

feeding the growth of 'seizure of power' usage in our documents, or the reverse: our formulations feed the militant tendencies I cannot say. But in the latest CP Program, adopted at the end of 59, they word-conscious mind picked up? ~~was~~ of the phrase 'seizure of power' on the aim of the Party; and nowhere is there any caveat about ^{the need for} democratic or majority support. The content is left unaltered. Here too, it seems to us, language imprecisely used, popular understanding of words which are differently intended in ~~the~~ specialist political discourse is a dangerous trend. And one which needs constant vigilance, and correction.

C19

[THE AG GUESTS] Kotane had begun showing signs of erratic behaviour at rare intervals. Normally a calm but purposeful, bluntly spoken man, now on rare occasions he resorted to erratic, sometimes uncharacteristic outbursts. This was one of those occasions. He suddenly berated an invader for ~~attacking~~ attack on Stovo ~~for~~ who he seemed to see as ~~some~~ a sinister influence against him and the line of policy he followed. The attack came from no discernible source, and had no apparent basis except in Kotane's own mind. Later Stovo told me, on an occasion when I was not present, Kotane had suddenly - from the blue - let loose an even more vicious blast against Stovo, accusing him of totally untrue, unprovoked hostile acts. Stovo thought he was losing his balance, and conducted a personal vendetta because of some remembered difference of opinion long ago ~~in~~ the ~~of~~ debate over the public engine of the Party circa 1959. I thought it was just the antebellumness of that age begin to set in, debilitated by the unquenchable stress of Kotane's life at that time, when he was treasurer and political grand old man of the ANK in exile, living uncomfortably and under constant stress in Tanganyika. Only later did it appear that what we were seeing were the advance signals of the hardening of his arteries, which produced occasional erratic outbreaks of anger and vituperation. Within a year, he succumbed to a heart attack which left him paralysed on one side and his speech injured. He was flown from ~~Tanganyika~~ to Moscow for hospital attention of a quality which was not then available in Tanganyika; and he lived out the rest of his life as an invalid in a Moscow hospital. His speech recovered slowly, but the paralysis did not. He retained the same certainty of mind, the same bluntness of manner which had led many of his colleagues to find him arrogant or even rude. But no one - ever to the end of his life - ever doubted his total dedication to the cause of liberation, or his absolute incomparability. He set a standard for probity and scrupulous honesty in office which I believe has set a standard for the upper echelon of the ANK which persists in remarkable degree to this day. He died in Moscow in _____.

His death marked the mantle of the passing of a regimen(?). Before he died, another titan of the CP history J.B. Marko was suddenly stricken by a heart attack, sending for from ANK HQ to Moscow to take up a bed adjacent to Kotane in hospital. J.B. - one of the best and most respected of the 1st generation of ANK-CP leaders was also, I think, his best loved. He had a broad humanity, an approachability, and a ~~reason~~ for the servant to the folks of the rank and file which was not equalled by any other leader of his stature. Evaporé knew him as Uncle JB. And when he died in Moscow in _____, another great pillar of our party cause was gone.

It seemed that a wave was sweeping over us. The entire group which had re-constituted the CP after the dissolution of 1950 seemed to be disappearing. Michael Hornal, perhaps the foremost disciplinarian of Party documents and statements of that time ~~was~~ had been recruited by the Party to the editorial committee of World Marxist Review in Prague. ~~He had~~ ~~had~~ ~~no~~ ~~role~~ ~~to~~ ~~play~~ ~~there~~. It was said he was ~~very~~ ~~unusually~~ ~~to~~ ~~think~~. Whether that was so or not, and whether it contributed in any way to his death, I do not know. He died aged _____ in Prague in _____. Soon after, Yussuf Dadoo, who had been going steadily thinner and more frail, was hospitalized in London where he had had his home for some years. He had kept up a strenuous schedule of work as Chairman of the Party, shuttle around the world on Party business, and simultaneously a leader of the ANK - Revolutionary Council, for which he shuffled constantly between London and Dar es Salaam. Evidently as a medical man he sensed what ~~the~~ cause of his waning was. But he steadfastly denied any real illness, denied that medical tests had revealed any physical causes, and kept up his work until it became physically impossible and he was hospitalized. Even in hospital he retained the impossible optimism which had kept alive the spirits of a generation living through the post-depression of the post-Revolution period and of life in exile. From his hospital bed he encouraged and spurred on the steady stream of comrades who visited him, straightening them as his own doubts drowned darkly away. In _____ he died, and was buried alongside Kaul Mera in Highgate Cemetery. In South Africa, the best loved of us all, Bram Fischer - seeing a sentence of life imprisonment - developed cancer in Potchefstroom Prison. He was hospitalized; the authorities refused to release him for better medical treatment than the SA Prison Service provided - until his death was imminent and certain. Then, for a short time, he was let out of prison under guard, and died in _____ hospital on _____. Even when the government refused to release his corpse for burial, his family. He was returned to the jail, and buried in Potchefstroom in lonely isolation.

