

two patrol vans on duty in the Vanderbijlpark area that night and that is the two patrol vans that went in the direction of Unipark Motors. I am not aware of any other yellow patrol van that could have been at that time on duty to go and attend there.

Is it impossible for some other police van who was also there in the vicinity to hear the same radio report and decide on his own to go there? -- Well, if a police vehicle receives such a report he would contact control and he would say to control: Look, I am in the vicinity, (10) I will go and attend so then control should be aware of it and it would not be necessary for them to send out some other vehicles. There were no other yellow patrol vans on duty in the Vanderbijlpark area, from the Vanderbijlpark police station which is the police station under which Boipatong actually falls, that could have attended to that complaint.

MR SITHOLE: If I may ask one question just to (inaudible)

MR DU TOIT: Yes, sure.

MR SITHOLE: Major Davidson, are you saying that the Van-(20) derbijlpark radio control room never received a message from a vehicle which was in the vicinity of Unipark Motors that it is in the vicinity and it would attend to the problem? -- Yes, it never received such a report.

Thank you.

MR DU TOIT: What did your investigation reveal regarding when the two, first the Casspir and then the Nyala later that entered the township initially together with the municipal Casspir; when they entered, the three police vehicles if I may put it in that way, when they entered the first (30) time/..

timedid they at that stage see any persons moving in the township wearing either white headbands or red headbands? What did they observe when they entered the first time?

-- They did not observe anything of that nature, Mr Chairman. When Sergeant Schlebusch entered, the first man from us and this is confirmed by the people of the municipal Casspir, as they drove in Lekoa Street in a northerly direction in the direction of Noble Boulevard, at house 761 Lekoa Street, there was a man in the street that stopped them. The municipal Casspir drove just past the man and (10) stopped; the Casspir of Schlebusch also stopped there and this man on the street spoke to Schlebusch but Schlebusch could not hear properly because of the noise of the engine and he told the man to get into the Casspir. So this man who was residing at 761 got into the back of the Casspir and he said to Schlebusch: Look, there was a problem at my house. Somebody attacked me here and one child, I think a child has been killed and somebody injured, and he said they damaged my house and Schlebusch asked him: But who was it? And he said: It was some black people, (20) I do not know who they were and they damaged some other houses also. So Schlebusch said to him right, stay with us, let us see if we can get these people. And they drove along Hlube Street in a north-westerly direction. In other words they turned left into Hlube Street and Schlebusch did this to see if he could not see any of these people attacking the houses. In Hlube Street he saw that some houses were damaged but he did not see anybody in the street there. So then he decided to go back to 761 to attend to the people injured, to see what was going on there. He reversed back (30) towards/..

towards 761 that is on the corner of Lekoa and Hlube Street. The fence of this house at 761 was trampled down towards the outside, in other words towards the road and it was flat on the ground, so Schlebusch instructed his driver to reverse to the door, more or less to the door of the house because he did it for two reasons. The one to have light there on the scene because I think they had some torches in the back of the van or something like that, and the other was for security reasons; to get, to have the cover of the vehicle and to get as soon as possible into the house. (10) So he got out with this man who stopped him in the street and they went into the house and when he was in the house he observed what was going on there. He saw one person dead and another one injured; he saw the damage in the house and at that stage some of the residents in the area also came to him and they said but at my house there also were some problems, at my house there were also some problems. Then he contacted radio control also and he asked for reinforcements, for Kruger - it was more or less at the same time that the report came of the shooting that was heard (20) in the area of Cape Gate so Kruger left his base and he went towards the Cape Gate/Boipatong area to assist Schlebusch and eventually he arrived there with Schlebusch.

Now when Schlebusch asked for reinforcements did he ask for just one Casspir?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may I before the witness answers this question be allowed to say something? The major was called to give the committee an overview of what the police version is going to be. These witnesses, Schlebusch and Kruger, they are all going to be called to give (30) evidence/..

evidence as I understand the position and surely they are the people to answer the questions that are now being directed at the Major?

