

country either to seek work, to join their menfolk, or for any other reason. This stricture effectively prevents the entry of women, and keeps the number of women in the Western Cape constant at the early 1955 level.

All these methods "stem the family flood", to quote Dr. Eiselen again.

3. The limited introduction of single migratory workers to provide for most urgent needs. This means just what it says. The whole panoply of Labour Bureaux, the pass system, etc., enables the authorities to see that only the required numbers of workers are in any given area. In the Western Province, only so-called "bachelors" are allowed to enter to seek work. This aspect of Governmental policy has been more fully described elsewhere in this issue—but it should be pointed out that since 1952 not a single house for an African family has been built at Langa, and not one at Nyanga, the other African township, since 1954. In the whole of the Cape Peninsula, therefore, no housing at all has been built in recent years to accommodate families, and only hostels for "single men" have been constructed by the authorities.

4. The removal of all Natives who come from the Protectorates. This bald statement covers another heart-breaking aspect of the scheme. There have been so many removals of African communities. This will be yet another—despite the fact that many Africans born in the Protectorates have been working and living in the Western Province for many years. To them the Western Cape is home. They have severed their ties with Basutoland (where most of them come from) or Bechuanaland. But they will be moved—just that one word, moved—when the time comes, no matter if they have lost all contact with their birthplace.

5. Reduction in the number of Native families. This is being done in several stages. The people living in the so-called "black spots" are being removed from all over the Peninsula to the two emergency transit camps which the authorities are busy setting up. And then, those who do not qualify to remain will be repatriated. This is the ultimate step of the Eiselen scheme, repatriation for all except for the select few who will be permitted to stay. Where, how, by what means is all this to be decided? Nobody knows, outside of the few who have devised the whole inhuman plan.

The final stages of the scheme are outlined in the Cape Town

City Council minute quoted in "The Crime of Langa", for its last paragraph shows that there will be no security for even the few families who remain, no security even for migrant African labourers. Whether there will be security for the Coloured people, who Dr. Eiselen claims will replace the Africans is, of course, yet another question.

Dr. Eiselen has openly laid down the steps which the Government is either taking or will take to remove all Africans from the Western Cape. He does not concern himself with where these people are to go, how they are to earn a living, how they can adjust themselves to tribal conditions after years of urban life. Human values, human suffering, human rights are utterly unimportant. That many thousands of Africans are to be forcibly removed is just another plan among so many plans in which people are treated as units and moral and ethical values are completely ignored.

Even apart from the moral issues involved, nothing perhaps demonstrates better the economic absurdity of apartheid than the Eiselen scheme. Here is a responsible Government official declaring that industrial expansion, the very basis of all modern society, should be controlled—or curtailed—in order to prevent too many workers from settling in a vast area of the country. One wonders whether the Government's own supporters are going to defend a policy which must lead to the economic ruin of the whole region. Already there is evidence that Cape Town and the Western Province generally are developing at a slower pace than the rest of the country. Compared to the other centres of the Union, industrial expansion in the Western Cape is slower, and those industries which have been established are of less economic significance. If this should continue, and it will assuredly if some 100,000 of its inhabitants are removed, then the Western Cape will become a sleepy backwater where all progress has come to a standstill.

This is, of course, an important enough issue in itself. But much more important is the ultimate agony it will cause the African people. They themselves will express their opposition to this brutal and inhuman policy, and it is up to all those, both in the Union and abroad, who object to the scheme, whether it be for moral, economic or other reasons, to raise their voices in protest with them *now*, before it is too late.

THE CRIME OF LANGA

L. B. LEE-WARDEN, M.P.

*Member of Parliament representing the Africans of the Western Cape,
Now undergoing Preparatory Examination on a charge of
High Treason.*

THE "Crime of Langa" is a factual account of the life of urban Africans in the Western Cape, where the Government's apartheid policy is particularly ruthless. It deprives them of any vestige of security, and the perpetual threat of mass removal to some unknown promised land of milk and honey hangs heavy over their heads.

Nothing is permanent here for the Africans, their whole life is in a state of flux. Where in other parts of the Union freehold property rights have been taken from the Africans, it has been replaced by leasehold rights of about thirty years tenure. But in the Western Cape even that is denied.

In recent years the whole pattern of African life has been changed by these very circumstances, causing a serious breakdown in home life and moral standards.

That the Africans are not indigenous to this particular portion of South Africa has been stated on many occasions by Government officials and historians; but how they came to be here and the many years they have regarded this as their homeland are facts not yet included in the annals of our history.

It is estimated that to-day there are 178,000¹ Africans in the Western Cape. This figure of course includes men, women and children. In the last twenty years their numbers have increased considerably, due not only to natural increases, but mainly because of the inability of the Native Reserves to sustain them. Unwillingly they have left their homes and drifted into this region.

It is interesting to recall that about 100 years ago the farmers of this fertile region were crying out for labour, and to satisfy this demand "many thousands" of African prisoners of war were imported. These men were put to work not only on the farms, but also on the badly needed harbour breakwater—all as indentured labour (i.e. a system of legalised slavery).

The Africans of that period were by no means savages, as many would have us believe. They merely lacked the scientific knowledge which the white settlers have brought with them from Europe.

¹ The figure given by Dr. W. W. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, in January, 1955.

They were, in the main, cattle farmers and enjoyed well-developed social and political institutions. The Chief was the depository of tribal rights, but he was in normal circumstances no despot, being controlled both in legislation and in the administration of justice by the tribal council and by the tribe itself.

With the passing of the years the female Africans joined their menfolk in the Western Cape, and so they became part and parcel of the composite population of this area.

In recent years the bulk of the Cape Town African population has been concentrated at Langa, a so-called native Township (or location) specially designed to accommodate, in small compact houses, the African and his family. For the bachelor or migrant worker, single quarters known as barracks were provided.

Of course not all the Africans could find homes at Langa, and with the rapid industrial development of this area and the perpetual call for cheap black labour—especially during the war years of 1940-45—many had to find quarters elsewhere. Thus sprang up little tin shanty-towns known as “squatters’ camps”, which are described later in this article.

It must be recorded that no government in South Africa—past or present—has really concerned itself with providing adequate housing for the African people. These “squatters’ camps” have existed, and still do exist, all over the Union. Indeed the local authorities encouraged it, since it meant that no money from general funds was required to build houses, and it assured the industrialists of a continued supply of cheap labour. They were happy to leave things as they were provided that they were kept out of sight!

As far back as 1903 Government officials have tried to persuade local authorities to improve the housing conditions of the urban African, but apart from drawing up reports little or no improvements followed. The Native Affairs Commission of that year (1903) does throw some light on this subject, for in its report it stated:

“The Commission has visited and inspected many Municipal locations and records its opinion that in some respects their condition leaves much to be desired. The Natives who reside in or frequent these locations are, in the main, working people. *As such there is every reason why they should be encouraged to stay as useful members of the community.*”

The above indicates the policy of the Government half a century ago. Labour was hard to come by and was to be encouraged to settle permanently. Better conditions were advocated but not implemented. Of course, at that time the inhuman migrant labour system was still in its infancy and as yet unorganised.

By 1913 the Western Cape, like other parts of the Union, had a

large and ever growing African population. A Government report on health gives an illuminating account of conditions that prevailed at that period:

“With few exceptions they are a disgrace, and the majority are quite unfit for human habitation . . . Speaking generally, the dwellings are mere shanties, often nothing more than hovels constructed out of bits of old packing case linings, flattened kerosene tins, sacking and other scraps and odds and ends . . . The dwellings are low, dark and dirty, generally encumbered with unclean and useless rubbish. Mud floors are the rule, often below the ground level and consequently flooded in wet weather.”

The fear of disease being spread to the white communities through Africans having to live under such conditions forced many local authorities to provide better accommodation for their African workers, although the above description can be aptly applied to many locations that still exist to-day throughout the Western Cape.

Langa can never fall into this category. It was designed to provide better homes for local Africans. The houses are mainly brick, electric light is available, and the roads are tarred. There are schools, churches, shops, sporting facilities and all that go to make up a civilised community. But a location is limited in size, and as the children grow into adults, marry and have families of their own, either more houses must be built or overcrowding is inevitable.

In the meanwhile the squatters' camps became more numerous. Forced to live in these overcrowded, disease-ridden slums, the poorer people were subjected to gross exploitation, having to pay not only shack rent to the landlords, but also fees for many of the other necessities for bare living.

For many years social workers have endeavoured to alleviate the hardships imposed on these unfortunate people, by instituting such things as crèches, clinics, soup kitchens etc., but no money could be found for houses! The white authorities were rarely called upon to improve conditions. “Send them back to the Reserves”, is a cry so often heard in South Africa when these conditions are exposed to the public. It depicts the callous attitude of the white racist to the plight of the African people in the towns.