I began to feel like an swower, diving to a spar as one after another the colleagues who had been with me in the resurrection of the Party slipped, one by one, ^{and life} into the dark pages of history.

I was the only survivor at large of that group that week by week, in motor cars, safohmas and under the trees in deep
 countryside, had reconstituted the CP, devised a new structure suitable for underground work, laid down a basic set of
 rules which ultimately became a constitution, set up the first new party units and convened the first national conference
 of the Party. Others of the first Central Committee elected at the Conference survived - Raj Simons, Brian Bantzi, M.P. Naidu, Walter Suckler.
 And others, who in my view, no longer can state definitely whether they were members of the CC or not: Joe Duro, Moses Mabhida, Dan
 Thorne, Fred Cameron, Walter Suckler, Abuel Khatibade, Raymond Mhlaba, Govan Mbeki. Some in South Africa and
 still active in the movement above ground or underground - and some in exile or about to go into exile, some in jail.
 In the Party CC, as that original core group died out, new and younger comrades stepped into their shoes. And that created
 change, more by inadvertence than deliberate. The original group, though seated partly in Africa, partly in London,
 operated with a secretariat - the effective day to day organ of the CC - in London. As death came off one after another,
 the weight tilted towards Africa, ~~but in Africa~~ and towards where most of the replacement comrades were
 stationed. Ultimately - I am unsure when - the secretariat itself ~~left~~ was transferred to Southern Africa, leaving
 London as the outpost. That this represented, in some way, a substantial political development cannot be
 doubted. It returned the leadership of the Party to a place closer to our real constituency of South Africa, and into close
 and almost continuous contact with our main ally and leader of the liberation movement the ANC, with
 headquarters at that time in Dar. Politically we gained from the shift. But paradoxically, I believe that
 organizationally we lost. All our cadres in Southern Africa were attached to the ANC, most of them full-time
 functionaries of the ANC. This severely hampered their freedom of movement; it became harder for the CC to meet
 regularly, and to function as it wished. It became harder for conferences, international get-togethers to be held and
 all our comrades could only absent themselves from ANC work with permission. And in the stretched state
 of ANC senior personnel in those days, and the ~~overlapping~~ rather attenuated formality of ANC-CP relations
 that permission was not easily obtained. Organizationally then, we suffered. Politically, too, it seemed to me,
 the changed central location introduced an almost imperceptible drift in our own ranks. The ANC in Africa, in those
 days, was virtually isolated from any sort of mass political activity in SA. Its New HQ apparatus then had, as
 its main political concern the development of the armed force, which was assembled and based outside South
 Africa, and was experiencing great difficulty, not by day and frustration in unrelentingly being taken into the country.
 This bias towards the military wing of the movement and its problems had an unpleasant, an unwelcome influence
 on the Party leadership itself. It was in this period that I first began to sense an increasingly impersonal
 approach to Party comrades, an almost any-style expectation that Party members - like soldiers - are to be viewed
 as human automatons who are required to respond to orders - not to question them; to obey, not to argue out
 differences. I began to find myself marginally out of tune with the prevailing ethos. The first manifestation of this
 came at a National Conference in 1970?? Here it was proposed that the new CC to be elected should consist exclusively
 of 'full-timers'. In ^{the main} ~~part~~ the justification for this proposal was drawn from Lenin's 'What is to be done' - which
 postulated (for Tsarist Russia) - a party of full-time, professional revolutionaries. I opposed the proposal.
 As I recall it, I was alone in my opposition at the Conference. My opposition was based on a fear - which I stated
 that full-time functionaries of the movement ~~have~~ ~~can~~ ~~at~~ ~~times~~ ~~find~~ ~~their~~ ~~views~~ ~~contrary~~ ~~to~~ ~~those~~ ~~of~~
 the rest of the membership - perhaps for good reason since they can be closer to the realities of the movement and
 its problems than the rest of the membership who are only 'part-time' in politics; perhaps for reasons of
 vested career or personal reasons not shared by part-timers. The proposal seemed to me, therefore, to open
 the way to a bureaucratic ~~domination~~ ~~of~~ ~~what~~ ~~should~~ ~~be~~ ~~a~~ ~~democratic~~ ~~process~~ ~~of~~ ~~decision~~
 making. As I recall it, mine was the only vote against the proposal at the Conference. I was accordingly, ineligible for
 continued membership of the CC. Now, twenty years on I still think I was right and the decision was wrong;
 but not for the reasons I then advanced. The threat of a separate 'functionaries' ticket did not develop. But
 what had happened without any of us being aware of it in advance was the Party membership had lost its
 absolute control of the choice of CC membership. That had passed to those who appoint those 'full-timers' for
 service in the movement, often an ostensible vastly different from those which should determine fitness for the CC -
 for reasons as varied as the fact that they are in the convenient place at the required time; that they have
 some technical or administrative skill; or even that they are out of a job and thus available. We never
 defined 'full-timer'. It came to mean almost anyone except those in normal employment - any personnel,
 trade union organisers, freelance journalists, ANC functionaries and so on. In fact we had surrendered the
 selection of our CC to a pre-selection process ~~by~~ conducted by others on an unregulated basis. I
 had occasion to refer to this quite recently in a letter to the Party leadership. I reviewed an almost casual
 dismissal: the decision, it was said, had not been for a 'full-timer' CC' but for all CC members to be living within
 reasonable distance of HQ. I disagree. Had that been the decision, it would still have been wrong. It still
 left the selection of CC candidates to them, since SA refugees do not have absolute freedom to settle near
 HQ in Africa, but can do so only if accepted as people for whom the ANC will stand surety with the
 host government. In effect, those outside Southern Africa can only obtain entry to live and work in Africa

