to defend competition, passive competition
from black trade unions, the threat for their jobs
and this could contribute to intergroup violence.
And during the March 1986 faction fighting the actions
of security officers at VAAL REEPS left much to be
desired and this was pointed out to management at

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the time/..

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JAH/7/8/87
PT133/sp11

MR NGOMANE : the time by the whole delegation
from top Government officials
from Transkei and Lesotho. They even quoted names,
PORKY RHEEDERS, and etc, etc, and they pointed to
their actions that they left ... In fact the workers
were complaining that they played dual roles as
employees of the mine and then become members I
think of the APU ...

MR PURCELL : APU.

MR NGOMANE : Yes. And now the way they
treated them, the way they
acted, the workers felt that they were sort of
retaliating, they were settling old scores from the
work place when they were standing as security men.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR LETHOBANE : Can I go?

MR CHAIRMAN : Please?

MR LETHOBANE : I intend to pass the particular
issue on which I was asking

DR MACNAMARA on. I only hope that the questions were
not unfair because they were based on the information
that the commission has heard and which have neither
been accepted as a proof as such nor been rejected.
I mean they are just floating information that I
just wanted your comments on. Perhaps one last
question that could be related to this particular
aspect in a sense would be that we seem to have quite
a number of possible problem areas that can be a
source of what you call tension among the workers
within the mining industry and I think we are here
talking specifically/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/5012

MR LETHOBANE : talking specifically about the
VAAL REEFS Mine Number One Shaft.

In your own presentation you made reference to the
migrant labour culture as being one possible, you know,
source of tension ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Sorry, what was it?

MR LETHOBANE : Migrant labour culture.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, yes.

MR LETHOBANE : Among the mine employees.

I am aware that there is also 10
yet another that is possible that being the relations
among workers themselves within the Union, to what
extent are they able to agree on possible lines of
action and to unánimously also agree that they are
going to follow that proposed line of action and/or
to what extent are they not in a position to agree
and they end up clashing and perhaps the division is
now taking tribal lines. That could also be
another possible source of tension that may result
into a violent clash. It could as well be attributed 20
to management/Union relations in that to the extent
that the Union is not in a position to agree with
management and it decides to take a certain line of
action which workers do not all agree with there
tends to be splits within the workers. Once again
the splits may be based on tribal lines. There is
also the internal political situation within South
Africa itself which prompts some action on the part
of certain mine employees to feel that no we are
not going to leave the situation as it is, we must 30
be seen/..

JAH/7/8/87
PT133/3013

MR LETHOBANE : be seen to be doing something to
change it, and perhaps much to
the dissatisfaction of those who feel that that intended
action would be directed against them and as far as
other workers know that those against whom the action
is going to be directed are going to respond in the
manner that may not be, you know what one could say,

the normal way/..

MR LETHOBANE : the normal way of preventing
somebody to take harsh measures
against you, they decide that no, no, no, we are not
going to be part of this and they stay aside and they
are seen as not being in solidarity with their counterparts
and this creates a tension, but to that extent I think
the tension is not attributable to the lack of unanimity
among the workers in respect of the decision they are
taking, but it will be attributed to the situation that
has resulted in the proposal for a certain line of action 10
being suggested and ultimately being adopted, though not
unanimously. To that extent I attribute the source of
tension to the situation that has prompted the dissatisfaction.
Well, there are quite a number of other examples that
one can cite. You may have a number of others, but
all I want here is your view as to where exactly you
think the main source of tension among the mine employees
really rests. Of those examples that I have cited,
even of others that I may not have cited, where do you
think really the main source of tension lies, basing 20
yourself at least on the case in point that we are
trying to address ourselves on, the fight at No.1 shaft in March
the
and November/December fights?

DR MACNAMARA : That is an interesting and
important question, because I
am aware of the fact that I have thrown up a variety of
factors and we end up with a multi-faceted explanation
which does not help a great deal. I am aware of that.
As you were talking, I felt we could distinguish - just
so that we can set this argument, there are four broad 30
/sources from ...

DR MACNAMARA : sources from which we can locate
this tension. The political,
the ethnic, the industrial, occupational/industrial and
the communal. To me, somewhere in those four factors
lies our answer. Either we are dealing with the
political problem in the sense of wider political issues
or we are dealing solely with the so-called ethnic
problem of tensions which may go back some years, or
we are dealing with an industrial problem which I think
we can add to that some of the occupational struggles for 10
jobs and so on and lack of mobility and opportunity, the
type of issues I have raised, or we are dealing with
communal realities in the hostel. The hostel is a
breeding-ground of conflict and that is where we
must look. To me it is in one of those four categories.
I think I have spent enough time arguing something for
everybody in all four of those categories. I think I
have an opinion of - I feel about where we should look
mostly and where we should look least of all. I feel
that the least significant of these four dimensions is 20
the ethnicity per se. Ethnicity as a driving force.
I can only, without elaborating in great detail on it,
say that I spend a lot of time looking at it from an
ethnicity point of view and have done all the literature
reviews one could possibly do on the topic; have analysed
the events in question and I find it very difficult.
Firstly they are not linked to rural factional violence,
that I could locate. Secondly, you find a bewildering
set of changes in the alliances and in the clashes, so
that in fact even some groups who share something in 30
/common, find ...

DR MACNAMARA : common, find themselves in
conflict at one or other point.
by the fact
Also informed that the social life of the hostel is
regionally based rather than ethnically based, there
is a distinction there. It is a question of from which
area you originate rather than what language you speak.
As in the case where Ciskeians and Transkeians have
nothing to do with each other. That of course might
mean that there is a regional dimension to it, but I
think ethnicity is merely a label that people use in a
conflict situation to mobilise people around some cause
or issue. That would be my considered view about it. 10
The other three factors, again I might be not assisting
you, but I would give the communal some significance in
the ripple effect that I tried to document or describe.
I believe I see it in some of the events here and I
believe it is partially accountable for the intensity
of the violence, the sometimes bewildering nature in which
the violence develops, I would link to the communal
reality of the hostel environment. That in itself only 20
affects the level of conflict, not its cause. So I
would then leave that at - point at position number three
in this poll. It remains now to try and sort out the
political factor from the industrial. Are we to do
here with problems that arise from work conditions and
people's issues and problems in those work conditions
or are we dealing with the emergence of political tensions
that have been introduced from outside. I think the
fact, and here I must lay my cards on the table, the fact
that I have proceeded in every piece of research I have 30

DR MACNAMARA : done from the pattern over time
that I have seen in the industry,
the fact that there is an ongoing set of issues, that
the unionisation process is arrived at in chapter 7 of
this book and accepting that if one is to accept the
political argument that the union will play a relevant
role in that discussion. I see the issue really
revolving largely around the - amongst these last two
contenders

MR LETHOBANE : Political and the industrial 10
elements.

DR MACNAMARA : The political and the industrial.
I do say that these form numbers
one and two in our little crude analysis here, in terms
of jockeying for first position, I would be mindful of
the fact that there is an underlying set of tensions and
conflicts that have their roots much deeper than the
immediate situation and that I would therefore see these
conflicts in an occupational industrial sense.

Inflamed, in terms of their intensity by certain union 20
activities which might have a political origin, I do
not know. But I think I would look at the occupational
industrial because I have seen that same trend of
conflict emerging from time to time before the arrival
of unions and before the state of emergency we now have.
The conflict with team leaders, the job evaluation
questions I mentioned earlier all reflecting a sense
among the unskilled that their time has not yet come.
What I believe has happened and that is why I do not
want to find myself simply opting for a one-dimensional 30

/view of ...

DR MACNAMARA : view of it, is that the advent
of the unions and the political
crisis has provided a greater organisational base for
interest
that group to promote the issues that they would like to
promote. And it goes back to your migrant worker culture
question, about agreeing on lines of common action.

I believe that the work-force does not always agree on
lines of common action, not because of their ethnic
origins but because the groupings in the work place
have different interests. The unskilled labourers
have an interest in basic wages and in physical
conditions and problems of that nature. The intermediate
category of rock-drill operators and others involved in
mechanical equipment have always been a separate
identity. They have had an esprit de corps which has
lasted for a long time and which has always been a - they
feel undervalued in the production process. And then
there is the supervisory category who want white men's
jobs, to put it crudely, who feel that there is an
opportunity for them to take on the black miner position
and these three sets of interests are not easy for a union
to create a common strategy around.

MR LETHOBANE : Thank you. I do not know how
I am going to formulate this one.

I think from the explanation that was given this morning
by MR NGOMANE, it does come out that perhaps more than
just being a traditionally stubborn group, the Pondos
are also a fairly politically conscious group and not
only Pondos but the Xhosas I would imagine generally,
taking into cognisance the fact that the most important

/leadership of ...

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MR LETHOBANE : leadership of one of the biggest
black organisations in this
country comes from that part of the world. I am also
aware that there has been some people who have also
regarded the ANC as nothing more than a Xhosa organisation.
Those statements have been said and they have been
reflected into writing in certain documents and to
that extent one might say that the Xhosa group is probably
one of the fairly politicised sections of the South
African community. I am also aware that there have been 10
statements that also have been reduced into writing by
various authorities to the extent that Basuto are also regarded
as one of the fairly politicised nations in Southern
Africa and I am trying to relate this to what you have
said in response to the earlier question that I put to
you that after you had given us four elements of the
possible sources of tension among the mine employees, you
struck them one by one starting with the least possible,
coming down to those you give most credence to as the
possible sources of tension, these being the political 20
and the industrial elements, which in a sense you tended
to also confront some difficulty in really drawing a
clear line of demarcation between. Now with this
observation that I have given, I am also aware that in
your presentation even yesterday and the number of
tensions that you have referred to in the mines, you have
been citing BCP involvement to a certain extent and which
to that extent I see as a political element that has
resulted in the tension.

MR CHAIRMAN : Sorry, which? 30

/MR PURCELL: Has resulted ...

MR PURCELL : Has resulted in tension.

MR CHAIRMAN : What contributed to the tension?

DR MACNAMARA : BCP.

MR LETHOBANE : The political element. And I
asked him that the - BCP

DR MACNAMARA : I mentioned the Basuto Congress
Party's involvement, yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : Oh, sorry, I just did not hear.

MR LETHOBANE : Oh, I see. I am sorry I
abbreviated the term. 10

MR CHAIRMAN : No, no, no, I know the abbreviation.
I just did not hear it clearly.

MR LETHOBANE : Oh.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. No, that is fine.

MR LETHOBANE : As I said, I do not know how to
formulate your question in the

final analysis, but I think I have given you a very
broad observation that I am making of the political
consciousness of these two different groups. Perhaps
the best way to put the question would be is it possible 20
therefore that these two groups would be most likely to
tend to mobilise each other first and foremost in the
event of any important action that has been taken in the
union so that even if disagreement arises, it will first
and foremost arise between those two groups. Or even
if unanimity is reached, it will be reached between these
two groups.

DR MACNAMARA : I would suggest the reason why
they are not in a position to
combine is that in each case the political interests are 30
/totally provincial ...

DR MACNAMARA : totally provincial. The BCP interests are completely focused towards Lesotho. The Xhosa interests that you related to, wider political questions, would then be focused to South Africa and in fact just because they are both politically conscious does not mean that they will find combination.

MR LETHOBANE : They need to clash.

DR MACNAMARA : I think in the future if there is a national and a super-national 10 development of political strategy in this country whereby Lesotho wants to be - I do not know, part of South Africa again, I do not know what it wants to be, that maybe there may be something happening, but at this point the BCP was a very provincial political movement, from my understanding, with very few wider connections. It had a specific objective in it and it seemed to have realised that objective.

