

Mr Chairman I have no more questions.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr Tshikalange. Thank you very much. You are excused.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS

Mr Kuny, is the next witness ready or not?

MR KUNY: He should be available after the luncheon adjournment.

CHAIRMAN: But do you have any summary?

MR KUNY: No I was going to explain to you, we don't unfortunately have a summary. I'm afraid it just hasn't been possible to do one, but in view of the fact that so much of what he has said is already in the possession of everybody here, I don't think that anybody is likely to be taken by surprise, and that, I understood was the purpose of the summary. (10)

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR LUNCH. THE COMMISSION RESUMES.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Roberts, please swear the witness in.

MNR. ROBERTS: Watter taal praat u mnr. Coetzee, Engels of Afrikaans?

MNR. COETZEE: Ek gaan my in hoof Engels praat.

MNR. ROBERTS: Ekskuus tog u gaan wat?

MNR. COETZEE: In hoof in Engels getuig. (20)

MR ROBERTS: Are you prepared to take the oath?

MR COETZEE: Yes I am.

DIRK COETZEE: /...

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DIRK COETZEE: d.s.s

EXAMINATION BY MR KUNY: Mr Coetzee, you were formerly a captain in the South African Police force? -- That's correct.

And when you left the country, that is South Africa, towards the end of last year, you indicated once the Commission had been established that you would be prepared to give evidence before (30)

this Commission if it sat outside of South Africa and that is why you are here today? -- That is correct.

In fact I think you indicated a desire to give evidence before the Commission? -- I did.

Now before we get on to dealing with the subject matter of the Commission and what it is inquiring into, I want to get some personal background from you. You were born in April 1945 in Pokwane in the Norh Eastern Cape? -- That's correct.

And you grew up in South Africa? -- I grew up in South Africa, mainly in Pretoria.

You were educated there? -- I did, I schooled in Pretoria, my primary school and my high school career. (10)

And after you left school what did you do? -- I started working in the Post Office in 1964, where I basically worked for six years and four months. Firstly as a post office counter clerk and later as a post office investigating officer.

And arising from your work in the Post Office, did this lead you to decide to join the police force? -- That's correct.

Why was that? -- Well during my working in the investigation branch I worked closely together with the handwriting expert of the South African Police in fraud cases. I also worked/... (20)

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worked with the dog handlers at night when call office boxes were raided and we were after these guys. And as well all our criminal cases in the Post Office finally ended up with the CID, with the South African Police and that made me, eventually, decide on 1 April 1970 to join the South African Police.

Had you done any sort of military service at that stage? -- I did in 1906 I volunteered ... (intervenens) (30)

19? -- 1966.

Yes? -- I volunteered for my nine months' military training in the Navy, where I have done my radar course and ended up on the ships on the President Steyn.

Was that a call-up or did you volunteer yourself for service?
-- No I volunteered to do military training.

And after that you joined the police force? -- Ja, I first went back to the Post Office and then on 1 April 1970 I joined the police after ending my service in the Post Office on 31 March 1970.

And did you go to the Police College? -- I did in fact in June 1970, after first being stationed at a police station as a student-constable. (10)

And did you end up the best student in your class in that particular group? -- I did in 1970 ended up as the best student in group 37 and eventually best student of the year for 1970.

And were you then posted to Gezina police station? -- That's correct I was posted back to Gezina.

Is that in Pretoria? -- That's in Pretoria.

And while you were there did you receive any promotion?

-- Yes I did, I wrote my sergeant's exam in 1971 and passed it with/... (20)

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with a first class and I was promoted to sergeant.

Did you also then apply to do a dog handler's course? -- I did in 1972 and roundabout August, if I'm not mistaken, went to the South African Police Dog School for a patrol dog handler's course.

Yes. Did you pass that course? -- I passed it and was then transferred to the radio control, or the so-called flying squad, which was then based in Marabastad in Pretoria. All dog handlers in the Pretoria area, during those days, were based at the flying (30)

squad.

Did you also during this period start the police scuba diving unit in Pretoria? -- That's correct. I was a member of one of five under the instruction of a Sergeant Botes, Anton Botes where we started the first Police Scuba Diving Club in Pretoria.

And thereafter did you do your warrant-officer's exam and in 1972 passed that also with distinction? -- Ja 1972 or 1973, I think. I think 1973.

1973. Thereafter did you undergo a counter insurgency course? -- I did with my, as a dog handler, went to a counter (10) insurgency course during the end of 1973 and then eventually have done border duty from January 1974 till March 1974 in Rhodesia, the ex-Rhodesia where we as dog handlers worked under the BSAP, the British South African Police and not as the normal police units that goes up, which serves under their own police officers.

Did you see any active service there? -- Well I was on follow-ups with the dogs and whilst stationed at Mount Tarbon in Rhodesia, we dog handlers helped to get rid of bodies of ex-ZANLA and ZIPRA, now so-called freedom fighters that was

killed/...
(20)

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killed in the war. They were brought in, identification was done on them and eventually the bodies were driven out on the road to Bendura into the veld there, where shallow graves were dug, lined with plastic and branches and then petrol poured over them and the bodies then partly mutilated, their hands, feet and faces, and then buried with soil.

Now you spoke about so-called freedom fighters. What did you refer to those people as in those days? -- Well, terrorists. (30)
Terrorists fighting the war in Rhodesia against the security forces.

Now after you had completed your tour of duty in Rhodesia you came back to Marabastad? -- That's correct sir.

And thereafter? -- Then in June 1974 I asked for a transfer to Sibasa as second in charge, of the police station there.

That's the present Thohoyandou in Venda? -- The independent homeland of Venda with the capital city Thohoyandou that's correct sir.

Is it there, while you were stationed there, that you first met Mr Tshikalange? -- That's correct, he was schooling then and working for extra money in the afternoon with me at my home in the garden. (10)

In the garden. -- I also clothed him of course, because the guy was very poor and had about nothing.

Now in 1975 you wrote your officer's exam and you passed that also with distinction? -- I did sir.

And what did you then become, a lieutenant? -- Lieutenant, but I first had to do a course, officer's course in the Police College in Pretoria, which I did towards the last half of 1975.

Yes/...

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(20)
COETZEE

Yes and you remained a lieutenant until April 1980 when you were promoted to the rank of captain? -- That's correct.

Now, after you left Sibasa where did you go and what was your capacity? -- 9 January 1976 I was transferred to the Police College in Pretoria.

In what capacity? -- Onto the law section as an instructor to the students, law instructor for the students in the College.

Yes. -- Where I stayed till June 1976, my eldest son was born during that time, Dirk Coetzee also, on 28 May 1976 and I have also done duty in the Soweto uprisings on 16 June 1976, in charge of a few instructors with students under them, guarding key points (30)

in the centre of Johannesburg city.

Yes. Now were you then posted to Volksrust? -- I was posted to Volksrust as station commander in July 1976.

Now this is all in the ordinary uniform branch of the police force? -- All still in the ordinary uniform branch, that's correct.

And for how long did you remain at Volksrust? -- Till 4 January 1977. Whilst at Volksrust, during the last half of 1976, Brigadier Van der Hoven I think was then colonel, Regional Commander: Security, East Transvaal, and one of his branch commanders at Ermelo, then Major Nick van Rensburg, or Captain Nick van Rensburg, he is at presently Brigadier van Rensburg, chief of Section C in Security Head Office. They came to see me. They were sent by the then chief of the Security Police, Brigadier Zietsman at that stage to come and interview me for a transfer to the security branch. (10)

Had you requested this, or did they approach you? -- They approached me.

Had/...

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COETZEE
(20)

Had you ever been in mind to try and get into the security police? -- Well it was always an elite unit, and it's a dream I think of every single policeman to get into this elite unit.

Yes, well we'll talk about that in a moment. But, in sequence what happened then? -- Well, I was interviewed and I was given a choice of either going to Oshoek border post, one of the, or the main border post in the Swaziland border, there is eleven border posts, or either Oshakati. My wife didn't want to know anything about going to Oshakati, so I eventually picked to go to Oshoek border.

Now, under what branch do the border posts fall? -- All border posts on the Botswana-Lesotho-Swaziland borders in South Africa (30)

falls under the security branch, the regional security offices of that area and in the case of Swaziland it falls under the security branch, the Divisional Security Commander: Eastern Transvaal, based in Middelburg, Transvaal.

Was this a post which you were keen to take up? -- I was very keen to take it up yes.

And when did you take up your post at Oshoek? -- I think it was on 4 January 1977.

Yes, and for how long were you there? -- I was there till towards just before Christmas I think 1979.

Now while you were at Oshoek, did you introduce any changes? (10)

Did you, were you like a new broom sweeping clean, if I may put it that way? -- Well I think I was always like that when, wherever I arrived and the relationships with the Swazi's was not good at all. I immediately started working on that.

In what way? -- Building up relations. First at the border/...

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border with the custom's officials at the border at that stage, and then further into Swaziland with the police head-quarters, civil servants, all on in the private business. (20)

How do you mean private business? -- All private business, people in private business.

You built up relations? -- In general with the Swazi's, that's correct.

And would you be able to say whether, during the period that you were at Oshoek, relations between your section and the Swazi's generally, and the Swazi Police in particular, improved? -- I think it's a well-known fact in Swaziland still now, that I had done a lot and they have had a great respect for me, and, I mean I even yearly was visited by the King's secretary, Martin Thonisa, who (30)

donated game from the King to the border post, for all our co-operation and goodwill.

Did you do anything for your men who were stationed at the border post, anything in particular? -- Yes I improved their working conditions, I got their wives all working on the border post. I built a clubhouse at the border post, without costing the police anything.

But how was that done, without costing the police anything? -- With the help of the Swazi friends, all our Swazi friends on the other side assisted and we built a beautiful place there and where we built up a relationship over drinks and visits. (10)

And did this assist in general co-operation between the South African Police and the Swazi Police? -- Ja, for sure. There was a contact, of course on security level with certain Swazi police in Swaziland but I think in general I had drawn them all into this set-up. For instance the Swazi's didn't

have/...

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have any passport control at the border at that stage and they decided at a later stage to start off with passport control and their three main border posts, Oshoek, Mahamba and Golela, with an overall chief Nchalichali(?) in head office came to me and I briefed them on what passport control is all about and helped him to start off with infrastructure as far as passport control is concerned. (20)

Now, we can't unfortunately go into any details about any of these operations, but what I want to ask you is while you were stationed at Oshoek, were there any police operations into Swaziland in relation to terrorists, anti-insurgency type operations? -- Plenty of it, and that's where, I call it, I've done my apprenticeship in the security atrocities, I have done (30)

in Swaziland, whilst at Oshoek border post.

You say security atrocities? -- I beg your pardon?

What was the word you used? -- Atrocities, bomb-blasts wherein people were maimed, breaking into places, placing bombs on railway lines and stealing cars.

You say your apprenticeship was in Swaziland? -- That's right, where I had done my apprenticeship, that's correct.

Prior to your entry into the security police, had you ever been involved in activities of that sort? -- Not at all, not at all, in fact the only knowledge I had about ANC and so, was what we have learnt on officer's course where we were briefed for a half-day session by the then specialist in the security head office, Brigadier Neels du Plooy, who came round with one of the first ex-Askari's that was captured, what we call Bra Moss(?). (10)

Sorry, his name was? -- Bra Moss(?).

Bra? -- Bra actually meaning brother, but he is called

Bra Moss/...

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COETZEE

Bra Moss, today a captain in the security police head office still at Vlakplaas, and he came, they sort of come to introduce us to the ANC, what it's all about, the Rivonia cases, the Sisulus, the Katadras and the whole history on that. (20)

Well, when you say history, can you just elaborate a little on the sort of picture that was presented to you, relevant to what is to come? -- Well for sure, communists, terrorists that wants to overthrow the white minority government in South Africa and who was a big danger for civilisation and christianity in South Africa. For instance, I remember one, he always started, it was a very christian kind of brigadier and he started off softly speaking and then working himself up into a frenzy and you can hear a pin drop when he told us about nuns being cut up in pieces (30)

by the mobs in Port Elizabeth area and, I mean you could, walking out there you really hated these guys, I mean these big terrorist monsters, this communist beasts.

Were you put in a frame of mind where you believed what you were told? -- Hundred per cent yes.

Were you shown any documentation? -- Yes there was a lot of communist literature, communist weapons which Moss also demonstrated, how it's been taken apart, and put together and they had even given Bra Moss a chance to give a short little speech on the ANC and the PAC and his experiences.

Now how did this assist you in dealing with the task at hand? -- Well firmly believing that I'm fighting a just cause and that one has got to prevent at all cost to get this communist, this "swart gevaar" preventing them from making a take-over in South Africa.

(10)

Where/...

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COETZEE

Where was this that you received this sort of lecture and training? -- During the officer's course?

(20)

Yes? -- It was in the Police College, they got guest speakers out and usually about one 35 minute period or two of them at the most and Brigadier du Plooy got more than half a day for his purpose and whilst other guest speakers were there there was usually fooling around etcetera, but he really had the whole audience hanging onto his lips.

Now was it on only this single occasion that you were told this or was this constantly stressed? -- No that was only on that single occasion. Of course preparing for my border duty, we were only taught you know tactics. Gorilla war tactics, booby traps etcetera, we're not supposed to pick up tins lying around and what you had to look out for, the formations during follow-up that you've

(30)

got to do, etcetera, but not into the politics as such as the ANC.

In your training at various stages, I take it that you learnt the use of weapons? -- That I learnt?

Learnt the use of various weapons? -- In the Police College, yes.

What about explosives? -- Explosives not at all.

Did you subsequently during the time in the security police have to use or have people with you who used explosives? -- That's correct, they always had on different branches like at Ermelo security branch there was a Sergeant Chris Rorich, an explosive expert, in Middelburg security branch there was a Sergeant Krappies Hattingh, explosive expert, so we always made use of one of them. (10)

If you went on a mission which involved the use of explosives? -- That's correct in conjunction with head office

security

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security technical division, Colonel Koos Benade's squad and specific Captain Wahl du Toit who always prepared the time devices for these bombs that we've had to use. (20)

Were some of them, did some of them operate on a time basis? -- Always on a time basis, that's correct.

Now without going into any more detail at this stage about your association with Swaziland, were you thereafter transferred from Swaziland border post on Oshoek? -- I was. Originally to Sunnyside uniform branch and that was with effect from 13 December 1979.

Why were you then transferred? -- Well there was at first rumours that I have assisted, or like General Johan Coetzee has put in the newspapers lately, that I have smuggled Portuguese immigrants into the country. (30)

Yes. -- And then thereafter there was a case where it was alleged that I was involved in a porn ring. I was then transferred back ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: What kind of ring? -- A porn ring, pornographic, porn films.

MR KUNY: Not pawn. (laughter) -- And two weeks before my transfer on the 13 December 1979 the story was put in the right context to General Johan Coetzee and General Zietsman who came through to Swaziland and he at last, on the last minute changed, altered my transfer to Middelburg security.

And what was your role at Middelburg security? -- I was on the security branch in Middelburg areas, second in charge. The most quiet period of my security police career. (10)

For how long were you there? -- Eight months.

Who was in charge at that stage? -- Captain Smuts but it was on the same level, on the same floor as the regional security/...

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security office, head office where Brigadier van der Hoven was in charge with Colonel Gough, John Patrick Gough was his second in charge. (20)

And so you say that was a relatively quiet period of eight months? -- Yes it was, except for the domestic problems, I mean I enjoyed my stay with Brigadier van der Hoven in the Middelburg area. My youngest child was born at Oshoek (...(?)) in 1978, 13 November. In 1979, after a year he became an insulin dependent diabetic and we have scarced landed in Middelburg when my wife had to apparently stay permanently in Pretoria with my mother-in-law because the child was at the specialists, the pediatricians about three times a week and they couldn't find out what was going on till 6 February 1980 when he went into an insulin (30)

coma, taken up in hospital and, a diabetic coma, and they then found that he has got diabetes and of course was one year old and she didn't want to move out of Pretoria. It was an emotional story and of course I was just working day and night, out in the veld enjoying my job and my wife in the end divorced me in June. I only found it out the day after I was divorced. I had a brother-in-law and something funny it looked, my wife didn't come home that afternoon I thought what the hell was going on, I was sleeping with her still last night and she had a nice dress on this morning.

(10)
CHAIRMAN: I think could we stick to the facts please. -- Oh sorry.

I'm really not interested in your married life.

MR KUNY: You were then, you then were transferred from Middelburg?
-- That's correct.

Did you request a transfer? -- Ja, well it was decided
that/...

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that let's go to Pretoria, the result of my son and my domestic problems.

(20)
And in Pretoria where were you posted to? -- At Section C, Security Head Office under brigadier, then Colonel Viktor, J J Viktor, he was in charge of Section C and I was specifically posted at Section C1, Vlakplaas.

Now what is, can you just tell us what the different sections in the security police are and what they stand for?

-- Well each, your security head office consisted, that time it was Brigadier Johan Coetzee with his second in charge Brigadier Jan du Preez, and then under that you get your sections, section A, B, C, D, E and F, I think.

(30)
Well without going into the individuals can you just tell us what those sections were? -- Well I know only of Section A,

which was the A section of Craig Williamson. My section, Section C the so-called ANC-PAC desk and then there was a personnel section, I don't know which one of the B, D or what it was and the technical division and then of course, if necessary, each section was sub-divided then again into 1, 2, 3 and 4 as much as we needed in that section.

Now being posted to Pretoria, where did you, from where did you function? From Pretoria or from Vlakplaas? -- I at first had an office in head office with Colonel Jack Buchner and Major Callie Steyn of Military Intelligence and Warrant-officer Stan Hancock and reported there in the morning 07h30, 07h30 in the morning all the sub-section chiefs has got a meeting with the section chief and then at 08h00 all the section chiefs go to, what they called, they baptised it the "Sanhedrin" the general meeting with the number 1 and 2 in charge of security. So in the beginning I usually went in for

that/... .

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that meetings at 07h30 in the morning and then thereafter went out to Vlakplaas to ...(intervenens) (20)

Now, what I want to know is, when were you first posted at Vlakplaas, when did it first become your base? -- When I landed there and I think it was in roundabout August 1980.

Had you known of Vlakplaas before that time? -- Yes I did through Major Nick van Rensburg and Brigadier van der Hoven.

Do you know when Vlakplaas first started? -- I believe in 1978, it was a venture of Colonel J J Viktor and Brigadier Jan du Preez the second in charge. ... (intervenens)

Incidentally, sorry may I just while I remember. During all these movements from Volksrust to Oshoek and back to Pretoria, what happened to Mr Tshikalange? -- He came and went. I think (30)

he first joined me again at Volksrust in the second half of 1976 and then he stayed with me. He was with me for a while at Oshoek then he went back and he was with me for a while in Middelburg and went back and I took him with virtually to Vlakplaas.

Why did you take him with you to Vlakplaas? -- Ag, he's always been with me and he was at that stage very well-known with Major Nick van Rensburg, Brigadier van der Hoven and Viktor. Major Nick van Rensburg even gave him a, quite laughable, you know a sort of a testimony that he was the best barman and the best cook and I don't know for Colonel Viktor and as I can recall it I then first (10) made him a, what we call a "HKZ-wag" for R50 a month.

What does that mean? What is HKZ? -- HKZ is a head-quarters guard, they usually pay this amount to people patrolling border fences, working for other departments to gain their assistance with a little allowance to keep their

eyes/...

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eyes open for any movement over the border.

Now can you remember more or less when it was that he would (20) have come to Vlakplaas? -- I think it to be at the same time roundabout that, few weeks after I came there, but I'll have to look at the records. They can get the registers as to.

Would he have been registered there as an employee? -- As HKZ, yes and later as an HQ-informer where his allowance would have gone up to R200.

Yes. Now what exactly was Vlakplaas? When you got there what did you find? -- There was a few Askari's, now if I say few they, I don't know how, exactly how many at that stage, but during my stay at Vlakplaas which was virtually a year and four months (30) from August 1980 till 31 December 1981, all in all there was about 18 of them. But when I arrived there not that much ... (intervenes)

Before you go on. What exactly was an Askari? We've had that term used often in this ... (intervenes)? -- An Askari is a rehabilitated terrorist what we call, either voluntary turned or him walking over or the security forces turning him into working for the South African Police. Now the word Askari is of course a Swahili, ultimate Arabic word meaning black soldier and they, it was a name that Colonel J J Viktor's colleagues has given to these rehabilitated terrorists and he earned the name of Colonel Maskarios in the end.

So when you say that some handed themselves over voluntarily and others were turned, how were they turned? -- Well with interrogations, I weren't present, we had a special section, Section C2 where Colonel Jack Buchner was in charge. (10)

I just/...

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COETZEE

I just received him after being turned, allocated to the farm.

He came to the farm, of course some of them pretended, as it proved later, that they changed and they were working with us and in the end they deflected back to the ANC.

Yes, and what would be their function, once they got to Vlakplaas? -- Their original function was just to do surveillance at shebeens, bus stops, railway stations and identify of their colleagues that has infiltrated the country and point them out to permanent members of the force to be arrested. (20)

Were they allowed out on their own to do this surveillance? -- They were yes and they had to move around alone and under some supervision meeting points and meeting places where they were briefed and debriefed.

And with whom would they meet and how would they be controlled? -- When I arrived there the, there was a section like say Port Natal received information that there was some infiltrations in (30)

their area, they would contact Section C in head office and say they need some guys that originated from the Durban area and they would get permission, come up by car, pick up two or three of the Askari's, go down and work with them and after they finished with them they will bring them back to the farm.

Now were there only Askari's at Vlakplaas, or were there also police of various ranks? -- When I arrived there there was a Warrant-officer Letsatsi, myself and I think during the early 1980's, early 1981's a few permanent black members of the force, amongst others Almond Nofemela as a constable
(10)
straight from the Police College, Constable John Mphofu and one or two maybe extra that I can't remember, came to the farm.

And/..

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COETZEE

And were you the only officer there? -- Yes, that's correct, permanently based on the farm.

Were there other officers who would come and assist in particular tasks? -- No, later during that year, I will also have to look at the records, but they have drawn in a few white policemen,
(20)
one Captain Koos Vermeulen, Warrant-officer van Dyk, Paul van Dyk, Sergeant Louis Olivier, a Sergeant Bellingham, Constable Braam du Preez, etcetera, I'll get you all the names but that was basically it, it was about eight or nine.

Now were they actually based at Vlakplaas or did they come and go? -- Based at Vlakplaas from where it was decided that they would operate as a Vlakplaas group, not like earlier on where they were picked up by the region, officers in that region, but if they needed some they were divided up into four groups basically, one police car with two white policemen in and then at first bakkies,
(30)
later they were replaced by Hi-Ace buses with a black policeman and a few Askari's, three or four. Then divided up to regions

like Captain Koos Vermeulen was, he knew Botswana very well, he operated always in the Western Transvaal area. Paul van Dyk's speciality was the Eastern Transvaal etcetera.

Let's take Koos Vermeulen in the Western Transvaal. Who would he have with him if he went on operations in the Western Transvaal? -- No he always had Warrant-officer Letsatsi as a policeman, Askari Piet Mokgai, they've made him captain now, Jeff Bosigo I know fairly regularly operated with him and as I say if I can get the records, one can make an estimation.

So you would have a group comprising a leader, usually a white officer, a black policeman and Askari's, is that how
(10)
the/...

K5.448

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COETZEE

the groups were constituted? -- That's correct, and if needed at a point that they feel that a whole group must operate in a area because of big infiltrations they will pull the whole group, all four groups, the whole contingent down to that area.

Now when you got to Vlakplaas, as I understand you, it was at a fairly basic, it was operating at a fairly basic sort of level?
(20)
-- Very basic ja, it was a farm that they rented from a Stewart guy for a very low amount of money and where these Askari's stayed because they were afraid to go home because of being assassinated by their organisation. So it was used basically as a base for them, it was later bought by the security police and modified.

Did you set about improving it in any way? -- Yes I did. They basically functioned out of a lot of, Colonel J J Viktor had a close relationship with the Rhodesian special branches and had a storeroom full of clothes and shoes and beds and boxes of canned food out of the security fund as such. So I got them onto the official quartermaster record so that we can order meat, milk,
(30)
vegetables, fruit, proper diet for the Askari's and I also later

succeeded in getting them appointed policemen, basically just for a better salary packet. They did not do any training, it was just a question of once they are policemen they qualified to carry police pistols for self defence, they qualified for S & T allowance, travel allowance, they qualified for then clothing allowance and they qualified for a free medical fund. So it was basically trying to get them a better deal than I did it.

And in terms of the physical set-up at Vlakplaas, did you bring about any sort of improvements? -- Physical set-up?

In terms of accommodation and general facilities and so on?/... (10)

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COETZEE

on? -- That came later, ja, but not in my time.

So during your time that is what you did to improve the conditions at Vlakplaas? -- That's right, I got them a TV etcetera.

And did numbers increase during your time, or did it remain fairly constant? -- Fairly constant. As a whole what I can remember, if I make my list, I can think about 18 Askari's being there in my time. As I say I can't exactly indicate at what stage whom arrived, but that is basically what it was. (20)

Now Mr Tshikalange, was he the only person in his position there, in other words as a sort of general factotum, the person who did all sorts of odd jobs and ... (intervenes)

They had three ex-Rhodesian terrorists, a Gottfried, Nixon and a Matthew working in the garden as labourers. Spyker was basically the cook on the farm, cooking for the Askari's.

Spyker being Mr Tshikalange? -- Mr Tshikalange, sorry, ja, that was his...(intervenes).

That was his nickname? -- That's his nickname. (30)

Yes. -- And eventually they agreed in making him a

student-constable, so he has not really been a gardener on the farm.

Incidentally as a student-constable, what would his rights have been? -- The moment if you are sworn in as a policeman, from that first day, irrespective of rank you've got full powers as a policeman. They would of course not issue him with a firearm before doing his training, but he has got full powers of arrest, just as a general, a captain, a major.

Once he's a student-constable? -- The moment he's been

sworn/...

(10)

K5.507

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COETZEE

sworn in, that's right..

CHAIRMAN: Yes, could I just get this clear. Before Tshikalange became a student-constable was he the cook for the Askari's? -- Yes Mr Chairman, basically the cook on the farm.

Yes?

MR KUNY: I'm going to ask you in a moment about an incident concerning a Mr Joe Pillay who was abducted from Swaziland and in respect of whom you will tell the Chairman what you had to do with that. Did Mr Tshikalange have anything to do with him? -- He did Mr Chairman after Pillay had been abducted by the Askari's, whilst I was down in operation and they abducted Pillay, brought him to Vlakplaas and in conjunction with Military Intelligence, a Major Callie Steyn and a Sergeant du Plessis, they have ordered, also ordered two policemen from Durban, Captain Andy Taylor and Major Gerry Fourie from Pietermaritzburg, because it was alledged that Joe Pillay was a previous active in a Natal machinery of the ANC, ordered them up to Pretoria and we went up to The Observatory, up at George Storrar Drive.

(20)

Where is it? -- George Storrar Drive, if you out, towards on, past the Fountains Circle on the Kempton Park Highway, right

(30)

opposite the Fountains Drive-in, you turn left up towards Klapperkop, past the Klapperkop Fort turn-off, a few yards on, on your right the old Observatory.

