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## SECURITY

### Defence

In November the minister of defence, Mr Magnus Malan, was handed the report of the committee of inquiry set up in May 1984 under the chairmanship of the chief of the army, Lieutenant General Jannie Geldenhuys, to investigate the South African Defence Force (SADF) and related aspects affecting the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) in the context of the economic situation and the future needs of the country (the Geldenhuys committee). More than 150 organisations and individuals from all sectors of society, including the military, made recommendations. The committee appointed 21 task groups, involving about 70 people associated with the defence force, to investigate various aspects of military strategy, weaponry and logistics, manpower, finance, and the size and structure of the military establishment.

Gen Geldenhuys said that the political unrest in 1984 and 1985 had influenced the committee as much 'as all the other happenings of the last few years—economic, financial, political, or otherwise'. He said that a few of the committee's interim findings had already been implemented, such as reductions in the number of South African Air Force squadrons, further streamlining of navy and ARMSCOR structures, and the appointment of a chief-of-staff for the defence force, Lieutenant General Ian Gleeson. However, the major impact of the committee's findings was likely to be felt only once Mr Malan received the bulk of the report. Most of the strategic and weaponry recommendations were classified.<sup>1</sup>

### Legislation

The National Key Points Amendment Act of 1985 came into effect on 24 April and amended the National Key Points Act of 1980 by, among other things, providing for the minister of defence to declare two or more national key points a 'national key points complex'. The minister could do this if in his opinion it would contribute to their safeguarding if certain steps were taken jointly by their owners. The minister was also empowered to order owners of national key points included in a national key points complex to take joint safeguarding steps, failing which he might himself cause the necessary steps to be taken and recover the costs from the owners.<sup>2</sup> Amendments mostly affecting security guards were also made to the regulations promulgated in terms of the National Key Points Act.<sup>3</sup> In March, speaking in the house of assembly during the debate on the amendment bill, Mr Philip Myburgh (Progressive Federal Party) said that there was a tendency for people to believe that by protecting installations through the building of walls and the hiring of armed guards they could save society. Security in South Africa would not come about unless it was recognised that changes had to take place in the political arena first, he said. As matters stood, every school, police station, and residence occupied by a black person who was prepared to

work within the system could be defined as a national key point, Mr Myburgh said.<sup>4</sup>

In May the Control of Access to Public Premises and Vehicles Act of 1985 was gazetted by the state president.<sup>5</sup> It granted the owners of public premises or vehicles wide powers for the safeguarding of those premises and vehicles. A person authorised by the owner of any public premises or public vehicle may, for instance, require of a person who wants to enter such premises or vehicle that he/she subject himself/herself, or anything in his/her possession to an examination by an electronic or other apparatus in order to determine the presence of any dangerous object. In terms of the act, powers of search and the authority to demand identification are given. The only qualification was that physical searches of women be done by women.

On 13 December the state president, Mr P W Botha, amended the general regulations promulgated under the Defence Act of 1957 by the addition of a new chapter to increase the powers of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in situations of internal unrest. Regulation 1 provided that the SADF might be used in connection with the police functions of the preservation of internal security, the maintenance of law and order, and the prevention of crime. Regulation 2 set out the powers and duties of a member of the SADF used in connection with these functions. In terms of section 6(4) and (4A) of the Police Act of 1958 the SADF could search and seize without a warrant, and set up roadblocks; in terms of various sections of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, the SADF had powers of search and arrest; and in terms of the Internal Security Act of 1982, SADF members of the rank of warrant officer or higher had the power to close places to prevent prohibited gatherings, to disperse prohibited or riotous gatherings, and to detain people under section 50(1) in 'action to combat a state of unrest'.<sup>6</sup>

An editorial in the *Eastern Province Herald* said that the new powers had been promulgated without any announcement by the minister of law and order, Mr Louis Le Grange, or the minister of defence, Mr Magnus Malan. It said that an army was supposed to oppose enemies outside a country's borders and that internal enforcement of law and order was the job of the police force. 'No good government intends (its army) to be used against its own people,' the *Eastern Province Herald* said.<sup>7</sup>

### Expenditure

The defence budget for the year 1 April 1985 to 31 March 1986 was R4 274,1m, an increase of R519m (13,5%) over the amount budgeted for the 1984/85 year.<sup>8</sup> In addition R133m was budgeted by the department of public works and land affairs for the erection or purchase of buildings and structures for defence. The End Conscription Campaign (ECC) claimed that a 'large chunk of military expenditure was also concealed in Namibia's budget allocation'.<sup>9</sup>

According to Dr P J Welgemoed MP (National Party) the 1985/86 defence budget (excluding buildings) represented 13,9% of the national budget, the lowest proportion since 1977, when it was 18,2%.<sup>10</sup> Dr Welgemoed said that defence spending in 1983 had constituted 3,8% of South Africa's gross domestic product, compared with 4,2% in France, 9,5% in Egypt, and 6,6% in the United States of America.<sup>11</sup>

The minister of defence, Mr Magnus Malan, said that the maintenance of a balance of power in the southern African region would require considerable financial sacrifices in the year to come. This, he said, was particularly so since

Russia was engaged in an arms build-up in neighbouring states out of all proportion to their security requirements. Increased expenditure could also be incurred during the 1985/86 financial year if riots and unrest continued, he said.<sup>12</sup>

### Personnel

In November the chief of the army, Lieutenant General Jannie Geldenhuys, took over as chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF) from General Constand Viljoen, who retired after having held the position for five years. Major General A J 'Kat' Liebenberg took over the command of the army from Gen Geldenhuys.

In February the minister of defence, Mr Magnus Malan, said that 123 members of the SADF had been killed in military operations and training exercises in 1984.<sup>13</sup> He refused to disclose how many of these were killed in the operational area, although he said that 169 civilians had been killed there. He also said that the SADF had killed 916 alleged insurgents and that 18 members of the local population had died in crossfire.<sup>14</sup>

In August, 32 battalion, stationed at Buffalo in the Caprivi Strip, became the first unit to receive its colours in the operational area. The battalion, which held the best fighting record in the SADF since World War II, originated during the 1975 Angolan war. After that war members of Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), who had been fighting against the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), settled at the Buffalo base in South West Africa/Namibia as refugees. In March 1976 they were incorporated into the SADF, and many of the original members of FNLA still formed the core of the battalion's non-commissioned officers. Portuguese remained one of the battalion's three official languages.<sup>15</sup>

As at 14 May 1985, 84 national servicemen were teaching in civilian schools in South Africa including the non-independent homelands, 28 in the 'independent' homelands, and 87 in Namibia. Mr Malan said that they were used only in African and coloured schools, and that not all of them were qualified teachers.<sup>16</sup>

During the defence vote in the house of representatives, Mr Douglas Josephs (Labour Party) said that coloured ex-servicemen's pensions should be brought into line with those of their white counterparts.<sup>17</sup> Mr Malan replied that pensions did not fall under the SADF, and that he could only help those people gain access to the relevant bodies.<sup>18</sup> The minister of co-operation and development, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, said that in February 1985, 1 372 Africans were receiving war veterans' pensions for having served in World War II. Dr Viljoen said that about 75% of them received the maximum amount of R65 a month as well as an additional war veterans' allowance of R5 a month, while the others received lesser amounts in accordance with certain prescriptions as well as the additional war veterans' allowance of R5 a month. The total amount paid out in such pensions was approximately R95 000 a month.<sup>19</sup>

