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REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY
into the Espionage Activities of
the South African Government
in the International
University Exchange Fund

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I INTRODUCTION

1. Authority, Constitution and Work of the Commission

This Commission of Inquiry into the Espionage Activities of the South African Government in the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) was set up in accord with a resolution adopted by the International Board and Assembly of the IUEF in Geneva on 11 February, 1980. The Board and Assembly had met in extraordinary session following the revelation that the former Deputy Director of the IUEF, Craig Williamson, was a member of the South African Security Police.

The Board and Assembly of the IUEF decided that the Commission of Inquiry would consist of three members. The individuals who agreed to serve on the Commission were: Mr. Sundie Kazunga, Special Assistant to the President (Administration), Zambia; Mr. Bertil Zachrisson, former Minister of Education and at present M.P., Sweden; and Mr. David MacDonald, former Secretary of State and Minister of Communications and M.P., Canada. Dr. John Wilson, Information Officer, IUEF, London, acted as secretary to the Commission. At the first meeting of the Commission in Geneva on April 16, Mr. David MacDonald assumed the position of Chairman of the Commission with the concurrence of the other members.

Also associated with our work was an observer representing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Mr. I.C. Mponzi, Deputy-Director of the Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees (BPEAR). At our first meeting, we adopted a resolution expressing our appreciation of the concern which the OAU had shown in the affairs of the IUEF and welcoming the active and full participation of the representative of OAU in our work.

We met as a full Commission on three separate occasions: from April 16 to April 18, in Geneva; from May 15 to May 20 in Lusaka and Gaborone; and from June 3 to June 6 in London and Geneva. In addition, we spoke individually with other people who wished to give evidence to the Commission. A full list of those who gave evidence to the Commission or who submitted written statements to us is appended to the report.

We received invaluable assistance from a large number of individuals, particularly members of staff of the IUEF's Geneva, London and Lusaka offices. In London, Ms. Wendy Boyce typed a very large amount of material for the

Commission and Ms. Jill Landymore handled the Commission's practical arrangements. In Geneva, Ms. Debi Marti and Ms. Sue Carter and in Lusaka Ms. Zanele Mbeke and Ms. Connie Brathwaite helped in similar ways. The Commission could not have handled its assignment without the willing and extensive assistance it received from these and other people.

2. Terms of Reference and the Commission's Perception of its Task

The decision of the International Board and Assembly of the IUEF was to establish a Commission of Inquiry into the Espionage Activities of the Government of South Africa in the IUEF. The Commission was empowered to investigate, draw conclusions and make recommendations on the following:

- a) The employment of Craig Williamson by the IUEF first as Information Officer, and later as Deputy Director of the IUEF;
- b) The activities of Craig Williamson during his period of employment with the IUEF;
- c) Harm done to the IUEF, to the recipients of IUEF assistance, and to IUEF relations with other organisations by Craig Williamson;
- d) Misappropriation and misuse of IUEF funds by Craig Williamson;
- e) Channels of assistance used by IUEF in Southern Africa;
- f) Internal security measures in the IUEF;
- g) Legal and police aspects of the events surrounding the exposure of Craig Williamson;
- h) Any other matters which, in the opinion of the Commission, are directly relevant to the activities of the South African Security Police in relation to the IUEF.

On our arrival in Geneva on April 16, 1980, we were presented with terms of reference which differed somewhat from those adopted by the Board and Assembly in February. The major change was the rewriting of clause c) to read:

"The extent of damage done to the organisation, to the recipients of IUEF assistance, and to IUEF relations with other organisation".

This rewritten clause c) was at the same time put at the head of the list of items.

We felt, however, that even this slight broadening of our terms of reference did not empower us clearly enough to investigate the full range of

matters which we felt we should if we were to fulfil our function. Accordingly, at our first meeting, we adopted the following resolution as clarification of how we would interpret our terms of reference:

That the Commission, responding to the terms of reference set out by the Board but conscious of the specific concerns about the IUEF raised by the donors at their Stockholm meeting, will take these concerns of the donors into account when pursuing its enquiries under the terms of reference.

The original terms of reference laid down for us appeared to confine us rather narrowly and we felt it was important to broaden them so that we could bring under our scrutiny the management of the IUEF before Williamson's real identity was known, not just because of the light this would cast on how Williamson managed to infiltrate and operate in the organisation, but also because questions of financial administration and management had become important in their own right. These questions had to be answered if the IUEF was to emerge from its difficulties as an honestly and efficiently managed organisation in which the donors could put their trust. We were conscious, in this respect, of the political repercussions in the donor countries, less of the revelation that the IUEF had harboured a South African spy on its staff than of the subsequent revelations of possible financial mismanagement and irregularity in the running of the organisation. It appeared to us that there was a wider danger in this than that the IUEF itself would no longer enjoy the support of the donor governments. This danger was that as a result of the IUEF's being discredited as a politically suspect and financially untrustworthy organisation, funds for all anti-apartheid work by other organisations or for any assistance which was offered with clear political intent would be curtailed. This was a clear and present danger judging by the various reports appearing in the donor countries. The Board and Assembly of the IUEF had established an international and independent Commission of Inquiry with the clear wish that the Commission would restore confidence and trust in the IUEF, "in order to strengthen the ability of the IUEF to carry out its objectives of assisting the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa and in other parts of the world". We felt that we could not hope to discharge this task if we ignored the concerns of the donors.

At the same time, it was our feeling that the political implications

of Williamson's activities while he was employed by the IUEF were of major importance, however large the organisation's internal financial and management problems loomed in the eyes of the donors and of some of the staff of the IUEF. We felt that it was important to establish that the IUEF had identified all the areas of possible financial mismanagement and irregularity and was in a position to guarantee that such mismanagement and irregularity would not recur so that the donors could be confident that money given to the IUEF will be properly and usefully spent. We felt it was equally, perhaps more, important to clarify how Williamson had infiltrated to the organisation, what his intentions were, what damage had been done to the international anti-apartheid effort as a result of his activities and what were the risks to which individuals inside South Africa were now exposed.

As we saw it, we faced two separate but closely inter-related tasks. We had to elucidate how Williamson penetrated the IUEF, what he did while he was undercover and the circumstances of his exposure. We had also to identify the financial and administrative problems which existed prior to, but only came to the attention of people as a result of, the exposure of Williamson. We saw the tasks as inter-related in part because Williamson probably exacerbated the organisation's severe administrative, financial and management problems and took advantage of them to infiltrate and work under the cover of the IUEF. We saw the tasks as inter-related also because the events surrounding the exposure of Williamson can only be understood if it is recognised that the South Africans must have thought they had something to go on when, as alleged, they endeavoured to blackmail the Director of the IUEF by threatening to expose mismanagement and irregularities in his running of the IUEF.

The Commission believed that only if all the political as well as the financial and administrative problems were clarified would the recipients of assistance from the IUEF (the individual scholarship holders and the liberation movements) and the OAU feel that the IUEF was an organisation in which they could place confidence and trust again. In this connection, we also felt obliged at least to consider two sensitive questions: was there any complicity prior to Williamson's breaking his cover between anyone in the employ of the South African Government and any member of the staff of the IUEF other than Williamson? and is there any possibility that the South Africans still have an agent or informer within or associated with the IUEF? The Commission felt that these essential questions had to be

faced before there was any hope of establishing that the IUEF was an organisation whose personal and political judgements could be trusted and an organisation to which individual refugees or liberation movements could safely commit even a small part of their interests. At the simplest level, we felt required to establish that there was no risk that the South Africans were still using the organisation for their own ends or could do so again in the future. If this could be done, we felt, there was some hope that the IUEF could resume its place as an important organisation within the international anti-apartheid network and as an important link between donor governments and organisations and groups, notably the Southern African liberation movements, which are struggling for political change in Southern Africa.

When we embarked on our investigations we were of an open mind about the future of the IUEF. We did not dismiss the possibility that our findings would completely and irretrievably destroy the credibility and reputation of the organisation. At the same time, recognising the valuable work done by the IUEF in the past and that a rehabilitated organisation could continue to do much to aid individual refugees and to advance the liberation of Southern Africa, we were anxious to help save the organisation, if we could, but not at any cost. We had clearly before us the possibility that we would discover that the suspicions about the IUEF and the mistrust of the organisation and of individuals associated with it were so strong and deeply rooted that it was no longer an appropriate organisation to extend aid to refugees.

II IUEF: The Background

This report is not the place for a detailed history of the IUEF, but we are anxious that the events on which this report focuses, of the late 1970s, should be seen in a context of the organisation's growth and preoccupations through the years.

The organisation was established in Leiden, Holland, in November, 1961, after resolutions had been passed in the International Student Conference (ISC), in 1960 and in preceding years, calling for the promotion of exchanges, scholarships and technical assistance for student organisations, refugee groups and individuals, and the establishment of a specialised agency to achieve these ends. The first director, Mr. Thord Palmlund was appointed in November, 1961. He served until the spring of 1963. His successor was Mr. Øystein Opdahl. He was succeeded in 1965 by Mr. Lars-Gunnar Eriksson who resigned in June, 1980.

The scholarship programme - which was to become the IUEF's major concern - began in the academic year 1962-63. Students from Southern Africa studying in British and African institutions were the first recipients of IUEF scholarships. These were funded by, largely, the Swedish Government. In 1962, when the programme began, the IUEF supported about 20 students. By 1972 the IUEF was supporting more than 1,000 refugee students on scholarships. By the end of the decade the total numbers of IUEF scholarship holders had increased to more than 2,000 African refugees and almost 600 Latin American refugees.

In the case of Africa, a majority of scholarship holders have been refugees from countries under white minority rule and colonial domination, but assistance has also been extended to refugees from independent African countries. Early in its history, the IUEF added to its activities the projects - school building, the improvement of educational facilities, promotion of special training schemes and many others - which were seen as supplementing the provision of assistance to individual refugees by way of scholarships. The organisation has also supported some research into refugee-related problems, and sustained a publications programme concerned mainly with Southern Africa.

In the mid-1970s the IUEF expanded its operations into Latin America, with an initial grant from, again, Sweden. A representative was stationed

in Buenos Aires at the end of 1975 and a regional office was established in San José at the end of 1976. The IUEF began in Latin America, as in Africa, with a scholarship programme to which have subsequently been added projects. Both scholarship programmes and projects have been mounted inside certain countries under repressive regimes. In 1978-79 the IUEF mounted a major programme to help deal with the Nicaraguan refugee crisis.

In its early years the IUEF was governed by an Administrative Council elected by the Supervision Committee of the ISC. The IUEF's parent body, the ISC, was dissolved in March 1969 after revelations that it had received funds from the CIA. In April, 1969, the Administrative Council of the IUEF met and decided that the IUEF should continue its operations. In May, 1969, the IUEF was re-established, at a meeting in Copenhagen, as an Association under Swiss law and the statutes under which the organisation has since been governed were adopted. In the same month, the headquarters of the organisation were moved to Geneva.

As an organisation, the IUEF has three component bodies - an Assembly, an International Board (which has also acted since 1973 through a smaller Bureau) and a Secretariat. The Assembly is the highest governing organ of the IUEF; its membership is open to non-governmental organisations contributing to the work of the IUEF. The Board is made up of individuals elected in their own right. It reviews the activities and programmes of the organisation and has certain defined powers, such as the appointment of the Director who heads the Secretariat. The IUEF's head office is still located in Geneva. The organisation now has regional offices in London, Lusaka and San José and representatives or local committees in several other places, particularly in Africa. The organisation's funds come largely from the Governments of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada, Great Britain in the case of Zimbabwe, and, most recently, Finland. Funds have also been received from voluntary agencies in several countries and from some international bodies.

Donor Governments have channelled funds through the IUEF for good practical reasons, but also with political intent - to participate, even when this could not be done directly for one reason or another, in struggles for liberation from different forms of oppression in different parts of the world. The aim has always been that through the IUEF a contribution - sometimes indirect - could be made to the liberation movements. The IUEF

itself has authority in its statutes to assist refugees and their organisations, which has always been interpreted to mean liberation movements and kindred organisations.

In its 10th anniversary booklet the IUEF noted that while it takes note in its dealings with the liberation movements of the decisions of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) regarding the recognition of movements, it is not bound to consider assistance only to movements which have the OAU's support. Accordingly, through the years, the IUEF has dealt with a very wide range of liberation movements and kindred organisations and we feel bound to note that this has at times contributed to some questioning of the IUEF's actual role in certain liberation struggles.

Nevertheless, the IUEF has made considerable and usually productive efforts to serve as an effective 'meeting place' for liberation movements and youth and other groups in donor countries. Thus, at the 1978 Assembly meeting the IUEF's relationship with certain Southern African liberation movements was put on a more formal footing by extending to them a standing invitation to be present as participating observers at all IUEF Assembly meetings.

For most of its existence, in spite of occasional uncertainties about its role, the IUEF has enjoyed a considerable measure of political trust from both the donors and the recipients of its assistance, and the worst effect of the Williamson Affair has been the erosion to some extent of trust in the IUEF's ability to make politically wise judgements and decisions and in its financial and administrative judgment and competence. The question of political trust and reliability is particularly important for the IUEF. The organisation has deliberately and consciously insisted that its work of assisting refugees, even the granting of individual scholarships, has political implications. It has offered educational assistance to refugees and their organisations with the hope of helping to achieve certain political objective --- in Southern Africa the ending of racist minority and colonial oppression. The IUEF has maintained close links with the liberation movements and channelled assistance to those inside countries under white minority rule who were educationally disadvantaged or who were working to mitigate or eliminate the effects of racist policies. Having these conscious political aims, the IUEF has enjoyed a unique relationship both with the liberation movements themselves and with governmental and

non-governmental donor organisations who could not, for various reasons, at various times, publicly identify themselves directly with the particular political goals towards which the IUEF was working. It has been in the past an organisation whose political judgment and discretion has been relied on by both donors and recipients. The effects of a crisis which has called into serious question the political judgment and reliability of the organisation are thus particularly devastating for the IUEF.

Whether the trust and confidence which the IUEF must enjoy if it is to do its particular job effectively can be restored was one of our major preoccupations as we investigated Williamson's infiltration of the IUEF and prepared this report.

Without anticipating any of our conclusions on this subject, this brief historical resume of the IUEF sets also the other important context within which the IUEF and its recent problems need to be set. This report necessarily focuses on what went wrong in the IUEF. What needs to be remembered is that the IUEF has, since 1962, assisted many thousands of refugees to gain an education using which they have been able to contribute to the liberation and development of their countries. This is something of which the IUEF can be proud, regardless of the answers given to any other questions asked about its activities. At this fundamental level of scholarship assistance to individual refugees, the worth of the IUEF's work has been great and this is, we feel, a perspective which needs to be kept on the developments and events with which this report deals.

III WILLIAMSON IN THE IUEF

1. Williamson's Pre-IUEF Life

We did not have adequate sources, and did not at any rate think it particularly useful, to go too deeply into Williamson's biography for the period prior to his making contact with the IUEF. The few facts that are readily available we include at this point in our report purely by way of background.

He himself reported in a curriculum vitae he wrote out for the IUEF after his arrival in Geneva that he was born on April 23, 1949, in Johannesburg, South Africa, and attended St. John's College, Johannesburg, from which he matriculated probably at the end of 1967. Sometime in the following year he joined the South African Police Force. From the early 1970s, among his student associates of those years, he was open about his membership of the South African Police, in which he served from about mid-1968 to about February 1971, and already offering the explanation that he offered later when in 'exile'. He claims he joined the Police in his late teens in order to avoid the annual call-ups to which he would have been subject had he entered the army as a conscript. He claimed he later left, before completing his full period of service with the police, because this regulation was changed. In the meantime, he also claimed, his experiences in the force had "politicised" him and turned him into an opponent of apartheid.