MR LETHOBANE : So you would imagine that unanimity between these two 20 groups, even within the union would be fairly difficult

DR MACNAMARA : I think it would still be.

MR LETHOBANE : ... in the light of ...

DR MACNAMARA : I mean we can think that possibly the white people of this country share the same political concerns about their future but they do not agree on them on how we get there and where we go. I think that is the nature of politics. If I can just add one comment just to make it quite clear where I stand, on looking at the political 30 /versus the ...

DR MACNAMARA : versus the industrial questions,
the biggest difficulty is that
the one is easier to collect evidence on than the other.
It is very easy to build up in evidence about the industrial
occupational thing and I have spent many years, my
job objectives were to investigate those and to find out
what were the concerns of the labour force and so on.
And I think you should take that into account in the way
that I am answering that question. I do not have
evidence and I have not sought evidence for a political 10
struggle and therefore I cannot comment on it. I do not
know. I think it is your task possibly more than
it is mine as to whether that exists. I put them up
there, I have a lot of evidence for the industrial
occupational issues and you have heard me talk about them,
because it was a task of mine to pursue those and it is
now reflected in my information.

MR CHAIRMAN : Because it is very difficult to
unscramble what has really been
two eggs which have now been mixed together because 20
having regard to the declared political stance of NUM
within Cosatu, it ^{would} stand to reason that the industrial
dissatisfaction, to give it a broad term, or dis-
satisfaction in the work place, would be a means for
organising the members of the union, (a) to attract them
to the union and this would probably go to most of the
unions that have adopted this similar approach. Because
it allows for, in many cases, a meaningful immediate
positive result.

DR MACNAMARA : And as you see, the eggs have 30
/become scrambled ...

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DR MACNAMARA : become scrambled together.

MR CHAIRMAN : Well, I have just used that analogy.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes. That is where I would say at the very least there is an inter-action between the employee's indigenous set of concerns and problems which are drawn in by the union, that is its task, an inter-action between that and certain political objectives is not impossible to conceive. And in fact I believe it is some of these inter-actions which is why we had such extreme violence last year.....

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MR CHAIRMAN : And then

DR MACNAMARA : in the severity and the intensity of the conflict is that there is this vicious inter-action taking place, it would appear.

MR CHAIRMAN : And then when the union seeks to lead its members into a certain course of conduct which does not arise directly out of circumstances in the work place, or the situation in the work place, that you might get these different agendas coming into play.

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DR MACNAMARA : Yes, there is that - that contradiction has emerged as I account in that article where eventually an employee will go so far because his own job security becomes at stake and if he is to be taken to jeopardise that for what appear to be for political aims, he will start to withdraw. And that withdrawal could produce a

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/great amount ...

DR MACNAMARA : great amount of tension.

MR CHAIRMAN : Another - I am sorry, I am
interrupting your

MR LETHOBANE : It is all right.

MR CHAIRMAN : examination, but dealing
with this tension, dealing

basically with the union situation on the mines. Let us
just deal with that. Historically one understands
both in this country and in all, most other countries,
the unions or unionisation and the whole workers' movements, 10
have derived from a variety of sources, they are not
all shall we say, communist inspired, far from it. They
have a variety of sources and certainly in the early
stages have met opposition from business, from management
and in many cases, from government where management and
government as it were, could be identified. Now one
has a situation in South Africa, particularly with NUM,
where its emergence did not follow quite the same route
as the emergence of unions in the other industries and at
one particular stage was encouraged by government, not 20
because government was of a view that it might necessarily -
was - what is the word I want?

DR MACNAMARA : Co-opting.

MR CHAIRMAN : Sorry?

DR MACNAMARA : Co-opting.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. But a union as it were,

had to be formed as quickly as
possible with encouragement in some cases of the mining
houses, if not encouragement certainly without
opposition by some of the mining houses. So one had a 30
/union leadership ...

MR CHAIRMAN : union leadership which found
itself in an unusual position of
a union and I think in some cases when unions were given
offices on the mines and encouraged to - well, encouraged
may be the wrong word, but were not opposed and in some
cases given support. They found themselves in a
strange position. It is almost a loss of an identity.
Has this in any way contributed to the tension?
In other words, the need to create an identity as
quickly as possible as being anti management, which in 10
the early stages of union development throughout the
world has been, I think always the position. There may
have been exceptions. In other words a contrast of one
against the other. I will throw it out

DR MACNAMARA : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : firstly if you accept my
premise that this is so.

DR MACNAMARA : No, it is certainly the case.

Perhaps MR MOSIME might even comment,
at the very beginning, 1983, when the union representatives 20
were given offices near - on mines, we know there was
some confusion in the minds of the work-force.
Unionisation was very new to them and they thought these
were now another form of personnel assistant in these
offices and it was not clear to them initially that this
was a union with whatever that implied to them. So I
think that is true. I certainly was aware of that at
the time. Whether the need to forge a functioning
identity as a trade union required tension, or resulted
in tension, I did not see that that necessarily had to 30
/happen. I ...

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DR MACNAMARA : happen. I think what happened,
as we proceeded through the years
1983/84 with the annual round of wage negotiations,
the union doing its own communication, I think that
early view disappeared quite quickly. I certainly do
not think there is any doubt in any worker's mind today
what a trade union's function is, in the way that it is
being presented to him. I am not sure that the union,
to follow your question, would have had to have gone to
the kinds of lengths to demonstrate its identity to in 10
fact be part of the tensions which we are now trying to
unravel. I think that would probably be pulling it too
far.

MR CHAIRMAN : Related to this is the very
swift evolution of NUM in the
mines to having representatives at shaft levels all the
way up. I do not know, and perhaps MR MOSIME can help
us, how trade unions had developed in other countries,
but I would imagine that the swift development and
extensive development of the trade unions in this country 20
may well have forced a situation where people - not
properly orientated, trained, aware of ultimate
objectives have been put in situations of power at one
level, authority at another and key communication in yet
a third. I mean we are talking about five years.
Obviously this would differ in different industries and
maybe in different mines, we are talking about the mine
industry as a whole where a large portion of the work-force
is illiterate or semi-literate. Is this likely to have
created an additional set of tensions?

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/DR MACNAMARA: It is ...

DR MACNAMARA : It is true that the growth has
been unprecedented. It is also
true that in other industries in other countries that
union membership is nowhere near as high as it is
starting to become in the gold mines. Most unions have
a moderate following in a plant or a factory in other
countries which gives them enough role in that work place.
So that also is unprecedented. I think it is also
true to say that the - although MR MOSIME might want to
comment, that the

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MR CHAIRMAN : NO, I am going to put these
very same questions to MR GOLDING....

DR MACNAMARA : Right.

MR CHAIRMAN : If he is good enough to
come again, but I would like as
many views as possible on this backed with
experience.

DR MACNAMARA : I think it is true on the one
hand that the organisation
structure of NUM has taken a few creaks and groans in
this massive task that they have and that they probably
have difficulty in staffing their function with people
that they feel confident with that have the training
and expertise that they require for the job that has to
be done. I am sure that they themselves have got that
problem with this growth, meaning that we are in a - I
suppose in an immature stage where at the grass roots
level the people that have been put into those positions
are in a learning process themselves.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, well the question is, is

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/this a ...

MR CHAIRMAN : this a factor in the tension?
A cause, a result, a ...

DR MACNAMARA : I believe from what I have heard
of the inter-actions and I have
not taken part in inter-actions of that kind with, you
know, at mine level and I have only probably heard one
side of the story, is that there are misunderstandings
about the nature of the service conditions and how they
operate and that sometimes it takes a great deal of
schooling, in fact, to school oneself in the service 10
conditions of this industry and that I think shaft
stewards themselves might sometimes get a bit confused
about how these conditions work and how the procedures
operate. And that could imply then that they might not
be in a position to inform members as to how these
procedures do operate.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, that is on the communications
side.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, which then means that
people may misinterpret certain 20
conditions and they may read into certain things
something which may cause frustration, anger, disappointment.
I know for example that the very basic issue, the fatal
accident scheme, which is an insurance scheme where
employees pay a premium and whether they are killed on
or off duty, they are covered and their families are given
a pay-out, is that men leaving the mine still want those
premiums back. They say, we are not dead, we want the
premiums paid back. And I am sure that management has
a great deal of difficulty communicating the fact that

/these premiums ... 30

DR MACNAMARA : these premiums cannot be repaid
and I do not know what sort of
difficulty the union leadership ^{has} and shaft stewards in
explaining this to the members. It may be that they
also feel they should be paid back, I do not know.
But I think there are a great number of these issues
which require a great deal of communication to explain
that those benefits cannot be paid back because they have
been paid to somebody who did die and somebody's family
that did die.

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MR CHAIRMAN : And may be a Sotho to a Xhosa!

DR MACNAMARA : I just raise it as an example.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. I think we can have an
adjournment now for ten minutes
or so, then we will continue.

ADJOURNMENT

COMMISSION RESUMES.

MR CHAIRMAN : Right. Then we can continue,
please, MR LETHOBANE.

MR LETHOBANE : DR MACNAMARA, I have been
considering two aspects of
incidents of violence in the industry. One is the actual
problem area for us ^{as} the commission, this being the VAAL REEFS
violence where we ostensibly have the National Union
of Mineworkers as the main union that is organising the
workers in that region and through the information at
our disposal we are aware that a fairly large number of
employees at No.1 shaft are members of the National Union
of Mineworkers, so that despite the fact that when the
clashes broke out, battle lines were drawn along tribal

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/lines which ...

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MR LETHOBANE : lines which still unsatisfactorily
say that in fact both
groups still had members of the union and yet they were
fighting among themselves.

DR MACNAMARA : would you want a comment on that?

MR LETHOBANE : No, I am going to go further
before you can comment.

I am trying to compare the situation with yet another
situation which I think you probably were in a position
to follow up. This is the situation that concerned 10
clashes between what were regarded as the UWUSA supporters
on the one hand and the COSATU supporters in the - I
think it is in the Natal region. I wonder if you can
be in a position to compare and/or contrast these two
incidents of violence?

DR MACNAMARA : Could I just ask you, the one
snafit fighting that you referred
to where both groups ostensibly had union membership,
just refresh my memory. Those two groups in question
from the reports, was that a Sotho/Xhosa clash? 20

MR LETHOBANE : That is right. The No.1 snafit
clashes starting in March,
November and December have ostensibly been between the
Xhosas and the Sothos and this is why I say much as they
took tribal lines, we are faced with a situation here
where we are aware that both groups had membership of
the same union within them and yet in the Natal region
we are faced with a situation where the clashes were said
to have been between the UWUSA and COSATU supporters.
So I just wanted you to contrast or compare the two 30

/incidents of ...

MR LETHOBANE : incidents of violence, if you
are in a position to.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, no I understand the question.

I think I have been on the look-
out for conflicts which have such a direct bearing on
the wider external conflicts, the most notable being
the one between the Inkatha-based UWUSA and COSATU.
Specifically that particular conflict would require large
numbers of Zulu speakers on a relevant mine, and I am
aware, just for your information, that that tension is
evident, although not as strongly as on the collieries,
but it is evident on certain gold mines on the west
Rand here, Randfontein Estates being one of them, where
the Zulu speakers have withdrawn from NUM, or they
certainly had at one stage.

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MR CHAIRMAN : They have withdrawn or they did
at one stage? I did not quite
hear.