During 1984 the number of SADF personnel seconded to the Ciskei administration was 44.<sup>20</sup> On 22 January all SADF personnel seconded to the Ciskei were withdrawn following alleged 'irregularities' at two military bases, Sandile and Mapaso, which had led to the deaths of two soldiers in December 1984. The president of the Ciskei, Chief Lennox Sebe, said that there had been insufficient control at the bases and three officers were suspended. The deputy commissioner of police in the Ciskei, Brigadier Dingleton Mlandu, was appointed head of the Ciskei defence force (CDF). Until the suspension of the three SADF

officers and the subsequent withdrawal of the seconded personnel, relations between the small one battalion-strong CDF and the SADF appeared to have been good. Late in 1984 the Ciskei department of information had announced the return of the first contingent of Ciskei soldiers from the 'operational area', where they had fought alongside the SADF (see *The Homelands*).<sup>21</sup>

In March Mr Malan, in reply to a question in the house of assembly, said that cadet training had been instituted for boys at white schools only, although the Defence Act of 1957 stipulated that 'every person' at an educational institution might be required, between his/her 12th and 17th year, to undergo training as a cadet. He said that it was the prerogative of each population group to decide on cadet training. In the four provinces 658 schools had cadet detachments, while 35 did not. Altogether 193 254 white male pupils were undergoing cadet training in the four provinces, 2 942 cadet officers being involved in their training.<sup>22</sup>

### Volunteers, including black volunteers

Mr Malan refused to divulge the number of people from each race group serving in the SADF, because, he said, the strength of the SADF was confidential.<sup>23</sup>

As at 31 December 1984, 13 Africans were rendering voluntary service in the citizen force, 531 coloured persons, three Indians, and 4 707 whites. On the same date there were 431 Africans in the commandos, 1 750 coloured people, 910 Indians, and 25 948 whites. These figures do not include white women, or coloured people and Indians who performed continuous voluntary service. Mr Malan said that he was not contemplating introducing any financial or other incentives for people who rendered voluntary service.<sup>24</sup>

In 1984, 4 080 coloured people volunteered for national service in the SADF and 1 550 were accepted. Like conscripted national servicemen, volunteers signed up for two years' service, after which they returned to civilian life unless they opted to apply to join the permanent force, and were accepted. Mr Malan said that facilities for the accommodation of coloured volunteers had been expanded in 1984 so that 297 more volunteers could be accommodated in 1985. He said it was planned to further increase the intake of coloured persons from the beginning of 1986 provided that suitable accommodation could be found in time.<sup>25</sup> In June the cabinet gave its approval for the establishment of a second military base for coloured people. This was to be based at Nelspoort in the Karoo and would provide not only military training but also a programme enabling those not educationally qualified for the South African Cape Corps (the only battalion for coloured people) to develop skills.<sup>26</sup>

The officer commanding western province command, Brigadier Yvo de Bruyn, said that volunteer training applications for the Cape Corps were up by 30% compared with the preceding three years, despite widespread unrest in the Cape. He said that in the present depressed economic climate with its accompanying unemployment, the SADF provided work opportunities for about 3 500 members of the coloured community. Brig De Bruyn said that the Cape Corps did not send out recruiting teams any more as the unit 'sold itself'. 'One would have thought that action against members and their families would have discouraged candidates, but it seems instead they are encouraged,' he said. In December it was announced that a second Cape Corps battalion was to be activated to train about 1 000 more soldiers.<sup>27</sup>

In the same month a petition with 1 006 signatures asking for a military base for coloured people in Kimberley was given to Mr Malan. Mr Malan had said during

an earlier visit to Kimberley that a military base there could be considered only if the coloured community was in favour of it. More than a hundred young men in the district had applied that year for admission to the Cape Corps but most had been turned away.<sup>28</sup>

In April Mr Malan told the house of delegates that coloured people represented 9,5% of the total number of members serving full-time in uniform in the SADF, while 16,5% of all civilian women employed by the SADF were coloured. He said that 3 754 permanent posts in the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) were filled by coloured people. (In December 1984 ARMSCOR staff were believed to number about 23 000.)<sup>29</sup>

Indians who volunteered for national service in the SADF numbered 1 450 in 1984, of whom 153 were accepted.<sup>30</sup> Indian volunteers were given their basic training at the SAS Jalsena naval base in Durban, after which they underwent two months' specialist training at Durban and Cape Town before being posted to various naval units or headquarters.<sup>31</sup> No extension of the facilities for Indian volunteers was envisaged, Mr Malan said, although recruitment of Indians would be increased to two intakes per year from July 1985.<sup>32</sup>

#### *Military chaplains*

In May there were 240 men doing their national service in the SADF as chaplains, apart from 113 chaplains in the permanent force and 1 231 engaged on a part-time basis.<sup>33</sup>

Clergy who are eligible for national service are called up in the same way as laymen and undergo the same initial basic training, including (unless they object) the use of weapons. After basic training they are used in the role of chaplains for their individual denominations. Other ministers, with the permission of their church authorities, may elect to serve for varying periods in the permanent force chaplains' corps. Churches may also appoint clergy to minister to the defence force in full- or part-time capacities, but these men normally remain under the authority of their churches, unlike the others, who are responsible to military authorities, are paid by them, and wear military uniforms.

An inter-church council, representative of the Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, and United Congregational churches, reported in September that there were 'those who believe that the integrity of the church's ministry to those involved in military structures would be best served by a demilitarised chaplaincy' responsible to church authorities. It said further that ministry to people in the defence force should be exercised in a way which would not identify it with military action, or with the aims and ideology of any particular side in military conflicts.<sup>34</sup>

In October a Catholic priest, Father Basil van Rensburg, fasted for 30 days in an attempt to persuade Catholic bishops to take action on the issue of military chaplains. Father Basil said, among other things, that there was a tremendous amount of unhappiness in the Catholic Church, which had an 80% black membership, on the issue of military chaplains.<sup>35</sup>

Defence force chaplains, representing 33 denominations, met in Pretoria during November. They issued a statement rejecting racism and said, 'We neither promote nor serve the cause of war, but are dedicated to minister, according to the mind of Jesus Christ, to those who are involved in the present conflict.' No state, political party, or group—'whether serving the status quo or the revolution'—could claim unequivocally that 'God's plan is on their side alone', they said.<sup>36</sup>

In December the president of the Methodist Conference, the Rev Peter Storey, said that they had had an 'indication' from the SADF which had given him reason to believe that they 'were close to winning the battle and getting chaplains out of uniform'. He believed that this was because the army was being confronted on the issue by Anglicans, Catholics, and Methodists together. It emerged that some parents with sons completing national service did not want their children to be without the ministry of clergymen, while black members saw ministers in uniform as nothing other than soldiers and collaborators in a system which they rejected.<sup>37</sup>

