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CHANGING DYNAMICS MILITARY-STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA

A CONFERENCE PRESENTED BY



Institute for Defence Politics

IN CONJUNCTION WITH



HANNS SEIDEL
FOUNDATION

6 AUGUST 1992

CSIR Conference Centre



Institute for Defence Politics
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CONFERENCE

CHANGING DYNAMICS

**MILITARY-STRATEGIC ISSUES
FOR A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA**

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THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE POLITICS

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6 August 1992

**Ruby Auditorium
CSIR Conference Centre
PRETORIA**

PAPER TOPICS

PAPER 1

REGIONAL INSTABILITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE - A VIEW FROM MOZAMBIQUE

Sergio Vieira, Director of Centro de Estudos Africanos, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo

PAPER 2

SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY: PRESENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Mr Helmoed Römer-Heitman, MA, well-known author and military correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly

PAPER 3

MANPOWER: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A FUTURE DEFENCE FORCE

Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Co-Director, Institute for Defence Politics, Midrand

PAPER 4

PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE TBVC MILITARY FORCES INTO A NEW DEFENCE FORCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Brig T T Matanzima, Acting Chief of the Transkei Defence Force

PAPER 5

THE INTEGRATION OF FORMER GUERRILLA ARMIES INTO CONVENTIONAL FORCES: LESSONS LEARNT FROM BMATT IN AFRICA

Maj Genl A W Dennis, CB, OBE (rtd) from the UK, previously Director of Military Assistance Overseas

PROGRAM

MORNING CHAIRMAN

*Mr G Linska, representative of the Hanns Seidel
Foundation in South Africa, Johannesburg*

AFTERNOON CHAIRMAN

*Mr P-B Mertz, Co-Director, Institute for Defence
Politics, Midrand*

1	07h30 - 08h15	45 min	REGISTRATION & COFFEE
2	08h15 - 08h25	10 min	WELCOME & ADMIN
3	08h25 - 09h15	50 min	PAPER 1
4	09h15 - 09h35	20 min	DISCUSSION
5	09h35 - 10h25	50 min	PAPER 2
6	10h25 - 10h45	20 min	DISCUSSION
7	10h45 - 11h30	45 min	TEA/COFFEE
8	11h30 - 12h20	50 min	PAPER 3
9	12h20 - 12h40	20 min	DISCUSSION
10	12h40 - 13h40	60 min	LUNCH
11	13h40 - 14h30	50 min	PAPER 4
12	14h30 - 14h50	20 min	DISCUSSION
13	14h50 - 15h35	45 min	TEA
14	15h35 - 16h25	50 min	PAPER 5
15	16h25 - 17h00	35 min	DISCUSSION
16	17h00		CLOSING

LOGISTICS

THE FOLLOWING GROUPS ARE BEING INVITED

Military, Industry, Academics interested in defence and related matters, Foreign Embassies, Political Groupings, Press and other

CONFERENCE ORGANISER

Mr Paul-Bolko Mertz

BOOKING ENQUIRIES

Lizette Alberts, P O Box 4167, Halfway House, 1685
Tel (011)805-1796, Fax (011)805-1874

FEES

R55,00 per delegate (including VAT)
(cheques, crossed and payable to the Institute for Defence Politics)

REGISTRATION

To confirm booking please complete the attached form and return to the above address together with your payment to reach us on or before **31 July 1992**

CANCELLATIONS


Fees cannot be refunded unless written notification of cancellation is received two days prior to the conference.

GENERAL

The conference will be publicized in the media during July 1992.

The organisers reserve the right to change speakers due to unforeseen circumstances.

Maximum capacity of 150 delegates.



