

The Pungwe Bridge blown up in 1981

were blown up, and effectively isolated Beira.

The expertise with which the bridge was demolished suggests the presence of South African experts in this operation. Remarkably, the pipeline, which is carried on the bridge supports, was scarcely damaged in the explosion. The rail bridge withstood the blast. But one supporting pillar was damaged and had to be replaced, and thus for six weeks rail traffic from Zimbabwe to Beira was interrupted.

The destruction of marker buoys at the port of Beira in early November clearly had the same target to disrupt a vital outlet to the sea for the land-locked countries of the region, and to intimate to them that it was unwise to try and break their dependence on South Africa.

Although the MNR immediately claimed sabotage of the buoys, there is good reason to believe that this was an exclusively South African operation. The high degree of sophistication required makes it more than likely that the job was carried out by a team of South African frogmen.

Emboldened by the unstinting military support received from Pretoria, the MNR started attacking small towns in early 1982. In accordance with lessons on propaganda which van Niekerk had given Dhlakama a year earlier, such raids were trumpeted abroad as major military victories. In fact, of course, looting isolated and undefended towns, holding them for a few hours and then withdrawing when the FPLM shows up, achieves no military objective at all. Nobody has ever won a war that way. But it does keep the name of the MNR in the world's press, and strengthens the suspicion that Mozambique is 'unstable'. This tactic is clearly aimed at scaring off potential Western investment in Mozambique.

Similar publicity-hunting motives were behind the kidnapping of two foreign workers in the Gorongosa National Park in December 1981. According to the Garagua documents, Cristina had advocated this sort of action. Foreign prisoners, he said, could be used to blackmail their countries of origin. In exchange for freeing them the MNR could "demand a particular sum of money, or material assistance". In the case of one of those captured at

18 Gorongosa, the British ecologist John

Burlison, the MNR employed this type of blackmail. They implied that Burlison would be released, provided his parents had a letter from Dhlakama published in the British press.

Although this was done, Burlison was not released and fears for his safety have mounted. Two days after the kidnapping, two Portuguese technicians travelling from Chimio to Tete were taken out of their car and shot at point blank range.

A further MNR target has been a power line taking electricity from the giant Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme in Tete province to South Africa. This appears to have been Cristina's idea: in November 1980 he suggested this in order "to disguise the existence of South African support for the MNR". This would not harm their South African employers, he hastened to add, since only seven per cent of South Africa's electricity comes from Cahora Bassa.

This proved to be a miscalculation. South Africa suffered a particularly severe winter in 1981, and, thanks partly to the MNR putting the Cahora Bassa lines out of action, faced a shortfall in electricity supply. The result was widespread power cuts. The MNR is now reported to have promised the South Africans that they will enjoy "a warm winter" in 1982 - which appears to be a pledge to leave the transmission lines alone.

Throughout the history of the MNR there are certain common features. One is brutality. Wherever the group has been active, it has left behind a trail of death and mutilation. On arrival in an area, an MNR band's first action is to seek out and murder the local Frelimo Party officials. Those not actually in the Party, but are believed to be sympathisers, suffer the lesser penalty of having their ears, noses, lips or, if women, breasts cut off. Defenceless peasants, their lips sliced off are told: "Now you can go and smile at Samora". This cannot be shrugged off as the work of a few individual sadists in the MNR. The reports are so consistent, from all areas where the MNR is or has been active, that it is clearly a matter of mutilation as policy, terror as a deliberate weapon to intimidate the local peasantry.

A second common thread is superstition. In his speech to his men at Zoabastad in October 1980 Dhlakama referred several

times to the "spirits". A bomb had recently exploded in the car of Domingos Arouca, a right wing landowner in colonial Mozambique who chose Portuguese nationality after Mozambique's independence. He had incurred Dhlakama's wrath by using the name of the MNR without permission. Dhlakama gloated over the explosion attributing it to "the spirits of the MNR".

Superstition plays an important role inside MNR camps. Recruits are told that if they desert, then "the spirits" will pursue them, in the shape of lions, and will devour them. Before any military operations, religious ceremonies are held which are supposed to make the participants invulnerable to "communist bullets". "The spirits" are also useful vehicles for Dhlakama's own paranoia. Repeatedly, people accused of being Frelimo spies are assassinated in the MNR camps — the information on which these murders are based is given to Dhlakama in his regular interviews with "the spirits".

For the MNR traditions animist superstition replaces political mobilisation. Terror takes the place of persuasion. Foodstuffs are acquired through straight forward looting. The aims of the MNR are not those of a domestic counter-revolutionary organisation — instead they are imposed on it from outside. It serves the strategies of foreign powers, first Rhodesia, now South Africa.