DR MACNAMARA : Well, I am speaking in terms of
a time when I was told that they
had withdrawn.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

DR MACNAMARA : I heard a claim, a rumour if you
like, that one of the princes of
the Zulu royal family had in fact toured certain mines
and advised people to withdraw from NUM, as a result of
the wider conflict between ^{the} political groupings that back
COSATU and those which are in the Buthelezi/Inkatha camp.
But I have not seen - firstly I would look for a large
proportion of Zulu-speaking people for that particular

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/cleavage which ...

DR MACNAMARA : cleavage which of course is not really the case on many gold mines, there is a fairly ^{low} proportion of Zulu speakers on most of the mines, but you are asking me something deeper, I assume, in terms of the Sotho/Xhosa clash having its origins in a wider political split. One then has to look at the relationships, the inter-state relationships between Lesotho and Transkei and I am reminded of the border closures and the border dispute that took place, I forget exactly when.

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MR LETHOBANE : 1976 I think.

DR MACNAMARA : was it 1976?

MR LETHOBANE : I think it was 1976.

DR MACNAMARA : Which did have an impact in a sense that movement through the

borders was very difficult and I was aware that there were even possible violence in the joint territories that were in contact with each other on the border between Lesotho and Transkei, where there is such a border.

I am not - exactly where it would be, probably north of..... 20

MR NGOMANE : Qachasnek

DR MACNAMARA : Is it Qachasnek?

MR NGOMANE : Somewhere there, is it not?

MR LETHOBANE : Yes, could be Qachasnek.

DR MACNAMARA : Sorry, I cannot do those things!

MR CHAIRMAN : It is sort of in the south-eastern boundary of Lesotho, or the north-western boundary of Transkei.

MR LETHOBANE : Quting is in the South.

DR MACNAMARA : Due south, I would say.

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MR LETHOBANE: Quting is ...

MR LETHOBANE : Quting is the south.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR NGOMANE : Qachasnek somewhere next to
Matatiele.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I was just going to mention
Matatiele. And I believe there

was some skirmish there or some conflict there, I am
not sure. But I have not seen that border dispute for
example, being reflected in the conflicts on the mines. 10

Subsequently I do not feel too well informed on the
relationships between the two countries. I think the
fact that there was the Transkei election, the polling
on the mine, which of course does take place after the
clash we are talking about, is an interesting event.

I mean there it is. There was an election taking place.
I am not going to pursue that, it is just quite interesting
that an attempt was made to disrupt that election later
on, which is an interesting question in itself. I think

I would be prepared to say that the relationship between 20
Sotho-speaking and Xhosa-speaking workers in the mining
industry has got a long history, because certainly since
the foreign labour contingent and I here in the sense of
this argument exclude Lesotho from the definition of a
foreign country, which I know is problematic, but it
seems to be much more inside of South African territory
and has a much closer relationship with the mines than
Mozambicans and others might be seen to have and that they -
two of them have become the mainstay of the labour force.

These two groups are the two key sources of labour at 30

/this point ...

DR MACNAMARA : this point and that is why
most mines you will find those
two groups the two dominant groups of recruits.
And that over the years they have been involved in a
variety of clashes stemming from some of the causes
that I outlined on the first day. And I might repeat,
I do not know whether I mentioned it before, that in the
whirlwind survey which was commissioned jointly by
ANGLO and NUM, in the group discussions, constant
reference was made to these earlier conflicts. The 1974 10
grievances was what was constantly mentioned. MR PURCELL,
I am not sure in the whirlwind report whether they were
referring to some of the events that are in fact common
to the events we are looking at now.

MR PURCELL : I am not that familiar with the
specific items in the report.
I have read it much in a whirlwind myself. I did not
pause to note the detail, I am afraid.

DR MACNAMARA : Anyway, the investigations were
completed, in fact they pre-cede 20
this particular - now that I recall, because the
investigations of that study were concluded in about
April of 1986 and there was a delayed report, so it
related to conflicts during 1985, as I recall. But ...

MR LETHOBANE : Excuse me

DR MACNAMARA : Sorry.

MR LETHOBANE : may I interrupt you? You
see this question that I asked
is still linked to the earlier question that I had
asked you, which is an attempt to try to locate possible 30
/sources of ...

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MR LETHOBANE : sources of these clashes. I am aware that you were trying to look it from, your know, political relations between the two countries, but in any case I am not aware that there is any feeling of animosity or what between the Basutos on the one hand and the Xhosas on the other as such. We do not have any tension. People in the south and people in the south-eastern part of the country do interact a lot with people from the other side of the border, but there have never been really any reported incidents of tension and things like that. The only incidents you could hear of could probably be those of theft, that one side would allege that the other side has stolen cattle, things like that, but they have never really resulted in any serious tensions. But the line along which I wanted you to answer the question, if I had to simplify it, would be this, that when you look at the Natal region running battles that are referred to, they have been seen by some observers as ^a state-sponsored effort to destroy COSATU and the reason why I said I wanted you to compare or contrast the two incidents is because in this particular incident we have got a situation where we know that there is only one union in operation and whatever happens, when the battle lines are drawn between these two national groupings, you are sure that both sides you have got members of this same union, though there may be others who are non-members but necessarily members of a rival union, they can only be non-members. So I wanted you to contrast and compare these two along this line, that we /have got ...

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MR LETHOBANE : warnings, or rather not the
killings, not the motives behind
the killings, but the motive behind the withdrawal from
active involvement in union activities by some people
who probably happen to have been mostly Basuto, as a
result of some of the warnings that the State President
had made against people who were too actively involved
in the activities of the National Union of Mineworkers,
and you also did not leave out the coup in Lesotho as
having had some bearing also on the number of Basutos 10
perhaps intending to step down their level of active
involvement in the union. Now I want to make one or
two observations which you will tell me if you agree with
or not. One, I think the statements of the State
President against people from neighbouring states who
actively involve themselves in the activities of the
union which in his view were directed against the State,
were mostly directed against the neighbouring states from
which those people came, not necessarily against these
workers, so that those statements should have been seen 20
more as a threat by the home governments from which these
people came than the workers themselves. Two, I doubt
if we can ascribe the coup to this particular level
of low involvement in the union at that stage, at least
at the time when these team leaders were killed, because
I am not aware that - I think the killings occurred at
around February 1986, is that so, MR PURCELL?

MR PURCELL : 19th. 18th.

MR LETHOBANE : February 1985.

MR PURCELL : Six.

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/MR LETHOBANE: Oh, 1986.....

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MR LETHOBANE : Oh, 1986.

MR PURCELL : Yes.

MR LETHOBANE : I am not very sure here, but I
doubt if by that time the

Lesotho government had clearly taken any stand as to what
it would want to see the people, the Basuto people who
were working in the mines, doing in respect of involving
themselves in the activities of the union. I doubt if
by that time there was already any policy on that. The
policy that came most probably came much later, April or
in March/April thereabouts. So that I do not quite see
at least the coup aspect as having been - or as one of
the sources that could be attributed to the possible low
level of participation in the union activities on the
part of those team leaders that ultimately invited the
dissatisfaction of some of the workers at No.5 shaft. What
would you say to that? Well, you can agree or disagree.
Are you

DR MACNAMARA : No, I see your point.

The earliest information just on
the second comment you made, the earliest information
that certainly I have seen about the statements by
General Lekhanye to Lesotho nationals was the document
which I quoted from dated around March of 1986. So
certainly the earliest - there could have been something
else, but I do take your point that it would - in taking
over the government in January that there were many
other things that I am sure required pressing attention
and that I certainly accept that there is a lag there.
We do know that from the 10th of March approximately,
/that that ...

DR MACNAMARA .: that that message went out by
some form, pamphlet form or
distributed at TEBA depots, the recruitment source,
so I think from the 10th of March we can agree that
Lesotho nationals had a little seed in their heads
planted. Now we are getting down to exactitude of dates
where the murder of the team leaders took place in February.

MR CHAIRMAN : I think 18th.

MR PURCELL : 18th, 19th, yes.

DR MACNAMARA : So certainly our available 10
evidence does not support what I
am, saying. I do see that. I raised it as a question
which has affected subsequent events, I believe.

And your comments about the statement of the State
President, also going through in the media how much it
really penetrated down to the mine level is a question.
I take that point.

MR LETHOBANE : Now in your surveys, not necessarily
surveys but I take it that since
you wrote your thesis on conflicts, black mineworkers' 20
conflicts, you must have since then had an on-going
interest at least in the mining industry such that even
with the advent of unionism in the mining industry you
were keeping abreast of the developments on that aspect.
Did you ever hear about the existence of another union
that is supposed to cater for employees on the mine of
higher job categories? I do not exactly know the name.
Did you ever hear about a union that is supposed to be
catering for the interests of black mineworkers who are
in a higher job category? 30

/DR MACNAMARA: Yes, I ...

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I seem to recall and I think this may have to be established, a newspaper report indicating that the National Union of Mineworkers had agreed to set up a separate organisation on that basis. Nothing to that effect?

MR MOSIME : No.

MR LETHOBANE : Did he say no?

DR MACNAMARA : He said no.

MR MOSIME : No, no. 11

DR MACNAMARA : Well, then I cannot recall the newspaper account - I would have to find out. There has always been an organisation called the Witwatersrand Native Clerks' Association which has catered for the interests of clerical employees and which in fact was in existence since the Lansdowne Commission which was

MR CHAIRMAN : What is the name of that?
Witwatersrand?

DR MACNAMARA : Native Clerks' Association. 21

MR CHAIRMAN : From what year, approx.?

DR MACNAMARA : It in fact was founded - I do not have the details but this organisation was founded in the 1920's.

MR CHAIRMAN : And you say it relates to the Lansdowne Commission?

DR MACNAMARA : The Lansdowne Commission gave support to it and it was seen as an important vehicle for what at that time were regarded as more sophisticated employees, to represent 30

/their interests ...

DR MACNAMARA : their interests but it has become moribund. It is widely regarded as not really operating any more. Its last meeting was held on the East Rand mines, but I do not think that answers the question too well.

MR LETHOBANE : Yes. Well, perhaps I could just put it before the commission and it stands to be corrected and/or confirmed by MR PURCELL because the existence of this particular organisation, it is something that one hears being said as he goes around speaking to different people, but people are very cautious as to how much they can give you about this particular union. It is supposed to be called MSOA. I do not know what it stands for in full, M-S-O-A. 10

MR PURCELL : Perhaps that gives you a clue, Mine Surface Officials' Association, which does have black members, of senior staff level.

MR CHAIRMAN : Oh, it is only surface officials.

MR PURCELL : Mine Surface Officials' Association. 20

MR CHAIRMAN : It would not involve team leaders?

MR PURCELL : No. There are three officials' associations and I believe and I think DR MACNAMARA could correct me on this, that all of them have black members as far as I know.

DR MACNAMARA : That is my understanding.

MR PURCELL : That is the Ground Officials' Association, the Mine Surface Officials' Association and the 30

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DR MACNAMARA : Technical

MR PURCELL : South African Technical Officials' Association, SATOA.

MR CHAIRMAN : Just let us have the three again. Underground Officials' Association.

MR PURCELL : Mine Surface Officials' Association. That is known colloquially as MSOA.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR PURCELL : And the South African Technical Officials' Association.

MR CHAIRMAN : Then in addition there is the Mineworkers' Union, presumably.

MR PURCELL : The Mineworkers' Union.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, that is white only.

MR PURCELL : Yes, well there is a whole then conglomeration of the Council of Mining Union Unions which are fairly widespread, Mineworkers' Union, South African Electrical Workers' Union, South African Boilermakers' Association. The Associated Engineering Union, there is a union involving Loco Drivers and Train Operators' Union.

DR MACNAMARA : Winding Engine Drivers.

MR PURCELL : No, they are part of Mining Surface Officials' Association.

DR MACNAMARA : Oh, are they?