His service in the police lasted between 2 and 3 years. Subsequently, he enrolled at the University of Witwatersrand which he attended 1972-1974, probably without completing a degree. While at the University of Witwatersrand he became active in student politics, first serving on the Witwatersrand Student Representative Council. Towards the end of 1974 or early in 1975, he moved to the headquarters of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) in Cape Town, taking up the post of Finance Officer. Within NUSAS he worked hard and efficiently and is widely credited with having nursed NUSAS back to financial health. He was largely successful in establishing his credentials and allayed at this time the suspicions at least some of his colleagues entertained because of his police service. His activities by the mid-1970s included running an 'escape route' for refugees into Botswana.

He left NUSAS, apparently after 2 years in office, in June, 1976, and as he claimed, worked for the Southern African News Agency (SANA) until he left the country in January, 1977.

He had married while in South Africa. His wife, Ingrid, worked subsequently in Geneva for the World Health Organisation on a project concerned with the medical effects of apartheid and may possibly have conveyed information in her own right to the South African regime. We have not had the time or resources to resolve the conflicting claims about her part in her husband's activities. His wife was, however, able to return to South Africa freely, and did so during her husband's 'exile'.

Williamson himself acquired a Botswana travel document in Gaborone. Although travel was not always easy on this document, in October 1978, advised that under British law he probably had a right to a British passport, he declined to accept such a passport on the grounds it might involve his being stripped of his South African citizenship.

2. Williamson in the IUEF

The IUEF made its initial contacts with NUSAS in the mid-1960s when the IUEF was still an organ of the International Student Conference (ISC). At that time the IUEF began funding various scholarships, prison education, leadership training and similar projects inside South Africa which had been set up by NUSAS. From the early 1970s all contacts on politically sensitive programmes were between the President of NUSAS and the Director of the IUEF. In the mid-1970s steps were taken to 'detach' certain programmes from NUSAS and put them under trusts or other specific organisations. At first the work of co-ordinating these different organisations, each responsible for different projects, was undertaken by a former President of NUSAS, Karel Tip. It was Tip who, according to Eriksson, identified for Eriksson a person within NUSAS whom Eriksson could trust politically and who had administrative skills. This was Williamson.

In October, 1975, Williamson, then Vice-President of NUSAS, came to Europe with the President of NUSAS and met with Eriksson and others. Eriksson formed a favourable impression of Williamson as a person of political and personal competence. When Eriksson next met Williamson, in Botswana in July, 1976, Williamson's passport had already been withdrawn and he was talking about handing over the co-ordinating function inside

South Africa, which he had taken over from Karel Tip, to another - Karl Edwards - with whom he had been associated in the police but who had also subsequently become an anti-apartheid activist.

After his visit to Europe in 1975 Williamson, according to Arthur McGiven, a former employee of BOSS, now living in London, submitted a voluminous report in which he outlined a strategy of appearing to get in disfavour of South Africa, fleeing the country, getting into the IUEF and from there penetrating the African National Congress (ANC). At the July 1976 meeting in Botswana Williamson raised the question of his shortly leaving South Africa - to avoid, he said, political emasculation. Eriksson promised help if Williamson did leave - a scholarship and possibly a job - but made no definite commitment. It had been the IUEF's practice not to employ refugees and Eriksson foresaw trouble if he employed a white and not a black South African.

Williamson left South Africa on January 5, 1977 in the company of another whose own credibility further enhanced Williamson's. The IUEF expedited his securing documents and he was in Geneva within a week of entering Botswana. In the first weeks in the Geneva office of the IUEF Williamson wrote up reports and documents about the new arrangements inside South Africa. In June 1977, the Bureau decided simultaneously to establish the post of Information Officer and to employ Williamson in that post, but with special responsibilities also for the internal South African programmes, along with Eriksson himself. The Board had already been informed in an Interim Report, dated March 31, 1977, of Williamson's appointment to the post, effective January 1, 1977.

With Williamson's arrival in the office Eriksson appears quickly to have begun to rely heavily on him for information and advice about South Africa. To some extent Williamson supplanted at least one other who had formerly provided Eriksson with such information and advice. His work as Information Officer was good at the level of attending conferences and producing ideas for publications, but the Department's actual output was not great. He was not himself, judging by some memos, entirely happy in the post. He appears to have had no special qualifications for it.

At the Board and Assembly meeting at the end of 1977 the post of Deputy Director was established. It was not Eriksson's original intention to

have Williamson fill this post. After recruitment difficulties, attention turned towards recruiting a Deputy Director from among the existing staff. Hassim Soumare the African Regional Director was considered but it was thought unwise to leave the Lusaka office without a director. Chris Beer, the London Director, was unwilling to leave London. It was only after attempting to recruit externally and exhausting other internal possibilities, and after making reasonably wide but informal checks, most on the level of should a white South African be appointed, that Eriksson offered Williamson the post. At the June, 1978, Bureau meeting the only questions asked about the appointment concerned Williamson's financial and administrative competence. The ANC was not formally consulted either at the time of Williamson's original appointment or at the time of his advancement to the post of Deputy Director. The second step, in particular, surprised them.

Williamson's advancement from Information Officer to Deputy Director was accompanied by a marked change in his personality and popularity within the Secretariat. From being well-liked, outgoing, and easy to get on with, he became authoritarian and abrasive. The question, related to this change, of his contribution to the staff problems in the organisation through late 1978 and 1979 is discussed elsewhere in this report.

3. The Warnings Against Williamson

It became clear to us that Williamson was taken into the IUEF, and advanced to a high position within the organisation, against a background of suspicion about his real identity and purposes and in the face of specific warnings addressed to Eriksson that he could be an agent of the South African Government.

Suspicious were current in student and other political circles inside South Africa about Williamson & Karl Edwards, the agent associated with him, from at least the middle of the 1970s. They were not suspicions that anyone could definitely substantiate. Suspicious were very much stronger within South Africa - almost to the point of being proved - about Edwards from the beginning of 1977. His activities and life-style were such that the police could have been expected to pick him up - but they did not. Some time in 1977/78 white activists were sufficiently uncertain about Edwards to, in effect, force him out of the Environmental Development Agency which he had founded. There was no certainty at the time about

Williamson. His association with Edwards in the police force was known, but the possibility was admitted that they were no longer in association. There were imprecise doubts rather than concrete suspicions about Williamson. But we have traced the history of suspicions and warnings about Williamson as far back as 1973/74.

In 1973 the South African Council of Churches (SACC) office in Johannesburg first entertained suspicions about Edwards and disseminated these suspicions informally to contacts and support groups. Williamson, because of his association with Edwards, was also on the SACC's list of suspects by late 1974 or early 1974. In 1974 suspicions of Williamson became more definite when certain officers of NUSAS were put on trial and the Court secured information which could have come only from Williamson or Arthur McGiven, the agent who was to figure in later developments concerning Williamson. In 1976-early 1977 when the SACC learnt that Williamson was to be hired by the IUEF it sent warnings to the IUEF through a South African expatriate, Duncan Innes; the warnings were repeated through the same channel in 1978 when the SACC learned that Williamson was to be promoted to the position of Deputy Director. On both occasions the SACC received the reply that Eriksson was satisfied that Williamson was clean.

In 1978 an additional reason for sending another warning through Duncan Innes was that two South African students who were used to carry messages and handle money, were taken by the police possibly on the basis of information probably passed on by Williamson. Innes was given a new message by the SACC; when this did not get through, the SACC also tried to warn the IUEF through the ANC.

Eriksson's account of these warnings is that Innes first raised concern in autumn, 1977, when he told Eriksson he had been visited by someone from inside South Africa who wanted him to tell Eriksson there was worry about Williamson's being employed by the IUEF as there was suspicion he was an agent of the South African Government and known to be a former policeman. Eriksson was given no hard evidence beyond the fact, which he already knew, of Williamson's membership of the police force. He was not told who was sending the message. Eriksson proposed submitting the matter to Karel Tip for his judgment. Innes accepted that a clearance from Tip would be satisfactory. Eriksson received a reply in a "social code" which confirmed

to his satisfaction that Tip had no doubts about Williamson's integrity. Eriksson then wrote to Innes asking that the question he considered closed. Eriksson dismissed a subsequent representation from Innes about Williamson as unnecessary rumour-mongering. In 1979 Innes, given reason again to raise the question of Williamson with Eriksson, declined to do so because his earlier representations had been dismissed.

We felt obliged to ask why Eriksson took up the question of Williamson's bona fides only with Karel Tip rather than with other sources. Tip's ability to give an impartial judgment at least might have been questioned since it was he who had first recommended Williamson to Eriksson as a person with whom the IUEF should work. We feel that Eriksson placed undue reliance on the word of the person who originally vouched for Williamson. X

Eriksson stated to us that through the second half of 1978 and the first half of 1979 there were no further security complaints about Williamson and no reasons to suspect him. But veiled warnings may have been directed towards him from other directions. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) began investigating Williamson in 1978. Its concern had been aroused when it learnt that some information discussed only with the IUEF had reached Salisbury. An official of ZANU told us that he had for a long time been hinting to Eriksson that from investigations carried out by ZANU it appeared Williamson was an agent. We also heard another South African exile, Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu, claim he had mentioned his suspicions about Williamson to Eriksson in this period and discussed with Eriksson the possibility that white radicals were being used as a link for infiltration through the South African Communist Party (SACP) into Black nationalist groups. In fairness to Eriksson it could be said that the voicing of suspicion from these two sources may have never been direct or substantial enough to warrant the title of a "warning". X

More importantly, in 1979 the SACC tried again to warn Eriksson about Williamson. The warning was necessarily imprecise and indirect (for the informants could not risk revealing parts of their own networks) but the SACC expected an immediate reaction from the IUEF which was not forthcoming.

The most substantial 'warning', apparently starting from this SACC source, reached Eriksson through the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka in 1979. The warning arose from unofficial conversations between members of the Swedish Mission and members of the ANC following contacts in which Williamson

himself had become involved over the IUEF's Composite Governmental Request (CGR). In the course of these contacts Williamson had visited the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka and a member of the embassy staff had asked ANC members about him. What the ANC said was sufficient to cause this person concern, although it appears to have been no more than Eriksson himself had been told when being warned by others to treat Williamson with caution. When advised, the Swedish Foreign Ministry took the matter seriously and instructed the officer to go back to the ANC. The officer knew that the ANC would, if pressed, refuse to say what it knew, or even deny knowing anything, to avoid revealing sources. He was, however, told by the ANC that it treated Williamson cautiously. The officer 'read' these ANC 'warnings' more seriously than Eriksson. He got the feeling there was real anxiety among ANC and that more was involved than that, as Eriksson later said he had the impression, a low ANC cadre had stumbled on the fact that Williamson had a police background.

Eriksson was advised about this 'warning' coming through the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka by letter by T. Palmlund, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a letter dated 27 June, 1979. In July, Palmlund contacted Eriksson in person about the matter. Later Eriksson attended a meeting in Stockholm, at the Foreign Office at which he was not told who had made the complaint or in what form it had been made. Eriksson agreed to contact the ANC to find out how concerned the ANC was. He tried but failed to contact the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo. In early October the Treasurer-General of the ANC, Thomas Nkobi, met with Eriksson in Geneva and, according to Eriksson, said the warning was an unfortunate misunderstanding. According to Eriksson, Nkobi 'cleared' Williamson in a quite unambiguous way. Nkobi declined to write to Eriksson putting this 'clearance' on paper, but agreed to meet Palmlund who was also in Geneva at that time. At the meeting with Palmlund, again according to Eriksson, Nkobi repeated his strong recommendation in favour of Williamson and urged that the Swedish Government channel more funds through the IUEF because of Williamson's position. Palmlund recalls that in the course of his 'brief word' with the ANC representative at that time he was advised that Eriksson had spoken with the ANC about Williamson and that the ANC had no suspicions against Williamson and was quite pleased with its co-operation with the IUEF.

The Swedish Foreign Office, however, continued to take this warning seriously. An informal letter was written to embassies concerned which warned people likely to be affected. Word of these actions reached Eriksson when Williamson came to him in anger about them. Eriksson then complained to the Swedish Foreign Office and sought to, as he saw it, quell the rumours being spread.

Eriksson's actions suggest to us that he was at this point more eager to quell rumours about Williamson than to see instituted any thorough investigation or inquiry. The reason may be that he was satisfied with what he thought was a 'clearance' from the ANC and vexed that rumours were continuing to circulate about a person he trusted. The important point is that in 1979 Eriksson rejected warnings against Williamson because Williamson appeared to enjoy the full confidence of the ANC and because the ANC, as Eriksson saw it, had given Williamson a definite clearance.

As reported to us, this is not how the ANC saw it. The ANC has admitted that it did not voice its own suspicions about Williamson directly to Eriksson. To some extent that ANC gave to Eriksson an appearance of accepting Williamson. It did so for its own reasons. Williamson had expressed an interest to the ANC in joining the movement from the very beginning of his 'exile'. He told the ANC, however, that he appreciated the movement needed time and to prove he was genuine offered to feed the ANC with all information he had about the struggle inside South Africa, particularly about white opposition and Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) activities about which he had information from his contacts inside South Africa and his present employment with the IUEF.

The ANC 'went along' with Williamson in part because the information which Williamson supplied them with, especially about alleged IUEF support for the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the ANC dissidents, was useful to them. The ANC was also anxious to maintain Williamson's confidence because, by comparing information Williamson gave it, on such topics as BCM activity in the Johannesburg area, with information it secured from its own sources, the ANC could gradually build up a picture of who Williamson was working or in contact with. This was a slow, difficult task. While it was proceeding, the ANC headquarters did not tell even ANC representatives in other countries about its doubts about Williamson because the information he was passing on was so valuable in establishing what information networks existed in South Africa and what Williamson himself was up to.

This is the background to the letter which the ANC wrote to Williamson, and not Eriksson, after the 'warning' which reached Eriksson through the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka and Palmlund in the Swedish Foreign Office, allegedly from the ANC. Eriksson on receiving this warning instructed Williamson to sort out his relationship with the ANC whereupon Williamson himself sought 'clearance' from the ANC. The ANC did not want to tell Williamson there were doubts about his real identity and roles because it would spoil this important operation of establishing exactly how information networks of which Williamson was a part were working. The ANC therefore wrote a letter to Williamson that did not, to its mind, clear him but said simply that the ANC had never said Williamson was a spy and that the question had been raised because of information about Williamson's police background. It appears that the ANC's suspicions about Williamson were persistent and the intent of the letter to Williamson was to allay Williamson's own fears so that he would maintain close contact with them and give them time to assess what he was up to and to monitor the people with whom he was in touch inside South Africa.

Subsequent to the letter having been written to Williamson, carefully worded to say only that the ANC had not said he was a spy, the ANC received a request from Eriksson for the letter to be addressed to himself. The ANC felt under pressure to make a premature open statement on whether it thought Williamson was a spy, and refused to give Eriksson the reply he sought. This refusal itself seems to substantiate ANC claims it was suspicious about Williamson but unwilling, because the suspicions were not proven and because Williamson was feeding the ANC useful information, to make its doubts known. But at the time the refusal clearly seemed to Eriksson to substantiate his belief that the ANC had no serious doubts about Williamson.

Eriksson has also claimed that one particular incident appeared to substantiate his belief that the ANC had more or less cleared Williamson. This was when, late in 1979, Williamson attended a meeting at the UNHCR in the company of Thomas Nkobi at which the airlifting of the refugees in Lesotho to Luanda was to be discussed. According to Eriksson, Nkobi brushed aside the hesitation of a UNHCR officer about Williamson's attendance by saying he was in effect an ANC man. The ANC told the Commission that Williamson had attended the meeting because the question had been discussed with him and Eriksson and the two IUEF officers had promised to

press the UNHCR to help the ANC with this problem. Nkobi insists he introduced Williamson as an officer of the IUEF, and that Williamson later mis-used the incident to attempt to show that the ANC trusted him. Eriksson was further convinced that Williamson enjoyed a close relationship with the ANC hierarchy when Williamson appeared to be successful in securing the presence of Oliver Tambo, then when Tambo fell ill, that of the ANC's Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo, at the opening of the 1979 IUEF Assembly meeting.