A dusty little piece of history is worth recalling, for not so many years ago the cry was just the opposite. In fact it was government legislation which first drove the Africans from the territories which were allocated to them by the white intruders.

In 1894 the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes, devised a method for obtaining labour for the diamond mines and for the white farmers. He introduced a Bill in that year taxing the male African population, and made no secret of its implications. He stated, “By the gentle stimulant of the labour tax you will

remove from them that life of sloth and laziness; you will teach them the dignity of labour and make them contribute to the prosperity of the state, and make them give some good return for our wise and good government."

It would be correct to say that the Africans in South Africa have contributed far more than their share to the prosperity of the State! South Africa is to-day one of the wealthiest countries in the world, while the African population has remained poverty-stricken, semi-literate and chained hand and foot by legislative enactments.

With the unexpected rise to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948 on their ambiguous slogan of apartheid, drastic legislation followed to eliminate the "black spots" (i.e. the squatters' camps and shanty towns) which are so characteristic of racial differences in South Africa.

The new pattern of homes for Africans and their families differed vastly from that found at Langa, where, as I have stated, family units live in comparative decency. The government announced that in future no funds would be made available for family houses at Langa. Instead, only single barracks for migrant labourers will be permitted, so that in due course Langa will become a huge camp designed to accommodate about 20,000 male African migrant labourers. The families now living there will be removed.

The economic and social effect upon the lives of the people who are affected by the migrant labour system is really the subject of a long article by itself, but I cannot resist the temptation to touch upon some of the cardinal evils of this system since it has been officially stated as government policy that as far as all the Africans in the Western Cape are concerned, *all families will ultimately be repatriated to the Native Reserves and only migrant labourers will be allowed in this area.*

This is the future that faces the inhabitants of such places as Langa. Repatriated to the Reserves—which are as foreign to the bulk of these people as it would be to transplant, say, a Londoner to the plains of Nebraska. And from the Reserves the male African must return to the urban areas to earn his livelihood as a migrant labourer, leaving his wife and family to fend for themselves as best they can.

Few white people realise just what it means to be a black migrant labourer. It is not unusual for young households to disintegrate almost as soon as they are formed. The separation which, except for a few brief months, may last any period between six and ten years. The burden that falls upon the women who are thus left

behind is indescribable. They must till and care for the land—usually without any help—and also keep their homes in good repair.

The women are quite unable to earn the money necessary to maintain themselves and their children, who often become a burden far beyond their strength. Occasionally the woman receives money from her husband, but more often than not his wages are so meagre and his job so precarious that few women in the Reserves know anything but dire poverty.

This is the fate that awaits the people of Langa—a crime with few parallels in living history. But the tragedy does not end there.

In the meantime preparations are proceeding to build a “transit emergency camp” at Nyanga West, some eight miles further out of the town, for the purpose of accommodating all African families in this area. A word or two about Nyanga is necessary in order to give the reader some idea of the type of accommodation approved by the Government.

Nyanga West was designed to hold about 8,000 African families living in tin shanties principally in the Northern suburbs of Cape Town. Each tenant has to pay £1 per month for a plot measuring 27 feet by 14 feet. Upon this the squatter may erect a shack, which usually consists of the rusted tins that comprised his former residence. Very few Africans can afford the new material necessary to house their families properly.

To anyone who has not seen the state of these “pondokkies” they defy description. Nothing short of a magic wand is necessary in order to break these down from the squatters’ camps and re-erect them at Nyanga. Yet it must be done before the Council’s bulldozers reduce them to rubble. To see these unfortunate people struggling during the weekends to comply with the removal orders (although the officials deny compulsion) is a heart-breaking experience.

The whole position of the Nyanga West Township is summed up in a Cape Town City Council minute dated 29th November, 1955. It states:—

“In connection with the establishment of the new Native Township at Nyanga West, your Committee has been informed by the Department of Native Affairs that it is an essential prerequisite to the approval of any projects for the provision of services in the scheme to be financed from Native Services Levy Fund that the Council shall first set up an emergency or transit camp for Natives at Nyanga in terms of section 6 of the Prevention of Illegal Squatters Act No. 52 of 1951.

“In the case of Local Authorities outside the Western Cape, the requirement is the setting up of “Site and Service” schemes, which are, in fact, embryo home-ownership schemes, whereby sites with the minimum essential services are allocated to individual Natives on which the Natives and the local authority are expected in time to build approved houses. “Site and Service” schemes are not, however, permitted in the Western Cape.

"In view of the special circumstances pertaining to the Western Cape, the Minister of Native Affairs has agreed to the financing from Levy Funds of the reticulation of minimum necessary services inside the scheme by way of a grant in terms of section 19(3) *bis* (f) of Act 25 of 1945. Link services will be financed from Levy Funds in terms of section 19 (3) *bis* (d) of the Act.

"When all the Natives now living in the various squatters' camps have been concentrated under proper control in the emergency camp, all those families who, in accordance with policy, are not entitled to be in the area will be repatriated and approved houses will be built for those families who qualify under section 10 of the Act to remain in the urban area.

"The type of house to be constructed in the scheme should be capable of conversion to single quarters in order that when the declared long-term policy of replacing married Natives by migratory workers is put into effect, the conversion will be simple and inexpensive. Similarly, the buildings should be reconvertible to family dwellings should Native migratory labour ultimately be replaced by Coloureds."

Thus the plan unfolds.

1. No houses will be built until all squatters are in the emergency camp.
2. Those not entitled to remain will be repatriated.
3. Houses must be easily converted to single quarters for migrant labourers.

Soon the day will come when no black child will live and laugh in Langa. Exactly when no one knows . . . but there are many thousands who care, and one day those responsible for this crime will stand accused.

AFRICAN LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

MARGARET BALLINGER, M.P.

Member of Parliament representing the Africans of the Eastern Cape.

IN 1913 the Union of South Africa embarked officially on the policy of territorial segregation or separation of land rights as between Europeans and Africans which constitutes both the foundation and the background of apartheid to-day. In that year, the first Parliament of the new Dominion passed its first Native Land Act. Prior to Union, in all the states that were to constitute the Union, some provision had been made in the form of Native locations or reserves for Africans living in traditional fashion and, in addition, except in the Orange Free State, general rights of purchase of land in freehold by Africans had been recognized. Now, alarmed at what the European electorate claimed to see as a dangerous tendency on the part of the African population to exercise this right, the first Union Government sought in this Act to limit and define the areas in which acquisition by Africans might take place—this ostensibly with the intention of preventing the intermixture of European and African ownership.

Experience, however, has repeatedly shown that it is easier to limit than to define rights in a multi-racial society. Particularly is this the case where the legislators belong to one section of those for whom the arrangement is being made. It is true that, under the Act of Union, the Africans of the Cape Province still retained a franchise which they had enjoyed since the institution of representative government in the old Cape Colony; but even in the Cape, the African voters had lost the right to send one of their own kind to Parliament, and the Africans of the other three contracting states had no political rights at all. (The existence in Natal of a provision for a highly discretionary franchise does not invalidate this generalization.) So then, as now, European interests and claims exercised a dominating influence on the government of the country; and against the determined opposition of that section of the African population which was already politically conscious, and of those Europeans who stood by the traditional policy of the Cape of equal rights for all civilized men, parliament legislated to restrict African rights in land to the already established reserves, such land as was already held by Africans in freehold, and such further land as might

be considered necessary to meet the legitimate future claims of the African population. It was to take twenty-three years before any South African Government could decide what this further provision should be.

In line with the general principle of the Act, all cash tenancy by Africans of non-African-held land became illegal. Exemption from this restriction was, however, provided in respect of African families already established as rent-paying tenants in other than scheduled Native Areas—that is, the Reserves and African-owned land exempted under the schedule to the Act from the restrictive provisions of the Act. But it was understood that this exemption should continue only until other provision could be made for the people concerned.

WHAT LAND TO BE RELEASED?

It is significant that a challenge in the courts established the claim of the Africans in the Cape Province that the restrictions of this Act could not apply to them in view of the franchise rights which they shared with the European population, and until 1936, when those franchise rights were abolished, Africans in the Cape remained outside the scope of the Act.