#### **Military service**

##### *Conscription*

During the defence vote in the house of assembly Mr J H van der Merwe (Conservative Party) claimed that as coloured people and Indians were the 'constitutional equals' of whites they should be compelled to do military service.<sup>38</sup> However, Mr Y I Seedat (National People's Party) in the house of delegates said that members of the Indian community would not accept conscription 'until a fair and just society is seen on the horizon'.<sup>39</sup> In the house of representatives Mr K H Lategan (Labour Party) said, with regard to the conscription of coloured people, that there could only be conscription 'subject to all people in South Africa attaining full citizenship'.<sup>40</sup> The minister of defence, Mr Magnus Malan, said that the issue of national service for coloured people and Indians was a decision that the members of the two houses would have to take themselves.<sup>41</sup>

Mr Malan said in March that 1 596 national servicemen called up for their initial training in 1984 had failed to report for duty, of whom 859 had been traced.<sup>42</sup> In the same year seven people were charged with and convicted of failing to report for military service, and one person for refusing to serve.<sup>43</sup> He said that 7 589 had failed to report for duty in January 1985. Reacting to claims by the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) that the increase in those failing to report for national service had occurred since the SADF had entered the townships, a spokesman for the SADF said that more than 6 000 of the 7 589 persons were students who had automatically been allocated for the July 1985 call-up, or who had received deferment on the grounds of studies. He said that a final total of 1 321 persons had failed to report, of whom 890 had not advised the SADF of their change of address and had not received their call-up papers. This had been rectified, he said. Of the balance of 431 persons, most were matric pupils who had failed and returned to school, he said.<sup>44</sup> In November the SADF used the same figures to rebut claims from, among others, the Committee on South African War Resistance (COSWAR) in London, that there were now 'thousands' of draft dodgers.

The exact number of young white men eligible for military service who left South Africa to avoid conscription was difficult to ascertain. COSWAR claimed in August that since 1978 it had helped more than 300 draft dodgers seek political asylum in Britain.<sup>45</sup> The organisation's London office said that since 1984 the 'trickle' of draft dodgers had become a 'steady stream'.<sup>46</sup> COSWAR's Amsterdam office said that 400 people had been granted asylum in the Netherlands in the past 10 years and that a further 100 cases were in the pipeline.<sup>47</sup>

A law graduate, Mr Alan Christopher Dodson (25), who was on a one-month army camp and who was opposed to the use of soldiers to quell township unrest, was fined R600 in August by a court martial in Durban for disobeying an order to go on a vehicle patrol in the townships. Mr Dodson pleaded not guilty to

disobeying a lawful command of his superior officer, Lieutenant David Haslett, on 31 July. Lt Haslett testified that Mr Dodson had made it clear that he was not prepared to go on the patrol because of his political beliefs. He confirmed that he had received a message at the beginning of the camp that he should try to accommodate Mr Dodson in an administrative or guard-room position. Passing sentence, the presiding officer, Colonel J Heyneke, said, 'Irrespective of the political views of other citizens on the use of the SADF in suppressing unrest, the force has a duty imposed by the legislature, and, as a soldier, it is your duty to obey all commands in this respect.' Criticising the prosecution and sentencing of Mr Dodson, the ECC said that it was 'harsh' at a time of conflict when troops were being deployed in the townships and the 'dilemma and anxieties confronting conscripts are most acute'.<sup>48</sup> In September Mr Malan said that there were no moral grounds in terms of which a national serviceman could refuse to do service in a black township.<sup>49</sup>

### *Calls to end conscription*

Major among the criticisms of conscription were that only whites were conscripted, that the way in which the SADF was being used internally and externally gave it a sectional role which was bad for race relations, and that it posed great dilemmas of conscience for some white men who wished to dissociate themselves from the defence force's role.<sup>50</sup>

Since its formation in 1983, branches of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) had been set up in Cape Town, Durban, Grahamstown, Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg, and Port Elizabeth. In September the ECC claimed that more than 50 organisations had endorsed its call for an end to conscription. It also called for 'a just peace in our land', for troops to be removed from the townships, and for a complete withdrawal of the SADF from Angola and Namibia.<sup>51</sup>

Over the last weekend in June the ECC held a 'peace festival' in Johannesburg at the University of the Witwatersrand which was attended by about 1 000 people. Messages of support for the festival were received from about 100 organisations inside and outside South Africa.<sup>52</sup> Among those who spoke at the festival were the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, Dr Beyers Naudé; a Progressive Federal Party (PFP) member of provincial council, Mrs Molly Blackburn; and the Anglican bishop of Johannesburg, the Rt Rev Desmond Tutu. Dr Naudé argued that the fight to end conscription was really a battle against the entire unjust apartheid system, which depended on forced military service to bolster it.<sup>53</sup>

In August the ECC, represented by Mr Michael Evans and Mr Richard Steele, gave evidence to the Geldenhuys committee (see above). It proposed that a volunteer army be established, that alternatives to military service should not be limited to religious pacifists 'but to all who in good conscience cannot serve in the SADF', and that the length of community service be made equal to the length of military service and not, as at present, one and a half times longer.<sup>54</sup>

On 9 September four members of the ECC were detained in terms of section 29(1) of the Internal Security Act of 1982. They were released 11 days later without being charged. Addressing a large crowd in the Cape Town city hall on 7 October, the day a protest fast by three ECC members ended, Mrs Blackburn claimed that there was a growing militarisation of 'our society'. She questioned whether the damage done to race relations by white troops could ever be repaired. She said, 'If you are black and living in the eastern Cape, you can

honestly say you are living in a state of civil war.'<sup>55</sup>

During a debate in June with the ECC on the topic 'The SADF—Shielding the Nation or Defending Apartheid?', the leader of the PFP, Dr Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert MP, said his party believed that conscription should be phased out and there should be a nonracial army. He accused the ECC of being 'dangerously romantic, extraordinarily naive, and counterproductive in its campaign'. He said that it was the duty of a defence force to combat terrorism and violence, but that it was not its duty to maintain law and order or to combat crime. He said the SADF should get out of the townships.<sup>56</sup>

The government viewed the ECC with suspicion and in September the deputy minister of defence, Mr Adriaan Vlok, said that people who approved of and promoted the ECC were being used by the African National Congress (ANC) to achieve its 'evil goals'.<sup>57</sup> Mr Malan said that the organisation aimed to break down law and order by weakening the State's machinery.<sup>58</sup> He said that the Black Sash, the United Democratic Front, the ANC, and the 'radical leftist ECC' aimed to influence servicemen to become draft dodgers and to rebel against their military duties.<sup>59</sup> The allegations were rejected by the ECC, which said that the ANC was a banned organisation and 'the ECC has never had, nor will have, links with it'.<sup>60</sup>

Despite differences within the PFP about conscription, officially its policy was that it would press for an end to military conscription as a matter of urgency. The party believed that a full-time, enlarged professional defence force, backed by voluntary reserves recruited on a nonracial basis would be in the best interests of the country as a whole.<sup>61</sup>

### *Conscientious objection*

The Defence Act of 1957 provides for three categories of religious objectors. They are those prepared to serve in the SADF in a non-combatant capacity; those prepared to serve but not in any capacity which would entail performing maintenance tasks of a combatant capacity or wearing a uniform (such persons have to serve one and a half times the length of a normal call-up period); and those whose convictions prevent their performing any military service or any related tasks (such persons also have to serve one and a half times the length of a normal call up in community service).