Whatever the impression Eriksson received from the ANC in these various ways, the ANC headquarters itself remained suspicious about, and cautious in its dealing with, Williamson. His requests, from 1977 on, to join the ANC, were all rebuffed. The ANC's suspicions of Williamson persisted through 1978 and 1979. In his attempt to penetrate the ANC he began 'punching at different spots' and was, the ANC felt, 'pushing too hard' to establish his credibility. The ANC remained, therefore, hesitant either to confirm or dispel the rumours about Williamson. But at the same time the ANC does not appear to have given anyone else other than Eriksson the impression that they had completely cleared or had no suspicions about Williamson.

Specifically, the ANC gave no grounds for substantiating the belief Williamson was spreading towards the end of 1979 that he was a member of, or enjoyed a special relationship with, the ANC and was to work full-time for the ANC. Eriksson did not at the time check this fundamental fact with the ANC, but appears to have taken it for granted on the basis of Williamson's own claims, and Williamson's appearing to enjoy the ANC's confidence. But the effect of the various factors mentioned was that replies from the ANC to approaches by Eriksson about Williamson were equivocal and open to interpretation by Eriksson as giving a more positive endorsement of Williamson than the ANC intended, or felt. If this was simply a misunderstanding, it had very serious consequences.

Further to this question of possible warnings against Williamson, Dr. Dzingai Mutumbuka, of ZANU stated to us that at the end of 1979 he alerted Eriksson to the possibility that Williamson's bona fides were suspect, although Eriksson has denied the warning was given.

Mr. Mutumbuka came to Geneva for the IUEF's Assembly meeting at the end of 1979. Dr. Mutumbuka privately told Beer that Williamson was suspected

by ZANU of being a South African spy during this meeting. Dr. Mutumbuka also expressed concern to Beer about Williamson's being as apparently close as he was to the ANC and hostile to ZANU. Subsequently, Dr. Mutumbuka met with Eriksson. According to Eriksson, what was discussed at this meeting was not that Williamson might be a South African agent but only allegations made by Dr. Mutumbuka that Williamson and another IUEF staff member were members of the ANC and the SACP. Dr. Mutumbuka claims he warned Eriksson about Williamson on two levels:

- (a) that ZANU were unhappy that the IUEF was getting too involved in ANC work and was employing an ostensible ANC supporter, Williamson, in a high post;
- (b) that Williamson was a BOSS agent.

According to Dr. Mutumbuka, Eriksson tried to defend Williamson and assured Mutumbuka that things were going to change with Williamson's being given a new assignment. Dr. Mutumbuka gave Eriksson an ultimatum - that unless something was done about Williamson, ZANU would find it difficult to work with the IUEF because security was more important to it than money. Dr. Mutumbuka felt that in this discussion, Eriksson was not prepared to look at Williamson objectively.

Related to this question of warnings is that of certain incidents which the Commission feels might, and perhaps should, have prompted Eriksson to ask questions that would have made explicit warnings seem more significant especially by late 1979. Our list of such incidents is necessarily incomplete and sketchy, but is included to put the warnings in some sort of context.

They are the incidents, some minor and others grave, in which the South African security police may have used information fed to them by Williamson while he was still based in Europe. Thus in 1978 a BCM courier who took money from Lesotho into South Africa was detained. Eriksson on this occasion was asked by BCM who might have betrayed him and after discussion the system was changed to using an individual in one of the homelands. This contact too came under police scrutiny to the extent he was told that, extra-ordinarily, he would have to get a visa to enter South Africa and was subjected to searches by a South African immigration officer. A third channel was then developed.

Much more disconcerting is the possibility of a connection between Steve Biko's receiving funds from the IUEF and his detention. The IUEF does not appear to have made any effort after Biko's death to ascertain if there was any connection between his funding by and association with the IUEF and his detention and murder by the South Africans.

Then, significantly, there was the arrest of Renfrew Christie on October 23, 1979. Christie was in South Africa on a research project which was known to Williamson, among others.

Another disturbing incident was the apprehension by the South African police of Winston Nkondo, an ANC member who was travelling on a plane to Lesotho which set down in Bloemfontein. Nkondo had travelled using travel authorisations issued by the IUEF. The possibility that the IUEF had 'set him up' - which was widely bandied about at the time - seems now likely in view of the fact that the Geneva office had issued the travel authorisations.

We concluded that there were warnings coming in from different sources and indications people were anxious about Williamson for a relatively long period, and other indications that Williamson might be a security risk. The warnings may have lacked substance and appear to have been based only on Williamson's having been a policeman. His explanation that his police service had politicised him may have been plausible in the absence of any other hard facts. But Eriksson could reasonably have been expected to know that such warnings would not be detailed or precise in order to avoid betraying sources or exposing those passing on warnings to any risk. Instead Eriksson insisted that he needed facts and was unwilling to act on rumour and suspicion. This seems inappropriate in the circumstances. When a second warning came from a different source Eriksson could have been expected to take decisive action to ascertain the truth of the warnings, or if he was not convinced by them, to ease Williamson out to the edge of the organisation, to a position in which he could have no access to further information likely to be of interest to the South African Government. Even this was not done.

At best, Eriksson's contacts with the ANC about Williamson reveal serious errors of judgment and a strange lack of awareness of the positions a liberation movement must adopt on such matters. Eriksson displayed an excessive trust in Williamson; he appears to have been at least the innocent victim of Williamson's cleverness in exploiting his dependence on

him for contact that allowed the IUEF to appear to have an active, independent role inside South Africa.

The occurrence of incidents which, if properly evaluated, might have made the warnings seem more serious reinforced our feeling that Eriksson displayed bad judgment in failing to pick up signals to which a man of his experience should have been sensitive. The key point to us is that Eriksson received warnings which should have prompted him, because of his knowledge and experience, to investigate Williamson as a security risk more thoroughly than he did.

We feel that Eriksson was also in error in not informing the Board about the warnings. According to the Chairman of the Board, the Board had considered Williamson's appointment in terms of the liberation movements' reactions if a white South African were appointed. Some members of the Board knew Williamson had been a member of the South African police force, but it seemed a credible personal development to them, as to Eriksson, for Williamson to have joined the police as a young man to fulfil national service requirements and become, as a result of his experiences, an ardent opponent of apartheid. They might have revised this judgment had all the information Eriksson gained come to their attention.

4. Williamson's Activities as an Agent

The precise goals of Williamson's mission are not entirely clear, and probably changed through the period he was operating from Geneva, but a scrutiny of the activities to which he devoted time while working for the IUEF can give certain clues. Certainly the time he spent maintaining contacts with representatives of the ANC in particular appears to confirm what McGiven told us, that the plan of using the IUEF as a cover to penetrate the ANC was conceived before Williamson even left South Africa.

But Williamson's first objective, in point of time, may have been to weaken and even get rid of BCM which seemed to pose a more immediate threat when Williamson left South Africa than it did later. Once this threat appeared to have diminished, his attention may have turned more strongly towards penetrating the ANC. If the goal of Williamson and his superiors in the years 1976-77 was to destroy and discredit the BCM, then the IUEF, as a major external supporter of the BCM, was an obvious

organisation to penetrate. Some effort does seem to have been made to cool the IUEF off the BCM through Edwards feeding strongly anti-BCM reports from inside South Africa. This may also have been behind Williamson's working within the IUEF to promote a shift to a pro-ANC stand, for such a step would deprive the BCM of one of its most important sources of support. This is not inconsistent with Williamson's primary goal later being to penetrate the ANC, for once the 'threat' the South Africans perceived in the BCM had faded, the ANC was clearly the source of the major remaining threats to the South African Government.

Eriksson's own statements indicated to the Commission that while Williamson was working hard on the IUEF for it to take a pro-ANC stand, he himself was coming to the feeling that it would be politically wise for the IUEF to 'recognise' the ANC. The PAC arrests were a turning point, as was the moving of the external BCM towards new structures which Eriksson thought could cause trouble. Some tension prevailed between the ANC and the IUEF, which Eriksson must have thought it wise to ease as the ANC began to assume a clear paramouncy in the South African struggle. The fact that the shift coincided with Eriksson's own understanding of what was necessary does not mean Williamson did not have a hand in making the shift for his own purposes.

But Williamson appears also to have continued to play a double game; while portraying himself in some circles as ardently pro-ANC he continued, in others, again with the apparent aim of establishing a relationship of confidence and trust, to talk badly of the ANC. To BCM representatives he claimed to be trying to win young whites in exile round to a position of support for the BCM. The more people from the more different groups he could secure information from, so long as his duplicity and inconsistency remained undetected, the more successful his mission. We concur, however, with the ANC's assessment that by the end of 1979, if not much earlier, Williamson's main aim was to use his completely successful infiltration of the IUEF to infiltrate the ANC.

Williamson's first effort to get a formal association with the ANC appears to have been a proposal that he join the ANC to raise funds, making use of the international contacts he had made through his IUEF post. This was declined by the ANC, without their giving Williamson the real reasons, but on the grounds he should continue his good work where he was. In November, 1979, Williamson proposed to the ANC that he work out of the Lusaka

office of the IUEF so that he could become more involved in the internal work of the ANC. The ANC replied that from its point of view, it would be better if he remained in Geneva and sent occasional reports as he had been doing. Rebuffed, Williamson appears to have switched his strategy to seeking an active role in the ANC office in Geneva which the IUEF had been instrumental in helping the ANC to establish. The arrangement suited the IUEF because it was having to continue to pay rent on premises which it had vacated and not sublet. At the time of Board and Assembly meetings in later November/early December, 1979, Williamson approached the intended ANC representative in Geneva with an offer to assist her in any ways he could. He endeavoured to monopolise IUEF relationships with the liberation movements to the point of attempting to stand between Assembly member organisations and those movements.

His attention was not confined, even through the second half of 1979, to the ANC alone.

Individually, in his position as Deputy Director, he was able to meet with large numbers of people representing a wide variety of exile black South African groups. He was also well-placed in Geneva to meet some leaders of the struggle inside South Africa when they visited Europe. His reports of meetings and conversations with these people in the IUEF files, read, now, as exactly what they are - intelligence reports. In relation to other South African organisations with external wings with which he established contact, Williamson's aim may have been not only to penetrate the organisations as far as he could but also to encourage the organisations to form links with the ANC - which could easily result in all opposition to the regime being depicted in South African propaganda as 'communistic'. This would also concentrate opposition in a disciplined, centralised organisation which the South Africans may have felt they could cope with more easily than a more diffuse opposition made up of many groups with varying activities.

This is a wide question, but we feel Williamson's activities in this area should be carefully analysed to see what they can reveal of South African intentions and methods in trying to cope with opposition to apartheid maintained by exiled groups and leaders.

We think it most unlikely that Williamson's main aim was to smash the IUEF. Crucial as the IUEF's work may have been in certain areas in sustaining

certain sorts of opposition to the South African regime, and eager as the South African regime may have been to see its assistance curtailed, the organisation was far more useful to Williamson as a cover than it was dangerous to South Africa. It is possible, even probable, that when he realised his return was inevitable, or even imminent, leaving the IUEF in ruins behind him became a goal in itself and this may have been a major guide to his actions in January 1980, but probably not much before then. It is possible that when Williamson was first planning his 'mission', the IUEF was, itself, a primary target to be infiltrated and then perhaps destroyed for its own sake, because it had played a major external role in promoting the BCM and was therefore itself a source of information about which BCM leaders and groups were receiving money. Once he was established in the IUEF, however, and as circumstances in South Africa changed and the immediate threat from the BCM to the South African regime receded, Williamson's aim shifted more clearly to using the IUEF to gain information about and even infiltrate other groups, notably the ANC.

Williamson's attention was also directed towards other groups than those of mainly black South Africans in exile. While his main interest was probably in controlling and silencing South African opposition to the regime - realistically, since that is where the real threat lies - the IUEF also provided an ideal cover for him to gather information about the activities of other organisations, especially on the international level, but also Western European anti-apartheid groups.

Williamson regularly represented the IUEF at important international anti-apartheid meetings, conferences and seminars. He played a prominent and active role in the Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonisation of the Special Non-Governmental Organisations Committee on Human Rights, Geneva. He was also an important link between the IUEF and the United Nations Special Committee and Centre against Apartheid and was seconded to the UN for the Lagos Anti-Apartheid Conference early in his career at the IUEF. His major aim appears to have been to keep tabs on international anti-apartheid activities, of which the UN Centre is a major 'clearing house', but possibly also to frustrate these activities by playing, when he could without harming his cover, a covertly destructive role at international conferences. Little of the information he could have gained from contacts at this level is confidential, but it might otherwise have been more difficult access for the South African regime

and was certainly useful to it. His attendance at some meetings, such as the seminar on material aid to the liberation movements of Southern Africa held in Holland in June, 1979, by the International Committee Against Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa, was of use to the South Africans in providing information they probably could not have gained from other sources.

In the case of the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), Williamson appears to have manoeuvred the IUEF into a competitive position with IDAF in the area of legal aid, although it was not an area in which the IUEF properly had a role to play. Putting the IUEF 'in' on the legal aid 'act' enabled Williamson to monitor what IDAF was doing, notably through joint meetings between IUEF and IDAF in a co-ordinating committee, which met most recently with Williamson present, late in 1979. IDAF was, unfortunately, not willing to co-operate with us in our inquiries, but we understand that not much was given away to Williamson that was confidential about IDAF's activities. }

Another of Williamson's targets in London was almost certainly the Committee of South African War Resisters (COSAWR) a London-based group which works to support those who refuse to serve in the South African Defence Forces. From COSAWR, and from the Southern African News Agency (SANA), in Botswana, Williamson, for example, sought details about war resisters who had left or were planning to leave South Africa, about what reception arrangements were made for resisters who fled to Botswana and who they were to contact.

The SANA story is a complicated one and we have not had time to unravel it completely. It operated both inside and outside South Africa and was, at least ostensibly, a network which was supposed to gather information inside South Africa and feed it out, through an office in Gaborone, Botswana, to be used overseas in the anti-apartheid struggle. The SANA office in Gaborone was staffed successively by different white, usually former NUSAS, South African exiles. It never functioned effectively as a news agency, largely, some people associated with it came to believe, because Edwards, who was 'running' the internal network, and Williamson who, recently, was funding it through the IUEF and supposed to be supervising the printing and distribution of SANA material in London, never had a great interest in its success. This was understandable, given that others working with SANA were

attempting to use it to disseminate information critical of the South African regime. SANA was useful to Williamson and Edwards because it helped to maintain their credibility as anti-apartheid activists and because it helped them keep in touch with other anti-apartheid activists who were feeding information into SANA, inside South Africa. Through the second half of 1979, Edwards had been seeking, before he apparently became aware that the two present SANA representatives in Gaborone were suspicious of him, information about organisations inside the country. He claimed to need this information so that the IUEF would know who to fund. He also sought information about those leaving South Africa, ostensibly so that he could help intending exiles, and about white exiles and exile organisations in Botswana.

Within the IUEF, Williamson showed little interest in the scholarship programmes. His visits to London, for example, were very frequent, but were never related to the scholarship administration and counselling work which are the main tasks of the London office. That is not to say, however, that he was not interested at all in individual students. One of his 'subsidiary' aims may have included recruiting refugees as spies particularly in ANC schools and camps, and the organisation should be alert to any suspicious activity by the students whom Williamson specifically recommended or in whose progress he took a marked interest. It is important to keep in mind that an interest by Williamson does not automatically brand any student, as Williamson had also at this time to maintain a pretence of being genuinely interested in advancing the liberation struggle and many of his activities in the IUEF had merely this and not any more sinister aim.