Significant also, although for a different reason, is the history of the attempts of successive governments to implement the obligations of the Act by delimiting both the extent and the locality of the further areas to be opened to acquisition by Africans. The Act itself made provision for the appointment of a commission to explore the position and to make recommendations in the light of its experience, its report to be completed within two years. In due course, the commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir W. H. Beaumont and in 1916, with a slight delay occasioned by the outbreak of the First World War, it presented its findings. It recommended the release from the restrictions of the 1913 Act of some 8,000,000 morgen of land, the amount of land which its investigations revealed as actually occupied at that date by Africans as recognized and established rent-paying tenants. This, together with the estimated 10,000,000 morgen of scheduled area, would have meant that ultimately some 18,000,000 morgen of land might pass into the hands of the African population.

These recommendations, which were submitted to Parliament in the form of a Bill, proved unacceptable to all parties, European and African alike. Since they had been made on a specific Provincial basis, it was thereupon decided to refer them to a series of local

committees for review. This was done and in due course these committees presented their own proposals. These followed generally the lines of the Beaumont Commission's recommendations but reduced somewhat the total area proposed for release by that Commission. They were also rejected and it was not until 1936, when the aftermath of the Gold Standard controversy produced fusion between the two major parties in the country, that this issue was brought to some sort of finality as part of what General Hertzog regarded as his comprehensive "solution to the Native problem". In that year, under the Native Trust and Land Act, legislative provision was made for the release of seven and a quarter million morgen of land for acquisition by or on behalf of Africans which, with the scheduled areas, would have opened to Africans something over 12 per cent of the whole area of the country. Most of this amount was specifically defined in the schedule to this Act, but according to the most recent estimate, that of the Tomlinson Commission, some 1,900,000 morgen still remain to be specified. Also according to that Commission, the final amount of land which may become "Native area" is not seventeen and a quarter million morgen but nearly nineteen and a half million morgen, which would bring potential Native area up to 13.7 per cent of the land of the country. Nearly all this land is situated in the eastern part of the country. It consists of some 260 scattered blocks of varying size and quality.

AREA, NOT AVAILABILITY

But in the circumstances of South Africa, the potential amount of Native area does not in itself reflect or explain the nature or extent of African property rights. These depend on the availability of such land. Here it is of the first importance to realize that only a small fraction of the areas scheduled under the 1913 Act was and is held in private ownership. The bulk of those areas is Native Reserve, the ownership of which vests in the Crown or, since 1936, in the Native Trust constituted under the Native Trust and Land Act of that year. It was and is densely populated by African families who are in effect tenants of the Trust. Their use of the land tends to follow a traditional pattern, namely an arable allotment, a garden site (on which the family's huts are erected) and a share of common grazing. The traditional size of the arable allotment is five morgen, but as pressure on the available land has increased, many allotments are smaller than this. No man may own more than one lot, and while in some circumstances he may alienate his

interest in his lot, he may not devise it by will. In each and all of these areas there are considerable numbers of landless men each of whom hopes some time to secure an allotment.

SEGREGATION AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL HOME

Thus the bulk of the scheduled areas does not provide a property market in the usually accepted sense of the term. The released areas would, it was assumed, serve this purpose. There were to be areas in which an aspirant class of land-owners might find an outlet for their resources and ambitions on land available in freehold. But by the time these released areas received legislative sanction, the country's Native policy had changed from one of residential separation to one of separate group development. Already under General Hertzog's segregation policy, the Native areas had begun to assume the character of an African national home. In these circumstances, and in order to hasten the process of separation of Africans and Europeans, the Government of the day planned not only to release areas for acquisition by Africans but to help to purchase these areas for African settlement. Thus the Native Trust constituted under the 1936 Act came into the field as a competitive buyer and most of the land that has been acquired since 1936 has passed into its hands to be settled on terms similar to those already operating in the Reserves—that is tenancy on the basis of one man one lot. Little land indeed has been acquired for Africans in freehold and less is likely to be so acquired in the foreseeable future for two reasons. In the first place the restrictions on the amount of land open to African purchase, together with the Government's interest as a purchaser, has gravely aggravated the general tendency in these latter years for land values to rise steeply, so that land purchase is beyond the reach of all but a very few Africans.

But an at least equally effective deterrent to African acquisition of land is to be found in the fact that Government policy is now opposed to the purchase of land by individual Africans. Where, in 1936, the Nationalist Party strenuously opposed General Hertzog's decision not only to release but to buy land for Africans, to-day, the drive of the Minister of Native Affairs is to control by public ownership as much as possible of the so-called Native areas, this in the interests of that ethnic grouping and the establishment of Bantu authorities under which he seeks to re-establish and maintain what he regards as the essential character of African society. Thus to-day, no African may buy land even in a released area without the

consent of the Minister of Native Affairs, and the Minister has declared that it is his policy to refuse this consent unless the proposed purchase fits into his plans for African social or administrative organization.

A further significant check on the possible emergence of an African landed class is to be found in the decision of the Minister of Native Affairs to maintain the present system of land distribution in the Trust-controlled areas, with its tendency to fragmentation, rather than encourage the consolidation of holdings and the emergence of a full-time farming class with a reasonable standard of living independent of migrant labour. His rejection also of the proposal to convert quitrent tenure to freehold, which was strongly urged by the Tomlinson Commission in order to encourage a sense of security and enterprise, tends in the same direction.

AFRICAN PROPERTY RIGHTS IN URBAN AREAS

Thus it is clear that for the African population, property rights in rural areas are very strictly limited. But not all Africans wish to become farmers even if it were possible for them to do so. To-day, out of a population of eight and a half millions, of whom something more than half have to seek their livelihood outside the Native areas, some two millions are already fully urbanized in the sense that their hopes and their ambitions are essentially urban; and the speed with which the process of urbanization continues is one of the most conspicuous features of our socio-economic life. What opportunities do our law and our practice afford to this section of the population?

At the time of Union, a degree of residential separation had already been enforced in the urban areas of all the South African states—in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State by law, in the Cape Province and Natal without legislative sanction. At the same time there existed generally a right on the part of Africans to purchase property. This right continued to exist down to 1937 when it was formally abolished by the Native Laws Amendment Act of that year.

But even while Africans had the right to purchase in urban areas, after 1923, when the first Natives (Urban Areas) Act was passed, rights of tenancy were strictly limited and ownership did not necessarily convey the rights of occupation. Under that Act, Africans could be required to live in municipally provided locations or hostels as tenants at will of the local authority unless they owned and occupied property valued at £75 and over, (in 1938 there were

3,431 such cases all told); and except in the Cape Province, even African-owned property might be expropriated to implement the principle of separation. It is true, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act suggested some recognition of the claims of permanently urbanized Africans to some form of investment and security in their place of domicile, by providing that areas might be set aside by the municipal authorities or be recognized by the Government as predominantly Native areas in which Africans might acquire property in freehold. But it is significant that the release of such areas is entirely discretionary and that even before the advent of a Nationalist Government pledged to apartheid, the provision in the Act was to all intents and purposes a dead letter. To-day, it is entirely without value, since not only has the present Minister of Native Affairs declared his determination to allow no new rights of freehold to Africans in urban areas but he is pledged to wipe out such meagre rights as have survived from a less rigid past. The attack on the Western Areas of Johannesburg under the Natives Resettlement Act of 1955, and the extension last year of the powers of the Group Areas Board to all other areas of actual or potential African ownership—a meagre four in all of which Lady Selborne in Pretoria is the most important—reflects the vigour with which the policy of making urban areas completely European, at least in the property sense, is being pursued by the doctrinaire protagonists of apartheid. To-day apart from these four areas which are now doomed to extinction, the only interest in property open to Africans who are not content to be tenants of municipal houses is the “privilege” of building a house on a municipally owned stand on a thirty-year lease—a concession which is itself at the discretion of the municipal authorities in each individual case. And having built his house, if he wishes to sell it, an African can only do so to a purchaser who has established or can establish his right to be in the same urban area. The same limitation applies to business premises and businesses, a limitation which can be very severe in operation. It has already happened that a man, having built up a successful business in an urban location or township and wanting to sell and retire, can find nobody in the area with the capital necessary to purchase the business and is yet denied permission to sell to a would-be purchaser from another area.

ALIENS VERSUS SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENS

But in terms of the apartheid policy, urban areas are European areas where Africans have no right to property. Incidentally,

“European” in this context includes aliens, who thus enjoy more rights in our towns and cities than do South African citizens who have helped to build them and continue to help maintain them—for Africans are South African citizens in terms of our citizenship law. Africans, urban as well as rural, should, it is contended by the protagonists of apartheid, seek their property rights—and indeed all their rights—in Native areas. But it is one of the significant anomalies of segregationist thinking that such towns as have come into being in Native areas are also European areas in terms of our law, with all the restrictions for Africans of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. It is true that at last the Minister of Native Affairs, the arch apostle of apartheid, has agreed that this is, in fact, something of an anomaly and has stated that one day these towns must become African towns. But he has also made it clear that the day is to be a distant one. He has indeed now agreed that Africans should be allowed to purchase property in these areas, but in each case his approval and consent must be obtained for each transaction, and the policy does not visualize any general withdrawal of the Urban Areas Act. For the rest, his plan for the urbanized African and the diversification of African society is limited to the surveying of new townships in the Reserves where individual Africans will be permitted to purchase lots on the familiar conditions of one man one lot. This, with the potential acquisition from Europeans of rural trading sites and mission stations, will, in the Minister’s opinion, adequately meet the needs of African investors in the foreseeable future.