if they are accepted for ~~that~~ work in an ANC or Umkhonto faculty. Even so, the decision is quite flawed; with a CP in exile scattered around the globe, to debate from the CC all those not in Africa is both anti-democratic and unnecessary. For the sectional or even the corporately small activities which meet at family, district intervals, some geographical limits for candidates is certainly required, or the whole organization would grind to a standstill. But for the ~~the~~ larger CC, which meets only occasionally — once in —, according to the new 1989 rules, it is not required, in an age when international travel is quick, and almost universal, accessible.

I felt slightly sour about the decision, and about being dropped from a body in which I had several layers than anyone else present, ~~without any voice of criticism being made~~ on a purely procedural basis. No one at all expressed either sympathy or regret at this outcome. It was as though the comradely help and awareness of the needs of others was decreasing, and a new anti-style imperiousness began to ~~disappear~~ replace it. I did ~~not~~ ~~that~~ ~~at~~ generalize about it at the time. But subsequent events began slowly to reveal to me a pattern which has persisted, perhaps even extended to this date.

→ Caroline Pages 56-58 etc.

LOOKING BACK: After the removal debate (Western Areas) there was, necessarily, some soul-searching and prof. mature discussion. But looking back and self-critical deep analysis was not ~~as~~ indulged in by the ANC at all, and by the Party, only hesitantly, and somewhat superficially. I think the Party membership had been hampered by what had happened to it in the great doctrinal disputes, the fierce 'Deborah' criticism and self-criticism of the 1920s, and by the consequent atmosphere of hesitancy, of reservation of behaviour and counter-accusations of repression. ~~There~~ Those who had peacefully rebuilt the Party from the shattered, ~~was~~ almost motionless corpse left by that process deliberately shunned anything which could resurrect a new round of that self-destructive. The Party — ~~was~~ ~~not~~ encouraged the study of the Marxist classics, and made it compulsory for all members to attend study classes; but it shied away from doctrinal disputation; it developed a style more pragmatic and devoted from practical exigencies than theoretical, derived from theory. It tended to look forward with more anxiety than it looked back; for looking back opened up the dark mazes of criticism and allegation of blame, of responsibility — even perhaps of treason or guilt by betrayal, and could let loose the demons of ~~the~~ ^{friction} divisions and 'fatty sides' within the ranks. Looking back too hard was dangerous; we had been bitten, and we were not likely to repeat the experience lightly. Over the Western Areas debate, we drew only a few lessons, foremost amongst them the folly of triumphalist and maximalist slogans like 'Our own dead bodies' when we were not advocating a real battle to the death, only ~~our~~ ~~own~~ ~~retreat~~. We noted, almost in passing, that we had failed to comprehend that landlords, tenants, homeless squatters in orange-covered corners of other people's houses and settled vendictos had differing interests on ~~the~~ ~~matter~~ issues of removal, and removal; and that in failing to do so to differentiate, we had been misled into taking the voice of the most militant vestiges as the vox populi. In the ANC too, the post-removal dog analysis was shallow and inadequate. The whole thrust of our movement since the war had been forward, forward, forward. There was little time and little appetite or aptitude for looking back. We took our defects hard, for a short time. But rapidly brushed them off to allow the next drive forward to proceed. ~~It~~ ~~that~~ There had been a concerted bias in the whole movement against looking sharply back. It had marginalized the analysis of reasons for the failure of the campaign to oppose Bantu Education by establishing people's schools; it had prevented our understanding the reasons for the defeat of the Congress campaign against Bantustans and its further defeat in attempt to mobilize a mass rejection vote in the first Bantustan election in the Transvaal. And the reasons for the less than satisfactory response to the 1968 post-Shopeville call for the mass burning of passes. ~~There~~ ~~was~~ This was a constant, persistent weakness in our whole movement — less powerful perhaps in the Party than in the ANC, but yet less excusable in what denied to be the vanguard of the advanced elements in the revolutionary movement. ~~Yet~~ ~~that~~ it had its positive side too. It prevented the movement from itself in long, slow analysis of its past mistakes, and giving way to defeatist gloom. It allowed the movement to keep up a bold optimism, and to move forward from campaign to campaign, from mass struggle to mass struggle, relentlessly. (Consider adding in a look back also at the squatters' movement!)

ON DEBATES REFORMS: When De Klerk became Prime Minister, everyone wanted to see which way he would move. Would he prove to be, like Botha, a loud-mouthed talker about reform and an unwillingly exponent of it? The position in the country and internationally was drifting steadily into ~~an~~ all round crisis condition; the political mass movement had developed such mass momentum that it was moving deliberately into open disregard of the restrictions placed upon it — a process it described as 'imbuing itself'. The country's economy was in crisis, with a severe balance of payments deficit, and a vast external debt falling due in the near future, with every prospect that the international