We feel it is worth noting that Williamson's work as a spy was facilitated, on the operational level, by the concentration of responsibility for the 'inside' programmes in the Geneva office of the IUEF. The Lusaka office where, from the general circumstances in the country, Williamson would have found it more difficult to play his role as a spy, was concerned with the granting of scholarships, placement and counselling. Contacts between IUEF and the liberation movements at the higher political levels and on 'inside' projects were all handled through the Geneva office by Eriksson, Williamson and from 1978, Piers Campbell, the IUEF's Projects Officer appointed in 1977. Reasons given for this

were related to security, including that it was preferable for sensitive mail entering South Africa to have a Geneva date stamp. Many of the reasons for having Geneva handle these matters were sound, but an unfortunate effect was that everything that was of interest to Williamson about IUEF activities he could monitor from Geneva.

It also justified his working entirely independently of both the Lusaka and London offices - London being important because of the wide range of anti-apartheid organisation based there. Williamson customarily did not inform the London or Lusaka offices of the IUEF when he was to visit those cities. He never required, as other visiting staff usually did, that programmes be drawn up for him so that the local IUEF staff were not aware of what he did or who he saw. He was thus able to maintain, independently, a wide range of contacts in London and in Southern Africa which were useful to his work as a spy.

This regrettably incomplete survey of Williamson's possible aims and methods of operation as an agent is not included in this report as a matter of interest alone. It forms a background to the assessment of the damage of Williamson's activities and so to possible steps that can be taken to minimise it. It may also be useful, although the South Africans may not try the same or even a similar ploy later, in helping to detect patterns of behaviour that might alert people to possible security risks in organisations like the IUEF. Further, more exhaustive, study of William's activities, as they are revealed in IUEF documents, could well be justified from this point of view.

IV. THE WILLIAMSON AFFAIR

1. Development of Late 1979

There were two important developments within the IUEF towards the end of 1979:

There was a serious staff and management crisis;

Williamson sought and was given a new position in the IUEF. It was also noticeable to many that at this time Eriksson was obviously under great strain, but it is not clear whether this strain was the result of pressure associated with the accumulation of problems in the management of the IUEF or pressure associated with Williamson's status in the organisation.

It seems clear that developments and pressures within the IUEF - some of which were probably applied deliberately by Williamson - were contributing to Eriksson's poor psychological state at the end of 1979. Eriksson himself confirmed to us that he was in such a state towards the end of 1979. At the direct personal level, Williamson could have been responsible for the anonymous phone calls to Eriksson's flat which contributed to the strain he was under, and which Eriksson himself believed, because of their timing, were connected in some way with someone in the office.

Williamson also had a deleterious effect on Eriksson's state in other ways more closely connected with the IUEF. Williamson apparently encouraged Eriksson's reluctance to consider or adopt the sweeping corrective measures needed on both the administrative and the financial levels, as the organisation's problems mounted. Throughout 1978, and particularly at the time of the crisis in late 1978 - early 1979, Williamson urged on Eriksson a centralised, authoritarian structure and way of running the organisation rather than a more open, collective, democratic approach, with staff committees or unions. Eriksson took from Williamson what he now admits was bad advice, although it appears that the advice coincided with Eriksson's style of running the organisation, and Williamson's activities alone do not explain the failure of

of successive attempts to improve staff relations and management practices.

Williamson's role in the serious personnel crisis at the beginning of November 1979 also appears considerable. The crisis was precipitated by the discovery of an offensive memo written by Eriksson to Williamson about his administrative assistant. It seems clear that Williamson left this memo lying about deliberately, perhaps as part of an effort to keep Eriksson preoccupied and 'off balance'.

Immediately prior to this crisis, Eriksson had finalised with Williamson a new position for Williamson within the IUEF. Williamson was to resign as Deputy Director and become a half-time consultant to the IUEF on Southern African affairs. It was Williamson's own wish to be relieved of the administrative detail of running the IUEF. He was expressing dissatisfaction with his position, and talking about a new role for himself within the organisation with Campbell, then Projects Officer, through August and September. A change in his position was raised when Eriksson and Williamson discussed the organisation of the Secretariat and the function of the Deputy Director in October, 1979. Williamson claimed, according to Eriksson, that he wanted more time for Southern African matters - the liberation of South Africa being his main concern! Williamson proposed himself that in future he work half-time as a consultant to the IUEF on Southern African affairs, which would give him an opportunity to work more closely with the ANC. These arrangements were finalised at a meeting in London on November 1, when Williamson and Eriksson were in that city together for a joint IUEF/IDAF meeting with a Danish donor on South African legal assistance. Williamson was to cease to be Deputy Director on January 1 and become then a half-time consultant - preparing information material, keeping up his internal network contacts, preparing policy papers and representing the IUEF at some meetings.

Campbell had met Eriksson in London briefly on October 29; Eriksson was tense, which Campbell attributed to the staff

troubles. Campbell could not recall what was discussed. On Campbell's return to Geneva, Williamson spoke to Campbell about moving out of the organisation. Williamson left for London on October 31 and returned about November 4. After the meeting between Eriksson and Williamson in London, Eriksson returned to Geneva on November 2 and at once began discussions with Campbell about setting up new structures intended to solve the organisation's problems.

The Finance and Administration and Personnel Committees, both chaired by Campbell, were established in mid-November after Campbell had been on a trip to Scandinavia and England.

In spite of these disagreements about how to cope with the IUEF's internal difficulties, at the executive staff meeting on Monday, November 27, Williamson, out of the blue, moved that the executives pass a motion expressing their confidence in Eriksson. Subsequently at the Assembly meeting - rumours being in circulation that the change in Williamson's status was a gentle way of firing him - Eriksson declared that Williamson enjoyed his full confidence. According to Eriksson he delivered this statement clarifying Williamson's position at the direct request of Campbell and Williamson.

The furore at the end of October, which was provoked by the discovery of the offensive memo, may have alone been enough to jolt Eriksson into realising that he must make at least significant gestures towards 'opening up' the running of the IUEF and 'siding' with Campbell who appeared to enjoy greater trust among the staff than Williamson. But since these gestures involved going against the advice about how to run the organisation which Williamson had been giving him consistently, at least since he became Deputy Director, they were probably also related to his discussion with Williamson in London on November 1.

Intensifying the pressures on Eriksson through October and November were peculiarly tense relationships among Williamson.

Campbell and Eriksson in the latter half of 1979. At atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust prevailed among the three at times. Eriksson and Campbell both entertained suspicions that the other was working with Williamson against them. It seemed that there was a 3-cornered power struggle going on at this time. In fact at this time Williamson was persuading Campbell to stay on in the IUEF, saying that he trusted Campbell and felt he could rely on Campbell's loyalty to the ANC to ensure IUEF payments to South Africa went to the right people and on Campbell providing him, Williamson, with information about the IUEF, after he had given up the post of Deputy Director. At the same time Williamson was making disparaging remarks about Campbell to Eriksson and fostering suspicions against Campbell in Eriksson's mind, trying to make Eriksson believe that Campbell was part of a plot to oust him as Director.

Eriksson now believes that Williamson was deliberately fostering mistrust between himself and Campbell in order to prevent their working together towards constructive Board and Assembly meetings at which the organisation's real problems would have been identified and steps instituted to solve them.

Whether this was Williamson's only aim, or whether he was also aiming to 'destabilise' Eriksson in anticipation already of some incident like that in Zurich has been impossible for the Commission to determine. The events of January, however, become even more difficult to explain if it is assumed that Williamson was planning from as long ago as November to lure a psychologically 'destabilised' Eriksson into a position like the one he has described finding himself in at Zurich. At the same time Williamson's manner at this executive staff meeting on November 26 and subsequently at the Board and Assembly meetings was calm, collected and assured. This could be regarded as reinforcing, at least in retrospect, the impression that Williamson was in command of the situation and 'softening' Eriksson up.

On top of the tensions within the headquarters, when the regional executives assembled at the end of November, 1979, in preparation for the Board and Assembly meetings severe splits developed

among the executives over the question of 'decentralisation' which further added to the strain on Eriksson. Williamson undoubtedly at the time of the executive staff meeting on Monday November 27, exacerbated tensions both by moving the vote of confidence in Eriksson and by trying to pretend the financial situation was not serious and encouraging Eriksson's style of running the organisation which was contributing to staff and administrative problems. By the time of that meeting, something very clearly had to be done, in terms of staff management and the financial situation, but Williamson was still urging Eriksson, specifically to maintain the status quo and deflect staff and other criticism and resentment by establishing a consultative or statute review committee with a wide mandate which would have to sit for a couple of years. Eriksson resisted this advice, but when advised that other members of the staff and apparently of the Assembly found the new arrangements for Williamson's employment strange (some had the impression Eriksson was trying to fire Williamson or at least move him out of the organisation) he made an effort to dispel any impression Williamson no longer enjoyed his confidence.

This confusing picture of Eriksson's attitude towards and relationship with Williamson through November and December suggested to several witnesses that something more had been discussed in London on November 1 than simply Williamson's new role in the organisation. Eriksson's denial of this to us, and we are told to others, was definite.

2. The Zurich Meeting

In constructing a narrative of the Zurich meeting and of the developments immediately after it, we have had, necessarily, to rely on the uncorroborated evidence of the only participant accessible to the Commission - Eriksson. Campbell was able to provide some confirmation of certain events peripheral to the main meeting. The only real corroboration which has been possible is comparisons among the different accounts given by Eriksson at different times - including the account given to the

to the Guardian journalists on Sunday, January 20. But this is very far from the substantiation from an independent source of a story that is in places perplexing which we would have liked to secure. We nevertheless felt it was important to include in our record a narrative account of the Zurich meeting and of events leading up to and following that meeting, for several of the key questions which the Commission feels it must pose about the whole affair, to which it cannot, unfortunately, give wholly convincing or satisfactory answers, can only be understood against a background of what the two major participants in the events, from the IUEF's side, claim occurred. The Commission's task was complicated by the fact that neither Eriksson nor Campbell wrote down accounts of events as soon as possible after they had occurred. Eriksson allowed us to read the written statement he prepared for the Board and Assembly meeting in February.

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The 'Williamson Affair' itself can be seen as beginning with the New Year. On January 2, Campbell, as arranged, met Williamson at Heathrow for the flight back to Geneva. Williamson was evasive to Campbell about his wife's absence. This was after the first of the McGiven articles about BOSS in the 'Observer' but before the second one, in which the IUEF was named. Williamson subsequently spent two days - Thursday, January 3 and Friday January 4 - working in the office. Campbell also saw Williamson in the office on Saturday, January 5, when Williamson had a suitcase with him and claimed he was returning certain documents.

On the 3rd and 4th Williamson and Eriksson met to discuss Williamsons's new role. They agreed Williamson should leave for an extended trip to Africa on January 16. On January 14 Williamson was to accompany Eriksson to the Cuban Embassy and on January 15 to meet for the full day with Eriksson to discuss his forthcoming trip. As late as Friday, January 4, Williamson may not have been anticipating any further change in his position in the IUEF. He wrote memos on that day indicating that he expected to continue to be playing a role in the IUEF in the months to come. The possibility cannot be ruled out, however, that these memos and his

discussions with Eriksson, were a blind and that he was already planning his withdrawal.

On Sunday, January 6, 1980, however, an article appeared in the 'Observer' which seems to have played a key part in precipitating the events that followed. This was the second of the articles by the BOSS defector, Arthur McGiven, in which the IUEF was named, but not identified as an organisation which had been infiltrated, specifically, by a South African security or intelligence service. Williamson's own reaction to this article appears to have been one of concern. He contacted colleagues in London asking them to find out what McGiven knew or had told the 'Observer'.

On Monday, January 7, Campbell found in the office a note from Williamson saying that his wife, Ingrid, was sick and that he had gone to London. That evening, Williamson called Campbell to say that his wife had had a nervous breakdown and had returned to South Africa and that he was shaken and being pursued by BOSS agents in connection with a recent escape from Pretoria Central, which he claimed to have assisted. Campbell contacted Eriksson, who was on holiday in Sweden, on January 7, primarily about the second McGiven article in the Observer which Campbell claimed, to Eriksson and others, was very damaging to the IUEF.

Eriksson was not obviously concerned about the article, but arranged for a response to appear in the 'Observer'. Campbell also reported to Eriksson finding the note from Williamson and the phone call, in which, Campbell told Eriksson, Williamson had sounded confused and had talked on about Ingrid and the Observer article.

Neither Eriksson or Campbell heard from Williamson in the ensuing week. On Saturday, January 12, Eriksson returned to Geneva and met with Campbell. Both were worried by Williamson's silence. Eriksson called Beer and Hugh Lewin, a South African living in London, but neither had knowledge of Williamson's whereabouts.

On Monday, January 14, Williamson called Campbell and said he was too frightened to come to Geneva and sought a meeting with Campbell and Eriksson outside Switzerland. On Tuesday, January 15, Williamson rang Eriksson at about 11 a.m. and stated he did not want to come to Geneva then or ever again. He sounded confused, refused to talk further on the phone and proposed a meeting in Frankfurt, which Eriksson refused. When Eriksson proposed Zurich as a meeting place, Williamson agreed unhappily. He asked that Campbell be present at the meeting.

On that Tuesday, Eriksson and Campbell discovered that Williamson's desk had been cleared out, but it is not certain when that occurred. It could have been on Saturday, January 5, when Campbell saw Williamson in the office with a suitcase. The papers missing gave Campbell the impression Williamson could be working in London on the CGR; but both Campbell and Eriksson were worried that something was seriously wrong. On this Tuesday, January 15, Campbell discussed with Eriksson the possibility that Williamson was being blackmailed by the South Africans. Campbell entertained a possibility Williamson was an agent, but he claims he did not put this into words. Eriksson has said he had then an 'inkling' what was up because there were no documents in Williamson's desk and claims that at that time made joking reference in conversation with Campbell to the possibility that Williamson was a spy.

On Thursday, January 17, Williamson rang Eriksson to confirm the meeting. He was no longer confused and assured Eriksson he was now 'clear'. Eriksson assumed Williamson had been having difficulties with BOSS. Williamson asked on this occasion that Campbell should not attend the meeting to which Eriksson agreed reluctantly, fearing Campbell would be upset. He did not inform Campbell of this until they were in the air on their way to Zurich the following morning.

Campbell and Eriksson flew to Zurich on the morning of Friday, January 18, Campbell booked into the Hotel International. The arrangement was that if he had no word from Eriksson by 2 p.m. he was to contact the Swiss police.

Eriksson met Williamson in the Hotel Central and the two then went to the Hotel Zurich. At about 1 p.m., after random conversation, Eriksson forced the issue of serious discussion. Williamson then confessed to being a member of the South African Security Police. He went on to distinguish his service from BOSS and to suggest to Eriksson that the Security Police and the Government were trying to do the same as Eriksson himself and that their common enemies were the communists. He told Eriksson he wanted a deal, to enable him to continue his police work and that a deal was necessary because of problems with McGiven and BOSS. He asked ~~Williamson~~^{Eriksson} to discuss the deal with his superior. The head of Williamson's service, Brigadier Coetzee, then entered the bar and before discussion resumed, allowed Eriksson to telephone Campbell, in Williamson's presence. In the course of the subsequent discussion Coetzee allegedly made certain threats, against Eriksson and his family, against the organisation. He proposed to Eriksson a 'deal' which involved Williamson being kept in the IUEF for up to six months in order to complete his mission of penetrating the ANC and the SACP after which Williamson would return to South Africa with as few complications as possible for Eriksson and the IUEF. Eriksson claimed he needed time to consider his response and required that Williamson return certain documents and appear in the IUEF office on Monday morning. Williamson was to contact Eriksson on Sunday in Geneva.