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N

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N4

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ATTERBURY RD

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BEN SCHOEMAN

JOHANNESBURG M1

PUBLIC SEMINAR

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL FORCES WHAT ARE THE FUTURE REQUIREMENTS?

hosted by the



Institute for Defence Policy

DATE Thursday, 24 June 1993
VENUE Conference Centre, Constantia Park, 239 Old Pretoria Road, Halfway House
(see map on reverse side)
TIME 09h30 to 13h00

PROGRAMME

09h30 - 09h40 **Welcome and Introduction**
by Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Institute for Defence Policy

09h40 - 10h20 **Military Intelligence and Special Forces in a post-settlement South Africa - the inevitable requirement**
by Maj-Gen C Thirion (rt) and Brig W P Sass (rt)

General Chris Thirion started his career as an infantryman in 1 Parachute Battalion following which he lectured at the Military Academy in Military Geography. The last twenty years of his career he spent in military intelligence where he held a variety of posts, including that of Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence. Brigadier Bill Sass recently retired from the post of Director of Personnel Utilization at the Personnel Division on the staff of Chief of the SADF. For many years he served as Chief Instructor at the Joint Staff College in Pretoria. He also served in the Strategic Branch of the Secretariate of the State Security Council.

10h20 - 11h00 **Tea / Coffee**

11h00 - 11h40 **An alternative view - the restructuring of Military Intelligence and Special Forces in the New South Africa**
by Mr Joe Nhlanhla, Head: ANC Security Department

Mr Joseph Mbuku Nhlanhla matriculated at Kilnerton High School and holds an MA degree in Economics. From 1969 he headed the ANC youth and students wing. He subsequently served in various positions including that of ANC Chief Representative in Egypt and the Middle East, National Administrative Secretary of the ANC and Secretary of the Political Military Council. He has been a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC since 1981. In 1987 he became Director of Intelligence and Security, a position which he still holds.

11h40 - 12h30 **Discussion**

12h30 - 12h40 **Close**

Should delegates wish to go for lunch there are a number of restaurants within walking distance of the conference centre.

Since space is limited, booking is essential.
Please RSVP to Lizette at (011) 805-4260/805-1796 or by fax to (011) 805-1874 by 18 June 1993.

TO ROODEPOORT N1 (WESTERN BYPASS)

HALFWAY HOUSE
KYALAMI

N1 BEN SCHEEMAN HIGHWAY

OLIFANTSFONTEIN
HALFWAY HOUSE

DEVELOPMENT BANK

TO PRETORIA

TO JOHANNESBURG

ALLANDALE RD

TO GERMISTON N3 (EASTERN BYPASS)

HALFWAY HOUSE

TREK
GARAGE

CONSTANTIA PARK

MAIN ENTRANCE TO
CONSTANTIA PARK


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20th July - Huntingdon

3rd Aug - Moskos - Hines

= MI covert role in
opposition to SWAPO
will it play a similar
role in SA (in opposition
to the ~~ANC~~)

- Thirion - factors influencing requirement for MI
in a post settl. SA (pssst) ^{elections - short - 2 years}
^{→ TONU - malin - 5 years}
^{- long term - 5-10+}
- structure
 - mandate.
 - "mechanisms for control of process of transition"
 - "challenge of conflict management is not going to be shortlived"
 - change in SA will take place in an unstable environment
 - locally, regionally, globally.
 - there is not much that a government can do to reduce the ~~the~~ violence in short to medium term.
 - intelligence as the key to stable government - not only in the present.
 - need for "joint intelligence effort" - should co-operate with other organisations to get the real picture on the table.
 - ~~MI must~~ MI must form part of SA intelligence community.
 - intelligence is a command function & responsibility.
 - tactical & strategic intelligence - often difficult to distinguish.
 - intelligence activities should be related to the "task" of the SAIF.
 - recently MI underwent meaningful restructuring (as a result of rationalisation).
 - we are not living in a safer world.
 - but certain factors have changed threat analysis.
 - probability of conventional threat has decreased rapidly.
 - inability of neighbours to stop cross border arms traffic.
 - a change in ~~govern~~.
- Election phase - internal deployment of security forces cannot be scaled down - might have to increase.

- greater legitimacy of future government
- can be more bragadig in combatting violence
- might contrib to reduction of violence

Threats to peace —
territorial integrity —
personal security —

Rapid deployment force — speed
 accurate firepower
 sustainability
 = acceptable & affordable deterrent threat

Reductions in budget \Rightarrow reduced military capacity
 \Rightarrow threat must be combatted by force
 multipliers.

Border protection \Rightarrow combat drug & illegal arms smuggling.
 Structure & function of MI must be decided by government.

- MI must not involve self in non-military intelligence functions
- terrain of responsibilities must be spelt out in detail by legislation.
- MI tasks cannot be left to civilian agencies
- joint evaluation & interpretation on national level must receive immediate attention.
- there should be no room for manipulation of information.
- govt should be advised by multi-party parl. committee on selection of main MI personnel.

