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The militarization of the Apartheid state



Committee on South African War Resistance (Nederland)

COSAUR-NL

The Committee on South African War Resisters - Netherlands (COSAUR-NL) is a committee consisting of South African war resisters who are actively committed to the struggle for justice in South Africa. The committee's main functions are: to provide assistance to South African war resisters seeking refuge in Holland; to research and publish information on various aspects of the South African armed forces; and to run campaigns on South African military issues.

The Fact Paper Project

With the entrance of the South African generals into the political arena in recent years and Pretoria's adoption of the SADF-formulated "total strategy" policy, anti-apartheid activists have increasingly expressed the need for indepth research into the nature and deployment of apartheid's armed forces in South and Southern Africa. To date most publication on the South African military machine have concentrated on the international links between the Western powers and Pretoria (the supply of arms and military technology to South Africa) and the nuclear potential of the apartheid state. It is only recently that one or two publications have been devoted to an analysis of the apartheid war machine, itself, and its role in Namibia, for instance.

Given the rise to power of the South African military establishment, it is only logical that anti-apartheid activists have come to feel the need for information to fill the gap. COSAUR-NL has decided to address itself to this need and has accordingly established a fact paper project to focus on this relatively neglected area. The aim of this project is to research important aspects of the topic and to convey this information to activists in the form of brief, non-expensive papers. It is not our intention to produce academic treatises packed with sophisticated analysis, although there may be occasions when such a publication is required. Rather, we intend to distribute crucial and often fairly inaccessible data to individuals and organisations who are actively involved in the struggle for national and economic liberation in Southern Africa. We hope that the information made available will be put to use in the various activities in which the activists are involved, or at least provide part of the necessary background for these activities.

Fact Paper No. 1

This particular paper takes a broad historical look at the militarisation of the apartheid state over the last two decades, with particular emphasis on the implementation of the total strategy programme over the last few years. It is confined to a general account of the military build-up in South Africa and the growth of the military influence within the country. For reasons alluded to above it does not deal with the international links in this process. Neither does it cover developments in Namibia. The latter is a large enough topic on its own and has recently been the subject of a comprehensive paper published by the International Defence and Aid Fund (104 Newgate Street, London, EC1A 7BP).

This fact paper is intended to provide an introduction to the nature of Pretoria's military potential. As such, it covers only the general background which is necessary for a fuller investigation of specific

aspects of the topic, e.g. the role of mercenaries in the SADF, the military's control of the media, the generals in the corridors of power, and the like. In addition, it provides a useful basis for understanding the role of the military in South Africa today.

Nevertheless, the paper should not be read in isolation. It is absolutely crucial to a comprehensive awareness of the militarisation of the apartheid state that the reader relate each development mentioned in the paper to the major events of the period under discussion. It is only in this way that the historical analysis which this paper aims at (as opposed to a contemporary analysis of existing factors), can be fully appreciated. The apparent weakness of the paper is that it does not provide a contemporary analysis of current strategic and political considerations confronting the Botha regime. This is deliberate. The paper is intended to be no more than an aid to activists who are constantly analysing or reassessing their analyses of the Southern African situation in the light of changing circumstances. We hope you can make use of it.

IMPORTANT

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Pretoria's decision to begin a costly military build-up came as a response to the situation in which the regime found itself. If we are to understand the origins of this build-up and the accompanying militarisation of South African society, both of which have led to the establishment of the most powerful military machine in the southern hemisphere and on the African continent, then we need to know the circumstances of this situation and the factors which prompted the militarisation of the apartheid state.

The White Republic

The beginning of the military build-up in South Africa coincides more or less with the establishment of the White Republic on 31 May 1961. But these events were not directly linked. Rather, the build-up came as a response to a number of developments both within and outside the country, which took place prior to and immediately after the formation of the republic.

The internal situation in the 1950s was marked on the one hand by the consolidation of National Party rule and the construction of the foundations of institutionalised apartheid on the basic system of economic and racial exploitation inherited from the Smuts government in 1948. On the other hand this period saw the growth of mass resistance by the oppressed majority under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies in the Congress movement. The state's response in turn was a vicious attempt to crush this resistance through bannings, banishments, detentions, cudgels and bullets. The conflict reached a climax on 21 March 1960 when police fired on a peaceful anti-pass law demonstration at Sharpeville, killing 67 and wounding 186. This event sparked off a wave of resistance around the country and in its attempts to smash it the apartheid regime declared a state of emergency, mobilised the Army and banned the ANC and its break-away, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The troops were once again mobilised the following year when a general strike threatened. A sabotage campaign which began in December 1961, was stopped within a few years and in March 1964, A.J. Vorster, then Minister of Justice, stated that 562 people who had been charged with sabotage, had left the country. Estimates of the number of those who had left for guerrilla training varied between 900 and 5000.(1) These events shook the apartheid state. In the 19 months to June 1961 there was a net outflow of capital from the country of R244 million as opposed to just over R20 million in the preceding period since 1957, while the gold and foreign exchange reserves fell from R315 million in January 1960 to R142 million in June 1961.(2) In addition, the number of emigrants jumped from 9379 in 1959 to 12.612 and 14.894 in 1960 and 1961 respectively.(3)

The external situation was not much more favourable to Pretoria. The late fifties and early sixties were marked by the emergence of independent African states which were hostile to apartheid and supported its opponents. In neighbouring White-dominated states guerrilla wars of liberation were launched, in Angola in 1961 and Mozambique in 1964, and the Central African Federation was rocked by African resistance on a large scale. Pretoria also came under fire in the United Nations as a result of both its internal policies and its unlawful occupation of Namibia. The UN imposed an arms embargo on South Africa in 1963.

Thus, by the early 1960s the apartheid regime had been given sufficient reason to conclude that its survival depended ultimately on the strength offered by an extensive military capability. The stage was now set for a major military build-up.

The Military Build-up

In 1960 the South African Defence Force (SADF) consisted of a small force of about 10.000 permanent employees and volunteers, and defence expenditure accounted for only 7% (R39.2 million of R562.8 million) of the total government revenue account, as opposed to 9% (39.4 million of R501.6 million) in 1955.(4) The transformation of this force into a powerful military machine began that same year when the authorities conducted a military appreciation of a possible threat to the country as a result of the turbulent political conditions in which the regime found itself. Given the nature of those conditions, Pretoria considered it essential to acquire some military muscle.

1. Manpower

In terms of the 1957 Defence Act, (5) the basic legislation governing apartheid's defence structures, the SADF is divided into three main sections, the Permanent Force (PF), the Citizen Force (CF) and the Commandos.(6) There is also a Reserve force consisting of the Reserve of Officers, the PF Reserve, the CF Reserve, the Commando Reserve and the National Reserve.(7) The PF and CF consist of the Army, Air Force and Navy units, while the Commandos have ground and air units. The administration and training of the armed forces in peacetime is undertaken by the PF.

The expansion of the SADF's manpower pool was begun in 1951, when Defence Minister, Jim Fouché, introduced a ballot system of conscription and called on White mothers to "give up their sons in defence of their land."(8) Initially there was a selective intake of 7.000 men for 9 months service. This was extended so that by 1964 there was an annual intake of 16.500.(9) In the same year the CF numbered 16.527 as opposed to 2.000 in 1961.(10) The CF was further expanded in 1967 when Pretoria abolished the ballot system and introduced universal conscription for White males between the ages of 17 and 65, both inclusive.(11) Conscriptees were drafted into the CF or Commandos for 9 months "national" service and were thereafter posted to their respective Reserve forces. Under this system the number of trainees increased by 50%.(12) The introduction of universal conscription came as a direct result of the deteriorating situation in the White-ruled states of Southern Africa. Liberation wars were in progress in Angola and Mozambique, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) had launched its armed struggle in Namibia in 1966, and in Zimbabwe the first stage of guerrilla warfare had begun with the active participation of units of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of South Africa's banned ANC.