Does the MNR enjoy any support at all? The answer to this question must be a qualified "yes". Those who lost their old power and privileges when Frelimo came to power are quite prepared to throw in their lot with the MNR. Apart from the "feticéiros", these include the "regulos" — tribal chiefs usually appointed to their posts by the Portuguese, and regarded as colonial stooges. The MNR wins their support by promising to restore them to their former positions.

Then there are those who attempted to win positions of influence in the new Mozambique, but failed. Both in the elections to the people's assemblies in 1977 and in the Frelimo Party structuring campaign in 1978, candidates had to be submitted to mass meetings in their villages or workplaces. In this process many were rejected. Some of them, particularly in Inhambane, have now gone over to the

MNR.

There have been two main bases for the recruitment to the MNR. One is tribal. The MNR has tried to mobilise the people of Manica on ethnic grounds. Both Matsangaiza and Dhlakama were from that area. The first deputy commander of the MNR, Orlando Macomo, was assassinated by Dhlakama "because he was a southerner". Dhlakama immediately stepped into the murdered man's shoes. The MNR attempts to generate ethnic support by peddling the lie that "Frelimo is controlled by southerners" and discriminates against "the people of the centre and the north".

The other recruitment method is simple coercion. The MNR kidnaps young peasant boys and forces them to undertake military training. They are initiated into banditry at a very early stage, and told that if they surrender to the FPLM, the Mozambican soldiers will slit their throats.

But the attitude of most people in central Mozambique towards the MNR is a mixture of fear, anger and loathing. When, in February 1982, President Samora Machel visited parts of Inhambane province affected by MNR activity, he was greeted everywhere with crowds demanding "guns to fight the bandits" — a demand that will be granted.

The South Africans have always denied their involvement in the MNR, but these protests of innocence are fooling very few people. Pretty well every Western diplomat in Maputo will privately admit they are convinced of the South African connection. Now the mask has slipped even further with MNR statements on *Voz da Africa Livre* that they will accept support from any country "including South Africa". How long before South Africa officially admits its ties with the MNR?

In conclusion, we can report that Afonso Dhlakama has made-up for his short-lived and ignominious career in the Mozambican army by his rapid rise in the South African one. According to MNR sources, he is now a full colonel in the South African army. This rank was attributed to him at a ceremony at Phalaborwa in 1981, attended by South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan. Addressing Dhlakama, Malan said: "Your army is part of the South African Defence Force."

# THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

by H.L.

*The protection of apartheid by military means has demanded the full participation of the military in the political arena. The military domination of the state apparatus has been sketched in the March issue of SECHÁBA.*

Concepts such as 'total strategy' and 'total war' are part of an all-embracing dogma called the National Security Doctrine (NSD). This doctrine provides the framework for apartheid strategists. Central to this strategy is the military institution. The primary task of the military is to wage a counter-revolutionary war. This involves using every means at its disposal, such as 'the state, the private sector, diplomacy, commerce, industry, etc.', and coordinated action in all fields 'military, psychological, economic, political, sociological ...'. These mechanisms for political and economic domination and social control are to be reinforced, extended and developed to enable the continued survival of the apartheid system.

The National Security Doctrine provides the rationale for 'changes' to the monopoly capitalist system in South Africa. The 'military state' is an attempt to resolve the crisis facing the apartheid system. Apartheid strategists, faced with the growing strength of the forces of national liberation, realise the need to secure the continued existence of the monopoly capitalist system. They are preparing for the 'managed evolution' of the apartheid system to a conveniently 'respectable' form.

## The Military and the NSD

The military have been the primary force and interest in developing the NSD and 'total strategy'. Within the military, the general staff and sections of the senior officer group have provided the impetus.

Other powerful interest groups within the ruling class, such as organised business and commercial interests, academics and researchers etc., have also contributed significantly to the development of a total strategy. These sections of the ruling class have come together with a common objective: that is, to ensure the survival of the 'free enterprise system' and the 'nation'.

The 'free enterprise system' is a euphemism for a superficially modified or 'restructured' apartheid system, and the protection of the 'white nation' remains central to this doctrine. So the national oppression and economic super-exploitation of the majority, essential to the apartheid system, will continue to be essential, too, to the 'total strategy'. According to the Prime Minister P.W. Botha, in his statement made in 1977, 'the principle of the right of self-determination of the white nation must not be regarded as being negotiable. Military strategy forms part of a broader national strategy to ensure this.'

According to Professor Lombard, a member of the Prime Minister's Planning Advisory Council, 'the National Security Doctrine specifies ... time to allow the "evolution" of the domestic order in the direction of a system of association among all its peoples which is also internationally recognised ... In future the time needed for the internal evolution will have to be bought by means of military operations.' Lombard advocates a 'restructuring' with the aim of defending the essence of apartheid, and at the same time appeasing 'international' interest.