Financial powers might refer to 'reschedule' old debts or view new ones; the international move towards trade sanctions was gaining strength everywhere, and foreign media - particularly American corporations - were shedding their investment and pulling out; the writs of the Afrikaner ruling caste had been broadened by the struggle - and the shadow box - between white supremacist 'conservative' reactionaries, and white conservative 'reformers', and the white front had begun to disintegrate with many groups throwing their weight into the ~~protest~~ overblown black UDF and launch its own democratic alternative through Palamanga opposition parties of with substantial electoral support. De Klerk made his intentions clear. He would 'reform'. He would seek a deal, an agreement of sorts with black leaders of unspecified character; he would vigorously protect 'white group rights' while tight-rope-walking towards universal participation in the process of government. It all sounded reminiscent of Biko's just reformist rhetoric before his nerve failed; and understandably ~~amused~~ the liberation movement it received a fairly chilly reception. Deeds were what was needed - not words. ~~And~~ Such ~~as~~ ~~of~~ ~~days~~ as were spelt out specifically - some fairly trivial removals of 'petty apartheid', some partial removals of or revised marriage and a few venally mixed city suburbs where the people had already rendered the laws virtually obsolete by non-compliance - were somewhat dismissively derided as 'cosmetic' only. I felt that ~~our~~ ^{we had a} long-standing refusal of any clever and attractive government attempt to mislead or corrupt our movement for many years - absence of constitutional 'reform', absence for black participation in what were essentially puppet bodies, that established reaction, it seemed to me, stood in the way of our real analysis of the engine of De Klerk and his supporters to power. Instead of analyzing the pressures which had produced his reformist promises and thus seeing to see whether they had the potential for real advances to be made, our movement it seemed to me reacted in an habitual sceptical and almost dismissive way. I recall that Magube I voiced a very much more trenchant opinion about in criticizing the weaknesses of the De Klerk programme, we were fairly to recognize that this was not just another species of Bikoism. We were ignoring the real ~~is~~ changes that was taking place in South African politics, undauntedly the revolutionary potentialities that was opening up or about to open; and thus were settling into an old pattern of political reaction to government which ignored new possibilities. I felt that successive ANC statements at the time concentrated entirely on the negative aspects of the De Klerk policy, of which there were many, and poured cold water on any hope or optimism ~~that~~ it might arouse amongst the people. There was joy and euphoria in our ranks when Sisulu and all the Rivonia prisoners were released; but still tempered with negativity, scepticism; Mandela had not been released; the ANC was still ~~not~~ banned; every regulation ~~still~~ remained in force. ~~These~~ These criticisms were not insignificant in itself. But they obscured the reality of the advance, the breakthrough process which was in train. Then came the dramatic announcement to Parliament that the ANC and CP laws were lifted; that Mandela would certainly be released shortly; that some emergency regulations were to be withdrawn. But ANC and CP reaction was again cold, critical of what had not been ~~the~~ 'reformed', careful - in a very careful - to minimize the real