By 1972 White rule in the sub-continent was under even greater pressure. This induced the apartheid regime to extend the period of compulsory military service to an initial period of 12 months followed by 19 days service annually for five years.(13) As a result

by 1974 the CF alone totalled 92.000 men.(14) The following year South Africa invaded Angola and in order to meet operational requirements there and in Namibia additional three-month tours of duty were introduced for members of the CF and Commandos. These have continued since despite the 1977 increase in the period of compulsory national service to an initial period of 24 months followed by 30 days annually ('camps') for the following 3 years.(15)

Efforts were also made to enlarge the PF which in 1961 numbered a mere 7721. By 1974 the figure stood at over 18.000.(16) Since 1975 there has been a major recruitment campaign aimed at persuading national servicemen to join the PF on completion of their compulsory service. By 1977 the PF numbered about 24.000 and it is estimated that in the same year the SADF's standing operational force (the number of troops under arms at any one time) stood at 105.000 as opposed to 42.000 in 1974.(17)

Since the early 1970s the SADF has put much effort into the recruitment of women. The Navy accepted its first woman officer in 1972 and the Air Force in 1974. Some 39 women had been commissioned in the Army by 1974.(18) Most female volunteers are recruited into the PF after a one-year training course, whilst some women are recruited directly and then receive a six-week training course. By 1977 there were 741 women (excluding nurses) in the PF and 6000 in the Commandos. In the same year an all-women Commando squadron became operational in the Air Force.(19)

Perhaps the most significant development in the growth of the SADF numbers is Pretoria's decision to recruit and train Black South Africans, and thereby go back on its initial refusal to train and arm 'non-Whites'. After the Second World War no Blacks were accepted in the SADF until in April 1963 the first Coloured Corps was established to perform certain administrative tasks and to act as drivers, storemen, clerks, stretcher-bearers and so forth. In April 1965 the Navy also began to accept Coloureds on a permanent basis. But it was only in January 1973 that it was decided to admit Coloureds to military training. Almost 2000 men were recruited for training in the Cape Corps Service Battalion. It was also decided to establish a similar service battalion for Indians on Salisbury Island.(20)

Government resistance to the service of Africans in the SADF was greater. As late as 1970 Defence Minister Botha categorically stated that they would never serve in the SADF.(21) But by 1972 a number of Africans were serving in combat alongside Whites, in Namibia and in Rhodesia.(22) Pretoria adopted a two-fold strategy for the training of Africans: the recruitment of Africans into the SADF and, on the other hand, the creation of bantustan forces. In both cases the units were formed along ethnic lines. The first African PF unit was formed in 1974. A year later the Transkeian Defence Force was established(23) and in 1977 the BophuthaTswana National Guard came into being.(24) It is estimated that between 1974 and 1979 over 7000 Black South Africans were trained and deployed, the majority on a permanent basis: 1000 in the Transkeian Defence Force, 1000 in the BophuthaTswana National Guard, and 500 Africans, 4000 Coloureds and 750 Indians in the SADF.(25)

2. Arms Production and Procurements

In 1952 the Prime Minister, D.F. Malan, told the House of Assembly

that "our difficulty in connection with defence is that we ourselves do not manufacture arms. We have to rely on imports."(26) This was essentially the position until 1961 when South Africa launched its own arms industry, with the intention of locally producing the most advanced weapons for its own requirements and reducing its dependence on imports in order to pre-empt a possible arms embargo.

The armaments industry was initiated and expanded at a rapid rate. Although arms imports continued, the emphasis shifted to the import of military technology, a more effective way of acquiring arms, whereby once a weapon is locally produced no outside authority can stop production of the same type, even if it revokes the production license. In 1961 alone Pretoria negotiated 127 licenses for the local manufacture of military equipment from a wide range of countries.(27) Besides obtaining licenses, the apartheid regime also encouraged foreign investment in the local arms industry. By April 1963 Defence Minister Fouché was able to report that South Africa could manufacture all the ammunition it needed.(28) By June 1964 he was able to provide reassurance to White South Africa that "We need nothing - and when I say nothing, I mean nothing - at all to maintain internal order."(29) A year later he announced that the country had obtained 120 licenses to manufacture arms locally and was "already practically self-sufficient so far as the production of small weapons, ammunition and explosives was concerned. We could even be able to sell arms which we manufactured in the country to well-disposed friends...."(30)

Although the United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo on South Africa in 1963,(31) Western Countries such as Britain and later France continued to supply the apartheid regime with weapons and foreign companies extended their investments in the armaments industry. To circumvent the embargo some foreign companies even resorted to establishing local subsidiaries which were partly engaged in production for the civilian market, e.g. in the field of electronics, avionics and communications equipment. The introduction of the arms embargo and the expansion of the arms industry called for greater rationalisation and co-ordination in the industry. To this end two state organisations were established in 1964: the Armaments Production Board to organise the acquisition of foreign arms and technology and to maintain quality and cost control in production, and the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARDPSCOP), the controlling body for armaments manufacture.

Acceleration of production and procurements, as well as advances in the field of military research, accompanied these developments. In 1965 Fouché disclosed that South Africa had received a license from a Western government to manufacture a bomb of the most modern type.(32) In the same year his successor, P.W. Botha, announced that 127 weapon-production licenses had been received from foreign producers.(33) Work was also begun on a new naval base and the military aircraft industry was launched with the establishment of the Atlas Aircraft Corporation. Rocket and missile research bore fruit in 1968 when the first rocket was successfully launched at the new missile base at St. Lucia.(34) A year later Botha announced the development of the Cactus air defence system, which is a South Africa version of the French Crotale missile system.(35) In the same year the first locally produced naval vessel was launched.

Under the control of ARDPSCOP, which was legally instituted in 1967,

the arms industry recorded similar achievements in other fields as it expanded in both the state and private sectors, but primarily in the latter. This expansion was reflected in government expenditure. The amount spent on the manufacture of munitions in South Africa rose from R315.225 in 1960-61 to R33.002.500 in 1964-65.(36) By 1972 nearly 50% of the defence budget was diverted to the development and procurement of arms.(37) In the same year Professor H.J. Samuels, head of the Armaments Production Board, announced that whereas R46.3 million had been spent on the manufacture of arms in 1965, this figure was now treble. Of this amount R0. was invested in South Africa where just under 1.000 private contractors were involved in the local arms industry.(38) It is estimated that over 70% of the contracting companies were subsidiaries of foreign concerns.(39) By 1976 75% of all locally produced weaponry and 90% by value of the SADF's heavy ammunition requirements were produced in the private sector.(40)

Already by 1974 the apartheid regime was virtually self-sufficient in the production of ammunition, firearms, bombs, mines and a range of related military equipment. Armoured cars and other military vehicles were also produced while the development of military aircraft, rockets and missiles was approaching an advanced stage.(41) Two years earlier Samuels had declared that South Africa could no longer be prevented from acquiring arms.(42) Pretoria was taking no chances and considerably lessened its dependence on arms imports. While the import of foreign weapons and technology did not cease, by 1976 the local armaments industry was well established and the foundations of a militarised economy had been laid.

3. Defence Expenditure

Some indication of the phenomenal growth of the South African military can be gained from a glance at overall government expenditure on defence. For instance this expenditure rose from 7% of total government expenditure in 1959-60 to 17% (216.3 million of R1.252.2 million) in 1966-67.(43) Apart from one or two years such as 1968-69 and 1970-71, when there was a slight decrease in the amount set aside for defence, the defence budget and actual expenditure have risen enormously since 1960. By 1977-78 the defence budget amounted to R1.654 million, while the actual expenditure on defence for the same year was R1.940.4 million.(44)

4. The Para-Military Forces

On the eve of the formation of the White Republic the South African Police (SAP) was the main security apparatus of the apartheid state. In the previous two decades its authorised strength had more than doubled to 28.007 in 1960, more than double the operational strength of the SADF. Yet by 1977 the SADF's total potential strength of about 367.500 was more than five times greater than that of the SAP.(45)

On the contrary, by 1977 the SAP regular force, which had consisted of 12.350 Whites and 13.321 Blacks in 1960, had been enlarged to include about 19.000 Whites and 15.320 Blacks.(46) Police strength was further increased in a number of ways such as the creation of

supplementary forces. The year 1961 saw the formation of a Reserve Police, a citizen force which voluntarily assists in performing ordinary police duties when the regulars are required for more urgent tasks. In 1975 the strength of the Reserve Police stood at 19.703, roughly the same as in 1964.(47) In January 1973 the state established a Police Reserve, consisting of ex-members of the SAP regular force and divided into an Active and Inactive Group. Members of both groups may be ordered to render police service for unlimited periods in times of emergency. The strength of the Police Reserve increased from 6.059 in 1974 to 15.040 in 1977. Through these innovations the total SAP strength stood at 64.941 in 1975, more than double the authorised police establishment in 1960.(49)

Apart from its usual crime prevention duties, since the early 1970's the SAP has increasingly been trained for and deployed in para-military actions against strikers, boycotting students, other participants in mass resistance and ANC guerrillas. In these operations it works closely with the SADF and in recent years such as in 1976, 1980 and 1981, joint operations between the two forces have become increasingly common. The growing emphasis on the military involvement of the police has been further enhanced by the conscription of national servicemen into the SAP.(50) Allotment to the SAP even precedes allotment to the Commandos.(51) In 1975 the first batch of 500 conscripts was diverted from the SADF to render two years service in the SAP.(52) Since then this number has grown.

Total Strategy

While the South African political hierarchy increasingly regarded defence as a priority the military leadership came to realise the need for a total defence strategy of which military defence would merely be a part. The premise of this strategy, as described by the then Chief of the SADF, General Magnus Malan, is that 'South Africa is today... involved in total war. The war is not only an area for the soldier. Everyone is involved and has a role to play.'(53) This war has been described by the military leaders as '80% socio-economic and only 20% military. If we lose the socio-economic struggle then we need not even bother to fight the military one.'(54) Actions are directed against South Africa 'in the political, economic, psychological and security fields. On its part, the Republic of South Africa has to act or counteract in all these fields.'(55) Essentially then, the aim of this total strategy, which has been official government policy for the last few years, is the harnessing by the regime of all the resources in the state and private sectors to enable it, through action in all spheres, including the military, political, social, economic, psychological and diplomatic, to maintain White class and racial domination in South and southern Africa. The total militarisation of South African society is merely a means to this end.