CHAIRMAN: Yes well, I was going to say at the end of Mr Du Toit's examination that I would hope that particularly counsel for the ANC and you and to the extent that he may be interested, Mr Mostert - but he does not seem, it would appear, to be involved, should get together and decide which police witnesses should be called - it may not be necessary to call some, it may be necessary to call others(10) but with that in view - I must say it is useful to get this sort of information, obviously it is of a hearsay nature and insofar as we are going to get the evidence directly from the witnesses it may turn out to be of no consequence at all. But I think for the purposes of deciding what witnesses are available it seems to me to be a useful - we should not take too long doing it, but..

MR HATTINGH: But certain Schlebusch and Kruger are available and they would in all probability be called so I do not think the Major should be asked too much about the.. (20)  
(intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No, I take your point. It is certainly not necessary to (intervenes)

MR DU TOIT: Ja, I am not going to - I just wanted...If he cannot answer, he cannot answer. I was just trying to determine the issues.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, no, but it goes further. If in fact they are going to be called there is no point in getting the hearsay version from Major Davidson.

MR HATTINGH: And it is not a question of the Major being(30)  
unable/..

unable to answer. He can say what they told him, but what is the point of him telling the committee and they come and tell the committee themselves.

CHAIRMAN: Yes. I would like to know the answer to the last question. Do you know whether Schlebush said how much or what other reinforcements he wanted? -- He just asked for reinforcements to come and assist him there because there was only that one other vehicle from the ISU that could help. Some other reinforcements did come there later. (10)

MR DU TOIT: But just to round off this point, the police version as I understand you is when the police entered the township the attack was already - there no more attackers in the vicinity of Boipatong, they had already left. Is that what your investigation revealed? -- Yes, that is correct. They did not see anybody at all that could have been attackers at that stage.

And just regarding the SADF, they only moved in much later in order to assist you in trying to get the injured out, they did not assist you from the initial start? -- (20)

There were two groups from the SADF that operated there. The one group was the Vaal Commando who was on patrol during the evening and which arrived just after Schlebusch - the one vehicle perhaps more or less the same time in the vicinity, on the outskirts, but not in Boipatong. The first vehicles of the SADF that entered Boipatong that evening was after reinforcements were requested. People from group 17 came in with 3 Buffels and in the company of Schlebusch and Kruger they entered the township. Two of those vehicles, of those Buffels. (30)

You /..

You mention that in your statement? -- Yes.

Thank you, that is all at this stage.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Hattingh, do you wish to put anything further?

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Yes, just a few questions at this stage, Mr Chairman. The vehicles, the police vehicles, the armoured vehicles that you testified to that were in the area during the course of that night did you check their log sheets? -- Yes, I did.

What is the log sheet supposed to show? -- The log sheet is a record of how that vehicle is used, where it (10) is used and by whom it is used, who the driver is. So in other words as soon as the vehicle, or as soon as the shift starts or a man wants to go out, he gets his vehicle, he signs for it on the log sheet and he records the kilometre reading of the speedometer at the beginning of his shift or when he goes on duty and when he goes off duty he records the date and the time and the reading on the speedometer again, and the vehicle is then booked back to its base, to its station.

Did you also check the log sheets relating to T2 for (20) the Saturday following the Wednesday of the attack? -- That is correct.

That would be Saturday, the 20th? -- That is correct, yes.

And according to the information contained in the log sheet, where was that Casspir on that particular day? -- It was at the base at Vereeniging, at the ISU base, and it was not in use on that day.