CHAIRMAN: Well it's not in George Storrar Drive, but in any event I know where it is. -- Oh, sorry I thought that was that mountain drive, isn't it George Storrar?

No, George Storrar runs East to West. -- That street over that, past Klapperkop, well that's the one ... (intervenes)

Johan Rissik Drive. -- Johan Rissik Drive, sorry.

MR KUNY: /...
(10)

K5.541

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COETZEE

MR KUNY: And ... (intervenes) -- And I took Spyker with as a guard.

Why? -- It was, Joe Pillay was a skinny guy, handcuffed, he was in foot chains, and basically just someone to look after him, he was blindfolded most of the time.

But Mr Tshikalange wasn't even a student-constable at that stage? -- Well that's not what it's all about, I could have trust him, and it wasn't an official police guard that I needed, there's no rules laid down for that. I made him my choice and that was
(20)
it. He was just there for, you know, tea breaks and so, that there is someone just sitting with Pillay, as I say it wasn't a big vicious man, it was a small skinny guy.

Well I'll come back to that but let's just carry on about Vlakplaas. When was it that Vlakplaas began to be organised into these groups that you have spoken about? -- As I say I will have to have a look at official records, but I think from the time that the black, so-called black policemen Almond and John Mphofu and so, it originally developed in some kind of a group system that they went down with the Askari's, but this officially took momentum
(30)
when the whites were transferred there, Paul van Dyk. Now I recall it as roundabout June 1981, towards the middle of 1981. But I'll

have to look at it, I'm guessing.

Now, you met Almond Nofemela at Vlakplaas? -- I did.

Had you had any contact with him prior to that stage? -- Not at all. They were selected by Brigadier Trevor Baker from Section, I think C2 in security head office, he went to the Police College to do the necessary, make the necessary selection.

Do/...

K5.573

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COETZEE

Do you know why Mr Nofemela in particular would have been selected for that posting? -- Not at all. I just received him on the farm as I received Askari's on the farm. (10)

What sort of qualities would you have been looking for from a policeman posted to Vlakplaas? -- Well just an honest guy, he was a non-drinker, he was a non-smoker, but not necessarily all of them, but, I mean that was not up to me, it was up to Colonel Baker, or Brigadier Baker.

And while on Vlakplaas, did he receive any training at your instance? -- No, not, not no training at all, I mean except from showing him certain weapons in the general discussion but no specific knife training or film shows or anything of that kind. (20)

These are the things that he mentioned in his evidence? -- I believe so and that is why I am saying.

Which incidentally you have read? -- I had insight in some of the stuff and that's not true, I didn't give them official training.

Do you know whether after you left Vlakplaas anybody might have instituted training? -- I believe so, a shooting range was built and the chaps were trained in shooting with Russian armory, they were trained in ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: If you only believe it, it doesn't assist me much. -- (30)

Well I had information ... (intervenes)

MR. KUNY: You don't know it as a fact that but this is what you heard? -- I've got information to that effect and that person is available to come and testify.

Yes. But in any event while you were there Mr Nofemela received no such training? -- No.

Oh. -- No, not at all.

And/...

K5.603

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COETZEE

And anybody else received such training to your knowledge? (10)
-- No, not at all, they had their training whilst with the ANC and the policemen had their training whilst in the Police College and I mean a Makarov pistol operates the same as a 9-millimetre police pistol, it's got a magazine and a slot and a safety pin etcetera.

Yes. Did you know a man by the name of Joe Mamasela? -- Very well, very well.

From where? -- From Vlakplaas, I meet him in early 1981, he first came there with a Valiant. He was an informant working for then Captain Jan Coetzee, I believe now Colonel Jan Coetzee. (20)
Ex-criminal, he was caught and turned and he worked then for security West Rand. He infiltrated the ANC in Botswana. He's done some crash courses in Botswana. He regularly came to the farm. He usually worked with Jan Coetzee in Krugersdorp, when Jan did not need him or when we need him for a special job like on the Mxenge job he was made available to us. He was also working with me on the Lesotho border at the stage. We've also done a raid into Botswana, Gaborone with him and he worked with us in the Eastern Transvaal too at a stage. I know Joe very well.

Can you comment on his ability or abilities in the jobs that he had to perform? -- He's a killer, he's a non-drinker, non-smoker, (30)
he rolled his "r's" heavily, it's the first time I've heard a black

man like the Boland rolling his "r's", his got a heavy roll in his "r's", super fit and he's a killer.

What do you mean by a killer? -- He takes no nonsense from no one. He had this one so-called terrorist Vuzi on his knees praying "Our Father who art in Heaven", he taught him that and I don't know whether Joe knew that one, and he kicked

the/...

K5.639

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COETZEE

the poor guy to pieces, it was just blood running down in the heat of the sun. (10)

You know that it's been put to Mr Tshikalange and to Mr Nofemela that Joe Mamasela will say that he was not, he had nothing to do with Vlakplaas in 1981 at all? -- I've got a surprise for him, I've got quite a few incidents that I hope there is still records left, that I am going to connect him up, for sure, hundred per cent.

And it seems, although I'm not sure, but it's been specifically put that he had no association with you at all. -- He did for sure, he's very fond of my child, my eldest child, Dirk too. I don't know why Joe and Jan is hiding it, what they are running away from but they are obviously lying and I'm going to put it right. (20)

Do you know whether he ever spent time living on Vlakplaas? -- I can't specifically remember it, but I believe there was a time that he was there with his wife and child for a few days, while he was moving from Soweto to Sebokeng, because of being hunted down by the organisation.

CHAIRMAN: I've just got a problem, Mr Coetzee, if you say you can't remember and then you start believing, I find it difficult to know what the evidence means. -- Mr Chairman what I actually meant is I can't say for how long they lived there specifically. (30)

No, you said you cannot remember him living there, and then you said but you believed. Now I say I find that difficult to understand. -- Okay then I think I must put it to you that I've heard it and I can't confirm it or deny it.

Thank you.

MR KUNY: Did you know an Askari by the name of Brian

Ngqulunga/...

K5.670

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COETZEE

Ngqulunga? -- I did very well.

(10)

Was he at Vlakplaas? -- He was, he was a Zulu from origin.

Was he, from where? -- He's originally, he's a Zulu, he is from Umlazi or Kwa-Mashu area.

And was he there during the time that you were there? -- He was.

If he says that he also had nothing to do with Vlakplaas during that period, what do you say about that? -- He was permanently on the farm, he was permanently on Vlakplaas.

CHAIRMAN: As what? -- As an Askari, Mr Chairman, going out with the groups, operating with the groups as all the other.

(20)

So he was an Askari? -- He was an Askari.

MR KUNY: Was Joe Mamasela an Askari? -- He was an informer, he became at a stage an Askari, I don't know when, I'll have to get records of that. If I can remember well, I got hold of a, the then passbooks, and I would like to get the application of his then passbook and even of his travel document, because I organised all of that and I, till recently, four days before I left the country, had a photo, but a small one that one, what I used to use for the passbooks, with me. Unfortunately it burned with my passport and a lot of other photos.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: But I don't know whether you answered the question at all. You gave us a lot of irrelevant information. -- Okay sir

can you ... (intervenes)

What was Joe? Was he an Askari or not? -- Not at that stage when I was there sir, he was an informant and he worked with us on the farm, at what specific stage he became an Askari, I'll have to look at the records.

MR KUNY: Now what I want to ask you is was it usual to use someone/...

K5.705

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COETZEE

someone who was an informant on the sort of jobs on which Joe was used? -- There was no rules for the job. We could use him at any time, there was nothing that prevented Joe from being used on a job. (10)

Did he carry a firearm? -- He did, he had a small leather pouch with a Makarov, with a Tokarev unregistered Russian Tokarev pistol with him always, carried it always with him.

Did he have any sort of authority to carry it? -- No not officially, in that pouch was a little letter from Jan Coetzee, Colonel Jan Coetzee, just saying Joe was one of his informers working for him and if there is any hassles then they must contact him. (20)

Yes. From the time that you got to know him, did he carry that firearm? -- He did yes.

CHAIRMAN: Do you know of any other informer who acted in the way or who was used in the way Joe was, Joe Mamasela was used? -- Well sir no, except before these turned guys was on the farm, before they were officially made policemen, they were exactly in the same position as Joe, HQ informer, was getting a normal pay, informant pay.

But they were Askari's, I think there is a difference between an Askari and an informer? -- Well sir yes, Joe was also in this way that he received crush courses, he infiltrated with the ANC (30)

and at that stage was treated amongst ANC as a member of the ANC, so Joe was also an Askari.

But he was never a member of the ANC in the sense that he joined the ANC bona fide. He's not a turn coat. -- Well sir I'm sure he couldn't have gone there as a police spy, they accepted him, the ANC must have accepted him as ...

(intervenes)

I thought/...

K5.748

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COETZEE

(10)

I thought you said he was sent by the police to infiltrate and he was then trained and he came back? -- Correct sir.

That doesn't make him an Askari? -- But, sir it's a, the name Askari, was a name that we have been giving to these guys that was turning. So the fact that Joe was amongst the ANC, accepted as one of their members and then came to the farm there afterwards when he was caught out, you could have named him Askari. He also in the end became a policeman just like all the other ANC turned Gorillas.

MR KUNY: But you say he had been a criminal, what sort of criminal?

(20)

-- He was in stolen vehicles and robberies, he said.

An ordinary criminal? -- An ordinary criminal.

Now I would like to come to the Joe Pillay incident, because that, in terms of time, was the, perhaps the earliest we are going to deal with. We know that in February 1981, Joe Pillay was abducted from Swaziland? -- Ja, I can't confirm which date, because I haven't got insight, but it was roundabout that time.

At whose instance was he abducted? -- We were down, well you want to know, we were working in Swaziland on ANC targets and Joe Pillay came, his name has come up that he will be abducted sometime or another. I was called back to Pretoria and the Askari's were left behind alone in Swaziland, and they abducted him that night

(30)

whilst I was in Pretoria, brought him over the fence to the then border post commander at Oshoek and he arranged through Ermelo security and they brought him to Vlakplaas.

Did he fall then under your jurisdiction? -- Yes, Section C, that's correct.

Now/...

K5.793

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COETZEE

Now you mentioned that the military were brought in? -- That's correct.

(10)

Why was that? -- I won't be able to say, as I say the, I think it was then Colonel Schoon, otherwise just before him, Colonel Viktor, I don't know which of the two was in charge of Section C then, arranged with Pietermaritzburg and Durban security for the guys, for the security men there Captain Andy Taylor and Major Gerry Fourie to come up to do the interrogation, and Major Callie Steyn was a representative for Military Intelligence on Section C, he had a desk in our office and, so that was arranged by them.

Was there any particular reason why he was taken to The Observatory, rather than kept at Vlakplaas or in a cell somewhere? (20)

-- Not specific that I can remember of, I think it was a question that the morning after he was abducted they caught the Askari's in Swaziland, the Royal Swazi Police and the Swazi army, and it came out that they were involved, it was that same car with that same registration number and they reported it on foreign affairs' level and there was negotiations going where ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes but all that has nothing to do with him going to The Observatory. That's all having to do with him going back to Swaziland, isn't that so? -- Well I won't know sir, I just ...

(30)

(intervenes)

The question was why did he go to The Observatory? -- Well

I couldn't say, it was arranged on higher level, higher than mine.

Thank you.

MR KUNY: Did you have anything to do with him at The
Observatory/...

K5.826 - 298 - COETZEE
Observatory? -- I was present during the whole interrogation, I
couldn't contribute anything towards it, because I had no knowledge
of the machinery in Natal.

Do you know whether he was ill-treated in any way? -- He was,
(10)
he got a few clouts, of course, when he arrived there he was fairly
bruised, blue eyes etcetera, but whilst there he was, he got a
few clouts etcetera, and eventually an army doctor rocked up with
a truth serum, and Joe Pillay was made lying down on his back,
an intravenous drip was inserted in his arm and the medical army
doctor controlled this drip.

Yes, now how long did that, do you know for how long that
continued? -- I can't say, it wasn't hours and hours on end, but
it was for quite a while.

CHAIRMAN: Now could I just understand why was Joe Pillay brought
(20)
to Vlakplaas? -- Sir that was instructions that they should bring
him up to Vlakplaas until further arrangements was made for his
interrogation.

But Vlakplaas was not a place of detention, was it? -- No
it wasn't at all.

That's what I can't, that's why I asked you why was he brought
to Vlakplaas? -- Well sir I'm sure if they didn't had caught him
out, or us out, or our people out that originally took him away
from Swaziland, that would have been the end of Joe Pillay, we
would have disposed of him afterwards.

(30)
But he was brought to Vlakplaas before he was taken to The
Observatory, I ask you why he was taken to Vlakplaas? -- Sir that

was till arrangements was made for the Pietermaritz- burg and Durban guys to come up and do the interrogation and found a suitable place, but as I say that was arranged on Section C commander level and in the meantime he was just

brought/...

K5.868

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COETZEE

brought to Vlakplaas.

MR KUNY: Was it your decision that he be brought to Vlakplaas?

-- Yes bringing him up to Vlakplaas until further arrangements
... (intervenes) (10)

CHAIRMAN: That's why, is was your decision to bring him up to Vlakplaas but you can't explain why he was brought to Vlak- plaas.

-- Well sir I mean where else as to Vlakplaas? I couldn't have, where else must I go with him? I couldn't officially went to a police station to sort of lock him up there.

Many people have been abducted from Swaziland and ended up in police stations. -- Ja, it's true sir, but many people also ended up somewhere else.

Well we'll hear about that in due course, I presume.

(20)

MR KUNY: In any event you have told us that Mr Tshikalange was used by, at your instance to assist in guarding him and is it correct that Mr Tshikalange then assisted in taking him back to Lothair from where he was returned to Swaziland? -- With Sergeant Koos Schutte, that's correct.

We've heard quite a lot about Sergeant Koos Schutte in the course of the evidence. Who was he? -- Sergeant Koos Schutte was officially a motor man working in the police ga-rage on motor vehicles, repairing it, and he was brought into the farm as foreman on the farm to sort of, he was always there looking after the vehicles, Askari vehicles, after
things on the farm see that the food gets to the farm that every-

(30)

thing goes according to plan. A foreman kind of on the farm.

And was he there for the whole time that you were there? --
He was for the whole time that I was there. I don't know how long
after I arrived there he was drawn to the farm,

but/...

K6.058

- 300 -

COETZEE

but that can be checked in the records.

Yes. Now, again I don't want to go into details concerning
any of the extra territorial operations, but if we can just proceed
to later in 1981 and to the time that you were in the Eastern Cape. (10)

Do you remember that? -- Ja, that I was in the Eastern Cape at
a stage, that's correct sir.

Can you remember when it was or? -- No not at all.

The records would appear to indicate that it was round about
August, September, October 1981. -- That I've been down in the
Eastern Cape?

Well that people from Vlakplaas were in the Eastern Cape.
-- Yes.

And that you yourself were in the Eastern Cape? -- Yes. (20)

Were you there for a continuous period or did you come and
go? -- Come and go, that record is not at all accurate as to exact
time leaving for Eastern Cape and then spending the full period
there. During that time people moved around from place to place.

In the Eastern Cape or away from the Eastern Cape? -- It could
have been away from the Eastern Cape, back to head office, back
again to Lesotho, Durban, back to Eastern Cape.

Can you remember some of the people who were with you in the
Eastern Cape? -- At a stage Mr Nofemela, Almond Nofemela, Mr David
Tshikalange, myself and I can't remember whether Joe was with at
that, but the three of us for sure. (30)

And anybody else from Vlakplaas? -- Not that I can remember.

We'll have to look at the records.

Where were you stationed?

CHAIRMAN: But if the records are not correct, why want to look at the records? -- Well sir as a whole I'll be able to
make/...

K6.82

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COETZEE

make an estimation what was going on, if you look at the record as a whole, but I'll point to you later on what I mean by not accurate.

(10)
Now, well that I accept that you say it's not accurate, that's why you continuously say you want the records to see and you want to look at them, but I thought you say they are inaccurate? -- Well what I actually mean sir the only real actual records that will show each vehicle and drivers' operation, will be the vehicle logsheet, because at the back, each month at each station where petrol was put in, must be recorded. But that will be the only real reflection on which day which vehicle was where. That would be able to quite clearly indicate where the guys were.

MR KUNY: Now, for what purpose would you have gone to the Eastern Cape in 1981? -- On request of course, firstly, of the security branch in Port Elizabeth, arranged with security head office and, do you want the specific incident that happened whilst I was there, or just why we went there?
(20)

I'm going to come to the details. -- Oh.

But in general terms what, why did you go down to the Eastern Cape? -- We will go down there on request of the relative regional security office, that they had need us there.

And what sort of work would you be required to do in general terms? -- Surveillance and of infiltrated ANC members.

(30)
Would road blocks be amongst your functions? -- In general not, but we did with the Elliot shooting incident sometime in 1980,

1981 August, I think, we were involved in road blocks near Lady Grey at Sterkspruit, or something like that.

Where/...

K6.104

- 302 -

COETZEE

Where were you actually stationed in the Eastern Cape? -- Whilst we were working in the Lady Grey area, we were sleeping in single quarters, it's a house at Lady Grey police station.

Were you there all the time or did you move from there? -- No we moved, but as I say I will have to get my vehicle log sheet to see when and for how long and whereto. (10)

Apart from the general surveillance and road blocks and so on, were there any specific operations that you can remember which were carried out while you were in the Eastern Cape, in which you were involved? -- Well, to start off in Aliwal North there was a uniform police constable, a black man, stayed in a black township there, that attended some trial that was going on in Aliwal North and was seen as a so-called liberal, and we were requested ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: A black what? -- Liberal.

(20)

No, no before he became a liberal he was a black what? -- He is a policeman, he was a black policeman at that stage, uniform branch. And there was an attempt to burn his car where Almond Nofemela was ... (intervenes)

MR KUNY: When you say there was an attempt were you involved in that? -- That's right. The window of the car was hit out, I think it was a Cressida, and a tyre with petrol was put in it but it never properly caught fire.

Now why was that done? -- Just to harass him and ... (intervenes)

(30)

We've heard quite a lot about the stealing or burning of cars in the course of other evidence. Can you tell the Chairman

something about that sort of tactic? -- It's just plain harassment in sort of giving this guy a hard time.

Were you involved in other such incidents? -- I was
in Rhodes/...

K6.126 - 303 - COETZEE

in Rhodes, the small town of Rhodes near Barkly East, where a so-called little hippie community live, also leftish they said and where (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: What kind of community? -- A hippie community. And (10)
we tried to set fire to a Volkswagen beetle one night, beetle or a Variant and a medium sized truck.

MR KUNY: When you say you tried was that unsuccessful or was it successful? -- The beetle I believe was unsuccessful, the truck I've heard they've succeeded in extinguishing the flames before the truck was completely destroyed.

Were you personally involved in that operation? -- I was personally involved ja. And there was an official police docket opened at Aliwal North, at, at Rhodes but the district CID officer at Aliwal North investigated it personally and they found a Jeyes' (20)
Fluid container of police origin in which we carried the petrol and he approached the security officer at Aliwal North regarding to this burning and said it was obvious that some policemen were involved.

When you say a Jeyes' Fluid container of police origin, how would that be established? -- It was a certain round one that is used at police stations, and apparently they could smell the Jeyes' Fluid still, that it had Jeyes' Fluid in it.

CHAIRMAN: No, but how do you know that the Jeyes' Fluid belongs to the police? -- No it was a specific thing, it came to police (30)
stations in that container, in such container.

What kind of container? -- It was a round one, tin.

What quantity? -- I can't remember, it wasn't very small, it can be five litres.

Five litres. Well I've got some of them on my farm. -- Was it round ones sir?

Yes, /...

K6.150

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COETZEE

Yes, round five litre Jeyes' Fluid cans. -- Well sir, that was what the CID officer said at Aliwal North and I am sure he has written it up in his docket. It must be there to be traced.

MR KUNY: Who accompanied you on that operation? -- Myself, Warrant-officer Paul van Dyk, Almond Nofemele, David Tshikalange and a chap from the security at Barkly East. (10)

When you went on an operation of this nature or any other nature in a local area, would you normally have a local policeman with you? -- If necessary yes.

Was there any other operation concerning a motor vehicle in the Eastern Cape? -- There was an Audi. An Audi 80 in Uitenhage black township. A car apparently went in for service and it belonged to a unionist, they had a key made of it, Major Nick van Rensburg or Lieutenant-colonel Nick van Rensburg at that stage, with a Sergeant Jan, I can't remember his surname. They handed the key to me, Almond and Tshikalange was with me and they took us to the house where I started the car whilst Almond and Tshikalange kept the front door intact to handle, because it was early at night, till I had the car out in the street and they dashed off to the car with inhabitants of the house screaming and yelling and we followed them and the car had to be burned, but the Audi had fairly new tyres on it and this Sergeant Jan needed desperately tyres for his private car, so we said well then he'll have to dispose of the car later after he's changed the tyres and we took the car to Jeffreys Bay police station where we would park this car in (20) (30)

the garage and I believe it was later found burned, I don't know where, but I presume after the tyres has been changed.

Yes./...

K6.175

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COETZEE

Yes. Now you mentioned that they had had a key made because the car had gone in for service. Can you just explain how that would happen? -- Well it is very easy to get, in Swaziland for instance I had a lot of car keys made of ANC chaps when they have their cars serviced at Lake's Motors, it's the Peugeot and the Toyota agency. I knew the Portuguese foreman at the garage, (10) (?) and whenever he went out to test a car after service he had some keys made of it and that's how we stole Stanley Mabizela, the then chief representative of the ANC in Swaziland's car.

And you say that was in Swaziland? -- That's right.

And this was now in the Eastern Cape? -- It will work exactly the same principle, some friend at a garage, at the garage where the car is serviced.

Is this something of your own knowledge as to what happens and how it's done? -- Ja, that was it, and that is how Nick explained (20) it to me.

And what would have been the purpose of stealing the unionist's car and burning it out? -- Harassing him. I mean if one usually going to work every morning at a certain time, you come out one morning, car is away, gone stolen, I don't think it's a very pleasant experience, especially if your car is not insured, I don't know whether that ... but I mean there's a lot of harassment involved in it.

Was there any significance in the fact that he was a unionist? -- Significant, he was giving the security police a hard time. (30)

Was there any official or unofficial attitude towards unions particularly in the Eastern Cape at that time? -- Well I believe

the motor vehicle unions gave the security police

quite/...

K6.197

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COETZEE

quite a hard time at that stage because later on there was another incident where we got rid of a Combi full of unionists on their way from Port Elizabeth to Harare for some congress.

Yes well I'll ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Did you get rid of the Combi full of unionists, or of the Combi? -- Just of the Combi sir.

MR KUNY: Yes I'll come to that incident in a moment because that didn't take place in the Eastern Cape as such? -- No, it's where it originated. (10)

Was there any, just to give an example, was there any other incidents where you personally had done something to harass a union in the Eastern Cape? -- Yes, I did there was an incident, a case where two unionists, two phones in a union office was on tap with the security police and they arranged to, for that lines to be put onto two phones on Colonel Nick van Rensburg's desk with an interlinking clips, which resulted in me phoning on the one line, say for instance PE/Johannes- burg and on the other line (20)

PE/America. This specific case that I'm talking about was a Mrs Clark, Hillary Clark, and her daughter is staying in Johannesburg.

So the one phone of the union will run a bill PE/Johannesburg and the other phone will run a bill PE/America and I would put them into contact and then they have a chat for hours and hours on the union's bill and that ended up where the union was having a hell of a telephone bill and a big quarrel with the Post Office and they won't know what's going on and the Post Office insists on them paying the account and if they don't pay their phone gets cut off and that was the one case I was in. (30)

You were, you say, were you requested to do this or was it

your idea? -- No I was asked to do it.

And/...

K6.221

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COETZEE

And is this while you were in the Eastern Cape during 1981? -- That's correct ja.

Now, have you any other specific recollection relating to the Eastern Cape, in other words in relation to any particular operation? -- No except the time that we went to park this Audi at Jeffreys Bay Police Station. In one of the garages next door was a two-door Datsun Stanza, light coloured it might have been a light blue or light green and after parking this vehicle we went into the police station, the passage right behind the charge-office to the end leads into a door and when we entered there there was a black man sitting on a bed, handcuffed to the bed with a black security policeman next to him, and this black man later on was brought up to the Komatipoort area in the Eastern Transvaal, by Colonel Nick van Rensburg, a Captain du Plessis of Port Elizabeth and a Sergeant Jan and he was given knockout drops, shot and put onto a pyre there and burnt.

Now I should have said, let's take this slowly. The man you saw in Jeffreys Bay, had you ever seen him before? -- I've never seen him before.

Did you know who he was? -- No, I can't recall his name at that stage, I've learnt in exile that it was Khondile, Sizwe Khondile.

CHAIRMAN: What is the name? -- Sizwe Khondile.

MR KUNY: At that time you didn't know? -- I did not know. The only information I had, and I even don't know whether he was at that stage officially apprehended, detained, I just, Colonel Nick just said that he was being interrogated, dived head first through a window, handcuffed, hands behind the back and landed on his head

and a doctor friend said there's

another/...

K6.247

- 308 -

COETZEE

another Steve Biko case coming up so they'll have to make a plan with this guy.

Well let's stick to what you yourself saw. You saw this man handcuffed to the bed? -- That's right.

In what condition did he appear to be? -- He looked normal to me. He was sitting on the bed and basically Colonel Nick was just hopping in to hear whether everything was still fine. (10)

Now you said that he was subsequently brought up to the Transvaal? -- To Komatipoort in the Eastern Transvaal.

Komatipoort. Did you see him? -- I did, I was present.

Was it the same man whom you saw in Jeffreys Bay? -- It was yes.

Apart from your, I think you said he had a beard? -- Ja, that's right.

Were there any other identifying features? -- No, slender built, not too long and that's that. (20)

Now you said that something happened to him there? -- That's correct.

Were you present? -- I was present.

And did you witness? -- I witnessed it.

What was it that happened to him? -- He was given knock-out drops.

What are knock-out drops? -- Knock-out drops is drops that I obtained from General Lothar Neethling of the police forensic laboratory. It's got the effect of chloroform, it's four drops for a medium built man in any drink. It's colourless, tasteless in any drink and he will be falling over before finishing that drink. And after being dosed with that he was then shot in the (30)

head by one of the Komatipoort chaps

with/...

K6.269

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COETZEE

with a Makarov pistol and a silencer on. He was then ...

(intervenes)

Was that in your presence? -- In my presence yes.

And what happened to the body? -- He was put into a pyre, pyre was built with wood and tyres and he was put on it and burnt to ashes. It takes about seven to nine hours, to burn it completely to ashes. (10)

Was that also something that happened in your presence?

-- In my presence. I was present the whole night. Myself at that specific incident, it was myself, Warrant-officer Paul van Dyk from Vlakplaas, Colonel Nick van Rensburg from Ermelo, Captain du Plessis from, excuse me sir Colonel Nick van Rensburg from Port Elizabeth, Captain du Plessis from Port Elizabeth, Sergeant Jan, I can't remember his surname, from Port Elizabeth and Major Archie Flemington of Komatipoort security with two or three of his men.