1. Botha and the Generals; A Bloodless Coup

Already in 1976, in reaction to the Soweto revolt, members of the SADF general staff had sent a memorandum to Defence Minister Botha implying that some form of military takeover might be necessary to

bring about the socio-political changes which they felt demanded immediate government attention".(56) Within two years the question of whether or not the military would stage a coup, had become academic. The assumption of the premiership by P.W. Botha in October 1977 marked the military's rise to power in a process which has been described as "the equivalent in Afrikaner nationalist terms of a draun-out coup d'etat".(57)

The change in character of the regime manifested itself in a number of far-reaching alterations made to the executive, legislative and security functions of government. The State Security Council (SSC), which had been established in 1972 to advise the government on the formulation of national policy and strategy and to determine intelligence priorities, now "conducts" the national strategic planning process. It formulates national policy which is co-ordinated at interdepartmental level by 15 interdepartmental committees of the SSC. Managerial responsibility rests with the Prime Minister's Department. The committees process the total national strategy directives of the SSC.(58) At the beginning of August 1979 Botha also revealed plans for the extension of the powers of the SSC to control all significant policy decisions of government departments (which has since been implemented) and semi-state organs such as the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) and the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR).(59) The SSC, which is dominated by the military establishment,(60) has thus replaced the Cabinet as the key decision making body.

Botha has further strengthened the hand of his military-civilian clique by reducing the amount of executive departments from 39 to 23, thereby concentrating more power in his own department.(61) The elected Senate was abolished and the House of Assembly was enlarged to include 12 MP's nominated by the White political parties in proportion to their numbers in the House. Thereby Botha reduced the number of potentially hostile legislators and was able to secure the nomination of his own supporters. It also made it easier for him to include his own men in the Cabinet, members of which are legally required to be members of parliament within a specified period. changes in the security services have also contributed to the military's supremacy in South African political life. The Bureau of State Security (BOSS) has been downgraded to the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI), which now has good working relations with the Security Police, has emerged as the leading security service. Ultimately all government security services now work under the control of the military establishment.(62)

In addition to the structural changes Botha has included top members of the military establishment in important government posts. In his mid-1980 Cabinet reshuffle, General Malan succeeded P.W. Botha as Minister of Defence while the Deputy Minister of Defence, H.H.(Kobie) Coetsee, was promoted to Minister of Justice. All these changes have further eroded the semblance of democracy which White South Africa enjoys. Malan had already recognised this when he declared that "There is a conflicting requirement between that of total strategy and the democratic system of government", a view subsequently endorsed by Botha(64) and Lt.-General Jack Dutton, SADF Chief of Staff (Operations) until 1981 and current Residential Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Chile.(65)

2. The Military and Para-Military Forces

(a) The Military

Since the adoption of total strategy as government policy in 1978 the apartheid regime has paradoxically concentrated more effort into the strengthening of its defence capabilities than at any other stage during the past two decades. This is clearly reflected in the defence budget which rose from R1.554.375.000 for 1973-79 to R1.990.000 million for 1980-81, which in turn rose by a staggering 30% to R2.465.000 million for 1981-82.(66) Further funds for military expansion have been raised through two Defence Bonds schemes which were introduced in 1976. There has also been a sharp increase in the actual amount appropriated for the Special Defence Account, the expenditure of which is not governed by parliament. In 1980 a total of R1.161.410.000 of the budget was appropriated for this account as opposed to R799.125.100 in 1973-79.(67)

(i) The SADF

Since 1977 the SADF's manpower pool has undergone considerable expansion. As a result of the doubling of compulsory service obligations in 1977 the number of national servicemen performing initial service has doubled to about 60.000. Between 1977 and 1979 the CF was enlarged from 120.000 to 230.000. In the same period the Commandos grew from 120.000 to 150.000.(68) Efforts were also made to expand the PF in order to provide technical staff and officers to train the increasing number of conscripts. In 1978 alone the PF was enlarged by 30%.(69) PF growth between 1977 and 1979 represented an increase from 7% to 28.6% of actual defence force strength, although only 30% of the desired PF strength was achieved.(70) Thus by 1979 the PF numbered about 40.000,(71) and a total of about 430.000 persons (a little under one of every two of the one million White males between the ages of 18 and 45) were in a state of actual or potential mobilisation.(72) In the same year the SADF's Standing Operational Force numbered 130.000.(73)

In 1978 two other measures were introduced to bolster SADF strength. Firstly, tough new penalties were introduced for failure to render compulsory military service(74) in an attempt to crack down on the increasing incidence of war resistance. Secondly, legislation was adopted to pressurise immigrants under the age of 25 into service in the SADF by denying citizenship or permanent residence rights to those who refused to accept citizenship (and thereby liability to render military service) within two years residence within the country.(75) Attempts are being made to deal with the strain placed on the economy by the growing military commitments of the White managerial and professional groups.

In this context the service of women in the SADF is becoming increasingly important. By 1977 the percentage of women in the SADF had increased from 0.0% of the total force to 7%.(76) The Deputy Minister of Defence has said that the use of women has reduced the burden on PF members and has freed national servicemen for other tasks.(77) About 1.000 women are now trained each year for the PF and CF (78) and by 1980 about 12.000 had volunteered for service in the Commandos since 1977. Although women are not

used in combat, they are no longer relegated to the traditional "female" roles of nursing and clerical assistance, and may now be found in a number of operational musterings, from Intelligence to the Signal Corps.(79)

(ii) Recruitment of Blacks

In 1978 Blacks constituted 2.5% of the SADF.(80) Of this the Coloured component is the most advanced. In January 1979 Deputy Defence Minister Coetsee revealed that the January intake of Coloureds into voluntary national service had increased by 33% and that there had also been considerable growth in Coloured participation in the Commandos.(81) By 1980 more than 3,000 Coloureds were serving in the SADF.(82) Of this number 1,500 had entered the SADF in January 1980 when the period of service for Coloureds and Indians had been increased from one to two years. The SA Cape Coloured Corps has regularly served in the "operational area" since 1975.

The recruitment of Indians into the SADF has developed along parallel lines. Since the mid-1970's about 150 Indians have been accepted into the SADF each year. Training takes place at the SA Indian Corps Training Battalion (SAICTB), now known as the SAS Jalsena, on Salisbury Island. It falls under the Navy which has proportionally the most Blacks serving in its ranks. Coloured and Indian membership of the Navy's PF increased from 17.4% in 1977 to 20% in 1979. They are employed in an operational capacity.(83) By September 1980 Coloureds and Indians accounted for one-third of the entire naval force and 30% of the enlisted personnel on some ships.(84) For some years now there have been plans for the eventual introduction of conscription for Coloureds and Indians. This possibility was already raised by Defence Minister Botha in 1977 and the SADF Chief of Staff (Personnel) estimated that it would take until 1982 before sufficient Black personnel could be recruited to provide the instructors required to handle the large number of conscripts, about 20,000 per year.(85) At present it is not clear whether this deadline will be acted on.

Pretoria has also intensified its attempts to involve Africans in the defence of apartheid through recruitment into the SADF and the bantustan armies. In June 1978 the enrolment of Africans for training in the SADF stood at 350.(86) During the previous year a total of 82 recruits had been accepted,(87) and according to P.W. Botha, the number accepted between 1 January and 5 May 1980 alone totalled 228.(88) All African recruits are trained at Lenz near Johannesburg by the 21 Battalion, which in 1980 consisted of 500 men. Training is conducted along ethnic lines. In May 1980 Botha announced the formation of ethnic units in the SADF for Swazis (111 Battalion), Vendas (112 Battalion), Shangaans (113 Battalion), and Zulus (121 Battalion).(89) There is also an initiative under way to form African combat auxiliaries within the rural commandos. The primary task of the latter is counter-insurgency.

The 21 Battalion also operates as a training centre for the bantustan armies. These forces, which include the Venda National Guard since the "independence" of Venda in 1979, still fall under the SADF's grip to a certain extent. Only the Transkeian Defence Force maintains a large measure of autonomy. However, its aims

and strategy are not likely to differ much from those of the SADF as its commander is none other than Col. Reid-Paly, the former chief of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, a unit notorious for the atrocities committed during Zimbabwe's war of liberation. Indeed, it has been reported that it is Pretoria's policy to regard the armies of the "independent" bantustans as part of a South African defence system to fight against "Marxism".(90) In the past few years troops of the "independent" bantustans have been deployed against ANC guerrillas on a number of occasions. Blacks have also been extensively used in the "operational areas." Since 1978 the 21 Battalion has been periodically deployed in the "operational area" in Namibia. While Blacks, including Namibians, account for less than 5% of Pretoria's armed forces, they constitute 20% of operational strength.(91)

(iii) Mercenaries

Strictly speaking, a mercenary is anyone recruited into a military role by the lure of material reward. This applies to both the soldier in the frontline and the technician operating an electronic device. British, United States and West German firms, which produce electronic equipment for military use, have supplied the apartheid regime with highly paid technicians to set up sophisticated electronic systems for military purposes and to train South Africans in their use. One may regard these technicians as "white collar" mercenaries.(92) In addition, the National Party regime recruits persons to participate in combat in return for material reward. These "kakhi" mercenaries include local Blacks, who are not regarded as South African citizens by the state, as well as foreigners.