The imperialist countries need to 'stabilize' South Africa and Southern Africa, for the continued exploitation of the people and their resources. In order to secure their immense investment and the continued operations of the large multi-national corporations, they are concerned about the


development of the liberation struggle, armed actions, strikes, riots, rebellions and with the general social instability. The imperialists have therefore applied a policy of pressure and intervention in an attempt to force the apartheid system to 'modernise' itself, to give it a new face.

#### Lombard 'theory'

Lombard envisages a slow move away from race discrimination; however, he emphasises the continuation of the existing apartheid system of exploitation and the continued rule and dominance of the present ruling class; 'the replacement of colour discrimination by classical norms of competition and democracy in the production and distribution of goods and services, both in the private and public sector, does not automatically imply the subjugation of the sovereignty of the state as such, to the whims of simple majorities in the total population on the so-called Westminster pattern. Quite the contrary: a clear distinction must be drawn between the welfare functions in the economy on the one hand, and the other functions of the state over that economy, on the other'.

Professor Lombard makes a distinction between the maintenance of political and economic power, and the need to be more concerned with the 'welfare' of its people. Here he is referring to the need to provide all South Africans with a material stake in defending South Africa. Apartheid strategists argue that it is necessary to expand the base of their counter-revolutionary alliance. For people to 'defend South Africa against attack', they need to have a 'stake in the existing system'.

This tactic is failing and will continue to fail. Economic incentives aimed at sections of the oppressed people, in order to lure them into an alliance with the apartheid rulers, do not and cannot succeed. The oppressed people will refuse to become mercenaries and instruments of their own oppression. The fascists fail to recognise their moral isolation from the majority of the people. Legitimacy cannot be bought from the oppressed people by mere economic incentives within the framework of national oppression and economic super-exploitation.



South Africa uses napalm in its war against the Angolan people

We cannot take seriously any 'structural' tampering with the apartheid fascist system. The essential nature of apartheid will be maintained. The oppressed majority, the black workers, the migrant and contract workers, the peasant subsistence farmers, the unemployed, those endorsed out to the bantustans, are eliminated from that body of individuals included in the fascist concept of the 'nation'. It is ridiculous for the racists to believe that oppressed people will rally to the flag of the fascists and their toy 'nations'. The Matanzimas, the Sebe's, the Mangope's etc., are the only people provided with a 'material stake in defending' apartheid.

#### Suppressing the 'internal enemy'

The military state will continue the apartheid policy of wholesale import-export of populations, the forced exile of opponents, internal populations transfers within 'national' territories, which ensure the partitioning and disorganisation of possible centres of 'subversion' in an attempt to 'sterilize' the people. These are all part of the 'total strategy' design for suppressing the 'internal enemy'. The present Bantustan policy will thus serve a military purpose as well as continuing to provide cheap labour to the white industrial areas via a streamlined labour bureau system.

#### Economic aspects of the NSD

An important aspect of the National Security Doctrine (NSD) is now being played out in South Africa where the military and monopoly capitalist interests have converged, and a joint 'total strategy' is being formulated at the highest level under the overall guidance of the military and the NSD. The State Security Council effectively the supreme decision-making body in South Africa, involves the heads of industry who sit on its sub-committees. This effectively incorporates the so-called

'private sector', under the leadership of monopoly capital, into the total strategy approach. This alliance between the state and monopoly capitalism has been developed by the close contacts between the military and monopoly capital, especially in the field of arms and munitions manufacture.

'Paratus', the SADF official mouthpiece, argues that a strong military would guarantee sound economic development and vice versa: "The shifting of a significantly larger proportion of the country's resources into defence may not be particularly good for the growth of private consumption in the short term. Heavy spending on defence is rarely popular with the public even in wartime ... This however can be regarded as an insurance policy for long-term benefits such as security, higher standards of living, and above all, a guarantee for the system of free enterprise."

The nature of the cooperation between the state and the monopoly capitalists involves three main points and objectives: 1) the consultation and cooperation in achieving 'common national objectives', 2) limiting state involvement in economic activities to a level more in line with a 'free enterprise economy', and 3) greater monopoly capitalist responsibility in shaping and maintaining the 'socio-economic environment'.