progress ~~and~~ girding of the steps thus far taken, stressing those things that had not been done. As a weighing up of what had and what had not been attained it was probably ~~very~~ ^{fairly} ~~balanced~~ ^{balanced} and 'responsible' in the most cautious conservative sense. But as a lead from a revolutionary force it seemed to me unfortunate and to be deplored. The tone of doubt and of pessimism once again seemed to me to disappoint the people, to damp down any feelings of triumph or elation, and thus to militate against an upsurge of revolutionary boldness and optimism. Such an upsurge, it seemed to me, should be encouraged, stimulated. People should not be contented to calm but melted to eschew and stretch the boundaries of political strife, to expand mass defiance into new, still unexplored areas, press forward boldly and with optimism. The war of nerves was over, the ramparts going down slowly. It was time to inspire the troops to assault - to drive forward into the breach and to explore every new opportunity to widen it. In the event, it seemed to me, old habits, the caution perhaps of city activists and of exile out of touch with realities at home, prevailed. What I felt should be a call to popular action and revolutionary advance was muted into a caution or yellow light or caveat.

SIG CONTINUATION. BACK & FORWARD RANDOM 20.

CLASS IN MOSCOW (Add in to Foreword piece about Moscow. Davison.) The class was of some 20 to 30 young South Africans, all aged 18 to 25, who were studying at the Moscow Institute of Social Science. I knew none of them. They were a generation who had been either unborn or babies in cradles when I had left South Africa 2, 7 years before. They were young people of a type I had not come across before - vital, intelligent, with a revolutionary passion and commitment to the liberation

struggle - which we had sought to instill in the South African youth prior to 1963 - and had failed. I engaged every minute of my time with them. It was hard work. They ~~never~~ knew very little about South African history ^{at first} - but they were products of the narrow indoctrination process known as 'Bantu Education'. They had picked up some knowledge of the history of the liberation struggle during their time in exile - but they were excited and fascinated to hear someone relate that to the broader history of their country, and above all to hear it from someone who could attest to much of it from his own experience. Sometimes it seemed to me they appreciated personal anecdote better than historical fact. Their eyes would light up, and they would question, argue, and doubt. They accepted nothing just because I or their best buds said it; everything had to be verified, justified, proven. They worked me hard. From two sessions a day, they persuaded me to increase to three sessions, mornings and afternoons. Two weeks of it left me exhausted but exhilarated. I had met a generation I did not know. And in time I realized there was the makings of a new renaissance force with a focus and seriousness which in my time we had hoped to develop - and here it died. Each morning as I approached the lecture of remembered an old Communist in the about Lenin appearing at the Peary Gates with a sad countenance, 27 volumes of his collected works slung over his shoulder; St Peter's refusal to open the gate until Karl Marx intimated: "This is the wheat of my Capital" lie down. Each day as I viewed the class assemble round the broadside table I told myself: "This is the wheat of my Capital." I had invested half a lifetime, and seen no substantial return. But that it was. The payoff for years gone by.