In the past South Africa has acted as a recruiting ground for mercenaries who were deployed in the defence of reactionary regimes in Africa, such as the Katanga secessionists in the early 1960's(93) and Rhodesia.(94) But it was not until 1976 that there were any indications that foreign "kakhi" mercenaries were being recruited into the SADF. In that year the remnants of the UNITA and FFLA forces and Portuguese and French mercenaries fled Angola to South African-controlled Namibia.(95) Some of these were accepted by the SADF.

The main concentration of foreign "kakhi" mercenaries is in the 32 Battalion based at Buffalo on the Okavango River in northern Namibia. Some insight into the structures and operations of this battalion was provided in 1981 by three ex-members thereof.(96) The battalion was established by the U I at the end of 1975 and numbers some 1,200 soldiers.(97) It is officered by SADF regulars along with British and other foreign mercenaries, and the ranks consist mainly of former FNLA members. Training is carried out at Okunduku base near Durban. The battalion is deployed mainly in Angola where, according to the testimonies of its former members, it has been responsible for systematic scorched earth tactics and the terrorisation of the local populace.(98) One of the mercenaries who deserted the 32 Battalion at the end of 1979, also revealed the existence of Zambian mercenaries in the SADF. According to him they are deployed within "Battalion 31" against SWAPO targets in Zambia and against Zambian objectives.(99)

Mercenaries are also accommodated in the SADF's Reconnaissance Commando (known as the Recces), which is divided into five

units. In early 1981 an Angolan mercenary and former member of S'Becca Commando (100) revealed before an international panel of lawyers that his unit, which is based in Durban, serves as a training centre for nationals of various neighbouring states, including Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Namibia. He, himself, was trained for combat against SWAPO and was deployed in Namibia, on one occasion as part of a unit of fake guerrillas used to terrify the local populace.

Units such as 32 Battalion and Reconnaissance Commando operate outside the normal SADF command structure. They fall directly under the Chief of the SADF.(101) They include mercenaries from neighbouring states, Europe, the USA and, according to reports, even Israelis and Chileans.(102) Their numbers have been swollen by former members of the Rhodesian security forces who have joined the SADF since Zimbabwe obtained independence in April 1980

(iv) Psychological Warfare within the SADF

In recent years the SADF has felt compelled to heighten its psychological war in order to maintain loyalty in its ranks and to boost its public image. One of the threats perceived by it is the growing resistance to military service. The military authorities sought to halt this by the introduction of harsh penalties in 1978 and a tightening of disciplinary procedures since then. This crackdown has been accompanied by a concerted propaganda campaign. The usual pro-apartheid riddled courses for national servicemen have been supplemented with a series of articles in Paratus, the official organ of the SADF, and other publications, which attempt to justify military service and the role of the apartheid war machine.

In 1980 the SADF even planned a propaganda campaign "to nullify the Opposition's attack on the Prime Minister during the budget debate". Signed by Major-General Pretorius, the Director-General of the SADF's Civic Action Programme, the document outlining the plan identified four target areas for the campaign and proposed action in each. Target areas included the unsuccessful recruitment of Blacks, pay problems in the SADF, the inequitable distribution of active duty commitments, and war resistance.(103) The exposure of this plan caused considerable embarrassment to the military establishment, but despite this, it was implemented in at least one of its target areas: that of war resistance.(104) A similar controversy was sparked off in June 1980 with the publication of an SADF pamphlet entitled "The Reason Why". It propagated National Party policies and included blatantly racist statements.(105)

There have been other publications as well. In 1980 the Minister of Defence revealed to parliament that the SADF had published 20 publications with a total distribution of 197.050 and a total cost of R349.504.(106) One of these publications was a journal for Black soldiers, called Warrior. It was criticised for its support of government policy and attacks on those opposed to it.(107) It is thus evident from internal SADF propaganda alone, that, in the words of former SADF Chief Malan:

"The Defence Force supports government policy and is responsible

for peace, law and order in this country. This policy is the same as that laid down by Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, namely multinationalism and self-determination of nations."(108)

(b) The Para-military Forces

Efforts have also been made to expand the para-military police force. According to the official estimates of expenditure for 1978-79 an amount of R220.450.000 was budgeted for the police. (109) By 1980-81 this amount had risen to R309.765.000.(110) But attempts to meet police manpower requirements were not as successful as in earlier years. As at 30 June 1977 the SAP regulars numbered 18.817 White and 16.202 Black,(111) and the Reserve Police and Police Reserve stood at 22.022 and 15.040 respectively.(112) The total was thus under the authorised police establishment of 72.500 in 1978.(113) The gap between actual and authorised strength has grown since then. By June 1979 there had been an actual drop in the number of regulars(114) and by the end of June 1981 the White regular contingent was more than 2.930 below its authorised strength of just over 21.300 while its Black counterpart was nearly 2.470 below its authorised strength of about 17.640.(115) In comparison the membership of the Reserve Police and Police Reserve has remained fairly constant.(116) It has been suggested that the police manpower shortage is attributable to the creation of "favourable employment opportunities" in the private sector,(117) more attractive benefits in other government departments and the fact that the police are more exposed to the realities of enforcing apartheid and repressing strikes, boycotts and other forms of mass resistance.(118)

The regime is currently attempting to solve the manpower shortage in a number of ways. The strength of the Police Reserve continues to be supplemented by the diversion into its ranks of an estimated 1.000 military conscripts per year.(119) In November 1980 it was announced that as from the beginning of 1981 Black police-women would be recruited and trained.(120) In September 1981 the Minister of Police, Louis le Grange, revealed a plan to establish a junior reserve police force as part of the Reserve Police. This force will operate on a volunteer basis under the supervision of senior policemen and will be open to White boys of 16 years and older. Its primary purpose is to alleviate the pressure on the regular police and members will have limited powers of arrest. The boys will assist the regulars with crime prevention duties in the urban and rural areas and will also be used to do guard duty on their school premises.(121)

Since 1976 an increasingly significant share of police resources has been channelled into anti-riot and counter-insurgency operations. The amount appropriated for expenditure on police equipment, arms and ammunition increased from R8.3 million in 1977 to R10.2 million in 1978. In his motivation for the increase the Minister of Police explained that more ammunition was being used in the combat of urban unrest and said that the amount would increase each year.(122) In May 1978 he remarked that the demands made on the police, especially in respect of internal security, had intensified.(123)

Police patrols have been introduced on the country's borders(124)

and police powers of search without a warrant have been extended in these areas.(125) New legislation also allows for the deployment of the police outside South Africa(126) and places severe restrictions on the publication of information concerning police activities, particularly the prevention or combatting of "terrorism".(127)

(c) Arms Production and Procurements

By the time the United Nations Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in November 1977,(128) the local armaments industry had become so firmly established that the embargo was doomed to have minimal effect. Control over the procurement of foreign weapon systems and technology, and local production had been centralised in ARMSCOR. The latter's assets had leaped from R200 million in 1974 to close to R1.000 million in 1979.(129) The number of its employees had increased from 12.000 to 20.000 in the same period (130) and its turnover in arms procurements had increased from R32 million in 1968 to R979 million in 1973.(131) Such growth would have been impossible without large-scale co-operation, agreements and trade with the Western powers, notably Britain, France, the USA and West Germany.(132)

In the years since the imposition of the arms embargo the South African armaments industry has experienced renewed growth. In 1978 ARMSCOR was allowed to enter the capital market. On 31 December of that year the number of persons employed by it and its nine nationalised subsidiaries stood at 37.950.(133) By 1981 the corporation's assets had increased to R1.200 million, probably ranking it second only to Barlow Rand among the country's industrial giants.(134) Since the imposition of the arms embargo it had spent R628 million on expansions to production facilities.(135) ARMSCOR falls directly under the Minister of Defence and in the words of its Chairman, Commandant Piet Marais, "is part of and exists" only to render a service to the SADF. The aim of course is to procure and manufacture arms at the lowest possible cost..."(136) This, however, is qualified by a deliberate policy to buy South African products and to replace imports wherever possible despite the increased costs which this may involve.(137)

Nevertheless, efforts to ensure that the arms industry is at least partially an economical proposition has led Pretoria to steep up its arms exports, begun on a modest scale in the late 1960's. According to a report released by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, South African arms exports between 1972 and 1976 amounted to \$19 million and to \$4 million in 1976 alone. Rhodesia was the main importer of South African arms, receiving \$5.5 million worth between 1967 and 1977.(138) In 1978 Defence Minister Botha announced that South Africa had begun to export major weapons systems.(139) In the same year South Africa ranked 11th amongst the 29 recognised arms exporting countries of the world and was reported to have exported arms worth more than R77 million, a phenomenal increase over previous years.(140) As in the past, South Africa exports arms mainly to conservative and reactionary regimes such as Paraguay, Chile, South Korea and Indonesia. Despite the stunning increase in arms exports in recent years, ARMSCOR officials say that the exports

programme is still very small. They see it as important for the future, both as a contribution to the balance of payments and as a cost-reducing factor in that it allows for longer production runs.(141) In line with this view, control over arms exports was placed in the hands of the Minister of Defence in 1980.(142)