It is possible to build on existing building blocks


- present MI will continue to serve government of the day
- top office of security establishment \rightarrow security adviser — should be close to government

- Control of intelligence services.

Intelligence ^{should be} a tool of policy making

- threat analysis
- alert govt to opportunities.

Sass - Special Forces



What are spas magte? (what makes Intelligence orgs. how different?)
What do they do?

Why SA will need them?

History of military ops in 20th

Turn of century - rise of mechanisation, air forces, etc.
+ special forces

All modern armies have them.

Typology of forces

A. SAID Regular Forces

1. Parachute Battalions

2. Counter insurgency battalions

- light infantry

- don't have weapons & equipment that show us

3. Mechanised Battalions

61 Mechanised Battalion
- heavy/conventional infantry

B. SAP Forces

- Koosait

- Ashari

C. SAID Special Forces

* 1 Recco.

WWII - special forces really started being formed

Among & behind the enemy

Characteristics

Strict selection process

Special training - can handle variety of operations with precision

Operate behind or among the enemy

Capable of operating without or away from the support and facilities of his force.



Special Forces Role & Tasks

- (a) Intelligence gathering operations
- close relationship with intelligence community.
eg. early warning info re: armaments, deployment.
- (b) Sabotage or Disruption Operations
- includes disinformation.
(similar to activities of revolutionary groups).
- (c) Support of resistance movements
- eg. Unita.
- (d) Anti-Terrorist Operations
- NB since 72 Munich Massacre (hostages killed by rescuers)
- classic example - Iranian Embassy / SAS
- (e) Counter-querilla operations
- eg. attack base areas.
(SAS specialised in this in Malaya, Borneo, Africa)
- (f) Training of broader army.


Control of special forces

* SA Army - controller controlled Spas Magte + CGS.

* Most countries - commander of Spas Magte falls under ~~control~~ of army



Special forces don't cost a lot of money



Possible role in assistance to states in the region

1. Deep reconnaissance ability is essential in modern army - eg. desert storm - precision bombing - relied on by Special Forces.

2. Cheap in respect of financial equipment & numbers
3. Flexibility & precision of deployment
4. Contributed to improved training of broader army.
5. Ideal to assist neighbouring countries.
6. Reduce own casualties.
7. Basic organization already exists.

1

Home

A Nhleahle - All armed forces require MI + Special Forces function.

- but no other issue is as problematic. □

Special forces - SADF terminology - 4 reserve regiments
Expanded definition to include - light infantry
- function constitutes them as spes. wop.

SADF def: MI

N's def: - more inclusive.

Variables ⇒ balance of power within int. community,
- ~~the~~ respective roles of orgs in int. community
- role of army (internal or external)
- degree of advocacy within MI
- legislative oversight.

B Axioms

① primary role - tactical (eg. external military configurations).

→ armed forces - ~~the~~

- restricted to armed capacity of ^{external} military capacity
- national intelligence & ultimate co-ordination of strategic intelligence brief.

② role special forces

- primary - gather strategic intelligence in advance
- disrupt enemy during conflict.

- parliamentary oversight

- national & international law - Geneva Conventions

- no use in internal counter ~~intelligence~~ ^{insurgency} job

① M1 + Supte at present

- '80s etc. - extension of brief.

Activities - monitoring & infiltration of
a wide range of orgs
- provision of covert funds
- monitoring of civilian individuals.
- ie. against South Africaas.
(also Namibian & Angolan conflict)

Fractions - should be those of Police,
RAF, (& NI?).

General expansion of role
60's, 70's, 80's

Counter intelligence

- should protect own information.

Continuation of WHAM in Northern Transvaal

Control & oversight measures need to be
introduced - start with open debate.

Since 1990 - increasingly dangerous special forces operations

emergence of special special force culture
- blueprint for issue of accountability.

(3)

How can structures
be transformed?

- Ques
- ① What type of defence posture will we have?
 - ② What type of ~~defence~~ defence force will we have
 - ③ What will be relationship between MI/Sps/Army?

① Defensive posture.

② Region - likely military co-operation
⇒ defensive posture

③ Internally - Police & PAF to play role.