Now I want to deal with radio call sign T2. As a result of the evidence given by a certain witness in front (30)

of /..

of this committee, did you make enquiries as to the possibility of there being other Casspirs in the vicinity or in the country with a similar call sign? -- Yes, I did. As far as I could establish so far in this area there are no other Casspirs here with the call sign T2 on it. I have also made enquiries that in the South African police we have a total of more than 500 Casspirs which runs from Cape Town to Messina and from Walvis Bay to Durban. We have sent out enquiries whether any other Casspir in the country has the call sign T2 on it. The faxes have been sent yesterday from head-office to Pretoria and during the course of the next day or two we should be able to give you an answer to that. (10)

Now as far as painting the call sign of a vehicle on the vehicle itself, are there any standing orders in that regard? -- No, there is no specific standing order on that. Each vehicle must have its registration plates on it but that is the normal registration number and as I have said before a commander of a unit may decide that he wants to put his call signs on his vehicles and then it will depend on the circumstances whether it is at the back door or on the top or on the side. (20)

CHAIRMAN: There is no standing order about that as I understand it? -- No, there is no fixed standing order on that. To give you an example, there are a group of people operating in the area during the last week. They also make use of Casspirs and they have given their Casspirs a series of numbers which makes it easier for their control, but it is only for this specific time that they will be working in the area. As soon as they go to another area they will /.. (30)

will take it off again.

MR HATTINGH: Now do I understand from that, Major, that a particular vehicle does not have a radio call sign that it keeps regardless where it moves? -- Ja, no, it does not have such a sign.

And do you know whether all armoured vehicles have their radio call signs affixed to the vehicle, painted onto it, while there are some without it. -- Yes, there are many without call signs.

You were asked about the killing of a policeman, (10)  
Coetzee. Do you know where that killing occurred? -- I passed the scene, the people pointed it out to me..

Let me try and assist you in this regard. Do you know whether it is nearer to Boipatong than any other traditional black area? -- Yes, yes, it is in the vicinity of Boipatong but I am not sure about the names of the streets. I know it was on the corner of a street but I have just forgotten the name of the two streets where it happened.

Major, at some stage we had photographs of T2. We cannot find them, do you perhaps know where they are? -- (20)  
Yes, if I may just refer to that file cover, if you could just open it.

Would you look at these photographs, please? You were asked when the letter T and the figure 2 was painted on that Casspir. Do you know from your own knowledge? -- Yes, it was some time ago that this photo was taken. I think it was when this Casspir arrived back from either repairs or something like that, that this photo was taken of the driver standing next to it.

CHAIRMAN: Are you saying that those photo's were taken (30)  
prior /..



prior to 17 June? -- Yes, yes.

MR HATTINGH: And do those photographs show the writing T2 on the side where we saw it on the vehicle yesterday?

-- Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: Mr Hattingh, do you want to hand it in?

MR HATTINGH: One of them I would submit would suffice.

CHAIRMAN: The next one is EXHIBIT 20?

MR HATTINGH: 19. How did you discover the existence of those photographs? -- It was when we made enquiries about this T2 that one of the people at the internal stability (10) unit said but we took a photograph of that vehicle when it came here. The driver wanted the photo, and they still had a negative, so I had the negative developed.

When did you make those enquiries? -- It was after the T2 Casspir came into question here.

As a result of the evidence that was given here before this committee? -- Yes, yes.

And you say you could only find the negatives and you then had photographs printed from the negatives? -- Yes.

You told the committee about the two yellow police (20) vans that were sent in response to the alarm that was activated at the Unipark Service Station. You told the committee that they never reached that destination? -- That is correct.

Do you know whether either or perhaps both of these vehicles returned to the scene, to Unipark, or went to Unipark Motors during the course of that night at a later stage? -- No, they went back to their station. They did not go in there again, it was not necessary for them to go there as the internal stability unit was in the area. (30)

Now the alarm system at the service station, do you know whether when you activate it there is also a siren or something like that or is it a silent alarm? -- It is a silent alarm, Mr Chairman.

Did you make enquiries with regard to the various call signs allocated to vehicles in the area at the time? -- I did not get your question?

