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THE NEW SWAZILAND.—NO. 1

THE CHANGED POSITION IN SWAZILAND

MR. AMERY'S 1927 VISIT INSTILLS NEW VIGOUR

The series of articles, of which the following is the first, will attempt to give an account of the new situation that has arisen in Swaziland out of Mr. Amery's visit to South Africa three and a half years ago. The writer begins by discussing the effects of the fresh air of security and encouragement let in by the knowledge that the British Government is now prepared to lend the territory very material assistance, and that the unsettling question of incorporation in the Union has receded into a distant background.

(FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.)

Perhaps it would be fanciful to represent Mr. Leopold Amery, sometime Secretary of State for the Dominions and Colonies as a fairy prince kissing the sleeping beauty of Swaziland to life. But it is a plain matter of fact that since his South African visit of 1927, the territory has stirred to a new awakening. Previously, lack of communications with the outside world had confined the possibilities of economic growth within narrow limits. The nearest points on the Union railway system were at Piet Retief, Lothair and Barberton—all well outside the Swaziland border and many days by ox-wagon from such areas of production as existed within the territory. Much the same applied to the Portuguese railhead at Goba on the east—with this difference, that Portuguese customs arrangements made it in the main even less serviceable from the standpoint of the Swaziland producer. Mr. Amery's visit chanced to coincide with important new transport developments, for in July, 1927, the Durban-Zululand line was extended right up to the Swaziland border at Gollel, thus giving the territory direct access to the Durban market. More even than this, by the beginning of 1928 the Union railway administration was operating a regular and systematic road motor service throughout Swaziland itself; and linking every district with the rail either at Gollel in the south or at Piet Retief or Breyton in the west. About the same time, it was arranged that Portuguese buses serving Goba and Lourenco Marques should run through to Stegi, 18 miles inside the Swaziland border. Thus, as it were in a flash, the country found itself furnished with a transport system many times quicker, more efficient, more complete, and cheaper than it had ever known before. Swaziland was now definitely on the map, with production for export well within the range of practicability. Mr. Amery seized the opportunity to assist such production by ensuring the availability of Imperial funds for agricultural loans and for capital expenditure on roads, bridges, and communications generally. His interest has been maintained by his successors in office, and in the last year or two Swaziland has drawn additional benefits from the Colonial Development Fund set up by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's Government, and even Treasury grants-in-aid to balance excess of current expenditure over revenue. The pulse of a new progress is beating perceptibly throughout the land; and Europeans and natives alike marvel at the change from the long indifference of Whitehall, and feel the stimulus of its encouragement.

INCORPORATION.

For 20 years Swaziland has suffered from the supposed imminence of its incorporation in the Union. The Colonial office allowed it to drift on from year to year, feeling a brief term set to its own responsibility and giving attention to little beyond the balancing of the local budget. Why worry, when in a short space the Union would be holding the baby? In a sense this *dolce far niente* almost justified itself, for there have been several occasions since the end of the war when incorporation was on the verge of taking place. Why, then, has it been so abruptly abandoned? One answer alone seems possible. The unhappy fact is that the Union is the chief enemy of British policy in native affairs on the African continent. The last few years have made it abundantly plain that British Africa is and will continue to be the cockpit of a protracted struggle between humanitarianism and the Afrikaner spirit. If the principles for which Britain stands and which her Government has recently reaffirmed in unequivocal terms are to emerge successful from the contest, it would be mere folly to hand over to their antagonist any further areas now under direct British control. Rather must such areas be used as vantage points from which to undermine the enemy's position. For that purpose the High Commission territories have a very special value.

That this aspect of the problem is not lost upon Downing Street is indicated not only by the comparatively generous assistance now forthcoming for development in Swaziland, but also by the appointment of a Resident Commissioner with a resolve to steer and shape events within the territory instead of merely "dealing with them as they arise," and finally by the

highly significant change in the High Commissionership itself.

And, indeed, Swaziland is the most promising of the High Commission territories for development and for experimentation in the African problems of the day—an admirably arranged laboratory where Britain, if she cares to take the trouble, may demonstrate, in full view of Afrikanerism, the practical superiority of her own policy. It is a country with important resources in coal, asbestos, and metals. Its conditions of climate and rainfall afford scope for a wide range of agricultural and pastoral activity. It is hardly touched, and almost wholly unspoilt. It is not a simple native reserve, and its settled white population, small as it may be, is genuinely and loyally attached to the land, of which nearly two-thirds is in its ownership. These facts, conjoined, guarantee Swaziland's material development along the lines which European civilisation has made its own. They also reduce the question whether such development can ultimately be to the benefit of Swaziland's inhabitants, black or white, to one of abstract philosophy. For good or ill, they are limiting factors in the administrative problem, and on their basis the contact of European and native cultures must be adjusted with such equity as British statesmanship can devise.

NATIVE FEELING.

At present the European community is apt to flatter itself on its relations with the natives. The account commonly given is that those relations have always been good and are growing better. Evidence tendered from the native side, on the other hand, does not always corroborate this sanguine view. Native feeling on the whole seems to be that those reactions to the colour question which have made the white population of the Union a by-word in the civilised world are becoming second nature to the white population of Swaziland also. The optimism of the latter is probably based on the fact that, owing to the primitive economy of the country, the respective interests of white and black have hardly begun to show even an appearance of conflict. But it is noteworthy that, as soon as they do, the appearance is dealt with after the manner fashionable in the Union. For example, there is a strong European prejudice against the grant of trading licences to natives within the boundaries of the townships; and up till now the authorities have thought it best to defer to it, in spite of native representations. A more striking instance, since so far from futhering European economic interests it cuts across them, is the obstinate reluctance of the European tobacco-growers of the south to accept native growers as members of the proposed tobacco co-operative society. This suggests unpleasantly that a large section of Europeans is already predisposed to the colour-madness of the Union, and needs but the slightest stimulus to break out into it. As the economic development of the country proceeds and knits classes and races into closer association, this sort of stimulus will, for a time at least, make itself more frequent and more forcibly felt; and it is clear that very large demands will be made on the vigilance and tact of the administration, if the more backward European types are to be kept on the hither side of lunacy. The next ten years may well determine the whole trend of racial relations in the territory for the rest of the century.

Meanwhile, the white groups in general make little reckoning of sinister possibilities. An air of hopefulness is abroad, a hopefulness that seems to see in store for Europeans a gentle, segregated progress which the black man will neither obstruct nor share in. Native development is a conception which their thought does not readily engage, and they leave it cheerfully enough to missionaries and such officials as are not too engrossed with routine duties to ponder it. But the new Swaziland is on the move in a sense broader than these assumptions calculate upon. White prosperity there, as everywhere in Africa, is intimately bound up with the home market, which is the native market. The dreams of European avarice will not come true, till Europeans cease to be content with seeing the native a chattel or an impecunious peasant, and turn to regard him as a purchaser.

(To be continued.)

THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION

REMARKABLE INCREASE IN FARM PRODUCE EXPORTS

In spite of the absence of reliable statistics, it seems clear that Swaziland is beginning to build up a fairly considerable export trade. This is a new departure in the history of the territory, occasioned partly by the new transport facilities and partly by the fact that the native is increasingly satisfying his own needs by his own production, thus restricting the local market for European-grown produce. At present the European farmer has done little more than make up on the swings of his exports what he has lost on the roundabouts of the home market. But, even so, the change is an important and advantageous one, because he has replaced a strictly limited market by one which is capable of indefinite development.

(FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.)

Before discussing Swaziland's prospects of development it is desirable to reach some general idea of its present economic conditions. Unfortunately, available information is so fragmentary that this is not an easy task. Data for estimating the national income and how it is apportioned between white and black are almost non-existent; there is no proper record of the volume of trade, and no Customs statistics. A somewhat hazardous starting point, however, is provided by the export returns given in the official Blue Book. These show that in the five years from 1925 the total domestic produce exported rose from £134,096 to £213,539, or roughly 56 per cent. The main expansion was in slaughter stock, tobacco and cotton, and the export value of the three increased from £53,737 to £158,594, or roughly 195 per cent. At first sight these figures suggest an impressive development of farming, and they offer a remarkable contrast with the position in the Union, whence exports for the five years 1923-27—a period of considerable prosperity—increased only by some 23 per cent. They lose nothing of their effect when it is remembered that they relate almost exclusively to European produce (practically speaking there are as yet no exports of native produce from Swaziland), and that the white farming population is very small and not reputed to be particularly progressive in its methods.

The curious thing is that throughout this period of apparently rapid growth there has been no corresponding expansion in receipts from income tax, or in public revenue and expenditure generally, or, so far as is known, in imports. Even collections in respect of beer and spirits manufactured in the Union reveal but an insignificant rise. In 1925 the income tax yield was £3,291, in 1929 it was £1,596; and though the latter does not include certain arrears which were to be collected in the ensuing financial year, the total tax assessment for 1929 was, in round figures, a mere £3,000. Again, Government expenditure in 1925 amounted to £96,980, and to £119,404 in 1929—an increase of £22,424; but the 1929 figure includes £32,000 spent out of grants-in-aid from the Imperial Parliament. As regards imports, the Customs receipts do, indeed, show a steady, if small increase; but these, as they represent a fixed percentage of the total Customs takings of the Union, merely indicate an increase in the import trade of South Africa as a whole, and no inference from them to changing conditions in Swaziland in particular is possible. Official reports state that the volume of trade in Swaziland remains small, and that there has been little variation in imports.

THE HOME MARKET.

How can these facts be reconciled with the large increase in exports? Only it seems, by supposing that the European farmer, in gaining an export market, has pari passu been losing a home market. There is some direct evidence to support the supposition. Twelve or even ten years ago there was practically no export of farm produce, and the European farmer lived by growing grain and a certain amount of tobacco for the local native market. Recently, however, an improvement has been taking place in native agricultural methods, and whereas at the end of the Great War the hoe of antique Bantu tradition was still almost the only implement of cultivation in native use, the agricultural census of last year pointed to an average of one plough to each native family. One result of this change is that the output from native lands is much larger than it used to be, and to-day supplies the Swazi people with some three-fourths of their grain requirements, so that, except spasmodically in bad seasons or at the tail-end of the farming year before the standing crops are reaped, they have little need to turn, cash in hand, to the white man. Growing mealies for native consumption is the easiest and laziest way of farming, and in relieving the European of the job the Swazi has done an important service to agriculture in his country. Not

only does the approach to self-sufficiency imply an advance in his own methods, but it has driven the white farmer to raise his to the level at which successful competition in the markets of the outside world becomes possible. The transition opens out much broader prospects of wealth to the white farmer. But it is still too recent for him to have moved far towards their realisation. His increasing exports do not yet mean for him a net increase in income, for so far he has been simply planting different crops and selling them abroad, instead of planting the old crops and selling them at home. But his having done this, his having found an export market at all, is good augury of his future success.

The theory of the lost home market does no violence to the export figures. The difference between the 1925 and the 1929 exports is about £80,000. If we assume that, in spite of the increase in exports, the European farmer has made little net increase in his turnover, we must also assume that in 1925 he was selling in the local market some £80,000 more mealies than in 1929. There is nothing improbable in this. It would only mean that the native was then spending on mealies 13s. 4d. per head per year more than he is to-day, i.e., that he was buying about two and a half bags more per family. It is quite possible that the increase in native production has restricted the market for European-grown mealies to that extent. But if so, the question arises: How is the money now being employed which in 1925 natives were using to buy mealies? The answer seems to be that some of it is being invested in cattle, and the rest is being spent out of the country by the Swazi mine boys on the Rand. We shall return to these points later.

POSITION OF NATIVES.

Upon a rough calculation from the value of the export trade, then, it appears that the average purchasing power of the white population can hardly be less than £80 per head per year, and may easily be more. What can be said of the economic situation of the natives? In some ways it compares favourably with that of any proletariat in more developed countries. The native has his land free of rent; his dwellings, such as they are, are built by his own household. Native-owned cattle number nearly 320,000 and represent savings worth perhaps £8 per head of the population. The native family produces enough food to supply its needs for about nine months in the year, and there is little reason why it should not also produce the balance. Although overstocking is becoming serious in certain parts of the country, the pressure on arable land is not severe, and Swaziland is not overcrowded in the sense in which Bechuanaland or the Transkei is overcrowded. On a level of simple subsistence farming, therefore, the Swazi household is reasonably self-supporting. But the Swazi's circumstances do not permit of mere subsistence farming. As a community he has to raise an annual fund of £45,000 for taxation, paying, in point of fact, more per head for the privilege of European government than any other native south of the Nile. He needs cash to supplement the food supply he himself produces, cash for the education of his children, cash for implements and trek-gear, and cash for various articles of personal and household use which are easily got by purchase from the stores. Unfortunately he is without a market. Apart from his stock, which he does not usually regard as a trading commodity, and latterly a little tobacco and cream, he has no goods to sell nor anywhere to sell them. The cash he requires can thus only be raised by the sale of his own labour. There is a strictly limited number of employers in his own territory, and consequently he has for the most part to emigrate in search of work either to the mines or the farms in the Transvaal. This emigration takes place to an extent and with results which we will shortly examine in some detail.

(To be continued.)

THE CURSE OF EMIGRANT LABOUR

HOW IT STRIKES AT THE ROOTS OF NATIVE LIFE

The practice under which the bulk of the effective Swazi manpower is permanently absent in employment in the Union is imposing an intolerable strain on native society, and incidentally making any important growth of prosperity impossible for Swaziland. For reasons which have been found compelling in the Belgian Congo, it seems essential that a stop should be put to the system of recruiting, as running counter to the interests of every class, both native and European, in the territory.

FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.