Justification of
Moral & ethical component in training of officers

Need for debate on ethics of intelligence

Danger of displacing members of signals to extrajudicial/paramilitary role

④

Special Forces

Special characteristics!

eg - high percentage of foreigners
- individual units require individual attention.

Restructuring requires tactical flexibility to prevent alienation of groups of soldiers.

① First phase of restructuring requires detailed personnel audit.

②

③ Third phase - national & regional consultation in dealing with foreign elements.

TDF PRESENTATION SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE : CHANGING DYNAMICS
: "MILITARY - STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA"
BY BRIG T.T. MATANZIMA : TDF : 6 AUG 1992

The Co-Directors of IDP Mr Paul-Bolko Mertz and Dr Jackie Cilliers, the other delegates from various establishments and Institutions, ladies and gentlemen.

Because I have been warned that time is of essence in this presentation, I will dispense with long-winded salutations and small talks and get on to my topic which is:

"Problems and considerations on the integration of the TBVC Military Forces into a New Defence Force for South Africa".

I am to deal with my subject in the following manner;

- EXPERIENCES OF THE TBVC ARMIES.
- THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION.
- THE MECHANICS OF INTEGRATION
- TIMING OF INTEGRATION

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE TBVC ARMIES

In this Sub-heading I do not intend to deal with nitty gritty detail, but to highlight those areas which the TBVC Armies have similar or contrasting experiences/facts and base my presentation and arguments on such similarities and or contrasts.

The origin of the TBVC Armies is that all of them either immediately, preceded or followed their countries' independences. THIS HAS THE IMPLICATIONS THAT THE PURPOSE, EXTENT AND THE NATURE OF THESE ARMIES BEAR RESEMBLANCE OF THEIR MOTHER COUNTRIES' POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN TERMS OF STRATEGY, TRAINING AND TACTICS. One has to just look at the individual independent state's origin of independence, Political and Economic Relations with the Republic of South Africa, Liberation Movements and the rest of the world to gauge the nature of these armies before 1989. These were designed to be extensions, ears and eyes of the SADF and subsequently RSA in a sophisticated manner, under the guise of constitutional independence.

Another area of comparison and contrast is that of training. With regard to comparison, all the TBVC Armies have had their elementary training in the SADF with a few exceptions which are of no significance so much that they are not even worth mentioning on this paper.

Almost all the TBVC Armies have staged military take-overs, albeit not all of them were successful. This move then ushered in a new era in the Military-Political outlook of the TBVC Armies, even in those armies which were not successful in their take-overs. This out-look was of course in varying degrees. The contrasting facts are that some armies were favourably disposed towards liberation movements and their armed wings and some not, due to leadership and politics of their various countries. Facts at hand on this point is TDF - CDF - VDF and to a lesser extent the BDF. This turn of events has an impact on the being of the TBVC armies both from the Republic of South Africa's and the Liberation Movement's point of view. The above has resulted in changing of patrons for the other in some cases, as is the case with Transkei.

The above scenario has quite very interesting and contrasting implications and subsequent results in terms of training, experiences and capacities of the TBVC Armies. Those TBVC Armies favourably disposed towards the RSA and SADF do get hand-outs in the form of training although this is limited in quality and effect due to what I would call HURDLES, MILITARY BACKGROUND, SADF-MEMBERSHIP attitude towards blacks (Their negative and prescriptive attitudes) and lack of military ordances and equipment. In some cases these hand-out courses are not limited as outlined above, but dove-tailed to suit the TBVC Armies. The result is that these armies only thrive on the above-described hand-out courses.

On the other hand, those armies favourably disposed towards Liberation Movements have had opportunities to train elsewhere than RSA, therefore they have been exposed to what I would call variety training and they stand a good chance of embarking on the cross-pollination of training in their own armies, as is the case with the TDF. Training in the TBVC armies is of varying degrees as indicated above.

One favourable comparison amongst the TBVC armies is that their training is conventionally based and that they have some experience in Administration. These attributes could well be exploited one way or another.

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATION

In the wake of Political renaissance prevailing over our sub-continent with the talk of a Non-Racial Democratic South Africa the related armies cannot afford to be left behind. The extent of the country's new political dispensation should reflect the diversity of its peoples' in Government structures including the National Army. No one army can claim political and moral legitimacy in this country until after the new dispensation has been arrived at. The above fact then breeds the necessity for integration of all related armies.