Campbell meanwhile was waiting in the Hotel International. Eriksson had rung after about 1½ hours to say Williamson needed more time. He arrived with Williamson about 1 hour later. Campbell was then certain that Williamson was either a spy or being blackmailed and certain that Eriksson was being blackmailed by Williamson. He had no sense that Eriksson was trying to 'signal' him. At Campbell's insistence he stayed with Williamson when Eriksson left to catch his plane. Campbell spent about two hours, discussing Williamson's future. Campbell was fishing for information about what was going on.

On his return to Geneva Eriksson informed his wife what had happened and they agreed to wait for Campbell's return. On Campbell's return, Campbell and Eriksson met, first at about midnight on Friday in the Erikssons' flat and then on Saturday morning, January 19, in a cafe. On the Friday evening and on Saturday Eriksson and Campbell had discussed three options: playing for time, doing the deal sought and blowing the story. They chose to blow the story which seemed to require, given how Erikson had interpreted certain things said in Zurich, that Eriksson's family be taken to a safe place of hiding. Campbell did this early on Saturday evening while Eriksson was telephoning from a friend's flat in Geneva. According to what Campbell told the executive staff on the morning on Monday, January 21, Eriksson contacted friends in the Swedish Social Democratic Party, who contacted the Swedish Foreign Office. } The Swedish Foreign Office rang the Swedish Mission in Berne which contacted the Swiss Security Policy seeking protection for Eriksson and his family. Campbell and Eriksson decided not to go directly to the Swiss police, to attempt to involve them in the espionage as opposed to the protection aspects of the affair. When he returned from taking Alison Eriksson and her son into hiding in France on Saturday, Campbell found Eriksson having an argument over the telephone with the Swiss police. Due to a misunderstanding, the Swiss police, after the Swedish representations, had gone to the Eriksson's own flat when Eriksson was in fact elsewhere. When he subsequently demanded protection as far as the border the police refused and an argument ensued. Eriksson claims he was at this time hoping Williamson might return and be arrested and one of the objects of his calling Sweden was to get pressure put on the Swiss to achieve this end. This appears to have been to no avail, partly because of Eriksson's argument with the Head of the Geneva Security Police.

Eriksson also decided that the Geneva papers would be unlikely to carry the story. A decision had been taken earlier to disclose the story through an English newspaper. The Observer or The Guardian were preferred because Eriksson had personal contacts on both papers.

Eriksson contacted Lewin, a personal friend who worked on the Guardian, by telephone on Saturday, January 19, about 5 p.m. to seek his advice on placing the story in a British newspaper. He told Lewin about the events in Zurich and that with his Swedish advisers he had decided to 'blow' the story. Lewin investigated the possibility of placing the story in the Observer the following day, but at that late hour the 4th edition was the best they could hope for. Lewin then suggested the Guardian on Monday morning and agreed himself, reluctantly, to attend an interview in Paris with the Guardian's correspondent, Walter Schwarz.

Campbell and Eriksson travelled by car from Geneva to Paris through the night of Saturday/Sunday, January 19/20, leaving immediately after the Swiss police had refused them protection to the border. The interview took place at Charles de Gaulle airport and lasted about three hours. Lewin and Schwarz then spent about two hours at the Guardian office writing the story up. It was phoned through at about 7 p.m. The Guardian then sought corroboration, indirectly, from South African contacts which was not forthcoming, although contacts in Sweden backed Eriksson as a person. The Guardian feared an adverse South African reaction if the story were a fabrication. The result of these hesitations (inside the Guardian office and not in the minds of Lewin or Schwarz) was that the story appeared only in the fourth edition (and not in the edition which reached Geneva) and did not name Williamson. Both these factors complicated the handling of the affair in the next few days in Geneva. The full story did not appear in the Guardian until Wednesday, January 23, although Williamson was named in the Daily Telegraph on Tuesday, January 22.

Over the weekend Eriksson also took steps to advise the IUEF employees in London. David Stephen, who was the executive officer of the IUEF-related Education and Refugee Service (ERS) and a former IUEF Regional Director for Latin America, was first advised of events in Zurich on Sunday, January 20, by Campbell, who said Stephen should come to Geneva, in order to proceed to Vienna on Monday with Eriksson in accord with an earlier plan.

Later on Sunday Eriksson phoned Stephen, asked what his involvement was, and after Stephen had reacted sharply to Eriksson's apparent insinuation, told Stephen he was not safe and should leave London and await instruction. He forbade Stephen to phone the Costa Rica office of the IUEF (Stephen being the Latin American programme consultant) to inform the staff there about developments, because he and Campbell had decided Campbell should inform all regional office staff. Eriksson also, on Sunday, January 20, telephoned Beer in London. He told Beer (who had been advised of the Zurich meeting by Hugh Lewin on Saturday, January 19) to leave London without telling anyone where he was going because the South Africans would be out for revenge, now he had given the story to the Guardian, and certain people had been named. He instructed Beer to contact Campbell at the end of the week. Beer consulted with Stephen and decided to ignore Eriksson's order. In a second phone call, Eriksson repeated his instruction and told Beer that he had been named. In this second, and a third, call to Beer, Eriksson told Beer he thought Stephen was not to be trusted. Beer informed Eriksson he trusted Stephen and would not leave London. The following day Beer secured an assurance from the British Special Branch that there was no threat to anyone in the IUEF's London office. Eriksson subsequently called Beer on Wednesday to tell him there was no further cause for concern. His telephone calls on the Sunday had, however, created a certain amount of confusion and mistrust in the London staff.

In attempting to assess these events we took two approaches. First, we considered whether Eriksson and Campbell could fairly be charged on the basis of their own accounts with having made serious errors of judgement or culpable mistakes in their handling of events. Secondly, we asked whether there was any justification for the doubts which some people have persistently raised against Eriksson's whole account of events in Zurich.

We came to the conclusion that Eriksson and Campbell made errors of judgement on Saturday and Sunday, January 19 and 20, the cumulative

effects of which were to allow Williamson to leave Switzerland without being arrested and to render more difficult the handling of the affair by the rest of the IUEF staff and others associated with the organisation.

We found it surprising that Eriksson and Campbell went to Zurich apparently without making any plans about how to cope with possible eventualities - one of which was that Williamson might be a South African agent. Both by their own admission had at least entertained, if not voiced, the idea on Tuesday, January 15, when they discovered that Williamson's desk had been cleared out, that Williamson might be a spy. Both Eriksson and Campbell have said that they did not consider the most likely explanation for Williamson's erratic behaviour in the first two weeks of January that he was a South African agent. But the Commission heard evidence which suggested that both had at least considered that possible before the end of the year and the Commission feels that a careful consideration of the events of the first two weeks of January should have suggested to both Campbell and Eriksson that this was by then a very much stronger possibility than they have said it was, especially in the light of the warnings which had been received. In Campbell's case, he had been uneasy about Williamson at least since he had learned Williamson had, at the beginning of December, asked a high officer of ZANU if Campbell was a member of the party. Williamson's 'disappearance' had not therefore, Campbell told the Commission, come as a complete shock to him.

We found it strange that Eriksson did not, against this background of at least some suspicion, find Williamson's peculiar behaviour in the first two weeks of January more suspicious given the long history of warnings about Williamson, the disquieting events of late 1979, and the revelation early in January that a former BOSS agent, like Williamson, an ex-NUSAS man, had hinted, although obscurely, at infiltration of the IUEF. This failure to prepare for the contingency that Williamson was a spy might not have been serious had Eriksson and Campbell not compounded it by failing

to take steps, following the Zurich meeting, to involve the Swiss police not only in providing protection for Eriksson and his family but also in having Williamson apprehended. It should be remembered that the arrangement was for Williamson to be back in Geneva by Sunday, as he was. Eriksson and Campbell knew, by Saturday evening, that the story would not appear in the papers until Monday morning, and that Williamson would probably not, therefore, know the story had been given to the press before he returned to Geneva in accord with the arrangement made in Zurich.

Eriksson gave as his explanation for deciding, in association with his wife and Campbell, not to contact the police in Zurich or Geneva, his conviction that the better strategy was first to give the events wide exposure rather than make an initial approach to the Swiss Police. He thought that such an approach was not worthwhile particularly because he had no knowledge of Williamson's whereabouts. His relations with the Swiss Police were, at any rate, soured early in the week-end by the quarrel he had with them after contact had been made with them from Sweden about protection for him and his family. Eriksson had not, it should be noted, hesitated to contact the Swiss Security Police on earlier occasions.

Campbell's reasons for this same omission were an ingrained distrust of the police and a belief that the police would not act on the facts available. The removal of documents (which Eriksson and Campbell had discovered on Tuesday, January 15) would seem to have provided at least some grounds for a charge. Finally, the police were, of course, contacted and believed the story to the extent of providing protection for Eriksson on Saturday night. It seems possible that the arrest of Williamson when he returned to Geneva to give back the documents (as Eriksson's agreement with the South Africans required) might have been effected had the situation been handled differently.

In the case of Campbell this reluctance to call in the Swiss police extended into Monday, January 21, when it was only after being requested by other members of the executive staff that he contacted

a lawyer and through the lawyer the police prior to going to a final meeting with Williamson in a cafe.

The handling of events in general by Eriksson and Campbell on Saturday and Sunday led to confusion among other staff members. Specific instructions to some staff members particularly in London, would, had the instructions been followed, have further weakened the organisation's efforts to deal with the affair. The actions of Eriksson or Campbell also fostered an uncertainty and even panic which was not conducive to the considered action which might have led to the outcome of events following the Zurich meeting being more satisfactory, both as regards the apprehension of Williamson and as concerns the organisation's subsequent recovery.

When we compared the various accounts available to us of the Zurich meeting, we detected a certain number of discrepancies on such points as who was named in what context, and the nature and severity of the different threats. In general, however, we found these discrepancies minor and felt they could be accounted for by a natural tendency to recall events slightly differently on different occasions under different circumstances or by innocently unreliable recall or note-taking of those listening to the accounts. They appeared much less disturbing to us than certain major questions which Eriksson's account of the meeting raised. The most important of these were:

- Why did an experienced and seasoned policeman, Coetzee, go to the risk of entering Switzerland to make an effort to clinch an impractical deal about only one of his very many agents?
- Can any reasonable sense be made of the deal Eriksson states the South Africans sought, which appears, superficially at least, to be incomprehensible?

Consideration of the supposed 'deal' throws some light on the former question. It is not difficult to imagine what Williamson wanted to achieve if he thought there was a real prospect that his cover could be maintained. His mission was clearly going to bear little fruit unless he penetrated the ANC. In spite of increasing ANC doubts about him as he pushed harder for acceptance, he may have felt that he was sufficiently close to the movement to make the final penetration, misled, as Eriksson

was, about the ANC's real attitude towards him.

Williamson was already well-placed, as far as the IUEF was concerned, following the change in his status at the end of 1979, to continue his work. He was being kept on already, although there are some indications Williamson may have been anxious that his continuing with the IUEF in any capacity was uncertain.

But the major difficulty is that the threat to Williamson's work as a spy was not that his position in the IUEF was in jeopardy but presumably that his cover would be blown from some other source. If his cover was to be blown by anyone other than Eriksson himself (eg McGiven) nothing Eriksson could do could protect him. The second Observer article can be read to suggest McGiven did know Williamson's real identity and was pointing the finger at the IUEF. McGiven himself has confirmed that he knew Williamson's real identity. In the Guardian he said he did not name Williamson, from a wish to protect Williamson himself from possible danger. He told us a further reason for not exposing Williamson was that he knew that so long as Williamson remained outside South Africa, people would be safe and useful work could continue to be done inside the country. Williamson's own reaction to the second Observer article appears to confirm that he nonetheless saw in it a real threat to his position.

The difficulty is that if McGiven did know Williamson's real identity, as Williamson knew he did, there was a constant risk of exposure and nothing Eriksson could do could protect Williamson. The possibility that Williamson in London in early January, secured assurances from McGiven that he would not name Williamson cannot be discounted. But if he did, there is no discernible reason why he should then expose his real identity to Eriksson, and McGiven denied to us that Williamson made any contact with him. One possible explanation is that the South Africans thought that Eriksson was coming independently to mistrust Williamson, and that Williamson's revealing himself was an attempt to forestall an exposure that Eriksson himself was on the point of making. But if Eriksson is right that he did not seriously suspect Williamson prior to the Zurich meeting, Williamson as his closest confidant must have known this was unlikely, even after his 'disappearance' in the first two weeks of January which he could have explained away, and did at first, as a temporary nervous breakdown.

Another possible explanation suggested to the Commission by Eriksson may be that the South Africans had realised the game was up for Williamson and were bluffing to secure Eriksson's agreement to a deal so that they could then close the IUEF down completely by impossibly compromising Eriksson. The difficulty with this explanation is that closing down an organisation whose chances of survival they must have known were not good, especially once the news of Williamson's infiltration became public, does not seem an important enough goal to run the risk of Williamson himself and even Coetzee being arrested in Switzerland. The South Africans already had enough on the IUEF to threaten its continued existence. The incrimination of Eriksson, would have helped only to achieve a goal already in their grasp, because once Williamson broke his cover, Eriksson and the IUEF, already in very serious straits, would in all probability be finished as a force in the anti-apartheid fight.

The other major difficulty about the Zurich story is the presence of Coetzee. It suggests the stakes could have been very high - higher than simply the continuation of Williamson's work in Europe, or the incrimination of Eriksson. The stakes were high if Williamson genuinely felt he was on the point of breaking through to gaining the full confidence of the ANC, and if Williamson thought Eriksson's support could protect him against exposure. This is to suppose Williamson was making grave misjudgments, which is not consistent with other evidence that he had a shrewd mind, at least on this level. Desperate that his mission be crowned with the spectacular success of infiltrating the ANC's inner councils Williamson may have deluded himself and his superiors into thinking those few more months were all he needed to 'crack' the ANC, perhaps by greatly improving the quality of the information he would feed the ANC until the ANC would relent, admit him membership and give him access to the ANC's own information which he was seeking. Coetzee's presence may therefore be explained in terms of Williamson wittingly or not, giving Coetzee to believe his position could be retrieved and a spectacular espionage coup be achieved if a deal could be struck with Eriksson to force him to collaborate in Williamson's schemes, up till then largely frustrated, to penetrate the ANC. It may have been the South African's intention to force Eriksson, given he was already partially complicit with them if he had not revealed what happened in Zurich, at the second proposed meeting actively to facilitate and promote

the penetration of the ANC which Williamson had not so far succeeded in achieving on his own.

Related to this possible accounting for Coetzee's presence in Zurich is the possibility suggested to the Commission, that the position of the Security Police within the South African political system required such a spectacular success as complete infiltration of the ANC. The Security Police is known to be fighting back against threats to its authority from military intelligence services and the bureau, now renamed, commonly referred to as BOSS. The publicity which attended Williamson's return to South Africa and Coetzee's role in his return suggest the Special Branch have, despite this last failure, attempted to exploit Williamson's activities to this end. The possibility that the events at Zurich can only be explained in terms of the Special Branch itself requiring a spectacular espionage coup is enhanced by the fact that the South African police do appear to have gone out of their way to present Williamson as a more effective agent than he in fact was. The Christie trial could be part of this strategy. It may have been that Williamson felt he needed Eriksson's more active involvement in his efforts to penetrate the ANC and that a deal could be struck to force Eriksson to co-operate as Williamson made his last strenuous effort. Eriksson has not indicated that this was any part of the 'deal' Williamson and Coetzee proposed him, but this is not to rule out that something along these lines was in the minds of Williamson and Coetzee.