The arms embargo has not prevented Pretoria from obtaining weapons from foreign sources, although it has made it somewhat more difficult to do so. In the main the apartheid regime attempts to import armaments behind devious covers and front organisations. An example of this occurred in 1979 when the SADF announced the development of its own locally produced 155mm extended-range gun, the so-called G5. Subsequent investigations revealed that this gun was the product of international collaboration involving the Pentagon, the CIA, and British and other Western banks and companies. There have been other incidents as well.(143) According to Lt-General R.H.D. Rogers, Chief of the South African Air Force (SAAF) there is a SAAF team which continuously examines foreign purchases with a view to local manufacture.(144) Presumably there are similar bodies performing the same job in the other two branches of the SADF. In any event, when Pretoria cannot smuggle foreign armaments into its arsenal it simply takes them, as in 1979, when it seized Soviet tanks and 150 tons of ammunition in Durban from a French shipping company.(145)

The South African armaments industry is currently entering a period of consolidation. During 1981 all extensions to production capacity were completed. According to an ARMSCOR spokesman a shift has also been made in production priorities from its required for anti-guerrilla warfare to "more conventional armaments."(146) This shift, when linked to South Africa's self-sufficiency in the production of most of its armaments requirements, is ominous. In mid-1981 Pretoria launched its largest invasion of Angola since 1975. Recent policy changes in local arms production, accompanied by an avalanche of threats, suggest that similar large-scale operations in other neighbouring states will be the apartheid regime's answer to the forces of liberation. Such tactics would definitely be far more "economical" than a constly drawn-out counter-insurgency programme.

(d) Nuclear Armaments

For some time now there has been speculation as to whether South Africa has a nuclear arsenal. It certainly has the resources to build a nuclear weapon. In 1978 South African-controlled uranium production (including that of Namibia) accounted for 11% of non-Communist output and 20% of non-Communist exports.(147) Most of this uranium is marketed to Western countries and the rest is retained for domestic use. Already in 1965 South Africa's first nuclear reactor, SAFARI 1, had "gone critical" and Prime Minister Verwoerd had announced that the country was considering both the military and peaceful uses of its uranium.(148) By the late 1960's it was revealed by Dr. A.J.A. Roux, Chairman of the South Africa Atomic Energy Board, that South Africa was co-operating in the nuclear field with Portugal, the USA, France and Britain.(149) Since then West Germany has joined the ranks, supplying much of the technology for the enrichment process.

South Africa has two known nuclear reactors, SAFARI 1 and Pelindaba Zero (brought into operation in 1967), both primarily for research purposes. A nuclear power station employing two reactors is being built at Koeberg near Cape Town and is scheduled to commence operations towards the end of 1982. But is in the uranium enrichment process that Pretoria has encountered difficulties. In the early 1970s the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa (URENCO) brought a pilot enrichment plant into operation at Valindaba with the long-term goal of enrichment on a commercial scale for export. But the enrichment capacity of this plant is limited. To date the fuel requirements of the research reactors have had to be met by the import of enriched uranium, provided mainly by the USA. According to the Los Angeles Times the United States has supplied South Africa with more than 700kg of highly enriched uranium to fuel SAFARI 1, over 25% of it since 1974.(150) Due to strict security measures it is not known whether any of these supplies were diverted for military use. The supply of enriched uranium was partially interrupted in 1976 when the USA denied contracted fuel shipments to South Africa. This came at a time when Pretoria had just begun construction of the Koeberg plant. As a result, in February 1978 the South African regime announced that instead of building a huge new enrichment plant to meet foreign demands for low enriched uranium fuel, substantial extensions would be built at Valindaba to ensure self-sufficiency in fuel loads for the Koeberg reactors.(151) It is estimated that the extensions will boost Valindaba's potential from an output of about 0,006 million separative work units a year(152) to an ultimate capacity of perhaps 400-500 tons of separative work units, about 10% of the original target.(153) But the Valindaba plant will only be able to supply the Koeberg reactors from 1984 onwards.

However, as one observer has noted:

"Whatever the difficulties there is no reason to question the republic's capacity to meet its own nuclear fuel needs whether or not additional nuclear power plants are built or to produce weapons grade material sufficient for a modest nuclear arsenal."(154)

South Africa's capacity to produce a nuclear device is not in question. Whether it has access to sufficient enriched uranium to build a bomb in addition to meeting its ordinary fuel needs, is another matter. In this respect Pretoria's hand was considerably strengthened in 1981. Firstly, a Swiss-French-German consortium delivered sufficient enriched uranium to ensure that the Koeberg plant will commence operations on schedule and will remain in operation until such time as Valindaba can meet its fuel needs.(155) Towards the end of the year there were also indications that the Reagan administration may soon lift the US embargo.(156)

There is still some doubt as to whether South Africa has actually produced nuclear weapons. But a number of incidents in recent years strongly suggest that not only has the apartheid regime constructed a nuclear device but has tested it as well. In 1977 Soviet and United States satellite photography revealed structures in the Kalahari which were purported to be part of a nuclear weapons test site. On 22 September a US Vela satellite observed a double pulse of light (the 'signature' of an atmos-

pheric nuclear test over the South Atlantic. According to the CIA a South African naval fleet was on manoeuvres in the area at the same time. It has also been reported that both the CIA and its military counterpart, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), made it clear that they knew that this explosion was a South African-Israeli test, but a White House panel set up to report to the public on the event, produced a cover-up.(157) Then on 15 December 1980 a United States spy satellite monitored another flash in the same general area. Reports stated that US intelligence officials strongly suspected that it was a small nuclear explosion.(158) Pretoria has denied involvement in all these incidents. In 1980 the 'World in Action' team of Britain's Granada TV revealed that the G5 gun could be used as a delivery system for a nuclear weapon and charged that this system was used to cause the nuclear explosion of September 1979.(159)

At the moment it is clear that if South Africa has not actually built nuclear weapons, it could do so very rapidly once the decision was taken. And in the words of former Deputy Defence Minister Coetsee, "If nuclear weapons are a last resort to defend oneself, it would be very stupid not to use them."(160)

3. Towards a War-Time Economy

ARMSCOR and its subsidiaries constitute merely a part of the defence industry in South Africa. The contribution of private industry to the war effort is enormous and since the inception of total strategy, has been systematically promoted and extended. In 1977 Defence Minister Botha revealed that 40% of the local expenditure on arms production was going directly to the private sector, while the balance went to ARMSCOR subsidiaries which in turn spent up to 90% of that amount on sub-contracts with private industry.(161) In fact, ARMSCOR's policy is to award as many arms production contracts as possible to the private sector.(162) It is therefore not surprising to note that by 1978 the proportion of local expenditure on arms production going to private South African contractors had risen to 60%. Another 30% was contracted to ARMSCOR's subsidiaries which in turn sub-contracted up to 75% of their work to the private sector.(163) By 1979 the number of private companies involved in ARMSCOR contracts or sub-contracts stood at about 800, directly contributing to the employment of an estimated 100,000 persons in the private sector, most of them skilled workers.(164) Private industry's contribution to the war effort extends beyond armaments production to the manufacture and provision of communications equipment, transport facilities, accommodation, rations, and administrative, training and recreational equipment. About 1200 private companies are involved in the overall defence industry(165) and over 400 companies now rely to a significant extent on defence contracts.(166)

Private industry is not a reluctant participant in the defence industry. The Defence Ministry is regarded as a secure client, an important factor in an economy frequently hit by recession. During the post-Soweto recession ARMSCOR even came under pressure from the private sector to spread its contracts among a greater number of firms.(167) In addition, private industry personnel play an active role in government-owned arms-producing companies, the most notable example being the seconding in mid-1979 of one of Barlow Rand's top men, John Maree, to ARMSCOR where he serves as executive vice-chairman

Much energy has also been devoted to establishing the defence industry's private sector involvement under South African control. In this, economic and security considerations are equally important. ARMSCOR actively seeks to ensure that firms involved in strategic production become locally controlled. (168) According to the corporation's chairman, Piet Narais, "there's no company controlled from overseas that does a lot of work for us". (169)

Private industry's contribution to the apartheid regime's war effort extends far beyond the confines of an identifiable defence industry. Through a combination of legislation, government measures and private business initiatives, moves have been made in recent years towards placing the entire economy on a war-time footing. Centralised co-ordination of this strategy was introduced in 1970 by means of the National Key Points Act. (170) This Act empowers the Minister of Defence to declare any place or area a "national key point" if it is so important that its loss, damage, disruption or immobilisation may prejudice South Africa, or wherever he considers it necessary or expedient for the safety of the country or to be in the public interest. The owner of any place declared a "national key point" must adopt security measures that meet with the Defence Minister's approval. Furthermore, the Act renders it illegal to publish or disclose any information relating to security measures at any "national key point". The identity of places declared "national key points" is not revealed to the general public. Contraventions of this Act are punishable with severe penalties.

