

Officials from China and the United States interviewed after the plenary were unaware of any progress in narrowing this gap.

\*Russia volunteered to have the next pair of meetings in Moscow. According to a Pentagon official, all of the countries except China would like to meet next in July or September.

During their London meetings, the perm five agreed to guidelines on arms transfers, which read as follows:

"(1) They will consider carefully whether proposed transfers will:

(a) promote the capabilities of the recipient to meet needs for legitimate self-defence;

(b) serve as an appropriate and proportionate response to the security and military threats confronting the recipient country;

(c) enhance the capability of the recipient to participate in regional or other collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations or requested by the United Nations.

(2) They will avoid transfers which would be likely to

(a) prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict;

(b) increase tension in a region or contribute to regional instability;

(c) introduce destabilizing military capabilities in a region;

(d) contravene embargoes or other relevant internationally agreed restraints to which they are parties;

(e) be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient state;

(f) support or encourage international terrorism;

(g) be used to interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign states;

(h) seriously undermine the recipient state's economy."

(Communique, "Meeting on the Five on Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation: London 17/18 October 1991")

These guidelines are subjective, and the perm five countries contend that the guidelines reflect the policies they already follow. It is highly unlikely that

any of the participants would be constrained by such vague guidelines if it really wanted to conclude a particular sale.

\*The Paris meetings produced a communique expressing the commitment of the five countries to "seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a global as well as on a regional basis." The participants also "recognized that indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability," and expressed the intention that, "when considering under their national control procedures conventional weapons transfers, they will observe rules of restraint." (Communique, "Meeting of the Five on Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation, Paris, 8th and 9th of July, 1991")

### THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

\*The Technological and Aerospace Committee of the WEU issued a report on 30 April 1992 which urges the Assembly to adopt a draft resolution on arms export policy. The report encourages the Council to:

\*"1. Elaborate and implement the necessary decision of the European Union for a harmonised arms export policy restricted in accordance with common criteria identified by the European Council in Luxembourg;

\*2. Take a joint initiative in the United Nations in order:

(a) to make the information to be sent in to the United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers a binding obligation for all United Nations member countries and enforceable by sanctions;

...

\*3. Call upon the next Munich economic summit to held [sic] in July 1992 to support vigorously the strengthened role of the United Nations in monitoring a worldwide arms export regime;"

\*The report also has provisions calling on all member states of the U.N. to join the NPT, making the Security Council responsible for supervision; urging a strengthening of the IAEA's role and budget; an international convention to complement the NPT; concluding early a chemical weapons convention and making the Australia Group's list a worldwide exportation ban under U.N. supervision; making the MTCR a worldwide regime; and urging the European Council's member states to provide financial support for the International Science and Technology Centre in Russia.

\*The report concludes: "The continuing reluctance of the WEU Council to debate the problems of

armaments transfers due to the fact that most member governments envisage a greater role for the European Community and the future European Union in these matters must be overcome because of the obvious implications for the essential security and defence interests of member countries. The crucial problems standing in the way of a harmonised arms export policy must be resolved in WEU and not in the framework of European political co-operation." It further calls for parliaments to make a "joint effort to strengthen their right to be informed" on arms export matters "before such decisions are made and to debate relevant agreements before they are signed." ("Arms Export Policy," Report Submitted on Behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Assembly of the Western European Union, Document 1305, 30 April 1992)

#### **THE WORLD BANK**

\*On 10 May 1992, the World Bank announced it will assess "nonproductive" military spending by 85 third world nations when deciding how much aid to provide them. The list includes not only the poorest nations, but also some which are "upper middle-income", such as Brazil. This action is similar to those already taken by Japan and Germany--who have both linked development aid to the level of military spending in the recipient country. (New York Times, 11 May 1992)