The last article indicated that native taxation is rather high, and that the Government services given him in return are rather inadequate. In respect of them his position is precisely opposite to that of the European, who pays very little and receives, comparatively, a great deal. As to whether matters should be levelled up by easing the native's burden or adding to the European's, there can be little doubt that the latter is the proper method, if development is really the aim in Swaziland. To put it with brutal candour, the European has drawn large subventions from the pockets both of the Swazi and of the taxpayer of Great Britain, and, if he is to go on shouting for progress, it is high time for him to start putting his hand into his own pocket. Probably he will show little alacrity in doing so. He is quite human enough to find pleasure in getting something for nothing while he can. A candidate for election to the Advisory Council recently proposed the abolition of the income tax as a main plank in his platform.

But the crucial feature of the economic position in Swaziland is related to taxation somewhat less directly. The crucial feature is the emigration of native labour into the Union. It has been customary to approach this whole question from the angle of the Union employer's convenience, and to suppose airily that it is simply common courtesy in a young territory with more labour than it can use to assist in supplying the labour requirements of its big brother next door. If the native standpoint has been given a thought, it has been swiftly dismissed with the soothing reflection that the native is extremely lucky to have within 300 miles of his front door a large market condescending enough to pay cash for his unworthy services. Such an approach is no doubt appropriate enough for, say, the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, but it is irrelevant for the British authorities who steer Swaziland's course. It is for them to study the effect of this emigration on the general wellbeing of the native society under their charge.

AN UNFAIR SUBSIDY.

Once again there are no accurate figures. A statement pointing roughly in the direction of the truth is the best that can be expected. A calculation from the returns of native taxation suggests that the total of adult males capable of work can hardly exceed 23,000. Another calculation from the stamp receipts in respect of passes issued to natives travelling outside the territory shows that in 1929 the fee was paid on 16,440 passes. The native of the Swaziland reserves is not addicted to travelling about, the Union for pleasure, and it seems safe to assume that, in round figures, 15,000 men left the country in 1929 to look for work. Of these perhaps about half would go to the mines. The remainder would place themselves either on farms or in domestic service, mostly in the Eastern Transvaal. The average term of absence from home for all the 15,000 would probably be about nine months, possibly longer.

It thus appears that approximately 65 per cent. of the adult able-bodied males of Swaziland spend by far the greater part of the year in service with European employers in the Union. And, as we saw in the case of Basutoland, their base on the land of the territory frequently makes it possible for them to accept a wage below what employers would be compelled to pay if emigrant labour from the protectorates were not on offer. In this way the soil of Swaziland is used at once to subsidise their employers and to depress the wage-levels of their fellow-workers in the Union.

In discussing the demands of non-natives for native labour, it is always essential to bear in mind the investigations of the two Commissions appointed in the Belgian Congo in 1924 and 1928. The Belgian Government, as Professor Buell has observed, is the only government in Africa which has had the courage to grapple with the problem arising from the "extreme fragility" exhibited by native societies when they are brought into violent and haphazard contact with a thrusting civilisation of the Western type. The Commissions' conclusion was that for labour at a distance from home no more than 5 per cent. of able-bodied adult males could be withdrawn at one time from tribal life without seriously upsetting the equilibrium of native society. Another 5 per cent. might safely be taken for work at not more than two days' distance from home, when prolonged separation from the family was not involved. Finally, a further 15 per cent. might without damage be treated as available for employment in the immediate neighbourhood of their homes. These proportions, calculated as they have been upon the particular needs of the Congo, are not, of course, to be applied mechanically to every part of Africa. But even if we assume (though I do not know why we should) that the margin of safety is somewhat wider in Swaziland, it is none the less plain that it is grotesquely overstepped by a percentage of 65 absent on long-term contracts entailing a complete interruption of normal family life. It is not too much to say that no tribal system can survive such a strain for very long.

GENERAL DISLIKE.

The strange thing about this annual migration is that it persists and expands in spite of the fact that everyone, except the Union employer, dislikes it, sometimes for good reasons, sometimes for bad. The Swaziland farmers dislike it, because in some seasons it leaves them short of labour and because they are afraid it may tend to raise the level of local wages. (There is a plausibility about this fear, but there seems to be no evidence of any actual general rise in wages during the last ten years.) The missionaries dislike it because they say, in the time-honoured phrase, that the mine boy comes back with the white man's vices, and none of his virtues. The chiefs dislike it, whenever they understand its threat to their own authority, and the system of which they are the heads. The spokesmen of the Union's civilisation, that triumph of pelucid rationality, presumably dislike it when they snort their disgust at native "invasion" of the towns and at all departures from the blessed principle of segregation, even if they like it when they bellow for more and cheaper labour. The natives dislike it, because they are home-lovers by instinct and because

they sense in a vague way its disintegrating effect upon their social structure.

There is, in truth, no possible defence for this wholesale export of labour, nor for any policy which encourages or countenances it. How can a country develop when, broadly speaking, two-thirds of its productive manpower is in permanent exile? Such a position, evidently, is only tolerated on a tacit assumption that the emigrant labour force is somehow "surplus" to Swaziland's needs. But this is a patent fallacy. That same labour force is the only possible engine-power for the territory's progress. It is, indeed, arguable that to give the native land on terms which prevent him from making anything out of it, is in some ways worse than not giving him any land at all. As I say, it merely pays a gratuitous subsidy to his foreign employer, and makes it impossible for him, or any other labourer in the market in which he competes, to secure the full value of his labour. Yet these, beyond question, are the terms on which the Swazi holds his land in present conditions.

A LIFE OF EXILE.

Taxation, when properly devised, acts as a stimulus to production. In principle, even the comparatively heavy taxation to which the Swazi is liable is unobjectionable. But it is essential to pay some regard to the means by which its demands have to be met. As long as the Swazi meets it by spending the bulk of his life in exile, the possibility of agricultural progress, except within narrow limits, is denied him. He is often rebuked for his slowness in adopting European methods of cultivation, when white farmers are continuously demonstrating them before his very eyes and he himself, as employee, is even taking part in them. But the point is as often overlooked that, in general, new methods are not applied to native lands because the men who ought to be applying them and supervising the change-over are not there. Women, small boys, and old men are not progress's swiftest vehicles. Labour-emigration, which began and to a large extent continues as a response to taxation, has in fact reached a point incompatible with increased native production in the territory. It is the main reason why the natives, as a community, still fail to grow more than a nine-months' food supply for themselves, and why they are obliged to furnish their requirements for the remainder of the year by purchase of European-grown produce—produce sold, needless to add, at a price based not on the cost of production, but on what it would cost to import from the distributing centres of the Union. That is to say, when the Swazi buys maize, he does not pay the Swaziland price, which is probably lower than the Transvaal price, but the Transvaal price plus transport, etc. charges from the Transvaal. This artificially augmented price is at least four times what it would cost him to grow the maize himself. The natives are, in short, caught in a vicious circle; their productivity is low because their manpower goes abroad, and their manpower goes abroad because mere productivity, in the absence of a market, cannot supply them with what they need—namely, cash.

USEFULNESS OUTLIVED.