The subsidiary question which this hypothesis raises is what the South Africans 'had' on Eriksson that made them believe he could be persuaded to co-operate with them. The threat to reveal the extent of the IUEF's financial mismanagement or of Eriksson's own political misjudgment does not seem serious enough to justify an expectation that Eriksson would commit political suicide, for the destruction of the organisation and of his own position would inevitably follow the eventual leaking out of the information that he had done a deal with the South Africans.

Eriksson himself believes that Williamson had observed his near-collapse after the November/December meetings and believed Eriksson was in a sufficiently unstable state, psychologically, that he thought he and

his superiors might be able to strike a deal with Eriksson. Eriksson has admitted he was in such a state and is sure Williamson detected this and knew that he had not sought medical help. Williamson may well have calculated Eriksson was ripe for the strike that would force him to conclude some sort of deal, whatever that deal was.

We are very conscious that we have been unable to answer many of the questions raised by Eriksson's account of the Zurich meeting. We feel satisfied, however, that Eriksson's and Campbell's errors of judgment and mishandling of events in the weekend following the Zurich meeting are serious, irrespective of any deeper, more sinister background there may or may not be to these errors of judgment.

We felt that there were sufficient uncertainties about Eriksson's and Campbell's conduct and roles in the days January 18-20 that the organisation could not successfully regenerate itself under their leadership. We feel therefore that Eriksson's resignation, of which we learnt just prior to the writing of this report, was appropriate.

3. Williamson in Geneva

The events of January 18-20 involving Eriksson, Campbell and Williamson were followed by two more days during which contact was made between Campbell, who returned to Geneva after the meeting on Sunday with the Guardian journalists in Paris, and Williamson.

Williamson was confident enough to return to Geneva on Sunday, January 20, and to remain in the city until at least the late afternoon of Monday, January 21. We were unable to establish why he was so confident - especially for some hours after the article had appeared in the Guardian. The article was not in the edition of the Guardian which reached Geneva and we had no way of establishing when he knew that Eriksson had taken the story to the press. On the Monday, Campbell insisted that the staff of the Geneva office act on the assumption that Williamson did not yet know that the story had been broken and he himself appeared to act on that assumption.

In the course of Monday, January 21, while he was in Geneva, Williamson made contact with Campbell. The contact included, most importantly, a meeting in the late afternoon between Campbell and Williamson

at a café behind a garage opposite the IUEF offices in Geneva. Our difficulty in reporting on this, as on the story of the Zurich meeting, is that we have had information about the telephone conversations and meeting from only one source, Campbell, and have not been able to corroborate what he told us was said or done. We find it again unfortunate that Campbell did not write down a full account of these events shortly after they happened.

When Williamson telephoned Campbell on Monday, Williamson himself, according to Campbell, did not know, or pretended not to know, that the story had broken. Again according to Campbell, in Williamson's first call he said he was in Geneva and wanted to contact Eriksson. Campbell said Eriksson was not present. In a second call he told Campbell he had left certain documents in the basement carpark, including, it was assumed, the sections of the CGR which Eriksson had said he had wanted returned urgently when he was in Zurich. In the third call Williamson said he was leaving Geneva and wanted to see Campbell.

Campbell went to the meeting alone against the advice of the criminal lawyer and of other members of the IUEF's staff, on grounds (which he has given variously) of bravado, of a wish to stall to give the police time to act, and of a wish to confirm that Eriksson's account of what had happened in Zurich was not fantasy. Campbell and Williamson talked for half-an-hour. The conversation became increasingly uneasy. Both, according to Campbell, acted as if they did not know the real circumstances. When the police did not show up after about half-an-hour, the meeting ended. Williamson was probably dropped off by car for this meeting; at its conclusion he was seen walking up the street away from the IUEF office.

The question why Williamson was not arrested while he was in Geneva on Monday, January 21, has, we have learned, been troubling many people. Campbell told us he did not contemplate contacting the police because of Eriksson's earlier row with them, because of his own mistrust of the police and because he did not think the police would act on the basis of the information he had. Although he was being pressed by other members of the staff to contact the police, Campbell did not contact the IUEF's lawyer until the late morning. At quarter to 3, after he had

arranged his meeting with Williamson in the café for 3.30, Campbell at last made contact with a criminal lawyer with whom he was put in touch by the IUEF's lawyers, in an attempt to get the police to come to the meeting. The lawyer advised Campbell that the police refused to come until a formal charge had been laid in writing, because of Eriksson's earlier argument. This process was not completed until Wednesday morning, January 23, by which time Williamson was in South Africa. Shortly after the café meeting Campbell retrieved personally the package left in the basement by Williamson which he had earlier been saying could be a bomb.

Campbell and Williamson were involved in one final incident on Tuesday, January 22, when Williamson called Campbell in the late afternoon. Immediately after the phone call, Campbell left the office in haste to prevent Alison Eriksson and her son from returning to their flat. Shortly afterwards left the office with them without informing the other staff about the phone call in any detail. The next day Campbell failed to show up for two morning appointments which caused considerable further alarm in the office. Campbell has given different versions of what Williamson said in this phone call and different reasons for his failing to be in the office at the time agreed on Wednesday morning. We were unable to decide whether these differences have any significance but feel confident in saying that in these last dealings with Williamson, after the Zurich meeting but before Williamson's return to South Africa, Campbell's actions were, at least, sometimes foolhardy and his decisions at least sometimes ill-advised.

4. Subsequent Developments in the IUEF

We regarded Williamson's return to South Africa as the end of the 'Williamson Affair' in its narrowest sense. We inevitably, however, learned also in the course of our investigations about developments within the IUEF, leading up to and following the Assembly and Board meetings in February, both within the Secretariat and at the level of relations among the different organs of the IUEF. Some of the later developments impinged directly on our work, and we had made to us allegations, which we are not inclined to dismiss entirely, that some of these developments may have been inspired by a wish to pre-empt

conclusions the Commission of Inquiry might reach or decisions the Assembly and Board might make at the proposed meetings in June.

We felt that some of these developments were disquieting and had both an effect on our work and an intimate connection with the Williamson Affair. But it would not be appropriate for us to state any conclusions about them as a full investigation of them would have taken more time and resources than we had at our disposal. It is our earnest hope that if the recommendations of this report are adopted, the organisation will be able to put behind itself some of the bitterness and ill-feeling generated by certain ill-advised actions in the period since Williamson returned to South Africa.

V. THE MANAGEMENT OF THE IUEF

1. Personnel and Administration

Although we were simply unable to answer satisfactorily the major questions surrounding the account of the Zurich meeting given by Eriksson, we felt we should still address ourselves to the other question which Eriksson's account of what happened in Zurich raised in people's minds. This was what information Williamson and Coetzee possessed that they thought they could force Eriksson to connive with their plan to maintain Williamson under cover in Europe for a few more months. In investigating this matter we found ourselves ranging somewhat beyond the confines of the 'Williamson Affair' itself. But much of the information we gathered in an attempt to discover what the South Africans might have known that could be used to discredit the IUEF, and so to threaten Eriksson, throws further light on how Williamson operated within the IUEF, why he found it a relatively easy organisation to infiltrate and how he managed to hinder its proper work, even while remaining one of its highest officers. It is also information which we believe has to be aired, quite independently of any assessment of Williamson's infiltration of the IUEF, if the future of the IUEF is to be discussed in realistic terms.

There is little doubt in our minds that Eriksson personally and the IUEF as an organisation were to some extent vulnerable to pressures because of the way the organisation had been run, because of the financial irregularities which had been committed and because the organisation was in a very shaky financial position because of administrative overspending and overspending on some programmes and because of a lack of any effective financial control. We feel that even without mentioning irregularities, there is much about the way the IUEF was administered financially that would be embarrassing for Eriksson and others to have revealed. We were disturbed to learn of overspending and neglect of proper budgetary and financial control in the area of administrative spending in the Geneva office on the decision of the 'Directorate', which means Eriksson and Williamson.

Contributing to the high cost of running the IUEF has been something we think inappropriate for an organisation like the IUEF - the relatively high salaries paid to some members of the staff. The Commission noted

that the London office has a separate salary scale from the Geneva, San José and Lusaka offices. We also noted that salary differences have contributed to staff discontent.

The problems created by unduly high levels of spending on certain items of administration were aggravated by a lack of financial responsibility. An example of IUEF funds being used indiscriminately, on Eriksson's responsibility, was the loan made to Kielan, a Pole who was the World Peace Council representative in Geneva for a disarmament seminar. In fact, the money was spent in casinos. The facts that the IUEF was apparently not the only organisation to be duped by Kielan into lending him money and that the money has since been repaid by the Polish Peace Committee does not exonerate Eriksson or the IUEF or diminish the force of the incident as an example of financial irresponsibility within the organisation. This irresponsibility is also evident in the readiness with which air tickets were given or hospitality was extended by the Directorate to representatives of organisations or movements, without any clear criteria being applied for such expenditures and under effectively no financial control. Inadequate budgetting and a lack of proper financial control and of clear criteria for expenditures on projects and scholarship programmes have also contributed to the organisation's financial difficulties and should be a source of embarrassment to the IUEF. The organisation's financial problems which arose from overspending and inadequate budgetting and financial control were aggravated by some external factors for which blame cannot fairly be laid on those who were administering the IUEF. These have included donor reluctance to increase administrative income at the same rate as programme income and, perhaps, exchange rate variations.

A separate problem from identifying the causes of the organisation's financial problems and one more closely related to the Commission's terms of reference, is explaining why:

- a) there was a lack of clear, accurate and detailed information about the organisation's real financial state;
- b) an effective programme was not mounted to deal with the organisation's financial predicament as the liquidity and deficit problems loomed ever larger.

Eriksson and Williamson at least were clearly aware of the financial problems facing the IUEF by the middle of 1978, when Williamson assumed the Deputy Directorship and became more deeply involved in running the organisation in association with Eriksson. In the second half of that year an 'external investigation' of the IUEF's financial situation was initiated by Eriksson and Williamson. Williamson proposed that the auditor of the London office, David Moate, should prepare a report on the IUEF's finances. This report was completed by October 1978. It indicated that the organisation was indeed in serious financial straits and recommended certain steps to improve the situation.

When Eriksson received this first Moate Report in October 1978, he and Williamson, with Nissen subsequently concurring, decided that if it was circulated it would create problems because it contained, Eriksson believed, misunderstandings about the nature of the IUEF's operations and reflected an attitude which was one, in Eriksson's words, 'coloured by a British auditor's training'. Copies of the report circulated briefly among the executive staff in Geneva but were then 'recalled' by Eriksson. Eriksson claims that this withdrawal of the first Moate Report from the executive staff and his subsequent failure to submit it to the Board did not amount to 'suppression' of the report. He claims that the 'hard' financial information in the report was included in the Secretariat's 1978 Finance Report and the report's recommendations presented to the Board as the Secretariat's own. A comparison between the first Moate Report and IUEF financial documents from this period does not entirely bear out this claim. Even if the differences are minor, the proper procedure would have been, it seems to us, for Moate's Report to have been given to the Board with comment appended to point out its shortcomings. It is true that at the Board meeting in December, 1978, the organisation's deteriorating financial situation came out into the open and cuts in expenditure were instituted, notably by laying off staff. There does not appear to have been a real effort made to impose significant cuts in other areas of expenditure, nor any real effort made to introduce stricter financial control in any but marginal areas of spending.

The liquidity and deficit situation continued to deteriorate, to the point that the IUEF required an overdraft of more than 1 million francs

for a period in the first half of 1979. In June, 1979, further steps to solve the organisation's financial problems were discussed within the Secretariat prior to the Bureau meeting. The Bureau required the Secretariat to make a further 10 percent cut in administrative spending at this June meeting, but at Eriksson's request, probably unwisely, left it up to the Secretariat to decide how to make the cuts. Subsequently, Williamson instructed Beer to take £7,000 from the IUEF London's discretionary grants account (from which disbursements are made to students, usually on the decision of the student counsellors) and transfer it to Geneva so that Geneva could then transfer it back to London for administration. Beer discussed this proposal with the accountant of the London office who refused to agree to the transfer being made from the discretionary grants account. We cite this incident as an example of how Williamson, at least, apparently hoped to solve the organisation's financial problems by manipulation and subterfuge which involved the misuse of funds.

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The other incident which illustrates this attitude is the organisation's reaction to the bank error made in 1974 and its subsequent use of the money which this bank error put at the organisation's disposal. A mistake made by the bank in debiting an IUEF account for a sum sent to a project in Zambia resulted in the IUEF 'gaining' on that account a sum of 216,000 Swiss francs. The IUEF did not inform the bank that it had made this error, but left the sum standing for five years on the project account before transferring it, in March 1979, to a special bank holding account and then using it, in November, 1979, to write off the deficits which had accumulated from the IUEF spending money on certain projects in anticipation of donors giving money, which they did not give. The voucher for the transfer of the 'bank error' funds from the project account to the special bank holding account was signed in March, 1979, by Eriksson. Campbell signed the November 27, 1979, adjustment, which transferred the amount from the special bank holding account. He did this with the approval of Eriksson and probably with the agreement of Nissen who was in Geneva at the time and had been told by Eriksson how it was possible to reduce the PRE-account deficits. Campbell did not inform the internal Finance and Administrative Committee, of which he was Chairman, of this adjustment, although it had a direct bearing on several of the questions with which the Committee was dealing.

The measure of indifference towards and even pride in having put one over the bank which several IUEF staff members expressed to the Commission seems to the Commission sad evidence of a serious corrosion of standards within the organisation and of a culpable lack of appreciation of the danger such transactions could involve not just for the organisation but for all funding of organisations like the IUEF.

Manipulation and subterfuge involving the misuse of funds was easier for those responsible for the organisation's financial performance to indulge in because of the high turnover of staff in the finance department. There have been five finance officers in 7 years and this high turnover appears to us to have been a major factor in the progressive deterioration of the organisation's financial state and in the hiding of financial irregularities for so long. Eriksson's reluctance to adopt the strict measures that the state of the organisation's finances required extended into November/December 1979 when he failed to present the full report of the Finance and Administration Committee to the Board and Assembly.

Faced with this record of the suppression or only partial revelation of information which drew people's attention to the organisation's financial problems and of reluctance to adopt measures which offered a prospect of solving these problems without having to resort to practices and actions that were at least questionable, we felt obliged to ask: whose work was it --- specifically Eriksson's or Williamson's; and what could the motives of Williamson have been? Eriksson was, by his own admission, trying by 'unorthodox' means to gain breathing space to allow him to solve the organisation's problems, although we doubt that this strategy would have succeeded and are certain that it was unwise. Williamson's exact role in this is difficult to determine. He no doubt did, as Eriksson claims, encourage 'unorthodox' or 'unusual' financial procedures. He may also have discouraged the adoption of measures intended to prevent the organisation from sinking further into the financial mire or which would have begun to lift it out. He may have followed these courses with a view to placing himself, eventually, in a position to blackmail Eriksson; he may have followed them simply as part of a strategy to keep Eriksson and other members of the staff off-balance and preoccupied with financial problems because it was easier for him to function as an agent in such an organisation. If the

first was his goal, what Eriksson has said happened at the Zurich meeting can be seen as the coming to fruition of a long-standing plan, although the timing and actual mode of executing the plan may not have been in Williamson's mind when he first laid it.

The same question about sharing the general responsibility for the IUEF's disastrous financial situation at the beginning of 1980 needs to be asked of the two Board members who had formal responsibility for the IUEF's finances through the period in which these problems accumulated, the Chairman, Carl Nissen, and the Treasurer, Paul Ladouceur. Ladouceur in particular as Treasurer should perhaps have made greater efforts to impose financial discipline on the organisation. His and Nissen's errors at this level were errors of omission, rather than of commission.