Having said this, the integration of the SADF, MK, APLA and the TBVC Armies is inevitable since neither of these groupings has the political or military strength to ensure that its army is installed exclusively as the New Defence Force.

Strategically and politically it is desirable that related and relevant armies be integrated because the exclusion of one of these armies would lead to conflict.

THE MECHANICS OF INTEGRATION

This aspect of integration is wrought with problems and difficulties which need to be cautiously considered if exploitation of one party position by another and total dissension is to be avoided at all. I will highlight a few of these problem areas:

- First and foremost is the question of numbers of members in the armies which are aligned with a particular party/movement position, an example here is SADF/RSA Government which has high figures.
- The type and standard of training which each party/movement/organisation will try to impose upon the others.

- There is also the question of the SADF - membership superiority in technical and sophisticated training which the SADF (and the regime) might use to their advantage.

- Lastly and most important is the fact that there is yet no democratically elected government which is legitimate to define the Government's strategy from which the Defence Force would extract and formulate the military strategy and doctrine from which in turn the New Defence order of battle can be established.

As pointed out earlier, certain cautious considerations need to be looked into;

- Recruiting by all armies to be suspended until the New dispensation.

- Military activities to be restricted to training only.

- Military operations to be under a Joint Command and should be jointly conducted amongst the relevant forces and these should be restricted to minimum and ~~be on~~ extreme necessity only.

- SADF to gear themselves for training the Senior and middle command levels of the New Defence Force as a starting point.

- Intelligence (SADF Special Forces = Directorate of Military Intelligence) operations to be completely dissolved and members of these organisations to be integrated into the regular SADF Units.

With regard to the actual integration process it is here submitted that the following process should be taken or followed;

- New Defence Ministry to formulate the strategy of the Democratic Government from which rationalization figures for the New Defence Force can be established.

- New Defence Ministry to give guidelines on Military doctrine to be followed by the New Defence Force. Establish a set of Selection Tests for various levels.

- Appointment of various level democratic Selection Boards (i.e. which are representative of all involved elements) to go through the selection process.

- Selection Board to establish registration centres (strictly for serving members) throughout the country for members who volunteer to continue with the Military Career. This is an endeavour to establish figures in respect of each army for Rationalization process.

- In line with the above, the various armies should be afforded the means to offer retirement and retrenchment package deals according to Rank, Age and Service to their members.

- The Defence Ministry to then appoint Command and staff elements who will start working on the Defence Act and Regulations and Postings of the Selected members according to Education and Military qualifications and experience in various Command and Staff Functions.

- Once Personnel has been selected and posted, the responsible staff compartment will have to arrange an on-the-ground training and orientation courses for key personnel and general training for the rest. Here the emphasis should be placed on and aimed at addressing the imbalances in training and skills so that appointments, postings and Promotions should be seen to be rationalized accordingly.

Meanwhile the various armies should start preparing their members psychologically and politically for the integration.

TIMING OF INTEGRATION

It is the considered view of the TDF that integration should actually be effected under a Democratic Government by a Democratic Government. The underpinning reasons here to are that;

At that stage the Democratic process would not only be irreversible but will be seen to be irreversible by the whole world.

Only the Democratic Government can claim legitimacy to Command and control the integrated New South African Defence Force because it is the only body empowered to repeal or ammend the present South African Defence Force Act, Military discipline code and regulations to meet democratic principles.

The Democratic Government is the legitimate body to mete out retirement and retrenchment package deals to serving members who would not like to pursue the military career any further. It is vital that these package deals be meted out from one central fund and by one central body for uniformity purposes.

- Lastly, the Democratic Government would be in a better position than the Interim Government to establish the New Defence Force Role, Composition, Character and Doctrine according to democratic principles.

CONCLUSION

It is worth mentioning here that the TDF is the most experienced of the BVC armies in administration because she has been exposed to spells where she has had to fend for herself without advisor assistance both in Administration and Training. Of course this does not purport to mean that the TDF be regarded as a praetorian force but as a viable source of manpower for middle management and lower-rank levels.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Democratic Government should strive to seek a well-balanced and representative command structure during and after integration.