Did you make enquiries as to radio call signs allocated to the sections working in the armoured vehicles at the time? -- To each specific vehicle? (10)

Yes. -- Yes, I checked that from the duty sheets of the policemen that were on duty that night.

And on checking those sheets again you would be able to establish who B3 was? -- Yes, I would be able to establish who B3 was.

At this stage I have no further questions.

EXAMINATION BY MR CHASKALSON: Major Davidson, I understand from the statements that you have made that you are attached to the unrest and violence crime investigation unit at S A Police headquarters? -- That is correct. (20)

Could you tell us what that does? -- This unit was established after the signing of the Peace Accord and according to that the police was to establish such a unit under the command of a General, which would investigate and monitor all political unrest-related cases and report then to this commission on that.

Can you give us some idea of when the Peace Accord was signed? Or let us put it differently, exactly when was this unit established? -- It was last year, I have forgotten the date now. (30)

I do not (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: The date, Major Davidson, I think is more or less the date that the unit was established. -- Yes, our unit was established some time in July last year.

MR CHASKALSON: Approximately a year ago? -- Yes, yes.

And can you tell us - you say it is to monitor all unrest-related matters? -- Yes, we have through the country branches of this unit, stationed in areas where it is necessary to have such units. Like in this area we have one, we have got one in the Johannesburg area, on the East Rand (10) and they attend to all these unrest-related cases and they report it to us at head-office then. They do the investigations on the ground from time to time. When we feel it is necessary we would attend from head office.

Is the purpose of the unit really to evaluate information that is received concerning patterns of unrest? -- Yes.

And plan responses? -- Pardon?

To plan responses to other situations which might arise in the future. -- Yes.

And you keep statistics, do you? -- Yes, we keep (20) statistics.

And I assume that you get reports of this commission in regard to its deliberations and its investigations? -- Yes, we do get reports from the commission.

And you evaluate those as well? -- Yes.

And incidentally, Major Davidson, you joined this unit approximately a year ago in July 1991? -- No, I joined it in September last year.

In September. And before that, what did you do? -- Before that I was attached to what is now called the Crime (30)

Intelligence/..

Intelligence Service.

Did that also involve evaluations of incidents of crime?

-- Yes.

Would it have been that before this special unit was established that all evaluations of unrest-related violence had been dealt with through that unit? -- No, not necessarily. All such cases were reported to head-office but I am not exactly sure which section dealt with that before but we always evaluate these reports of unrest and violence and things like that. (10)

When you say we always do it, who is the "we"? I know that since July it has been the special unit to which you are now attached but before that, who used to do it? -- Well, some of the departments at head-office but I am not exactly sure, to say it was exactly this one. Actually there are various sections. The people from internal stability unit or before they changed their name it was the unit that was responsible for that, they evaluated it. And various other sections at head-office would evaluate the situation.

I see. We will come back to that a little later (20) possibly in a different context, but what I want to ask is this. In about, I think it was about a month ago - the date if I remember correctly is 1 July 1992 when you made a written statement which was to give an overview..(mechanical interruption).. -- Yes, since it occurred I was here and then I was tasked to investigate specifically the allegations of involvement of the police and the security forces in general.

And when you prepared that memorandum of 1 July, can you tell us what the sources were on which you drew for (30) that /..

that memorandum? -- I had interviews with the people concerned. I made enquiries.

So you.. (intervenes) -- And I had a look at log sheets at that stage also, duty lists and things like that.

Well, let us take them in stages. You say you interviewed people concerned? -- Yes.

Would you have taken statements from them? -- Yes, statements were taken but for my own purpose I interviewed people personally also.

So you say statements were taken but you actually (10) interviewed them and went beyond statements that had already been taken? -- Yes.

And this account, you gave us an account a little later today - well, you gave us an account shortly before the end of your evidence when you were describing Sergeant Schlebusch's movements through Boibatong, his calling at the house in Hlube Street and his securing the house and his behaviour and all that. Was that the sort of information that you were getting at that time? -- Yes. Yes, I spoke to Schlebusch.