Non-religious objectors refusing to perform any type of military service on political, moral, or ethical grounds fall outside the jurisdiction of the board for religious objection and can be tried by civilian courts, which have to impose a minimum six-year prison sentence.

During 1985 the board for religious objection received 435 applications for religious objector status. The board's secretary, Major David Fourie, said that of the 342 applications which were granted, 72 were classified as category one, four as category two, and 266 as category three religious objectors. Of the remainder six were refused, 37 withdrawn, and 50 were outstanding at the end of the year.<sup>62</sup>

The minister of manpower, Mr Pietie du Plessis, said that from 1 January 1984 to 5 June 1985, 278 religious objectors had been assigned to his department for placement in alternative service, of whom 33 had already been so placed. Of the remaining 245, 97 had not responded to letters requesting them to report to his department's offices. He said that there were 115 religious objectors being prosecuted because they refused to do community service, while the remaining 33 would be placed in service in the near future.<sup>63</sup>

It became apparent that Jehovah's Witnesses (the majority of those granted

religious objector status) were not reporting to the department of manpower as it was against their beliefs to report voluntarily for community service. This rendered them liable to serve 2 175 days in a military prison (equivalent to one and a half times the total number of days involved in national service, including the period of continuous service). However, once sentenced they became eligible for parole and were then assigned to community service, which, according to a Jehovah's Witness spokesman, was acceptable because then they were prisoners, even on parole, and forced to do what the law demanded.<sup>64</sup>

### Military operations

Speaking during the defence vote in the house of assembly in May, the minister of defence, Mr Magnus Malan, said that for many years the South African Defence Force (SADF) had been reasonably successful in remaining aloof from 'cheap party politics'. He said, however, that because of recent political reforms, mounting international pressure, and the intensification of the insurgency 'onslaught', 'it was going to become increasingly difficult to elevate security interests above the interests of party politics'.<sup>65</sup> He had a month previously told the houses of delegates and representatives respectively that the SADF was 'neutral, impartial, and beyond the arena of politics', and that it should not take up party-political issues.<sup>66</sup>

### Civil unrest

According to *Info Bulletin*, which is compiled by the SADF's military information bureau, for practical reasons and because of the magnitude of their task, policemen could not be deployed in large numbers in black residential areas. The SADF had therefore been drawn into the townships in a supportive capacity to help the police. The bulletin also said that communities, for instance the Indian community in Natal following unrest there, had asked that the SADF give the police help (see *Political Developments*).<sup>67</sup>

In 1985 a total of 35 372 members of the SADF were deployed in 96 African townships countrywide in 'support of the South African Police (SAP) in the prevention or suppression of the internal disorder'. Mr Malan said that the eastern province command had been deployed in 34 townships, the Witwatersrand command in 25, the western province command in 13, the Natal command in nine, the northern Transvaal command in five, the Orange Free State command in four, the northwestern command in three, and the northern Cape command in three.<sup>68</sup> He said that it would be a 'time-consuming process' which would 'not justify the cost in manhours' to establish how many SADF members had been tried by military courts for refusing to carry out duties in the townships.<sup>69</sup>

According to the deputy minister of defence, Mr Adriaan Vlok, SADF members deployed in townships during unrest situations did three to four days of training in patrolling townships and unrest control 'followed by in-service training during their period of deployment'. He said that they were trained in the riot-control techniques of roadblocks, vehicle control points, cordons and searches, crowd control, vehicle and foot patrols, and immediate action drills. Special equipment issued to troops thus deployed comprised gasmasks and anti-riot helmets, he said.<sup>70</sup> Arms issued to troops in townships consisted of 9mm pistols for officers, and R1 and R4 rifles. In addition each Buffel vehicle (an armoured troop carrier) was equipped with a 37mm stoppergun, a shotgun, teargas grenades, and

shock grenades. Mr Vlok refused to answer a question asked by a Progressive Federal Party (PFP) MP, Mr Roger Hulley, whether troops were, in addition to R1 rifles, not also issued with weapons that fired rubber bullets, buckshot, or birdshot.<sup>71</sup>

Referring to repeated calls for the withdrawal of security forces from the townships, Mr Vlok said in April that if this happened, township residents would 'murder one another on an unknown scale'.<sup>72</sup>

During the period 1 May 1984 to 31 May 1985 five people were killed and one person was injured as a result of action taken by SADF members 'performing support services' in unrest situations. Mr Malan said that two people had been killed in Katlehong (east Rand) on 4 October, one in Langa (Uitenhage) on 17 April, one in Despatch (eastern Cape) on 20 April, and one in Duduza (Nigel) on 18 May. During the same period one serviceman was killed at Alberton (south east Rand) on 8 May 1985 when two Buffel vehicles collided, and 25 were injured.<sup>73</sup>

In August a Ciskei soldier was stoned and beaten to death at the funeral near King William's Town of a murdered Durban lawyer, Mrs Victoria Mxenge. A Ciskei army truck which had driven into the middle of the funeral procession was pelted with stones and a soldier who had leapt out and tried to escape was caught and killed.<sup>74</sup> Corporal J Schoeman (19) became the first SADF soldier to die in a combined police army operation. According to a police spokesman the incident had occurred on 13 October during a patrol of KwaZakhele (Port Elizabeth) when soldiers had split into small groups to follow some suspects. He said that on their return to their vehicle they had found Cpl Schoeman missing, but had soon discovered his body with 73 wounds. On 15 October five people were detained in connection with his death.<sup>75</sup>

The atmosphere was reported to be 'calm apart from curious and sometimes hostile stares', when a convoy of more than 50 army and police vehicles, many carrying full quotas of men, paraded through Port Elizabeth's African townships on 30 April. Helicopters, swooping low overhead, monitored the convoy's progress. The SAP liaison officer for the eastern Cape said that the show of force was an attempt to bring unrest in the area to an end.<sup>76</sup> At about the same time Mr Malan warned that the SADF could shortly be used in the 'prevention and suppression of terrorism' in the country.<sup>77</sup>

In early May SADF backing was given when security forces took 'steps to restore law and order' by sealing off KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) in response to what they claimed were complaints by 'moderate blacks' in the township. The PFP's spokeswoman on law and order, Mrs Helen Suzman MP, responded by asking what was meant by 'moderate blacks', and reiterated that her party was in principle against the use of the army in cases of civil unrest.<sup>78</sup> As the month of May progressed the SADF acted with the SAP and Railways Police in sealing off various eastern Cape townships in their efforts 'to root out the criminal element' and 'normalise the situation'.

As the presence of troops in the Transvaal townships of Alexandra (Johannesburg) and Tembisa (Kempton Park) became more evident, an editorial in the *Sowetan* of 26 April spoke of the 'impression (gained) that this part of the country is under military occupation' and said that, among other things, Africans were becoming 'quite insouciant about the presence of grim looking police and army vehicles in their midst'.