When introducing this legislation the Defence Minister announced that these measures had become necessary in the light of increasingly frequent guerrilla attacks on economic, communications and police installations. He declared that the private sector had to adopt security measures as it was in the frontline of the onslaught against South Africa. He also revealed that since the early 1970s a National Key Point Committee had been in operation and had identified 633 "national key points", 45% of which were fully co-operating with the government. (171) A SADF spokesman has revealed that by June 1981 "several hundred" sites had been classified as "national key points" under the Act. They include airports, power stations, oil refineries and chemical plants. In return for their co-operation private companies will be offered financial incentives, including tax concessions. (172) In recent years efforts to develop a militarised economy have received added impetus through the establishment of Commando units at many industrial sites. One of the main areas in this respect is the industrial stronghold of Port Elizabeth and the surrounding district, one of the chief scenes of worker militancy. (173) Private industry co-operates closely with the SADF in the establishment of these units.

The private sector has also been drawn into the process of national policy formation. Top men now serve on the Defence Advisory Council. These include men like Mike Kosholt, chairman of Barlow Rand; (174) Christopher Saunders, head of the Tongaat group, one of the largest companies in Natal, and a director of the British-owned Standard Bank; and three other directors of British-owned banks in South Africa. (175) Influential industrialists have also been brought into the previously civil servant-controlled Public Service Commission, which is inter alia responsible for overseeing state expenditure. (176)

4. Military Intervention in the Social Arena

(a) The Propaganda War

Ever since it began in the early 1960s the militarisation of the apartheid state has been accompanied by government propaganda to justify the military build-up and nurture a war psychosis. Under the total strategy policy this has assumed the proportions of a virtual propaganda war. Government publications have been supplemented by privately-owned journals, magazines and newspapers in their "revelations" of the "total onslaught" against South Africa and their exhortations to combat this onslaught with a "total strategy". Radio and television, both controlled by the regime through the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) broadcast the same message. Indeed, in 1973 decision-makers of SABC-TV actually met with SADF generals to plan pro-military propaganda. (177) Private industry has also rallied to the support of the military's mind control efforts. Advertisements are ever increasingly adopting war as a theme: a light truck is advertised as a "little tank"; a lawn mower is promoted to fight "the battle of the lawn"; and a video camera is marketed under the banner: "shoot the workers. It's the only way they'll learn." (178) The sale of light arms to white South Africans is booming and over 750,000 whites are licensed to carry arms. (179) Not even the children have been spared: in 1974 the sale of war toys and games increased by 500% over the previous year. (180)

Publications which provide any meaningful opposition to the war effort are simply banned. Neither are the newspapers spared. Countless legislative measures determine what may be published and what not, with severe penalties for any contravention. All articles dealing with the military situation must be vetted by the SADF. (181) The military establishment is thus able to manipulate the press, for example, by covering up its casualties and military losses. (182) Under such pressure the newspapers practise self-censorship and in many cases SADF displeasure is sufficient to veto publication even where such publication may not be unlawful. (183) When a newspaper has stepped out of line, its editor has been removed (either by the state or the controlling company) (184) or the papers, themselves, are simply closed down. (185)

Whenever it regards it to be necessary the military supplements its general propaganda offensive with more specific thrusts against particular threats. For instance, the SADF directs much energy into curbing war resistance. Propaganda justifying service in the apartheid army has accompanied the introduction of legislation designed to curtail discussion on the subject. (186) The regime has also resorted to producing bogus editions of publications of exile-based South African war resistance organisations, (187) and to encouraging smear campaigns against war resisters in the local press. (188) In September 1981 the SADF even co-operated in the infiltration of an exile-based war resistance organisation in the USA and obtained most of its files and documents. (189) Another example of a specific propaganda thrust is the military's attempts to discourage the rural populace from providing food and shelter to ANC insurgents.

Pamphlets designed to achieve this effect are dropped in the rural areas and sometimes reveal total insensitivity towards the local populace.(190)

(b) The Indoctrination and Training of School Children

The White school system is based on the National Party's philosophy of "Christian National Education" and is intended to inculcate in the youth a patriotism towards the apartheid state. Already in the early 1960s the military had realised the need to nurture this patriotism and channel it into the war effort. Accordingly a system of compulsory cadet training for White boys from 12 to 17 years old was introduced into the schools. The boys are clad in military-type uniforms, are given parade and rifle drill and are made to participate in flag-raising ceremonies. Training is provided by local Commandos, ex-SADF officers and teachers who in some cases are seconded to the army. In recent years voluntary cadet training for White girls has also been introduced into some schools. According to Colonel Viljoen, the director of school cadets, the youth must be involved in the total national strategy and that the purpose of cadet training is to prepare the youth for military training.(191) The cadets are encouraged to attend SADF-run camps during their holidays where they receive fairly advanced military training. Cadet groups are also being affiliated to PF and CF regiments and young teachers are to be called up in the January holidays each year for training as Commando officers.(192) In April 1979, there were 589 cadet detachments around the country, consisting of 125.000 cadets.(193) By February 1980 the corresponding figures were 626 and 154.000 respectively. It was planned then that within three years 210.000 cadets would be involved in the programme.(194) Compulsory cadet training for white girls is also planned.(195)

A strong military presence in the White schools has also been generated by the youth preparedness courses and the veldschools organised by the provincial government and the central authorities. The youth preparedness programme in the classroom is geared to emphasise military preparedness, patriotism and discipline.(196) The veldschool is an outdoor extension of this scheme. Boys and girls attend separate veldschools. The latter are run on military lines and activities include inspection and flag-raising, survival training, tracking and camouflage, marching and practical field training during the day; group discussions, lectures and films in the evening. The lectures and discussions centre around the "Communist onslaught" aimed at the youth, and the need for security vigilance and military preparedness.(197)

Until 1979 a system of cadet training existed for Coloured youth of 13 years and older. However, the training centre was forced to close down when a commission found that conditions at the centre were appalling and that trainees were mishandled and badly treated.(198) Nevertheless, the government has persisted in its attempts to extend the cadet system to racial groups other than Whites. In 1978 the Minister of Defence announced that legislation was being drafted to extend the school cadet system to Coloureds and Indians.(199) Despite opposition from Coloured leaders and teachers the regime is pressing ahead with its plans. In 1980 it was reported that the training of Coloured and Indian students would begin within two years.(200)

(c) Militarisation in the University

Over the years the SADF has also made serious attempts to introduce a military presence into the White universities. Already Commando units consisting of students and lecturers have been established at all the Afrikaans-language universities. These units are used to maintain servicemen in a constant state of preparedness, and are called upon to guard university buildings and installations during times of civil unrest. In 1980 the Commando detachments of the Pretoria, Orange Free State, Port Elizabeth and Potchefstroom universities were incorporated as units of the SADF.(201)

To date, efforts to introduce a similar military presence at English-language universities have met with much opposition both from students and staff. This is partly due to the strong tradition of "academic freedom" which exists in these universities. However, great pressure is being exerted on the controlling bodies of these institutions to permit a military presence on the campuses and it remains to be seen whether the university authorities can withstand the pressure for much longer.

Nevertheless, all White universities, as well as a number of other institutions of higher education, have been incorporated to a greater or lesser extent in the state's research programme. Through organisations such as the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), senior students and academic staff investigate and report on various priority elements in the fields of industrial, commercial and military development. This research enables the state security organs to make and implement informed decisions in these spheres.

(d) Civil Defence

In 1976 Pretoria instructed every municipality and local authority to establish and provide facilities and funds for the maintenance of a Civil Defence organisation.(202) In the following year a Civil Defence system was formally established "to provide for the protection of the Republic and its inhabitants in a state of emergency and for other incidental matters."(203) By June of that year there were already 692 civil defence organisations throughout the country.(204) In collaboration with the provincial administrations civil defence liaison officers from the various regional army command headquarters began to activate new civil defence organisations while improving the state of preparedness of existing organisations. In 1979 a uniform civil defence structure was established throughout the country and the Defence White Paper of that year declared it essential that industries, commercial enterprises, schools and universities set up their own internal civil defence organisations in co-operation with the local authorities. According to the White Paper, 131 of a total of 636 civil defence organisations around the country had reached the "A" grading, meaning that their emergency plans complied with required standards.(205) Attempts were also made to root the civil defence organisations firmly in civilian hands (but under ultimate military control) by reducing reliance on SADF and police resources,(206) and by making civil defence a contractual obligation subject to penalties.(207)

The main function of the civil defence organisations is to be

prepared to take responsibility for the maintenance of essential services within each community in times of natural and other emergencies. It is a network of civilian organisations and Comandos under ultimate military authority, and in this sense is geared to fulfil the functions of a white militia when required to do so. This role is already felt to be of primary importance in the rural areas where attempts are being made to repopulate abandoned white farms and to establish a civilian-military barrier on the country's borders in an effort to stem guerrilla infiltration.(208) The civil defence system is of major importance to Pretoria in its efforts to mobilise the general civilian populace for the military defence of the apartheid state within the overall programme of total strategy.