MR PURCELL : They used to be separate.

MR CHAIRMAN : Would the Underground Officials' Association include team leaders?

MR PURCELL : No. Not at this stage.

/MR CHAIRMAN: Not at ...

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MR CHAIRMAN : Not at that level.

DR MACNAMARA : I think the distinction is between
associations which are for

officials

MR PURCELL : Officials and

DR MACNAMARA : and unions which are for
union men, as far as whites are
concerned.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. Would MR MOSIME be able to
throw any light on this - I will 10
not call it a phantom union, but this factor that
MR LETHOBANE mentioned.

MR MOSIME : The MSOA?

MR CHAIRMAN : Well, MSOA we have heard about,
but is there any other union that
is perhaps involved in recruiting - in competition with
your union, let me put it this way, other than UWUSA?

MR MOSIME : There are several unions in the
mine, but I think the question
was whether there is a union that recruits senior staff 20
if I am not mistaken.

MR CHAIRMAN : Recruits team leaders.....

MR LETHOBANE : Yes, well basically I wanted to
find out if these particular
team leaders at No.5.....

MR CHAIRMAN : that is looking to recruit
team leaders.

MR MOSIME : The union that exists does not
only restrict their membership 30

/to team ...

MR MOSIME : to team leaders.

MR CHAIRMAN : Which union are you talking
about now?

MR MOSIME : There is the Black Allied Mining
and Construction Workers' Union.

DR MACNAMARA : BAMCWU, yes.

MR MOSIME : Yes. BAMCWU.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. Would that be recruiting
team leaders?

MR MOSIME : No, no, no. 10

MR LETHOBANE : No.

MR CHAIRMAN : No, no. Should we limit
ourselves to team leaders,

MR LETHOBANE? Is that what you are looking for?

MR LETHOBANE : Yes, well I wanted to find out

MR CHAIRMAN : Is there any competition for
team leader allegiance by any
group that

MR LETHOBANE : Other than

MR CHAIRMAN : Look, there is clearly UWUSA and 20
NUM.....

MR MOSIME : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : that we know of.

MR MOSIME : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : Is there any other element of
which you are aware or have
heard of

MR MOSIME : No.

MR CHAIRMAN : which might be

MR MOSIME : No, MR CHAIRMAN. Other than 30
/the MSOA ...

MR MOSIME : the MSOA there is nothing.

MR CHAIRMAN : ... competing for their
allegiance. Sorry?

MR MOSIME : I say other than MSOA there is
nothing else.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. No, that is separate. Yes.

MR MOSIME : There is nothing else.

MR LETHOBANE : I think that answers my question
because I want to find out if
these team leaders at No.5 probably do not belong ^{to} either 10
one of the senior workers' associations and I think
MR PURCELL's explanation ...

MR CHAIRMAN : It looks unlikely.

MR LETHOBANE : Yes - has clarified that.

MR PURCELL : Perhaps I could assist to say
that there would have been people
present at No.5, black employees at No.5, who would
have been members of MSOA. They would have been the
senior personnel assistants, kitchen supervisor, who
would be members of MSOA. But certainly not 20

MR LETHOBANE : Not the team leaders.

MR PURCELL : team leaders, not in their
groups.

MR LETHOBANE : Now what would you now ascribe
the reluctance of the team leaders
to join the union and become active to - I mean I am
having a problem here. What would we really say that
now resulted in the reluctance on the part of the team
leaders, to be reluctant in being seen to be active in
union activities? 30

/DR MACNAMARA: Well, that ...

DR MACNAMARA : Well, that leaves us with only
one remaining explanation. Over
the years there have been substantial efforts to develop,
train and in some cases prepare team leaders for moving
into higher job positions on the part of management and
that they have been increasingly over time, given benefits
associated with their rank on the mines, including for
many years the better wages, the better percentage
wage increases on those better wages, the granting of
domestic benefits in the form of separate dining areas, 10
fewer men per hostel room, thicker mattresses, a whole
variety of domestic benefits. And I think it has
become apparent to the rank and file that the team
leader is being cultivated for better things, being
rewarded for his supervisory role as the key contact
person between white supervisors and the black teams,
become an absolutely fundamental pivotal role in this
industry, without which I dare say it would not be able
to function. And it is this - really goes back to the
theme I developed earlier about the rank and file's 20
reaction to that, that as they say there is apartheid
among blacks, that although we all do the same job, upstairs
he gets better food, in fact it was even suggested in
the whirlwind report to which I have alluded quite
frequently, that the differential wage increase has set
the team leaders against the workers, that is a quote
from one of the statements, and I think there is no doubt
that if we look at the events more broadly, that many
of the resentments and frustrations have been expressed
in terms of the invasion of the mess facilities of the 30
/team leaders ...

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DR MACNAMARA : team leaders. So the fact that they have been cultivated as a group by management must be considered as a factor in this argument.

MR LETHOBANE : You see, DR MACNAMARA, I also have met some team leaders, not necessarily from No.1 shaft, not necessarily from No.5, team leaders, people whom I know to be team leaders generally, whom I have enquired from whether they have got anything against joining the union and almost all of them have told me that no, they like the union and if anything, they have always been part of it since it was founded. They have never had any in-built negative attitude towards it and yet as time went on, they have pulled out themselves because (1) they are called "impimpis". I think that is the word that a number of them have used, that they are called "impimpis", and they are not trusted by a number of workers for several reasons, but mainly - almost all of them are based on the nature of work that they are employed to do. I do not know how true this is. I am just throwing it to you, that if anything happens at work or somebody does something wrong at work, the team leader is expected to go and report to his senior and it would appear under normal circumstances his senior would be a white man. Now this man is seen as one who is back-biting other workers to the superiors and therefore inciting the authorities to punish them, even to the extent of dismissing them ultimately. So in this manner they are regarded as "impimpis". And to the extent that somebody understands /what that ...

MR LETHOBANE : what that word means, he feels
that he cannot continue to
participate in the activities of an organisation that
regards him as an impimpi. And as I said, I am just
throwing this to you. I am not by any means saying that
what you have told me is not true. But these are some
of the views that have been expressed by some of them.
What would you say to that?

DR MACNAMARA : I could briefly comment that in
organisations of the kind that 10
we have in the mining industry and that have been....
we have found in Africa, elsewhere in Africa, one always
finds in a black/white context situation that there are
certain roles in the middle that are going to go into a
situation of role conflict as it is called and the
black team leader potentially is one of those roles where
he is the key interface role and he has a difficulty in
deciding on his allegiances. He faces the situation now
where on the one hand he has been given opportunities by
mine management to improve himself, to develop himself 20
and I believe in expectation of the removal of things
like the scheduled person that he would advance up into
the position of black miner. On the other hand there
is a growing struggle in the country and on the mines
which is primarily related to a black point of view and
a black cause with which I believe he probably also
identifies and as is so much the case in our society
today, people are being obliged to choose whether they
are for the struggle or against the struggle and he is
now in a position of tension in his expectations. On the 30
/one hand ...

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DR MACNAMARA : one hand he is seen as leader of
the black work-force in whom
much faith and trust is being invested to be the first
vanguard of advancement and on the other he is seen as an
informant, as betraying the cause.

MR CHAIRMAN : As?

DR MACNAMARA : As betraying the overall cause.
There have been research studies
actually on the role conflict of the team leader but
they were conducted before this time. So, I do not know
what I am saying, I do not know whether I am commenting
or whether I am agreeing. I am speculating.

MR CHAIRMAN : No, I think this is an added
dimension to the many we have
already got, but ...

DR MACNAMARA : I am sorry about that!

MR CHAIRMAN : No, it is not of your making
at all. I would rather that
we have them.

DR MACNAMARA : I think it was a good question
and it has prompted the thought.

MR LETHOBANE : Thank you, DR MACNAMARA.
I do not have any further questions.

MR PURCELL : Perhaps I could just follow on
there and ask DR MACNAMARA
what he means by the overall cause that is being
betrayed.

DR MACNAMARA : I have perhaps used that

MR CHAIRMAN : As perceived by them.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I used that term fairly
/loosely, that ...

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DR MACNAMARA : loosely, that in view of the
internal conflicts among the black
people in the country today, that whatever the intentions
and aims, there is a need for solidarity, there is a
need to stick together, there is a need to collectively
work towards some goals for the future and that - I am
not suggesting it is a political cause, it is a general
developmental cause at the very least. It may have
political aspects to it, and that he is being cut out of
it and taken away from that - I am putting it the way 10
people would see it. When a man is called an impimpi,
he is informing on a cause, he is informing on another
purpose of things. I do not think I could elaborate
what that cause looks like. I accept that it probably
has certain political connotations.

MR PURCELL : I think what I understood you to
be saying is that there is an
overall polarity between black and white and any person
who attempts to bridge those two identified groups or
groupings, would be regarded with suspicion and mistrust. 20

DR MACNAMARA : Yes.

MR PURCELL : On the industrial level, any
attempt to alter the division
between working classes, would meet with some resistance
because of this almost primordial division, black and white,
the division there. Is that - that is a spontaneous
thought.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes. It is based in part on
the fact that in the surveys I
alluded to earlier, the white supervisor is very poorly 30
/trusted on ...

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DR MACNAMARA : trusted on this trust analysis
that is done. He is invested
with very low trust. Now if the black supervisor has
dealings with the white supervisor, then questions will
be asked, is he going over to the other side, I suppose.

MR PURCELL : Just something else which has
struck me before, a personal
experience too, which may offer commentary on this
same theme. Between line officials and personnel
officials on the mine there is a certain amount of - I 10
might be straying a bit, but a certain amount of distrust
which I understand to be on the basis that personnel
officials have a higher level of closer dealings with
black people on the mine. Any comment in that regard?
Again in the same vein.

DR MACNAMARA : Could you just repeat that for me?

MR CHAIRMAN : Between line officials and
personnel officials.

MR PURCELL : The overall profile of a personnel
official is one of a class of 20
white people who are more sympathetic to black people
than the class of line supervision. Maybe I am imagining
things, but it is an impression I get.

MR MOSIME : Excuse me, MR PURCELL, I do not
quite understand your question
clearly. A class of personnel officials, you say, are
more sympathetic or seem to be more sympathetic

MR PURCELL : By whites. I am talking here
of white perception.

MR CHAIRMAN : Within the white 30

/MR MOSIME: Oh ...

MR MOSIME : Oh.

MR CHAIRMAN : Within the white management situation.

MR MOSIME : Yes.

MR CHAIRMAN : As between the line official and the personnel official there is also an element of mistrust, is suggesting, MR PURCELL, such mistrust arising out of the fact that the line official has presumably a different view of the black worker than does the personnel official. 10

MR LETHOBANE : Yes. Now would we say they are sympathetic or they are regarded as collaborators.

MR CHAIRMAN : I do not know if it goes as far as collaborators.

MR PURCELL : Well, it is a matter of degree and a sympathetic, perhaps not a word, but certainly having a different political attitude.

MR CHAIRMAN : A different empathy, shall we say. 20
Perhaps not a complete empathy but

DR MACNAMARA : I would suggest that in terms of the personnel function, that they see themselves as a buffer role, that in order to resolve the issues, because the mine's reality is pretty much management and white dominated, if they are to perform a buffer role and assist in resolving conflicts, they would probably find themselves having to functionally take more of a sympathetic stance in order to achieve that. 30

/MR PURCELL: And thereby ...

MR PURCELL : And thereby incurring a sort
of impimpi type reputation
amongst - in the white view.

DR MACNAMARA : Which, as we know ...

MR PURCELL : I am equating that sort of
situation. Did you

DR MACNAMARA : In other words the equivalent of
the word impimpi is "kaffer-boetie".