When the present Minister of Native Affairs addressed the final meeting of the Natives’ Representative Council in 1952, he informed the members of the Council that Africans must look for their own advancement to the sort of economic diversification through which Europeans had built up their society. The opportunities for investment and property which the Minister’s policy itself allows would suggest that the process of diversification will not only be a lengthy one but that the Minister’s intention is that it should be so.

AFRICAN TRAGEDY

PHYLLIS NTANTALA.

It is the sad story of a whole people—8,535,000 souls, landless, homeless, destitute; a people who have been ruthlessly uprooted from the country but not allowed to develop roots in the towns; victims of a vicious worked-out system to render them homeless, propertyless and poor so that they can be pushed into the labour market to still the economic cries of the industrial age. The Native Reserves have them by the thousand—those young men who have never known life; husbands and fathers who have never known what home is, what family life is; fathers who do not know even their own children. It is the tragic story of thousands of young women who are widowed long before they reach the age of thirty; young married women who have never been mothers; young women whose life has been one long song of sorrow—burying one baby after another and lastly burying the husband—that lover she has never known as husband and father. To them—both men and women—adulthood means the end of life; it means loneliness, sorrow, tears and death; it means a life without a future because there is no present.

Hoping to escape misery in the reserves, they form a never-ending line to the cities where they crowd themselves with relatives and friends in the city slums, in the “pondokkie” or shanty towns sprawling round the big cities.¹ Johannesburg has its share of these slums—Alexandra Township, that black “city” of eroded streets—streets made boggy by ever-dripping water taps, a place of filth, disease, vice, and acts of violence. It has its Orlando Shelters, that grey “city” of breeze blocks, overflowing sanitation buckets fermenting in the hot Transvaal sun, a place of stench and disease that fill the air—a hot-bed of all kinds of social evils.

And Cape Town. Cape Town has its Windermere the beauty of whose name sneers at the cluster of dun-coloured beaten-out oil drums, beaten-out motor car shells, rusty bits of iron—all put together to form a roof over so many heads—a confusion of ill-constructed, badly-lighted shacks surrounded by pools of mud, urine and excreta. It has its Blouvillei, Cook’s Bush, Vrygrond, Eureka Estate, Rylands Estate, Sakkiesdorp—all death-traps winter and

¹ According to the figures of the 1951 census, this population constantly moving between town and country numbered 569,000 a year, and it consisted of 503,000 males and 66,000 females—two-thirds of whom were between twenty and thirty-nine years old and nearly 94% younger than fifty years. (Tomlinson Report P. 53.)

summer alike, for the rickety structures cannot stand the Cape Peninsula winter floods and in summer they are too hot to live in. Durban has its Cato Manor; Port Elizabeth its Korsten; East London its East and West Bank locations—none of them fit for human habitation. Here stay men and women who refuse to succumb to the conditions of squalor in which they live. It is in these places and because of the deplorable inhuman conditions under which people are forced to live, that many a young life is ruined. It is these erosive conditions that have given rise to the Skollie, the Tsotsi, the thief, the cut-throat and murderer. What is amazing is that so many of these people still manage to remain decent, respectable and law-abiding.

In the Cape Peninsula in 1954 there were at least thirty-eight of these pondokkie villages on the Cape Flats and in Goodwood, Parow and Bellville, "Black Spots" with about 17,000 people living in them. All 17,000 had moved to these villages because they could not find accommodation in the slums of Cape Town, nor in Langa and Nyanga locations. Here they built their own shacks on someone's ground at a rental of about five to ten shillings a month; many, however, were sub-tenants. There are no amenities even of the barest kind—no water, no lights, no sanitation. Water they buy at a penny per four-gallon tin from a hawker, the bush and sand dunes serve as latrines. In a few like Eureka Estate, whose Xhosa name is "Kwa Qhobosh 'imfene"—meaning "at the place where a baboon is knee-haltered"—and Windermere, known to the people as "e Mtsheko" "purging with belly-ache", there is some form of bucket sanitation, but these are always overflowing and with the pools of water, mud, excreta, there is a foul-smelling slough that for ever surrounds these pondokkies. In all of them life is insecure, for these are hot-beds of vice and crime. In winter these flimsy shacks are beaten by storms and rivers of water form right inside the pondokkies, washing away kitchen utensils, household goods and other possessions.

During the winter of 1954 the whole of Cook's Bush was flooded neck-high and most of the pondokkies were submerged, and nearly 600 people rescued from the floods lost everything they had. And summer with its strong South-Easter in the months of October and November is equally dreaded. A fire breaking out in one of these iron and paper shacks spreads so quickly to the others, and fanned by the South-Easter, the flames leap from structure to structure so easily that often fifty to sixty of these structures are eaten up by flames within a few minutes and hundreds of people rendered

homeless with everything lost. Many a man, woman and child has been burnt to death in these fires; many a savings of many years of hard toil have been lost in these fires and many a hard-earned wardrobe has been burnt to ashes in these fires.

The *Cape Times* of 3 November 1954, carried this caption: "URGENT PLAN TO CLEAR BLACK SPOTS" and went on to announce that the Divisional Council was waiting for the Government green light to go ahead with a plan to establish an emergency camp in Nyanga where 18,000 pondokkie dwellers would be settled. This meant that all Squatters' camps or Black Spots would now be controlled by the Divisional Council, and a plan of some sort in the building of the pondokkies and the camps be followed. Each family would be allotted a site on which to build and for which the Divisional Council would pocket the sum of £1 per site. The owners would have to provide their own building material. This "Emergency Camp" has since been established. There are three of these camps in this area—"Kraaifontein", whose people came mainly from pondokkies in the Kraaifontein, Bellville and Goodwood areas. Here there is a main road of sorts, the sand dunes have been levelled out by the Council, there is a pit latrine to each family, a water tap, and all the pondokkies stand in rows, and here the people have shown how ingenious they can be, shown their desire to have a home, real homes, stopping at nothing to make these temporary shelters presentable. They have used every penny they could spare to put up strong well-constructed pondokkies. The ugly rusty iron has been painted by most, the insides neatly finished off with brown paper over the sheets of cardboard; some have the insides lined with ceiling board, the floors lined with bricks and covered with flooring board; some even have pieces of dining room, bedroom and kitchen furniture. Needless to say, this is the show-piece of the Divisional Council even though perhaps the Council's contribution towards making this camp presentable has been the slightest.

Then there is "Brown's Farm". Here too most of the pondokkies are arranged in rows, strongly built, of a fairly large size. But there is neither water nor sanitation—for latrines, the people hide behind the bush and the sand dunes. Most of these people came from Cook's Bush and are the victims of the 1954 floods. "Sakkiesdorp" is the oldest of these camps, but there are many new arrivals in that part of the camp further in the bush. As the name implies this was a camp of hessian or sack shelters, but since the change-over, the people have been made to use iron

and timber. In the older portion of this camp, the pondokkies stand irregularly on little knolls around which stand pools of water and mud. These pondokkies look small and rickety. Those further in the bush stand in rows. Here also the people have used all their money to put up respectable pondokkies; these are neat and clean; some have plants ready to put in the ground when the time comes. As in "Kraaifontein" there are pit latrines—one to two families—white boxes that look very much like phone booths. But as in "Brown's Farm" there is no water here—water is bought from a hawker who brings it in a big drum on his horse-cart and sells it to the people at a penny per four-gallon tin and half a crown per drum. Only three shops serve the whole population of the Nyanga area and these three camps—one shop near the Cement Works Factory and the other two on the main road. To the people in Sakkiesdorp the nearest shop is about a mile away through bush and to those in Kraaifontein about two miles away. Fortunately, some Indian traders from Bellville and Parow bring them groceries twice a week and from them they make their weekly purchases.