This presentation ladies and gentlemen makes the TDF's perspective and point of view in this regard.

Thank you.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY

PRESENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS *

By Helmoed Romer-Heitman, MA
Author and military correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly

1.0 INTRODUCTION

South Africa's defence industry has experienced a very difficult three years. Defence funding was dramatically cut in the wake of the settlement in south-western Africa, leading to an equally or more dramatic cut in ammunition, stores, and equipment purchases by the armed forces. Great hopes of "peace in our time" brought further defence funding cuts, leading to stretched-out equipment delivery schedules, and to the slowing down, "freezing", or even termination of many development projects.

The continuing financial difficulties facing government, suggest that there may be yet further defence funding cuts in the offing - if only in real terms.

The prospects for the defence industry do not, therefore, appear to be very exciting at first glance. A proper analysis, however, offers a rather less gloomy picture.

2.0 THE PRESENT SITUATION

The political and strategic developments of the early 1990s have brought difficult times for the South African defence equipment industry. Indeed for this industry internationally. It is likely that times will remain difficult through the mid-90s.

The political and strategic developments of the later 1990s and around the turn of the century, by contrast, are likely to bring new opportunities.

This will be so quite simply because the recent developments are not signs of some fundamental change in man or his way of doing political business. Man has not yet outgrown war. Nor has he yet outgrown the use of violence to attain his ends. This sad truth should be self-evident to anyone who reads beyond the comics of his daily newspaper.

Contrary to the vain hopes expressed by the more naive among us, the end of the Cold War has not made this world a more peaceful one. What it has in fact done, is remove the competition between the two super powers; which competition was a major contributing factor to giving us forty-five years of relative peace by virtue of keeping much of the world in a state of stable tension.

This controlling factor has now been removed, and we are seeing some of the first signs of the new - warmer? - world in which we will have to live for the next few decades. These signs include

* Paper presented at a conference on **Changing Dynamics: Military-Strategic Issues for a Future South Africa**, hosted by the **Institute for Defence Politics** in conjunction with the **Hanns Seidel Foundation**, CSIR conference centre, Pretoria, 6 August 1992.

EMBARGO: 6 AUG 92, 09h35

those ancient quarrels that have already flared up in the former Yugoslavia, those equally old quarrels being so enthusiastically revived in the eastern parts of the former Soviet Union, and yet others being remembered and revived in the former Czechoslovakia and along Russia's western frontiers. Other signs are visible in the Indian sub-continent and in the Middle East, where Saddam Hussein's Kuwaiti adventure could never have progressed beyond a fevered dream in the days of the Cold War. The Far East is also not without its tensions, perhaps the most apparent being along the inter-Korean frontier and the multi-national quibbling over the Paracel and Spratley Islands.

Africa is not immune to these developments, anymore than it was immune to those of the Cold War era. Africa also has its own set of internal tensions that could yet lead to intra-African wars - not least among them the fractions of colonial borders that were drawn in blithe ignorance of ethnic groupings, the problems of failing economies, and those of disintegrating state services. We must not forget the long tradition of states facing internal stresses turning to border quarrels or foreign wars to sublimate them. Can we really hope that Africa will be so very different? It is also far from impossible that outside powers may again see this continent as an area of opportunity, as its own governments struggle to cope with its problems. A new "scramble for Africa" is not impossible, and it could bring some unexpected players to the region, with consequences that are as yet very difficult to calculate with any certainty.

The first decades of the 21st Century could thus very well see a number of crises, clashes, and even wars in various parts of the world, including Africa. Some of these developments will, quite inevitably, also affect South Africa.

2.1 SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is the *de facto* regional power of southern Africa - both economically and militarily. This will become more and more widely accepted and recognised regionally and internationally in the near- and medium-term. In the longer-term, South Africa may well also become the *de jure* regional power within the framework of a regional security pact.

The status of regional power - *de facto* or *de jure* - brings with it responsibilities, not least as regards regional security and in the wider strategic arena. South Africa certainly cannot, for instance, afford to ignore serious conflicts within the region, or on the borders of the region. Nor could South Africa safely ignore any external power seeking to establish its authority in or adjacent to the region. Quite apart from a regional security responsibility, it will be in South Africa's immediate interest to ensure that this region is prosperous, peaceful and secure.