On the imposition of a state of emergency on 21 July in 36 magisterial districts,

the commissioner of the SAP, General P J Coetzee, said that the SADF would continue to support the SAP and the Railways Police. In terms of the emergency regulations, however, an extensive range of powers could be invoked by members of the 'security forces', which term included the SADF (see below).<sup>79</sup>

On 27 September Tembisa (east Rand) was the first township involved in the SADF's 'supportive projects' programme. It followed a visit by Mr Malan to the Tembisa town council, when SADF assistance in the planning and execution of certain projects was offered.<sup>80</sup> By the end of the year five soccer fields had been developed in the township, four areas levelled for the future erection of ten netball fields, and five boreholes sunk. Other townships where playing fields were developed were Duduza (east Rand) and Bethlehem (Orange Free State). The projects cost the SADF R22 971.<sup>81</sup>

Soldiers were allegedly involved in the breaking down of squatter shacks in October in KwaZakhele.<sup>82</sup> In November the belongings of rent defaulters in Katlehong were allegedly dumped in the street by members of the SADF. The mayor of Katlehong said, however, that SADF members had only accompanied the messenger of the court, and that it was not soldiers but the messenger who had taken possession of residents' belongings.<sup>83</sup>

For two weeks starting on 16 November members of the SADF's medical corps and civil defence volunteers were used to assist in the running and functioning of the Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto when about 800 daily-paid workers and 940 student nurses were dismissed following strike action. In spite of allegations that armed soldiers had rounded up dismissed workers to collect their final pay packets, the member of the Transvaal provincial executive committee in charge of hospital services, Mr Daan Kirstein, said that the police and the defence force had been brought in to help at the hospital and not in connection with the strike. Between 550 and 600 defence force members were involved in maintaining essential services at the hospital before the workers and student nurses were reinstated.<sup>84</sup>

#### *Allegations regarding the behaviour of troops in the townships*

A number of incidents of alleged misconduct by the defence force in the townships were reported in the press in 1985. The majority of these are dealt with below. It should be noted that allegations of bad behaviour were often aimed at 'the police and the defence force' or 'the security forces' so it was difficult to single out which body was responsible for the alleged misconduct (see also *Police* below). An unnamed serviceman who had been with the SADF on township duty noted in September, 'Almost throughout these four months the army has been mixed up with the police, with SADF members in police vehicles.' He said, 'For the black population there has been no opportunity to differentiate between the two forces, and the SADF almost immediately inherited the lack of credibility and bad reputation of the police.'<sup>85</sup>

#### *Complaints lodged with and against the SADF*

Mr Malan said that between 2 June and 17 December, 33 'official' complaints had been lodged with the SADF about the actions of troops in the townships. Developments regarding these complaints were as follows: in nine of them SADF members had not been involved; six were still under investigation by the SAP; in five, complainants, or those allegedly assaulted, could not be traced; in four, SADF members were tried and found guilty in magistrates' courts (two of the

cases were for assault and two for theft); in two, complaints were unfounded; in a further two, those responsible were dealt with by the army itself; in the case of the wrongful detention of a high school pupil, release was obtained and an apology rendered; in a case of 'unnecessary questioning' the complainant had been wrongly pointed out as the 'guilty party' and apologies were rendered; one complaint was withdrawn; one was awaiting the decision of the attorney general; and one complainant could not identify who had injured him with a teargas cannister.<sup>86</sup>

During the year under review 76 civil actions were instituted against the minister of defence and his department, of which four had prescribed because they had not been lodged within six months. Mr Malan said that in 45 of the cases 'internal investigations' had shown that SADF members were not involved, although evidence to the contrary might be led during the civil actions. The remaining 31 claims comprised 13 assaults, 17 shooting incidents, and one rape. By April 1986 none of the actions had been finalised.<sup>87</sup>

Mr Malan said in February 1986 that 40 complaints, lodged with bodies other than the SADF, had been received concerning actions of national servicemen in the eastern Cape unrest areas of East London, Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth, and Uitenhage, in Soweto (Transvaal), and also in the Pretoria areas of Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, and Pretoria West. The nature of the complaints ranged from murder and robbery, and the throwing of teargas, to defiant and provocative behaviour. He said that 32 of the complaints had been found to be unsubstantiated, and in the eight cases found to be legitimate, legal or disciplinary steps had been taken.<sup>88</sup>

On 11 September the SADF opened temporary complaints offices in 28 centres to inquire into and deal with alleged offences by troops in the townships. There were 13 in the eastern Cape, nine on the Witwatersrand, three in Pretoria, and three in the western Cape. Extensive publicity was given to the opening of the centres, which were manned by teams of citizen force members or members of the public and patrolled by the army to offer protection to complainants. Criminal offences 'which seemed sound' were to be handed over to the police for prosecution in the normal way, and where grounds for civil claims against the SADF existed, the SADF was to deal with them itself.<sup>89</sup>

It became apparent by 15 September that people were not making use of these centres. The senior citizen force manpower officer on the Witwatersrand, Colonel Basil Ginsberg, said that the response had been disappointing and that the SADF would have to devise other ways of reaching the people. 'We have heard many rumours about the activities of soldiers in the townships and feel they must be investigated,' he said.<sup>90</sup> On 18 September the director of manpower liaison, Brigadier A C Chemaly, said that in the week in which the centres had opened, they had not received a single complaint. Expressing concern, he said, 'We're not stupid. When you play rugby, injuries should be expected, but nobody is approaching the centres with complaints.' One reason for the lack of complaints, he suggested, was that people were afraid of intimidation. In an attempt to accommodate those who feared this, he said that people had been advised to approach the army through their employers, but added that only two or three complaints had been received in this way.<sup>91</sup> The head of the Methodist Church, the Rev Peter Storey, suggested that in some areas 'sinister behaviour' by the police could be a reason for the reluctance of people to come forward with complaints.<sup>92</sup>

It was announced on 24 September that the complaints offices would stay open for an extended period. Col Ginsberg said that in two cases they had helped families find their lost sons, and that two cases had been referred to higher authorities. He said that the army was not above the law and any misconduct would be answered for. 'We are not in the townships to make enemies, but to make friends,' he said. However, residents in the townships called upon the government to appoint an independent commission of inquiry to look into the actions of the security forces in their areas. *The Star* reported visiting the complaints office in Katlehong, where residents had stood outside the office but had not entered it. People gathered there had said, *The Star* reported, that it was fruitless to lay complaints to the men 'you are accusing'. One resident said that he feared he would be in serious danger if he lodged complaints with the security forces.<sup>93</sup>

In October the chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen, said that investigations into allegations that the complaints offices had not met expectations had shown that intimidation and 'aggressive action' by 'malicious elements' had prevented complaints from being laid. 'At the same time it also appears that genuine well-founded complaints do not exist,' Gen Viljoen said. He also urged people once again to come forward with complaints as he accepted that irregularities could occur and that appropriate action would be taken against offenders.<sup>94</sup>

In November eight SADF members who 'with intent' assaulted an African man on 15 July, branded his legs with heated iron bars, and pelted him with stones, were sentenced to a R200 fine or four months' imprisonment each, when they were found guilty of assault by the New Brighton (Port Elizabeth) magistrate's court. They all pleaded guilty to assaulting the victim, saying that they had had nothing against him, and adding that they could not explain why they had attacked him. The magistrate also found that the men had admitted that at the time of the incident they had known that they had no right to assault him.<sup>95</sup>

#### *Concern expressed over the use of troops in the townships*

Apart from calls for the withdrawal of troops from the townships from the End Conscription Campaign and the PFP (see above), many other organisations and bodies also expressed concern at their presence.