(e) The Civic Action Programme

In line with the view that the military contribution to the defence of apartheid only constitutes 20% of the total, the SADF is itself committed to an active scheme to "win the hearts and minds" of the people in its battle against the forces of liberation. This scheme is a centrally co-ordinated civic action programme (CAP) whereby the SADF renders material assistance to the local populace in an effort to buy the latter's support.(209) Both the terrain and the target of the CAP is the local populace, and when their support cannot be bought they must be removed from critical areas.(210)

Essentially the CAP consists of the deployment of military servicemen in non-military forms of service but always as members of the SADF. After basic training and a six-month CAP course, participants in the programme are seconded to other government departments or to the governing bodies of the various bantustans whether the latter are "independent" or not. Under the direction of these institutions they work as engineers, mechanics, sport organisers, tourism directors, teachers, university lecturers, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and agricultural, legal and financial advisors. Soldiers involved in the CAP are required to wear military uniform and carry weapons. The idea behind this is:

"to project an image of the soldier as a man of action but who is nonetheless a friend of the Black man and who is prepared to defend him. We want the national serviceman to teach the Black man whilst his rifle is standing in a corner of the classroom."(211)

Under the CAP soldier are active in a number of bantustans, in particular, Kwa-Zulu, BophuthaTsuaana and Ciskei. They also operate in other rural areas, in Black townships such as Soweto and Umhlabi, and as teachers in Coloured and Indian schools. Apart from bantustan bureaucrats such as Ciskei's Chief Jongilanga,(212) most leaders of the Black community, ranging from Fanyana Mzibuko, a member of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee, to Kwa-Zulu Chief, Gatsha Buthelezi, have criticised the CAP.(213) The deployment of SADF personnel in Soweto schools has also led to class boycotts on a number of occasions.(214) Nevertheless, despite this opposition, the SADF continues to implement its CAP.

It is clear that the military's role in South African society under the current total strategy programme is extensive to say the least. The military is directly involved in every major sphere, political, economic, social and psychological. This involvement is being extended every day. In this respect it is fair to conclude that apartheid society is undergoing a systematic militarisation.

But current developments indicate an even more ominous change. In this study we have only examined the direct role of the military in any depth. The overall militarisation of apartheid society has only been alluded to and the military's growing control of the state apparatus has only been cursorily examined. It must be realised that the military involvement described above is only one part of the regime's total strategy programme. In addition, it must be borne in mind that through its effective control of state power the military determines and directs the implementation of this strategy in all areas, even those beyond direct military involvement. When seen in this context, it is readily apparent that the apartheid state is being transformed into a military laager which will attempt to crush all moves to overthrow the tyranny of its class and racial minority.

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23. South African Digest, Pretoria, SA Department of Information, 19 April 1975.
24. The Citizen, Johannesburg, 22 June 1977.
25. IDAF, op.cit., p.40.
26. Quoted in Cockram G., Vorster's Foreign Policy, Pretoria, Academica, 1970, p.107.
27. Barber, op.cit., p.192.
28. Minty A.S., South Africa's Defence Strategy, London, Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1970, p.5.
29. Quoted in Thompson L.H., Politics in the Republic of South Africa, Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1966, p.215.
30. Quoted in Cockram, op.cit., p.109. Minty, op.cit., p.6.
31. UN Security Council Resolutions 181 (Security Council Document S/5316) and 182 (Security Council Document S/5471).
32. The Star, 26 March 1965.
33. SIPRI, op.cit., p.137.
34. Minty, op.cit., p.7.
35. ibid.
36. Cockram, op.cit., p.109. See also Barber, op.cit., p.192.
37. International Defence Review, December 1971, quoted in SIPRI, op.cit., p.117.
38. Quoted in SIPRI, op.cit., p.137.
39. ibid.
40. IDAF, op.cit., p.14.
41. SIPRI, op.cit., p.136.
42. ibid., p.137.
43. Barber, op.cit., p.192.
44. IDAF, op.cit., p.16.
45. ibid., p.43.
46. ibid., p.44.
47. UN Unit on Apartheid, op.cit. IDAF, op.cit., p.45, table IX.
48. ibid., table X.
49. ibid., p.43, table VIII.
50. Allotment to the S.A.P. is permitted in terms of section 67(2).
51. Section 67(1).
52. The Star, 26 October 1974.
53. ibid., 10 September 1977.
54. General G.J.J. Boschhoff, quoted in Progress, Cape Town, Progressive Reform Party, June 1976.
55. Brigadier C.J. Lloyd, Officer Commanding Natal Command (now Major-General Lloyd, Officer Commanding the South West African Territorial Force), The Importance of Rural Development in the Defence Strategy of South Africa and the Need for Private Sector Involvement, paper delivered to a workshop of the Natal Region of the Urban Foundation, Durban, 10 August 1979, p.3.
56. Evidence presented in 1980 to the US Congress House African Subcommittee by United States foreign policy consultant, Dr. John Seiler, based on information he obtained during a visit to South Africa in 1979. Quoted in Resister, no.3, May/June 1980, p.9.
57. Crocker C.A., "South Africa: Strategy for Change", Foreign Affairs, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., Winter 1980/81, p.334.
58. 1979 White Paper on Defence, Pretoria, Department of Defence.
59. The Star, 5 August 1979.
60. Its key members are the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defence, Police, Justice, Foreign Affairs (the only one without military or police experience), the Chief of the S.A.F., the Commissioner of the S.A.P., and Lt.-General A. van Lentervelt, the secretary.
61. See Crocker C.A., South Africa's Defence Posture: Coping with Vulnerability, The Washington Papers, Beverly Hills and London, Sage Publications, 1981, p.91.
62. IDAF, op.cit., p.6. Resister, no.15, August/September 1981, pp. 12-15.
63. The Sunday Times, London, 13 March 1977.
64. IDAF, op.cit., p.7.
65. Louw L.H.H., (ed.), National Security: A Modern Approach, Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria (ISSUP), 1974, p.113.
66. Annual Surveys of Race Relations, 1979-80, Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR). Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 13 August 1981. These figures reflect estimates of expenditure on Defence (actual expenditure is usually higher) and do not include estimates of Defence expenditure from other government departments. The estimate for 1981-82 represents almost 16% of the total budget. The Guardian, London, 13 August 1981.
67. Annual Survey 1979, p.53; and 1980, p.204.
68. IDAF, op.cit., p.41, table VII.
69. 1979 White Paper on Defence. The White Paper also stated that "the expansion during the past two years would have been greater had so many trained members not left the service... the last represents an enormous brain drain."
70. Annual Survey 1979, p.71.
71. IDAF, op.cit., p.41, table VII.

72. ibid., pp.35-36.
73. ibid., p.41, table VII. This figure is composed of 40,000 in the PF, 60,000 national servicemen and those members of the CF (50,000) and the Commandos (30,000) doing camps.
74. By the Defence Amendment Act, No. 49 of 1978.
75. Section 11, South African Citizenship Act, No. 44 of 1949, as inserted by the South African Citizenship Amendment Act, No.53 of 1974.
76. Annual Survey 1980, p.200.
77. Hansard, no.11, 1980, col.5310.
78. Paratus, Pretoria, SADF, May 1974.
79. IDAF, op.cit., p.39.
80. According to Harry Schwarz, Defence spokesman of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), Hansard, no.11, 1974, questions, col.4473.
81. Hansard, no.11, 1979, col.4754.
82. Crocker, 'South Africa's Defense Posture', p.35.
83. Annual Survey 1979, p.43.
84. Newsweek, New York, 29 September 1980, p.14.
85. Resister, no.10, September/October 1980, p.12.
86. Annual Survey 1973, p.55.
87. ibid.
88. Hansard, no.14, 1980, col.792.
89. South African Digest, 30 May 1980.
90. The Citizen, 8 September 1974.
91. Resister, no.9, July/August 1980, p.11.
92. See Eolon C.H., 'Mercenarisation' in Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars (ed.), U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, Boston, South End Press, 1974, pp.113-123.
93. Rhodie E., The Third Africa, Cape Town, Nasionale Boekhandel, 1968, pp.64-65. Burchett U. and Roebuck ., The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1977, p.231.
94. Fire Force Exposed, London, Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979, p.32. Burchett and Roebuck, op.cit., p.137.
95. Stockwell J., In Search of Enemies, London, Futura Publications, 1979, pp.254-257.
96. Trevor Edwards, a British mercenary and platoon commander in the SADF, whose story was given extensive coverage in The Guardian at the end of January 1981; Jose Belmundo, an Angolan and former captain in the SADF, who testified before an international panel of lawyers at the same time; and an Australian mercenary, codenamed 'Cowboy', who provided information on his 2-year stint in the 32 Battalion in Salisbury in February 1981. Both Edwards and 'Cowboy' were previously members of the Rhodesian Light Infantry.
97. The Guardian, 29 January 1981. One source (Africa, London, March 1981, p.31) has reported that the battalion comprises nearly 9000 Angolan mercenaries.
98. The Guardian, 29 January and 2 February 1981. Africa, March 1981, p.31. Deposition of Jose Ricardo Belmundo to the Second Session of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Regimes in Southern Africa, held in Luanda from 30 January to 3 February 1981.
99. Africa, March 1981, p.32.
100. Lutenna Manguvo. ibid.
101. Cape Times, Cape Town, 7 and 17 September 1979.
102. Caputo Radio, 17 September 1981. The Guardian, 17 June 1981.
103. Sunday Times, Johannesburg, March 1980. Annual Survey 1980, p.200. Resister, no.4, May/June 1980, p.6.
104. The plan envisaged a publicity campaign, involving the Chaplain-