You had all that information when you submitted your (20) first report? -- Yes.

And as far as records are concerned you have told us that there were log books and - perhaps I should ask you a little more about basic records. Each of the, well, let us take the records that exist. You talked about occurrence books. -- Yes.

Is there an occurrence book at the internal stability unit? -- Yes.

One at the Vanderbijlpark police station? -- Yes.

One at the Sebokeng police station? -- Yes. (30)

Are /..

Are there any other, if I may broadly call them police occurrence books that may in any way be relevant to this inquiry apart from the three I have mentioned. -- Each police station has an occurrence book.

So there will be one at the Sebokeng police station which may be, Sebokeng municipal police station that may be relevant to the movement of the Casspirs? -- Yes.

What would that be, an occurrence book there as well? -- Yes.

Apart from those you have mentioned now at Vanderbijl(10) park, you have mentioned ISU, you have mentioned Boipatong municipal police station and you have mentioned the Sebokeng municipal station. Apart from those occurrence books is there any other occurrence book dealing with the police movements or reports to police which would be relevant to the night of the 17th and the events of that night? -- Can you just name them again?

Yes, I think (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Well, I have got five.

MR CHASKALSON: Oh.

(20)

CHAIRMAN: There is ISU, police station at Vanderbijlpark and Sebokeng, the municipal police stations at Sebokeng and Boipatong. -- Yes.

Is that correct? -- Yes.

And are there apart from the Vanderbijlpark police station would there be any other police station in the Verreeniging area whose records would be relevant? -- No.

So we have really mentioned everything that you have considered to be relevant? -- Yes, yes, as far as I know.

Now I think you have told us about the use of the radio/.. (30)

radio. Again I wonder if you could give me a few more details of call signs. I have noticed in one of the records I have had access to, a reference to Q. Do you know what Q is? -- That is Quibec ja, let me just see if I have got it here, Mr Chairman. I have made some notes. Q..

Well, don't worry if you do not remember now, Major.  
-- Ja, I do not have that..(simultaneously)

But you would be able to find out at the tea adjournment for us, would you? -- Yes.

Would you mind making a note and then possibly tell (10)  
us after the tea adjournment?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, may I perhaps be of assistance?  
The major has in fact already done that exercise already and I think he was looking for his list now, but we are sitting with it. If perhaps..

CHAIRMAN: Well, even so, he can tell us at a convenient time.

MR CHASKALSON: If they have got the list perhaps it could be handed up to the witness now. I would have no objection if it would help him. -- Q, it would be the base or sort (20)  
of control station in Sebokeng.

Control station in Sebokeng? -- Yes.

CHAIRMAN: The control base of..? -- Of Sebokeng, the municipal police.

MR CHASKALSON: Control base of the Sebokeng municipal police. And there is a reference to BU. Could you tell us what BU is? -- No.

You do not know what that means? Alright, there is a reference to V, capital V. -- V, that is Victor.

So V and Victor are the same and are they the ISU or (30)

who /..

who are they? -- No, Victor is Vereeniging.

Vereeniging what? -- Vereeniging police station.

Police station? -- Ja, the internal stability unit is Victor Zero.

To the ISU is Victor Zero and plain V is Vereeniging?  
-- Yes.

Is there a police station at Vereeniging in addition to Vanderbijlpark? -- Yes.

And would the records at Vereeniging then also have relevance to the events of this night? -- Well, Boipatong (10) is not in the Vereeniging area. Vereeniging is not policing there although they can monitor the radio conversations.

Did you come across in your search, records showing that V or Victor had been making reports that night? -- I will have to check again but I know I had a conversation with the station commander at Vereeniging when I enquired about the vehicles or something and his men deployed.

Well, did you look through the Vereeniging records itself? -- I looked through a lot of records. I will have to check my records first. (20)

And Bravo 3. I think you may have given it to us already. I seem to remember something about Bravo. -- No, I said I would make enquiries.