Now have you any idea why this man was shot? -- I believe he had, he picked up brain damage during his interrogation and then they officially released him out of police custody and kidnapped him on the road and his car was taken through to Swaziland and parked in front of the Holiday Inn, Legogo Holiday Inn, to give the impression that he has run away after released to Swaziland and back to the ANC. (20)

So just explain, you say he was released officially? -- That's correct.

And after his release he was then kidnapped? -- Kidnapped by the security police again.

So what would the records reflect as far as he is concerned? -- That he was released and he disappeared and his car was later (30)

then found in Swaziland and that gave the

impression/...

K6.292

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COETZEE

impression that he fled the borders and must be with the ANC there.

Do you remember when that would have been? -- This was whilst the white contingent of Vlakplaas was there already, so I, it was towards the last half of 1981.

Yes.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but according to the records you were only in the Eastern Cape in any event during the last half of 1981? Could you be more specific about when it took place? -- No I can't sir, except that it happened whilst the white guys has already been on Vlakplaas, the Vermeulen, Van Dyk etcetera. (10)

MR KUNY: Sorry may I just be... If you were in the Eastern Cape round about August, September, October, that area, 1981, was this subsequent to the time that you were in the Eastern Cape? -- I think a good indication will be the time when that Audi was stolen, it was after that, I don't know when the Audi was stolen, whether there is perhaps any records of that. I wouldn't like to commit myself to a specific time but it will be after that incident where the Audi was stolen. (20)

Yes. Why all the way up to Komatipoort? Why would he be taken there? -- Well I think that was one of the first experience of Nick van Rensburg of getting rid of a body by burning. He later took that task onto himself in the Eastern Cape in the dealings there, to see.

CHAIRMAN: Yes but that doesn't answer the question at all. Please answer the question? -- Sir, that was one of his first mutilating or getting rid of bodies which he said, by burning and he came up with that guy to the Eastern Transvaal and that was the reason therefor. (30)

MR KUNY: Was there any reason why you were present? -- I

took/...

K6.317

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COETZEE

I took the knock-out drops from General Lothar Neethling's office down to Komatipoort.

Now we know, Mr Coetzee, that in November of 1981 you and other members of the Vlakplaas squad went to Durban. -- That's correct.

And that during this period Mr Griffith Mxenge was murdered. (10)
-- That's correct yes.

You know about that incident? -- I know about it.

Did you know Mr Mxenge prior to going to Durban? -- Not at all.

Have you ever met him? -- Never in my life. The name I - never mentioned to me, I didn't know him at all.

You never had anything at all to do with? -- Nothing to do with him. In fact I only carried security files for the eight months whilst I was in Middelburg, it's the only time in my life.

So when you got to Durban, did you have a specific task to fulfil? -- The normal surveillance in the area until I was called (20)
one day by Brigadier Van der Hoven, the regional commander in Port Natal security.

And what was the purpose of that call? -- It was to instruct me to get rid of this chap Griffith Mxenge. They gave me some background on him that the ANC, roundabout R100 000 was channelled through his bank account during the past year for ANC, that he was acting as instructing attorney in all these terrorist trials and that I must get rid of him.

Now when you say get rid of him, what did that mean? -- Words (30)
to that effect that can only mean one thing and that's take him out, murder him, kill him.

Take him out? -- Take him out means kill him, get rid of
him./...

K6.352

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COETZEE

him.

Why do you say that? Why do you say the words "take him out" mean to kill him? -- See sir, I'll have to explain it. In our security in a set-up, we've got a language that a very few words mean a lot and I mean if you tell me in a security set-up that get rid of or take that guy out, it sure doesn't mean picking him up and take him out of the room. It means taking him out of this world. (10)

So did Brigadier Van der Hoven give you this information and instruction? -- That's correct and the only specific instruction was that he was not to be shot, it should be, we should stage a robbery.

Was there any particular reason for this? -- Well I think there is, I won't know what he exactly had in mind, but disappearances means, could have meant in that, it was a man like Mxenge as I've learned later would have resulted in something like a Biko day or would have the wrong political affect or, I wouldn't, I can't say. (20)

Why would there be a difference between shooting and stabbing in this connection? -- I can't answer your question sir.

Had you ever been given a task like this previously? -- Not as, I'll have, I don't know in specific what sequence did things happen, because Vuzi and Peter was killed by us and I don't know whether that happened before or after the Mxenge killing.

Yes, well, we'll deal with this in detail, but in any event you got a specific instruction? -- That's correct. (30)

Did it shock you? -- No not at all.

Why not? -- It was part of the game that was what we

were there for.

And who was to decide how the operation would be carried out?

-- Myself as commander.

And who was to decide who would carry out the operation? -- Well it was left in my hands.

Did you make that decision? -- I did.

What did you decide? -- I choose Almond Nofemele, David Tshikalange came in and Brian Ngqulunga. (10)

Why Brian Ngqulunga? -- He knew the area, he was a Zulu from that area.

Why Almond Nofemela? -- I saw him fit for the job and I selected him.

Yes. And was there anybody else whom you chose? -- Joe Mamasela and he was to be brought down from Vlakplaas to Durban, ag from Krugersdorp area where he was working with Jan Coetzee, to Durban.

Well now if he wasn't in Durban at the time, why should you specifically have requested Joe Mamasela? -- I thought he was just the right guy for the job, he had the killer instinct and he would do it. (20)

So was he brought down? -- He was brought down by Sergeant Koos Schutte from the farm.

And in order to be able to identify Mr Mxenge, did you consult anybody in Durban? -- I consulted with Captain Andy Taylor, the man on his case and he gave me one of his black policeman and there was a few trips made to Mxenge's office, the place where his car was parked and his house. Now I can't recall exactly in which case who was with us, but I know that at a stage that Joe and Almond was with at this point where we went to point out this places to (30)

them.

There/...

K6.410

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COETZEE

There has been reference made in Mr Tshikalange's evidence and I can't remember whether Mr Nofemela also gave evidence to that effect, that a photograph of Mr Mxenge was furnished, do you remember that? -- I can't remember anything of that kind. I can't remember. If it was I can't remember.

Yes. Would it have been normal to have furnished a photograph so as to be able to identify him? -- Not necessarily I would say if I point a motor car of the relative chap to him and for a few days the same guy gets into that car, that must be obvious, I mean there is a possibility that it could be the wrong guy at a stage but ... (intervenes) (10)

Would surveillance have been kept on Mr Mxenge? -- Ja, there was.

And on his house? -- On his house, I believe so too. That was left into the hands of Nofemela, Mamasela and the rest.

Why was David Tshikalange chosen by you for the job? -- He has been with me for so long, he's trustworthy, not to speak about it later, and he could handle a knife, I mean there is very few blacks that can't handle a knife, so I saw him fit for the job. (20)

CHAIRMAN: That is really illogical what you now say. -- Well sir I mean in the end I ... (intervenes)

So his ability to handle the knife was no plus point? -- Well I picked him for the job sir, and I didn't prove wrong in the end, I mean I was successful.

MR KUNY: Talking about the knives. Where were they obtained?

How were they obtained? -- The hunting knife came from Koos Schutte on the farm. The two Okapi knives as I can recollect it was bought out of money that I made available out of (30)

K6.441

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COETZEE

security funds. I'm not sure about it, that's how I can remember it.

Now there's also been evidence concerning the dogs that were kept by Mr Mxenge, do you remember that he had dogs? -- It was reported to me, and if I can remember correct, by the security chaps at C R Swart Square, he had four dogs of which three was bull-terriers and I then prepared meat for the dogs, poisoned with strychnine that I had in the back of the car. (10)

Could you tell the Chairman how you would have prepared that meat? -- Well I got four pieces of meat from the kitchen at the single quarters at C R Swart Square, made a little cut in the meat and took a little knife-point of strychnine to put it in the middle.

If you put it on the, you know outside of the meat it's got a very bad taste, well that's what they say, I've never tasted it myself and the dog wouldn't swallow it. If you put in too much poison, the dog will vomit it out in the end. So, and it's got the look of crystals, not really crystals, but like, you know, how can I put it, fibreglass like, crystals and you just took a little knife-point and put it in the middle of the meat. (20)

Mr Nofemela has said that in addition to the poison that you gave him, he also bought meat and you gave him a bottle of the poison and he poured it over the meat. Have you any recollection of that? -- Nothing at all and I've seen that piece of evidence of him and looking at it I can see he has never in his life seen strychnine.

Now do you know who put the meat into the garden of Mr Mxenge? -- Again as I can recollect it it was one night when we went there, myself, Paul van Dyk, Tshikalange, myself, Paul van Dyk, Koos Vermeulen, Captain Koos Vermeulen and Joe and (30)

K6.474

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COETZEE

Almond. Almond went to throw the meat at night. But as I say it was a few trips, about two or three trips that I made to that house personally and I can't recollect exactly who was with me on each occasion and what was done.

You say Koos Vermeulen, was he in Durban at that time? -- He was for sure, he was sleeping next to me. We were the only two officers and we slept in the officer's quarters and our rooms was just divided by a shower. (10)

Because, I ask you that because if one looks at his worksheet he doesn't appear to have been in Durban at that time. Are you sure he was there? -- I'm hundred per cent positive on that.

If you will bear with me for one moment. Or perhaps we could come back to this, I don't want to delay. Now what was the purpose of poisoning the dogs? -- It was ... (intervenes)

Sorry we found the document, it looks like it's B29 in the bundle of worksheets and during the period November 1981 from the 5th until the 22nd, according to Vermeulen's worksheet he was in the Western Transvaal and the Eastern Transvaal. -- No not at all, he was in Durban for sure. He left the afternoon before the Mxenge murder, on the Thursday afternoon he went home. (20)

CHAIRMAN: The question was, what was the purpose of the poisoning of the dogs? -- Sir that was the final act where they're going to kill Mxenge and how was left entirely into their hands, according to circumstances, how things happens and it was thought of that they would do it at his house as he stopped there and get out of the car at one stage if that should occur, so we made provision for that, but the final

(30)
analysis/...

analysis was in their hands, they had to decide where, the opportunities and when.

Now, did you receive any report as to what had happened in regard to the dogs? -- Ja, some of them did die of poison.

So it was reported to you? -- It was reported to me.

Did you ever go back to the house yourself after the dogs had been poisoned? -- Not at all.

Did you ever go back to that spot? -- Not at all, never again.

CHAIRMAN: You say they reported, you received a report that the dogs had been poisoned? -- Yes I can't remember whether it was the newspapers' report sir and whether it was at the C R Swart Square from Captain Andy Taylor and Brigadier van der Hoven. (10)

Yes you know, I'd prefer it, I would have thought that you meant that one of the poisoners told you, or someone in the police told you that, who was involved in this, did the poisoning or saw it. -- I'm sure Almond and them wouldn't have seen it sir, they would have throwed the meat and left it there and only there afterwards, now I can't remember how long after that in fact that Mxenge was killed and whether we in fact heard it then there afterwards out of police sources or through newspapers' reports. (20)

MR KUNY: But you did receive such a report? -- I did.

CHAIRMAN: Well then I also received a report because I also read the newspaper report. That's why the evidence ... (intervenes)

MR KUNY: That's his evidence.

CHAIRMAN Yes but that kind of evidence or information is gratuitous and doesn't assist at all, is it not?

MR KUNY:/...

MR KUNY: With respect Mr Chairman, ultimately you can make a decision as to the witness's liability but ... (intervenes) (30)

CHAIRMAN: No it doesn't turn on his liability, it's simply upon the question of relevance, I mean we all know the dogs died.

MR KUNY: Well I asked the question and that was his answer.

CHAIRMAN: But it doesn't affect his credibility at all.

MR KUNY: Now Mr Coetzee, what was the next thing that happened as far as you are concerned in regard to Mr Mxenge's murder? -- He was killed one rainy night and I had a meeting point at a bar in Durban. The entrance of the bar is not near the beach front but if you would come out of the entrance of the bar you would face the sea-front. The bakkie was parked outside. I stopped there and as far as I can recollect all four of them were in the bar. I can remember Joe Mamasela standing with Mr Mxenge's grey jacket on, it was a little bit short on his arms, and his watch on his arm and he had a wallet and key and they came out and I took all their clothing and shoes and Mr Mxenge's ... (intervenes) (10)

Where did you take, where did you take this, was it at the bar or was it at C R Swart? -- At the bar, right in front out of the bakkie into the boot of my car.

So had they changed at that stage? -- They have changed at that stage.

On whose instruction did they change? -- I said they must put on old clothes and old shoes etcetera so that I can take hold of it for in case identification, someone has seen them and to prevent identification. (20)

When had you said that to them? -- Beforehand, before they've ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: /...

K6.571

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COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: In other words they had already changed their clothing before they came to the bar? -- That's correct sir. (30)

MR KUNY: And you took all their clothing or only some of their

clothing? -- As I can remember, all of it.

Shoes as well? -- Shoes as well, and the knives, and Mr. Mxenge's jacket, and his watch, and his wallet, and his kar keys.

And then, where did you go? -- I went to C R Swart Square, where I traced Warrant-officer Paul van Dyk and Constable Braam du Preez. We went to the vehicle, fitted it with false number plates and I asked them to leave for Golela border post with the car, where I would meet them roundabout lunch-time the next day.

Why to Golela border post? -- There was a representative like Paul van Dyk was in the earlier years a representative, Ermelo security had, at Oshoek border post there was a chap called Frederik Pine Pienaar, or we called him Pine Frederik Pienaar, warrant-officer of Security, Ermelo, based at Golela border post. (10)

Yes, but why there? -- A place where I can meet them the next day and first find out now what's next, what must I do with the car.

Was there any particular reason why that spot was chosen as the place to meet? -- It was just decided by me at Golela because Pine is there, it's the nearest, it's far away enough from Durban and on our way back to Pretoria.

So did you follow immediately or wait until the next day? -- I did not, I went to report to Brigadier Van der Hoven's flat, he was staying in the married quarters at C R Swart Square. I went to report to his flat that night, it was (20)

fairly/...

K6.603

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COETZEE

fairly late he was in his pajamas already and then went to bed.

CHAIRMAN: Reported to who? -- To Brigadier Van der Hoven, the regional commander.

Yes, thank you. -- Then went to bed and as usual reported just after 07h30 the Friday morning to his office. When I arrived (30)

he said that Mrs Mxenge has already phoned and enquired whether they have apprehended him because he never came home last night, and he then also instructed me that Brigadier Schoon has phoned and said the squad must immediately pull up and come back to Pretoria. I then went down and gave instructions for the people to pack and return home and back to Vlakplaas and Pretoria. I drove up the North Coast road where I met up with Paul and Braam outside Golela border post on the North Coast road.

Did you drive up on your own? -- I drove up on my own.

Now I want to just ask you here. In, I think it was an (10) interview that you gave which is before the Commission, you said that Mr Tshikalange accompanied you when you drove up and that you dropped him off ... (intervenes) -- At Empangeni.

At Empangeni, on the way. -- Ja, I think that was with the time that we took the diamond dealer of Lesotho's body up to go and burn it, it was at that stage and not with the Mxenge case.

So that was wrong? -- That was wrong.

What happened when you got up to Golela? -- Paul van Dyk and Braam was waiting outside on the North Coast road, just past the bridge, there's a big river just before the Golela turn-off, coming (20) up from the South towards Golela and we then went to go and hide the car in an empty police house at Golela

border/...

K6.636

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COETZEE

border post. There was an empty house at that stage. If you drive into the garage of the house the house is on your left and it's not fixed onto the house, and Pine undertook to look after the car for us there, after which we returned to the river, next to the river where we burnt his jacket and wallet, his watch was thrown (30) into the river together with the number-plates, the false number-plates, after it was burnt.

Did you mention that false number-plates had been used, I'm not sure.

CHAIRMAN: Yes. -- I think I did mention that we fitted the car with false number-plates. We then went back to Pretoria where I reported Saturday morning to Brigadier Van der Hoven on his smallholding ... (intervenes)

MR KUNY: Van der Hoven? -- Ah, ah, Brigadier Jan du Preez on his smallholdings at Swartkops in Pretoria and I suggested that seeing that it was a brand new car that we exchange it with a car at Koevoet with Brigadier Hans Dreyer, getting a car from that side again to be used in this area and he said no the car must immediately burn. Of course the original staged robbery turned out in a slaughter so I don't think it was a question of robbery anymore, so ... (intervenes) (10)

Sorry can you just explain that? -- Well there was more than 40 stab wounds in Mxenge's body ... (intervenes)

How did you know that? -- It was reported to me by Jan, he was viciously stabbed, his throat was cut, and I believe his ears too, or one of his ears were cut. And it was obvious that it was not a robbery anymore, so we got instructions to burn the car. That Sunday afternoon ... (intervenes) (20)

CHAIRMAN: But it could never have been a robbery, only a robbery?

I mean whether he is killed with one stab wound or

with/...

K6.669

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COETZEE

with 40 stab wounds, it remains a murder. -- That's correct sir ... (intervenes)

Yes, now what's your point? -- If one is killed and his money is missing and his car is missing and his watch is missing it would have been robbery, but motive that we were trying to create was robbery staged. (30)

MR KUNY: You were trying to create the impression that this was an ordinary robbery? -- Yes.

And not a politically motivated killing? -- That's right.

CHAIRMAN: So they messed it up? -- They messed it up completely yes.

And as a result you say the car had to be burned? -- The car had to be burned.

Was there any reason why the car wasn't simply taken through into Swaziland? -- Well no, it was the, we thought amongst one another that we should park it at a regular crossing, known crossing point in security circles, just south of Bothashoop border post in the fence to Swaziland where the ANC members always crossed into South Africa and back to make it tend then that it's the ANC eventually because there was a quarrel on the money and that was what press reports, according to General Coetzee and press reports said afterwards, that there was some quarrel between the ANC and Mr Mxenge on R100 000 that went through his bank account. So we left Pretoria myself, Paul van Dyk and Koos Schutte of the farm, Sergeant Koos Schutte, we took with a 20 or 25 litre can of extra petrol to sort of put in petrol in our car so if the car is traced eventually and there is suspicion on Vlakplaas that we couldn't have made that distance on one tank of petrol or two tanks of petrol from when we left Pretoria, we put in petrol/...

K6.702

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COETZEE

petrol that night at Piet Retief police station and Paul signed the petrol register, Paul van Dyk, that Sunday night, but my Datsun hadn't had a spare wheel and we had to stop at Bronkhorstspuit where Koos Vermeulen stayed and we borrowed his Datsun's spare wheel and he insisted that he wanted to go along and Koos went along with us.

So there was yourself, Van Dyk, Vermeulen and Schutte? -- And Schutte, that's right, went to pick up the car at Golela border post, Koos at a stage drained some petrol out of the Audi, a five litre can, which we eventually burned the Audi with. I was driving the Audi and Paul van Dyk and Koos Vermeulen lead the way in the police car for in case there was road blocks set up. While I was driving, Koos amongst other things removed the radio and the speakers out of Mxenge's car and Paul which knew the Swaziland border very well, being operating there from Oshoek for quite a few years took us to the spot where the car was driven in the direction of the fence and then the bonnet open poured petrol on the engine and just not fully closed, but closed again, the boot opened, petrol poured into the boot and then inside of the car and it was lit. I remember that Koos Schutte in the end tried to get hold of the battery, it was brand new, from the back seat, but there wasn't any spanners and he couldn't break the battery cables ... (intervenes) (10)

Sorry do you say from the back seat? -- Ja it's under the left back seat, the Audi's battery, and eventually we burned it just like that. (20)

And you left it there? -- And we left it there. The report we received from Pine Pienaar, some time earlier in the next week was that some lumberjacks or people from forestry

found/...

K6.737

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COETZEE

found the car smouldering the Monday morning in the plantation there and reported it.

What time was it that you had set it alight, approximately? -- It must have been quite after 12 that night towards 03h00 in the morning, between 24h00 and 03h00 I'd guess. (30)

Yes. How long, do you know how long it would take a car to

burn out? -- No not.

Was there any time that you can place on it? -- No not, I must be guessing if I say.

Right, so you got a report that it had been found smouldering? -- That's right.

In the meantime where did you go after you had set alight ... (intervenes)? -- Back to Pretoria where I reported, well the first thing when I walked into Brigadier Schoon's office the Monday morning, was he asked me whether we left any traces and I said no and then they asked on a report on what happened and ... (10)
(intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: On which day was that? -- On the Monday sir, Monday after the murder. And it was decided that David, Joe and Almond will receive R1 000 each as "kopgeld" bounty money for the job they had done and Brian nothing because he played the most ... (intervenes)

I didn't catch the word, as what? -- As bounty money, what they call "kopgeld".

MR KUNY: Was that a commonly used term? -- Well yes.

In what quarters, where was it used? -- In security circles (20) and Koevoet quite often I think from court case, not think I have got record, court case records where a Koevoet member was charged and where this was specifically mentioned,
this/...

K6.773

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COETZEE

this "kopgeld" bounty money.

Was Koevoet a police operation? -- It was a police operation falling directly under security head office, they also appeared in our security head office phone list.

But they operated in what was then South West Africa? -- In Namibia, South Wes, that's right. (30)

Who decided that these three would get R1 000? -- Well it was decided by Brigadier Jan du Preez.

And where did the money come from? -- He said he'd ask Brigadier Hans Dreyer to put a claim in of R3 000, and that R3 000 will then be dealt with in Section C1.

And did you receive the money? -- I did in fact eventually receive R3 000.

In notes? -- In notes.

And in what form? -- I can't remember whether they were in three separate packets in envelopes that was closed up, or what, I can't say. My normal, I would normally not hand it out alone to each one alone, but in the presence of one, two or three of them being present, I mean so that I have got some control, because I didn't sign for the money and neither did they. (10)

Weren't they required to sign any form of receipt or document? -- Not at all.

Wouldn't that have been regular and required? -- I beg your pardon?

Would that not have been required that they sign for it? -- That would have left traces exactly, as now there would have been traces that this in fact happened then. (20)

CHAIRMAN: Yes and did you say you handed money over to them in their presence, with more than one present? -- Normally I would/...

K6.811 - 325 - COETZEE
would have done that yes. I can't recall where it was, but, my nature is of such that I would have normally seen that there is one or two, two or three present of them, so that I've got witnesses that I have handed them the money. (30)

MR KUNY: You say you can't remember whether in this instance you did that? -- Ja, that's correct.

When you say normally, had there been other occasions in which you paid "kopgeld" ? -- No not at all, but I mean it was just giving R1 000 to someone, he can come back and say I had only given him R800.

Well except that he could count it there and then and be satisfied that it was ... (intervenes) -- I suppose it's possible, yes.

So did you in fact pay these three their R1 000? -- I did.

And why was Brian Ngqulunge not paid? -- He played the most passive roll, apparently he just stood there one side with a gun in his hand. (10)

But he was nevertheless part of the mission and had been the driver and the guide and so on? -- The final decision wasn't in my hands, I mean I could only give the feed-back and a final decision was in the hands of my superiors.

Did you give David Tshikalange his R1 000? -- I did.

Did he take it? -- He must have, I don't know at what stage, but I mean, it was handed to him.

Did he give it back to you or did he keep it? -- I can't remember. (20)

He says that he left it with you and only collected it subsequently the following year, can you remember that? -- I can't/...

K6.846

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COETZEE

can't remember it, but it's possible, but I can't remember it, I mean I always acted for him as a godfather and I would have, if he had asked me to look after it until he went home or something I would have done it, but I can't recall it.

Is there anything else at all that you can recall then in regard to this whole unfortunate ... (intervenes) -- I just want to say that that radio of Mxenge's car went into Brigadier Jan (30)

du Preez's Mercedes 230. I did in Mauritius gave the impression that it either went into Jan du Preez or Brigadier Schoon's car, but Brigadier Jan has always been very close to me all these years, up until last year still and his wife has written me a letter after I have left the country, but I mean he was close to me and that's why I lied about it, but it went into his car.

Now, do you remember two people by the name of Vuzi and Peter?

-- I remember them.

Who were they? -- Peter was a member of the ANC, I believe not of the military wing ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Just give me some time. What is the name Mr Kuny?

MR KUNY: Vuzi and Peter.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you, carry on. He was a member of the ANC?

-- That's correct sir, he was a student in Bulgaria.

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman I don't know whether it would be an appropriate time to stop. I know it's not quite 16h00, but it's been a long session and ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No, thank you for suggesting it Mr. Kuny. It suits me very fine.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS.

THE COMMISSION RESUMES ON 26 APRIL 1990

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman just before we begin after we adjourned yesterday some of our colleagues complained that it was going a little bit too fast and they were having difficulty in getting down the evidence. So perhaps we can take it at a slower pace.

CHAIRMAN: Yes I'd appreciate it myself.

DIRK COETZEE: (still under oath)

MR KUNY: Mr Coetzee, yesterday when we adjourned I was about to ask you about two people by the name of Vusi and Peter, but before (10) I get to that there's another aspect that I'd like to question you on. There has been reference made to a trade union Combi. -- That's correct.

I think it was described as a red and white Combi? -- That's correct.

Do you know anything about that? -- I do.

Could you tell the Chairman what you know about that and when approximately this took place? -- It was towards 1981 and ... (intervenes)

Towards or in 1981? -- In 1981 towards the second half of (20) 1981, when I received instructions from Brigadier Schoon of Section C to contact Colonel Nick van Rensburg of the regional security headquarters in Port Elizabeth. I did so from Vlakplaas by phone ... (intervenes)

A little slower please. You contacted him. -- And he informed me of trade unions that were on their way to a conference in Harare and that they would overstay in Johannesburg. They did put dagga pills through the air vents of the Combi.

Who did? -- The security police in Port Elizabeth.

What/.. (30)

What was the reason for that? -- To prevent them from, to

get them arrested and prevent them from reaching their eventual destiny. They phoned the police station on the road, I believe it was Queenstown where this Combi was stopped and the police could not find this dagga.

So did the Combi eventually reach Johannesburg with the trade unionists in it? -- They did reach Johannesburg and I was informed by Colonel Nick van Rensburg that they booked into the Johannesburger Hotel and that I must prevent at all cost from them leaving Johannesburg.

Did he say how? -- Suggesting that we sabotage the vehicle or anything with the vehicle, but they must not be able to reach Harare. (10)

As a result of this instruction did you do anything? -- I did. We, myself, Captain Koos Vermeulen, Paul van Dyk, Sergeant Koos Schutte and Mr Nofemela left for Johannesburg in my car to the Johannesburger Hotel. We stopped right opposite the street, to the entrance of the parking garage under the Johannesburger Hotel.

Did you have a description of the vehicle? -- I did. It was a red and white Combi with a CB registration number, that time I had the exact number but I can't remember it now. (20)

Yes, and what happened? -- Under the Johannesburger Hotel there is not very much parking place and the instructions to the people leaving there cars there is that they must leave the keys in the cars so that it can be moved around by the personnel. For instance if a car was parked in front can't get out, so that they can remove the car behind. I went to check and I saw that the keys and the parking ticket was in the vehicle and I went back and I suggested, my chaps were

waiting/... (30)

waiting in the car outside opposite the street, that Almond should remove the car as the original driver of the vehicle that took it into the parking garage was black, was a black man. Captain Koos Vermeulen, however, insisted that he wanted to do it and he went in, started up the car, paid about R2 at the entrance, gate fee, and followed us.