- General of the SADF and White Opposition parliamentarians, to justify military service and curb war resistance. This was implemented in the course of 1980. For example see Paratus, March to December 1981.
105. Annual Survey 1980, p.201. Resister, no. 9, July/August 1980, p.40.
106. Hansard, no.12, 1980, questions, col.701. These publications do not include standard military instruction and training documents and texts, which are invariably riddled with pro-apartheid propaganda.
107. Annual Survey 1980, p.209.
108. Quoted in Cape Times editorial, 25 October 1979.
109. Annual Survey 1978, p.65.
110. Annual Survey 1980, p.218.
111. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police for the year ended 30 June 1977. The Star, 22 November 1978.
112. IDAF, op.cit., p.43, table VIII. Crocker, 'South Africa's Defense Posture', p.23.
113. IDAF, op.cit., p.43, table VIII. In 1980 the authorised police establishment stood at 50,431.
114. To 18,464 White and 15,612 Black members. Report of the Commissioner of Police for the year ended 30 June 1979. Cited in Annual Survey 1980, p.227.
115. Report of the Commissioner of Police for the year ended 30 June 1981. The Guardian, 15 September 1981.
116. In 1974 the Reserve Police numbered 21,420 consisting of 12,333 Whites and 3497 Blacks, while the Police Reserve comprised 3639 active and 11395 inactive members. IDAF, op.cit., p.45, tables IX and X.
117. According to the Commissioner of Police, General Mike Goldenhuys. The Guardian, 15 September 1981.
118. Crocker, 'South Africa's Defense Posture', p.23.
119. IDAF, op.cit., p.46.
120. Annual Survey 1980, pp.227-228.
121. ibid. The Guardian, 15 September 1981.
122. Annual Survey 1973, p.73.
123. Rand Daily Mail, 26 May 1978.
124. ibid., 14 August 1978.
125. Section 2, Police Amendment Act, No.64 of 1979.
126. Police Amendment Act, No. 50 of 1980.
127. Section 9, Police Amendment Act, No.64 of 1979, and the Second Police Amendment Act, No.82 of 1980.
128. United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 of 1977.
129. Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 11 September 1981.
130. ibid. Crocker, 'South Africa's Defense Posture', p.15.
131. IDAF, op.cit., p.14.
132. See Annual Survey 1978, p.57; and 1979, p.85.
133. Annual Survey 1979, p.15.
134. Financial Mail, 11 September 1981.
135. Financial Times, London, 22 December 1981.
136. Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 15 July 1977.
137. Financial Mail, 14 July 1978.
138. Annual Survey 1971, pp.57-58. The Star, 10 August 1973.
139. IDAF, op.cit., p.16.
140. To the Point, Johannesburg, 17 August 1979.
141. Financial Mail, 11 September 1981.
142. Armaments Development and Production Amendment Act, No. 86 of 1980.
143. Resister, no.14, June/July 1981, p.19.
144. Rand Daily Mail, 12 August 1978.

145. Annual Survey 1940, p.24.
146. Financial Mail, 11 September 1981. Financial Times, 22 December 1981.
147. "South Africa's Role in World Mineral Supply", Briefing Paper no.6, Johannesburg, Minerals Bureau, 1980, papers presented to the Advanced Planning Conference of the International Association of Finance Planners, April 1980, table p.2, quoted in Crocker, "South Africa's Defense Posture", p.57.
148. South African Digest, 13 August 1965.
149. Minty, op.cit., p.3.
150. Barnaby F., "The Shadow of the Bomb?", Africa Now, London, June 1981, p.81. Dr. Barnaby is the Director of SIPRI.
151. Koesberg requires about 48 tons of fuel per annum (after an initial fuel load of 146 tons), about 3% enriched, and SAFARI 1 requires 12kg per annum. Africa Now, June 1981, p.61. Crocker, "South Africa's Defense Posture", p.62.
152. Barnaby, op.cit., p.61.
153. Crocker, "South Africa's Defense Posture", p.61.
154. *ibid.*
155. The Times, London, 13 November 1981. De Volkskrant, Amsterdam, 2 December 1981.
156. Financial Times, 22 October 1981.
157. Rogers B., "The Nuclear Threat from South Africa", Africa, January 1981, p.46.
158. Daily Telegraph, London, 19 February 1981.
159. Rogers, op.cit., p.46.
160. Quoted in Newsweek, 29 September 1980.
161. IDAF, op.cit., p.14.
162. Annual Survey 1971, p.59.
163. *ibid.*
164. 1979 White Paper on Defence: Annual Survey 1979, p.95. Financial Mail, 11 September 1981.
165. Annual Survey 1973, p.59.
166. IDAF, op.cit., p.15.
167. Annual Survey 1978, p.59.
168. *ibid.* A good example of this policy in practice was the takeover of Recal Electronics, a major British supplier of the SADF, by the South African company, Grinaker Holdings, a deal "encouraged" by UmSCOR. Sunday Times, London, 25 June 1979. Financial Mail, 25 May 1979.
169. *ibid.*
170. No. 102 of 1980.
171. See Annual Survey 1980, pp.214-215.
172. Financial Times, 26 June 1981.
173. See New York Times, 19 May 1979. Annual Survey 1979, pp.59-60. The Star, 29 April 1979.
174. Financial Times, 24 October 1981.
175. Africa Now, June 1981, p.68.
176. Financial Mail, 17 August 1979.
177. The Star, 24 March 1980.
178. IDAF, op.cit., p.48. See further most South African publications.
179. Financial Times, 5 July 1979.
180. *ibid.*
181. See Annual Survey 1971, p.53; and 1979, p.77.
182. See Resister, no.6, January/February 1980, p.11; no.7, February/March 1980, p.17; no.11, December 1980, pp.12-13; and no.16, October/November 1981, p.3.
183. Conversations with a number of journalists from various South African newspapers in 1979 and 1980.
184. c.f. the banning of Daily Dispatch editor, Donald Woods, in 1977, the various detentions of Percy Laboza, former editor of The

- World, Weekend World, and later Post and Sunday Post. and the removal of Rand Daily Mail editor, Arthur Sparks, in 1981.
185. This was the fate of the black newspapers, The World and Weekend World, which were banned in October 1977, and Post and Sunday Post, which were closed down in January 1981.
186. Section 121, inserted by section 10, Defence Further Amendment Act, No.83 of 1974.
187. See for instance the distribution of a false edition of Umkeer in October 1979. Umkeer is the official publication of a South African war resistance organisation in the USA.
188. For an example of this see Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 12 October 1980.
189. Rand Daily Mail, 9, 11 and 12 September 1981. Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 13 September 1981.
190. See Resister, no.15, August/September 1981, p.17.
191. Annual Survey 1980, p.209.
192. Financial Mail, 23 June 1979.
193. Annual Survey 1978, p.56.
194. Annual Survey 1980, p.209.
195. Die Burger, Cape Town, 2 February 1980.
196. Annual Survey 1979, p.34.
197. Personal communication from a teacher who participated in a veld-school in 1979. See also Resister, no.4, September 1979, pp.9-10.
198. Annual Survey 1979, p.23.
199. Rand Daily Mail, 1 February 1979.
200. Annual Survey 1980, p.209. See also Rand Daily Mail, 22 April 1977.
201. Annual Survey 1980, p.212.
202. IDAF, op.cit., p.23.
203. Civil Defence Act, No. 67 of 1977.
204. Annual Survey 1978, p.59.
205. Annual Survey 1979, p.88.
206. See Government Gazette, No.6317, R356, Cape Town, 2 March 1979. Also the speech of Brigadier Muller, SADF Director of Civil Defence. Annual Survey 1979, p.88.
207. Annual Survey 1980, p.212.
208. See the Defence Amendment Act, No.49 of 1978, the Promotion of the Density of Population in Designated Areas Act, No.37 of 1979, Annual Survey 1979, p.89, and Senate Hansard, no.2, 1979, col.415-460.
209. For an outline of the CWP see Smal A., The Civic Action Programme of the SADF: A Brief Overview, Cape Town, National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), December 1979. See also IDAF, op.cit., pp.51-52.
210. Lloyd, op.cit., pp.11-12.
211. Letter from Brigadier Lloyd to New Republic Party (NRP) MP, Vause Rau, 25 October 1979.
212. Sunday Post, Cape Midweek Edition, 20 September 1979.
213. EcuNews Bulletin, South African Council of Churches, 5 October 1979. Rand Daily Mail, 21 February 1980.
214. The Citizen, 3 December 1979. Annual Survey 1980, p.209.

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