These points are illustrated in the following view of the South African economy. The militarisation of the state has included an enormous expansion of the domestic military industrial complex. At least 90,000 workers are involved, either directly or indirectly, in the manufacture of a broad range of military requirements. The state arms manufacturer, 'Armcor', is one of South Africa's biggest industrial undertakings, and is currently headed by a manager on secondment from a private firm, Barlow Rand. The private sector has been drawn into close collaboration in this operation. Over 800 companies are involved





in contracts or sub-contracts in the military industry. A highly influential body, the Defence Advisory Council, has been expanded and is playing a central role in the formulation of economic policy. Several major South African industrial enterprises have at least one director serving on this committee.

There are a number of other ways in which the private sector of the economy has become more closely integrated with the Government and the military. Agencies such as the National Development and Management Foundation have played a role in bringing together industrialists, government, and the military, through seminars. Agencies like the Rural and Urban Founda-

tions have brought private finance into areas formerly occupied by public funds only. More recently, the Small Business Development Corporation and the Development Bank have provided financial institutions through which both public and private funds will be used to further the policies of the regime.

#### COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The 1977 Defence White Paper calls for a 'resolution of a conflict'. This is a call for the escalation and precipitation of war — a counter-revolutionary war.



This war is to be waged, and is being waged, against the oppressed majority in South Africa and Namibia — against the liberation movements, the ANC and SWAPO, who lead and embody the revolutionary aspirations of the oppressed people. This war is being waged against the neighbouring states who support the liberation struggle against the fascist apartheid system. The war is also aimed at destabilising the revolutionary governments of socialist-oriented countries such as Angola and Mozambique, in accordance with imperialist strategy which demands neo-colonial solutions.

The National Security Doctrine provides account internal aggression, manifested through infiltration, ideological subversion, and guerilla movements.

This exposes the NSD as a convenient legal framework, to provide justification for the use of the military institution to reinforce and uphold the exploitative imperialist system. South African fascist theoreticians place an equal emphasis on 'foreign aggression' — their own aggression against the 'foreign' frontline states.

According to M.H. Louw, ex-director of ISSUP, 'National Security Doctrine deals with war, and war as a brand of politics ... which must have a philosophical basis for its punitive intent, violence and extermination of life.' Louw emphasises the offensive nature of the doctrine; 'taking the initiative to intensify the conflict for achieving set political results ... a defensive position cannot lead to a political solution.'

24 What is proposed is an aggressive

offensive against the frontline states, to be carried out with the effect of bludgeoning them into a position of surrendering to the demands of the apartheid regime. Louw explains: 'National Security Doctrine is a trilogy of foreign policy, military policy and domestic policy ... We must mobilize through its mechanisms and resources a capability (power, leverage or violence) for effective resistance ... this means a capacity to withstand challenges to our own territorial integrity and political and socio-economic order as well as to exert pressure on other, mostly weaker states, to make their behaviour consonant with our interests.'

#### Root Causes of Oppression

In order to ensure that the apartheid fascists survive, the imperialists provide information as to how to combat national liberation struggles. US 'counter-insurgency research' specialists and 'psychological operations' specialists, Colonels Katz and Barber (see SECHABA, March 1982), attended the ISSUP conference in 1974 and brought with them their experience of fighting 'communism and national liberation wars.' These individuals are merely examples of a significant exchange process of counter-revolutionary material. Colonel Barber of the US Marines provides the apartheid strategists with an insight into the methods mechanics and operations of the NSD as implemented in the US, but with particular emphasis on the fight against 'terrorism' related to wars of national liberation. According to Barber, 'The Soviets and their partners have become skilled in the export of terrorism ... Your (SA) experience in Angola, and ours in Vietnam provide recent example of this and also demonstrate the difficulties and frustrations in countering Marxist-sponsored wars of liberation.'

So according to the imperialists, people fighting fascist oppression are automatically 'terrorists', directly linked to Moscow. The imperialists fail to realise that they are the root cause of oppression together with their fascist allies. The oppressed people cannot fail to realise that the Soviet Union a fascist legitimisation for militarization and the consequent pursuit of war as a policy. This war doctrine identifies friendly and enemy camps and elaborates from this identification a war strategy. On a global



level this identification centres around the 'fundamental East-West conflict', an uncompromising conflict between 'Christian Western' world and 'Communist Eastern' world. The fascist theoreticians reduce everything to simplistic notions: 'them and us', 'freedom' versus 'communism'. They place themselves clearly in the camp of the 'western free world', while often pretending for convenience to be some kind of 'original' third force, having 'transcended the capitalist-communist dilemma'. This device is often used to explain their position when gestures of disapproval are directed towards them by their US and European allies.