In May the director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Mr John Kane-Berman, said that the use of young white conscripts to help maintain civil order in black areas led to greater racial polarisation, cast the army in a political role, created the impression that the State was at war in the townships, and implied that the police were out of their depth.<sup>96</sup>

On 25 June Mrs Sheena Duncan, president of the Black Sash, noting the increasing use of the army in civilian control, said that the rapid militarisation of South African society was 'one of the most obvious symptoms of the abuse of power'.<sup>97</sup> Church and other bodies expressed concern at the mounting level of unrest and alleged that the use of the SADF in townships was 'fanning unrest'. In reply to a telex from the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Rev Philip Russell, calling for a judicial inquiry into the activities of both the SAP and the SADF, Mr Malan said that the SADF shared the church's concern. 'The SADF is doing its utmost to prevent further violence,' he said, but denied that it was involved in action that inflamed unrest.<sup>98</sup>

In July the state president, Mr P W Botha, responded to a call from the South

African Council of Churches (SACC) for the withdrawal of troops and riot police from the townships by saying that they were there to protect law-abiding citizens, and that the SACC enjoyed the security their presence guaranteed to express 'whatever irresponsible opinions (they) wished to express under the cloak of religion'.<sup>99</sup>

A call for the removal of troops from townships was listed in July as a demand by the consumer boycott committee in Port Elizabeth, and by various community organisations and trade unions throughout the country. In October at a meeting organised by the Soweto civic association, the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC) was formed. Among other things, the SPCC resolved 'that the SADF (should) leave the townships, and police leave the schools with immediate effect so that children feel safe to return to classes'.<sup>100</sup> On 23 November Mr Vlok told a delegation of the SPCC that the army would be withdrawn from Soweto only when peace and order had returned to the townships. Mr Vlok was also responding to all of the proposals put to him concerning the withdrawal of the army from the townships. An SPCC spokesman said that it had made it clear that the Soweto community believed that the withdrawal of the SADF remained one of the necessary requirements for normal schooling.<sup>101</sup>

When troops were withdrawn from Port Elizabeth's African townships on 21 November, for the first time since October 1984, a spokesman for the SAP maintained that it was because there had been no recent 'incidents of unrest', and dismissed suggestions that it was because of the demands of 'certain organisations'.<sup>102</sup> The United Democratic Front (UDF) vice president for the eastern Cape region, Mr Henry Fazzie, said that the move would 'minimise the current vicious circle of violence in the townships'.<sup>103</sup>

In November the Vaal civic association said that the occupation of the townships by the defence force and the introduction of a state of emergency had become new obstacles to resolving the Vaal Triangle rent crisis (see *Housing*).<sup>104</sup>

#### *Civil, area, and border defence and operations*

Between 30 July and 3 August all white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 54 years resident in the eastern Cape magisterial districts of Kirkwood, Humansdorp/Hankey, Cradock, and Somerset East had to register for the commando force. Eastern province command said that about 400 members would be selected for use in the commando.<sup>105</sup> The acting officer commanding Group 8 commando, Commandant Dennis Shore, explained that people were being called up to protect the area in the event of unrest. He said that while people had become used to unrest in South West Africa/Namibia, internal unrest had brought the situation 'closer to home', and that 'there was no realistic alternative to calling people up in an area to protect that area'.<sup>106</sup>

In reply to a series of questions in the house of assembly in March and April Mr Malan said that a wall and an electrified fence stretching between the Sand River and Beit Bridge along the Limpopo River had been constructed as part of an integrated experiment with border barrier systems 'to facilitate more effective border control where necessary'. He said that the project cost R2.5m and the voltage carried by the fence could be continuous or pulsating up to 3 000 volts. Mr Malan said that illustrated warning signs in Afrikaans, English, and Venda appeared at 50m intervals on both sides of the fence. He also said that the Zimbabwe government had confirmed in February that it had been informed of the fence.<sup>107</sup> A decision on the extension of the fence would be taken after it had

been 'thoroughly evaluated', he said.<sup>108</sup> Mr Malan disclosed that during the night of 29 to 30 March a person of unknown nationality was killed when he attempted to cut the electrified fence.<sup>109</sup>

A report by the Angolan News Service (ANGOP) that there were plans to build an electrified fence along all borders with frontline states, including between Angola and Namibia, was denied by military spokesmen, as such an undertaking would be impractical and the cost exorbitant.<sup>110</sup>

Mr Malan said in June that in 1981, 1983, and 1985, the SADF had made use of herbicide in Namibia, the operational area, and on the outlines of the 'so-called Yati Strip'. The herbicide had been used to eradicate vegetation to facilitate the location of enemy crossings of border strips, Mr Malan said. He also said that the herbicide used was a commercially available product found to be harmless to humans and animals if applied according to the directions.<sup>111</sup>

On 17 June the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) government was launched in Namibia by the state president, Mr P W Botha. The MPC was given wide powers to govern Namibia's affairs but the South African government retained control over defence, security, and foreign affairs. The South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) rejected the MPC's offer of an amnesty to returning guerrillas — only four of whom accepted and returned to Namibia during 1985. The war in the north of Namibia between the South West African Territory Force (SWATF) and the SADF on the one hand and SWAPO on the other continued.<sup>112</sup>

In June the secretary of finance in the interim government, Dr Johan Jones, estimated that the war against SWAPO, at that stage in its 19th year, was costing South Africa about R400m a year. The officer commanding both the SADF and the SWATF, Major General George Meiring, said that about 61% of the soldiers in the war zone were Namibians. He said that the SWATF had 21 163 members, while he estimated SWAPO's military strength to be about 8 500. Gen Meiring said that when 225 vacancies for Ovambo soldiers had been advertised recently, more than 3 000 people had applied (see also *Police*).<sup>113</sup>

In May Mr Malan said that it was South Africa's policy to 'defend and safeguard itself offensively with all the might at its disposal against any form of foreign aggression or internal revolution'. 'In addition', he said, 'it is our policy to prevent the build-up of any hostile terrorists — or of conventional forces in neighbouring states which may pose a threat'. Mr Malan denied that destabilisation of neighbouring states was an aim of the SADF.<sup>114</sup> He said that the forces of the frontline states numbered an armoured tank capability of 1 642 units with an overall value of more than R1,6bn, military aircraft capability of 715 units with a value of R3,6bn, and naval capability amounting to about R5m, while 332 000 troops were under arms of whom 'more than 35 000 were communist surrogates, mostly well-trained Cubans'.<sup>115</sup> The leader of the official opposition in the house of assembly, Dr Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert (PFP), said that when it came to matters of international relations or even domestic initiatives, the minister of defence and his department appeared to 'have their own timetable, and a totally independent and unaccountable agenda and basis of operation'.<sup>116</sup> He added that the SADF was creating for itself and the country a major crisis of credibility.<sup>117</sup>