The device of emigration was, in the circumstances in which it arose, necessary, and therefore to that extent, and while confined to reasonable limits, useful. But it has been carried far beyond the peak of its utility. Though the number of boys going out has risen by 32 per cent. since 1924, the total deferred pay remitted to Swaziland has fallen by 41 per cent. in the same period. A smaller proportion of workers is making use of the deferred pay method, because a larger proportion is acquiring the habit of spending its wages on the Reef. Labour-emigration is thus progressively falling of its primary purpose of bringing money into Swaziland. Many mine boys come back with nothing and take a fresh advance from the recruiters the day after their return in consideration of a promise to re-engage. Even when they do bring back something in the way of pay or compensation for accident or disease—something, that is, in excess of what they need for taxation and the other purposes mentioned above—it is habitually invested in scrub cattle, a doubtful blessing for a country where overstocking is already becoming a serious problem.

On the physical and moral side the present indiscriminate migration is equally injurious. If migration were limited to the stronger and more enterprising characters, who should leave home in purposeful spirit to seek their fortune and the hard schooling and wide experience of the outer world, there would be much to be said for it, and the migrants might return with a valuable cargo of new ideas and enlightened leadership. Even now traces of such valuables are no doubt to be discerned in the extremely mixed bag which the traveller carries home. But they are rather like needles in bundles of hay, too often submerged and concealed in a various mass of injured health, occupational and venereal disease, debt, criminal inclinations, disrespect of parental, tribal and Governmental authority and a general malaise of mind, for which tribal life is less and less able to offer any beneficial appeasement. Obviously, labour-emigration on the present scale turns the traditional family existence upside down. Apart from the dangers attending the prolonged separation of husbands and wives, it is inevitably followed by a growing emigration of unattached women, few of whom return the better for their adventures and many of whom remain abroad to ply the least savoury of trades. What is more, the system, as Swaziland knows it to-day, must strike at the sources of life itself and impair the survival rate of the nation. It is highly significant that the yield of native hut tax shows no appreciable rise since 1922.

(To be continued.)

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EXPORT TRADE IN NATIVE PRODUCE

CAN SWAZI MAN-POWER BE KEPT AT HOME?

In principle, the cure for labour migration and its attendant evils is obvious enough. It is to export the fruits of labour instead of the labour itself; in other words, to send goods, not men, to fetch the cash the country needs. The following article discusses possible methods of translating this principle into practice, and points out that a condition of success is the stoppage of the labour recruiting system.

But how to put an end to labour emigration, and all the ills it brings in its train? The reply of economic theory is simple and obvious. It is to replace migration by export trade in native produce, sending out goods instead of hired labour to fetch back the cash the natives need. The difficulty is not to find the principle, but to apply it in practice.

It is well, before considering possible applications, to emphasise an inevitable corollary of the principle itself—namely, the termination of the recruiting system so far as Swaziland (and indeed every High Commission territory) is concerned. The Belgian Government has found the courage to prohibit recruiting among certain tribes in the Congo on which the demand for labour has been shown to be excessive, and it is an essential prerequisite of good government in the High Commission territories that the British authorities should do the same for Swazi, Basuto and Bechuana. The end of recruiting would not, of course, mean the end of labour emigration, nor would it mean restricting the free passage of volunteers to any labour market in which they might care to offer service. But it would mean that such boys as continued to go to the mines would go as pure volunteers at the spur of a genuine economic motive, and not as victims of ingenious bait held out to their inexperience and improvidence. Presumably, and preferably, it would lead to a progressive diminution of labour emigration. But the point is that it is absolutely necessary to stop recruiting in order to afford the best chance of success to schemes designed to keep the Swazi's productive labour on tap in his own country. The recruiting system cannot logically receive any form of approval or recognition from an authority charged with the well-being of the High Commission territories as distinct economic and political units. It is highly questionable even whether such an authority ought to allow Swaziland to be used as a clearing station for the traffic in Portuguese boys. And apart from the well-being of natives in the territories, there is the Union native to be considered. The former furnish approximately one-sixth of the whole labour force employed in the mines and works of the Union. The gradual withdrawal of this very considerable proportion of the total supply is the one discernible means of attaching to the remainder (i.e., the Union natives generally) that scarcity value which alone can secure for them something approaching a fair economic price for their labour.

TWO OBSTACLES.

In establishing an export trade in native produce, two distinct kinds of obstacles have to be overcome—one social, arising out of tribal custom and tradition, the other economic, arising from the ordinary difficulties of production and marketing. The social obstacle is somewhat solid. As we saw in the case of Basutoland, tribal tradition is antipathetic to individual enterprise. A man who assiduously follows modern methods and achieves any marked increase in production always runs a risk of incurring the envy both of his chief and his fellow tribesmen. Then it quite possibly follows that the witch doctors are put on his tracks, and even that he is evicted from his lands. It is largely a question of manners. A well-bred tribesman does not take pains to demonstrate his superiority over his fellows. That spirit of competition, that passion to excel which, through many generations, have been bred into our European psychology, are alien to the Bantu, and pull roughly against tribal convention and etiquette. Naturally, the raw native is much more sensitive to the tribal atmosphere than the educated native is. For this reason it seems politic to begin the effort to set up a native export trade by concentrating on the schools and the class of educated adults. Educational policy should probably be framed in the light of the export trade idea; at the least it should always be checked by reference to it.

It must be remembered that education itself is quite a young growth in Swaziland. The first missionaries arrived in the country nearly 60 years ago, but for 40 of them the war against heathenism was of a purely guerrilla type. It is only since about 1910 that the missions have been operating from a consolidated position and their educational labours can only now be said to be coming of age. Not until two years ago was any plan evolved for co-ordinating these labours. The posts of agricultural officer, director of education, and native school supervisor are all barely two years old. The first native agricultural demonstrator was appointed in 1923. To-day Swaziland still has to import such demonstrators from the Union because she has not yet trained her own; indeed, this is true in the main of all types of native teacher in the territory. All, or almost all, the educated Swazis have found their education beyond their own borders.

These facts are additional reasons for focusing Swaziland's limited resources on those points where education has something of a hold, and leaving the "raw" areas aside for a later campaign. It seems, for example, that if the best value is to be obtained from the agricultural demonstrators their attack should be intensive round and about the schools and not diffused over the remoter tribal districts. Again, one of the teacher's chief perplexities at present is that the native seems to require of education that it should turn him into either a clerk, a teacher or a parson. Some daylight might perhaps be let in on this particular problem by establishing a land settlement scheme for educated Swazis. Such a scheme could be linked up with the schools by awarding some of its benefits as a prize to selected scholars. Whether it should be run on a co-operative basis or on a basis of individual ownership would need careful consideration.