Paralleling these mounting financial problems, which were not being properly faced up to, and inter-related with them, was a steady deterioration of staff morale in the Geneva office of the IUEF. The observable facts are that staff turnover in the IUEF has been very high and staff morale very low. About a score of people have left the Geneva office since January, 1979, several under circumstances that collectively paint a very sorry picture of staff management and relations. The important issue is not whether these staff members resigned, were fired, or were coaxed to leave. The Director and, when he was involved, the Chairman, may have on occasion made incompetent decisions when hiring new staff which made it necessary for the staff hired to leave or be fired in the interests of the organisation. But it is clear also that the attitude of the Directors towards the staff provoked competent people into leaving and created ill-feeling among those who stayed.

Eriksson does appear to have made occasional, desultory attempts to solve the problem of recurrent waves of staff resentment and ill-feeling. There was, for example, experimentation with committees on which the disaffected staff were represented, but they appear not to have been given any real power or to have marked a real intention by Eriksson to abandon any of the authority centralised in himself. The general staff feeling became that these various initiatives were not genuine attempts to change the organisation's autocratic, highly centralised style of management.

Williamson's role in blocking any changes in the way the office was run which might have eased staff discontent and prevented recurrent crises in staff relations is not entirely clear. We do not feel competent to decide exactly to what extent Williamson simply took advantage of existing tension among the staff to further his own ends or to what extent he actively fomented such tensions. It is clear to us that Williamson did not alone cause the difficulties on this level. The organisation was already autocratically and arbitrarily run with major decision-making and all responsibility centred in Geneva and in the person of the Director, before Williamson entered it. It may well have been that he sensed the way a man like Eriksson would run an organisation would make it one of the easiest of all possible organisations of its type to infiltrate because secrecy would be endemic and his own position, once he had ingratiated himself with the one key person in the organisation, would be that much more secure (as indeed does seem to have happened on the level of Eriksson keeping largely to himself the warnings which were given against Williamson). Williamson, for his own reasons, probably played on Eriksson's worst instincts to keep the IUEF an organisation in which there was no real delegation of power or responsibility, no confidence shown in other staff members, secrecy and a reluctance to impart information to other staff members.

The internal breakdown of the organisation - on the level of personnel and staff relations as on the level of financial mismanagement and irregularity - became more serious as Williamson penetrated further into the organisation from the middle of 1978 on. Williamson appears to have at least exacerbated and taken advantage for his own purposes of these internal difficulties, first to consolidate his own position within the organisation and subsequently perhaps to be able, should the need arise, to put pressure on Eriksson with the threat of revealing how the organisation was being run. Such a need may have arisen at the very beginning of 1980 and this background of the part Williamson appears to have played in the organisation's deterioration may go some way towards making Eriksson's account of the Zurich meeting more understandable, if it can be accepted that Williamson and his superiors genuinely believed that Eriksson would be terrified at the prospect of having what Williamson knew about the way the IUEF

had been run revealed. But when Williamson and Coetzee threatened, as Eriksson claims they did, to discredit the organisation if Eriksson did not go along with their wishes, they had more in mind than just this general background of mismanagement and incompetence. There were also specific irregularities which they must have believed that Eriksson would go to almost any length to cover up.

2. Southern Futures

One of the more serious of these irregularities was the use made of the Lichtenstein company, Southern Futures Anstalt. Our work in investigating Southern Futures has been hampered by the fact that the basic documents of Southern Futures, except for a ledger book, have gone missing under circumstances unknown to us. Both Eriksson and Campbell suggested to us that Williamson took the Southern Futures files with him when he left the IUEF office for the last time (presumably over the weekend January 5-6), because, they suppose, he needed the original documents for trial purposes or because with the originals he could better embarrass or discredit the IUEF.

The initiative for setting up Southern Futures came from Eriksson in 1976, but only after discussions in previous years with N. Rubin about the growing difficulties in getting funds inside South Africa. The company was set up, in principle and ostensibly at least, to facilitate the transfer of money into South Africa in a way in which the authorities would find it difficult to trace the money back to its real source and so bring into play the increasingly stiff legislation against getting money for certain purposes or from certain sources outside South Africa. Such legislation, possibly affecting the IUEF was passed in South Africa at about this time.

It is the opinion of the main architect of Southern Futures, N. Rubin, that the principle behind the company was not properly understood by some IUEF officers, that the correct 'distance' between the IUEF and Southern Futures was not maintained and the most effective ways of obscuring the source of the money reaching South Africa were not followed.

Large sums of money apparently left Southern Futures as cash, which means it might just as well have been withdrawn directly from the IUEF since the South African authorities could not trace back anywhere sums passed in cash from hand to hand. Further, where cheques were drawn, they were drawn on a bank in Geneva instead of a bank outside Switzerland. Finally, there is the extraordinary fact that the Southern Futures letter paper gives, for the Company's address, Eriksson's personal address. In short, a most inadequate cover was maintained, one which the South Africans could easily have pierced even if Williamson had not infiltrated the IUEF. According to the testimony of McGiven, the South Africans knew about Southern Futures, although not all details of its administration, before Williamson joined the IUEF.

While we cannot really fault the principle of using a company like Southern Futures to get money into South Africa quickly and with the least possible risk to recipients, we feel we must fault the improper use made of an acceptable mechanism. The fault was to use the secrecy and lack of formal accountability which the company offered for improper purposes --- most seriously to disguise a level of administrative spending greater than that which the funds granted to the IUEF for administration allowed. The substantial facts about the improper uses made of Southern Futures are contained in a report prepared by Mr. David Moate in February, 1980. Eriksson has objected that Moate's report on Southern Futures makes unfair judgments and reveals an ignorance of the work the IUEF was doing and how, Eriksson claims, this work had to be done. We feel that most of the irregularities which he identified were not required by the nature of the work the IUEF was doing and the circumstances in which it had to be done. We might just accept such practices as charging costs, eg. for 'courier' travel, incurred in the direct implementation of a programme to the programme account rather than to IUEF administration. But if such practices are thought acceptable, there seems no reason why these charges to the programme accounts should be 'hidden' by passing the funds through Southern Futures.

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And, in any case, this is rather different from what actually occurred --- the transfer of programme funds, which should not, or need never, have been put through Southern Futures at any rate, back from

Southern Futures to cover 'questionable', largely administrative, charges which had been placed on the IUEF's own (as opposed to Southern Futures) project and programme accounts.

In March-April, 1979, faced with an impending Danish State Auditor's investigation of IUEF accounts, Eriksson and Campbell agreed that it was necessary to 'clean up' the Danish International Development Authority (DANIDA) and also the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) accounts and necessary 'in regard to some of the more questionable charges to the accounts to use SF (Southern Futures)'. Some 500,000 francs of 'questionable charges' were then booked to Southern Futures and so no longer appeared as charges which might come under unwelcome scrutiny from the auditors on the open accounts of the IUEF itself. At this time, also, the IUEF was, to some extent, keeping itself afloat financially by using money which in the accounts appeared as large credit (unspent) balances on certain project accounts to cover the large deficits on other accounts, both programme and administrative. In order to present the donors with a financial picture which suggested that the bulk of these project funds had already been spent on the projects concerned money was transferred from the project accounts into Southern Futures (where it disappeared, as far as statements and auditors were concerned, from view). This deliberate deception of the donors about the status of certain project accounts was necessary because of the acute liquidity problem, which was made worse but not created by the practice of donors giving money later in the financial year than the first payments have usually to be made.

Eriksson admits that conscious decisions were made both to use some of the money sent through Southern Futures for types of activities not precisely those for which the donors had granted the funds and to hide underspending on certain projects from the donors. He believes it was politically justifiable, in respect of the first type of transaction, to switch funds from programme to programme as political situations changed. He justified the transfer of money back from Southern Futures, to which it had been consigned on account of certain projects or programmes, into the IUEF's administration accounts on the grounds that the donors had not paid an adequate administrative

levy on all grants made to the IUEF and that these transfers were simply a way of 'taxing' donors. Campbell, for his part, has claimed that the money transferred back for IUEF administration was to promote the organisation's ability to respond quickly to extraordinary requests from the liberation movements. These are not justifications for the transfers made which we feel able to accept. It is clear that by the end of 1979 the complexity and secrecy of Southern Futures' operations were being used both to mask transfers of funds into South Africa in order to protect the recipients of those funds, and to mask the improper use of funds by the IUEF. X

The other serious question is whether the secrecy of Southern Futures was also being used to provide cover for the IUEF's continuing to support political groups in contradiction to its stated policies particularly, most recently, the policy of supporting the ANC as the leader of the South African liberation struggle. An added complication is that, vis-a-vis its donor governments, the IUEF could have been doing this either without the knowledge of the donor government and in defiance of that government's policy or with the knowledge of the donor government because the government wished to keep certain lines of political communication and intelligence open but without openly acknowledging that it was maintaining those lines. Eriksson can recall payments being made to a group of ANC dissidents, the 'gang of 8', who broke from the ANC, but only using BCM funds at the direct request of the BCM or only using general scholarship funds to support the studies of their children. Payments to the PAC ceased, according to Eriksson, on the exhaustion of the funds received specifically for the PAC. Some payments may also have been made, however, from other funds to PAC members on trial and to the families of PAC political prisoners, but this has not been done, Eriksson claims, since the IUEF issued its statement on the ANC in the middle of 1978. We feel we should record, without passing any judgment, that some witnesses suggested to us that Southern Futures may have been used to get funds covertly to a wide variety of dissident South African groups, for the IUEF's own political reasons. X

The question arises about responsibility for the improper use of Southern Futures on the level of misuse of funds. Here again the Commission has been hampered in its work by the disappearance of the

basic documents concerning Southern Futures. But it is clear that Eriksson had in effect full power over the disposition of funds from Southern Futures because the other bank signatory, N. Rubin, was in the habit of signing 30 blank cheques at a time which were then at Eriksson's disposal. With this power, Eriksson must clearly have been privy to, if not the initiator of, all major transactions involving Southern Futures. Nissen as the only member of the IUEF Board to have formal association with Southern Futures, as a Director of the Company, made at least some effort to ascertain what use was made of funds paid out of Southern Futures. He sought, in 1977, 1978 and 1979 some assurance that the funds leaving Southern Futures were spent on proper purposes. He never pressed for full details about the operations of Southern Futures, feeling that the fewer people who knew about an operation ostensibly intended to get money secretly into South Africa, the better. He gained assurances which satisfied him in 1977 and partly satisfied him in 1978. He was not satisfied in 1979, by which time Campbell was in charge of the Southern Futures books. He was shocked after Williamson's cover had been broken, to learn that funds had been improperly spent. He can be criticised for being content with brief and inadequate statements about the operations of Southern Futures: his errors in this area of general responsibility for Southern Futures irregularities are again probably those of omission rather than commission. For most, if not all of the rest of the Board, the news that Southern Futures even existed came as a surprise, and even a shock, at the beginning of 1980.

Campbell took over responsibility for looking after the books of Southern Futures in February-March, 1979. He did not present to the Directors of Southern Futures at their annual meeting in June, 1979, any written accounts. Nissen recalls that the reason Campbell gave for this lack was that there had been difficulties with the internal accounts of Southern Futures and that he was in the process of restoring the accounts to order and had not had time to prepare the information in written form. The intention to present written statements later in the year was never fulfilled.

Campbell kept the Southern Futures books throughout 1979 and has admitted knowing that administration costs were being debited to project accounts by using Southern Futures. We came to the conclusion that

Campbell was not just a functionary keeping the Southern Futures books but participated in the financial irregularities associated with the company. We feel that this, taken together with the uncertainties about Campbell's conduct and roles in the days January 18-23, makes his resignation from the organisation a prerequisite to its being successfully re-established as an organisation in which both donors and recipients can place their trust.

The payment of Directors' fees to the Directors of Southern Futures was, the Commission was told, a means of 'transferring' the fee owing to N. Rubin for his legal services to the IUEF to his father, L. Rubin, without his father being aware of this (although the year before N. Rubin had simply handed his fee over to his father without such a device being employed). In the case of Nissen, the fee had to be paid to maintain the 'cover' to L. Rubin. The arrangement was that Nissen would use the fee to meet expenses he incurred on IUEF business. We have been unable, from the records available to us, to determine the exact nature of Nissen's personal financial transactions with the IUEF or to establish whether or not he received more than he was entitled to to cover his travel costs, per diems and Chairman's fee of 3600 francs a year, in addition to his Southern Futures' Director's fee while he was on Southern Futures or IUEF business. Regardless of this, we question the propriety of making informal, complicated arrangements of this nature. If a good case existed for Nissen to receive some additional compensation for the demands the IUEF placed on his time a completely above-board arrangement, approved by the Board of the IUEF, should have been adopted.

3. Other Possible Misuse of Funds

The other major area of possible misappropriation of IUEF funds concerns the payments made to a BCM contact in Botswana, Ranwedzi Nengwekhulu. According to Eriksson, at the Zurich meeting Williamson alleged that the South Africans had evidence of systematic embezzling of these funds. Nengwekhulu told the Commission that the last occasion on which he personally handled money being transferred from Geneva to inside South Africa was in 1974. Because it then became difficult to transfer money through Botswana, alternative channels,

through Lesotho, a lawyer in Johannesburg and through a 'homeland' were adopted. The IUEF secured evidence that at least some money sent in for some purposes reached its destination. The IUEF representative in Gaborone was, however, 'quite often' and until recently instructed by telex to pay Nengwekhulu reasonably large sums. This money went through the IUEF account in Gaborone; some money was also sent directly from Geneva. He had no knowledge about how the money was used as the disbursement of funds inside South Africa was done by agreement between Nengwekhulu and Eriksson.

The difficulty of being precise in this particular area, is an example of a general difficulty the Commission faced to put its fingers precisely on when 'flexibility' and lack of financial control degenerated into outright misuse or misappropriation of funds. People appeared willing to tolerate varying levels of 'flexibility' or 'discretion' in use of funds and we are far from willing to brand all prompt and flexible reactions to requests for funds for specific purposes as improper. It is for obvious reasons very difficult to establish when money has actually entered South Africa whether it has been used for the purposes for which it was given. For security reasons IUEF itself does not always come into direct contact with individual recipients or people running inside projects, but through some organisations, some checks were possible. The possibility of misappropriation within South Africa is a risk that must be run if any effort is to be made at all. There may also be a need for diversion of money from the project which the donor intended to support to another similar project especially in an 'emergency' or when there were problems with the police. We are, however, well aware that at some point flexibility becomes misuse, and are not willing to see any blanket justification thrown to cover some practices which are not justifiable.

The ANC told the Commission that one possible major misappropriation of IUEF funds occurred when, in anticipation of a restrictive act being passed, Williamson and Eriksson passed a very large sum to Edwards for which there was no specific programme backing. Edwards' readiness with money and his extravagant style of living and working were only possible if he had large resources behind him. But the transfer of large sums of money before a channel was closed off by legislation could be regarded as

prudent. The level of Edwards' expenditures is not proof of the misuse of IUEF funds because Edwards was funded by other organisations outside South Africa and was also able to draw, presumably, on the resources of the South African Government to keep his contacts amenable to his efforts to find out about their activities.

VI. The Damage Done by Williamson

Again because of the pressures under which we conducted our inquiries and wrote this report, we have not been able to assess the damage Williamson has done on different levels and in different areas as completely or as systematically as we would have liked. We felt less uneasy about this than we might have because we received assurances that the liberation movements and other possibly affected groups have taken steps to ascertain the extent of the damage done to their own work. It was neither appropriate nor necessary for us to delve into this area of damage and what steps could be taken to minimise it.