Was he alone in the car? -- He was alone in the car yes.

And followed you to where? -- To Vlakplaas.

What did you do with the Combi once you got to Vlakplaas?
-- We parked it there and immediately opened the back door of the Combi and the engine compartment and there was quite a few dagga, (10) and not the pill, it was fairly long and thick, openly lying in the engine compartment.

Yes. Now what ultimately happened to that Combi? -- That Combi was ultimately sold in Swaziland.

Was anything removed from it before it was sold? -- There was a Pioneer radio with four round speakers that went into my official car and the booster of that radio went into the private car of Sergeant Koos Schutte.

And who arranged for it to be sold in Swaziland? -- I did, (20) after getting permission from Brigadier Schoon, I took it down to Swaziland to that border, Oschhoek border.

Did you have any connections there which would enable you to dispose of it in Swaziland? -- Yes I had a chap by the name of Arnaldo Santos, a Portuguese guy.

What was your connection with him? -- Well as a source whilst being at Oschhoek border, I knew him very well. He travelled through the Oschhoek border quite frequently and they were also involved in importing expensive stolen cars from overseas through Mozambique.

Stolen cars? -- That's correct, through Mozambique into Swaziland, eventually registering them in Bophuthatswana, the independent homeland and then bringing them to Johannesburg.

Yes. So did you know that he might be a person to whom you could dispose of this car? -- That's correct.

Did you make any prior arrangements with him? -- I did. I did contact him in advance and then we fitted the Combi with false licence disc, third-party disc and number-plates and we met him at Oschhoek border.

Where incidentally did you get the false discs and licence plates? -- At security head of its printing works yearly, these discs, it's a Transvaal licence disc, in my time they printed twelve month disc with the same serial number, a stack of them as well as third-party discs, also with exactly the same serial number where you can, which was handed out then to me as commander and which was put onto our operational cars. You could then choose any false registration number that you want, mine for instance was DJC, my initials, 036, at that time I was 36 years old, T, and then you would just type that registration number onto the licence disc and write it onto the third-party and fix it to the window of your vehicle. (10) (20)

What was the purpose of using a false registration? -- For the car not being traceable during operations.

Yes. So you say you fixed to the Combi false discs and registration? -- That's correct.

And who drove it to Swaziland? -- Koos Schutte as far as I can remember and Paul van Dyk and myself accompanied him in my Datsun vehicle.

And did you go into Swaziland or merely do the transaction at the border? -- Just outside the border on the (30)

South African/...

South African side Arnaldo Santos came out and paid us R7 000.

Cash? -- Cash, in cash.

What happened to that money? -- That money was eventually at a later stage, it was first kept at head office with Brigadier Schoon and whilst we were at Lady Grey Colonel Nick van Rensburg together with the then regional commander of Eastern Cape security, Colonel Gerrit Erasmus came up to Lady Grey and in the single quarters, there this money was handed to him.

So it went to Port Elizabeth security? -- It went to Port Elizabeth security. (10)

And you don't know what happened thereafter? -- I don't know what happened thereafter.

What was the, you say the purpose was to stop the unionists from reaching Harare, why? -- Just again harassing them and ... (intervenes)

Were they unionists from a particular union? -- I can't remember from what union, I believe it was motor car, it was from a motor union, all PE unions was, the most of them were from motor unions in Port Elizabeth. (20)

Were there particular problems at that stage in regard to the motor unions? -- Well it was a headache to the security branch at Port Elizabeth.

Do you know whether that vehicle, or did you have any information as to whether that vehicle was insured or don't you know? -- I believe the vehicle was not insured and Colonel Nick van Rensburg told me later on that they, after getting back to Port Elizabeth they tried to back-tape the insurance and they, as security policeman made anonymous calls to the insurance company to sort of prevent them from doing it.

(30)
You/...

You don't know whether they were ever paid out for that vehicle? -- No I have never heard again.

Then I wanted to ask you, Mr Coetzee, about this incident that Mr Tshikalange referred to, relating to Zeerust and the farm house near Zeerust, near the border of Botswana. Were you involved in any operation which commenced from that farmhouse in 1981? -- I was. It was a raid into Botswana onto the house of Joyce Diphale and her husband Roller.

Now where exactly was this farmhouse situated? -- As you come from the Botswana side through Kopfontein border gate the road runs fairly due East and then at a stage turn, a few kilometres from the border in a Southern direction. Immediately on your left there is a little mountain range running East/West and a farm turn-off right at the foot on the Northern slope of this range and if you turn off there you get the farmer's house at first, a kilometre or two inside, right at the foot of this mountain and then further in there was an old deserted, dilapidated farmhouse where the Western Transvaal, Koos Vermeulen, used as base when he operated in that area.

So this wasn't the only occasion on which the, a group operated from there? -- No. No he always made use of that house.

Were you involved in any other operation from that house? -- Yes at the stage when Peter and Vusi was to be killed, the original operation started off there.

So it was known to you? -- It was known to me.

Now on this particular occasion, with regard to the Botswana raid, who was present? -- It was myself, Captain Koos Vermeulen, Warrant-officer Paul van Dyk, Captain Jan Coetzee

from/...
(30)

from West Rand security, Captain Rudi Crause from Zeerust security.

CHAIRMAN: Just a moment. -- Sorry sir. Captain Jan Coetzee from West Rand security, Captain Rudi Crause from Zeerust security, then Joe Mamasela, Almond Nofemela and David Tshikalange.

MR KUNY: I just wanted to ask you, do you, did you know of a man by the name of Captain Grobler? -- I've heard of his name, he was from Soweto security, I can't remember his face.

Do you know whether he might have been present on this occasion? -- I can't remember it, that he was there.

You have no recollection of him? -- I have no recollection of him being present. (10)

Now, why would Joe Mamasela have been included in this operation? -- Joe stayed in that house whilst being with the ANC and doing crash courses in Botswana, he stayed with Joyce and Roller in that specific house and he had the whole layout of the house.

So he knew it? -- He knew it.

And was he sent in on any advanced surveillance mission before you went in? -- After original - the layout of the house was shown to us where the bedrooms, the front of the house et cetera which street it was in, Joe, just after lunchtime that afternoon, went in with my old three litre official Cortina with a BPC registration number, Transvaal, I can't remember the figures, and I'm not sure whether Almond accompanied him, went through the border, came back after a while. I took the bakkie then and went in with that bakkie, did my observations and came back. (20)

Also through the border? -- Also through the border.

Now/...

K1.176

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COETZEE

Now, was it close enough to the border for him to simply be able to go and come back within a few hours? -- That's correct. (30)

Kopfontein border gate from Gaborone I think is about 11

kilometres.

And the farmhouse from the border gate? -- Another three to four.

Yes. -- I then went in .. (intervenes)

Sorry. We now, we can't deal with what actually happened inside Botswana, so I just want to get the details of your going in and coming out. -- Okay but after I have come out, just before 20h00, Kopfontein border closes at 20h00 at night, Joe went in again with the, with that bakkie, BPC bakkie and the rest of us got over the fence and met inside.

(10)
When you say got over the fence, what does that mean? -- We illegally entered Botswana with weapons and ammunition ...
(intervenes)

Vehicles? -- No the vehicle we used went in with Joe and there will be no record of Joe's exit again because we came back with the vehicle through the fence, cut the fence and we all came back through the fence late that night.

So he went in with the vehicle, you went over the fence and did you meet him inside? -- We met him inside, he first made sure that there was no road blocks on the road, came back and picked (20)
us up and we went in. Came back again, Jan Coetzee and Rudi Crause waited a few, kilometre or two from the border inside Botswana and they met us and showed us the way with the vehicle to the fence through the veld where we cut the fence and got out by vehicle.

Did you take any precaution to disguise yourselves in any way? -- We did. The actual chaps involved in the shoot out
that/...

K1.200

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COETZEE

that night was Joe Mamasela and Mr Almond Nofemela and myself (30)
and Koos Vermeulen, we had long-sleeved shirts on, long pants and our hands and our faces we blackened with this, with a powder that

they use in theatre and we had balaclava on which was pulled over our hair and over our ears.

And after you came back from Botswana did you go back to the farmhouse or did you return straight to Vlakplaas? -- No, we first went back to the farmhouse and the next morning early we departed again.

Did Mr Tshikalange take part in that? -- He was in, he was waiting with Warrant-officer Paul at the bakkie about two blocks away from the house that we went to.

Now I would like to come back, Mr Coetzee, to the question of Vusi and Peter and you, I think may have said that Vusi was somebody who came from Mozambique? -- That's correct. (10)

It was the raid into Matolla in, I think February 1981, three guys were captured by that, the people involved in that raid from the South African security forces, two to be, two proved ANC members and the third one was a Mozambican citizen.

Do you remember the names of these people? -- I can remember the two ANC chaps the one was Ghost, that was his MK name, he decided to co-operate with the security police, but Vusi refused and was detained at Brits police station where they were interrogating him and trying to build up a case against him. (20)

Can you remember anything more about his name? Vusi? -- About his?

What was his name? -- He was called Vusi, I've got it written down somewhere, but I can't remember it out of the face, out of the fist.

So/...

K1.228

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COETZEE

So he was detained at Brits and then? -- And then according to Brigadier Schoon he had the attitude of charge me or shoot me ... (intervenes) (30)

CHAIRMAN: No, please, please talk clearly.

MR KUNY: Just what did you say, just repeat that? -- I beg your pardon?

Would you repeat that answer? -- Oh, sorry I thought I said something wrong. Vusi had the attitude of charge me or shoot me.

Was he not prepared to co-operate? -- He was not prepared to co-operate.

I think, did you say that somebody said that that was his attitude or did you hear that that was his attitude? -- I didn't hear it, it was reported to me by Brigadier Schoon.

(10)

So what happened then? -- So I was instructed that they are preparing for his release and that I must pick him up, pretending that he's now voluntarily working, he is released and he has agreed to work with us voluntarily at Vlakplaas as an Askari.

Just explain how that would happen? What would be done to release him? -- The section who was doing his interrogation, that time Brigadier J J Viktor who was then the regional commander at Northern Transvaal security, would arrange for his release papers. I can't remember whether it was handed to me or was already at Brits police station, waiting for me to just sort of pick him up. Then I went to Brits police station and after his prisoner's property what they call it, was handed back to him I put him in the back of the car, handcuffed him and left with him to Zeerust.

(20)

Did you do that at the police station or outside of the police/...

K1.250

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COETZEE

police station? -- At the police station in the back of the police yard.

And did you drive him alone? -- I did drive him alone.

(30)

Or were you with anybody? -- I drove him alone.

And you say he was handcuffed? -- He was handcuffed.

And what was his attitude at that stage? -- Well he didn't mention anything on the road, didn't say anything, didn't talk to me not at all.

Now was there a man called Peter? -- There was an ANC guy on the farm, also called Peter. He was a student in Bulgaria and deflected to some embassy there and eventually made contact with the South African police and Colonel Jack Buchner at Section C2, eventually arranged for him to be flown out to South Africa and after debriefing by Colonel Buchner he was also on Vlakplaas, placed on Vlakplaas.

As an Askari? -- As an Askari, although he had no military training. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Mr Coetzee I don't know whether it's the fact that you are now speaking English whereas your main language is Afrikaans, but you swallow your words and I cannot hear you, I'm very sorry.

MR KUNY: Would you speak up so that ... (intervenes)? -- I will, I'll speak up.

Would you just explain again about this person Peter? Where was he a student? -- Peter was a student in Bulgaria. He was a ANC member with no official military training. He deflected and eventually made to a embassey there, not a South African embassey, and then made contact with the South African authorities and he was eventually brought out by Colonel Jack Buchner of Section C, security head office and after (20)

debriefing/...

K1.275

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COETZEE

debriefing put on Vlakplaas with the farm.

And did he actually work as an Askari? -- Yes he did work as an Askari.

Did this happen while you were on Vlakplaas or was he already there at the time that you arrived? -- It happened whilst I was (30)

on Vlakplaas.

Can you describe Peter? -- Peter was a slender built, he didn't always look whether he was all there, he was always late for operation when we had to leave, he was always late and a pathetic kind of guy and caused a lot of problems, the other Askari's couldn't get on very well with him, they assaulted him quite frequently and it was decided then by Brigadier Schoon that we should get rid of him together with Vusi.

What did that mean? -- To kill him and dispose of the body.

Was that explicitly spelt out to you? -- Not explicitly spelt out, just get rid of him, make a plan with him, words to that effect. (10)

And in your language, did you know what that meant? -- It meant only one thing, murder the guy and dispose of the body.

For how long had he been on Vlakplaas at this stage, can you remember? -- I can't remember exactly how long.

So who was responsible for doing this? -- Myself and Captain Koos Vermeulen in the original stage.

CHAIRMAN: I'm sorry Mr Kuny, you say responsible for doing this, we are now dealing with two cases, I'm not quite sure which is which and where is where?

MR KUNY: I'm sorry I'm dealing with Peter, specifically at the moment. You were entrusted with the task of, as you say, getting/... (20)

K1.302

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COETZEE

getting rid of Peter? -- That's correct.

And I'm asking you about that now. You and, you say, lieutenant Koos Vermeulen in the original stage? -- Ja.

So what did you do? -- I picked up Vusi at Brits police station after going to Brigadier Lothar Neethling of the forensic ... (30)
(intervenes)

I'm sorry, sorry before I get to that, I was asking you about

Peter.-- Oh Peter?

Yes. -- Peter was with Koos Vermeulen already at the farm.

I see, and then you picked up Vusi? -- Vusi.

Now you say, what did you do before picking up Vusi? -- I arranged with Brigadier Schoon to contact Brigadier Lothar Neethling where I picked up poison and knock-out drops.

Now, why did you do this? -- The original idea was to get rid of Peter and Vusi by giving them poison and then burning them after they have died.

And how did you know to, where to get the poison and the, (10)
what you call it, knock-out drops? -- Well it was in our security circles a well-known fact that you get it from Brigadier Lothar Neethling.

Had you ever met him before, or had anything to do with him?
-- Nothing at all.

And did you on this occasion meet him? -- I did meet him personally.

Did you get anything from him? -- I got two small parcels of powder from him, which was to be put into the drink of the people that you want to kill and also a small bottle with drops, colourless (20)
drops in it.

Were the drops also poison, or what was the purpose of
the/...

K1.328

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COETZEE

the drops? -- The drops, if administered too much, four drops for a medium built guy would put him out, and eight or more would eventually kill him, put him to a sleep where he will never wake up again.

Now, what did you do with these drops and this poison? -- (30)
Well we eventually met up at the farm where Koos worked in Western

Transvaal, near the Kopfontein border gate, after stopping over at Zeerust police station and asking the dog handler there, Sergeant Willie Mouton to pick up old motor car tyres for me and bring it out to the farm, which he did.

Yes. -- I then met with Koos on the farm and he administered that powder into a cool drink for Vusi and to a beer for Peter, into a beer. I in the meantime made Vusi sign three blank HQ informer slips, the ones that they sign at the end of the month if they receive their allowance.

But Vusi, was he an informer? -- Vusi was the ANC guy that had the attitude of charge me or shoot me. (10)

Yes. So you say you got him to sign? -- Ja, that's right, pretending that he voluntarily joined us and the idea was, we planned and for the future that if there was any queries on Vusi, we could show that he actually worked with us for three months and that he received informant pay for three months and then just disappeared.

Yes. So did he sign these forms? -- He did sign them.

What did you do with the forms? -- The forms is on record, I handed it to Lieutenant-colonel at that stage, Roelf van Rensburg, Brigadier Schoon's second in charge. (20)

Now as a result of administering this powder, did anything happen? -- Nothing at all. So later that night we gave Vusi four of this drops, knock-out drops into a cool

drink/...

K1.360

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COETZEE

drink again, to see how it works, how long does this drops take to get effect, and what effect in fact did it have on him and for how long.

And did it work? -- It did work and quite soon too and you could see he was, although at a stage looking at you he couldn't (30)

hear you, he couldn't speak to you and eventually fell over. He was very restless during the night, scratching in the soil next to him, but you could see he was not at all with us, or knowing where he was.

And what about Peter? -- Peter we kept under the impression that he's in fact there to guard Vusi and we handcuffed Vusi onto him, but we did not administer this drops to Peter.

So what happened? -- So Koos Vermeulen went back the next day to Brigadier Lothar Neethling and brought back some more of the powder poison and his remarks was that Brigadier Neethling can't believe that it is not working, so he doubled the original dose, which we administered again, and again nothing happened. (10)

And so what did you do? -- We had to leave then for the Groblersdal area where, the whole squad, where we worked for a few days and during a Sunday morning Koos and myself, Koos Vermeulen went back to Pretoria to Brigadier Neethling's house.

Well now just before we deal with that, what happened to Peter and Vusi in the meantime? -- We stayed in a house, the whole squad and we kept them separately in a house next door, it was smallholdings for this war veterans that they built after the second world war, just outside Groblersdal. (20)

Were they kept prisoner there in fact? -- Ja, they were kept/...

K1.390

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COETZEE

kept prisoner away from the rest of the group.

And you went back to Pretoria on the Sunday morning? -- With Koos Vermeulen, that's correct.

And you say you went to Brigadier Neethling's house? -- We did.

With what object? -- To get some more of this poison. We went, picked Brigadier Neethling up, went to the forensic (30)

laboratory, where he eventually dissolved this powder into a fluid and drawn it up into two insulin syringes of mine, the size of the insulin syringe is 100 unit each and he drew up that solution into the insulin syringes and rolled it up in foil, tin foil to prevent the plunger from going down and letting this fluid out.

Just to explain, you are in fact diabetic? -- I am yes.

And you take insulin regularly? -- That's correct.

Which you administer by way of syringe? -- That's correct.

Now, armed with these two syringes where did you go and what did you do? -- Back to Groblersdal and Koos administered it to them in drinks and again nothing happened, because Brigadier (10)
Neethling couldn't believe it, but that is the fact. We then arranged to take Peter and Vusi, myself, Koos Vermeulen and Paul van Dyk, down to Komatipoort where we met up with major Archie Flemington and two of his men, two or three of his men at a place right next to the Komati river, near the road bridge, where they, Peter and Vusi were administered these knock-out drops in drinks again, and after they fell over Koos Vermeulen shot them each one a shot behind the ear with the Makarov pistol and the silencer on, and they were both put into a pyre of logs and tyres, burnt (20)
through the night/...

K1.421

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COETZEE

night and their remains dished into the Komati river.

Now, why did you have to go to all the trouble of twice returning to Brigadier Neethling, when you could have administered the drops in the first place, knocked them out, shot them and done the same thing as what you ultimately did? -- I think it was a question, I don't think whether anyone had really the heart to shoot a chap at point-blank and it just developed that way that in the (30)
end we had to do it.

What would have been the effect of the poison had it worked?

-- According to Brigadier Neethling it was administered to a sheep, after 10 or 15 seconds it would just jump in the air, fall down dead and the result would be a heart attack.

So it would simulate the effect of a heart attack? -- That's correct.

That's what you expected? -- That is what we expected.

What would you then have done, had they responded to the poison and died, what would you have done with the bodies? -- Disposed of it in the same way, onto a pyre, logs and tyres and burn it.

But would it have mattered whether it was a heart attack or anything else? -- No it wouldn't, I mean it was just the fact that, (10)
a question of I don't think, well I haven't had it in me to shoot them at point-blank and I think that was the main question.

Yes. And why specifically Komatipoort or in that area? Why was that chosen as in the case of the other person who was burned, in order to burn the bodies? -- I can't say, it was in the Eastern Transvaal, it was in a deserted spot, there is many other deserted spots, but I, Archie Flemington had a lot

of/...

K1.449

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(20)
COETZEE

of experience of it and ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Of what? -- Of getting rid of bodies in this way.

Of what doing? -- Of getting rid of bodies.

But you have got a lot of experience of getting rid of bodies? -- It is sir, but, you know, it is difficult to explain logically why we did certain things.

No I'm concerned why you did certain things, not why other people did certain things. I'll ask them when they get their chance to testify. -- Well I think sir, with me it's a question (30)
whether there is method in my madness or madness in my method.

I decided to do a thing in a certain way and I wasn't thinking

of ending up one day to explain it in court to someone, it was just coming out spontaneously.

But that's not the point Mr Coetzee, the point is we are assessing the probabilities of what happened and for that reason it is fairly important for me to know the reasons why things happened.-- Ja.

And that is why Mr Kuny asks you those questions. So your answer is you have no logical explanation why you went through this ... (intervenes) -- Apart from that there was a close rapport between us, between the Komatipoort group, the Ermelo security group over the years and Vlakplaas group which, whilst I was down at Oschhoek border post we all fell under the regional commander of security in the Eastern Transvaal which were at Middelburg, based at Middelburg. (10)

MR KUNY: Now I'm going to ask you about someone by the name of Ace Moema, did you know such a person? -- I did.

Who was he? -- He was also a MK Askari.

CHAIRMAN: Excuse.

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman I'm told that it should be spelled into the/... (20)

K1.482

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COETZEE

the record, I think his name is spelt M-o-e-m-a, his surname. Is that correct? -- I just know it's Isaac Ace Moema, the exact spelling I don't know.

Isaac Ace, A-c-e Moema? -- Moema yes.

M-o-e-m-a. -- Ja.

Yes, but who was he? -- He was also a ANC captured guy, that decided to work with us, but he was always reserved and one could see that he was, his heart wasn't fully in the job, and eventually Koos Vermeulen took him up in his group after I had him with me, and Almond, and his attitude was discussed with Brigadier Schoon. (30)

His attitude being? -- Being that they are not sure of him, he's going to run away one time or another, that was the general feeling, and then Koos got knock-out drops from Brigadier Neethling and with Schoon's permission got rid of Isaac Ace Moema, also in the Komatipoort area.

Now, now I would just like to make it clear, you, were you part of that? -- I was not part of it, I wasn't present, it was a report that Koos has made to me and Brigadier Schoon afterwards.

Did you ever see Ace Moema again after that? -- Never again.

Would any explanation have been given to the other Askari's
(10)
at Vlakplaas about, I'm sorry ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Just, sorry, you are not writing, the others are, we are all trying to write down what is being said.

MR KUNY: I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you.

MR KUNY: Was any explanation given to the other Askari's or anybody else on Vlakplaas as to what happened to people like
Ace/...

K1.516

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COETZEE
(20)

Ace or Peter or Vusi? Well Vusi wasn't there but Ace and Peter?
-- Not at all, but there was a, they all knew and if I like I have spoke in exile, I don't know whether it's relevant, you must please stop me if it's not. I spoke in exile now with ... (intervenes)

MR KUNY: (inaudible) -- Oh, but they knew, they knew and that person disappeared when he really ran away and when something fishy was going on.

And was there any reason why you personally didn't undertake the task of getting rid of Ace Moema? -- Well Isaac was a very nice chap, reserved, very intelligent and Koos just took him out,
(30)
the chop out of my hands, I mean if it ended up in a order to get rid of him I would have done it.

Mr Coetzee I hadn't intended to deal with, or ask you to deal with the question of the diamond dealer, but Mr Tshikalange was cross-examined about it. Mr Nofemela was asked some questions about this matter and I'd just like to briefly deal with this, the diamond dealer in Lesotho. -- Yes.

We've heard that, through someone by the name of Moshoeshoe David and Almond and Joe heard about a diamond dealer in Lesotho. -- That's correct yes.

And somebody came to you for money? -- That's correct.

Who was it that came to you for money? -- Joe, Almond and Tshikalange. (10)

How much money? -- R5 000.

What did they want to do? -- They wanted to buy diamonds in Lesotho from a contact and sell it and get rich.

Yes.

CHAIRMAN: To sell it to? -- And get rich.

MR KUNY: Now, did you have R5 000? -- I did not but I borrowed/...

K1.552 - 347 - COETZEE
(20)
borrowed it from my mother-in-law for them, after they assured me it was a safe contact, they will get the money back.

Now this person Moshoeshoe who David says had been their contact, did you know him? -- I did, his real name was Ernest Ramathlala and he was involved in the attack, or attempted attack on the life of Chris Hani a ANC guy in Lesotho.

How was he involved in such an attack? -- He was a member of the Lesotho Youth Organisation and a Lesotho citizen and through Section C a bomb was prepared for him to plant on Chris Hani's car which he took in and something went wrong whilst planting the bomb and Ernest ended up blowing himself up landing in hospital in Lesotho, eventually appearing in court in Lesotho. Bail was (30)

organised, he jumped defence and since then came to Vlakplaas where he has ever been.

And was he badly injured in the ... (intervenes)? -- He was very badly. His knees especially, on both legs has got very bad scars.

Yes. Now you were prepared to lend the money for this deal, would you have got anything out of it? -- Well if they had made their millions I would have for sure had some commission out of it.

And they went off in order to do the transaction. Did you have anything at all to do with the transaction? -- Not at all. (10)

In fact they left in Almond's private car which was a Mazda at that time I think, a 323.

And what was the next thing you heard? -- When they came back and they showed me what they had bought and I could see it was absolutely a lot of rubbish.

And did you give any instructions? -- I said they must immediately go back before that guy spends any of that money, get my/...

K1.589 - 348 - (20) COETZEE

get my money back and hand this trash back to him.

Did you give any other instruction if they couldn't get the money? -- No not at all.

And so they went? -- They went.

And did you then receive any report? -- They later reported back to me with a Datsun Laurel, a grey-blue one with Lesotho registration numbers, good state and they said they couldn't get the money back, the chap refused, so they got him out of Lesotho in some way or another, after which he was apparently arrested by Almond with his ID card, driven to near Lindley on a gravel road in a eucalyptus bush and where he was shot several times. (30)

And the car was taken? -- The car was taken, the body was left there and they came to my house.

And so what did you do? First of all what was done with the Datsun Laurel? -- It was taken to Koos Schutte's house, who was staying in 20th Avenue, Rietfontein-North, Pretoria at that stage.

20th Avenue? -- Rietfontein-North in Pretoria, where the car was parked in his garage and he stripped all identifiable things from the car. He replaced the radio of that car with a cheaper version and myself, David and Almond immediately left for Lindley.

Joe had to go back to Jan Coetzee in Krugersdorp, where we picked up that body in the eucalyptus bush, put it in the back of the boot. I had mortuary bags, big plastic bags, it was white ones that they usually transport corpses in. He was put into one of these bags and into the boot of my car. We still threw in petrol at Bethlehem police station that night, and then went to Durban where the rest of the group was working.

Why/...

K1.626

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COETZEE

Why did you involve yourself in the whole question of the disposal of the body? -- Well of course in our set-up the guys know a lot about officially legal acts and if that body was found and they eventually end up in court, Almond and them would have done exactly the same what happened now, what Almond has done before he was hanged on the 9th October. So it was ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: But he wasn't hanged? -- No, I know sir but I mean ... (intervenes)

MR KUNY: That was to be hanged. -- Before he was to be hanged.

Yes, so you considered it necessary to dispose of the body? -- That's correct.

And why did you go down to Durban for this purpose? -- The whole squad was already down in Durban and we had to leave already

(30)

previously, it was just a question of waiting for them to come back so that we could also join the group.