South Africa may also again find herself asked to deploy forces to assist allies in another part of the world. Who, after all, would have been brave enough in 1989 to predict a South African "blue helmet" UN-contingent in Angola in 1992? Some will argue that this role, at least, is one that can be avoided. That would be very short-sighted. The world has become far too interwoven for a country like South Africa to assume that it can dodge such responsibilities with impunity.

South Africa must, therefore, develop and maintain armed forces that are strong enough to deter military adventures against her or within the region, to support her regional neighbours, and to enable her to play her part in international operations. These forces must receive equipment that enables them to be effective against modern armed forces. Given the amount of equipment that will "cascade down" from the major powers to the aspiring major powers over the next decade, any assumption that South Africa's armed forces will be able to make do with old equipment, would be criminally unwise.

There is, thus, a clear need for South Africa to have effective armed forces, and to ensure an effective re-equipment programme for them.

2.2 SUMMING UP

To sum up the overall argument: There will continue to be a need for armed forces internationally, and there will continue to be a need for equipment. Equally, therefore, there will continue to be a need for defence industries to develop and manufacture that equipment. There is no good reason why the South African defence industry, and indeed South African industry generally, should not benefit from this.

First, however, it must survive its present crisis.

3.0 PRESENT CHALLENGES

The survival of South Africa's defence industry and, indeed, the further expansion of its capabilities, is not only a matter for this industry itself. It should be a matter of some considerable concern to government and to industry generally.

It should be of concern to government for strategic and economic reasons. Strategically, a national defence industry is a vital factor in maintaining national independence. Reliance on foreign equipment sources can too easily lead to political dependence on the supplier nation. All of the major powers have used equipment sales to gain leverage over their clients. Another great danger lies in those smaller suppliers who are happy to sell equipment, but then refuse to support that equipment as soon as the client is faced with any threat, being unwilling to export into a "zone of tension". An indigenous defence industry serves to reduce the vulnerability of the country to these dangers. It also serves to provide the armed forces with equipment tailored to their actual needs and capabilities.

Economically, the defence industry can be an important national asset. It is a major employer, a major trainer of highly skilled and semi-skilled workers, a major client of many other sectors, and potentially a major earner of foreign exchange. The defence industry can also be valuable as an "engine" for developing and expanding the national technology base. Equipment developed for the armed forces is often at the leading edge of technology, and requires high manufacturing standards. In satisfying those needs of the armed forces, the defence industry also creates a base of knowledge that others can exploit.

The defence industry is, thus, an important element of the overall economy. As such its continued survival and, indeed, its renewed growth from a smaller peacetime base, should be of some considerable concern to all players in the economy, and to the engineering and electronics industries in particular. It serves the industrial sectors and the wider economy almost as directly as it serves the armed forces. This is not always understood by those who should understand it. Not very long ago a publication in the engineering world waxed quite lyrical about the benefits of further defence cuts. Well, those cuts have come to pass, but we have not seen much rejoicing in the engineering industry as a result of them.

The argument here is not that a national defence industry is the ultimate investment in purely economic terms. It very certainly is not. Defence expenditure, however, is inevitable and given that fact, it makes excellent strategic, economic, and financial sense to spend as much of that money as possible at home. That demands a defence industry with the depth to develop, produce, and support complex weapons systems. Fortunately, this industry can also bring benefits in other areas, as outlined above.

South Africa expended much effort and money to develop a viable defence industry. This industry does not consist just of Armscor and now Denel. It encompasses many large and small private firms that have worked as contractors on various defence projects and programmes. Just as much as the official defence industry, these firms have developed some very valuable "know-how" and

"do-how". They, and the official defence industry have also developed some very competent research and development capabilities. Together this represents a valuable and almost irreplaceable asset. South Africa must search for ways to ensure that it continues to draw strategic and economic returns from this asset, and to further exploit its potential.

If South Africa acts to draw maximum advantage from the inherent potential of the defence industry, it can ensure a functioning and viable industry to equip its armed forces, and can further develop the industry as a national economic asset. A failure to do so, will waste much of the very considerable industrial and technological capability that was built up at such great effort and expense. It will also weaken South Africa strategically.