MR PURCELL : Yes. Which has been attached
to personnel departments as such 10
or is quite common. I am just trying to draw a parallel.

MR CHAIRMAN : No, look, if that is a fact that
management has that problem as
well

MR PURCELL : I would just like to know if
DR MACNAMARA has sort of ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. Are you aware of that?

DR MACNAMARA : I have found it mostly with
hostel managers. Hostel managers
have indicated to me on a number of occasions because I 20
have spent some time interviewing them, that they are
seen by line as "kaffer-boeties" who attempt to take
the black man's side. That allegation has often been
levelled at the hostel manager. With his reduction of
his status described earlier and the arise of the personnel
function, the personnel function is finding itself in the
same sort of situation.

MR PURCELL : That has confirmed a suspicion
that I certainly have.

MR MOSIME : In other words a personnel 30
/officer finds ...

MR MOSIME : officer finds himself, that is
in relation to white line
management, he finds himself in a position which is
similar to the one a team leader finds himself in, in
relation to

MR PURCELL : A fairly rough parallel,
but that was the point I was ...

MR CHAIRMAN : I do not think it has ever
resulted in violence or
anything like that.

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MR LETHOBANE : Well, I may just make one
observation here, once again
stands to be corrected by MR PURCELL, in relation to the
surveys, officials, whatever union MSOA. I collected
from my informants that in fact it looks like membership
of this particular organisation is not optional to
people who achieve certain level of ...

MR PURCELL : Level. That is correct.

MR LETHOBANE : Yes. The moment somebody is
appointed in that position, he
automatically finds that subscription is already being
drawn from his salary.

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MR PURCELL : Perhaps - clarify that further.
The MSOA has a closed shop agreement
with the Chamber of Mines where all jobs regarded as
officials - jobs in other words, require that any
person appointed to that job must be a member of an
official association.

MR LETHOBANE : And apparently MSOA does not
enjoy, or should I say, the support

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MR LETHOBANE : of NUM. It does not have its
credence.

MR PURCELL : I would accept that.

MR LETHOBANE : Besides that a member of that
organisation.....

MR PURCELL : MR MOSIME would probably be able
to comment better on that.

MR LETHOBANE : a black member of that
organisation ...

MR CHAIRMAN : You say it does not enjoy the 10
support of NUM?

MR LETHOBANE : Yes. So that a black member
of that organisation would
definitely not be in the good books of the NUM.

MR PURCELL : Well I would accept that.
I suppose they are opposition
and I suppose the NUM are

MR CHAIRMAN : What is NUM's attitude?

MR MOSIME : In fact, MR CHAIRMAN, the NUM
was on several occasions 20

approached by members of this MSOA with a request that
representations should be made on their behalf to
management, you know, conveying their unwillingness to
continue their membership with MSOA. This mainly
happened in hospital staff members. For instance I
remember very well a case in Randfontein Estates Gold
Mine, ^{where} members in the hospital were compelled by virtue
of the nature of what they were doing, to join MSOA and
they came to the union and requested us to make
representations on their behalf. Even before the 30

/problem was ...

MR MOSIME : problem was resolved, they had organised themselves into a branch of the NUM holding two memberships at the same time, but I do not know what ultimately happened. Today they have ceased their membership with MSOA and they are members of the union.

MR CHAIRMAN : Are they having their salary automatically deducted because of their position as a - that part of their salary as a MSOA due.

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MR MOSIME : Yes, they

MR CHAIRMAN : In other words they are nominally members of MSOA

MR MOSIME : Yes, they did have that

MR CHAIRMAN : but structurally and in fact they regard themselves as members of NUM and are seen as NUM members. Well, there you have got another element of tension.

MR MOSIME : At work they deduct their salaries for the purpose of membership subscription, that is in respect of NUM, and their NUM membership. I am not clear as to what ultimately happened to their problem, MR CHAIRMAN, but their membership with MSOA ceased and they are now members of

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MR PURCELL : It ceased?

MR MOSIME : Yes. And they are now members of the NUM.

MR CHAIRMAN : That there is a closed shop. Perhaps they told you that their /membership has ...

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MR CHAIRMAN : membership has ceased, MR MOSIME!

MR PURCELL : And I know from my own experience
in the pure personnel field as

far as closed shop agreements, I have seen letters to
management, or to the employer, saying it has come to
our notice that this person occupies this job. He is
not according to our records a member, please fix the
situation otherwise in terms of our agreement we will
request you to dismiss him from your employ within a
certain period. And that is not unusual, certainly the 10
Mineworkers' Union, is also subject to a closed shop
agreement and we deal with a number of such letters
frequently.

MR MOSIME : As I say, I do not know what
ultimately happened to the problem.

They may have told me they have ceased their membership
and so on when it was

MR PURCELL : Yes, and

MR CHAIRMAN : Well, I am sure they have told
you that, but they obviously have 20

not, for a variety of reasons.

MR MOSIME : Do they have a certain portion
of their salary deducted?

MR LETHOBANE : I may just say that ...

MR PURCELL : I think they pay R8 a month or
something like that. Compared
to your membership it is quite high.

MR LETHOBANE : I learned it was something like
R10.

MR PURCELL : R8 - R10, I cannot recall. 30

/MR LETHOBANE: And they ...

MR LETHOBANE : And they were concerned that membership subscription for NUM is only R1 and this side is R10 and one has to accept membership of this particular organisation in order to be able to, you know ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Do the job.

MR LETHOBANE : get hold of the higher position to which he has been promoted or otherwise if you refuse membership of this organisation, then you lose your position.

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MR CHAIRMAN : That seems to be the position that MR PURCELL was explaining to us.

MR PURCELL : It is a condition of employment.

MR LETHOBANE : They were quite concerned, yes. It was a concern.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR PURCELL : I can confirm that there have ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Well, somebody will have to address its mind to this.

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MR PURCELL : been, to my knowledge, some statements of reluctance and preference for membership of the NUM.

MR LETHOBANE : By saying it is a closed shop I think you have actually confirmed that. That there is no way one can pull out unless you were to sacrifice his position.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, that is as I understand it, is the position. Are there any other matters?

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/MR LETHOBANE: No, as ...

MR LETHOBANE : No, as I said, I have finished.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, MR MOSIME?

MR MOSIME : MR CHAIRMAN, I want to ask
DR MACNAMARA some questions, but

I have not formulated them very well. Can I ask

MR NGOMANE to proceed? I will come after him.

MR CHAIRMAN : MR NGOMANE? Yes?

MR NGOMANE : Yes, MR CHAIRMAN. DR MACNAMARA
in your evidence you mentioned

the involvement of vigilantes, Kimberley in 10

this instance. In some of the mines where most of the

inter-group conflict occurred between 1984 and now, I have

noticed that the Russians always feature in this faction

fighting, either being recruited by one - mostly being

recruited by one side, the Basutos. In your study and

your observation what would you comment about the Russians

being involved in faction fighting in the mines?

DR MACNAMARA : Again, just from a broader
perspective, MR NGOMANE, to assist

you, in the earlier years the references that I could 20

find to the Russians, I have a few - perhaps let me

just make the point that the term Russian is a sort of a

popular term, as I am sure you would agree. It is

applied to people who are trying to explain the identity

of a particular group. Sometimes the group to which

they give this name calls themselves Russians as well and

sometimes they do not. In fact the term Russian

originated during the British wars in the Crimea and the

South African blacks regarded everybody who was anti-

British as a Russian. So in fact the origin of the 30

/term was ...

DR MACNAMARA : term was a political resistance
to the British. That is of some
academic interest I agree, but it does tell us where
this term started. And that subsequently the term was
used to describe the activities of gangsters or groupings
that were involved in criminal acts in the Springs area
on the East Rand in the 1920's. There are records of
that. There are records of - again this is how people
used the term, I have read in the 1950's riots in fact
on the mines in the East Rand, that the police in fact 10
referred to the people involved as Russians, and that is
the use by the police of the term Russian. And those
were actually acts of resistance associated with the
general conflict in the late 1950's in this country.

MR CHAIRMAN : The political conflict?

DR MACNAMARA : It preceded the defiance campaign
and the various activities.

MR CHAIRMAN : So it had a political connotation.

DR MACNAMARA : It seems the events were linked
to politics and the police ... 20

MR CHAIRMAN : In other words it was not a
gangster element, it was a
political element.

DR MACNAMARA : What I am saying is that I have
read reports that the police
identified the mobs as Russians. My concern is that
this has just become - could have become part of the
normal terminology which is applied by observers to
decide that a group is a Russian or not. They were
actually called Basuto Russians, and any Basuto mineworker 30
/involved in ...

DR MACNAMARA : involved in a riot became a
Russian and I would just question
very clearly who is calling what and how the term is
applied. In the more recent years, in 1976 on a mine
near Vaal Reefs, Buffelsfontein, there was a clash
between Sotho and Xhosa combined with Pondo, arising
from activities of so-called Russians in the area.
Allegedly a Sotho Russian gang operated a prostitution
business on three dairy farms which might even be in close
proximity to Vaal Reefs at this point in time, I do not 10
know, and these three dairy farms, the Sotho Russian
gangs charged R10 for the services of the prostitute and
the Transkei and Xhosa-speaking patrons were dissatisfied
with the charge, and there was a clash between Sotho
and Xhosa with Pondo involved as well. I have already
mentioned the alleged involvement of Kimberley and the
deferred pay disputes, so I have jumped over that.
And then in 1979 at Elandsrand Gold Mine, which is in
the Carletonville area, which is some distance from
Vaal Reefs, there was a work strike there just after 20
the mine had started production, it was a new mine, which
the management felt had a link to so-called Russians.
The Russians had allegedly been living in the hills
along the ridge, the Carletonville ridge of hills, and
they were mainly deserters from the mines, people who
had been black-listed and discharged from the mines, a
rather motley group of people that lived in the hills
and also came down into the hostel which did not have a
fence around it, as part of a more modern design, and ate
the food in the hostels and in fact sometimes slept there 30
/and that ...

DR MACNAMARA : and that they were allegedly seen present at meetings about the strike and in fact the management believed that they had been instrumental in bringing about the strike, which I say was an allegation made at the time. The motive being that three months earlier, a white farmer had apparently shot a Russian and the Russians it was said were going to take revenge and they had become involved in the work strike to that purpose. Those are really theories and allegations which were reported and recorded at the time in various sources, mainly the management sources. I think one agrees that on the line of hills extending from Western Deep Levels and beyond, that there are many unemployed people living in the hills who many people call Russians. It is the opinion of TEBA who I feel could give very useful testimony here if they were here, that the gangs originated from Maseru. There was a north gang from north Maseru and a south gang from south Maseru. That is the information that was reported in information that I saw prepared by TEBA. The theory and again I feel very guilty - again I seem to give more theories than I do facts, but the theory which I again read and I am merely reporting it, was that the Sotho Russian gangs had the object of sowing dissension on the mines to cause repatriation of Lesotho nationals back to Lesotho to effect the overthrow of Chief Jonathan. That was the theory which the TEBA obtained from State Security. I have often subsequently found very little support for that. I just could not find further support for that. But that such groupings exist, certainly they exist.

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/Whether they ...

DR MACNAMARA : Whether they call themselves
Russians or not is another matter.

They are seen to be also in a position to waylay and
intimidate and exploit mineworkers through their running
of shebeens, prostitution, robbery and so on. I believe
that the popular view from the work-force and I cannot
always of course speak for them, is that they are seen as
straight gangsters who prey on mineworkers. More or
less reporting all the information I do have about them.