LOOKING BACK & FORWARD Could: There had been a strange reversal as a consequence of exile. What once our movement had looked forward, forward as though afraid to look back or indulge in nostalgia, in exile the process gradually seemed to go into reverse. As the movement became more and more remote geographically, and more and more disconnected politically from daily events and challenges in South Africa, its attention tended to be necessarily backward-looking. Every event of note, every success in our past history became an occasion for celebration. Anniversary dates multiplied in our calendar, and memorial meetings seemed to follow one another at close intervals. Speeches and political statements from the NGC or individual leaders almost inevitably looked back to the glories of yesterday, the feats and struggles of an ever more remote time past. I was always critical of this nostalgic looking back without a balance; or even over-weighting looks forward. In substituting the past for the present and future, I believe, we missed missed opportunities to inspire our own members to push forward to conquer new slopes. In the last years of the ANC/CP illegality, a real difference began to surface between the ^{approach of the} leaders of the mass-movement inside the country which was - like ours in our legal days - essentially forward-looking, and those outside looking in the reflected glories of the past. I do not suggest there was a political gulf, or an 'inland-extended' struggle so frequently alleged, without evidence, by uninformed newspaper scribes. But there was a difference of spirit. And it was that difference of spirit which showed itself in the contrasting content of the 'external' broadside the Klerk phrase, and the excited and optimistic tone of the leaders of the internal struggle, the VDF, COSATU, the SACC.

ON DISSOLUTION & AFTER: There has only been one explanation ever advanced for this extraordinary decision to dissolve the Party. That is that a long period of legal operation had given rise to legislative illusions which prevented realistic preparatory measures to be taken for an underground party. I doubt if this can be the whole story. I was not at the CC meeting where the decision was taken. I know little of what was actually said or discussed there. Only Michael Hanel, with whom I had worked closely on propaganda tasks over the years, ever gave me any inside information of what went on, and then mainly related to the 'disrupt or continue' debate; not to any prior consideration of underground organization. Neither then nor later did I make efforts to discover from my close friends in the CC - Brian Tjebk, Miss Kotane or others, whether the possible preparations of an underground structure paralleled with our legal one had ever been considered in the months running up to the S of C Act - months in which the intent if not the details of the Act had been clearly stated by the Government. I suspect that - until that last CC meeting, the matter had never been discussed. It may have been privately thought of, or even chatted over informally among members of the

of the CC, but never articulated at formal meetings. I think the Executive, like all of us, had their eyes concentrated firmly on the struggle to oppose, perhaps defeat the Parliamentary passage of the Act. But there must surely have been also the subjective element - an unwillingness to face the discomfort and lessons of underground work of any deliberate form to underground work, which showed itself in the last-minute ratiocination which ^{later} devoted the decision to dissolve from an act of abdication to a defensible and rational political act. I believe that, when the CC finally assembled within weeks of the Party's re-cess, there was an element of panic in their decision making. Not panic by reason of physical fear, but panic at the enormity of the decision facing them for which no preparation either physical or theoretical had been made. That belief is supported by the fact that amongst all those who voted for the dissolution at that meeting, there was many - probably a majority - who opposed to join the underground without hesitation when one was formally asked after dissolution. Why they voted as they did at the meeting has never been explained to me by any of my comrades and colleagues who did so. I believe it was a panic decision taken in a moment when they were caught unprepared. I believe that another aspect of the decision, which affected us our activity directly in the weeks immediately after the meeting, was equally a panic reaction. That was the decision to liquidate the Payable Brotherhood rather than to effect a subterfuge by selling it off to a trusted comrade or attempt a other legislative device to save it.

→ INCREASE PEOPLE'S BOOKSHOP. P.??