And when you were in Durban where did you go? -- I immediately reported the incident to Brigadier Van der Hoven and asked him whether I could leave to the Swaziland border, myself Paul van Dyk and Koos Vermeulen, to dispose of the body.

What happened to David Tshikalange? -- David Tshikalange on that trip went with us up to Empangeni where he had a girl-friend and we put him off and we picked him up the next day on our way back.

And we don't need to go into details, but was the body disposed of? -- It was disposed of eventually. (10)

By way of being burnt? -- Being burnt.

And did you report this to David Tshikalange? -- Ja, they all/...

K1.656

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COETZEE

all knew about it.

Now there was one other thing I wanted to ask you before I get onto the general questions. Reference has been made a number of times both by Nofemela and Mr Tshikalange of the use of silencers on firearms by the security police. (20)

CHAIRMAN: I don't think that's quite right. All I know is that Mr Tshikalange said that there were silencers at Vlakplaas.

MR KUNY: And I think Mr Nofemela mentioned ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: That it was once used. So.

MR KUNY: Yes, well may I put the question differently then, that silencers or a silencer was used on one, perhaps one or more than one occasion. Do you know anything about the use of silencers by the security police? -- Yes I had five HMK 9 millimetre machine guns in the back of the boot of my car prepared by the technical division in security head office with silencers on and a little (30)

cap welded over the, where the empty shells is expanded through, with a canvas bag to catch up this, these empty shells.

Why? Why was that necessary? -- Before ballistic trace us afterwards and two of those guns Koos Vermeulen and myself used in Botswana for instance.

So as not to leave traces? -- Not to leave traces, that's right.

Why were silencers used? -- Shooting at night, to keep it quiet. I mean for noise not to attract attention, unnecessary attention.

Now were these silencers specially made or were they imported (10)
or, where did you acquire them? -- It was from technical headquarters. I don't know whether Captain Wal

du Toit/...

K1.693

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COETZEE

du Toit himself has made them.

Captain? -- Wal du Toit.

Who was he? -- He is the chap with the engineering diploma from the CSIR and has been working in the technical division at security head office preparing all kind of devices, time devices, (20)
fitting silencers. There was amongst the other things, there was a black briefcase with a 9 millimetre machine pistol which was donated to General Johan Coetzee, the chief of security during a visit by Americans to him and he donated it again to the security police, technical division. Now this pistol was built into a briefcase with a silencer and an extension of the trigger mechanism at the bottom of the suitcase. I may just mention for interests' sake that I've seen in a newspaper reports later on of Almond Nofemela's younger school brother, a 17 year old talk - must I (30)
go on?

Well I don't think it's really. -- Where he described this

exact briefcase.

Now you recounted a number of incidents of conduct which was quite clearly of an unlawful nature. -- That's right.

As have Mr Nofemela and Mr Tshikalange and the question has been put on a number of occasions as to whether your group ever did anything lawful. I would like you to deal with this if you would? -- You see sir, it's difficult to explain. We in the security family has a special protection which allows us to operate, to go on illegal operations inside and outside the borders of South Africa. Borders didn't mean much to us I mean it was a fence. Now this protection enabled us to operate above the law. (10)

Now this protection is vested in a culture in the security police.

A culture of a close-knit

family./...

K1.752

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COETZEE

family. A culture which can be described as special, a loyalty to one another, a special relationship between subordinates and superiors. Secrecy as I said and this enabled us to operate above the law.

(20)

When you say above the law, why was it necessary to operate above the law or outside of the law? -- It was not always possible to handle this war, this what they call twilight war, this war against the onslaught towards South Africa through court cases and then in a legal way.

What was this twilight war that you speak of? -- Exactly what we have been doing at Vlakplaas, taking law into our own hands and ... (intervenes)

But what war were you fighting? -- Against the terrorists and the communists, against the onslaught towards South Africa.

(30)

And why was it not possible to handle it in the normal way within the boundaries of the law and the courts? -- Well I think

it was frustrating to get hold of activists and guys that moved on the borderline, always stay with, inside the law and frustrate the security police as such and I have got examples that I can quote if you would prefer. I don't know whether you want to sir?

Well perhaps you will be asked about that. -- I beg your pardon sir?

Perhaps you will be asked about that. You say that there was this whole area of secrecy surrounding the operations. -- That's correct.

You know that there have been a number of affidavits put up by various of the persons whom you have named in your evidence, in which they have denied allegations of this sort

that/...

K1.791

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COETZEE

that have been made against them or concerning them. -- Yes sir.

I think you have seen some of these affidavits. -- I have seen some.

What do you say about that? -- It's all lies sir and if I would have been back home in South Africa, I would have done exactly the same.

Why? -- If you admit you are going to end up where Almond Nofemela is at the moment and that's the story.

CHAIRMAN: But is the contrary also not true, that since you are safely out of South Africa you can say whatever you wish? -- No sir I think it's a question of, I could have stayed behind and stuck with them and stuck with lies, but now that I'm outside the country I can afford to speak the truth and the whole truth and if only, I think that's my personal opinion, you must please say if it is not relevant, if only those guys would come out with the truth I think it will be a matter of discussing it and settling it and get rid of the past and bury the past.

Is that your intention? -- I beg your pardon sir?

Is that your intention? -- My intention is just to get the truth out and if that means that I must live for the rest of my life in exile, then I'm out, but at least I've got a clean conscience and I couldn't just carry on for the rest of my life with all this atrocities and blood on my hand, so it's really not a question of playing, trying to play hero or to just stick there day to day with a fear of whose the next one that's going to talk, whose the next one that's going to speak and I just thought this is the end and I must get it off my conscience.

(10)
MR KUNY:/...

K1.827

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COETZEE

MR KUNY: Had Mr Nofemela not come out with his revelations in October last year, what would you have done? -- I would have most probably be still inside the country with my political views as it was at that time and going on with my life, and I must just put it sir, I mean it's not nice to leave your wife and children behind and suffering there and you sit out in exile and loose contact with them and so it was for sure not just for joy that I've done it. (20)

Where are your wife and children? -- Back home in Pretoria still where they stay in my father's house.

Mr Chairman we've almost reached the end of the evidence but perhaps it might be an appropriate stage and if there is anything to cover we can deal with it briefly after the adjournment.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS. THE COMMISSION RESUMES.

CHAIRMAN: Yes Mr Kuny.

DIRK COETZEE: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY MR KUNY: Mr Coetzee I'm afraid there are still quite a number of aspects that I must deal with and tie up various loose ends and ... (intervenes) (30)

VOORSITTER: Mnr. Bertelsmann, van u kant is die geluid 'n bietjie hard.

MR KUNY: I want to tie up certain loose ends and also deal with certain other matters. Before we adjourned you were talking about this security police culture, I'm not sure what you call it, and I would like to just go a little further on this. What was the relationship between the regular police force and the security police? What were the attitudes and what was the sort of inter-relationship? -- Well they respected this special culture of us, I mean we were seen as a family above the normal police family, fighting a just war/... (10)

K2.013 - 355 - COETZEE
war in, as we call it, a twilight war against the onslaught of South Africa.

Yes. So how would, what would the relationship be? -- A very good relationship and I have in my time no CID has ever entered security head office to do any investigations there as to any possibility of the security police being involved in any murder cases or possible murder cases et cetera. (20)

What would happen if you came, for example, to a road block, if you had a body in the boot of your car? -- No one would touch me or ask me to open my boot if I say I am from security, in fact that happened.

And were you ever required in your capacity as a policeman to swear affidavits? -- Swear affidavits?

Well to sign an affidavit for anybody? -- Yes, yes I was.

Did you ever sign false affidavits? -- Yes I did.

For what reason? -- In 1983 I think, whilst being a recruit in head office with the uniform branch I was called over by Brigadier Schoon of Section C and he said Vusi's lawyers are getting (30)

uptight about Vusi's disappearance and I put in a statement under oath saying that Vusi voluntarily joined us, he worked with us for three months, he received informer's fee for three months of which there were record of and then after giving him off one weekend he just never came back, to give the impression that he deflected and most probably went back to the ANC. I also in a departmental trial, under oath, stated in 1985 that Moema, Isaac Ace Moema, Vusi and Peter deflected with Johannes and Chris Mnisi and Ben Lucky Zwane to the ANC who had in fact Isaac Ace Moema, Vusi and Peter were killed.

(10)

Now you said that under oath at your departmental

trial?/...

K2.040

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COETZEE

trial? -- That's correct.

Why were you prepared to do that under oath in South Africa?

-- I was sort of demonstrating at that stage that Vlakplaas was not so secret as they wanted it to be, that there was already ANC chaps that deflected back, but I couldn't say that we've killed Vusi and Peter and Moema at that stage and I would have end up in court with criminal charges of murder against me.

(20)

And was there also an incident, I don't need to go into all the details of the incident at the moment, but the incident which occurred in the Lindley area, relating to a shooting, not the diamond dealer? -- There was, there was a shooting incident.

And did you in that connection also make an affidavit? -- That's correct.

A statement. -- Also not with the true happening, what really truly happened there.

Well without going into all the detail, was there in fact a shooting that took place and who was the person who was responsible for that? -- There was a shooting, I was travelling

(30)

in my car and behind me Almond Nofemela in his bakkie with Joe Mamasela. I was trying to pull off the road an Escort, Ford Escort with five black men inside and I could see they had had a lot to drink and they wouldn't stop and while going up a hill I heard shots fired and some blasts flew into my official car. I was right next to them, when I looked over my shoulder Joe was hanging out the left front door of this bakkie with his Tokarev pistol emptying it on this Ford Escort which resulted in an arrest afterwards and I contacted Brigadier Schoon and we decided to, that Almond would put in

(10)
the/...

K2.063

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COETZEE

the statements at Lindley.

CHAIRMAN: Who was arrested? -- The driver of this vehicle Mr Chairman, and the man ... (intervenes)

MR KUNY: Why was it decided that Almond would accept the responsibility? -- Because Joe was no policeman at that stage, he had no police authority, powers and was carrying an illegal Tokarev pistol.

(20)
And what did you do to make it look as if it was Almond who had done this? -- He took the rap, what we called, he said that he did the shooting with a 9 millimetre pistol of mine. We fired a few shots, took the empty shells, handed it in and later when I left the farm there was a quarrel between Joe and Almond and the attorney-general in the Free State decided to charge Almond because he should have foreseen that innocent people could have got hurt in the car during the shooting and then Almond refused sort of to stand in for it anymore and we had to go down to the divisional CID office in Welkom, under which the Lindley police station falls and the station commander, Lindley Warrant-officer Heath had to be there too, and they corrected the story with the

(30)

attorney-general in the Free State and the charges were withdrawn and the man that was shot in the back, they settled a civil claim of R1 500 against the Minister of Law and Order.

Had you put in a false affidavit in that? -- I did for myself and Almond in my handwriting.

Any other instance that you can think of where you had sworn a false affidavit? -- Not what I can think of at the moment.

Something to do with, was there something to do with illegal immigrants in relation to Swaziland? -- Oh it was, was it/...

K2.088

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(10)

COETZEE

was it, I think you are referring to an incident where I helped a Miss Rika Lourens Botes.

Yes. -- With an alibi and a passport and then eventually she was found guilty in court by the Johannesburg diamond branch, Brigadier James Beeslaar at that stage, and of course they then wanted to get at me for helping her with, in the alibi and this was then referred to the then divisional CID officer in Eastern Transvaal and later CID chief, Brigadier Stan Schutte for his personal investigation and at district CID level,

(20)

Lieutenant-colonel Ronnie van der Westhuizen, the present Major-general Van der Westhuizen was to assist Brigadier Stan Schutte. Brigadier Stan Schutte then conferred with my chief, Brigadier Van der Hoven of the regional, the divisional security head office in Middelburg and they called me up and when I came there Brigadiers Schutte and Van der Hoven sent me down to the office of Lieutenant-colonel Van der Westhuizen. And he was already half-way through the first page writing an explanation as to what happened wherein it was admitted that I know Rika Lourens Botes, that she was a source of us and I couldn't remember the rest of it. It was a short statement in Lieutenant-colonel Ronnie van der Westhuizen's handwriting and I signed that in the end.

(30)

I think I ... (intervenes)

Well what I want to know, was it, what you signed, was it true? -- I can't remember the exact contents. As I can recall it correctly I admitted knowing her, but denied helping her with an alibi and a passport.

All right. Were you ever associated with the issuing of false passports? -- Yes I was.

What can you tell the Commissioner about that? -- For the Askari's/...

K2.116

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(10)

COETZEE

Askari's at Vlakplaas, whenever they went into the neighbouring Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland countries, they were issued with false passports from the relative department, actually travel documents what they are called. I recently had one in my possession which I'm sure can be produced, of Mr Tshikalange in the name of Alpheus Mpaphuli, that was used by him in Swaziland and it is available.

What, how would you get a false - would you procure the issue of the false passports? -- I beg your pardon?

(20)

Would you ever procure the issue of false passports yourself? -- No, I can't do it, it must be with permission from head office and they control it and I think it is kept separately at the relative department with the necessary indication as to what it is need for and why.

Do you know how many false passports Almond had? -- I beg your pardon?

Do you know how many false passports Almond Nofemela had? -- No I can't recall the exact number, but he had false passports too.

(30)

I just want to clear up one question. In regard to the Eastern Cape and the things that you did there in relation to the vehicle

and the telephone. Were you acting on instructions? -- I was acting on instructions yes.

Where did the instructions emanate from? -- From Colonel Nick van Rensburg down in PE. As far as the Combi is concerned I was instructed from Brigadier Schoon to make contact with Colonel Nick.

I think when I led you on the question of your record in the police force I didn't cover entirely your academic record and I just want to ask you about that, it is out of place

but/...

K2.142

- 360 -

(10)

COETZEE

but let me just ask you. After you left Vlakplaas did you continue to study? -- Yes I did.

What did you do? -- At that stage I had the subjects Private Law I and Introduction to the Study of Law for the degree B.Iuris through Unisa and then in 1983 I have written in for English, Afrikaans and Latin Spes. Special Latin, which I passed in 1983.

With what grades? -- Well, Latin and Afrikaans was distinction.

You never pursued your studies? -- I never did.

(20)

You have mentioned in your evidence a number of times, well you mentioned various operations into or connected with Swaziland, and I want to ask you about a certain person whom you, I don't know whether you encountered him personally, but encountered arising from instructions from C R Swart police station in Durban, who was somehow related to Swaziland. -- Just after the Mxenge murder, during that time, there was a Swazi citizen detained under the security laws at C R Swart Square by the security police there.

You had not detained him? -- I had not detained him.

Had you had anything at all to do with it? -- Not at that stage. They handed me a passport with this person's name and photograph in it, I unfortunately can't remember. It was a blue

(30)

Swazi travel document and the idea was that they would release him and he would be kidnapped afterwards and disposed of, killed and burned, and I replaced the photo in the passport, in that travel document with a photo of Brian Ngqulunga. I was transferred ... (intervenes)

Before we deal with your transfer, why Brian Ngqulunga? -- He was a Zulu and Swazi and Zulu was very closely/...

K2.171

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COETZEE

(10)

closely related in language to one another.

So what was the purpose of replacing the photograph in the passport? -- The purpose was to send Brian then through the passport, through the border post with that passport to get record, onto record that this chap in fact after his release left South Africa into Swaziland.

So there would be a record of his return into Swaziland? -- That's correct.

In the meantime what would have happened to him? -- To the Swazi citizen?

Yes? -- He would have been kidnapped and disposed of, killed and burned. (20)

Now, did you in fact replace the photograph in the passport? -- I did replace it and had the passport for quite a few years with me afterwards.

Well do you know whether anything happened arising out of this plan? -- No I did not whilst I had already been transferred from Vlakplaas, I received instructions from Brigadier Du Preez to contact Brigadier Van der Hoven and go and finish off the job and when I did contact Brigadier Van der Hoven it was just said it was not necessary anymore, but I've got no idea what happened at all afterwards. (30)

Right. You have mentioned the question of Mr Pillay and I just want to ask you one thing about him. We know that he was taken back to Swaziland and handed over. -- He was.

Between the Observatory, where he was being held and Swaziland, where did he go? -- He slept for a night or two at Sergeant Schutte's house in 20th Avenue Rietfontein from where he was taken by Sergeant Schutte and David Tshikalange. David was left with him there, handcuffed onto David to guard him and/...

K2.193

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(10)
COETZEE

and he was then taken to Lothair police station by Sergeant Schutte and Tshikalange.

Did you see him at Koos Schutte's house? -- I was there, I was present.

Did you sleep there or were you just there for the evening? -- No I was just there for the evening, visiting.

Was anything on television? -- There was.

With regard to Mr Pillay? -- On the news that night a story about Mr Pillay was there and he recognised that they were talking about him and he mentioned it. (20)

He mentioned this? -- Yes he said but they are talking about me on TV now, about my case.

Do you know what ultimately happened to Mr Pillay, after he was handed back? -- He was taken back in the boot of a car, after he was kept for a while at Lothair police station, because he was quite bruised during the kidnap by the Askari's and they kept him there for a while to medicate him and then he was taken through in the boot of a car through Oschhoek border and left on the other side with R15 I think, to get home.

Well you weren't there .. (intervenes) -- I weren't there, it was ... (intervenes) (30)

And you don't know first hand what happened there? -- That's right.

Now I think that you touched in your evidence-in-chief on this documentation and the accuracy of the documentation S & T forms and worksheets and so on. -- That's right.

You had an opportunity of looking at some of this documentation? -- That's right.

Are you able to comment on how accurate it is as far as you/...

K2.213 - 363 - (10)
COETZEE

you can see, as a reflection of where you have or any of you would have been at any particular time? -- Yes I can, during those long periods where they just indicate Eastern Transvaal or Eastern Cape, it's not accurate at all.

Why not? -- Because we were travelling up, that S & T was mainly if you are away from your main base, you receive S & T.

So it was irrespective if we were in Western Transvaal or Eastern Cape, the amount stayed the same that you received. And these is, I for instance left blank S & T forms at head office with Warrant-officer Connie Zwieggelaar. (20)

Go slowly will you? -- Oh, sorry.

Yes, you left blank? -- S & T forms, signed.

With whom? -- With Warrant-officer Connie Zwieggelaar, who was handling the administration.

Always or just sometimes? -- Well I always left it with her and in the beginning before she was there, I would have completed it myself and handled it, but she was later brought in for the administration.

Yes, Now what would the procedure be in so far as the filling out of S & T forms was concerned? -- She would have completed it and entered the date of return, and she on occasions took my money, (30)

S & T, while I was for long periods out she would sort of close them off at one date and immediately starting the next date without me coming in and hand the money over to my wife.

Now how would she know what to complete on the form? -- She would just write Eastern Cape and the amount is known what we qualify for and when we left that date and the date when we then actually come back is reported to her and she would write it in.

Do/...

K2.236

- 364 -

COETZEE

(10)

Did you report to her your movements during that period? -- Not at all, not at all.

Would it have been necessary to do that for the purpose of getting S & T? -- No not at all, it wouldn't have affected it at all. Strictly speaking, according to police regulations yes, I would say but.

Was everything done according, strictly to police regulations? -- No, not at all.

And so, when you say that is not necessarily accurate why wouldn't it necessarily reflect where you had been? What could happen during that period which would make it inaccurate? -- For instance while being down in the Eastern Cape one would be called up to Lesotho, one would go there, back to the Eastern Cape, maybe down to Western Transvaal, Durban for instance when I checked that record there is no trace of myself being in Western Transvaal during the Joyce Diphala attack in Gaborone. Koos Vermeulen's sheet showed that he was in Western Transvaal in stead of in Durban from the 4th till the 20 November. Then on occasions again, for instance there is the night when the car was burnt, that Sunday night 22nd, 23rd, there's an indication of Koos Vermeulen and Sergeant Schutte.

Of what? -- That they claimed S & T for that night, Mxenge.

Are you talking about Mr Mxenge's car? -- Mr Mxenge's car.

So you say, if I may just put it in a nutshell, that what you would really give is the date that you leave and the date that you return? -- That's right.

And you may say Eastern Cape or Western Transvaal or

Eastern/...

K2.259

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COETZEE

Eastern Transvaal and that would be the blanket description covering the fact that you were out all over the place? -- As I (10)
said the only way that you can track the drivers of the different vehicles at least, on the back of the vehicle log-sheet there is a place where every petrol intake for that month, each station and the litres intake must be written down so that will be your indication exactly how the chaps have travelled that month, on which day they had been where, at which police station.

CHAIRMAN: But then as you say you take a can of petrol with you and then that was also of no assistance? -- Well sir that was once with the Mxenge car case.

Yes but the others could have done it more often. -- But (20)
I mean the real intake of the petrol will be, on that log-sheet and at the police station there is a petrol book that you have also got to complete inside, so that can be checked whether that vehicle when he was at Lindley and at the back of the log-sheet it's indicated that there was, he took in 50 litres of petrol at Lindley police station then in Lindley police station there is a petrol register where he has got to put in the readings of the petrol pump and sign for that petrol.

MR KUNY: So those books ought to be a more accurate reflection of the movement of vehicles, not necessarily of all the people (30)
who were in those vehicles? -- Yes, that's right.

And did the vehicles change hands from time to time? -- They

had their specific drivers and would on occasion change hands yes.

And would that book reflect who the, who was in charge of the vehicle at any moment of time? -- Who threw in petrol for instance./...

K2.284

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COETZEE

instance. I would, being at C R Swarts Square, would ask one of the younger men to just go and fill up my vehicle, but it would be my vehicle registration number, and the signature that he is putting petrol in.

(10)

His signature, not yours? -- His not mine.

And, so your comment about the accuracy of the S & T forms, does that also relate to the worksheets? -- Yes, that worksheet is not at all what it's name reflects. It's more a record of the S & T that has been paid out and I've checked that too and that even doesn't correspond exactly with the other documents that is included. Even the amounts on it is not accurate.

Generally did you have to keep a notebook as a policeman of all your activities? -- I'm, as an officer had to keep a diary, a daily diary and the non-commission officers had to keep a pocket book, strictly spoken according to police rules, but this wasn't done.

(20)

Why wasn't it done? -- We operated above the law, there was no record kept of it. We didn't require it. We didn't seem it to be necessary.

So if at the time you had been giving evidence in a matter concerning any of these events and I had cross-examined you and asked you to produce your pocket book as to where you had been and what you had done, would you have been able to do that? -- I wouldn't have been able to produce one.

(30)

Would you have had a pocket book at all? -- No not at all, we kept one in the vehicle just to dot down our petrol intakes

during the month ... (intervenes)

Yes, apart from, I'm talking about your activities now? --
No, we wouldn't have had one.

Would/...

K2.307

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COETZEE

Would you have note it down if you took a person into
detention? -- No not at all.

Or if you went across the border? -- No not at all and even
in my vehicle log-sheet where you are supposed to be according
to regulation book out your vehicle every day from day to day,
each trip you have made. On my sheet you will see for instance
I indicated 1 January, say 1981, "secret file S1816" that was the
general ANC/PAC file, and then at the end of the month book the
vehicle back one entry 12 000 kilometres done. (10)

Yes. The date on which you return, in other words if you
have been out on an operation for two weeks and you return, say
on the afternoon of the 1st of the month, what would be the, on
what date would the, to what date would the S & T form relate?
-- We usually try to keep it, if we left for instance 8 o'clock
on a certain date, we would try to stretch it till 8 o'clock
the next day that we arrive home, sort of to keep it a full 24-hour
S & T period. But for instance when I was after the Mxenge murder,
we left the car at Golela on the 21st. On the 22nd and the 23rd,
on the 20th, the Friday I returned to Pretoria on the Saturday
and the Sunday, I went back to Golela on the Sunday, so my S &
T ran till 23rd indicating that I've never been home, and where
I was in fact home, and that would also as I was, be, and the only
way that one can check and check that if one could get hold of
my vehicle log-sheet and check at the back and check the petrol
intake. (20) (30)

Well will you work-sheet reflect that you were in Natal from

11/11/1981 until the 23 November 1981? -- Yes in fact I had been home over that weekend from the 21st and the 22nd.

And/...

K2.338

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COETZEE

And then back to ... (intervenes) -- Back to Golela border post and pick up the car and the 23rd back to Pretoria.

Would there have been records at C R Swart at the time that you had gone down there relating to the presence there of your Askari's and your men? -- It's difficult to say I don't know whether they booked us officially at the police single quarters, officers' quarters and the other men at the single quarters. The petrol registers should reflect that. But then again the standing order stocks there is a fixed rule as to, after how many years you can destroy which records. So the vehicle, although, I don't know what, how long that period is, I will have to have insight into that specific standing order to check on it, but the petrol logbook or the petrol registers at C R Swart Square should reflect all the petrol intakes again at C R Swart Square during that time. (10)

I want to ask you now, Mr Coetzee, about Paul van Dyk whom you have mentioned in a number of instances in your evidence. (20)

When and where did you first meet him? -- I met Paul van Dyk first in early 1977, he arrived a day or two before me. I arrived on the 4 January 1977 at Oschhoek border post and Paul was transferred from Amsterdam police station, uniform branch to Oschhoek as the first representative of Ermelo security branch on Oschhoek border.

They had another guy down in at the same time at Golela, Schoeman and that is when I met Paul. I worked with him for three years there and with the permission of course of head office I drew him to Vlakplaas in 1981.

And was he at Vlakplaas with you all the time that you were there? -- All the time until, I believe he is still there. He (30)

has just changed section now recently, last last to section, /...

K2.374

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COETZEE

section, to the interrogation section, I think it's Section C2.

Did you maintain contact with him after you have left Vlakplaas? -- Only for a little while in 1982 and then after Nofemela blew the whistle, we had contact again.

What sort of contact? -- Well when the news broke of Nofemela on the Friday morning, actually Thursday night, Friday morning, 20 October, I phoned Warrant-officer Connie Zwiegelaar on the Saturday and got hold of Paul's number because I didn't know where he was staying. (10)

Why did you want to get hold of Paul? -- To find out what's the next move, what we are going to do about it, what is the reaction because I mean I'm not in the police anymore. He's still got contact with Brigadier Nick van Rensburg, Brigadier Jan du Preez, well I had contact with him too, but I mean he was still in Vlakplaas. So I phoned, I got hold of his number and phoned his wife, which I also knew well, the Saturday late afternoon and I then learned that he was on his way back from the border by military plane and she is going to fetch him that Saturday night at Waterkloof Air Force Base. (20)

Well, anyway did you have any contact with him? -- I did a week afterwards on a Monday morning he phoned me and came to see me at my house.

In connection with? -- In connection with the whole allegations that Almond has made on Mxenge.

Was anybody else present at your house at the time he came? -- David Tshikalange was there, but I asked him to stay in the room. I didn't want Paul to see him. (30)

Why not? -- I first wanted to hear what is Paul's story, what was going on.

And what was Paul's story? What was going on? -- Paul said that before he left for border duty in South West on 17 September 1989, he last spoke to Schoon and said that they must help Almond because there is trouble coming our way.