The immediate challenge is to overcome the damage caused by the very heavy and sudden cuts in defence expenditure over the past few years. These were far too heavy and at far too little notice to allow the industry to absorb them safely, by developing other market areas and skills. One result has been that the industry has already begun shedding highly qualified and experienced staff. With few challenging and satisfying positions available in other industries, many of the best among them will emigrate. Once lost, their "know-how" and "do-how" will require immense effort, and much cash and time to replace. South Africa really cannot afford this loss.

What is needed is for the government, and industry generally, to come to fully understand the importance of the defence industry to South Africa. Once that is achieved, there are measures that can be taken, despite the financial situation, to keep its core alive long enough to develop alternative areas of activity that, in turn, will enable it to maintain its defence capabilities.

South Africa should, for instance, follow the example of all the major powers, by keeping the research and development programmes alive despite current procurement cuts. A relatively small expenditure here, will ensure the retention of key personnel and know-how, and will go some way towards ensuring that the armed forces can be properly re-equipped, should a new threat develop. Some major development projects can be stretched out, not merely to delay expenditure, but also to incorporate the most current technology when they do go into final development. Some of the major re-equipment programmes can be continued at low production rates. While this is not ideal, it does keep the manufacturing capability alive.

Some of this is already being done. One need merely think of the stretched out Rooikat production, and of the low-key development of the Rooivalk. More will need to be done if South Africa is to save this important asset and draw benefit from it. This lies in the province of the government.

Beyond what can be done by government, the industry should very actively be seeking export possibilities. Effective marketing of weapons systems, sub-systems, and components that are already in production for the South African armed forces or for others, can serve both to ensure the medium-term survival of the industry, and to fund research and development work for future products to ensure its long-term survival and growth.

The armed forces, for their part, should make every effort to support the industry in its drive to win foreign orders. Their support can range from assistance in assessing potential markets and supporting the marketing team, through arranging equipment demonstrations, to seconding personnel and providing facilities to support the development of variants to client specifications. Where a client is found for equipment that is already in service with the South African armed forces, they should make equipment available from their holdings for refurbishment, modification to client specification and delivery, when prompt delivery is known to be an essential element in clinching the contract. The upside to the armed forces would then be one for one replacement of the equipment with new-production items.

A carefully balanced programme of continuing work for the SADF, coupled with aggressive and imaginative export marketing by the industry itself, can go a considerable way towards ensuring the survival of the industry and then its growth.

Given that the industry's survival is ensured, what then are its further prospects ?

4.0 PRESENT PROSPECTS

The immediate prospects for the South African defence industry do not look very rosy. Given a reasonable degree of vision and forward planning on the part of government, the armed forces and the industry, there is no reason why the defence industry should not survive the present crisis with its core capabilities intact and with considerable potential to expand its capabilities from this smaller peacetime base.

The remainder of this paper is, thus, based on two assumptions:

- That the government understands the importance of maintaining both effective armed forces as such, and the industrial base to support them.
- That the defence industry accepts that the days of the armed forces as a captive and not too critical client are over, and works actively and imaginatively for its own survival.

The core of present prospects for the defence industry lies with the South African armed forces and with other existing clients. Satisfying the needs of these two client groups should, properly handled, lay the foundation for its ability to break into other markets. There is also a present prospect of some "gravy" to be earned by the imaginative marketing of current products to new clients, but that lies more in the area of future prospects.

4.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES

The South African armed forces are the core client of the South African defence equipment industry, and this must continue. From the national point of view, the primary purpose of the industry is to develop, manufacture, and support equipment for the South African armed forces. The *quid pro quo* is that this work forms a solid foundation on which the industry can build to expand into other markets, to the wider economic benefit of the country and, of course to its employees and shareholders.

There are five general areas in which the industry can serve the South African armed forces:

- Maintaining existing equipment
- Refurbishing existing equipment
- Upgrading existing equipment
- Converting existing equipment to new roles
- Developing and supplying new equipment

With defence funding short, the emphasis will for the time being have to lie on the first four areas.

4.1.1 Maintenance

The concept of industry maintenance of major equipment items, is well-known to the Air Force and also to the Navy. Given that the South African Army's main combat forces are in large part manned by the Citizen Force, with only a small standing element, a good argument can be made for a programme of industry-run maintenance of the Army's heavy equipment. While this is already done

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