# SUMMARY OF MAJOR INITIATIVES TO CONTROL ARMS EXPORTS TO MIDDLE EAST

CANADA 8 February 1991 "Proposal for a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction"	USA 29 May 1991 "Middle East Arms Control Initiative"	FRANCE 3 June 1991 "Plan for Arms Control and Disarmament"
<p><i>"[A] special responsibility for arms build-ups resides with the major exporters and states leading in the development of weapons technologies. New efforts among this group, but also reaching beyond to other arms exporters should be undertaken..."</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Canadian Ministry of External Affairs and International Trade</p>	<p><i>"The support of both arms exporters and importers will be essential...since proliferation is a global problem, it must find a global solution."</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">White House Fact Sheet on Middle East Arms Control Initiative, 29 May 1991</p>	<p><i>"The entire world, southern and northern hemispheres alike, has a vital interest in seeing the arms race halted, and the dangerous and ruinous proliferation of weapons checked."</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">"Plan for Arms Control and Disarmament," Provisional Translation, 3 June 1991</p>
<b>CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting of major exporters, to look at transparency, constraint, and consultancy in situations of unusual build-up</li> <li>- Early action on information exchange and serious examination of expected U.N. study on arms transfers</li> <li>- Commitment of CFE signatories not to export affected systems to regions of tension</li> <li>- Unilateral national report on arms exports with calendar year 1990</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting of permanent five, to be hosted by France; Expand discussions to include other suppliers, e.g. - G-7</li> <li>- Suppliers to submit to code of responsible transfers, avoid destabilizing transfers, and establish export controls on end-use</li> <li>- Consultation mechanisms among suppliers: advance notice of sales; regular meetings; <i>ad hoc</i> consultations if guidelines not observed; suppliers provide one another with annual national reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting of permanent five, discussions to be enlarged at next U.N. General Assembly meeting</li> <li>- International registry of arms transfers under U.N. auspices</li> <li>- Scrutiny of sales of conventional weapons on parallel markets</li> <li>- Continued EC consultation to formulate proposals</li> </ul>
<b>NUCLEAR WEAPONS</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Early commitment by signatories to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, and adherence of non-parties to provisions</li> <li>- Reaffirmation of nuclear weapons states' commitment to pursue further disarmament under Article VI of NPT</li> <li>- Strengthen multilateral control on dual-use items</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regional states to implement verifiable ban on production and acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials (enriched uranium or separated plutonium)</li> <li>- All states to sign NPT</li> <li>- All regional nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards</li> <li>- Eventual creation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zone</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Will sign the NPT</li> <li>- Importance of halting proliferation beyond the "five existing weapons states"</li> </ul>
<b>CHEMICAL WEAPONS</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conclude Chemical Weapons Convention by end of 1992</li> <li>- Expand membership of Australia Group, increase Group's role in controlling exports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All regional states party to CWC</li> <li>- Regional confidence-building measures (CBMs)</li> <li>- Note Bush's 13 May Chemical Weapons Initiative (U.S. forswears use and will destroy stock within 10 years of completion of CWC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Proposed a special committee on chemical weapons in Geneva to complete discussions by year's end</li> <li>- All states to be party to CWC at outset</li> </ul>
<b>BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Develop CBMs and conflict resolution mechanisms of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention at September Review Conference</li> <li>- Propose 1993 conference to negotiate verification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strengthen BWC and increase information exchange mechanism at September conference</li> <li>- Regional CBMs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Will introduce a protocol on verification at September conference</li> </ul>
<b>BALLISTIC MISSILES</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Global consensus to end proliferation</li> <li>- Increase Missile Technology Control Regime membership</li> <li>- MTCR to cover smaller payload, longer range</li> <li>- Exchange on peaceful space-related purposes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Freeze on acquisition, production and testing of surface-to-surface missiles in region, toward elimination</li> <li>- Suppliers to increase export coordination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- MTCR to be enlarged geographically, better controlled, applicable to all</li> <li>- Define regulations promoting civilian cooperation in space</li> <li>- "Code of Good Conduct" - applicable to civilian and military satellites</li> </ul>
<b>OTHER</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Proposes a World Summit in 1995, under U.N. auspices, to celebrate completion of comprehensive network of specific non-proliferation regimes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Issued a Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation with the Soviet Union on 4 June 1990, focusing on nuclear, chemical, ballistic missile proliferation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strong regional focus: CBMs, disclosure on forces, international organization to monitor; Negotiations on regional balance of forces, toward build-down; Mid East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, missiles</li> </ul>

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent research organisation that analyses international security policy in Europe and North America. BASIC works to promote public awareness of defence, disarmament, military strategy, and nuclear policies in order to foster informed debate on these issues. BASIC facilitates the exchange of information and analysis among researchers, journalists, and parliamentarians on both sides of the Atlantic.

---

**BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL**

8 John Adam St, London, WC2N 6EZ. Tel: +44 (071) 925 0862  
1601 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Washington D.C., 20009. Tel: +1 (202) 745 2457

**Collection Number: AG1977**

**END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN (ECC)**

**PUBLISHER:**

*Publisher:- Historical Papers Research Archive*

*Location:- Johannesburg*

©2013

**LEGAL NOTICES:**

**Copyright Notice:** All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

**Disclaimer and Terms of Use:** Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only.

People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate, distorted or untrue. While these digital records are true facsimiles of paper documents and the information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand has not independently verified their content. Consequently, the University is not responsible for any errors or omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the website or any related information on third party websites accessible from this website.

This document is part of a collection held at the Historical Papers Research Archive at The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.