Before, on the 17th of what? -- Of September, before he went up to South West for special border duty. And according to him Schoon's reply was that Almond knows too much and he must, justice must go it's course. (10)

Now this was before Almond had made his affidavit? -- No that was, he made his affidavit on the night of the 19-20 ... (intervenes)

Of October? -- Of October.

Yes. -- Then not that immediate Monday that followed, the Monday thereafter Paul came to my house.

No but when had he spoken to Schoon? -- Before he left on 17 September.

So this was before Nofemela made his affidavit? -- Made his statement, that's right. (20)

And why did he want to help Nofemela? -- Because Nofemela knew a lot and he was sure that at the last moment Almond was going to do just exactly what he did.

And he was told that he knew too much and justice would take it's course? -- Ja.

Had Paul van Dyk, to your knowledge, been visiting Nofemela at all? -- Yes he said so and he said that when he was asked at the Commission, the McNally Commission of Inquiry, there was allegations that he, if they promised help to Nofemela, his reply was that there was a warder always present during these visits and that he has never made any promises of help to him. (30)

So now ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes but you, please, Mr Coetzee, it does not assist me if you, that much, if you tell me what he told Mr McNally. -- But sir he personally reported it to me, I don't know whether it's permissible. I knew that, who gave evidence in that first week before the McNally Commission.

MR KUNY: From whom did you hear this? -- From Paul van Dyk. (10)
So you are now reporting what Paul van Dyk said to you? --
That's correct.

And did he say anything else to you in connection with this matter? -- Well he firstly said that on the McNally Commission with Mr McNally and Lieutenant-general Aalwyn Conradie, was a Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht incorporated that takes down the affidavits in front of the Commission. And that he just said to him before he entered "you just know nothing and you just deny everything".

But who had said to whom? -- Brigadier Engelbrecht told him, (20)
Paul van Dyk, which message Paul relayed to Brian Ngqulunga and Joe Mamasela. Paul also said that during that first week, that Brigadier Schoon has already given evidence, Gene de Kock himself, Brian Ngqulunga and Joe Mamasela. So ... (intervenes)

And that they had denied everything? -- They denied bluntly everything. And I must just let the chap "Optok" which is meaning referring to Vendaland and to Mr Tshikalange, I must just also let him know that he doubt that the McNally Commission, whether they will for sure contact me and that when the report on this affidavit from Nofemela came through, the attorney-general of (30)
Johannesburg, Mr Klaus Von Lieres, his wife is at present the private secretary of the chief of

K2.460

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COETZEE

security, Major-general Basie Smit. She was at the office and there was no one to contact and she had to take all this down and her nerves were going ... (intervenes)

Well we don't need to know all that. -- Oh.

I just want to know what was reported to you by ..(intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: I wonder if there is someone in South Africa left that has not yet been implicated? (laughter). --That is unfortunately
(10)
so.

MR KUNY: So you would, you were told to just deny it? -- Ja.

Is that what you are saying? -- That's correct.

And did you in fact convey this to David Tshikalange? -- Yes I did.

Did, were you ever approached then to make a statement?
-- Not before I left. I immediately decided that this can't keep on for my life I could see from David Tshikalange he was permanently, he was also, things, his past were catching up with him. He was at that time, for the eight months at home fairly ill
(20)
mentally and I decided that it's time to get somewhere where I can just get everything out into the open.

And so you left? -- So I left.

CHAIRMAN: You say David was at home mentally ill? -- Not mentally ill.

But you said mentally ill. -- Well sir what I meant that was his past it was worrying him a lot, this murders has worried him. He has been to see pastors there and I'm not actually a medical doctor that I can say he was really mentally sick, but I could see it was worrying him a lot.
(30)

MR KUNY: And did you know that he suffered from some form of epilepsy? -- Yes I know that for quite a while.

When you were given this instruction, or this advice by
Paul van Dyk, /...

K2.492

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COETZEE

Paul van Dyk, did you ask him any, did you have any questions for him? -- Well I said to him Paul and if they turn against us that they, that the way they are doing it with Nofemela now, and he said to me, I asked him that same question that morning, I said never do. Well I had this experience earlier in my life which is not relevant I think at this stage, but I ... (intervenes) (10)

You are talking about the departmental inquiry? -- The departmental trial ja.

Yes. -- And I said I'm not prepared to, for that risk again, take that risk again to stand up in court against generals and senior people and try to tell my story, it sounds like fiction, no one believes you, and I will have to get out of the country then.

Yes. In fact from the cross-examination of various witnesses it's, and perhaps of you in due course, it seems that you are being painted as a sort of renegade policeman who was onto his own thing, doing his own thing and not acting in accordance with instructions or according to proper police practice and that you were on a frolic of your own basically? -- Not at all sir, and I think I can give a, I think it's fit now that I can give you a quote of the then second in charge of the security police, Brigadier Jan du Preez, if you wouldn't mind. A statement that he made under oath and during my departmental trial. (20)

Well, to what effect? -- To exactly what I was trying to put over about that we not always keep inside the law, that we are actually above the law and that in this war of ours it's sometimes necessary to go above the law. (30)

Well, with the Chairman's permission ... (intervenes)

K2.522

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COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: Well you probably know whether it's relevant or not Mr Kuny, I don't.

MR KUNY: Well I think it is relevant to this aspect Mr Chairman, perhaps he can read it. Do you have it at hand? -- I have it at hand.

Now this was in the departmental inquiry in which you were being charged with various counts? -- That's correct.

In about 1985? -- That's correct sir and this specific quote comes out of volume 12 of my departmental trial on the 23 July, 1985 and it was in Afrikaans, page 755 and 756. Now I'll start where Mr Hennie de Vos, my advocate, it's in Afrikaans, just ask: "Net 'n laaste aspek brigadier. Het u nou vir kaptein Coetzee geken vir die laaste paar jaar?"

And his answer was "Ja".

"Kan u moontlik in die algemeen vir die raad sê wat se tipe indruk het u van hom as persoon?" en sy antwoord was "Die indruk wat ek van hom gekry het, hy is 'n redelike intelligente persoon. Hy is 'n baie entoesiastiese en aktiewe werker gewees, maar dikwels onortodoks. Dikwels onortodoks." Toe kom advokaat Hennie de Vos en hy sê "Nou". Toe gaan brigadier Jan du Preez aan hy sê:

"Die kennis wat ek van hom het, is hy was 'n harde werker gewees, baie inisiatief aan die dag gelê. Ure het nie vir hom saak gemaak nie en verder is dit aan my bekend dat hy nie baie gesond was nie. Dit is die algemene indruk wat ek van hom het." En toe kom advokaat Hennie de Vos en hy sê:

"Kan ek net so by u vasstel in die algemeen, die onortodokse metodes waarna u verwys het binne

veiligheidsverband, hou die veiligheids afdeling hulle streng by die reëls, streng by die handboekvoorskrifte van hoe 'n saak ondersoek moet word?" en brigadier Jan se antwoord:

"Die algemene reël is die veiligheidspolisie of die veiligheidstak moet hulle hou by alle reëls van die wetgewer insluitende die polisie-administrasie. Die administratiewe bepalings wat op hulle van toepassing is. Nou ongelukkig is dit so dat die reëls van die spel van veiligheidswerk nie altyd dit toelaat nie en daar kan afwykings somtyds kom, na gelang van bepaalde omstandighede. So daar kan afwykings kom van die reëls. Dit is nie te sê dat wat die dissiplinêre reëls betref hulle" en dan word hy deur advokaat Hennie de Vos met 'n ja in die rede geval, "Die dissiplinêre reëls het niks te doen met die, van sy uitvoering van die polisieman se pligte as lid van die veiligheidstak nie, maar by die uitvoering van sy statutêre werk kan daar soms afwykings kom."

En toe net, "ek het nie verdere vrae nie dankie."

Does that statement reflect ... (intervenies)

CHAIRMAN: It depends on what the statement means. What does the statement mean? -- Kan ek net ... (tussenbeide)

Nee ek vra nie vir u nie? -- Ekskuus.

The statement as I understand it says, that the rules of procedure are not necessarily followed, but I don't find anything necessarily there, in my limited knowledge of Afrikaans, which says that the laws of the land can be ignored.

MR KUNY: No, maybe it doesn't say that. Perhaps the statement/...

statement speaks for itself and the witness has chosen to refer to it in support of what evidence he has given.

CHAIRMAN: But in support of the evidence that the law of the land is not binding?

MR KUNY: Well it doesn't provide him with an excuse it merely, in his mind, constitutes an explanation. -- Ag Mr Kuny, excuse me, Mr Chairman may I just interrupt? Can I just go on to put another few things in context which I think is ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN Ja. -- In our police magazine, Servanus, in September 1981, major, the ex-Major Craig Williamson wrote articles, "What a way to run a Revolution?" and I just want to put a few quotes here that must also, of course, in general put in context, but he said: (10)

"But the war by it's very nature, is a secret one fought in the twilight world of revolutionaries and secret agents and it is a secret war against treason. We..."

and then he goes on and on and amongst other things

"We cannot reveal successful tactics, and while my name and face are well-known by now, we cannot reveal the identity of my many colleagues who fought the secret war alongside me, who are still fighting."

And then he goes on, I think it's in the same article 1981 page 10, he says ... (20)

"When all is said and done we know we won and they know they lost. That is important."

Then in the next article also in the magazine "Why Spy?" he says:

MR KUNY: May I just ask, how does this relate to the evidence that you have been giving about your operations and the things that/...

K2.619

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COETZEE
(30)

that you did in the security police? -- That we in the security police are above the law, that it is respected by the police force

in general, that way, and I think the majority of the public in South Africa too. It's a secret war that we fight against a secret enemy and in ways that, like where it says:

"Therefor the only real answer is secret operations against the enemy, using many of the secret operation methods, devised by the communist revolutionaries themselves."

"Law enforcement officers" is another quote on this page: "such as members of the South African police and other organs of the security forces, understand that the RSA is faced with a revolutionary onslaught which, if it is ever allowed to succeed will plunge the southern tip of Africa into chaos."⁽¹⁰⁾

CHAIRMAN: Yes but as far as I understand what you read Mr Coetzee, it deals with the philosophical basis for spying for security police, it does not go beyond that. -- No sir, it does, I can just, I want to go on if you don't mind sir. I know it is very difficult for the people outside this family to understand and that one can understand words in completely the wrong context. I've got another quote where exactly this Craig Williamson was trying to explain to the chairman then during my trial, when he said:

"I think I must preface answering that question with a comment, and that is that because of the relationship between Captain⁽²⁰⁾ Coetzee and I, in other words we know each other so well a lot of the explanation of the criptic nature of the conversation is due to the fact

that/...

K2.657

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COETZEE

that there is a very close rapport."

So what he actually means is what might sound completely ...

(intervenes)

Yes, yes, but please Mr Coetzee that is in the context of⁽³⁰⁾ his evidence and what you and he conveyed to each other. But if

he writes an article in a newspaper he doesn't talk to you he talks to the general public. -- It is sir, but what I'm trying to bring over to Mr Chairman is that there is a certain language and we are in the security police, acts above the law and it's not a question that I've been a renegade policeman ... (intervenes)

Well what you have quoted doesn't say that. You may believe it because it was unsaid or said somewhere else, but those statements don't say it. That's all I say. Carry on.

MR KUNY.: Mr Chairman I have no further ... Sorry there's just one other aspect. When did you get to know and where did you get to know Lieutenant Koos Vermeulen? -- I got to know Koos Vermeulen⁽¹⁰⁾ 1974, whilst at Sibasa. He was the station commander at Levubu at that time. He later moved to Bronkhorstspuit as station commander, from where I drew him to Vlakplaas with the permission and authority of my superiors.

And after leaving Vlakplaas did you continue to maintain contact with him? -- No I did not, he went, he's, at some occasion came to see me once or twice afterwards, but not permanent contact.

Did you maintain any contact with Mr Nofemela after leaving? -- No not at all, he phoned me on an occasion or two and at that time my phone was on tap and I said he mustn't phone me he must⁽²⁰⁾ rather come and see me, but he never came to

see/..

K2.694

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COETZEE

see me again.

Did he ever meet your children? -- He did. He was very fond, especially of my eldest child at that stage, Dirk Coetzee, he was then 5 years old and on occasion went out with me into the veld, on, not actual operations, on surveillance.

Yes. I have no further questions Mr Chairman.

(30)

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, the evidence has been quite long and

involved and we should be grateful of an opportunity just to marshall our thoughts and to get instructions on certain aspects.

If it would not be inconvenient, could we crave your indulgence to adjourn until tomorrow at 10h00.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Kuny do you have, is that acceptable? I think the evidence was heavy, if I may say so.

MR KUNY: Yes Mr Chairman I can't say anything about that. My own position is that I can only be here until Tuesday evening.

But beyond that I can't comment on this.

CHAIRMAN: Oh yes. No but I cannot imagine that I'll have to sit through that long cross-examination. I hope not.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS TILL 27 APRIL 1990 AT 10H00.

THE COMMISSION RESUMES ON 27 APRIL 1990.

MR BERTELSMANN: Before advocate Maritz proceeds with the further examination of the witness, may I just make a formal announcement and to place on record that our clients, the Lubowski family, yesterday decided to withdraw from the Commission for the present.

Their decision to do so is motivated firstly, by the fact that the Commission's present terms of reference do not include an inquiry into the murder of Mr Anton Lubowski. You held earlier that the terms of reference could not be given such an (10) interpretation. Our clients then requested the State President to widen the ambit of your Commission, but unfortunately so far without success. Our clients still hope to be able to do so and to persuade the Government otherwise, in which event they would participate in such an inquiry again. Regarding the allegation that Mr Lubowski was a paid agent of the South African Defence Force, the evidence presented to the Commission must remain untested, because of the Defence Force's unwillingness to allow this evidence to be subjected to public scrutiny and cross-examination. As this impedes our clients' ability to clear (20) Anton Lubowski's name, they have decided to withdraw from further participation in the Commission. Nothing is intended as a slide upon you or the Commission. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN: There is only one error in your statement and that is, it is not the Defence Force's refusal to allow you access. It is my personal decision.

MR BERTELSMANN: Well the decision which you took certainly was influenced by the stance which the Defence Force took.

CHAIRMAN: It was - it was not by the stance, but by the evidence.

MR BERTELSMANN: / (30)

MR BERTELSMANN: As it - I - then I stand corrected, but under

the circumstances, certainly the family finds itself in the invidious position that we are unable to test this evidence. It cannot be held up to public scrutiny and under those circumstances they have decided to withdraw.

CHAIRMAN: No, all I say is don't blame the Defence Force, blame me. Yes.

MR BERTELSMANN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN: In any event, the estate is still represented and the inquiry will proceed along those lines.

MR ROBERTS: Roberts speaking. Before the witness continues, may (10) we place on record that there are two documents which have now become available and I now hand it in. Firstly B127, which is a computer printout from police records relating to the theft of the red and white combi in Johannesburg and then the next document, B128 which is a similar police computer printout relating to the theft of the blue Audi in Uitenhage. DIRK COETZEE (still under oath):

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: Thank you. You left the Republic of South Africa on 5 November 1989. Is that correct?
-- That is correct.

(20)
How did that come about? -- I made contact in the weeks previously with a journalist friend of mine, Jacques Pauw of Die Vrye Weekblad and told him that I want to speak out the truth about all this allegations Nofemela has made, that and more. And I did not see my way fit and open to do it within the borders of the Republic of South Africa and that I will give him an interview on Mauritius on my way out of the country.

And did you then fly to Mauritius from South Africa?

-- I /...

That was on 5 November last year? -- On the Sunday morning, yes.

Now very soon after that, you made a statement which is in a written form on 8 November 1989 at Port Louis. -- That's correct.

It was taken down by or written down by Mr Jacques Pauw and I signed it.

That is EXHIBIT B(2). Now, what is the status of that document? -- Well it is basically to get something on record before I leave Mauritius for London, for in case something happens with me on the road, so that there'd be the story - the basic of the story that I've got, that it's on record with someone somewhere. (10)

Because at that stage, I didn't know how far behind me the South African Security Forces was and what was awaiting me when I arrived in London.

I see from paragraph 46 of that statement that there were local customs or regulations or rules which precluded you from attesting to that statement in Mauritius. -- Ja, basically we went to see a lawyer. I thought it worked like in South Africa where you can go to a lawyer to get the statement under oath, but apparently there's a procedure which you must apply for a court date to appear in front of a judge and then get the - the relative statement sworn to there. (20)

If it hadn't been for that, would you have been prepared to swear to that statement? -- At that stage, yes.

At this stage? -- Oh I haven't had a look to it, I can't remember what is in it. If you could look at it, you will see there's a - couldn't even remember names of the Askari's and incidents. You must accept that I wasn't at ease at all. I was - my nerves was gone, the future was uncertain and it was for /...

for sure not a relaxed - you know, state that I was in.

But did you tell any untruths in that statement? -- Well, you have to read it to me again. I believe the - the stories - basic stories of it will be exactly the same as what I'm testifying now in front of this court - this inquiry.

You are hedging, when you told your story that you were prepared to swear thereto as being the truth? -- That's correct.

Were you then satisfied that what you had told, was correct? -- I was.

Did you believe that what you said there was the truth? --
(10)
In that state of mind, yes.

Has your state of mind changed since then? -- I think so, yes.

In which respect? -- Well, not that I'm at ease at all now with a lot of people looking - sitting here, but I think I - I know, I feel more comfortable about the future and what my my present situation is. So I, I think I can improve on that statement that I've made in Mauritius.

But how does your state of mind affect the truth or un-
(20)
truth of what you are saying and telling? -- It is just a question of well sitting at Mauritius. I don't know who was haunting me from behind. I don't know whether they're gonna catch up with me in Mauritius. We arrived on the Sunday night, we had to go to Port Louis on the Monday morning to make my arrangements for London.

I had to go there. Arrived Monday afternoon 15h00 back at the Blue Lagune Hotel where I stayed. I was tired. My - as I say, I was not in a relaxed frame of mind. I had to go back on the Tuesday to Port Louis, arrived back on the Tuesday afternoon, worked right through

(30)
the /...

the Tuesday night till 04h00 in the morning, slept for two hours on the Wednesday - Tuesday night, Wednesday morning, got up, in the car to Mauritius, the statement was further written in the bank in Mauritius where I was waiting for my money to come through, this - this statement was finished and I'd sign-ed it. In the bank. And at that stage at 14h10 in the after-noon, I should have already been at the airport. I think at 13h45 that afternoon.

On the airport to where? -- To Port Louis - eh - Port Louis - the airport on Mauritius, from Port Louis.

(10)

To where? -- To the airport on Port Louis.

CHAIRMAN: Where would you fly? -- To London. Sorry, on the 16h10 flight on the Wednesday.

MR MARITZ: What were you to do in London? -- Meet up with the ANC.

To do what? -- Well, to tell my story to the ANC.

But it - it sounds to me as if you were the author of your own trouble. What was the rush in getting this statement on paper? -- Well, I wanted to get out of the country before I ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: But you were out of the country. -- Out of S.A.

(20)

You were at that stage out of South Africa. -- I beg your pardon?

You were out of South Africa. The question was what was the rush to get the statement on paper. -- For in case some- thing happens on the road. I was going to the ANC. I didn't know what to expect from them. What I had in mind of the ANC was that they were terrorists and most probably for what I had done against them, atrocities that I've committed against them, I would - I wasn't at all certain that I would be alive

after /...

(30)

after telling my story. So it was a - to me at that stage, a calculated risk.

MR MARITZ: So what you are saying actually, is that you wanted this statement on paper for posterity in case you were knocked off? -- Something on paper, on - if, for in case I get knocked off on the road, ja.

CHAIRMAN: By whom? Who could - who would knock you off? -- Well, either from the security side, I - know, our security side or maybe ... (intervenes)

Who's your security side? I'm not quite sure. -- The security forces, Vlakplaas guys. (10)

Yes. And, or? -- And ANC on the other side.

MR MARITZ: So you wanted to leave a record behind, in case you were killed. -- Some kind of record, in case I'm killed. That's right.

For what purpose? -- To get the truth out to the world, or as - the, the basics of the truth out to the world.

For posterity? -- What do you mean by posterity?

As a - as a, as a historic testimonial? -- No, no, no.

CHAIRMAN: Vir die nageslag. -- Vir die nageslag. No, no, no. (20)
Not that dramatical. I mean I just wanted the truth about the so-called, or as they later called - named it, hit squads. What, what actually happen within the security forces.

MR MARITZ: Now if that was the case, it must have been a very important document to you. -- Ja. It was an important document and I tried to hold back on it to complete it in full after I've met up with the ANC, you know, in a more relaxed state.

And being an important document, I suppose you would have taken pains to make sure that what was contained in it, was correct. -- As I said, my state and frame of mind at that

(30)
stage /...

stage was not relaxed at all and I was not sitting in a easy chair back at home and relaxing and thinking. I had a lot to think about in front of me, was worried who was following me, how much the security forces know at that stage. Do they know I'm out of the country, are they gonna sort of catch up with me in Mauritius, if I get out of Mauritius, what lies ahead.

You talk a lot, but you don't make sense. What has your frame of mind to do with the fact whether you were speaking the truth according to your own likes, or not when you made the statement? (10)
-- If you read that thing that I've made on Mauritius, you'll see basically it's exactly what I'm telling this Commission now ...
(intervenes)

Then why are you hedging? -- Why am I?

Why are you hedging? -- In what way am I hedging?

You want your cake and you want to eat it as well. -- No. Not at all. I'm giving you exactly what happened. You are one to sit in a lean chair there and wanted to - to - wanted to think what I should have done at that stage and what I should have thought at that stage. I exactly told you what happened. (20)

I'm asking you: What is contained in that statement according to your likes, was it the truth or not the truth? -- The basic truth on what happened, ja. Small detail could have been left out. Murders, atrocities.

CHAIRMAN: No, no. The question is, is - I, I think Mr Maritz is more interested not in what has been left out, but whether there are statements in here that are not correct. -- He's got to read it to me ... (intervenes)

That's unrealistic. Can you recall any statement within this ... (intervenes)

(30)
MR KUNY /...

MR KUNY: With respect ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: I'm not going to ... please, Mr Kuny. I'm not going to, to ask Mr Maritz now to read the statement to him. We can come to the detail in a moment. I won't - I am not going to allow this kind of examination to proceed much longer. All I want to know of the witness is, do you know of any statement in this, any allegation in the statement, do you know of any that is incorrect.

Not which has been omitted. -- I can't recall what - what I said in there, except that I tried to - the motor car installation of the radio that was taken out of Mxenge's car, for instance, I can remember. But I tried to put it forward that it was either in Brigadier Schoon or Brigadier Jan du Preez's car. There might be - other small - in that line, you'll have to point it out to me.

Yes.

MR MARITZ: Then later - apparently at a later stage, you had a further lengthy interview with Mr Jacques Pauw, which was recorded on a tape recording. -- It was during that - that period, that same period.

(20)

And over how long a period did you make that statement?

-- That all happened during the Monday night for a short while and then Tuesday afternoon coming back from Port Louis till 04h00 Wednesday morning in the car from Port - from the holiday, from our place of residence to Port Louis again in the car. In the bank we went on and then on our way to the airport.

CHAIRMAN: No, no. Please. Please, Mr Coetzee, please. Just answer the question. How long did the statement take? -- I, I haven't checked. It could have been a few hours, I think.

MR MARITZ: Well, I have a transcript of the tape recording

(30)

here /...

here which runs into 198 pages. Would that be correct? -- I wouldn't know. I have given it, I don't know who has made the transcript and how long it is, but I've given a fairly lengthy interview, that's correct.

That's right. Now, I've read the transcript and I've listened to the tapes and it appears to me as if you tried to be as accurate as possible and to supply as much detail as possible.

Is that correct? -- It's quite possible at that stage, yes.

Now what is the statement of the - the status of that statement you made to Jacques Pauw? -- Same as the one (10) that's been written down, to get my story basically on - on, on paper for in case something happens on the way.

You tried your best to tell Jacques Pauw the truth? -- Basically what happened, yes.

According to your likes. Is that right? -- Basically what happened, yes.

You made no attempt to mislead Jacques Pauw? -- No. Not, not - not on purpose.

And if you had received the transcription of the tape recording, would you also have been prepared to swear to the truth thereof? -- After I've read it and I can look - have a look at it, I will most probably ... (intervenes) (20)

CHAIRMAN: Haven't you read the - the transcript? -- I haven't read it at all.

Mr Kuny, then I think we better adjourn for the witness to read his statements, because we're going to waste a long time. Do you not think so? I cannot believe - we provided your side, I believe, long ago with these

transcripts /...
(30)

transcripts and if the witness now says he hasn't read it and he came unprepared, I find it difficult to know how we're going to handle the matter. It will take him some hours to read and I'll simply have to adjourn. -- But he can put forward to me what's - what's worrying him in that - that statement and I'll admit to what's not the truth and where's the truth. I think it's as easy as that.

Yes, alright. Let's see if - but don't, then don't ask everytime to read it first. If you want to read it, I'll adjourn and then you read it. -- Okay.

MR KUNY: But this is why I was going to submit to you earlier (10)
that if my learned friend is going to say to the witness is there anything in the statement which is untrue or incorrect ...

(intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes?

MR KUNY: Then he must put the statement, allow him to have a look at it and point out what it is that he complains about in the statement.

CHAIRMAN: No, I would have thought that a witness of Mr Coetzee's standing would have read his statements prior to getting into the (20)
witness box. Yes, carry on.

MR MARITZ: Thank you. Now, we'll get back to these statements later on, but can I remind you of something you said some years ago in 1985? I'm sorry, I've just mislaid the document. Excuse me one minute. No, I'm sorry, I'll come to that later on. You went to the - to the police college I think in 1971. Is that right? -- 1970 as a student.

CHAIRMAN: To the police college? -- To the police college, yes.
1971? -- December 1970, I was out of the police college at

Gezina /... (30)

Gezina police station in 1971, Pretoria.

MR MARITZ: How long did that - or how long was the duration of that course? -- That police college training course?

Yes. -- Roughly, six months.

We have it that you started at the college on 6 July 1970.
-- That's right.

Then you must have completed the course at the end of 1970.
-- During December, I believe, yes.

Now what are you taught - or what were you taught at the police college in those six months? -- Basically drilling, we had physical training, we did law, we did musketry, riots, riot training, riot drill - can't remember what else. (10)

What were you taught about the duties of a policeman? -- Contain law and order, basically.

Were you taught to act unlawfully? -- No, not at all.

Were you taught to uphold the law? -- That's right, that's correct.

Were you taught to be an example in the community? -- Correct.

Were you taught to conduct yourself with dignity? -- That's correct.

Were you taught to prevent crime wherever possible? -- That's hundred percent correct. (20)

And when you left the police college, did you adhere to those principles, or did they just blow out of your head? -- No, I adhered to it.

And how long were you at Gezina then, after that? -- If I recall correctly, roundabout August 1972.

And from there you went to what you call the Flying Squad?
-- No. First to the police dog school, training school for

four /... (30)

four months.

Yes? -- To do formal training with a police dog, patrol dog.

Yes, and then you went to the Flying Squad? -- That's correct.

And how long did you spend there? -- Roughly till June 1974.

With a break of about three months border duty and of course training for counter insurgency duty.