MR CHAIRMAN : Is there any individual at TEBA 10
who we could approach who

might make himself available as you have, or as

MR GOLDING has? I do not want twenty individuals

DR MACNAMARA : No.

MR CHAIRMAN : we will never get anywhere.
Is there some

DR MACNAMARA : Well, the organisation inside
TEBA in question is called the
Liaison Division.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. 20

DR MACNAMARA : And they have a new head of the
division, whose name I do not
recall. I have in fact got the name on correspondence
and I could get it to the enquiry. Unfortunately he
is fairly new there and the people who have been most
exposed to these issues in question include MR SID PETERS
who has recently retired....

MR CHAIRMAN : Well, he might be a very
suitable man. What is his name?

DR MACNAMARA : H S PETERS. He has retired to 30
/Milnerton in ...

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DR MACNAMARA : Milnerton in the Cape.

MR CHAIRMAN : Oh we will all go there!

MR PURCELL : You did mention the TEBA diary.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, yes.

MR PURCELL : There is a log or ...

DR MACNAMARA : TEBA keeps a log of all conflicts.
They have a log of the February/
March events and they have a log of the November events
which are kept in a diarised form that I actually assisted
them to prepare and they have those in their records. 10
They are more or less blow-by-blow accounts which could
assist in confirming and corroborating some of the
questions that have been raised as to who went - who and
what was happening.

MR CHAIRMAN : Where are their records, in
Johannesburg?

DR MACNAMARA : They are kept in their liaison
division at the TEBA depot in
Eloff Street.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, I think I might have a 20
look at it.

MR PURCELL : I would say so. When you say a
log, it is a factual account, is
there any analysis with the log or

DR MACNAMARA : There is sometimes a comment
attached, a commentary of several
pages. There is a lady whose name I do not recall, who
is responsible for producing these and she prepares
commentaries - attached

MR PURCELL : She comments on the log contents. 30
/DR MACNAMARA: She comments ...

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DR MACNAMARA : She comments on the log content
and puts them in a wider context,
occasionally.

MR PURCELL : Is she an academic or do you
know her

DR MACNAMARA : I do not know her, I have ...

MR PURCELL : How do you rate her comment?

DR MACNAMARA : She seems

MR CHAIRMAN : Well, switch off the machine!

DR MACNAMARA : She seems to be fairly knowledgeable 10
about industrial relations.

One comment I saw was a detailed analysis of the Marievale
incident, which she seemed to be fairly familiar with,
and the consequences it had for unfair labour practices
and so on. She seemed to ...

MR NGOMANE : DR MACNAMARA, we mentioned
earlier through, when MR LETHOBANE
was examining you, he came to the point of the involvement
of mine security. As I said, I have been going to mediate
in faction fights in many places either in mines in the 20
ANGLO fold or in GENCOR. The actions of mine security
is either they come too late to prevent something or
they do not come out at all although knowing that a fight
is imminent. I would mention a case in Western Deep
Levels, that one was satisfactorily resolved, in Vaal Reefs
I think it was in the West Division, even Vaal Reefs
during the March incidents, what could be the cause of
this in your own experience and analysis, why do mine
security come too late or is that part of the passive
complicity you mentioned earlier? 30

/DR MACNAMARA: Mine security ...

DR MACNAMARA : Mine security are caught between
several contradictory expectations.

If they come too early, it is often alleged that they provoked something and then they are often alleged to have come too late. I am aware of a tremendous dilemma that they do have of sometimes being told to have - why were they not present to keep the peace and at other times being told why did they interfere and provoke. I think they definitely are caught, in my own opinion, between these expectations and it is very difficult for them to know when they should intervene. I know that they have been accused often by the union of either coming too early or coming too late and I think the very fact that they are accused of both of those charges, gives you some idea of the difficulties they are placed. That is - sorry, that would probably be a more personal comment. And as far as their role is concerned, I can only report that their role has developed over the years and has become - I would say more professionalised than it used to be. In the early days they were ill prepared for what they were doing, training services were extended over time, maybe they are better prepared today. I do not know how else to add to that.

MR NGOMANE.

MR LETHOBANE : Sorry, did you want to ask it?

MR NGOMANE : Yes, you can ask on this point.

MR LETHOBANE : DR MACNAMARA, I am aware that
the mine security is composed of

both the black staff and white staff, but there is a
tendency among the black mine employees to identify

/mine security ...

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MR LETHOBANE : mine security with the white
security officials. Would you
know the underlying cause for that? That is the presence
of the black security officials, it is not regarded as
anything important, that when they talk of security
in the clashes that they have in the hostel, you must
know they are referring to the white security officials.
Perhaps I may just ask hereone question in order to
facilitate your response on this question. Are these
two groups of officials, that is blacks and whites, equally 10
equipped?

DR MACNAMARA : Sorry, equally?

MR LETHOBANE : Equally equipped. Training wise
and physically.

MR MOSIME : Should I also point out,
DR MACNAMARA, that he should be
mindful of the fact that many of these black security
personnel are unionised, but in spite of that, animosity
is directed at white security officials.

DR MACNAMARA : I really could not comment on 20
their training, MR LETHOBANE.

I have never really attempted to investigate that and
I would just deliver meaningless comment. I am aware
that they have themselves had their own grievances, the
black security staff and even I think on one occasion
involved in a strike of their own and possibly linked
to MR MOSIME's comment. Beyond that, it would be
difficult for me to comment. I really have not looked
at them in depth. I know their role in the conflict
situation, I know that in most conflicts they very 30
/quickly appreciate ...

DR MACNAMARA : quickly appreciate that they
cannot manage them and that they
withdraw, and that ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Are you talking about security or
black security?

DR MACNAMARA : Generally mine security forces.
They are there for a containment
situation for a minimum force
operation and they make a decision fairly quickly or
fairly soon as to whether they can really handle it and 10
then it is the case often or it has been in the past that
South African Police come in at that stage.

MR LETHOBANE : Yes, you see, I appreciate we are
probably asking you difficult
questions because you have not made any study of the mine
security, I suppose, but there is a feeling which I
think could lay credence to the animosity being directed
against the white security officials. There is a feeling
that even when there are clashes in the hostel, people
are fighting, the black security officials or officers 20
are not really playing a prominent role. They are more
of what one could say watch-dogs perhaps. They can
only act on instructions from the white security officers.
So perhaps when I asked whether they are equally equipped
physically and training-wise, I was expecting you to give
me, you know, the seniority level within the security
force arrangement, because I have heard at some stage
somebody actually saying: No, actually the white security
at times do possess fire-arms and he says he has never
experienced anywhere where a black security official would 30
/be issued ...

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MR LETHOBANE : be issued with a fire-arm. So they regard the white security officers as the people who are actually in charge in any conflict situation in the hostel and unless they instruct accordingly, the black security officials cannot do anything.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes. I cannot comment, I do not know.

MR NGOMANE : DR MACNAMARA, I am sure you have been involved in research with various mines. Let me speak about the mines in the ANGLO fold, especially that - we are talking about Vaal Reefs in this matter. What are your observations about the culture of ANGLO at head office level and the culture at individual mines? Is there a similarity in their culture or they seem to - each mine devolves its own culture about its running? 10

DR MACNAMARA : You really want to get me into trouble, do you not! I think the ANGLO AMERICAN gold division as a whole compared to other mining groups, still does have a distinct philosophy. Although there may be internal variations across the regions of ANGLO gold division, it is still the case that the ANGLO gold division has adopted a more progressive attitude towards trade unionism. You can see that in the membership figures alone, I do not even have to support that statement. Because I think already they represent a distinct class of management from say other mining groups. How substantial those internal variations are with the regional cultures or the mine 20 30

/cultures, I ...

DR MACNAMARA : cultures, I must say I have found
has really become the difference
between an organisation culture and the people in it.
The individual personalities of the managers will
obviously have a bearing on the climate that is set at
a mine. I would not say that their objectives differ
that
and there is a formalised distinction to that extent, but
merely the personality of management.

MR NGOMANE : Perhaps, MR CHAIRMAN, I would
precede my question with a 10
statement. I have been in discussions with two mine
managers in the Vaal Reefs region, at different forums
though. If a mine manager's pronouncement is obviously
anti-union, do you think probably such pronouncement would
be conducive to a mutual work relationship between the
management of that mine and the union?

DR MACNAMARA : I assume that anti-union implies
something specific. In other
words I am asking in your question must I look for anti-
union in the sense of an attitude ... 20

MR NGOMANE : I think it is an - I would put
it an attitude. Let me make an
example of a statement like this. If we can - probably
have to throw this baby out with its bath-water, a
statement like that, that revolves around an attitude.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I would say this, that
the quality of the relationship
between management and the union on a mine which is a
two-way street as well, is going to have a very big
impact on the quality of the whole mine's climate. 30

/I think ...

DR MACNAMARA : I think that we can say. If they are in conflict, if it is known to employees that the management and the union are in a sort of an on-going dog-fight, there is no doubt in my mind that that is going to produce a discomfort and a set of insecurities among the work-force because they know that if that is the case, that it could have consequences for them. So if there is a poor relationship between the management and the union, however that has arisen, it will affect the work-force, I believe. 10
And I have to interpret your question in saying that should the management demonstrate by various ways which one could look at, an anti-union stance, that I imagine employees could become confused.

MR CHAIRMAN : Could become?

DR MACNAMARA : Become confused. Their question would be: Must we understand that we ourselves will be looked at in a poor light if we join a union in that situation? I believe it could lead to nervousness on the part of the work-force, but I think what would have to happen is that the anti-union sentiment as such as it is defined, would have to be fairly clearly evident to the work-force. I think statements that are made by the management, you know, in a confidential session, may not necessarily get out to the work-force. Something fairly concrete would have to happen. I mean there are mines, not at Vaal Reefs, where NUM has in fact been de-recognised. I think that would be a fairly concrete statement, anti-union statement to the work-force. I am not sure how an /attitude could ... 20 30

DR MACNAMARA : attitude could eventually find
itself down to the work-force.

It would have to be clear that there is an anti-union
attitude.

MR NGOMANE : As you have mentioned that while
the relationship is a two-way
street, we have an emergent union here, having some
militants as we have had some evidence, we have got a
management probably let us say not ready to accept the
challenges of emergent trade unions. When these two 10
sides meet, if there is a - would you agree with me
if each side does not trust each other, it would affect
their communication when the trust dimension has been
severely weakened, there will be a lot of suspicion, poor
communication in certain events, even increasing conflict,
if I may put it that way.

DR MACNAMARA : No, indeed, I do agree with you.
If I am to observe the situation
rather than be a participant and I looked at management's
attitudes in the same way that I have been trying to 20
talk about the attitudes of employees and the management
perspective has changed in a sense that they initially
accepted and embraced trade unionism because it was
clear that there was a need for this representation, but
what I clearly see they are uncomfortable with, is the
apparent emergence of a political agenda inside that
trade unionism, and I think they find that very difficult
to manage. I think it is most unfortunate that the
mining industry unionised when it did, because it became
unionised - it is difficult enough for a manager to 30
handle a ...

DR MACNAMARA : handle a trade union on the
property. That is a big step
for him, it is like a father losing his children, you name
it, it is like all kinds of things. For that to
happen is already a difficult step. For that to happen
at the same time as having to handle the deterioration
of this country's political situation, is a most
unfortunate concurrence of events as far as the mining
industry is concerned. It would have been better - this
is wishful thinking. it would have been better if we had 10
clarified unionisation five/ten years ago and established
a solid set of relationships, the kind of trust you are
are describing, to better withstand this kind of
subsequent tension, and I think that is unfortunately
what has happened, so the honeymoon is over.