Dr Slabbert asked, 'Was, or is, destabilisation an accepted strategy of South Africa's regional diplomacy as far as the SADF is concerned?' He gave references to South Africa's position in the Angolan war, the acknowledged assistance to the resistance movement in Mozambique (RENAMO), the alleged assistance (to Mr Mike Hoare) in the Seychelles coup (1982), and questioned where South Africa

stood in arming and training opposition movements in Lesotho and Zimbabwe.<sup>118</sup> Mr Graham McIntosh MP (PFP) outlined an aggressive pattern of SADF activity in southern Africa in the last decade, beginning with the invasion of Angola in 1975 and followed by covert sponsorship of guerrilla movements in neighbouring states. He said, 'We have become a major aggressor in southern Africa. We have trained people to bomb, to kill innocent people — in simple words, to terrorise'.<sup>119</sup>

In August the chief of the South African Air Force (SAAF), Lieutenant General Denis Earp, said that a Russian supplied radar 'air umbrella', as 'formidable as those in eastern Europe or the Middle East', was being built up in neighbouring countries. He said that the 'air umbrella' secured bases for insurgency organisations in those countries so that South African counter action against insurgents became more difficult. Unless the 'air umbrella' was neutralised, long-range operations into countries hosting insurgency operations would not be possible without heavy casualties, Gen Earp added.<sup>120</sup>

### Angola

On 17 April South African troops withdrew from Angola, in spite of South African allegations of continuing violations of the Lusaka agreement by SWAPO forces. In terms of the agreement, signed in Zambia in February 1984, the Angolan government undertook to restrict the movement of SWAPO in southern Angola, while the South Africans undertook to withdraw from the area (see 1984 *Survey* p826). The chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen, said the joint monitoring commission would remain operating at the border for a further 30 days, during which time he hoped that a system of further negotiation between Angola and South Africa would be formulated.<sup>121</sup> However, two platoons of troops remained stationed at the Calueque barrage and pumping station about 12km inside Angola while final details regarding the handover of the pumping station were sorted out. They were to withdraw by 17 May.<sup>122</sup> Towards the end of the same month the president of Angola, Mr Jose dos Santos, said that the withdrawal of the South African forces was not a solution to the civil war in Angola because 'Pretoria continues to support the rebels by supplying them with the arms, ammunition, uniforms, and training (necessary) to terrorise the population and destabilise our economy'.<sup>123</sup>

On 21 May two South African soldiers were killed and one, Captain Wynand du Toit, captured in Cabinda (northern Angola). Mr Malan said that the small commando force of which they had formed part, had been on a reconnaissance mission to find ANC and SWAPO training camps.<sup>124</sup> Capt Du Toit, however, told his captors that the reconnaissance commando had gone to Cabinda to sabotage American oil storage tanks.<sup>125</sup>

On 30 May the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Roelof Botha, said that South Africa had been informed by the Angolan government that it was breaking off all negotiations with South Africa.<sup>126</sup>

At the end of June the SWATF launched a three-day cross-border raid, codenamed 'Boswilger', into Angola against SWAPO insurgents. According to a statement by Gen Meiring the force, which penetrated up to 40km into Angola, was involved in skirmishes with SWAPO and a search for arms caches.<sup>127</sup>

In September Gen Viljoen announced that the SADF and SWATF had again crossed the Angolan border on 16 September in a follow-up operation against SWAPO. The Angolan defence force had been informed of the move and

requested not to interfere, he said.<sup>128</sup> According to Gen Meiring the raiding force consisted of 12 'reaction units' of about 40 men each who penetrated as far as Nehone and Evale, about 100km inside Angola. The defence force confirmed that an air attack on a SWAPO command post at Nehone had taken place.

It was announced on 22 September that all the troops who had crossed the border had safely returned to base in Namibia. During that week 15 SWAPO insurgents were killed in Angola in nine armed encounters and four ammunition dumps were found, Gen Meiring said. He made no mention of the reported fighting in the southern Angolan Kuando-Kubango province where Angolan government forces were engaged in a concerted drive against the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) headquarters at Jamba.<sup>129</sup>

However, it was reported that an SADF medical orderly had been killed in a skirmish between UNITA soldiers and Angolan troops on about 14 September. Furthermore, while the defence force said it was taking action against SWAPO insurgents ANGOP claimed that SAAF planes were bombing Angolan government troops advancing on Jamba, and South African armoured cars, identified as belonging to 32 battalion, were close to Jamba.<sup>130</sup>

On 27 September Mr Malan explained that South Africa's three major military considerations in the Angolan situation were 'limited' military action against SWAPO; 'moral, material, and humanitarian aid' to UNITA; and the massive accumulation of sophisticated communist military equipment in Angola. He claimed that Angola had violated the Lusaka agreement by not sticking to its undertaking to restrict SWAPO activities in southern Angola. He claimed further that Angola had violated the agreement 145 times, while South Africa was responsible for four violations. The South African violations had been deliberate, Mr Malan said, and undertaken because the SADF needed to know whether SWAPO was building up a presence in southern Angola. With reference to the Cabinda incident Mr Malan said, 'What we may or may not have been doing in other parts of Angola, whether we may or may not have been gathering intelligence, has absolutely nothing to do with the agreement.' Explaining the presence of South African troops in Angola he said, 'When it comes to gathering intelligence other countries use aircraft...and satellites—we do it virtually on foot.'<sup>131</sup>

At the end of September ANGOP claimed that troops and air force planes were still assisting UNITA. In mid-October the Angolan government reiterated its claim. South Africa, however, denied that it had troops directly involved in the fighting.<sup>132</sup>

On 14 November the SWATF said that security forces had staged a limited cross-border operation in Angola in pursuit of eight SWAPO insurgents.<sup>133</sup>

In the same month it was reported that a large quantity of Russian built missiles (SAM-8s and SAM-9s) and radar equipment had been moved into southern Angola to Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale.<sup>134</sup>

#### *Botswana*

In the early hours of 14 June the SADF carried out a cross-border operation in Botswana. The targets were ten houses and offices, allegedly used by the African National Congress (ANC), spread throughout Gaborone. Twelve people were killed and six wounded during the operation, which, according to the SADF, took 40 minutes.

The South African government claimed that among the items captured from

the ANC were a silencer and subsonic ammunition for an AK assault rifle, a sophisticated night/telescopic sight for an RPG-7 rocket launcher, and a large quantity of other material which included documents such as the ANC's financial records for Botswana from 1977 to June 1985, and telephone accounts with details of trunk calls made to ANC contacts in South Africa.

At a press conference after the raid the chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen, claimed that the targets hit by the SADF had been involved in the planning, training, control, and provisioning of insurgents against South Africa. The SADF had been ready to hit the targets a long time previously, he said, but had hoped that the Botswana government would deal with the ANC presence. New intelligence, however, had indicated that the ANC intended operating from Botswana to commit many acts of sabotage in the last two weeks of June, Gen Viljoen claimed. The object of the operation had been to disrupt the 'nerve centre' of the ANC's machinery operating against South Africa, he said, adding that since the signing of the Nkomati accord on 16 March 1984 (see 1984 *Survey* p753) the ANC had had to find another way of infiltrating South Africa and had chosen Botswana. A large quantity of arms had not been found, he claimed, because of the ANC's practice of not keeping weapons in large quantities in places like Botswana because the local security police would confiscate them and make arrests. According to the official magazine of the SADF, *Paratus*, the ANC had been responsible for 36 acts of insurgency planned and executed from Botswana since August 1984.<sup>135</sup>