From what you said to Jacques Pauw, it appears as if it was rather a boring experience at the Flying Squad. -- A boring experience?

Yes. -- In what way?

Wasn't it? -- I enjoyed it at that stage. I was a dog handler and did arrests with the dog. I was very fond of the dog. (10)

You intimated to Jacques Pauw that your work basically consisted of apprehending blacks for being without their night passes. -- That's correct.

Was that the high water mark of your stint at the Flying Squad? -- Not necessarily. There was other arresting, house-breaking, thefts that we've done.

But I suppose they were few and far between? -- There were some. I can't remember. I can't tell out of the fist how many we've arrested. There was always competition on between the relevant sections to who has made the most arrests. (20)

But at some stage or another, you decided you were stagnating at the Flying Squad and wanted to get away. -- That's correct.

And that was then to Sibasa? -- That's correct.

Now /...

C1.20

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COETZEE

Now Sibasa at that time must have been a very small little place? -- It was. We were only three - four white policemen there at first. Later on three, sort of guiding the Venda police towards independence. (30)

But it's a rural community. -- Ja, mostly rural.

Very quiet? -- Quiet, yes.

Not really crime of any moment in the district? -- Many - ja - as far as black crime ritual murders, there was a lot. But that was handled by the Venda police.

So you had quite a quiet time in Sibasa? -- Yes, I did.

And from there you went to Volksrust? -- First to the police college as instructor in January 1976.

Yes. By the way, how long did that officer's course take? -- Roundabout two to four months, towards the end of 1975.

And what were you taught then? -- We were given - a lot of guest lectures came in to give an idea of all facets of police work. All different sections, security, CID, re-cruiting, head office, and then basically to do departmental trials, to - and a lot more. Basically, how to behave as an officer. (10)

Were you taught to be dishonest there? -- No, not at all.

Were you taught any criminal activities there? -- Logical not.

What were you taught in regard to the conduct of a policeman?

CHAIRMAN: Police officer. Police officer, or policeman?

MR MARITZ: Oh, yes. Of a police officer. -- What your duties as a police officer should be and how to behave. How to - what's expected of you. (20)

And /...

C1.21

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COETZEE

And what - what were those expectations? -- To lead your - your juniors at a police station and look after them and bring them up in their police duties and help them, direct them and run a police station or run a section wherever you were posted to.

I would imagine that it would be a great honour to be a police officer. -- Of course it is, yes. (30)

You've got to be a upright, upstanding member of the community to be a police officer. -- That's correct.

And you have to be an example not only to the community itself, but also to your subordinates. -- That's correct.

Now after you had qualified as an officer, you became a lieutenant. -- That's correct.

And after that you went to Volksrust. -- First stayed on in the police college on the law section as instructor.

But not for long, for a short while. -- Six months.

Very well, six months. Then you went to Volksrust. -- That's correct. (10)

What were your duties there? -- Station commander.

Also a rural community? -- Ja. Mostly rural, a little town.

Small community? -- that's correct.

Quiet community? -- Ja. Fairly quiet.

Anything of great moment happened at Volksrust? -- No. Nothing special, except there was a - great lot of house- breaking and theft amongst the business - businesses in Volks- rust, which I came down on and brought the housebreakings to virtually zero over the Christmas period. (20)

And did you conduct yourself with honour at Volksrust? -- Well, I think so, yes.

And /...

C1.23

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COETZEE

And then you went to Oshoek? -- Oshoek border. That's correct.

And what was your function at Oshoek? -- Basically border post commander in charge of passport control.

Is that a very difficult job to do? -- No, not at all.

What does it entail? -- Entail - doing passport control. (30)

When you get at Jan Smuts airport, it's being run by - I think

custom, Department of Inland Affairs, I think. But that duty was performed on the Swaziland border, as on Botswana border, by policemen, passport control functions.

And although the border posts fall under the jurisdiction of the security branch of the police, you were nevertheless still a uniformed policeman? -- We as officers fell fully under the command of the regional security office. security officers in Middelburg, Brigadier Van der Hoven and Colonel Gough specific at that stage. The only thing that uniform has got to do with it, as far as the infantry and the normal stocks on the - for orders (10) on the border post is concerned.

Ja, but what - what was your status? -- My status was border post commander, in charge of passport control.

But were you attached to the uniform branch? -- I was attached to security, Middelburg. I was once in uniform during an inspection and that was over a three year period.

Now, the - the job of passport control officer, you've already said, is not a very difficult job and there's nothing intricate about it. -- Not at all.

As a matter of fact, I would imagine that it would be - could (20) be quite boring. -- I should say so, yes.

To do that job. -- Yes.

Did you experience it as being a boring job? -- Ja, it is actually /...

C1.25

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COETZEE

actually a boring job, but a job that's got to be done.

I see. Now, from Oshoek, you were then transferred to Sunnyside, but that never came to pass and then you went to Middelburg. -- security, that's right.

To the security branch. -- That's correct.

And then roundabout 20 July 1980, I think, you were

(30)

transferred to the headquarters in Pretoria? -- It was towards the middle of 1980. That's correct.

Now, how soon after that did you land up on Vlakplaas? -- Immediately.

Immediately? -- Ja. With an office in head office, a desk in head office, where I reported in the morning and then going out to the farm during the day.

Now, being a member of the security branch, did this mean anything specifically to you? -- Well, it's an honour to be in the security police. I think it's - it was always seen amongst all policemen as a elite section in the police. (10)

Why? -- Eh - there's some - they were seen as the front line against the onslaught against South Africa. They worked in secrecy, they performed a honourable task against the enemy of South Africa and it was a small family. Not everyone was selected to join them. So, it was an honour to be with them.

To - to become a member of the security branch, which qualities would a police officer had to have then? -- It's difficult to say.

I think you should ask that to the superiors. I - I wouldn't know. I don't think it will all be the same quality, depending in which direction they - they apply you. As in the offices, in the field, as a field worker, et cetera. (20)

Would /...

C1.28

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COETZEE

Would you think that one would require honesty from such a policeman? -- Loyalty.

CHAIRMAN: The question is, do you think that honesty is a requirement? -- Not necessarily.

MR MARITZ: Why do you say that? -- The security police operate as a small family. It - you've got a complete other association between subordinates and your superiors. There's a loyalty (30)

amongst the members, there's a secrecy amongst the members, they were seen as a necessity, an exclusiveness for the job they - they've, they've got to do. And this enabled - we were in a strong position of trust, which enabled us to operate above the law. This was not implied in any law, statutory. It was more culture and aspects of this culture, like necessity, exclusiveness, secrecy, was respected by the police for - the rest of the police force in general and the subservient community in South Africa. We were seen fighting a just war, sometimes unconventional and that is exactly how it was.

(10)
CHAIRMAN: Is that why you say honesty was not a requirement?

-- It's difficult - if I ... (intervenes)

Just answer the question. Is that why you say honesty was not a requirement? Yes, or no? -- Yes.

MR MARITZ: But nevertheless, you say that what - the result was that you ended up in a strong position of trust. -- That's correct.

Whose trust? -- Trust amongst - my superiors could rely on me, trust in me that I'll report back to them, that I'll keep the secrecy up, the loyalty amongst us and the security culture that you grow into. You're not taught that. And that is why it's so difficult for me to put my life in context,

(20)
because /...

C1.30

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COETZEE

because of the Commissions mandate and I respect that. But if it - it wasn't for that and I could have started from A and go down right through my career, through the three years in Swaziland where I have done my so-called apprenticeship in the security police, then I think it will fall more in place. So it's very difficult for me to explain to you in a water tight compartment of atrocities inside the country. Borders were - meant nothing to us. It was things that you pulled out, pushed down and drove

(30)

with a car over. Neighbouring countries was, we did not suspect their - their - our neighbouring countries at all. We went in there whenever we liked and did what we liked and came back into South Africa. So it's very difficult for me to put to the Commission the small part of my life in a water tight compartment and expect the Commission to understand it. But I - I have to adhere to the Commission's mandate and in that context, I'm trying to get the truth out.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think what - what Mr Maritz wants, is not what you did at this stage. All he asked you, is what did you mean with a position of trust. That you were in a strong position of trust. -- Of trust ... (intervenes)

That - that has nothing to do whether you leave the country. -- But to understand this whole trust theory in the security culture, I'll have to go wide, very much more wider than this.

Otherwise you will argue about words of trust and you won't understand it, as with respect, the Chairman didn't understand what means "bakgat". But in security language it means something specific, because it's a culture that you are - that you grow into and to come there and to explain to you in words, being confined in a water tight compartment what it all amounted to, is very very difficult. Or else, if I had

the /...

C1.31

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COETZEE

the opportunity to start from my birth, my whole police career, you will see that I'm still the same authentic Dirk Coetzee that left the school; the same authentic Dirk Coetzee that joined the uniform branch; the same authentic Dirk Coetzee that entered the security culture and the same authentic Dirk Coetzee sitting here in front of you. So it's a question of my capabilities used to the best effect of the branch that I was in. And if I can -

can - can go on, before I joined the security police, I think there's no record of any murders that I've committed. After I've left the security branch there's no evidence of any murders that I committed, cars that I've stolen. So, I just want you to understand that you cannot confine me into a water tight compartment and then expect from me to explain to you in understanding language what the security culture is all about.

The loyalty you stick to, there is such thing, ja. The loyalty to the culture you grew into.

Well, could I ask you something differently? -- Yes.

(10)

You said that honesty was not a requirement. Right? -- Sir, can - let's put it this way. Honesty in the uniform branch ... (intervenes)

No, we're talking about the security branch. -- Okay. Between subordinates and superiors, yes. Honesty to expect of me to report to him in fully after operation what exactly happened. That honesty, yes. But I meant honesty as what we were doing is honest and right from a community point of view, no.

No, not whether it's right of wrong. It's whether it's - forget the morality. We're talking about honesty. Eerlikheid. -- Eerlikheid teen - against - between us and to our

(20)

superiors /...

C1.32

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COETZEE

superiors, yes.

But why did you require honesty of those who served with you at Vlakplaas? Why was that a requirement you looked for? Why did you want honest policemen in your part? -- In the security culture we need a honest report back. Honesty amongst one another.

Only on report back? -- On all aspects amongst us. Amongst the security culture, amongst our - our security policemen, there was a honesty.

(30)

But - but, say for instance not amongst you and the quar-ter-master-general of the police? -- In a different sense.

I had nothing to do with him, but - except if we needed a car or stocks and that would be a completely different honesty you are talking about.

Well, is that a requirement of a member of the security branch to have that kind of honesty? -- I beg your pardon?

Is it a requirement of a member of the security police to have that kind of honesty, or not? -- Of all policemen. In the respect as to the quartermaster, et cetera.

(10)

And the paymaster? -- Ja. Paymaster too.

So it's not only amongst the security policemen themselves? In a report back basis? -- In a report back basis, yes.

Ja?

MR MARITZ: Look, can I put it to you this way: You have described I think, in your evidence here within this commis- sion, you've described the security branch as an elite core.

-- That's correct.

Do you still think it was or it is an elite core of the police?

-- It all depends on what elite - I thought as a elite

(20)

from /...

C1.34

- 400 -

COETZEE

from a policeman's point of view. As far as the atrocities that's going on, that is not my decision.

Then please tell us. -- I've told you about the security culture Mr Maritz.

Do you regard the security branch as an elite core? -- Yes, I do.

That to me, presupposes that you would seek out the best in the police for the elite core. -- That's correct, but that's not to say that in your uniform police branch and in your CID police

(30)

section, there are not elite people in there too.

I appreciate that. I appreciate that. But by seeking out the best, you are going to look to those policemen who stand out in the performance of their duties as a policeman.

-- Yes, you can put it that way.

Or if one would want to be a bit more mundane about it, the bloke who caught the eye, he would land up probably in security branch. -- Yes, you can call it that way.

His quality will inter alia be to be a very good detective.

-- Sure, it should be, ja. Whether it - in practice that is a fact, that remains to be proven. (10)

He would have the gift of investigative powers. -- Yes, that's true. If he's employed in an investigation post, like a field worker, like a chap on the ANC, PAC-desk, taking or doing interrogations and taking the specific case to court, yes.

I suppose that one of the main functions of a security branch is to collect information, collate information and to digest information. -- It's one of the functions, yes.

Is that not the most important function? -- That is, yes.

Know /... (20)

C1.37

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COETZEE

Know thy enemy. -- Know thy enemy.

In other words, what you're looking for in security branch is a man with an analytic mind. Not so? -- Depending in which job you employ him, yes. I mean, all of us is not in the file doing collections. I've never done interrogations, I never carried founds. So, I don't know where you - what you're trying to sort of get at. In the specific sections where they use them as investigating officers, yes.

(30)

I'm trying to get at ... (intervenes) -- But you can't put it as a general that each one from the lowest constable up to the

general, has got this specific quality that you're looking for now.

No. But what I'm trying to get at, is this: Is that the qualities one would look for in a policeman to bring him into the - into the security branch, do you agree with - with the suppositions I have made to you, that ... (intervenes) -- Theoretically yes. Whether it's practical always that way, I don't agree with you. You get just as useless security policemen as you get uniform and CID people.

I appreciate that. -- Ja.

(10)

But you would not be paid to be looking at your - your recalcitrant policemen to draw from to the security police. -- Normally not, yes.

You would not be looking at your bad element in the police to do that job. -- No, that's right.

You would not be looking at the men with the criminal tendencies for that job. -- If you're coming to Vlakplaas and the security police, you will see that we're nothing else than a bunch of thugs. Not myself, though a lot of us. Thugs that operate above the law. (general laughter)

(20)

No /...

C1.38

- 402 -

COETZEE

No, we'll come to that. -- Well, then you must not ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No, the question was when you draw someone to the security police - do you draw policemen with a bad record? -- They won't draw policemen with criminal records from Pretoria Central Prison. They draw elite people that they can trust in and grow into this family, but I still ... (intervenes)

(30)

That's - I think that's, that's what Mr Maritz wanted to know. -- But he's busy trying to paint a picture of things that doesn't

exist. I mean if - for sure on Vlakplaas you won't find Dr Heyns, Dr Boesak, Dr Tutu in this hit squads. I mean ...

(intervenes)(laughter)

What - what is the point? Except being facetious? -- No, but I mean, he's, he's building up now, and wants to admit every time and admit every time and I was confined in evidence-in-chief that I couldn't put you as chairman into the whole picture, because I respect, the Commission has got a mandate and I've got to stick to that. Now, it's very diffi- cult to me. If I could have led my evidence or in-chief as I wished to, to put the whole - my whole (10) life and the security operations inside and outside the country into context, he wouldn't have even asked me those - those questions.

But please bear with me and try and assist me and don't be facetious. -- No, I will not.

The question is simply this and was the following: When you draw someone from the police force to the security police, do you take people with bad records? -- No.

Thank you.

MR MARITZ: I want to read a passage in what you told Jacques Pauw (20) and I want to hear what you say about that today. I'm referring /...

C1.40 - 403 - COETZEE
referring to EXHIBIT B(3)(a) and I'm reading from page 16. Jacques Pauw asked you the following question:

"Het jy belang daarin gestel om Veiligheid toe te kom?"

And you answered as follows:

"Ja, baie. Dis vir my - dit was vir my 'n vreeslike elite pos, soos wat dit by almal in die polisie is. By Veiligheid is (30) daar so 'n - so 'n - 'n - so 'n 'spy' at- mosfeer om Veiligheid.

Jy's 'n soort van uitverkorene. Ek meen, jy, jy as

uniform-ou meng nie in met Veiligheid of vra hulle vrae, of 'query' hulle of ek meen. As hy by jou stasie kom en hy gooi petrol in en hy - en hy wys sy ID-kaart en hy sê hy is so-en-so van Veiligheid, is hy 'n gerespekteerde ou. Dit is 'n ou wat jy darem nie met handskoene hanteer nie."

-- It is exactly what I've said, isn't it?

And you adhere to that, today? -- Ja.

Well, in 1985 on 22 July you were asked the same question and that was in your departmental trial and I'm reading from vol. 9 at page 549 of your evidence which you referred to yourself (10) earlier on in your testimony and your evidence was then to the following effect: The question was posed to you:

"Goed. Nou sal u saamstem as ek vir u sê dat die Veiligheidstak is eintlik 'n prestigetak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie?"

And this is your reply:

"Ja, uit watter oogpunt beskou? Uit polisiemanoogpunt beskou, of uit die algemene publiek oningelig beskou?"

And the prosecutor said:

"Die stelling wat ek aan u maak, is dat dit vir 'n lid van die mag, dat dit vir hom 'n eer is en dat dit eintlik (20) prestige /...

C1.41

- 404 -

COETZEE

prestige is om in die Veiligheidstak van die polisie te dien."

And this is your reply:

"Ek dink dit hang af van lid tot lid. Daar is nie - die Veiligheidspolisie is bloot 'n afdeling van die polisie. Dat hy met speurders en uniformtak saamgestel is. Daar is nie 'n benaming soos Veiligheidspolisie amptelik nie. Dit is polisie. Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie."

(30)

Then the prosecutor asked you:

"Maar 'n mens gaan nie ..."

And you interrupted him:

"'n Afdeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie."

And he tried again:

"Maar 'n mens gaan nie na die Veiligheidstak toe as jy nie self
daarom vra nie, nè?"

And you replied:

"Jy kan daarvoor vra. Jy kan daarvoor vra. Jy kan aansoek doen
daarom. Dan word jy gekeur deur 'n spesiale keurkomitee en
daarna bevind hulle of jy goed of sleg is. Jy doen aansoek,
nie altyd nie, jy word getrek ook. Dit is korrek."

(10)

The question:

"So die feit dat daar keuring is, dui daarop dat mens moet sekere
eienskappe hê voordat jy in daardie tak op- geneem kan word."

You replied:

"Ja, dit moet so wees."

You were asked:

"En daardie eienskappe hou verband met, kom ek stel dit aan u,
'n mens se intelligensie en jou vernuf in
ondersoekwerk /...

(20)

C1.43

- 405 -

COETZEE

ondersoekwerk. Sal u saamstem daarmee? -- Ja, dit is so, maar
daarmee wil ek nie voorgee dat 'n Veiligheidsman enigsins
beter is as 'n speurder of 'n uniformman nie. Daar is baie
bekwame indien nie bekwamer mense, in die uniform- en in die
speurtak van die polisie."

-- It's exactly what I told you.

Do you adhere to that? -- Yes. At that stage P.J. Visser
Professor Major P.J. Visser - he was prosecutor there in this
departmental trial, was trying to build up something there
hunting down to mouth stories and I stopped him. And I just ...

(30)

(intervenes)

You knocked him down. -- Ja, I knocked him down.

You knocked him down. You said: "Look, this is non-sense."
-- Ja, don't try ... (intervenes)

The security branch is nothing special. -- No - special in this sense that it is the same atmosphere that you wanted to create here, angel - holy angels above, you know, sort of special elite.

But what you said ... (intervenes) -- That will do nothing wrong.

But what you said at the disciplinary trial ... (inter-venes)
-- Ja?

And what you said to Jacques Pauw ... (intervenes) -- Ja? (10)

Are two total opposites. -- That's correct.

Now, which one of the two do you wish to choose today? -- Choose - in what context do you want to see it? I think I choose the one today where the security police is above the law and I can prove it and we operate like a lot of thugs.

Then what was the purpose of what you told the prosecutor at your disciplinary trial? -- The prosecutor was trying to build /...

C1.44 - 406 - (20) COETZEE

build up a image to the chairman in that departmental trial and I was just pointing out to him it's not - not only all - all uniform branch members and all CID members in the police that are stupid, there is just as clever guys in the uniform and the CID branch.

CHAIRMAN: I think - that there can be no misunderstanding. What Mr Maritz said, is that you told and you said - so, you told opposite things to Pauw and at the trial. -- Sir, the trial ... (intervenes)

C.2 Just - just a moment. And what you told Pauw and that, the context of the questions is: "Dat dit vir my 'n vreeslike elite pos was." Is that - do you understand that that - it's in that context that the question was put to you. -- That - that's right, (30)

yes.

Thank you.

MR MARITZ: Thank you. If I understand you correctly, you are today saying that your real attitude was the one you expressed to Jacques Pauw. -- An elite post - seen as an elite post, that's right.

CHAIRMAN: But - but then I don't understand your previous question. That - that what you were - it cannot, it cannot be elite if it's an atrocious branch of the police. -- But I can't know what he's building up to. What ... (intervenes)

(10)

That doesn't matter what he's building up to. Just answer the question. -- Well, well ... (intervenes)

That's now my question. I don't know what he's building up to. You asked - I asked you a question. -- What - what question?

Just give me the question again, because ... (intervenes)

MR MARITZ: I - no ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN /...

C1.47

- 407 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: I asked you a question. -- Sorry, can I just hear your question? (20)

My question is this: You today say it is an elite branch. -- Ja.

And then you say it is an atrocious branch, or a branch committing atrocities. -- That's right.

Now I have a difficulty to reconcile that. -- What I've said now to Jacques and what I've said to P.J. Visser in the departmental trial?

No. Listen to me. You say that you say today it is an elite branch that commits atrocities. And I find difficulty in the logic of that statement. -- It is seen as an elite branch. (30)

You see it as an elite branch, a branch that commits

atrocities. -- Well, as I say, I'm sure that the rest of the police also see it as an elite branch and the subservient community in general too.

Is that your answer? -- Ja.

MR MARITZ: But there's a total dichotomy here. You understand that? -- Yes, I understand that.

Can you explain this to the Commission: How can you say in the one breath that you hear you have this elite branch which is looked up to by the community and the police, but in the other breath you say they're a bunch of thugs. How do you reconcile these two ... (intervenes) -- Yes. In that departmental ... (10)
(intervenes)

Opposite poles?

CHAIRMAN: No, we're talking about what you say today and ... (intervenes) -- What I've said ... (intervenes)

No, no. You - today you say they are a bunch of thugs,
but /...

C1.49

- 408 -

COETZEE

but they are an elite branch - and they are an elite branch. - (20)
- They are seen as an elite branch and they ... (intervenes)

But you say ... (intervenes) -- You say that I'm saying ... (intervenes)

(Inaudible) ... You see them as an elite branch and you commit atrocities. That's the question. -- That is just what I meant.

It is exactly what I meant. It is an elite branch. It is seen by everyone as an elite branch and the trust is misused and we operate above the law. And I would say time and time again, if the - the Commission's mandate were broader than it is now ... (intervenes)

Well you have made that point repeatedly. -- Okay. Now, I (30)
- can I just ... (intervenes)

You need not make it again. -- Sir, can I ... (inter-venes)

I - I'll take it read - every answer you give is subject to that qualification. -- Good. Thank you. Can I just put then one thing more to you. We can sit here and talk for years and if they give me the opportunity to go back to South Africa with an independent investigating team, I'll prove each and every allegation that I've made.

Well, I offered you to come back to South Africa under a qualified amnesty, which was refused, point no. 1. And point no. 2, do I take it that you say I'm not an independent investigator. (10)
-- No, but I mean you - you as a judge, can't investigate the security police without the knowledge of the inside of the security police. It's a question of take a thief to catch a thief.
(laughter)

In other words, take a murderer to catch a murderer. -- That's correct. That's correct.

THE /...

C2.0

- 409 - COET

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR TEA. THE COMMISSION RESUMES. (20)
FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: I think before the tea adjournment you used the following expression on more than one occasion and I just want to examine it a bit. You say that as a member of the security branch you misused your position of trust to operate above the law. Did I understand you correctly?
-- We misused our position to operate above the law. That's correct.

Who is we? -- All the members involved with me on Vlakplaas and my superiors.

Now which position of trust are you speaking of? -- Suppose (30)
the trust justice has got in us, suppose the trust the general public has got in us and the trust of the police CID and uniform

branch in general.

I suppose that would include the trust that the commissioner of police had in you? -- That's hundred per cent correct.

But it will also include the trust that the commanding officer of the security branch had in you. -- He was part of it, yes.

Part of what? -- Part of this "we" I'm talking about.

So are you saying that he also misused his position of trust? -- Our previous commissioner of police, Johan Coetzee, was chief of the security branch. The present commissioner of police, General Johan van der Merwe, is a member of the security branch and our previous CID chiefs were all members of the security branch. (10)

General Visser had his spell there, General Zietsman was chief of the security branch.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but please - just answer the question. I don't want a list of all the ... (intervenes) -- Mr Chairman ... (intervenes)

Commissioners of police since - since 1910. -- No, excuse me /...

C2.1 - 410 - COETZEE
(20)
me but he - he was asking ... (intervenes)

No, he asked you whether the chief of the security police misused his position. -- Sorry. Yes. My answer is yes.

MR MARITZ: As a matter of fact, as I understand you, what you're really trying to convey is that all those in command, including the names that you have just mentioned, were all contaminated by this self same misuse of trust. -- They were all once part of this security - security system, part of this dirty war against the so-called enemy. Yes.

And they all misused their position of trust? -- Some of them I know of, yes. (30)

And those, the names of which you mentioned? Do you include

them all in those that misused their position of trust? -- According to me, I can prove incidents, yes.

CHAIRMAN: No - I don't know. When counsel says those you mentioned - you've mentioned just now Visser and Zietsman - are they all included in, in your list of ... (intervenes) -- Of - of, of ex-security chiefs that know, that knows what went on and knew of the atrocities, yes.

MR MARITZ: You also included the present commissioner of police General Van der Merwe. -- That's correct.

Now how did he misuse his position of trust, as a for instance?
-- If you look at his spell in Bloemfontein, whilst being stationed
in Bloemfontein security, where at that time Warrant-officer
Hendrik Prinsloo, who was very fond of poisoning his activists,
it will be interesting to, to watch the history of deaths in
detentions and deaths of activists whilst he was there. He then
moved to Windhoek security, thereafter to head office and then
eventually became security police chief.

I /...

C2.2

- 411 -

COETZEE
(20)

I know that. -- Ja.

But talk is cheap and money buys the whisky. -- That's correct.

What proof do you offer for his dishonesty? -- Well it is very difficult to prove if you're not in the family. To come up with positive proof and that's why I've left the country, I would have been exactly in this same position. All operations is planned to leave no traces at all.

Hang on. Wait a minute. You sit there blandly telling the world that General Van der Merwe, the present commissioner of police, is basically a dishonest man. -- That's hundred per cent.

Back it up. -- I've just told you. Go and backtrack him
in where he was and check in his areas how many activists have

died and if you want to tell me that a - in our security family in your area activists get wiped out and you don't know what is going on there, then you are mistaken.

Do I take it that you can offer no proof whatsoever as you're sitting there? -- Except from Warrant-officer Hendrik Prinsloo who met me in recruiting head office in 1983, confirming that General Johan van der Merwe was part of the - the click in Bloemfontein.

CHAIRMAN: What? -- Of the click in Bloemfontein.

No, well, there are many clicks. Now, I don't know how many clicks there are in Bloemfontein. What click are you talking about? -- Well, of the - of the - you have knowledge. (10)

No, but, but please. You said you were told he was part of a click in Bloemfontein. -- Ja. Of the Bloemfontein security branch, that's correct.

But he was a member of the security branch. -- That is correct.

So /...