On a national level, counter-revolutionary war involves a multi-faceted and comprehensive assault against the oppressed people and the national liberation movement. 'Total war' abolishes the previously clear distinction between the civilian and the military spheres. The whole of society now becomes a battleground, and every individual is involved in the conflict, either for or against. It is a total war because the battlefields and weapons used relate to all

individual and community life. This war allows no escape from the conflict. The weapons are very diverse: political, economic, psychological, and military. They also include diplomatic negotiations, alliances and counter-alliances, agreements or treaties with public or secret clauses, commercial sanctions, loans, capital investment, embargoes, boycotts and dumping, as well as propaganda and counter-propaganda, suggestive slogans for internal and external use, means of persuasion, blackmail, threats, and terrorism. This is 'total war' because the distinction between wartime and peace time is gone: war is now permanent.

#### Absurd definitions

The Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria (ISSUP) played an important role in launching the National Security Doctrine. Its first symposium held in 1974 provides an insight into the thinking of the fascist strategists and their imperialist sponsors who are keen to provide



the apartheid regime with strategic and tactical experience gained from their own counter-revolutionary wars, particularly Vietnam.

A Brazilian general provides a definition of National Security: 'The traditional concept of national defence places the accent upon the military aspects of security, and consequently emphasises the problems of foreign aggression. The concept of National Security is much more complete. It includes global defence of institutions, and takes into consideration psycho-social aspects, preservation of development, and internal political stability. In addition, the concept of security is much more explicit than that of defence, takes into represents progressive humanity, and will continue to champion the struggles for national liberation against imperialism, colonialism and racism.

Colonel Katz provides South Africa with a mechanical analysis of 'communist organisation', 'revolution', and 'people's war'. According to him, the 'political' work of national liberation movements is equivalent to psychological operations (PSYOP) which he defined as 'the planned or programmed use of propaganda and other actions to influence both attitudes and actions of friendly neutral and enemy populations important to military commanders.' So now the imperialists advocate the systematic indoctrination of the oppressed population. The most virulent advocates of this policy were US officers captured during the Vietnam war, where they underwent re-education courses. So being unnerved by the militant practices of their adversaries, they try to use the enemy tactics for other purposes.

'Enemy is difficult to define'

In the 1950s the US Defence Department, foreseeing the rise of national liberation wars, recommended that officers read guerrilla war classics so as to be better able to combat this kind of war. For the Americans the French experience in Algeria and Indo-China was invaluable. The French military, based on its colonial war experience, was the first to formulate a theory on the struggles against 'insurgency' and 'subversion', the revolutionary war.

26

Subversion is defined in the following

terms: 'an ensemble of actions of every possible nature (political, economic, psychological, armed, etc ...) which aim both at taking power and replacing the established system by another.'

The new enemies were to be defined thus:

'In modern era, the enemy is especially difficult to define. There is no physical barrier or frontier separating the two camps; the line between friends and enemies is drawn within the same nation, within the same village, and sometimes even within the same family. It is often an ideological, immaterial frontier, but which must necessarily be established if we are to be sure of overtaking and vanquishing our adversary.'

This war had new requirements: 'an essential element of modern warfare is the inhabitant ... Control of the masses by a strict hierarchy, or often even by several parallel hierarchies, is the master weapon of modern war'.

The US in Vietnam adopted two primary approaches:

- a) the conventional, generally supported by the establishment; and
- b) the unconventional, or 'liberal' supported by liberal reformists.

The conventional approach has a preference for conventional ground and air operations requiring large deployments of troops. Search and destroy missions (mop up operations), the tactics of encirclement and attrition which involve on the one hand the establishment of large military fortifications (bases, enclosures), connected by mobile battalions: and on the other hand, the massive displacement of a civilian population and the creation of free-fire zones. The conventionalists prefer setpiece battles, and apply political and institutional pressures toward forcing, or luring the guerrillas into conventional showdowns. The results are sustained aerial bombardments and invasions of guerrilla 'sanctuaries' across national frontiers of conflict.


The unconventional approach, which in the US and French situations emanated from a liberal-reformist political position, in practice demands the creation of counter-guerrilla guerrillas (special forces such as the

Recco's); and the stress on irregular tactics, the unity of civilian and military roles, maximum use of mercenaries, psychological warfare, counter-terror, and 'pacification'.

'Pacification' is a term borrowed by US theoreticians from the French, and involves a military as well as a civil process: (1) it sets out to 'protect' or 'sterilize' the rural population, thereby depriving guerillas of their popular base; (2) it attempts to generate support for the central government by reviving a sense of rural administration and providing economic incentives, and establishing essential services such as medical and educational — as well as 'policing'. The military aspects of pacification involve the 'neutralisation' of guerillas. It entails irregular tactics, small-unit deployment, efficiently and relentlessly executed punitive measures against people suspected of aiding guerillas, systematic use of torture murder of prisoners, and the institution of total control over the population.