The second, or economic, aspect of the problem—the aspect of production and marketing—brings us to the concrete possibilities of export. At the head of the list, obviously, comes slaughter stock. A native export trade in stock has special attractions, because it would kill several birds with a single stone. Besides bringing in the cash return, it would ease the pressure on the pastures of overstocked areas and minimise the danger of serious soil erosion. Erosion has nowhere yet assumed the alarming proportions common in Basutoland, but they have been avoided more by luck and the natural advantages of

the country than by conscious good management. In many parts the offences against proper husbandry, which are erosion's most fruitful causes, are freely indulged in—overstocking, unregulated grazing and the ploughing of fields on steep slopes. The coming penalty is already casting a visible shadow, for example, on the red-soiled hillsides south of Mbabane and in the middle veld sections of the Hlatikulu district. It will inevitably spread unless means are found to thin out the cattle population of such areas. The export of stock might also have the further advantage of modifying the native's ideas in relation to cattle and turning his attention to other forms of investment. Attempts by Government officers and missionaries to interest him in savings banks and suchlike institutions have hitherto failed largely because of his inability to grasp the fact that money breeds quite as quickly and remuneratively as scrub cattle and is, on the whole, more immune to the attacks of pests. Once he ceased to regard cattle as a simple lock-away investment he might well become accessible to new ideas about money.

There are at present two markets for Swaziland stock. One is the Union quarantine market in Johannesburg or Durban, for which, as Union regulations require, every beast must be not less than 800lb. in weight. The other is the overseas export market in Durban, for which there are no restrictions of weight. Unfortunately the Portuguese East Africa market is closed to Swaziland. The Union's insistence on a minimum weight of 800lb. may in the end prove to be a blessing in disguise to the native, as it already is to the European farmer, if it induces him to raise the quality of his herds to that level. Every effort should be made to persuade him to regard the restriction as setting a standard which it is his aim, as stock breeder, to satisfy.

SELL OFF THE SCRUB

Meanwhile, he has an extremely useful, if temporary, stand-by in the Durban overseas market. Thanks to the big contract with the Italian Government, its absorptive capacity for good veld-fed stock of any weight is at present practically unlimited. How long this pleasant condition will last is, of course, uncertain. For the next year or two at any rate it gives the intelligent Swazi farmer an opportunity to sell off his scrub stock and buy in its place either animals capable of meeting the requirements of the quarantine market or animals suitable for dairying. The Government has, it seems to me, a duty to take active measures to encourage natives to seize this opportunity and to provide them with a simple and inexpensive marketing channel. A number of native-owned cattle have already been disposed of on the overseas market, and the fact perhaps accounts in part for the fall of the average weight per beast exported from 530lb. in 1925 to 447lb. in 1929. But sales have usually been to European speculators touring northern Zululand and Swaziland to see what they could pick up—hardly an "optimum" method of marketing from the standpoint of native interests. Recently arrangements have been made by which the Government will sell cattle on behalf of natives, either on the quarantine market or on the overseas market. Very few natives, however, seem to be aware of their existence, and it is clear that for the Government merely to state that its assistance is available, while leaving the natives to come and ask for it, is not enough. New ad hoc machinery is needed, and a positive Government-applied stimulus to natives to make use of it.

Production presents less difficulty than marketing. In the low veld there are large areas of first-class grazing which have hardly yet been touched. At present the only permanent water is in the big rivers, and it is, in the main, only on pastures within easy reach of these that stock is raised. By building small dams to store the whole of streams which do not run the whole year round, much new grazing land away from the river frontages could be thrown open for stock raising, and the cattle population of the country considerably increased without overstocking. The Government is, as it happens, already contemplating dam construction on this plan in native areas, and a grant from the Colonial Development Fund has been obtained for the purpose. But if the scheme is to be an economic success, it seems essential that it should go hand in hand with a cattle export trade in the early stages, and possibly with dairying later.

TOBACCO AND CREAM.

After slaughter stock the most promising native exports are tobacco and cream. With both a beginning has been made. In 1930 34 native growers produced 21,000lb. of tobacco, and the average return from the crop was probably not less than £25 per head. Similarly, two small dairies are at work, one at the new Swazi National School near Bremersdorp, and the other at Chief Mniisi's kraal at Forbes' Reef. The dairies take all the milk which neighbouring natives care to deliver, separate it, and send the cream to Johannesburg, charging 10 per cent. of the proceeds for their services. Some natives are already making £3 a month in this way. Dairying is still on a very small scale, but if it continues as well as it has begun it may perhaps lead natives to grow stock feed in order to keep their cows longer in milk and even to experiment with breeding up their stock. And were those things to happen, the establishment of a central creamery and cheese factory at Bremersdorp would not seem a visionary project. Swaziland is associated with the Union's dairy control scheme, so that a Union embargo on Swaziland cream, butter, and cheese is improbable—at least much more improbable than an embargo on cattle. For this reason, dairying is safer than ranching as a permanent line of development.

Tobacco growing also seems capable of indefinite expansion, and given a lead by the Government and by the more enterprising type of native, the time will no doubt come when every native garden in suitable districts will contain a few thousand plants. Of all crops possible to Swaziland, tobacco probably gives the largest return per acre.

In the future cotton may take an important place among native exports, even turning out to be a purely native crop as in Uganda and parts of Nyasa-land. The Swaziland cotton grower

is not unfavourably situated in these days of improved transport, and he can get his cotton ginned, pressed, baled, insured, and carried to the Durban market for an inclusive charge of about 1½d. per lb. of lint. But cotton is a tricky crop, both as regards pests and markets. European farmers are at present against cultivation by natives on the ground that the stringent regulations directed towards pest control, under which they themselves operate, would not be properly observed; and the Government hesitates to put the native on to a venture which owing to fluctuations of a world market may prove highly speculative. That there is substance in both objections cannot be denied. But, at the same time, there seems no reason why a start should not be made by selected natives under close Government supervision and in selected areas outside the zone of danger to white farmers.

Whatever may be the future of cotton, the possibilities of stock raising, dairying, and tobacco growing are such that their development for export could gradually absorb the bulk of the manpower which now dissipates itself outside the territory. It is only by some such means that the Swazi people can be freed from the noxious domination of the Union labour market and that a home market can be built up in Swaziland with sufficient consuming power to purchase the products of European industry. The mere withdrawal of the Swazi labour force from employment in the Union would tend towards a rise in the wage levels of unskilled labour in the Union, and thus towards an increased demand for Swaziland produce, such as meat, butter, and tobacco.

(Continued in next column.)

(To be continued.)

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EXPORT TRADE IN NATIVE PRODUCE

CAN SWAZI MAN-POWER BE KEPT AT HOME?

In principle, the cure for labour migration and its attendant evils is obvious enough. It is to export the fruits of labour instead of the labour itself; in other words, to send goods, not men, to fetch the cash the country needs. The following article discusses possible methods of translating this principle into practice, and points out that a condition of success is the stoppage of the labour recruiting system.

But how to put an end to labour migration, and all the ills it brings in its train? The reply of economic theory is simple and obvious. It is to replace migration by export trade in native produce, sending out goods instead of hired labour to fetch back the cash the natives need. The difficulty is not to find the principle, but to apply it in practice.