Oh, about Bravo? -- About Bravo 3.

Is there a difference between BU and B3?

CHAIRMAN: B3 is the one you said you did not know and you would make enquiries. -- Yes, yes.

And BU the same? -- BU I will also have to make enquiries about.

You will also make enquiries about. It is not on (30)  
that /..



that little sheet you have in front of you? -- No. I will just make sure.

Yes, if you will let us know during the course of the day, if you can do it by tea so much the better. -- Yes, yes.

Major Davidson, I would like to ask you for some information about the command structure of the ISU on the night of 17 June. Who was the senior officer on duty, we are talking now about the Vereeniging ISU which responded to this matter. -- Yes.

Who was the senior officer on duty that night? -- (10)  
Captain Roos. He is the commanding officer of the ISU base at Vereeniging. He was not on duty as Schlubusch and Kruger were on duty. Kruger was the senior sergeant on duty so for the duration of that shift Kruger was the senior man, Schlebusch who was a lance sergeant at that stage I think, he was under Kruger. Captain Roos is, as I have said, the commander of the base and if necessary they would contact him either by radio if he is in his car or otherwise at his home or maybe in his office even.

You also made investigations, was he at home that (20)  
night? -- He was at the office for some time; at some stage he went home.

Do you have details of when he was at the office and when he went home? -- Yes, I have, I have made enquiries but I do not have the exact times with me now.

Do you know (intervenes) -- Schlebusch, I also had some radio communication with the control room when Roos was either also available on the radio or in the control room; I am not exactly sure about that, you will have find that out from him. (30)

Well /..

Well, do I understand you say that at a certain time during the activities of Schlebusch in connection with this event, Captain Roos was available in or around the control room? -- Yes.

Do you recollect now and again if you don't, you can find out for us, do you recollect whether at that stage Schlebusch was entering Boipatong or going through it, whether it was before that stage or whether it was at a later stage? -- It was after Schlebusch had seen groups of people gathering in Boipatong, saying that they were on their way to attack KwaMadala because their houses had been attacked by people from KwaMadala, according to what they said. Then Schlebusch reported that to his control room and then the reinforcements from unit 17 of the defence force was activated and at that stage Roos was available there. (10)

And did you establish from Captain Roos where he had been earlier in the evening? -- Yes, he was in and around the area, but I am not exactly sure whether he was in his office or whether he was (intervenes) (20)

But wasn't that an important matter for you to consider? -- Well, he was available on the radio when it was necessary to contact him and the first time it was necessary, according to everything that I, all the enquiries I have made that it was necessary to contact him was at that stage when Schlebusch was in the area and he heard of these people who wanted to attack KwaMadala.

You are saying that the first time that Schlebusch considered it necessary to contact the commanding officer was when he heard that there might be an attack on KwaMadala (30)

hostel/..

hostel? -- Yes, he saw this group of people who said that they wanted to go and attack Madala and he then must have realised that he, on his own, could not prevent such an act and then he contacted his control room and he asked for reinforcements and it was at that stage that Roos was also on the air.

But I take it you spoke to Sergeant Schlebusch to - you were after all investigating for this commission to establish whether the police had behaved properly or not. You are nodding your head, I think that is yes, is it? -- (10)  
Yes, yes.

And of course a very important part of your investigation was to see whether they had responded correctly to the situation which had developed. -- Yes.

I mean after all that is directly part of the work that you do at the unit to which you are attached? -- Yes.

And in addition it had become an international incident? -- Yes.

And you were going to report to this commission? --  
Yes. (20)

So you must have questioned Schlebusch quite closely?  
-- I did not get you clearly?

You must have questioned Schlebusch quite closely? --  
Yes.