So if the masses are to be rallied to the counter-revolutionary cause how are they to be taken? Psychological operations, which

is part of the pacification process, is aimed at carrying out this task. It is defined as 'a supplement of the physical weapons used against the enemy. It seeks to reduce the enemy's will and ability to work and fight, by creating new attitudes which destroy his morale. It represents persuasion by non-violent means, the use of propaganda'. Propaganda is defined as 'the systematically organised use of any communication designed to affect the feelings, thoughts, and actions of a group in a definite direction and for a given purpose.' A distinction is made between five different kinds of propaganda: overt propaganda (when source is recognised); covert propaganda (when the source is not revealed, and disguised in such a way that one believes it comes from the enemy); strategic propaganda (when the objectives are of a general, long-term nature, and attempt to reach the entire population); tactical propaganda (which is destined for a particular group of individuals and has a definite, specific objective), and counter-propaganda (which combats and neutralises the effect of the enemy's propaganda).




The Nazis were the first to use a 'modern approach' to psychological warfare. It was applied to their own people, in order to develop conformist attitudes. Hitler referred to it as 'the war with intellectual weapons': which brings us to another weapon in the fascist armoury - torture as an 'information gathering technique'. The NSD systematises the use of torture in a theory of information. Torture is not only considered as a means for obtaining information on clandestine networks, at any price, but also as a means for destroying every individual who is captured, as well as his or her sense of solidarity with an organisation or community.

Another weapon advocated in the war against the people is the computer. This is no stranger to South Africa, but this is how Colonel Katz sees its military role: 'to institutionalise PSYOPS. intelligence the US military designed and developed a computer-oriented system - PYSOP Automated Management Information System - to provide the spectrum of information needed to support PSYOP organisations for planning and evaluation,

to enforce the 'methods' of information gathering programmes, and to provide a data-processing system for analysis and use of gathered data.'

The counter-revolutionary strategists insist on viewing revolutions as conspiracies, which results in a grossly distorted interpretation of the revolutionary process. Revolutionary war is considered to be a technical problem. Because of the pre-occupation with techniques, the conduct of counter-revolutionary war is seen as an exercise in the strategy and tactics of 'pacification' (PSYOPS) and military warfare. Managerial and military experiments are seen as part of the 'total war'. The military advantages of the freedom fighters are studied, and 'counter measures' are developed.

But it is heartening to recognise that all these tactics developed for fighting national liberation wars around the world have been unsuccessful. We can only be spurred resolutely into action against the fascist enemy, who is using this vast array of weapons, which will ultimately ensure the defeat of the fascist apartheid regime.



---

## BOOK REVIEW: FORCED LABOUR SYSTEM

---

*"Working for Boroko: The Origins of a Forced Labour System in South Africa".*  
By Marian Lacey, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981.

The central theme of this book is about the struggles between different interests within the white ruling class to secure for themselves cheap, highly exploitable, black labour power. Lacey analyses the period of the Hertzog administration (1924-1932). Its value lies not in the 'discovery' that apartheid had historical antecedents, but rather lies in the examination of the conflicts within the ruling class, providing insights into the contradictions which characterise white minority rule, in its bid to retain economic as well as political power.

Lacey argues that the conflict between agrarian and mining capital interests centred around how best to secure a labour reserve and reduce competition for labour between the two primary sectors; how to fight against actual and potential competition from black agriculture and at the same time resist the pressures for higher wages, better working conditions and stabilised, urbanised labour which the onset of secondary industrialisation inevitably brought with it. Whilst mining capital wished to secure its labour supply by establishing a labour system based on permanently oscillating labour, migrating between the reserves and the mines, land-based agrarian capital argued that any access to land severely inhibited their labour supplies. And thus the argument raged about the amount of 'quota' land to be added to that already scheduled in the 1913 Land Act.

Mining interests preferred slightly more

land, to secure, so their rationale is argued, sufficient to ensure that the subsistence base of migrant labour could be maintained, without enabling the worker and his family to subsist and thereby resist working in the mines.

Landed interests wanted as little land as possible allocated for African occupation. This debate over how small to make the land allocation is documented by the successive proposals put before parliament in the period 1916-1936, with each reducing the amount suggested in the former proposal.

The 1913 Land Act had successfully restricted African access to land in 3 of the four provinces. Land interests were calling for the extension of this restriction to the Cape. This extension required the withdrawal of the limited franchise which Africans enjoyed in that Province, since it was based on a land qualification. Whilst Hertzog was determined to couple the vote and land questions, Lacey rejects the analysis popular in liberal theory (and not only) that the shadow of the vote was substituted by the substance of the land. Her argument rejects any notion of exchange, which is used rather as a justification than an explanation. Rather, she contends that the drive was to reduce all Africans, throughout the Union to the common status of what she describes as super-exploitability. Contemporary African opinion recognised that the withdrawal of the limited franchise represented a further erosion of the few remaining rights left them.