MR MOSIME : Do you mean that there is a
struggle for control of the
work-force now by the shaft stewards and hostel or line
management in the shaft? That is after the advent of
trade unionism. 20

DR MACNAMARA : MR MOSIME, I am suggesting that
the fact that it is perceived
as a struggle over the work place is the problem.
Industrial relations is about the negotiation of an
agreement in an organisation for a common purpose, that
benefits and costs are negotiated out. The fact
that the mining industry has become an issue about who
has control, is the very problem that we face, that it is
seen as a control issue, it is seen as having wider
implications and I believe that sense of control over the 30
/work place ...

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DR MACNAMARA : work place is something which is informed by the generally deteriorating situation that this country is in. It is a winner take all perception of things, not a negotiated compromise, basically.

MR LETHOBANE : Can I add something else?
I think the question still is in a situation where the mine manager has got a negative attitude against the union, what would be the situation in the relations between the two and you said it would confuse the workers. Now what I want to find out is what is the inevitable consequences of the strained relations between the union and management? Is it not that you will find a situation where the union would want to prove that it has got the strength...

MR CHAIRMAN : That it has got?

MR LETHOBANE : It has got the strength, the power, and in order to demonstrate that they would definitely have to step up recruitment and make sure that they have got more membership, secondly they would disrupt a lot of normal activities of the mine and challenge a lot of established procedures in order to indicate to that man who has got a negative attitude against them that we have got the power, you had better accept that we are here to stay. I mean are these not the normal things that you would expect in a situation where the person on the one hand who is the manager, tends to be dissatisfied with the presence of the union in his mining hostel? And on the other hand on the side of /the management ...

MR LETHOBANE : the management, would you not
have a situation where the
manager himself would also make everything possible to
indicate to the union that you do not have the power that
you want to demonstrate to me that you have. And if
anything that he can see that there is that power, to
whatever degree, would he not take steps to make sure
that he limits, he minimises that power, so that in
future the union is not in a position to boast about any
further power. I think I have given you my perceptions 10
and I want to find out from you what you would imagine
would be the consequences of strained relations between
management and the union where the other side is not
happy about the existence of the union.

MR PURCELL : Perhaps in addition to the
question, would the presence of
a good relationship improve the situation markedly?

DR MACNAMARA : It is a game of perceptions, I
believe. The management perceives
that the union's growth is a threat, not merely to the 20
organisation of production, but ^{that} it has wider consequences.
That is their perception. They then put up defences and
resistances because they are almost not sure what the
consequences will be. The union on its part sees
these defences and then interprets, and in some respects
realises that this is now no longer just an orderly
development, this is going to be a struggle. And yes,
it then produces a spiral of response from the union that
it now has to resort to perhaps more extreme means than
it may have planned to take in the first instance. 30

/Those extreme ...

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DR MACNAMARA : Those extreme measures in turn
now produce a reaction once
more from the management, that it has now confirmed its
suspicions that this is where it was going and it now
withdraws even further, and I believe this is what is
happening all the time, is that there is this spiral of
conflict between the parties. The effect on the employees
which is eventually the germane question we have here, is
to see this spiral of conflict and deterioration between
these two parties and a number of things happen. There 10
is insecurity and there is opportunism. I believe there
can be in this type of environment some employees who
themselves may not share the goals of the union, who
feel that they are aware now of the management
perception and that maybe they can do things which maybe
somebody will turn a blind eye to. I think that is
possible. Conversely union members themselves feel
that they must now work harder, take more extreme measures.
It is a most unfortunate situation. I am just trying to
see it from a distance. 20

MR LETHOBANE : Would you find it inconceivable
in
that a situation like that,
management would even further than that, want to see to
it that it limits the power of the union by reducing as
much as possible, or influencing as much as possible, that
those - a number of other people who are known to be
members of the union, pull out of the union. Would it
be inconceivable?

DR MACNAMARA : In a way that is a policy question
of how people would react. 30

/MR CHAIRMAN: It would ...

MR CHAIRMAN : It would create the climate
for this. Leaving aside whether
a decision is made to do it, mistrust, suspicion

DR MACNAMARA : Create the climate for a

MR CHAIRMAN : a spiralling of both
mistrust and suspicion with
violence, would certainly create a climate for each
party, I would imagine, to strengthen its own position
and to weaken the others as a matter of

DR MACNAMARA : Of tactic. 10

MR CHAIRMAN : tactical awareness.
Whether it is done is a different
story entirely.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes. In the sense of it being
a chess game, there is a
political - analysis could be made that people will now
attempt to maximise their own position in an adversary
situation.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes, where there is a confrontation.

DR MACNAMARA : I think I also read in the 20
management perception that their

understanding of industrial relations is that it is a
balance of power and that that power is more or less
equally distributed and it is negotiated out. Where
one party dominates the other in both situations, in the
past management totally dominated the labour force, but
like most things in history, this is going to now swing
completely the other way and somewhere along the line
I think the management would like to see a balance of
power and anything that is going to depart from that

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/will create ...

DR MACNAMARA : will create problems.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. What is a balance, of
course? If the two parties

agree that the same thing is a balance, that is one
thing. If each one sees a balance in not quite the
same way as the other one ...

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, indeed.

MR CHAIRMAN : we do not really - help much.

Interestingly enough you have
used the term here balance of power as management's 10

perception. I think MR GOLDING used the term an equitable
balance at one stage. His perception of what an equitable
balance is and management's perception of what is a
balance of power are unlikely to be the same. I have
not heard from management or from MR GOLDING yet as to
precisely what each has in mind when each uses a
phrase or a term which might appear to be the same.

MR PURCELL : I am sure it would involve
movement away from extremes

and that is all as far as I 20

MR CHAIRMAN : Well, for starters it might, but
you know, this is perhaps the

crux of the - or one of the cruxes in this problem.

I think we will adjourn now until 13h45.

MR MOSIME : Just one question before we
adjourn.

MR CHAIRMAN : Oh, sorry. Yes? Yes,
certainly.

MR LETHOBANE : Just on this point. DR MACNAMARA,
would you not see the calling of 30

MR LETHOBANE : a spate of wildcat strikes which
disrupt production and the normal
running of a company as being regarded as a tilt in the
balance of power by management.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I believe they would see
it as a

MR CHAIRMAN : As a what? I did not hear the
word.

DR MACNAMARA : As a change in the power balance.

MR CHAIRMAN : Oh. Yes.

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COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR LUNCH

COMMISSION RESUMES

MR CHAIRMAN : This is the afternoon session of
Thursday 7 August 1987.

DR MACNAMARA being cross-examined by MR NGOMANE.

MR NGOMANE : DR MACNAMARA, I think you are
sufficiently aware of the extent
of politicisation in industrial relations during 1985
and 1986 and I will just cite some few examples of how
politics have interfered ^{with} industrial relations.

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These are in the form of stay-aways, sit-ins, the need
to respond to political demands, especially from trade
unions, the need for industry to distance itself from
apartheid.

MR CHAIRMAN : To do what?

MR NGOMANE : To distance itself from apartheid.
When I am talking industry I am

talking mining as well. The suspicion that trade
unions are controlled by outside political forces and also
the view that trade unions have become subordinate to

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/political organisations ...

MR NGOMANE : political organisations. Boycotts,
white resistance, as well as
pressure from outside the country.

MR CHAIRMAN : What was the last one?

MR NGOMANE : White resistance or the white
backlash. There are two
questions I would like to ask you. Would you agree
with me when comparing with other countries that it is
not uncommon for politics and industrial relations to
be intertwined? The second question, would you say 10
that management is equipped, looking at the mine scenario,
would be equipped to handle these political stresses?

DR MACNAMARA : The first question, it is
definitely not uncommon for
industrial relations and politics to be intertwined.
One only has to look at the British trade union movement
to see that and further I have been acquainted with
studies that have attempted to show that where the working
classes of a country have political representation in
government, that the level of industrial conflict 20
declines. It is no longer necessary for the working
class to promote their issues and causes in the work place.
All they have to do is to go into parliament and change
the law and effect the objectives that way. And there
are a number of studies which have shown that and when a
Labour Government is voted out of power, that during
its period out of power, level of industrial conflict is
increased. It is not a perfect correlation, but there
are articles which have attempted to show that in terms
of the European industrial relations situation. Which 30

/leads us ...

DR MACNAMARA : leads us to the statement that
where certain proportions of the
labour force are not politically represented, that one
would expect that they would have no other channels to
express their interests as a group but through an
industrial sector. Whether South African industry is
going through that right now, it is an easy observation
to make. I think I said earlier that at this stage it
would appear that the intensity and the frequency of the
conflict that we see could be related to a general set
of political dissatisfactions, although it is difficult
to find particular disputes that are explicitly political
in their aims and objectives. That is a little more
difficult. On the second question I think it is quite
clear that the management is not equipped. Their task
is to manage an industry and to see that that industry
survives. I think I said earlier that they are
uncomfortable with the handling of these political
stresses and it is for that reason that the business
community in this country has started to coalesce into a
political interest group in an effort to root political
conflicts out of the work place. I trust those are
answers. They are comments more than they are answers.

MR NGOMANE : Thank you, Doctor. Would you
concede that here in South
Africa as you know the political situation, that since
the blacks have got no political platform, they are
likely to pursue their political aspirations or at least -
let us say in part through the industrial relations
machinery.

/DR MACNAMARA: I think ...

DR MACNAMARA : I think the question is - I
would agree that they would have
few other avenues open to them. The question really is
how would that that be pursued? How would they in fact
pursue that objective and concern in industry?
Would it be to put pressure on the management to act as
an agent for change? Would it be to literally render
the work place so unmanageable that it would bring about
some sort of political crisis, or is it merely an
expression of frustration with no specific objective 10
in mind? I do not know which of those it would be and
how this would happen.

MR LETHOBANE : I just wanted to make one enquiry
on this particular aspect,
about management's position as regards the politicisation
of unions and you are saying that in fact in order to
counter that, there has been an attempt on the part of
the business community to coalesce into some kind
of a political interest group. I do not know how far
that has been successful, but all the same, an interest 20
group knows that whatever it will achieve can never
necessarily be in the short term, it would be in the
long run. Now with management, with whatever
preparations it is making in order to, you know, cool
down a situation and in the process perhaps attempt to
meet some of the possible grievances of their black
employees that they know they have against the powers
that be, what would be the position of management in an
event where workers take a politically inclined industrial
action, beyond which at that particular stage or at that 30
/particular point ...

MR LETHOBANE : particular point in time,
management has got no control.

Let me cite an example. Take a situation where a mass of people from one of the black townships attends a funeral and the funeral tends to get politically charged and the armed forces intervene and in the process cause casualties that may result in the deaths of some people and as a backlash we have got strikes mushrooming in the mining industry. You see management does not have any immediate control on the release of the 10
armed forces to go and control a chaotic or a riotous situation anyway, but now here are workers going on a strike at their industry, what would be their position in regard to such a situation?

DR MACNAMARA : Sorry, their position?

MR LETHOBANE : In regard to such a situation.

DR MACNAMARA : The management's position?

MR LETHOBANE : That is the position of management, yes. They are aware that workers 20
are going on a strike now, because they feel that people have been unduly harassed and some killed when they were peacefully attending a funeral. Now that was a State action but the strike now is directly against management not against the State as such. what would be the view of management in that regard? At least about that kind of a strike. You see their production is being interfered with on something that they do not have immediate control of.

DR MACNAMARA : You are asking what the management's view would be and you are asking me! 30

/MR LETHOBANE: Well, somebody ...

as

MR LETHOBANE : Well, somebody who has had an
interest in industrial relations
and done some work on it.