It is well, before considering possible applications, to emphasise an inevitable corollary of the principle itself—namely, the termination of the recruiting system so far as Swaziland (and indeed every High Commission territory) is concerned. The Belgian Government has found the courage to prohibit recruiting among certain tribes in the Congo on which the demand for labour has been shown to be excessive, and it is an essential prerequisite of good government in the High Commission territories that the British authorities should do the same for Swazi, Basuto and Bechuana. The end of recruiting would not, of course, mean the end of labour emigration, nor would it mean restricting the free passage of volunteers to any labour market in which they might care to offer service. But it would mean that such boys as continued to go to the mines would go as pure volunteers at the spur of a genuine economic motive, and not as victims of ingenious bait held out to their inexperience and improvidence. Presumably, and preferably, it would lead to a progressive diminution of labour emigration. But the point is that it is absolutely necessary to stop recruiting in order to afford the best chance of success to schemes designed to keep the Swazi's productive labour on tap in his own country. The recruiting system cannot logically receive any form of approval or recognition from an authority charged with the well-being of the High Commission territories as distinct economic and political units. It is highly questionable even whether such an authority ought to allow Swaziland to be used as a clearing station for the traffic in Portuguese boys. And apart from the well-being of natives in the territories, there is the Union native to be considered. The former furnish approximately one-sixth of the whole labour force employed in the mines and works of the Union. The gradual withdrawal of this very considerable proportion of the total supply is the one discernible means of attaching to the remainder (i.e., the Union natives generally) that scarcity value which alone can secure for them something approaching a fair economic price for their labour.

TWO OBSTACLES

In establishing an export trade in native produce, two distinct kinds of obstacles have to be overcome—one social, arising out of tribal custom and tradition, the other economic, arising from the ordinary difficulties of production and marketing. The social obstacle is somewhat solid. As we saw in the case of Basutoland, tribal tradition is antipathetic to individual enterprise. A man who assiduously follows modern methods and achieves any marked increase in production always runs a risk of incurring the envy both of his chief and his fellow tribesmen. Then it quite possibly follows that the witch doctors are put on his tracks, and even that he is evicted from his lands. It is largely a question of manners. A well-bred tribesman does not take pains to demonstrate his superiority over his fellows. That spirit of competition, that passion to excel which, through many generations, have been bred into our European psychology, are alien to the Bantu, and pull roughly against tribal convention and etiquette. Naturally, the raw native is much more sensitive to the tribal atmosphere than the educated native is. For this reason it seems politic to begin the effort to set up a native export trade by concentrating on the schools and the class of educated adults. Educational policy should probably be framed in the light of the export trade idea; at the least it should always be checked by reference to it.

It must be remembered that education itself is quite a young growth in Swaziland. The first missionaries arrived in the country nearly 60 years ago, but for 40 of them the war against heathenism was of a purely guerrilla type. It is only since about 1910 that the missions have been operating from a consolidated position and their educational labours can only now be said to be coming of age. Not until two years ago was any plan evolved for co-ordinating these labours. The posts of agricultural officer, director of education, and native school supervisor are all barely two years old. The first native agricultural demonstrator was appointed in 1928. To-day Swaziland still has to import such demonstrators from the Union because she has not yet trained her own; indeed, this is true in the main of all types of native teacher in the territory. All, or almost all, the educated Swazis have found their education beyond their own borders.

These facts are additional reasons for focusing Swaziland's limited resources on those points where education has something of a hold, and leaving the "raw" areas aside for a later campaign. It seems, for example, that if the best value is to be obtained from the agricultural demonstrators their attack should be intensive round and about the schools and not diffused over the remoter tribal districts. Again, one of the teacher's chief perplexities at present is that the native seems to require of education that it should turn him into either a clerk, a teacher or a parson. Some daylight might perhaps be let in on this particular problem by establishing a land settlement scheme for educated Swazis. Such a scheme could be linked up with the schools by awarding some of its benefits as a prize to selected scholars. Whether it should be run on a co-operative basis or on a basis of individual ownership would need careful consideration.

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the country than by conscious good management. In many parts the offences against proper husbandry, which are erosion's most fruitful causes, are freely indulged in—overstocking, unregulated grazing and the ploughing of fields on steep slopes. The coming penalty is already casting a visible shadow, for example, on the red-soiled hillsides south of Mbabane and in the middle veld sections of the Hlatikulu district. It will inevitably spread unless means are found to thin out the cattle population of such areas. The export of stock might also have the further advantage of modifying the native's ideas in relation to cattle and turning his attention to other forms of investment. Attempts by Government officers and missionaries to interest him in savings banks and suchlike institutions have hitherto failed largely because of his inability to grasp the fact that money breeds quite as quickly and remuneratively as scrub cattle and is, on the whole, more immune to the attacks of pests. Once he ceased to regard cattle as a simple lock-away investment he might well become accessible to new ideas about money.

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Meanwhile, he has an extremely useful, if temporary, stand-by in the Durban overseas market. Thanks to the big contract with the Italian Government, its absorptive capacity for good veld-fed stock of any weight is at present practically unlimited. How long this pleasant condition will last is, of course, uncertain. For the next year or two at any rate it gives the intelligent Swazi farmer an opportunity to sell off his scrub stock and buy in its place either animals capable of meeting the requirements of the quarantine market or animals suitable for dairying. The Government has, it seems to me, a duty to take active measures to encourage natives to seize this opportunity and to provide them with a simple and inexpensive marketing channel. A number of native-owned cattle have already been disposed of on the overseas market, and the fact perhaps accounts in part for the fall of the average weight per beast exported from 630lb. in 1925 to 447lb. in 1929. But sales have usually been to European speculators touring northern Zululand and Swaziland to see what they could pick up—hardly an "optimum" method of marketing from the standpoint of native interests. Recently arrangements have been made by which the Government will sell cattle on behalf of natives, either on the quarantine market or on the overseas market. Very few natives, however, seem to be aware of their existence, and it is clear that for the Government merely to state that its assistance is available, while leaving the natives to come and ask for it, is not enough. New ad hoc machinery is needed, and a positive Government-applied stimulus to natives to make use of it.

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THE VEXED PROBLEM OF TRANSPORT

PROS AND CONS IN ROAD V. RAIL CONTROVERSY

What form of transport is best suited to the special conditions of Swaziland, and likely to give the cheapest and most efficient results? The point can only be finally settled by expert investigation, for which the European community has already asked. Meanwhile, it is suggested that, judging from the whole trend of modern transport development, railway construction is unlikely to play a major part in solving Swaziland's problem.

FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.

Second in importance only to the conservation of native man-power comes the question of transport. As we saw, the position in Swaziland has undergone a wide and beneficial transformation by the extension of the Durban-Zululand railway to Golele, and by the establishment of the road transport service by the Union Railway Administration. These improvements have cheapened transport by some 50 per cent., and speeded it up in a higher proportion still. Nevertheless, the present system has certain peculiarities which make it less attractive than it may appear at first sight. It is essentially a foreign service, carrying practically its entire revenue out of the country and spending it abroad. Swaziland thus derives no benefit either from the capital expenditure on its establishment or from expenditure on wages, operation, maintenance, and repairs. She receives no share even of the profits, no revenue from licences in respect of the vehicles employed, and no contribution towards the upkeep of roads on which the wear and tear of the heavy lorries is extremely severe. In short, the service, for all its great utility, is concurrently a big drain on the resources of the country.