It was in Sakkiesdorp that we met Mrs. Dumani. Her pondokkie is one of the big ones—a fairly large bedroom and a kitchen-living room in front. When we visited her, her husband who works at night in a factory in Parow was busy partitioning off the kitchen. (As he works at night, Mr. Dumani should have been sleeping at this time, but how can a man sleep when there is a home to build for a man's family?) It is a neat little place, this pondokkie, with walls and ceiling neatly lined off with cardboard over which are neatly pasted sheets of brown paper. The wooden floor is firm and well-laid—in the bedroom there was a clean square of linoleum covering the floor and on top of the wardrobe was another roll of linoleum waiting to be laid on the dining room floor when that was finished. There were still stacks of material outside—iron, timber and cardboard; Mrs. Dumani's plants stood in tins outside ready to be put in when all was ready. The material for all this had cost them £40 and it is lucky for Mr. Dumani that he can wield a hammer, for he has done all the work himself with the help of a friend over the weekends. His neighbour Mr. Cwaka instead has had to pay £150 for material and labour for his pondokkie—a man prepared to spend so much money on a temporary structure which he may be ordered to pull off the next day?

The Dumani family came to Sakkiesdorp from Tiervlei where they shared a house with a Coloured family. And before Tiervlei and Sakkiesdorp?

“Mr. Dumani here is my second husband—my first died here in Cape Town in 1949—he was Mr. Sahluko and we both came from the Engcobo district in the Transkei. ‘U Sathana wandicela mna ku Thixo, waza u Thixo wampha’—The Devil asked God to give me to Him for a present and God did. I was only nineteen years when I got married to my first husband in 1932; he was already a worker here in Cape Town. He was one of four brothers and of these only his eldest had a piece of land to till—this having been handed down to him from his grandfather. But we too hoped that some day we would have a piece of our own and remain in the reserves. It was a silly hope.”

“Although I was pregnant and my husband and I would have loved to be together when our first child was born, he was forced to leave me six months after our marriage and come to seek work in Cape Town. The child was born five months afterwards—a boy. But his father never saw him, for the child died at the age of fifteen months before his father could afford to join us again. It was not until the end of 1935 that my husband could come home—the years 1933 and 1934 were very bad years—there was drought in the reserves, the stock had died, very little had been reaped from the fields and all the money he sent home was used for buying food. So bad was the position that in all the two years he managed to buy just two beasts. Towards the end of 1936 I got my second baby—another boy. This baby my husband saw because in spite of our difficulties he was determined to stay by me until the child was born. He left for the city again in 1937 when the baby was three months. He never saw him again. The baby died at the age of ten months. My husband’s intention when he left in 1937 was to remain in town for only two years and then return to the reserves for good and build his own home. But he lost his job—a good job that paid him £8 a month—and after hunting for a job for three months he managed to get a £6 job as a cleaner.”

“So in 1938 we decided that I should join him in town. We shared a room with two other couples—also from Engcobo—in Napier Street and for the room we paid £1 per family per month. Three couples in one room! Just like animals, no privacy at all! I got a job as cook soon after my arrival and this brought in another £6 so between the two of us we had £12 a month. But in 1940 I fell pregnant and did not go back to service until my baby-daughter was two years old. I had to go back to work, but with a baby on my back there was no hope of finding a job. So I was forced to part with her. I sent her away under charge of some friends who

happened to be returning 'home' to the reserves—to be looked after by her father's mother. I went into service again, this time getting an extra ten shillings to my six pounds a month and my husband also had got a better paying job in one of the Bazaars at £3 a week. Putting 1945 as our dead-line for going back to the reserves, we tried to save as much as we could, putting away in the Post Office every penny of my wages and trying to make do with my husband's £3 a week; my husband walking to his work in the Bazaar in town and I coming out to the room once or twice a week and sending £3 every two months for the maintenance of the child in the reserves."

"So in April 1945, we packed and left for the reserves for good—so we thought. When we got there we quickly put up a home of our own not very far from that of the old people, bought two cows and two oxen and then started the vain search for a piece of land; even one to hire if we could not get one of our own. You can have no idea how scarce these allotments are. There was a time when a bribe could secure one some arable plot, but by 1945 these were so scarce that even your fattest heifer could not secure you a single acre. My husband was in the Engcobo Land Office every Tuesday, waiting there with many others and he used to tell me how of the twenty to thirty people there on any Tuesday, only five or six would get land allotted them. Twice he was told that as his father and brother had allotments he could not get any. There were men as old as his father who had never had any allotments. Meanwhile the drought was becoming worse and worse—there hadn't been any milk now for five years since the castration² of the bulls in 1939-40, the field crop had been poor and the stock had died of thirst and hunger—one of our cows too had died in the winter of 1946 after calving. The little money we had brought with us was fast being spent."

"And so it was that my husband left for Cape Town in February of 1947. I never saw him again. He spent most of 1947 in and out of hospital and in 1948 he died of T.B. here in Cape Town. I could not even come down for the funeral—I had no money for the journey. It was only months after that I could manage to come down, leaving my home and my child. I never saw my daughter again. She died in 1951 at the age of eleven. And so the

² In 1939-40 the Government sent its officials to castrate the bulls of the people in the Transkei (each herd usually had its own bull), on the promise that the Government would send the people milk-producing bulls that would improve their stock. But instead of the Friesland, Jersey and Shorthorn bulls that the officials had spoken of, Afrikander bulls—non-milk-producers—were sent. These were so few—one bull to each Ward—that very few cows were ever covered in a year and very few calves were born. This was the first factor that made milk so scarce in the reserves.

last link with my late husband was gone. There was nothing left of what I had with him—the home in which we had hardly lived together during our nineteen years of married life was in a bad state of repair, our few beasts had not increased, the little money we had was gone and now our only surviving child was dead; everything was gone. So even though his people wanted me to stay on with them I could not—what was there to remain for?”

“So back to town I came and in 1952 I met and married Mr. Dumani who worked in a furniture shop in town earning £3 5s. a week. We stayed as sub-tenants in a room in Kensington paying a rent of £3 a month. I got back to the job I left before going home in 1951. In 1953 we were ejected from this room for failure to pay rent. The chief tenant to whom we paid our £3 a month never paid a penny to the landlord for nine months, and though the landlord was sympathetic there was nothing he could do for us—according to the law we had not paid our rent. To Cook’s Bush we moved, then built our own shack in March 1953. We lost this with everything we had in a fire that broke out one night in November then. We soon put up new ones—these were flooded out in the winter floods of 1954 when the water rose neck-high and our pondokkies were like little boats in an ocean of water. There again we lost everything except the clothes we stood in and a blanket each. This time it was really hard for we had not recovered from the fire of the previous year. So, rather than go to Nyanga, we decided to look for a place—dry and solid even if it meant paying three pounds for rent. We managed to get this place in Tiervlei where we shared a house with a coloured family. My husband had got a job near—in Parow—the job he has now. Here again we were not to stay—the Inspectors came; they wanted ‘no natives among coloured people’—we had to go to the emergency camp in Nyanga or I would have to go back to the reserves.”

“So one wet morning we were brought here by lorry, dumped in the bush and had to do what best we could to provide shelter for ourselves and our possessions. On occasions like these I sometimes feel thankful I have no children; it is really heart-breaking to those who have children and have to run around in the cold with them on their backs, carrying them around as a cat carries its young in its teeth. This is another pondokkie-land and we will be smoked out of this place one day just as we used to be smoked out in Cooks’ Bush. The £40 we used in the building of this place is about all the savings we had; transport is

bad, it costs so much. Return to the reserves, they say. What is there to go back to? Those from the reserves tell us that the position there is worse than it is in the towns—at least here one can still take in washing and get some five to ten shillings for it depending on how liberal one's mistress is. In the Ciskei where my husband comes from the position is worse than it is in the Transkei; for generations now so very few have had arable plots of land; all his brothers are in the big cities working, so are his sisters and their husbands; his mother and father were in the cities too, they only went back to die in the reserves. There is nothing to go back to. What is there to go back to?"

Her story is typical of many of these people who are forever moving up and down between town and country, every day of every month of every year. The reserves are eroded bare and cannot provide any livelihood for the people. It is not a question of overstocking and the bad farming methods of the "native" as some would have us believe, but a question of over-population and a crying demand for the re-distribution of the land. There is not enough land for those who would like to remain on the land as peasants, not because the land has been used as pasture but because it has been occupied by the increasing population. The Native Reserves to-day are so over-crowded that in some areas the population density is from 94 to over 200 per square mile—the wonder is that there is still a blade of grass growing. If the cattle owned by the Africans were to be divided among the people there would not be enough to go round, for each person would get just a horn and an ear. This is against seventy head of cattle per white farmer. It is so with the sheep too, for to every five sheep that an African owns there are ninety per white farmer. These figures then explode the lie of overstocking. Milk to-day in the reserves is a luxury, so much of a luxury that many children born ten to fifteen years ago have never seen milk from a cow, never tasted *amasi*³ from the family cow for there is no family cow. If they know milk at all it is as it is sold in tins in the shops. "Bad farming methods of the native"—and who is there to produce crops for consumption and market, when all the able-bodied men and women are in the work centres and if young women there are, it is those far advanced in pregnancy and those with young babies? The reserves to-day are a haven for the infirm, the aged and the children.