The dissolution terminated an entire era of Party history quite brutally. For 38 years the Party had been an ever-present part of every South Africa political struggle and campaign. It had been an influence in every organized sector of the popular movement - trade unions, national liberation organisations, local peasants and residents bodies. And then suddenly, by combined assault from Government legislation and CC directive, it no longer existed. It had some getting used to. Many of us had lived our lives not just in politics, but in the Party. We had found and used our voices, our pens, our organising abilities not just in politics, but in the activities of the Party. We had to make a radical and wrenching readjustment. Politics remained; political campaigns and political debate resumed. But the ~~underlying~~ ^{atmosphere} under which we had entered into them had gone. Almost all our numbers readjusted, some slowly, some rapidly; but we readjusted. We found our feet, like windswept leaves to well ~~underneath~~ after a long period bedridden, unobedient, useless. But rapidly we learnt to adopt our political stance, so that we participated in the national politics now not as a separate Communist party, but as individual Communists within a broad complex of political bodies. The profound effect this shift would have on South Africa's development was not then quite appreciated, nor has it since been much considered by historians. In tracing the development of the Congress Alliance which now forms the backbone of our national movement, most commentators have focussed on the fairly simplistic facts of early Youth League-CP hostilities, especially in the 1950 May Day strike period; followed by a mutually defensive temporary alliance against the threat of the Suppression Act; and finally from that a process of national gravitation towards each other whose mechanisms remain unexplained. The analyses are too simplistic. The act of dissolving the Party, I believe, ~~had~~ had the most tremendous influence over all our later national history in a way never dreamed of by the CC which took the decision. Ever since its formation in 1921, relations between the Party and the national liberation movement had fluctuated incessantly between moments of co-operation and moments of antagonism. The hostilities against the Party - and Communism - which flared up during the controversies over the 1950 May Day strike were a symptom of the long, very ~~long~~ antagonism and instincts which ~~had~~ stretched back over the years - to the 19?? sacking of ANC Society, Gwede for his leaps towards Communism, to the 1922 strike division between 'moderate' leadership and radical, Communist Council of Action, through the splits and factional collapse of the ICU, through the perennial debates at ANC Congresses on the apolitical of Communists, and so on. The existence of the Party as a separate organized section of the popular movement had - as not acknowledged recognize - brought a new ferment of ideas and ideologies to the whole movement; it had provided pointers to new tactics and new styles of organization and struggle. But its very existence as a separate, independent body - apparently if not actually challenging for leadership of the whole, had simultaneously fuelled antagonism, hostilities, divisions and the formation of pro and anti-factions. It was not the 1950 anti-Suppression Act campaign that ended the antagonism and rivalry. That contributed - as temporary alliances had contributed temporarily in the 1922 strike, the ICU campaign etc. But what transferred this necessary co-operation - hostility within into a steady more lower ever deeper alliance was the disappearance of the Party as a separate body, a rival, ~~an~~ challenger for leadership. Everyone knew that though the Party had gone, the Communists remained. I have never, at any time, experienced hostility with the movement to Communists as individuals, and almost none to Communism as a philosophy. The hostility has been always to the separate party, ~~whose~~ ^{relations to the whole body politics} ~~was~~ ^{was} not always clear even to its own spokesmen, and was often perceived as threatening and challenging ~~to its outsiders~~. The dissolution of the Party, paradoxically, provided the matrix lay swept after by its philosophy. For the thought and deposedly integrated of the Communist into full acceptance in the national movement. It thus laid the basis for a formal and solidly founded permanent alliance which would be forged in later years, after the returned Communist prohibited son of the movement reconstituted their party independent in 1960.

Nevertheless, being a disciplined member of a Party implies limits - self-imposed limits - as laws wide and far beyond any Party decisions one should carry one's public commentaries. Within the Party, freedom of opinion, however off-beat or unorthodox, is always legitimate. And the only constitutional limit placed on it is that it may not extend to the organising of a faction ^{for the} to propagate that opinion.

Collection Number: A3299

Collection Name: Hilda and Rusty BERNSTEIN Papers, 1931-2006

PUBLISHER:

Publisher: **Historical Papers Research Archive**

Collection Funder: **Bernstein family**

Location: **Johannesburg**

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