Among those killed were eight South Africans. Three Botswana nationals who died included a six-year-old child and two domestic workers. The fourth non-South African was a Somali-born Dutch national.<sup>136</sup> While early reports said that South African intelligence had claimed four of the deceased as ANC operatives, other reports from Gaborone claimed that not one of those killed was or had ever been a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC. The Gaborone reports said that only five of the dead had had any links with the ANC—in some cases only a tenuous relationship. The *New African* commented, 'Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the raid was the startling breakdown in the South African intelligence establishment which it brought to the fore. Militarily, it was, plainly speaking, a mess.'<sup>137</sup>

#### *Lesotho*

In the early hours of 20 December nine people were killed when two homes were the target of commando-type raids in Maseru, Lesotho's capital. Six of those who died were said to be ANC members, and although the SADF and the SAP denied being involved in the raid, the Lesotho government was adamant that the attack had originated in South Africa.<sup>138</sup> Other reports said that six of those who died were South African refugees and three were Lesotho nationals.<sup>139</sup> The following day a spokesman for the Lesotho National Liberation Army (LNLA) claimed responsibility for the killings, but this was contradicted by the Lesotho government, which claimed that Lesotho authorities had eye-witness accounts confirming that the killers were whites who had spoken Afrikaans. The minister of information in Lesotho, Mr Desmond Sixishe, alleged that, in any case, the LNLA was 'little more than an extension of the South African defence force'.<sup>140</sup>

#### *Mozambique*

In March Mr Malan rejected persisting allegations that elements in the SADF

were supporting Mozambique's counter-revolutionary movement—the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)—in spite of the Nkomati accord. The accord, which was signed on 16 March 1984, provided that neither Mozambique nor South Africa would provide facilities for 'elements' hostile to the other (see 1984 *Survey* p753).<sup>141</sup> Later Mr Malan declared that the border area between South Africa and Mozambique was a 'specially restricted airspace'. The step, he said, was taken to curtail smuggling and to prevent private interests from giving logistical support to any rebel movement.<sup>142</sup>

The following month the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Roelof Botha, told the house of assembly that 'there was of course a time when we helped to train (RENAMO) and assisted it'. Mr Botha claimed that this was because more than 90% of all violent attacks in South Africa had emanated from Mozambique. He said that on the conclusion of the accord, however, all aid to RENAMO had been stopped. It no longer served the country's purposes to have RENAMO blowing up power lines or threatening the harbour of Maputo, Mr Botha said, adding that it 'must stop its violence... In any event it cannot achieve decisive military victory'.<sup>143</sup>

In May Mr Malan said that, following talks with the Mozambique government on 14 March, an investigation into the defence force had found evidence of one RENAMO 'sympathiser', while four other people were suspected 'sympathisers'. To eliminate further any suspicion of collaboration with RENAMO certain units with Portuguese-speaking members were to be moved, he said.<sup>144</sup>

In spite of these moves, allegations persisted that the SADF had massively topped up RENAMO's supplies and equipment on the eve of the signing of the accord enabling the movement to continue its operations uninterrupted, even if South Africa scrupulously upheld the accord.<sup>145</sup>

In September Mozambique government troops overran rebel-held quarters in Gorongosa and, among other things, captured a diary which purportedly exposed South African aid to RENAMO. The diary, kept by a Mr J Vaz, appeared to have been that of rebels. It documented, among other things, regular SAAF flights to RENAMO's bush headquarters at Gorongosa, a navy submarine mission to pick up a rebel leader from the Mozambique coast, and three secret visits by the former deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mr Louis Nel, to the guerrillas' main base. Mr Botha and Mr Malan rejected Mozambique's charges that these had been violations of the Nkomati accord. South Africa and the SADF had at all times upheld the accord, they claimed, saying that they would explain to Mozambique that humanitarian aid to the rebels, the air force flights, the submarine mission, and Mr Nel's visits had all been undertaken in the cause of bringing the two sides in the Mozambique civil war together. They denied allegations that weapons and munitions had been supplied, saying that a limited quantity of weapons had been flown to Gorongosa on 21 August 1984 for the protection of South Africans who were building an airstrip there (for the purpose of implementing a ceasefire).<sup>146</sup> The ministers maintained that South African breaches of the accord were 'technical'.<sup>147</sup> At talks between the two countries immediately following the disclosure of the diary, Mr Botha claimed that some ANC members were still in Mozambique.<sup>148</sup>

In October the head of the SADF, Gen Viljoen, alleged that the diary had been 'doctored' by Mozambique in an effort to discredit the SADF. In addition, he said, the Mozambique government had rejected several offers of military assistance, among them an offer to protect the road and railway from the border

at Ressano Garcia to Maputo, and another to use SADF engineers to repair damaged bridges that were preventing technicians from getting to places where RENAMO had cut the power line from the Cahora Bassa Dam.<sup>149</sup> Also in October, Mozambique suspended the joint security committee that had been set up to monitor violations of the accord.<sup>150</sup>

In December the president of Mozambique, Mr Samora Machel, reiterated accusations that South Africa was using RENAMO to sabotage his country.<sup>151</sup>

### *Zimbabwe*

A series of landmine explosions in the northern Transvaal in November prompted concern that insurgents had been able to penetrate into the area from Zimbabwe. In November the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Botha, said that South African forces would have no alternative but to cross the South Africa/Zimbabwe border in pursuit of suspects if the Zimbabweans did not act to prevent further landmine explosions in South Africa.<sup>152</sup>

At the end of November farmers living on the border said that they wanted an electrified border fence to be erected to ensure greater safety for them. They said that the double sisal fence planted to mark the border with Zimbabwe was inadequate.<sup>153</sup>

In December the minister of agricultural economics in the house of assembly, Mr Greyling Wentzel, said that it was the government's duty to protect the public in rural and urban areas, and that it was concentrating on stabilising the position of established farmers in the northwestern Transvaal.<sup>154</sup>

After further explosions in December in the northern Transvaal, the Zimbabwe government sent a message to Pretoria reiterating that it had not and would not give ANC guerrillas bases in Zimbabwe. At the same time the prime minister of Zimbabwe, Mr Robert Mugabe, claimed that South African troops had been massed along the border.<sup>155</sup>

In late December, after a landmine explosion 3km from the Zimbabwe border had killed six people and injured five, Mr Malan said that continued insurgency action along that border could lead to a situation similar to that pertaining to SWAPO in Angola (see above).<sup>156</sup>

Some of the measures planned for the northern Transvaal area, roughly between Messina and Pontdrif, included security fences, alarm systems, floodlights, and window protection for homes on isolated farms; large-scale repatriation of illegal immigrants and workers who were suspected of aiding the ANC; increased efforts to step up occupancy of farms in the area (the defence force said that about 50% of the farms were not occupied); the supply of army rifles to some farmers' wives (most male farmers already had such weapons as they were members of local commandos); and extensions to the two barrier fences along the border with Zimbabwe—one an electrified fence, which had already claimed two victims crossing into South Africa, and the other a combination of razor wire and sisal strips. The officer commanding the Soutpansberg military area, Colonel J Swanepoel, said that since 1980 extensive security measures had been introduced in the district.<sup>157</sup>

### **Directorate of Security Legislation**

The department of law and order consists of the South African Police (SAP) and the directorate of security legislation of the department of justice. The latter is

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