The Glen Grey Act and all the Land Acts never gave the African

³ A form of buttermilk.

land; the reserves were never meant to provide the African with land from which to squeeze out a livelihood. In the first place most of the land in the reserves is crown land and the people have no rights on it, they can be moved any day and receive compensation only for the huts they have put on it; even in those areas where there is some form of individual tenure of land, in fact the people have no rights. For they may not dispose of the land as they like, they may not stay away from it beyond a certain period, it may not be mortgaged nor is it divisible by will and is inheritable only in terms of a Table of Succession, based on a system of primogeniture. If we compare the rural land area with the rural population we find that 124,186,000 morgen of land are owned and occupied by only 700,000 Whites, while 6,025,547 Africans are crowded into 17,518,977 morgen of crown land called the "Native Reserves". The problem of the African, the cause behind this story of a people's agony is *LANDLESSNESS*: *LANDLESSNESS*, so that the people will be forced out into the labour market, to the mines and farms where they will be herded together in camps, compounds and locations, where each white industrialist, farmer and housewife will be allotted his or her fair share of hands. In the towns only their labour is wanted—themselves not.

Each day after they have given of their labour, they must go and hide themselves away behind some bush or sand dune, to come out only when their hands are wanted again. To remain in the towns they must carry permits—documents legalising their stay, and every man and woman and every boy of sixteen and over must carry on his or her person this document of permission and must produce it on demand by an official anywhere and at any time; failure to produce it may mean going to jail as if one were a criminal; it may mean work on a work-colony; it may mean being trucked back to the reserves whether one has a home there or not. It is not that the town does not want them, not that their hands are not needed—these are the people who rear the white child the moment it arrives from the nursing home until it is a teen-ager; the people who keep the white man and his home clean; the people who cook his food, the people who have built the great towers in which the white man lives; the people who have made him rich. The purpose is to make them forever feel unwanted, insecure, feel that they are in town because of some kind and benevolent Government official, feel inferior and sub-human and not fit to reap the ordinary fruits of their labour.

THE KENYA CRISIS

BASIL DAVIDSON

British Author and Journalist.

Is there a *political* solution to the troubles of Kenya—a solution, that is, within the framework of existing parties and party-political activity? That, of course, is what the vast majority of Europeans in Kenya have never believed: they have traditionally held—they hold it still—the idea that political change should never be allowed to reduce their dominant control of the country's affairs. Their immediate response to Mau Mau, typically enough, was to abolish all African political organizations: only after that did they turn their attention to military repression. Their crisis is therefore a chronic one.

But it goes through different phases. Before examining the present phase, let us have a look at the last one: at the "emergency" and the consequences of the "emergency". By the middle of last summer the British Government seemed confident that the repression had largely done its work. "The most striking thing about Kenya today," said Mr. John Hare, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, last June, "is that while the Emergency is not yet over, the end is at least in sight and militant Mau Mau is affecting the life of the Colony less and less. The latest estimate of terrorist strength is not much more than 1,000, compared with 1,750 only three months ago. There are now only five major leaders at large as against about fifty a year ago." Mau Mau, since then, has continued to weaken month by month, and in October the Government could triumphantly announce the capture of Dedan Kimathi, perhaps the most important of the five leaders still at large.

Thousands were still in concentration camps and prisons. A couple of months later the Heaton Report put it this way: "Valuable work has been done in the last three years in the rehabilitation of thousands of members of Mau Mau. At the height of the emergency some 72,000 members of Mau Mau were in detention and prison camps in the Colony. The number of members of Mau Mau still in detention and in prison camps now is about 44,000, and they are being released at an average rate of 1,500 a month. By the middle of 1957 the bulk of the short- and middle-term Mau Mau convicts will have finished their prison sentences, and those remaining will be, for the most

part, those convicted of the more serious criminal offences, and therefore best dealt with by ordinary prison methods. . . .”

So there would seem to be some grounds for the British Government's confidence; and some hope that the severity of the repression may be alleviated in the near future—and even, conceivably, that non-European politics may begin again. Is it surprising that the repression has “paid off”? On the contrary, what is surprising is that African resistance should have lasted so long. When the history of all this comes to written, then it will be seen, I fancy, that the Mau Mau rebellion—however morally disgusting in many of its manifestations and however politically misguided—was after all, a turning point. It will have left its deep indelible mark. For this was no mere murderous eruption, soon mastered, soon put down—just one more “trouble” in the story of so many “troubles”. Severity on one side was more than matched by severity on the other. Nothing shows this better than the bleak statistical answer provided last summer by the Minister of State for the Colonies, to a question from Mr. Fenner Brockway on the number of executions carried out since the fighting began. This answer is worth quoting in full:

Charges	Period			Total
	20/10/52 to 19/7/55	20/7/55 to 31/12/55	1/1/56 to 31/3/56	20/10/52 to 31/3/56
Murder - - - -	257	32	8	297
Unlawful Possession of Fire-arms - - -	288	32	17	337
Unlawful Possession of Amn. and Explosives -	87	8		95
Consorting with Terrorists	219	3		222
Furthering Terrorism -	8			8
Demanding Supplies for Terrorists - - -	2			2
Totals - - - -	909	79	27	1,015

This table shows that for nearly three and a half years the Europeans in Kenya were hanging Africans at the rate of nearly one a day. It is perhaps the best (if also the most painful) comment on the real nature of the emergency.

Now it might be expected, in face of all this bloodletting, that the governors of Kenya would submit themselves to a pretty severe course of self-examination. For whatever shape Mau Mau may have taken in the course of the fighting, nobody really doubts that it took its rise from African despair at ever being able to secure peaceful change. For years before the emergency was declared, after all, every intelligent European in Kenya (and even every unintelligent European, and there are plenty of those) was perfectly well aware of the existence of profound African grievances. They might differ on the nature and justification of the grievances: they knew the grievances were there. Those who wanted to could easily discover what Africans felt about their lot, and what they really wanted. They needed only to consult one or other of the sensible and well-informed leaders of the Kenya African Union; or read the political literature which the Union put out from time to time. There was absolutely no excuse for European ignorance—except European indolence, irresponsibility, and prejudice.

But indolence, irresponsibility, and prejudice must surely be stirred by the last few years in Kenya? Yes, up to a point, they have been; but the point is not very far. Great energy has been spent in providing abstruse anthropological and magical explanations for Mau Mau. We have had a Royal Commission which has issued a learned and immensely long report. Retired Governors have descanted sadly in the columns of *The Times*. British Ministers have fiddled with the *minutiae* of constitutional change. But the results are extraordinarily small in terms of genuine change. Amazingly enough, the Kenya political position remains today very like it was before. With a few fresh reservations, a little less insolence, a modified arrogance, most Kenya Europeans are saying (and evidently thinking) much the same things they said and thought before. Their triple objectives are unchanged: they wanted, and they still want, to shift responsibility for Kenya from Whitehall to Nairobi; to build into any conceivable future constitution a cast-iron guarantee that they, the Europeans, shall remain the real government of the country; and to concede to Africans no more than the shadow and the fringe of what Africans want in terms of land and livelihood, social and political rights, unquestioned equality of human status.

This year we have seen small constitutional changes. Africans are given a little more political representation in a closely controlled legislative Council: but the apparent concession is at

once paralleled by an increase in European political representation. Kenya still lags far behind the political practice and ideology both of Uganda and Tanganyika. Its Legislative Council is still packed with Europeans who completely dominate it in every field of its work or authority. These Europeans, as I say, are still faithful to their past ideas and prejudices.

In March, true enough, there will be elections at which Africans will be able to vote for their half-dozen representatives on the Legislative Council: about 450,000 (out of a total African population of over 5 millions) are expected to be eligible for the voting roll. And one of Kenya's Ministers, Mr. Vasey, has gone so far as to declare himself in support of progress towards a common electoral roll (a voting list, that is, common to all racial communities); although it was clear from what he said that the progress would be nothing if not extremely slow. But these things do not in the least satisfy African (or Asian) aspirations. Europeans may have thought it a big thing to admit Africans to "parity of representation"—they meant, of course, in numbers, not in real influence: but Africans no longer accept parity. They point to neighbouring countries and ask for much more than parity. Said a very moderate African leader not long ago on this point—he was Mr. Kodhek of the Nairobi District African Congress: "What the Africans wanted was to modify the Lyttleton Plan (for constitutional change) now to allow two additional Africans in the Legislative Council and one additional African Minister with a Portfolio. The non-African said that we could not have these at their expense, and that any changes must include increases in their own numbers to keep Africans in the third place in their own country." The brutal fact is that the political balance of power in Kenya has not shifted at all: or, if it has, then it has shifted *towards* the Europeans, not away from them. This must seem a curious way of trying to make peace.