THE UNION GAINS.

All these disadvantages to Swaziland are, of course, advantages to the Union. It is true that Swaziland has no liability for losses which may be incurred; but the immunity is of the less significance since, if there were any persistent losses, the service would be discontinued. Its maintenance and extension are evidence that it pays its way. The Union also enjoys certain less direct gains from it. We must take into account the fact that the great bulk of the traffic handled by the road service is fed straight to the Union railways, which make a further profit on it in respect of rail carriage for greater or less distances. Another point is that the service for which Swaziland pays has opened up a large farming area in the Union—namely, the area between Breyten and the Swaziland border, including the Lake Chrissie district. In all these circumstances, the white population of Swaziland, grateful as they are for the Union's opportune assistance, are quite rightly inclined to regard the present arrangements as no more than temporary.

The attitude of the Advisory Council has been to press for the appointment of an expert commission to investigate local transport needs, and, keeping in view the possibility of developing the coal resources, to report on the desirability of constructing a railway through the territory. Their hopes obviously are that the report would be favourable to the railway idea, but they frankly state that they are ready to abide by the findings of such a commission, favourable or unfavourable. The Secretary of State's first response to this very reasonable proposal was unsympathetic. A further petition is now being drawn up, and the Resident Commissioner has promised his help in getting the matter reopened. It is to be hoped that he will be successful, for beyond question there is a genuine need for expert inquiry into the whole transport problem.

THE RAILWAY IDEA.

Without anticipating the possible results of such an inquiry, it is permissible to doubt whether railway-building is likely to figure largely in the problem's solution. For years it has been the fashion in Swaziland to assume that a railway is a sine qua non of any considerable economic development. In Blue Books, annual reports, and up and down official publications generally, as well as in the speeches of members of the Advisory Council, the assumption is continually propounded with a dogmatism for which modern conditions seem to afford little warrant. The experience of railway systems in every developed part of the world to-day increasingly suggests that, except for heavy, long-distance traffic, they are destined to be superseded by the more mobile and adaptable road transport. And an attempt to read the Swaziland situation in the light of that experience leads naturally to the inference that the main job of transport in so small a territory must always be to feed, by road, the railways with which it is surrounded. Coal might conceivably prove to be a special case; and should the time come when an assured export or bunkering market were in prospect, there might be a case for linking the coalfields by rail with the Goba line. But the determining factor there would be the practical conditions of the market in question, and until the market puts in a concrete appearance the point is not to be settled, a priori, by theories of ideal means of transport. Furthermore, by the time the Swaziland coalfields come to be exploited, scientific experimentation with fuels derived from coal may have altered the whole position; and the need may be not for railways or even for roads, but for pipe-lines or something else which to-day seems equally remote.

However that may be, the view that a railway and nothing but a railway can do the trick for Swaziland seems an archaism surviving from the cast of thought of Victorian times. Nothing could be clearer than in the main, i.e., in normal conditions in most parts of the world, the future lies with road transport. The railway is no longer the unique Open Sesame to progress and prosperity; indeed, it would be more reasonable to regard it as a very expensive incubus to be avoided whenever possible and only resorted to when shown to be indispensable in special conditions. It is customary in Swaziland to seek to prove the superiority of rail transport by taking present road costs in the territory and comparing them with present rail costs in the Union. Naturally the comparison displays the latter in an attractive light. But it is devoid of any practical value, because it ignores a number of important factors, such as the possibility of cheapening road transport in Swaziland, and because it tacitly and indefensibly assumes that rail charges in Swaziland would be the same as they are in the Union. Actually, unless Swaziland contrived to saddle the patient taxpayer of Great Britain with the early losses, a railway would for many years be a heavy weight for the European community to carry, and freight rates would inevitably be considerably higher than they are in the Union.

OIL FUEL.

From the other side, the development of the heavy oil-burning lorry holds out a firm promise of important reductions in the cost of road transport. If the prices of petrol and heavy oil were to remain at their present respective levels, the reduction in operating costs would be impressive indeed. But it is well known that the oil producing companies at present use the big demand for petrol to raise the price of that product in order to cover losses on the other products of the refining process—namely, heavy oil and tar. From this fact it is often argued that, with the advent of the Diesel engine for road transport and the consequent increase of demand for heavy oil and decrease of demand for petrol, producers would gradually transfer to the former the burden now borne by the latter, and raise the price of heavy oil to carry the losses on petrol and tar. No doubt the use of the Diesel engine on a large scale would be followed by some rise in the price of heavy oil. Yet it is authoritatively estimated that, even were heavy oil to advance in price to the level now ruling for petrol, the increased mileage given by the higher calorific value of heavy oil should result in a reduction of 50 per cent. in fuel costs, or about 25 per cent. in total operating costs.

In all this there is inevitably a large element of surmise. But it is probably near enough to the mark to suggest that Swaziland would do well to regard its dreams of a railway as somewhat anachronistic, to concentrate attention on the improvement of roads, and to follow carefully the most up-to-date development of oil-burning lorry design. If the country is resolved on some drastic treatment of the transport problem, there is surely a better method than a State-guaranteed railway, and that is a semi-State public utility corporation operating a complete road-service with oil-burning machines, spending its revenue in the country, employing local labour, and possibly having an assembly-plant and repair-shop at Bremersdorp.

A SWAZILAND TRANSPORT COMPANY.

Once securely established, such a corporation might be in a position to effect further reductions in transport charges by purchasing its own rolling-stock for use on the Union railways, thus reaping the benefits of private ownership which British practice has made familiar. It seems possible that assistance from the Colonial Development Fund might be forthcoming for a scheme of this kind, particularly if the fleet of lorries required were purchased in Britain. An experimental beginning might perhaps be made, under present conditions, with a small express service carrying cream to Breyten.

Eventually, of course, such a scheme would involve the transfer to the suggested corporation of the responsibilities now discharged by the South African Railways road service. But, as we saw, that service, in spite of all that it is doing for the development of the country, has intrinsic disadvantages by reason of which it cannot be regarded as more than a temporary makeshift. In any case, it is difficult to see how the South African Railways could raise a convincing objection to the transfer. If the present service is making a profit, it is but equitable that the lion's share of that profit should go to Swaziland; while if it is making a loss, presumably the South African Railways would rejoice at the prospect of Swaziland taking that loss over.

(To be concluded.)

CONDITIONS OF FUTURE PROGRESS

PROXIMITY TO THE SEA AN ASSET THAT NEEDS EXPLOITING

The concluding article of the series sums up the chief possibilities of economic and political progress, and attempts to outline the conditions necessary for their realisation. It emphasises the value of a geographical position within easy reach of the sea; and, finally, it reaffirms the need for a "dual policy," associating natives and Europeans in the furtherance of mutual and complementary interests.