Because of communications problems and constraints of time, we were unable to meet with representatives from the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and unable, therefore, to find out from them what damage Williamson's activities may have done to their organisation and its work. But we feel confident that since the exposure of Williamson, SWAPO has taken the necessary steps to minimise the effects of Williamson's activities on their struggle for the liberation of Namibia.

The responsibility for immediately warning those who were possibly at risk inside South Africa should have been assumed by those in the IEUF who had administrative responsibility for the "inside" programmes - Eriksson and Campbell. On the question of warnings then and actions which could have possibly been taken then or later in respect of those with whom the IEUF maintained contact, the unfortunate fact is that little can probably be done to protect or otherwise assist those on whom Williamson has incriminating (in South African eyes) documents or information.

Had the Southern Futures files not disappeared it might have been easier for others to identify who might be at risk in South Africa today, although even these files would not have given a complete picture because such large amounts were handled in cash by, among others, Williamson himself.

We feel the danger must still be taken seriously that people are still at risk inside South Africa. Williamson and Edwards persistently offered their services particularly in providing and channelling money

to a wide variety of individuals and organisations with the aim of gaining information about who was doing what, where, rather than of compromising people receiving funds brought into South Africa illegally or engaging in any other activities such as supplying certain information or receiving banned publications that are illegal under South Africa's draconian laws.

In considering the damage done by Williamson, we were conscious of the fact that Williamson acted in many instances as an agent provocateur in that he initiated programmes or instigated activities which might now incriminate certain individuals in countries still under minority rule.

Nevertheless, now that 'Operation Daisy' is, presumably, over, there is no reason for the South Africans not to start picking off those who have been so compromised by Williamson's, and Edward's, activities. A 'round-up' may follow of people who have had contact with the IUEF, especially if the South Africans produce evidence, which they may well forge, to 'prove' that the IUEF is a terrorist or communist organisation. It was suggested to us that Williamson's intimate knowledge of the white activist networks could allow the South African state to mount a conspiracy trial like the South African Students Organisation (SASO) trial and NUSAS trial of the mid-1970s. Such a 'trial of conscience' would not be good for South Africa's image, but the possibility cannot be ruled out and the South African regime may still be evaluating the evidence available (which could take some time, given the amount of documentation the South Africans claim Williamson sent while he was employed by the IUEF). One particular breach of security in the IUEF may have serious repercussions at this level. On at least one occasion Williamson may have had unrecorded access to letter paper presigned by Eriksson and the possibility of forged letters being produced in South Africa to implicate people in much more serious activities than they or the IUEF were involved in cannot be entirely ruled out.

Williamson's only victims in the role he was at times trying to play as an intermediary between white activists and the ANC appear so far to be Renfrew Christie, and possibly Duncan Innes. It was also suggested to us that the questioning about how the SACC has used some money which is not formally accounted for may result in the SACC being

charged with having given money to banned organisations, Williamson having been aware of some money having gone to the SACC from the IUEF through the WCC. At least SACC's affairs may come under closer, more dangerous scrutiny as a result of Williamson's knowledge of certain SACC funding.

On the side of black activists inside South Africa, Williamson can probably identify certain major BCM contacts inside the country though he is not in a position to know details of the projects on which they were spending funds provided by the IUEF, except in a general way about certain specific projects.

On the level of individual scholarship holders inside South Africa or in any Front-Line State being possibly at risk, we were assured that most students with links to a liberation movement or other organisations were handling it well within their organisations, and we are satisfied that these organisations are aware that Williamson was, for example, instrumental in helping his sister to secure financial assistance for some ANC students in Lesotho. At worst, we expect Williamson has details on, and so is possibly in a position to compromise, ordinary students who received funds through IUEF-funded organisations. In general, the ANC has not given the IUEF the names of its activists inside South Africa.

The ANC suggested to the Commission that the organisations likely to be affected adversely by knowledge Williamson has of their work and funding are those organisations which received money directly from the IUEF - notably the surviving BCM groups and the SACC. The ANC itself is in a different position because it was careful to safeguard the secrecy and security of its channels for getting money into the country. The ANC was always careful not to respond to offers, made by both Eriksson and Williamson, to make use of the mechanisms the IUEF had devised for getting money into South Africa. Similarly, the ANC rejected the offer the IUEF made at the July 1979 meeting to assist the ANC in bringing ANC people out of South Africa and then returning them. The ANC refused to introduce its underground activists to anyone or to, in any way else, breach its security principles. Neither Eriksson nor Williamson pressed these points, the ANC believing

now that Williamson was sufficiently sensitive not to risk confirming any ANC suspicions, even though the contacts would have been extremely useful to him as an agent.

The damage done to, or even which may be done as a result of, his contacts with, anti-apartheid groups in Europe is likely to be small. COSAWR, for example, dealt with Williamson as a representative of the IUEF; dealings with him were limited to those necessary to maintain contacts between the organisations. The organisation resisted being 'steered' by Williamson towards making contacts inside South Africa with war resisters, which some felt he was attempting to do. A similar 'resistance' to Williamson in IDAF was mentioned in Chapter III, Section 4.

A certain level of mistrust and suspicion had been the inevitable result of the discovery that Williamson was an agent. This is not completely confined to relations between the IUEF and other organisations. But such mistrust and suspicion are to a certain extent healthy and if in other organisations, as in the IUEF, greater attention is given to scrutinising applicants for sensitive posts and to internal security of files and information, Williamson has done the anti-apartheid movement an inadvertent service, as he may also have done by fostering a more sober appreciation of what the struggle involves especially among non-South Africans.

Williamson showed no great personal interest in the IUEF's Latin American programmes but many letters were copied to him and it should be assumed that the South Africans know certain names and of certain activities which would be of interest to the secret services of several Latin American countries. There are indications of some contact, in other connections, between South African and South American secret services, but this is not to say there has been contact with respect to IUEF-supported activities subsequent to Williamson's return to South Africa. There was an understandably nervous reaction in some quarters in Latin America among IUEF recipients and contacts when the news broke, but these were calmed by the IUEF from a genuine conviction that Williamson's own lack of interest and the somewhat better security arrangements in the San José office and in the Latin American department within the head office meant the danger was not great. The

several programmes for which the names were not known in Geneva cannot be affected as a result of Williamson's activities because he had no access to the sensitive information.

X
C
The damage Williamson has done to the IUEF itself has been very considerable although, not to give him more credit than he is due, the organisation would have been overtaken by a serious financial crisis in 1980 whether he had ever been on its staff or not. To some extent, indeed, Williamson did the IUEF a favour by bringing to a head the accumulated problems of financial mismanagement and administrative incompetence which have hampered the organisation from doing effective work in recent years.

X
C
Perhaps the most serious damage he has done to the organisation itself is raise suspicions about its reliability. We had voiced to us from several quarters rumours and suspicions that the IUEF itself might still be subject to infiltration, and the currency of such rumours and suspicions will certainly impede the organisation's work in future years, unless they can be authoritatively laid to rest. It was beyond our competence, however to establish whether there is at the moment any other source of South African - or of any other - espionage within the IUEF. It is a task on which professional guidance should be sought from an appropriate quarter. Once the task has been done, then people should again be able to deal confidently with the organisation. The solution to this predicament must lie, we believe, in the IUEF, as soon as the present structural and administrative uncertainties have been resolved, thoroughly reviewing the status of all staff who have any direct access to information which could be of interest to any security service.

It is a reasonable assumption that if, as we believe it should, the organisation continues to have a clear political role, further infiltration will be attempted, by the South African regime, as the struggle there intensifies, or by Latin American regimes whose victims the IUEF is assisting. We have made certain formal recommendations concerning the prevention of future infiltration in our concluding section. We would emphasise here the urgency of the Board, or whatever authority has the power in a newly constituted IUEF, addressing itself to this question. The Board of the IUEF has never, to our knowledge,

discussed the possibility of infiltration of the IUEF, although it seems a reasonable assumption that the South African and other governments would want to keep tabs on or use the organisation. Such an organisation cannot, of course, guarantee to protect itself against infiltration or take pre-emptive measures that definitely rule out possibility of any further infiltration. But this is not reason enough, as it appears to have been regarded in the past, for the organisation not to bother giving the question serious and formal consideration. X

VII Recommendations

In framing these more general recommendations about the future of the IUEF, we would like to recall the statement of the organisation's aims and purposes:

- To cater to the needs, particularly in the field of education, of refugees, with special reference to refugees from Southern Africa;
- to assist refugees and their organisations to prepare for the future development of their countries;
- to promote and assist the economic development of the developing countries, particularly in the educational field;
- to act as a channel for aid or otherwise to assist student organisations in developing countries and thereby encourage them to contribute to the national development of their countries;
- to undertake activities, co-operate with other bodies or assume such functions which directly or indirectly support the above-mentioned objects.

There have been significant changes in Southern Africa in particular since these aims were first stated, but we feel they remain in substance valid. Much has been achieved; but much remains to be achieved. We would like to think that if our recommendations are acted on, a renewed IUEF will be able to play as useful a part in achieving successes in the future as it has played in achieving the successes of the past.

We would like to emphasise, in a report that has, necessarily, concentrated on things which went wrong, that the IUEF has significant achievements to its credit and much to be proud of in the years during which it has been assisting refugees and their organisations. We have received from many quarters, in the course of conducting our inquiries, strong encouragement for and good will towards our task - which almost all perceived as being to set the organisation back on the right track

so that the work which the IUEF has been doing will continue to be done in the future. There was, of course, a widespread recognition that there had been blunders and mistakes - some serious. But there was too a willingness to accept that even those responsible for the mistakes were committed to the work the IUEF was doing and mounted very many successful programmes and projects. The IUEF was not infiltrated by the South Africans only because its problems made it an easy organisation to work through; it was infiltrated also because it has been in the past an effective anti-apartheid organisation and has made a significant contribution, through its programme of educational assistance, to the liberation and development of Africa and more of recently Latin America.

Our report has not been able to deal systematically with all the causes of those of the IUEF's problems which have had a bearing on Williamson's infiltration and work. We feel one cause has been a possibly over-rapid expansion of the organisation's programmes beyond the capacity of the organisation under its existing structures and style of management. The organisation appears to us to have attempted to answer too many demands without accurately identifying its priorities and to have attempted to do more than it was capable of given its structures and the ways it was being run. The solution we see to this is not to reduce the organisation substantially, but to introduce changes in its structures and organisation which will prevent any future administrative or financial breakdown like that associated with Williamson's activities.

We would therefore recommend (1): a complete restructuring of the organisation, by reframing the statutes if necessary, in order to define precisely the roles and relationships of the different organs of the IUEF, so that it can function as an efficient, properly controlled organisation.

We see the non-governmental organisations who have been members of the IUEF's Assembly in the past, as playing a vital role in the IUEF's work. Through working with and supporting the IUEF they acquire a sense of being responsible for its work on which the IUEF can usefully rely particularly in its relationship with donor governments. We would therefore recommend (2): that attention be given to encouraging national

non-governmental organisations to feel involved in and in some greater sense than in the past responsible for the work of the IUEF and to encouraging new national non-governmental organisations to participate in the IUEF's work and new governments to contribute to it.

We recommend (3): that in this reorganised IUEF, the role of the liberation movements and of the countries in which the IUEF mounts its assistance programmes should be strengthened. We would like to see the IUEF providing a framework for co-operation on an equal basis between Europe and North America and Africa and Latin America. We feel the close collaboration with the liberation movements on specific projects and programmes which is desirable should be reflected on the level of organisation in some more effective way than simply by giving the liberation movements a particular status at the Assembly meetings. At the same time we recommend (4): that the liberation movements neither seek nor be given powers completely to control IUEF projects or programmes while exercising the right they must have to be consulted fully and frequently about programmes or projects which impinge on their own struggle.

We recommend (5): that while the IUEF remains very consciously and deliberately a political organisation committed to certain political goals and to achieving these goals by working in closely with the liberation movements or their counterparts in Latin America, it does not become itself a political movement as such. We accordingly recommend (6): that the IUEF not resign itself to becoming, or allow itself to be forced to become, an agency granting scholarships on humanitarian grounds alone. It should continue to feel free to use its scholarship programme, where appropriate, to contribute to the realisation of its stated political goals and feel free to mount other projects when the granting of scholarships alone is inadequate to achieving those goals.

If the IUEF is to work towards its political goals it will sometimes have itself to support or assume responsibility for programmes inside countries under racist or other oppressive regimes. We would recommend (7): that the IUEF should do this only after close consultation with and the agreement of the liberation movement or other organisation concerned. We would also recommend (8): that the IUEF

remain willing to use unconventional or unorthodox means of channelling money if the circumstances require this, provided some acceptable form of accountability is worked out. We do not feel that the organisation's unfortunate experiences with the internal South African programmes which Williamson helped to mount or with Southern Futures Anstalt justify a reconstructed IUEF from shrinking either from working inside countries like South Africa or from using appropriate means to get that work done.

We make these recommendations fully aware that such an organisation will be likely to continue to attract the attention of regimes hostile to its goals and to be subject to further infiltration. In order to reduce the likelihood of such further infiltration we would like to recommend (9): that employment practices in the IUEF be tightened up, to make it more difficult for people like Williamson to get a job with the organisation, by more systematic and thorough checking of candidates, especially if their background seems unusual or if their position involves access to any information that might be interesting to any government hostile to the IUEF's goals. Related to this we would recommend (10): the preparation of job descriptions and the stabilisation of administrative structures within the Secretariat to avoid any ad hoc hiring of staff, as Williamson was hired. We would also recommend (11): the prompt adoption of whatever administrative procedures are needed to ensure that secrecy of information is maintained, and particularly to avert any risk that the subvention of a person already employed might pose. We would also recommend (12): that the IUEF employ refugees who have had any links with the regime from which they have fled and who still have members of their immediate family inside that country only in special circumstances and only after the most thorough checking of their credentials.

We feel that the donors cannot be entirely absolved from blame for creating the situation of which Williamson took advantage since certain practices of some donors have made the efficient running of the sorts of programmes the IUEF mounts significantly more difficult. We would like to recommend (13): that ways and means of fostering constructive dialogue and consultation between the Secretariat and the donors, like those which were being developed before the crisis overtook the IUEF, should be devised and implemented. We would also

like to recommend (14): that the donors accept that the IUEF has in part been effective because it has been able to move quickly and flexibly and therefore be willing to devise rules which, while satisfying all their requirements for accountability, do not diminish the IUEF's capacity to respond to unusual needs and needs which arise suddenly.

We acknowledge that this report leaves very many questions about the Williamson Affair and the role of the IUEF in the past unanswered. We recommend (15): that further research and investigation on the most important of these questions should continue, including research on the IUEF's record of support for different liberation movements and other groups through the 1970s, in order to clarify political doubts current in certain quarters. We do not think, however, that the Secretariat of the IUEF should become too involved in these continuing investigations as a preoccupation with the past would be unhealthy in an organisation which is endeavouring to carry on the good parts of the IUEF's work while putting behind it the errors and mistakes of the late 1970s.

In investigating South African infiltration of the IUEF we accumulated documents and records, some of which are sensitive or were submitted to us on a confidential basis. Our final recommendation (16) is: that the Secretary of this Commission be instructed to put the Commission's papers in order and that the papers then be filed in some place where their safety is secured and where access to them can be restricted to the members of the Commission or to persons authorised by a competent body of the IUEF.

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Thomas Nkobi) National Congress

List of abbreviations used in the Report

ANC	African National Congress
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
BPEAR	Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees
CGR	Composite Governmental Request
COSAWR	Committee of South African War Resisters
DANIDA	Danish International Development Authority
IDAF	International Defence and Aid Fund
ISC	International Student Conference
IUEF	International University Exchange Fund
NUSAS	National Union of South African Students
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SACP	South African Communist Party
SANA	Southern African News Agency
SASO	South African Students Organisation
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
UN	United Nations
WCC	World Council of Churches
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

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