No wonder, then, that leading Africans in Kenya declare that European ambitions and intentions are unchanged. One of them, Mr. Tom Mboya, writing lately in *Drum*, remarked that the "basic racial attitude of the Europeans has not altered" despite the changes which had taken place since the emergency. "Today, many people talk of the need for Europeans to make concessions and gestures which will help to win confidence in European leadership. But the African does not ask for concessions, nor need gestures of European generosity. He is not asking for privileges. The African asks for his rights. He seeks to establish

equality of all individuals, black, brown or white. In this demand there can be no half-way compromise, for it is either absolute equality or superiority of one over the other.

"It is because of this," continued Mr. Mboya, "that I believe that the whole idea of multi-racialism or partnership is bound to fail. Both these terms are open to a variety of interpretations, but in their East and Central African context they mean recognition of participation of all racial groups in the Government. They consist not of the recognition of individual citizenship rights but of group rights. . . ." Now it is just these "group rights" that Europeans in Kenya will not recognise: or, if they do recognise them, then they recognise them only on a "multi-racial" basis. Africans can have certain rights, that is, provided that these are "African rights". They cannot have *human rights* like everyone else. But this, as Mr. Mboya also said, is the best way to perpetuate and inflame racialism. "Insistence on a 'multi-racial' Government," said Mr. Mboya, and surely he was right, "will in fact help to promote racialism, and hence create even greater dangers to the Europeans than they at present recognise."

The *politics and parties* of Kenya are still, therefore, what they were before: a flimsy camouflage for European autocracy. Behind and beyond that autocracy the non-European peoples of Kenya suffer and persist, thinking their own thoughts, hoping their own hopes, expecting little from their masters—and waiting, no doubt, for the day when those masters shall at last have lost their power. On all that, there is little that can usefully be said. In the political foreground, meanwhile, the settlers have divided into two main political groupings—respectively, the followers of Mr. Michael Blundell and the Independence Group that is led by Group-Captain Briggs. In last autumn's elections the Independence Group won eight of the fourteen European "elected seats" in the Legislative Council, and the followers of Mr. Blundell won the rest, the Capricorn and Federal Independence Party's candidates being defeated. Now Mr. Blundell's views are reasonably well known. What does this newly constituted—and rather successful—Independence Group want for Kenya? It wants—and these, please note, are the more "progressive" of the settlers—exactly what the Kenya settlers have always wanted.

"We intend to press", said a pre-electoral statement signed by its leaders, "for progressive transfer of executive authority

from the Colonial Office to the Government of Kenya, and for the progressive removal of restrictions on the legislative authority of the Legislative Council of Kenya. This implies no desire to cut adrift from the Imperial connexion"—the Kenya settlers, you see, are not quite so arrogant as they used to be—" (for) that must be maintained, not only for purposes of defence and foreign relations, but also by reason of our affection and loyalty for the Queen and fellow-countrymen in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth." The fellow-countrymen in the United Kingdom, after all, provided most of the money and most of the soldiers in the late "emergency".

"But"—and here comes the main point—"we must aim at full control of our internal affairs at the earliest possible date. We would agree to the Colonial Office reserving power of veto in respect of racial legislation."

Even the Kenya settlers know that the Colonial Office has had that veto in Southern Rhodesia since 1923, and has never once used it. But "we are opposed to any scheme of provincial independence which might go so far as to deprive Europeans of leadership and control of the Colony as a whole". And that's that: the majority group of Europeans is hereby serving notice on the world that it wants, and means to have, exactly what its fathers and forefathers wanted. Can Africans in Kenya be blamed for despairing of ever getting sense out of such people?

Yet in spite of all these limitations, there is certain to be a political struggle in Kenya over the coming months and years. No solution may be possible within the present framework of parties and constitutional rights—everything confirms that this is true: then, in that case, the framework will have to be changed. And if it cannot be changed then it will have to be shattered. Though nothing may shift in the minds of Kenya settlers, a great deal shifts in the minds of Africans: and a great deal shifts in the world that lies beyond the racial barriers of Africa. In spite of their loud declarations of self-confidence, the Kenya settlers are no longer the self-elected supermen they once believed themselves to be: and for all their crippling losses, the Africans of Kenya are no longer the mere *objects* of policy. There exists, today, an African public opinion. It has learnt from its experiences and its sufferings. It is becoming mature. It will not be set aside, casually, contemptuously, for much longer.

THE BELGIAN CONGO

CLAUDE DE MESTRAL

*Secretary, International Committee on Christian Literature
for Africa.*

DURING the latter part of the 19th century the Congo Free State—the sole property of King Leopold II of Belgium—was mostly known by the shocking tales of the exploitation of Africans there. Charges of maladministration were not only levelled, but also proven, once provoking the resignation of Governor C. Janssen, in protest against the high-handed methods of the King's agents in the Congo. Public opinion and indignation, in Belgium as in other countries, decided the Belgian Senate to take over the Congo Free State on November 15th, 1908.

If the transfer of power took place without ceremony, Belgium at once took measures to ensure a fair and enlightened administration of its new colony, in real agreement with the high humanitarian principles that Leopold II had never ceased to profess, but had been unable to bring into practice. It must be admitted that the result is outstanding in colonial Africa. Though the Belgian Government and Belgian business men and industrialists had no such colonial experience as either Great Britain or France, they have achieved what can well be called a unique state in Africa.

Former Governor-General, M. Pierre Ryckmans, has stated on more than one occasion that the corner-stone of the Belgian policy in the Congo is: "*The Belgian Congo is a black man's country*". This does not mean that Europeans are unwelcome; far from it. But the Congo Governor's first duty is to look after the welfare and the future of the Congolese. Whites are welcome provided they are willing to contribute an important tax, the proceeds of which *must* be spent in the Congo for local development. Any white unable to cover his expenses is at once shipped home, thus preventing the creation of a class of poor whites—which is anywhere a serious barrier to African advancement. In the Belgian Congo neither whites nor Congolese have any political rights or vote. Hence the Government's paternalistic policy can be said to be able to operate quite freely. Similar conditions exist elsewhere in the African continent, usually to the detriment of the Africans. Not so in the Congo. Why? How?

There is little doubt that the Belgian administration, taking control of the Congo following upon a long period of fierce denunciations of shocking abuses by the King's agents, has been, from the beginning, anxious to do better. The Governor and his aides have watched with great attention the measures taken by their great neighbours, especially France and Great Britain. They have not been slow to notice how the mere grant of political rights without an accompanying improvement in the material well-being of the Africans does not lead to happy relations.

We often hear of paternalism in colonial administration in Africa—but nowhere is it so evident as in the Belgian Congo. The reason is probably to be found in the general attitude of industry towards its black workers. In this field Belgian industrialists are certainly far in advance, in their practices, of their colleagues elsewhere in Africa. In Elisabethville, for instance, the seat of the huge *Compagnie Minière du Haut-Katanga*—exploiting the same copper deposit found in the Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia—workers' salaries are graded in some twenty-one classes. By improving their skill Congolese workers can pass from a lower to a higher classification, with correspondingly increased wages. And the company is helping them in this, by providing free classes daily after work. Attendance by the workers is entirely free, yet average regularity is above 90 per cent. These courses are given by white workers who have spent the whole day at their job, and they are not paid for this "service". Yet, they, too, seldom miss their classes. When I inquired on the Copper Belt whether similar courses existed, the only answers I received amounted to: "Why should we do it?" This attitude, no doubt, partly accounted for troubled labour conditions at the time.

While in Elisabethville, I was shown around the workers' town on the mine's compound by a young man who had gone through a complete builder's course. One of the buildings he showed me with pride was a neat nursery school, a nice one room affair. He pointed out the beams inside the roof: "Do you see these names? When we completed this school, as part of our regular training, the general manager of the *Cie. Minière* came to inspect it. He congratulated us on our work, then said: 'There is one more thing I wish you to do. Write your names on these beams. Later on people will remember you, and you'll be able to show also what you built!'" Such a comprehension

of the value of the human element in labour by management is unique in Africa. It explains a great deal of the general contentment in the Belgian Congo too. Alone also in Africa the administration has fully realized the waste and the blunder of "*migrant labour*", which compels hundreds of thousands of workers to live in huge compounds—*without their families*. By law, in the Belgian Congo, industry is compelled to provide for the family accommodation of its workers and every married worker must reside with his family. In cities, workers are even encouraged to buy and own their houses.