DR MACNAMARA : I think their view would be that
the union leadership needs to
examine its own policies and decisions in view of the
consequences of pursuing that, not merely for the
management, who will suffer certain things, but also for
their members who will suffer greatly in other respects.
I think it would be the management view that certainly 10
they will suffer, but who suffers in the end? Who
suffers from the overheating of an industry? In the
mining industry, thousands of employees are going to
suffer. Certainly the mines will become a little less
profitable and slow down to some extent and the management
of the industry would not regard that as a comfortable
situation to be in. The foreign exchange of the country
would be affected, which of course affects all its
citizens, but more so the employees. I think that
would be the management perspective, is that ultimately 20
the union leadership may have to take a decision. If it
has to go down that road, what will be the consequences
for its own members.

MR LETHOBANE : Which is possible expulsion.

DR MACNAMARA : Possible expulsion in something
which went well beyond the
legality of industrial relations but even in the knowledge
that most conflict situations have consequences which
we see in the examples we have before us at Vaal Reefs,
consequences which one can no longer have control over 30
/which lead ...

DR MACNAMARA : which lead to deaths, injuries,
destruction of property and
the deaths invariably are deaths of employees, either as
victims or as perpetrators.

MR LETHOBANE : I do not think I am very happy
about that - the response. You
see we are agreed that the unions in South Africa are
generally politicised probably due to the political
situation in South Africa itself and the National Union
of Mineworkers does not seem to be an exception to this 10
general rule and it looks like over time this is a reality
that management - of the mines in which the National
Union of Mineworkers is operating, has had to live with.
So what I want to find out is what is the possible
reaction of the management of these mines and more
probably in particular the management of the Vaal Reefs
region in regard to the politicisation of their workers
to the extent that production of the mine may find itself
being disrupted because of things that management
believes that it does not have immediate control of. 20

DR MACNAMARA : I know of some fairly constructive
examples where managements of
certain mines that perhaps best not be named now, have
played a constructive role in the wider political problem
by attempting to secure agreements between the police
in the townships and the comrades in the townships because
whatever is happening there affects their employees
who travel daily to that work site. And I must stress
that because management cannot operate from anything
outside its own value system. Everybody operates 30

/from their ...

DR MACNAMARA : from their value system and its
value system would be our employees

are being affected, what possible involvement can we have?
And I do know of examples where fairly constructive
negotiations have been brought about with management as
a chairman where it has been agreed for example that the
comrades will agree that they will hold their funerals on
week-ends and not on weekdays and that the police in
turn will agree that they will leave mourners alone.
I know of agreements that have been struck on that basis. 10
It could be that that is the only way in which the
management could operate at this point in time, is to
deal with immediate issues which affect their employees
and make some kind of adjustment of this kind.

MR LETHOBANE : Let me be a bit more specific,
DR MACNAMARA, perhaps this would
help us to come to an amicable solution to this problem
that I am having. You see, the management of the mine
or perhaps most mines in South Africa, is not composed
of people who are uninterested in the South African 20
political development as such. In most cases I
imagine it is composed of actually South African born people
and the reality of the mining industry as it still is
today is that policy making management level within the
mine is still composed of the white people. Now if I am
not wrong, I think I stand to be corrected by MR MOSIME,
I think the National Union of Mineworkers and COSATU have
both adopted ^{the} freedom charter. To a certain extent
this goes to show the level of politicisation of unions
within South Africa and I am not aware that the freedom 30
/charter as ...

MR LETHOBANE : charter as it is today is acceptable to any one of the present political parties that are participating in parliament. I am referring here specifically to the white political parties. Now what would be the position of the mine management which is composed of people who belong to either one of those political parties that are participating in parliament and which we know that do not subscribe to the freedom charter even if they see it as a communist document? I think I have been a bit more specific. 10

DR MACNAMARA : Sorry, you are asking what should management's reaction be?

MR LETHOBANE : What would be the reaction of mine management in that kind of a situation, to the politicisation of the union with which they are working?

DR MACNAMARA : Now I am putting myself in the minds of the management.

MR LETHOBANE : But under normal circumstances, you can even give us a theoretical perspective, what would be the natural reaction that one could expect from a manager whom you know that he is not also a - I mean he is not politically an associated somebody, I mean he also has got his own political interests at the end of the day. 20

DR MACNAMARA : Yes, I think it is. I think we all agree that its perspective would be that the most important priority for him in his position would be to see that the mines keep running /and that ... 30

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DR MACNAMARA : and that without those - no,
I am now assuming a value position
that I think a manager might assume, if the mines do not
run, we can all pack our bags. Unless we have economic
stability we have no political stability. Unless we
have an industry which can generate the wealth to
support this country's change process which is a very
expensive process, then there is no real - nothing is
really going to be achieved. So he would take steps to
safeguard the goose that lays the golden egg. He would
take steps to safeguard the mining industry and put it
first and foremost and leave the political resolution
to a much more stretched out set of deliberations. And
attempt to make a statement to that effect. The president
of the Chamber, the outgoing president, made statements
to that effect to the Press, that there was a role for
business in the future of this country and leave that
kind of higher level political negotiation to the highest
levels of leadership in the industry and confine himself
to the task of keeping the mines going. I do not know
if that answers a carefully steered question!

MR MOSIME : It does. The freedom charter
among other things calls for
the sharing of the country's wealth, the nationalisation
of mines and other demands which are slightly socialist
inclined. The union, the NUM for instance, on its
political policy, that is ANNEXURE "CC", EXHIBIT "CC" ...

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes.

MR MOSIME : Clause 1.6 states that apartheid
and capitalism are two inseparable
/evils that ...

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MR MOSIME : evils that must be smashed.

Now do you think mine management's attitude towards the union will remain unchanged after an adoption of such a stance by the union with which it will have to deal?

DR MACNAMARA : I see. Perhaps you have extended the question. I think that

would depend on how they stated their objective. I am now going to engage in a little bit of philosophising and suggest that it is possible for the management to still embrace trade unionism while recognising those. 10

Firstly that is partly rhetoric which might even be designed to scare managements into responding.

Secondly I know it is part of a policy that would be adopted. I think the management would - it is not inconceivable that the management could still accept trade unionism under those conditions, provided it could make clear that trade unions in fact function best under capitalism and not under socialism. Under socialism,

trade unions have a very poor track record, in fact they have even been outlawed. In socialist countries the banner of the workers is taken over by the state, maximum wage price, wage controls, are instituted, strikes are outlawed. I do not think it would be 20

difficult for the management to present a picture of the legitimate democratic role of a trade union under capitalism. I think that argument could be made. I am saying it depends on how the management perceives it and the objectives that they are trying to support. You know, I do not know if that really helps the question. 30

/I personally ...

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DR MACNAMARA : I personally do not - I see that impossible to make that argument and then I would assume that it is possible for management to say: We will demonstrate that the trade unions can work under this system, because we actually know that this is going to be the golden days of trade unionism in this country and that under socialist - any type of socialist arrangement, it can only be downhill from there onwards and that eventually employees may see that, unions will see that.

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MR NGOMANE : DR MACNAMARA, thank you for your exposition and I was just examining one of your dimensions, the four dimensions you mentioned, the political one, if I may look on the industrial one

MR CHAIRMAN : MR NGOMANE, we are definitely not going to finish with DR MACNAMARA today. I have had a request from quite a number of sources to conclude at this point in time and it is a convenient stage in the sense that you have finished the political and now you want to go on to the industrial.

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MR NGOMANE : It is sort of inter-linked, MR CHAIRMAN, it is one question anyway.

MR CHAIRMAN : Oh, fine then. Yes?

MR NGOMANE : We have in the mine situation the white employees who admittedly the emergence of a black trade union has made them uncomfortable in the sense that it has eroded some of

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/their perceived ...

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MR NGOMANE : their perceived supervisory prerogatives. Would the mine-workers, white mineworkers, - with the perception that the trade union is a threat to their privileged position and well aware on the other hand their contribution, I mean their role in production in the mine, would they put pressure on mine management and put it simply: Look, this trade union, you must do something about this trade union, it is our privilege, and now it is talking politics. Is it possible that they could rally there and put pressure on management at local level, to do something about the black trade union? What would be your view and comment on that? 10

DR MACNAMARA : Sorry, you meant that certain grass-roots groups of workers would ask the management to take a position on the trade union's political lines?

MR NGOMANE : Yes. The white - especially the white trade unions having been uncomfortable because of the existence of the black trade union - of NUM, let us put it that way. 20

DR MACNAMARA : Oh, the white members?

MR NGOMANE : I am talking about the white members. You know, they are uncomfortable about the emergence of the union because it challenges certain, many rules. Would they rally and put pressure on mine management to do something about it?

MR CHAIRMAN : What MR NGOMANE called the white backlash. And has there been /any such ... 30

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MR CHAIRMAN : any such white backlash?

DR MACNAMARA : Oh, the backlash started when
the first steps were taken to

appoint black artisans and accommodate them in the same
accommodation as white artisans, but those steps have been
taken and those have died down, as it were, so some
success was achieved. It is certainly the case that
whites are asking about their own security. As you
probably know, certain two white persons were killed
at Western Holdings not a long while ago and there is a
sense of insecurity which will have to be addressed.

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I think your question obviously is that with this white
pressure, would this oblige the management to take
harsher action against the trade unions?

MR NGOMANE : And management on the other hand
knowing the key role on production,
the key the white personnel possess.

DR MACNAMARA : Yes. Well, there are managers
who will question that key role,

there is a lot of debate as to whether that role is key
any more. The mines have been run before when whites
went on strike. I think the issue of the scheduled person

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is a way of answering this in that it is a matter of
urgent priority that that issue be resolved and I think
that the white interest as such will take second place
to that concern right now and although mine managements
are very aware and concerned about the white backlash as

it is called, they would like to move on that issue and
I do not think that they are going to be pressurised
into not moving in and I could be wrong, but my

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/understanding is ...

DR MACNAMARA : understanding is they will not.
That is a difficult question.

I am trying to give a short answer as well.

MR NGOMANE : That is it for today
MR CHAIRMAN.

MR CHAIRMAN : Yes. We certainly are at an
area where we can read the papers

over the next week in order to see precisely what is
happening on this very score. We will adjourn until the
31st of August, that is Monday the 31st of August

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unless otherwise advised. We can communicate with
each other telephonically, and unless otherwise advised,
we will be meeting here and the intention is to work
with DR MACNAMARA and with MR GOLDING. It is one of
my regrets that MR GOLDING has not been present while
DR MACNAMARA has been giving his evidence.....

DR MACNAMARA : It is not my regret!

MR CHAIRMAN : and vice versa.

MR PURCELL : But he will have the benefit of
the record.

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MR CHAIRMAN : Certainly. Hopefully by then.

And if you would mention this to
MR GOLDING, please, MR MOSIME. I hope the coming weeks
will allow for a speedy resumption of our enquiry.

In the interim, it might be an opportunity for the
promised or threatened summaries and heads of argument
to be worked on and be prepared. We have got something
like just over three weeks. I recognise fully that
this is not the only job that people have, but it would
be an opportunity to get some lines of thinking on this.

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/We have ...

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MR CHAIRMAN : We have had a lot of material
this last session where we have
gone almost uninterruptedly for about fifteen days or so.
I would like to thank you all in the interim and look
forward to seeing you again.


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CERTIFICATE

I the undersigned JULIET HARRISON hereby certify
that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript
of the proceedings mechanically recorded in the
matter of the VAAL REEFS COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY.



J A HARRISON
TRANSCRIBER
HALFWAY HOUSE
20/8/87

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