The other area of contention between mining and industrial capital was the issue of 'squatters'. Mining capital with landed interests used their farms as labour pools, drawing labour into the mines on 6 months

contract and allowing their families and the workers to cultivate the land for the remaining 6 months, on payment of rent. Farmers bitterly opposed this, arguing that such access to land attracted labour off the farms. They also resented labour pools developing in the industrial centres, and called for the redistribution of 'squatters' and 'excess labour' amongst the farmers. They called for stricter legislative and administrative measures to prevent farm workers from leaving the farms to find employment in the industrial centres, wishing to bind farm labour to the farmer, so long as he needed them. Their opposition to enlargement of the reserves also related to the 'squatter' issue, since they felt that if 'squatters' could find alternative land in the reserves they would be able to resist farm labour. The outcome of this was the provision in the 1936 Land Act on the systematic abolition of squatting.

Thus, Lacey argues, labour policy was shaped by the struggle between the interests of mining and agrarian capital. By the end of the Hertzog Administration the major differences between them had been resolved and they were set to go as a united force to achieve their common goals. It is in this period that she dates the origins of the apartheid system, declaring that it was neither a product of the peculiarity of the Afrikaners nor a system which came into being in 1948, as if by magic. It is salutary to add, however, that whilst the roots of apartheid were well sown prior to 1948, the coming to power of the Nationalist Party and the economic, political and social doctrines it has pursued were neither predetermined nor inevitable, but were themselves the outcome of class and national struggles.

Which brings me to one of the major weaknesses of the book. Although Lacey declares a wish to put the record straight concerning the contribution that the black working class has made to creating the enormous wealth that the white minority has appropriated for itself, she in no way achieves this. Her explanation as to why the white ruling class approached the white

and black sectors of the working class differently is neither satisfactory nor enlightening. She tends to regard the oppressed African majority as a passive, hopeless and albeit fated body. None of the dynamism of struggle enlightens the conflicts between the ruling class and the working class. She fails to pose the national question, which, with the primary forum of class struggle — i.e. between the ruling and working classes — integrally determines the ensuing social and class relations that have come to characterise the South African social system.

The book remains, worthwhile reading as Lacey has attempted to clarify issues



which previous interpretations have clouded, whilst at the same time raising issues which themselves need further research and interpretation.

S.

# LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Comrade Editor,

As ANC activists we would like to comment on some of the issues raised by the writers from the Western Cape in their reply (Sechaba, January 1982) to G.J.'s letter in Sechaba of April 1981. It is not that we feel G.J.'s letter should be defended, or that the Western Cape writers need to be contradicted, but that the writers raise serious questions about the meaning of our call 'Unity in Action'. These questions need to be answered not just officially, but also by the rank and file of our movement who must daily seek the means of implementing this most basic call of our revolutionary strategy at this time.

What does 'Unity in Action' mean? Does it mean the unity of the PAC, ANC, the Unity Movement and whatever other groupings may exist amongst the oppressed people? Does it mean that every grouping should have equality on every campaign platform, in every campaign newsletter and on every campaign committee? Does it mean we must not argue steadfastly the ANC's political position but rather refrain from arguing our point 'in the interest of unity'? In answering these questions, dear comrades, let us not fall into the pit of liberalism, of 'laissez-faire' and of political shortsightedness.

'Unity in Action' would seem to mean: firstly, the unity in everyday struggle of all the organs of mass mobilisation -- the unions, civic organisations, student organisations and women's organisations; secondly, the unity of the levels of struggle -- the unity in action of mass struggle, clandestine struggle and military struggle; thirdly, the unity in active resistance of all democratic South Africans, -- black, white, christian, muslim hindu, jew, atheist, socialist and black nationalist; fourthly, and most importantly, the unity in revolutionary struggle of every sector of our population -- workers peasants, intellectuals, students, urban and rural dwellers from the Limpopo to Cape Agulhas, from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic. This could reasonably be seen

as the basis of our call 'Unity in Action', not the formalistic idea of a unity between certain organisations, this latter unity is only meaningful if it comes out of the former and arises from everyday struggle.

In practical terms this means that we, as activists of the ANC, must seek to broaden the areas of mobilisation, increase the numbers of people mobilised into revolutionary structures and increase and make more specific the campaigns around which we fight. It is the number of people mobilised into the struggle which will determine whether our victory is sooner or later, not the number of organisations represented 'equally' on the campaign committee. If our 'revolutionary unity based on equality' is to mean that every organisation in an area has equal voice in determining the direction of campaigns we will quickly find our struggle usurped by those who have no popular base, but who by virtue of radical rhetoric feel they have a right to guide the revolution.