Did you understand from Sergeant Schlebusch that the first time he considered it necessary to communicate with his commanding officer was when he received information that there might be an attack on the KwaMadala hostel that night?  
-- Yes, taking (intervenens)

No, just answer yes or no and then you can explain (30)  
it /..

it afterwards? -- He also heard from the bystanders there that various other houses had been attacked and now we have this group who says they want to go to KwaMadala and it was at that stage that he decided it necessary to get more people in.

But that is not my question to you Major Davidson. My question was that the first time that he considered it necessary to communicate with his commanding officer was when he heard about the possibility of an attack on KwaMadala hostel, is that correct? -- It happened simultaneously with (10) all these reports that he received of all the other houses which were attacked. At that stage he realised that it would be too much to handle for him alone and then he asked for reinforcements.

He asked for reinforcements for what purpose? -- Well, to control the situation, to see what was going on.

We will come back to this a little later I think, Major Davidson? I do not want to be diverted from what I want to ask you about now. So we have it then that Captain Roos is the commanding officer? -- Yes. (20)

We have it that he was on call at all times that evening, all times relevant to the occurrence? -- Yes.

And that the person who was taking decisions at the ISU station at the time, who would be responsible for the decisions which were taken would be Sergeant Kruger? -- Yes, on the shift Kruger was the most senior man at that stage.

Alright. Well, then it also seems from some of the logs which we have had access to and we do not seem to have had access to everything, but those to which we have had (30) access/..

access to seem to indicate that communications are maintained between the ISU, between the South African police in the region responsible for ordinary policing, the SADF and in some occasions the security officers of private firms. Is that correct? -- Yes, if you say communications maintained, what exactly do you mean?

Well, let me ask you about that. Is there a radio control room at the ISU? -- Yes.

And does it keep a detailed log of radio communications which it receives? -- Yes, there is a report form (10) that is completed for radio reports that are received and attended to.

Can you explain to us what that report form is? I mean what does it deal with? -- Well, it deals with the date and the time a report is received; the time that it is attended to and then there is a report back time. So after the report has been attended to it is completed and then filed.

And is it one sheet or is it a series of separate sheets? -- It is one sheet and you can add some other sheets on it, depending on the length of your report. (20)

I understand that. Would that be something different to the occurrence book? -- Yes, that is a different report.

CHAIRMAN: Is that kept by the man in charge of the control room from time to time? -- Yes.

That is a written report? -- Yes, it is a written report.

Is there no tape recording of reports that come in? -- Yes, at some control rooms we do have tape recordings.

And at this one? -- At this one there is also a tape recording machine which records whatever, you know whatever transpires over the radio. (30)

So /..

So is there a tape recording, was there a tape recording made of the reports coming in on 17 February? -- Yes. We took those recordings, the tapes but there is some problem with the tapes. The tapes that were used at that stage can only be taped on one side of the tape but apparently what happened is that it was changed and taped on the other side also. So some of the conversation on the tape is clear, the others are not clear. Some had been erased in the process when it was recorded on the other side of the tape also. (10)

MR CHASKALSON: What were the portions - well, have you had access, is that tape in your possession? -- Yes, we have the tapes and we have battled for quite some time to get something from the tapes. On certain occasions we could link a conversation with an entry in the OB with a radio report.

CHAIRMAN: Was Dr Waddington given access to the tape? -- We told him about the tapes and the problems we had with the tapes but when he was here we had not yet sorted out the tapes and up to this stage we can give some of the conversations but it is a bit of a problem. (20)

MR CHASKALSON: Well, perhaps you could tell us first of all, are the tapes in your custody? -- Yes, the tapes are with me.

You would be willing, I take it, to make them available to this commission? -- Yes, the commission can listen to them.

And you would have no objection to our having access to those tapes and to employing our own experts to evaluate them? -- Yes, I suppose there would be no... (30)

And /..

And you say that you have been able to make sense of some conversations but not of others? -- Yes.

What are the times that were the difficult times? -- Let me just get the dates more or less ..