Whatever may be the right solution of the transport problem, there is every hope that it will not now be many years in coming. Swaziland's feet seem securely planted on the highway of economic progress, and the administrative authority is quite alive enough to the posture of the country's internal and external affairs to justify the belief that transport facilities will by one means or another keep adjusted to its growing needs. In this the European population may look, with some reason and confidence, to the British Government for further assistance. Even on the basis of the present transport arrangements, which, as we saw, are open to criticism much more for their high cost than for inadequacy of service, the white farmer has an almost bewildering choice of agricultural and pastoral possibilities before him. Beyond his present lines of tobacco, cotton and ranching there lie at least fruit, timber, wattles, dairying and eggs. All are promising, and in none has potentially been more than superficially scratched. Tea and sugar are also being experimented with, and in a few years may perhaps claim inclusion in the above list. The farmer, clearly enough, has plenty of material to hand for moulding, by his own energy and enterprise and by informed sympathy with native development, a prosperous future for himself.

Swaziland is also fortunate in being able to look forward to a growing mineral development. The workings of tin and asbestos on a scale considerable in relation to the general economy of the country only awaits the recovery of the world's markets. The extensive deposits of coal, given favourable external circumstances, may one day become an important factor in economic expansion. There is, further, ample water power for the electricity requirements of the population.

THE SEA.

But perhaps Swaziland's best asset of all and one which has not yet begun to be exploited, is her proximity to the sea. This is of especial significance in relation to citrus and coal. In the case of citrus the advantage is climatic. The Union is the only country in the world in which any large commercial production of citrus takes place at a distance of hundreds of miles from the coast, and there is little doubt that this peculiarity is a serious handicap in growing the best quality of fruit. Swaziland is so placed that she could start without that handicap. In the case of coal the advantage is geographical. The coal resources of Natal and the Transvaal are easily and cheaply worked, the average pithead price being under 7s. and 5s. respectively. There is no reason, so far as present knowledge goes, to expect that Swaziland coal would compare unfavourably in this respect. But export trade and bunker trade in Union coal have shown a disappointing development for one main reason—namely, the situation of the mines far inland, and the consequent cost of freight to the coast. It seems at least possible that Swaziland might capture the exports and bunkers which Natal once hoped would fall a prize to herself, though both, by reason of the increase in the proportion of oil-driven shipping, are perhaps dwindling trades.

The economic exploitation of Swaziland's proximity to the sea, of course, implies the cultivation of the closest and most cordial relations with her Portuguese neighbours. This is a task, possibly somewhat neglected in the past, to which the new High Commissioner may be expected to address himself with a will. It should prove to be simplified for him, both by the change in the High Commissionership itself and because Swaziland's incorporation in the Union is obviously no longer a possibility of the immediate future.

A JOINT COUNCIL?

I mentioned above that the progress of the white community depended in a special sense upon its informed sympathy with native development. Upon the bridge of this observation we may make the passage from the field of economics to the field of politics. How is this informed sympathy to be attained? At present the distinction between European affairs and native affairs is cut very clear, alike in the minds of Europeans and natives, and in the practice of government. The Advisory Council consists exclusively of Europeans, and, theoretically, it advises exclusively on European affairs. Policy in native affairs, on the other hand, is framed by the Government in consultation with the Paramount Chief, who has his own council of natives. This sharp differentiation corresponds, of course, with no economic reality, and is in practice increasingly difficult to maintain. As the country develops it will evidently have to give way to something better suited to the facts, and presumably the first complete stage in the adjustment will be a joint Advisory Council of Europeans and non-Europeans. European opinion is as yet unripe for such an innovation, and will, no doubt, take some time to assimilate and adapt itself to the idea. Nevertheless, it seems essential that Europeans should be gradually associated with the formation of at least the broad principles of native policy, and educated, by means of co-operation with the Government, to the view that native interests and European interests are neither separable nor antagonistic but twin-yoked and complementary. Similarly, some regular machinery will before very long be needed for the proper consultation of representative native opinion on changes of policy which primarily affect Europeans.

CONTACT WITH NATIVES.

In the former direction at least there is already a well-marked tendency. When, for example, the annual Estimates are presented to the Advisory Council, members are encouraged to take into their perusal the whole field of public finance, and the Government does not attempt to confine discussion to items of revenue to be derived from the European community and items of expenditure proposed for its benefit. An even plainer index of the official line of thought is seen in the new Native Education Committee, whose membership includes, besides native missionaries, and officials, certain members of the elected Advisory Council. By such means, it may be, European opinion will be stimulated to a friendly concern for native advancement, and familiarised with the idea of co-operation with natives to secure it.

In parenthesis, it is worth remarking that the ordinary European public seems to carry to surprising lengths its aloofness from human contacts with the natives. In Mbabane, for instance, there is a native amusement hall where concerts, dances and other forms of social entertainment take place

under the auspices of a native managing committee. When I visited it to listen to a very diverting concert, I was informed that I was the second European to do so, the first having been the Resident Commissioner. I do not imagine the statement to be strictly accurate, but it is probably useful as a pointer. Extremely useful work is open to European residents of the village in the way of helping the committee to get suitable cinematograph films from Johannesburg, in arranging lectures and debates for natives who speak English, and generally in attempting to satisfy some of the needs which are met in Britain by the Workers' Educational Association. Ideas of this kind seem to have occurred to no one. And, apart from dedicated persons, such as missionaries and officials, the European public in Swaziland generally seems insensitive to the charm of native psychology, and little interested in assisting its struggles towards more light. This indifference means a loss to natives and Europeans alike. One would have expected to find a sort of patriotic pride in operation here, a desire to see the Swazi as the most hopeful and most enlightened representative of all the southern Bantu. Apparently it is not so.

GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE.

The influence of the Government on relations between the European and native communities can hardly be more than indirect. And the example set by the Government in recent years is beyond cavil. A great deal has been done to establish intimate and unbroken touch with the various phases of native sentiment. Arrangements have been made for monthly meetings at headquarters with the Paramount Chief, as well as for monthly meetings between assistant commissioners and chiefs in the districts, and at both types of meeting matters of interest or importance to the natives are freely discussed with a minimum of formality. Both have rapidly proved their usefulness, and the former in particular now form an indispensable link in the administrative chain; for the Paramount Chief, besides being a highly engaging personality, distinguished for his intelligence and public spirit, enjoys great confidence among his people, so that his willing co-operation with the official element is a notable simplification of the work of government. Committees, elected at public meetings, have also been formed throughout the territory to represent the views of educated natives and coloured persons. The committees have access to the Resident Commissioner at any time, and are encouraged to tender advice.

Dear Sir,
I, too, had a great deal to say on the subject of the proposed changes in the Government of Swaziland.
Yours,
Johannesburg

Johannesburg
Monday 20. 4. 1931 Page 14

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