This in no way justifies sectarianism on our own part towards genuinely popular based democratic organisations whose policy and outlook may differ from our own. To these we should extend a comradely hand and seek areas of mutuality around which we can campaign as partners. But in proffering our hand we need not hide our own policies behind our backs or pretend that we have come over to their way of thinking. Rather we should offer our hand with our views clearly stated and while campaigning together seek to convince them and all involved, of the correctness of our policy in a spirit of comradely debate, as far as that is possible in a revolutionary situation. Ultimately, of course, the people will judge whose policy is correct and meaningful to the struggle for national liberation.

In this regard our comrades from the Western Cape are entirely correct when they distinguish between 'genuine fighters and loud mouthed slogan shouters' by asking

the questions; 'who do they direct their main blows against? Do they direct their blows, their venom and their anger at the oppressors and the regime or do they direct it at the oppressed people even if they don't agree 100% with you?' An excellent distinction! But let us not be naive by believing that the enemy is always dressed in police uniform or always drives a GG car. Besides the agents of the Botha/Malan regime who may infiltrate the people's ranks, the forces of imperialism (particularly the United States and West Germany) are keen to subvert our democratic struggle by injecting amongst us provocateurs and those who would lead us away from popular based action. Our blows, our venom and our anger must also, at times, be turned against these agents of the broader enemy. In doing so, of course, we must be absolutely sure that their actions of subverting our struggle are exposed to the people.

Finally we feel it is necessary to raise a point with our comrade editor. In your comment opening up this debate you seek to find common ground between the writers of these two letters by making a distinction between internal and external issues. This certainly is a shallow distinction at this point when our struggle has reached a point when the unity of internal and external wings of our movement and the unity of internal and external issues is stronger than it has ever been since the ANC was forced into exile in the 1960s. Furthermore why is it necessary to seek this common ground when by their very contribution to Sechaba the two writers have exhibited, beside all their differences, a more solid and fundamental common ground a commitment to a free and democratic South Africa.

an ANC unit - Western Cape.

---

# UNITY IN ACTION

---



**SECHABA  
and other  
ANC Publications  
are obtainable  
from the following  
ANC Addresses:**



**ALGERIA**  
5 rue Ben M'hidi Larbi  
ALGIERS

**ANGOLA**  
PO Box 3523,  
LUANDA

**BELGIUM**  
9c Rue de Russie, 1060  
BRUXELLES

**CANADA**  
PO Box 302, Adelaide Postal  
Station, TORONTO,  
Ontario M5C-2J4

**CUBA**  
Calle 21a NR 20617  
Esquina 214 Atabey,  
HAVANA

**EGYPT**  
5 Ahmad Hishmat Street,  
Zamalek,  
CAIRO

**ETHIOPIA**  
PO Box 7483,  
ADDIS ABABA

**GERMAN DEM. REP.**  
Angerweg 2, Wilhelmsruh, 1106  
BERLIN

**GERMAN FED. REP.**  
Postfach 190140  
5300 BONN 1

**INDIA**  
Flat 68 - Bhagat Singh Market,  
NEW DELHI - 1

**ITALY**  
Via Capo d'Africa 47,  
00184 ROME

**MADAGASCAR**  
PO Box 80  
TANANARIVE

**NIGERIA**  
Federal Government Special  
Guest House, Victoria Island,  
LAGOS

**SENEGAL**  
26 Avenue Albert Sarraut,  
DAKAR

**SWEDEN**  
PO Box 2073, S - 103 12,  
STOCKHOLM 2

**TANZANIA**  
PO Box 2239 DAR ES SALAAM  
PO Box 680 MOROGORO

**UNITED KINGDOM**  
PO Box 38, 28 Penton Street,  
LONDON N19PR

**UNITED STATES**  
801 Second Avenue, Apt. 405  
NEW YORK, NYC 10017

**ZAMBIA**  
PO Box 31791, LUSAKA



**FREE MANDELA!**

**Collection Number: AK2117**

**DELMAS TREASON TRIAL 1985 - 1989**

***PUBLISHER:***

*Publisher:* **Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand**

*Location:* **Johannesburg**

**©2012**

***LEGAL NOTICES:***

**Copyright Notice:** All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

**Disclaimer and Terms of Use:** Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only.

People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate, distorted or untrue. While these digital records are true facsimiles of the collection records and the information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand has not independently verified their content. Consequently, the University is not responsible for any errors or omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the website or any related information on third party websites accessible from this website.

This document is part of a private collection deposited with Historical Papers at The University of the Witwatersrand.