CHAIRMAN: Perhaps we can take the tea adjournment now.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS

THE COMMISSION RESUMES

CHRISTO DAVIDSON, s.u.o.

EXAMINATION BY MR CHASKALSON (CONT.): Major Davidson, I assume that you have got a lot of notes of records which you have consulted from time to time in the course of your (10) investigations? -- Yes, I have, I have made some notes.

Would it help you to have those records with you during this questioning? -- Ja, it..

Because I have no objection to you having them in front of you if that will help you. -- Well, yes, in certain cases (intervenes)

And I do not want to ask for any secret documents because they are in front of you if that is going to help you. You do not need to wait for an adjournment to go and look at them. If it does not make any difference then we (20) will just carry on. -- I have got some seven volumes of documents. It is a stack like this, Mr Chairman. Perhaps if I could come back to the radio call signs that Mr Mr Chaskalson asked for?

Yes, please. -- Quibec, I think we have sorted that out.

CHAIRMAN: Just BU and B3. -- Ja, B3 was the call sign used by the Casspir from the municipal police that evening.

CHAIRMAN: In Sebokeng? -- Yes.

MR DU TOIT: Can you just repeat that, is it BU? -- B3, Bravo 3. Bravo Uniform call signs are used by the uniform (30) branch/..

branch of Vanderbijlpark. Now the calls signs might then be Bravo Uniform 1, 2, 3.

CHAIRMAN: So BU would have been one of the uniform (inter-venes) -- Vehicles from Vanderbijlpark, yes. So it is possible that you would then have a Bravo Uniform 3 at Vanderbijlpark and you would have a Bravo 3 at Sebokeng. Sebokeng also have their own network that they are working on but they do not use Bravo Uniform, they only use Bravo 3.

MR CHASKALSON: Major Davidson, this tape which was no longer apparently of much value; it would have been of (10) great value of course if it had not been damaged. -- Yes, of course, it would have assisted us a lot.

It would have told us everything that was going on over the radio at that time. -- Yes.

We would have been able to get all the conversations of all the people. -- Yes.

Unfortunately it is damaged. -- Ja, it is not damaged. as I have explained the tape, it was taped on both sides by the person operating in the control room. Apparently they were not aware of the fact that you could only tape on the (20) one side of the tape.

Who was the person operating in the control room that night? -- I cannot remember the name, but they only have, I can perhaps put it to you lik this, they only I think, speaking under correction, I think something like eight tapes available. They use one tape as days go on, if nothing serious happens then they use the same tape again. So the - die een band word oor die ander een gespeel.

Ja, I understand what you are saying that if nothing serious happened then they used the one tape and they (30)

record /..



record over it. -- Yes.

But in this case something very serious had happened?  
-- Yes, when we came here, when I came here on the 18th I asked immediately for the tapes and took possession of it but apparently at that stage at some or other time the tape was changed to the other side. Where the wrong side was in at the time of the conversations I am not aware, I think that is what the position was. It was the wrong side of the tape that was in the machine when it was operated at this time. I have checked it for I think, we (10) are talking about the 17th, I think I checked it from about the 14th to the 20th and you have stages where there is a blank on it and you have stages where you have conversations and there are stages where there is a blank and stages where there is a conversation.

Well, that actually sounds as though somebody deleted part of the tape? -- No, I do not not think it is deleted.  
CHAIRMAN: Wouldn't you just get a blank if it has been recorded over? -- It is a technical thing that I cannot explain. We have tried to sort it out but I cannot give (20) you a technical answer on that.

Where is the tape at the moment? -- It is in Pretoria in my office. I took it there some time ago, we worked on it here, and I took it also there to work on it there at some stage. It is in Pretoria.

It is in the same condition that you got it? -- Yes, yes, yes.

Can you bring that here tomorrow? -- Okay, I will try to have it here tomorrow.

MR SITHOLE: Who are "they" that cannot explain this (30)  
technical /..

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