Yet, even in the Congo, events in Asia and elsewhere in the great continent are penetrating the minds of the Congolese, even though very few of them so far, have been allowed by the administration to seek further training abroad. Last year, especially, has seen many events pointing to the need for change and emphasizing the demand for quicker reforms in the Congo.

Already in his annual Governor-General's speech to the Government Council in 1955, M. L. Petillon had pointed out: "For the Congo of today, the essential question is—I must stress it—that of human relations between white and black". He took occasion to condemn rash action by some of the settlers, quoting the words of Governor-General Eboué (an African, in French Equatorial Africa): "If there are some who don't agree with our chosen policy, we won't bear them any grudge. They are at liberty to leave us and we will bid them a courteous good-bye".

Early in 1956 M. A. A. J. van Bilsen, professor at the Institute Universitaire des Territoires d'outre-mer, in Brussels, published a 29 pages "*30 years' plan for the political emancipation of the Belgian Africa*". He pointed out that Belgian empiricism had so far produced no doctors, veterinaries, engineers, high civil service workers or army officers. He stated clearly that paternalism was out of date, having no difficulty in showing what had happened to other colonial powers unwilling to read the signs of the times. His suggestion is a federation between Belgium on the one hand and a great Congolese Federation on the other. He went so far as to suggest that the Belgian Government ask the United Nations to offer its help and suggestions in hastening and ensuring the realisation of such a plan. His plans would necessitate the usual democratic freedoms for the Congolese, and the introduction of a regular political life in a land where such notions have long been dampened.

Almost at the same time the Roman Catholic Episcopate made a Declaration, affirming that “*the rights of the natives must have priority*”. It studied also such problems as private property—labour and its remuneration (any difference in wages solely based on a racial difference would be unfair)—trade unions—human relations and, last of all, political emancipation (all the inhabitants of a country are in duty bound to contribute actively to the general welfare. They have the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs).

Last July the Belgian Socialist Party, now in power with the Liberal Party, while admitting all that had been achieved so far in the Congo, made plain that what is needed now is a strong change in the general policy: *from economics, welfare and paternalism, the way must now lead to social and political development*. From its seven-point Action Programme we extract the following: “Full practical freedom of association, meeting and press. The establishment, first in the urban centres, of local assemblies elected by universal suffrage. The establishment, at a later stage, of provincial assemblies by universal suffrage. The gradual extension of local and provincial powers . . . Colonists should only be supported as far as their enterprises and services contribute to the emancipation of the natives, and to the development of a harmonious community life . . . Primary education should become compulsory for girls as well as for boys¹ . . . Revision of the labour legislation in connection with the number of working hours, holidays with pay, labour inspection, health insurance. The creation of consumers’ co-operatives, and the creation of a social council in which capital and labour are equally represented . . .”

Such pronouncements, coming from responsible Belgian voices, are certainly worth noting. Many of the suggested reforms run well ahead of actual conditions in British Africa, for instance, except in West Africa. But 1956 heard for the first time the authentic voices of the Congolese themselves, thinking aloud about their future. In July, *Conscience Africaine*, an African-owned newspaper in Leopoldville, printed a *Manifesto*, prepared by a group of Congolese évolués.² Compared with similar declarations of

¹ Primary and secondary education has traditionally been entrusted to the Missions—Roman Catholic and Protestant, which received similar grants. Recently, however, “lay” schools have been opened up in the Congo; they are open to Congolese and European children alike. This experiment is proving satisfactory. Two Universities exist also; one directed by Roman Catholic teachers, the other, at Elisabethville, by the State.

² Educated Congolese.

nationalist leaders elsewhere in Africa, the *Manifesto* is entirely without anger. It takes for granted that the Belgians can be trusted to do what is right once they see the light. Its demands are moderate, without any racialism. Its aim is a Congolese nation, "composed of Africans and Europeans", while it affirms "we want to be civilized Congolese, not black-skinned Europeans." The *Manifesto* rejects "the principle of 'equal but separated', as hurtful", and says: "the Belgians must understand as of now, that their rule in the Congo will not last forever". But the authors of the *Manifesto* reject the use of political parties as well as any recourse to violence. Its prime aim is to weld the Congolese into a real nation: "We believe that it is perfectly possible for heathens, Catholics, Protestants, Salvationists and Moslems to agree on a program of common welfare which respects the principle of natural ethics engraved into the hearts of all men . . . This program can best be realized by the united Congolese with sincere respect for every one's beliefs". Such a mild and moderate declaration may have startled some hard-boiled settlers; it must certainly have pleased the administration, and given it the feeling that its efforts were appreciated and not useless.

But how representative of the Congolese nation were the writers of the *Manifesto*? One month after its appearance another group added its voice: The ABAKO, a cultural association of the Ba-Congo people (western Congo). Its tone was different, far less tolerant of Belgian rule and far less patient.

Abako criticizes the *Manifesto* for its disdain of "the means by which a country is led . . . Is it possible for one to participate in the government of a country while by-passing politics? . . . The contest among parties, although dangerous, is very necessary in a democracy". All the various above-mentioned documents have a good deal to say about economic progress. Abako, while supporting the *Manifesto* in its demands for far higher wages for African workers, is quite vocal as to the big business men whose "social works are in reality only reinvestments of profits . . . to distract the tourists and to mislead the visitors". Abako is equally vocal against the regime "which has earned for the Congo the title of empire of silence". They fully agree with Mr. A. van Bilsen who has written: "I believe . . . that political maturity precedes in many cases the capacity to administer", but Abako will have nothing to do with any "30 year plan". "It is today that we must be granted freedom, rather than to set it back thirty years

hence'. The Ba-Congo leaders realize that the Congo is a heterogeneous agglomeration of people and so they too, seek a Congolese Federation. They affirm, however, that such a Federation can never become part of the Belgian territory—as French Togoland, for instance, is part of the French Union. Because of the Congo's size, and its amazing wealth especially, they see their future not as another province of Belgium, but rather as a partner in some Belgian Commonwealth, on an equal footing with the mother-country.

There is no doubt that the Governor-General and his administration have not been caught napping. They have long realized that the Congo could not escape the wave of emancipation sweeping across the African continent. Already in the larger centres some representative assemblies have been set up, with elected members. Some months ago in Leopoldville, I learned much about such developments, which have brought to the fore a number of outstanding Congolese men until then often unknown to the administration.

The Governor is well aware of the growing demand for political life, the desire for a fuller life than is possible under an enlightened paternalism, however well-meaning and generous. *On both sides there is certainly a great deal of goodwill.* The recent visit of King Baudouin has evoked a natural and ready response, enthusiasm even, among a great many Congolese, who have not forgotten the King's rebuke to those Europeans who want to treat Africans as second-class individuals. It is to be hoped that Belgian political parties will rise to their unique opportunity and allow the Congo to become another Ghana.

DESEGREGATION AND THE U.S. LABOR MOVEMENT

WILLARD S. TOWNSEND

*National Vice-President, American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations.*

MANY racial segregationists in the Union of South Africa, like Prime Minister Strijdom and other Nationalist party officials, are deriving obvious comfort from the widening conflict over desegregation in the United States. The questions are bluntly asked: "What right has the United States to criticize us when she cannot solve her own racial problems without calling out the militia?" "If she cannot integrate her small Negro population which is culturally similar to the white population, what does she expect of us who are surrounded by a sea of primitive African blacks?"

These indignant questions are based on the patently false assumption that the status of persons of African descent in the United States is not substantially different from the status of Africans in the Union of South Africa. The questions also reveal an understandable ignorance of major trends in Negro-white relations in America.

Undoubtedly these observers see in American racial disturbances what they desperately wish to see in them, a justification for apartheid. But as a matter of fact there is little in the relations between Negroes and Whites in the United States which should provide much comfort to a South African segregationist. Indeed American experience would supply many valuable aids to that brave group in the Union who are sincerely seeking a solution to interracial conflicts in a multiracial society. The emphasis here is on solution, not suppression by brute force of one segment of the population, which seems to be the ultimate means of the great majority of whites in the Union of South Africa.

The American labor movement today as represented by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, comprising over 15 million members, actively supports a policy of full equality for Negroes in American political and economic affairs. This policy of equal treatment also extends to many important social relations such as equal treatment in hotels; in bus, train and air transportation; in housing accommodation; and in educational facilities.

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