C2.4

- 412 -

COETZEE

So, now what does that show? He was part of a click. -- Well, part of the family. The family is a click. (20)

Now? Yes, now what about it? -- He has - he must have had knowledge of - of what happened in, in his area whilst being there.

Yes. Is - is that the totality of your proof - of, of your facts? -- And Warrant-officer Hendrik Prinsloo, one of his close - close colleagues that worked under him, yes.

What - what, what does that proof? -- That he said that General Van der Merwe was one of the guys for these kind of jobs to get rid, take activists out.

Yes.

MR MARITZ: So you base your entire slander of General Van der Merwe on the hear say stories of a Warrant-officer Prinsloo? (30)

-- Unfortunately all - most of my stories will be hearsay, except that - those that I am personally involved in, because the rest, there is for sure no evidence left ever. Every operation is planned with no evidence left.

But the salient point is this: You take these stories, you make them your own and you slander people. -- We will sit here for years arguing in words and I won't be able to prove to you, except if this Commission is broadened, which I have said already and the chairman has taken note of it. So it's no use going on for hours arguing and arguing about words.

(10)
CHAIRMAN: No, but the point is this: What General Van der Merwe did in Bloemfontein, has nothing to do with the broadening of my Commission. I can deal with the matters if I have some facts.
-- Ja.

You now make the statement and you don't produce the
facts /...

C2.5 - 413 - COETZEE
facts. And that is what Mr Maritz complained about. -- Yes. One will have to look at my whole life from ... (intervenes)

(20)
It has not to do with your life, because you were not stationed in Bloemfontein. -- But I operated there.

Did you operate in Bloemfontein? -- Ja.

Did you kill people in Bloemfontein? -- Not in Bloemfontein, under their area in Lesotho. Going to Bloemfontein headquarters, receiving my orders there, going down ... (intervenes)

But we're talking about what happened in Bloemfontein. -- Ja. That was told to me by Warrant-officer Hendrik Prinsloo. That's right.

I see. Yes.

(30)
MR MARITZ: As a matter of fact, we can take this a bit further.

You left the South African Police on 6 March 1986. That right?

-- 31 January 1986.

Well, a bit earlier. -- Yes.

You fled the Republic of South Africa on 5 November 1989.

-- That's correct. On a Sunday.

And today, if I'm not mistaken, I think it's 28 April 1990.

27 April 1990. Is that right? -- I don't know. If you say so, it must be ... (intervenes)

You can take my word for it. It's 27 April 1990. -- Then I take your word.

CHAIRMAN: Just check on my watch, yes. It is. (laughter)

(10)

MR MARITZ: You've made two statements in the meantime, the Mauritius one and the one that you spoke to Jacques Pauw, is that right? -- That was one statement there, yes.

Yes? You also appeared on a television program that was screened here in the UK some days or weeks ago. -- On several

TV /...

C2.7

- 414 -

COETZEE

TV programs, yes.

How many statements did you make to the - to the tele- vision?

(20)

To various television networks? -- I can't remember, it was a lot.

Many of them. -- Ja.

So many of them, that you can't even remember ... (intervenes)

-- Yes.

The, the, - the, the total. -- That's correct.

I see. Now all this time, you haven't been able to come up with a shred of proof to back up your accusations? -- A shred of proof to back up my accusations?

That's right. -- You won't find any proof. If you go back home, that's what the investigation team was trying to do all these months. And I could have given them a letter that they won't find

(30)

any proof, because that - the jobs was planned that way. But then, I challenge again: Appoint me as one of those investigating officers and I'll put my money where my mouth is.

CHAIRMAN: But I think - what I don't understand, if there is no shred of evidence available, how will you find the evidence? -- I've found it so, so stunning that after all this allegations that was made by three former policemen, myself, Tshikalange and Nofemela, not even one Askari was locked up. As far as the CCB was concerned, colonels, and I don't know how many we got ...

(intervenes)

That has nothing to do with the question. Please answer the question. -- Well, I'll - I'll prove it. I'll, I'll - I'll ...

(intervenes)

No. Just listen to the question, and answer the question. -- Okay, sorry. Can you just repeat the question?

The /...

C2.8

- 415 -

COETZEE

The question is, you say there is no evidence, because no traces have been left. But if you go back to the RSA, you will find the evidence. -- I think there's enough honest men still left on Vlakplaas and elsewhere in the police that used to be with the - that were with me in Vlakplaas, that will come out with the truth if they've got the assuery for their future career in the police. (20)

Hm-m.

MR MARITZ: Let me give you an - a for instance. I don't find the place in my notes now, but those around me can correct me if I'm wrong. You said for instance, Joe Mamasela, you said that you can offer proof of his involvement in the various murders and escapades that you testified about here in this Commission.

Remember saying that? -- That's correct. (30)

Where's that proof? -- I was busy getting it from the Botswana

police, the entering of him with my bakkie through the border, myself going in after him and him going in later that night. I think that should be - be proof what we, what we were doing on that border post with one bakkie, entering one after another, if you listen to my story. Then I hope, only hope that with the Lindley shooting incident, that his name was mentioned with the Attorney-General when that, that - that case was put right. Then, I don't know whether it's applicable, but I'm ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: But I think, point no. 1, what happened - let's assume that you went into Botswana as a fact, that doesn't take my investigations further. Point no. 2, assume that he fired at - at a private individual in Lindley, that also doesn't take my cut - or my further (intervenes)

MR KUNY /...

C2.9

- 416 -

COETZEE

MR KUNY: May I just say something here in explanation? You might remember that the questions put were to the effect that Joe Mamasela will say that he had nothing at all to do with Vlakplaas or Captain Coetzee during 1981 and to the extent that Captain Coetzee has now said evidence is being sought to show that there was a connection, that would take your investigation a substantial way.

CHAIRMAN: I see, yes. -- And if I can just add to Mr - I don't know whether - I think it was Mr Maritz that asked it, I would also like to get hold of the file of his passbook application, his passport travel document application and his eventual application to become member of the South African Police.

MR MARITZ: In due course, we will show you all these documents.

Have no fear. But what I'm interested in, is you said that at least in that one instance, you could offer proof. You have now spoken of Mamasela having entered Botswana. You've also spoken

of the Lindley incident as being matters which would corroborate you. Are there any other scraps of evidence or pieces of information? -- If not being tampered with, I hold, as I said, the passbook application - the passport application and I'll even challenge Joe to stand identification parade with my five - with my son who was five years old at that time, very fond of Joe and he's now 13 and I'd like to - to test my son's memory on that.

Also Dirk Coetzee.

Fine. So that's the totality of the - of the proof that you spoke of? -- And then relying on people like Sergeant Schutte and eventually other Askari's coming to the forth - to the front who is prepared to speak the truth in the end. (10)

CHAIRMAN /...

C2.10

- 417 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: But I thought you said you will prove during the course of your evidence? -- If I had the opportunity to enter the country, I'm sitting in the side-car ... (intervenes)

No, no. I - I take your point there. All I said, that I think I recall that you said that you will in course of this hearing prove these allegations. If this documentary is put available to me, yes. (20)

Ja. Thank you.

MR MARITZ: Let us take something else as a for instance. In your evidence-in-chief, you could make great moment of log- books. -- That's right.

And petrol sheets. -- That's right.

Now, I don't really understand, because you contradict yourself and I want to explain to you why I say so. You say that if one would look at the log-books, one would see where you went and what you did. -- According to your petrol intakes at the back, (30)

at which police stations you've put in petrol, yes.

But in the same breath you say that there were no log-books in the cars that you used. -- No, I said the log-book in front - I - you must have misunderstood me. You've - you've got a front page, where you complete - you are supposed to complete your daily trips. Daily. Time leaving, time ending your trip in return.

But at Vlakplaas, we had one entry the 1st of the month under the file 1816, a signature and at the end of the month just close about 12 000 kilometres done. So on the front of the page where you should complete each and every trip, that's not done. But the back page, makes provision for a piece where every police station where you put in petrol during that month, must be stipulated. And that and

the /...

C2.11

- 418 -

COETZEE

the - the, the - the quantity of petrol that you've taken in. And that can be checked. Once you've got that, you can go back to the police station and check in the police petrol register the exact reading of the petrol pump, the signature of - of the, the driver of the vehicle that is putting in petrol.

Now, what are the police regulations saying about documents such as those? -- There are in standing orders stores, you - they can be destroyed after certain years.

But my question is, that the main file of those - of the of every police vehicle is kept at the quarter-master and I just hope that there's record thereof at the quarter-master. Because I've got information, which is denied too, that these log sheets were destroyed soon after Almond Nofemela spoke.

Ja, but that's another hearsay story that you have come up with. -- Well, it will be funny to know why the worksheets weren't destroyed after ten years, which is actually not really a

worksheet, but a - that's why we'll have to get hold of standing order stores and see what - what do they say when that must - when that must be destroyed.

Isn't it - isn't the true position that all these sheets are audited and then within two years after the audit, they are all destroyed? That's standard practice in the police. -- I can take you to many a police station where that is not destroyed after two years, but kept for years. And according to my information, the same at headquarters and it was destroyed recently.

Now ... (intervenes) -- And, and, and according to my view,
(10)
that was the only traceable document that we - one would have been able to trace each and every individual's - with a

car /...

C2.12

- 419 -

COETZEE

car - his movement during days. To say that he was - he must have been in the Lindley area, he's putting in petrol in Lindley. He must have been in Durban, he put in petrol that day in Durban.

CHAIRMAN: In other words what you say, is that records have been destroyed. -- They've been destroyed, ja.

(20)

They have been destroyed. So they don't exist. -- I hope there's some, some - some copies at the - the quarter ...

(intervenes)

But you said you know that, have been told they were destroyed. -- They just told me, ja. That's right.

MR MARITZ: Well, what must we make with the evidence of Almond Nofemela, who said that no records were kept. What he had, was a note-book in which these particulars of petrol intakes were jotted down and nobody cared about the note books after that. -- No. No, that's untrue. At the end of the month, I don't know
(30)
whether it was done at head office, from that little petrol pocket - it's a police pocket book that they kept in the van to complete,

in - in the car, and then at the end of the month, from that book, they transferred it onto the log-sheets.

And what happens when a car is no longer in use? -- It's - it's a administrative matter. You mean being, being - being boarded on the end, taken from the book, or how do you mean not in use?

Yes. Say now for instance a motor car which was in use is no longer in use. What happens to the documentation in regard to that car? -- That is kept at head office and I don't know the exact administrative procedures between head office and quarter-master, (10) where the main file was kept for

this /...

C2.13

- 420 -

COETZEE

this - for this vehicles.

All I want to put to you and I don't - I want to know whether you can dispute this, is that in a case of vehicles which have become unfit for use and in the case of statements which have been audited, at least after a period of two years, those records are destroyed. -- In theory, yes.

(20)

I see. It appears as if the theory and the practice in the police, according to you ... (intervenes) -- Are not relevant.

Don't meet one another. -- That's correct.

Oh, I see. Now, a lot has been said about the S & T claims and the worksheets. What is your view regarding those documents, which are available? -- I don't know when they have to be destroyed.

That we can also look at. That will also be ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No, the question is what is your views about those that are available. -- In - in what sense? My view, can you just please elaborate on it? My view to?

(30)

MR MARITZ: Well, are they crooked documents, or are they accurate documents? -- The times of departures should usually be correct.

The times of coming back, will be always made up to the next day, or there can be a case where a chap has returned to - to base and gone back and it's never been pointed out on the - on the S & T sheet. The worksheet was basically just a transfer from the S & T sheet by a clerk onto the worksheet and it was - is not in practical a worksheet indicating the true position of what - what is going on. And if you will allow me, I am sure you will at a stage, and I can point it out to you.

No, what I want to know at this stage, we'll get to that

later /...

(10)

C2.16

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COETZEE

later on, what I want to know now, your dishonesty did not stretch to the extent that you stole from the quarter-master, or did it?

-- From the quarter-master?

Yes. -- Stole what from him? Money?

Money. -- No. From the police we stole money, yes.

When and where did you steal money from the police? -- For instance, with the Mxenge case I was back home for two days over the weekend, it was 21 and 22.

(20)

Yes? -- And I never booked back and went back to burn the car and I only booked back on the Monday morning.

Are there any other cases that you can recall? -- There must be. I - I can't think of it as it is now, but there's always a one or a two day. I remember periods being up in Pretoria from Barkly-East, just leaving a day as it is and going back.

But that's penny pinching, really. -- If you want to put it - I don't how - how much did it amount to here.

Very little actually. -- Ja, ja. It was very little.

Penny pinching. -- Wrong pinching, ja.

(30)

But by enlarge you knew that if you gave markedly false information on your S & T claims, some time or another, you would

land up in trouble. -- Markedly?

False information on your S & T claims. Some time or another, it would catch up to you - you would land up in trouble. -- It never caught up with me and the rest of Vlak- plaas.

But wait a minute, didn't you have to report to the divisional commander of the area that you worked in? -- Yes, that's correct.

And didn't you have to report when you left that area?

-- That's /...

C2.17

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COETZEE

(10)

-- That's correct.

So it was no secret when you arrived and when you left.

-- Ja, within a few hours, that's right.

So if you were going to falsify S & T claims, you would have been caught out. -- If I falsify it in that way that I never left the farm and put in a false - false claim that I've been off the farm for a week, yes, but not with coming in 21h00 at night and booking in till the next morning, you know, 08h00.

That boils down to penny pinching. -- If you want to call it that, yes.

(20)

Claiming for a couple of hours, whereas you shouldn't have really. -- That's right.

Now, I just want to discuss the worksheet in your particular case. I am referring you to B99 at page - page 8. It's also B31.

Have you got the document that I'm referring to? -- 101, 31 is on my page.

That's right. -- Okay.

It has your name on it? -- It's - it's got my name on it.

It's got your rank as "Kaptein". -- That's true.

It's got a number there. Is that your force number? -- Force number, yes.

(30)

If you look in the right-hand column, the first signature

appearing there, is that your signature? -- That's mine.

Now, the very first entry reads that you were in East London from 20 August 1981 to 20 September 1981. -- That's correct.

So you would have left Vlakplaas on 20 August. If you turn to the actual S & T sheet, you'll find a corresponding entry.

It's /...

C2.19

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COETZEE

It's the seventh entry from the bottom. -- Yes.

According to which you left Vlakplaas on 20 August 1981 at 08h00 in the morning. -- That's right. (10)

The S & T sheet and the worksheet show that you did not in fact return on 20, but you stayed on, but the entries are broken up. So there was a continuous period then again from 20 September 1981 to 1 October 1981. -- That's correct.

The next entry shows a gap. It shows that you returned to Vlakplaas but then left again on 9 October 1981. -- That's correct.

Also at 08h00 in the morning. -- That is correct.

And then you returned from the Eastern Cape, according to these entries, on 29 October 1981. Is that right? -- Yes. That's correct. (20)

So I suppose that when you reached East London, on or about 20 or 21 August 1981, you would have gone to the divisional commander and reported to him. -- That was normal practice.

And I suppose that at the very least, when you left the Eastern Cape you would have done the same when you departed on 28 or 29 October 1981? Saying I'm done now, I'm going back.

-- Well, if I hadn't left in between that area, yes. I mean that's not - that's not to say that I stayed fixed in East London from 20 August till 20 September. I could have moved all over the country during that period. (30)

I appreciate that. I appreciate that. But at least, I'm

saying at the very least that when you finally left on or about 28 or 29 October 1981, you would have gone to the divisional commander and said look, we're all going back to Vlakplaas, or I'm going back, I'm not coming again. -- That's

right /...

C2.21

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COETZEE

right.

That right? -- Yes.

Now, according to these entries, that was the only period that you were in fact stationed in the Eastern Cape. -- According to what - what's written here. (10)

Are these entries correct ... (intervenes) -- Mr ... (intervenes)

In that regard? -- I wouldn't be able to say. I must have - have my vehicle log sheet, and I'll be able to indicate whether I'd travelled during that period.

CHAIRMAN: No, no. That's not the question. -- But he asked whether ... (intervenes)

No, no. Just - no. Just listen to the question is this: (20)
These documents show that during the period 20 October to 1 - 20 August to 1 October, 9 October to 29 October you were sometimes at least, in the Eastern Cape. -- That's correct.

Fine. -- That's right.

Now what Mr Maritz wants to know, apart from these periods, these wide periods, there's no other indication that you were in the Eastern Cape. He wants to know whether you were in the Eastern Cape in any other period beyond those two mentioned. -- Quite possible, yes.

Could you indicate that? -- It's not - I'll have to have - not, not according to this sheet. Not according to what's written onto this "werkskaart". (30)

No, no. Just, just look at it. At the next page, your S & T form. -- Ja, but I see for instance the entry between 11 November, the second last entry on this "werkskaart" and the last one, there's one missing. The one of 1 December 1981 till 22 December 1981, an amount of R556,50.

Yes /...

C2.21

- 425 -

COETZEE

Yes? -- Which was not dotted down on this so-called "werkskaart".

(10)

No, no. But - no. Please, just try and listen carefully.

If we take page - the document, the original document. Forget the "werkskaart" for a moment. Let's just go back to the original document. You left, as you said, for the Eastern Cape on 20 August 1981. Is that right? And you travelled around and around and you came back on 1 October. -- That's correct, ja.

Then presumably on 9 October you again left for the Eastern Cape, travelled all across the country and you came back on 29 October. -- That's correct.

Then we know that on 11 November you went to Durban. -- That's correct. (20)

And you travelled around and you came back on 23 November. -- That's correct.

Fine. Then there's an entry relating to December. Now what Mr Maritz wants to know, is: What other times did you travel to the Eastern Cape beyond those shown here? -- But then I said, it's impossible to indicate it out of my fist. If I've got my vehicle log-sheet with my petrol - petrol take-ins, I'll be able to indicate to the Commission.

So you don't know? -- I don't know.

(30)

Thank you.

MR MARITZ: Let us take for instance the next period there. From

11 November 1981 to 3 November 1981 you were in Natal, according to the worksheet. -- 11 November till 23 November.

In Natal? -- That's right.

And it corresponds with the S & T sheet itself, where you left Vlakplaas at 14h00 in the afternoon on 11 and you
returned /...

C2.23 - 426 - COETZEE

returned, according to the worksheet, at 08h00 in the morning on 23. -- That's correct.

So those dates would be accurate dates. -- I ... (inter-venes) (10)

Reflecting that you left on 11, you returned on 23. -- Ja, it can be. Yes. 11 I'm not sure of. 23, I've got an explanation.

When I reached Pretoria, I stayed for the week-end, went down and came back on 23.

You've already said so. Excepting that. -- Oh. Okay. Then except that.

Why are you not sure of 11? -- It is - it is possible that that is correct.

You stretched periods to penny pinch the quarter-master. -- That's correct. (20)

But you never shortened them. -- No, I wouldn't have shortened them. So that is most probably correct.

Yes. And then we have the entry which you say is not accounted for and I accept that at this stage and then there's a further entry of 29 December to 31 December, where you were in the Eastern Transvaal according to the worksheet. -- That's correct.

Right. Now, before you left for somewhere which is not reflected on the worksheet on 11 August 1981 to 12 August 1981, have you got that entry? -- 11 August 1981 to 12. Got it. (30)

You were away, it looks like about a day - two days. Two days you were away. That right? -- Ja. A day and a night.

Before that, the last entry was 19 February 1981 to 27 February 1981. -- I see it.

So between 27 February to 11 August, you never left

Vlakplaas /...

C2.27

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COETZEE

Vlakplaas. -- 27 February, according to this, yes.

Is this correct, then? This sheet - this worksheet? Ag, this S & T sheet? -- Ja, it's - I don't, I'll have to look at the original one and the - the original register. I see it's not been a - a certified copy. As it is here, I must accept it as correct. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Well, you can accept that I do not ask anyone to provide me with certified copies. We make copies and we assume people are honest. -- I'm sorry.

And if, if you wish to place it in dispute, I'll go back to South Africa and I'll check and I'm sure Mr Kuny will also check. -- Okay, sorry.

So, forget that we work on copies, as you can see. -- Okay, but I've seen some of them has been - has been certified by, as - as originals. That's why I'm asking. I'm not ... (intervenes) (20)

Not in this file.

MR ROBERTS: Sorry, Roberts here. If one looks at B32, which is the document in its original form which we handed in, that is in fact a certified copy.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARITZ: So let's not bother with certified copies at this stage. Do you concede that the S & T ...

CHAIRMAN: What period are you talking?

MR MARITZ: That the S & T sheet contains an accurate reflection of the S & T claimed by you as set out on that entire document? (30)
-- Yes.

Do you concede that? -- Ja.

Right. So it boils down to this: Since more or less August 1981, you spent some time in the Eastern Cape, you

spent /...

C2.28

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COETZEE

spent about two week in Natal and you spent some time after that in the Eastern Transvaal, allowing for the fact that you may have moved around in those periods. -- Yes.

CHAIRMAN: Would you please not place your hand in front of your mouth? -- Ja. Excuse me.

(10)

Because it tends to obstruct what you're saying. -- Yes.

My answer is yes.

MR MARITZ: Now you referred - I beg your pardon. You referred in your statement which you made to Jacques Pauw at 17 to your stints in the Eastern Cape in these terms:

"Ja, byvoorbeeld in Augustus, was dit 81? Toe dit die jaar in Johannesburg gesneeu het, toe die Elliot - toe die Elliot, die klomp daar by September. Daar by Elliot was die skietery met die terries gewees. Toe is ons hele groep af, byvoorbeeld, soontoe om die paaie, padblokkades te hou en die terries daar te laat rondbeweeg. Ons het op Lady Grey gebly en tot by Elliot ..."

(20)

And then you were interrupted. The question was asked:

"Het julle hulle gekry?"

And you asked:

"Het ons?"

And the question was repeated:

"Het julle hulle gekry?"

And you answered:

"Nee, nee. Daar was mos van hulle doodgeskiet en van hulle het weggekom, of hulle was bang vir nog infiltrasie of wat ookal."

(30)

So do we take it that when you were referring here to the Elliot incident, you were referring to the stint in the Eastern Cape as is reflected on the worksheet? -- I had reflected to

the /...

C2.30

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COETZEE

the time that we've been at Lady Grey, based in the single quarters there during the year that it snow in Jo'burg. Yes.

And were you based at Elliot - ag, at - sorry, at Lady Grey during that whole period from 20 August right up to 29 October?

-- Not the whole time. I remember a spell that we slept in army⁽¹⁰⁾ barracks in Queenstown too.

Yes? -- Spent some time there.

But your main activities I suppose, in that three month period, were centered in the Eastern Cape. -- I can only answer exactly on that if I've got my vehicle log-sheet. I can check my petrol intakes and I can answer a definite yes. Otherwise, I must let myself be led by this and I can't eh ... put it that this is hundred per cent right.

Well, one thing is sure. Is that apart from the two weeks that you were in Natal, you weren't in Natal at any other time.⁽²⁰⁾

Is that right? -- I just - I just ask you, please - I don't want to put it again. If I've got my petrol intakes, I can confirm it. Otherwise, I must just say yes, yes, yes, according to what's standing here. And I can't confirm that. I've been in Durban only once as a result of what is in - in front of me and I do not regard it as accurate.

But wait ... (intervenes) -- As to my exact movements during that time.

Wait a minute. Wait a minute. You have chosen to come and sit here and to testify under oath. -- That's right. ⁽³⁰⁾

And you are testifying from memory. -- That's right.

Now, cast back in your memory what you did from 11 November to 23 November 1981, when you were in Natal according to the worksheets. -- Whilst I was - as far as the murder is concerned, the Mxenge murder?

No /...

C2.31

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COETZEE

No. -- I can't tell you exactly from - from, from day to day nine years ago and there's certain incidents that were important to me that I can remember and I know that during this period we've left also from Durban. So, it's impossible for me⁽¹⁰⁾ to from my memory tell you exactly what happened from day to day.

Well, let's try and refresh your memory then. We know for a fact that the late Mr Griffith Mxenge was murdered on 19 November 1981. -- That's right, on a Thursday night.

We know from what you've told us, what you say you did between 19 and 23 November. -- That's correct.

Now, according to you, before 19 November, there were preparations to commit the murder. -- There was.

How long did those preparations take? -- Can't tell you ...
(intervenes) (20)

How much time did that entail? -- No, I can't tell you. One will have to look at when the - the Mxenge dogs were poisoned and how long thereafter the murder took place.

What about the surveillance? -- The surveillance was done by the blacks on their own.

How long did that take? -- Impossible for me to say.

Were you present while the surveillance was being conducted? -- Not in the - their company. I was present in Durban for a short spell. I was on my way to PE and was stopped at Lindley police station, asked to turn back. I can't remember what the⁽³⁰⁾ incident was.

Do you recall at all when you were supposed to have received instruction from Brigadier Van der Hoven to have the late Mr Griffith Mxenge murdered? -- Shortly before the murder. Exactly how long, I can't say.

You /...

C2.33

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COETZEE

You wouldn't know whether it was shortly after you arrived there, or on the day that you arrived there? -- No, I won't.

You can't be helpful in this regard at all? -- No, not at all. (10)

I see. Now, can I ask you something else of a general nature first? How does a policeman handle an informer? -- If it is one of the informers who register as an informer, he does work for you as an informer.

Before you go on - how do you register an informer? -- At headquarters, putting his name - I, I only know about headquarters.

Doing what? -- I only know about registering informers at - at headquarters - excuse me - at police security headquarters.

And that was done by putting his name next to a headquarters informant number. They each get a number. His full names, the exact form that you would complete. I don't know. At that time they were receiving R200 a month and it was all Askari's. (20)

Those were the - the, the Askari's at, at - at Vlakplaas that were registered as informers at head office to facilitate payment. -- That's correct.

I see. But I'm not talking about an Askari. I'm talking about a - an informer in the usual course of affairs. -- No. I have no experience of that. Eh ... at Middelburg, I had no informants and what I know of it, is what I've been told. (30)

Were you not taught at the police college? -- No, not at all.

How to handle an informer? -- It's handled like any other source in the police. It's not specifically taught. It is something that you also grow into. You meet this guy in
the /...

C2.35

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COETZEE

the underworld, arrange for him to - for him to be registered, to receive a monthly payment or like in the diamond branch and the drugs, they would per job pay him and you meet, you make meeting places with him, et cetera.

Yes. You spent some time at SANAB. -- That's right. (10)

Did you handle informers there? -- Not at all. I didn't register one.

You never in your entire career as a policeman, you never handled any informants? -- I did handle informants, like Mr Lockwood, with a diamond and a mandrax trap, together with Brigadier Hannes Erasmus, but he was paid for the specific job. He was not registered. A file was not opened for him and he was not paid on a regular base.

Very well, excepting for Mr Lockwood, did you handle any other informants? -- Not at SANAB and not in the security police. (20)

Not anywhere? -- In Swaziland on a non-, non payable basis, yes. But not officially registered and officially paid.

Can I tell you how one handles an informer? -- You can tell me.

An informer is allocated a number. -- As I have done with the Askari's in head office.

Yes. And only the handler knows the name of the informer. -- That's how it should be in practice - eh, in, in - in theory, yes.

You know that? -- Ja. In theory. (30)

Where did you learn that? -- It's common sense. You picked

it up - you pick it up as you go on in the police. I mean, that you won't put your informer on a stage and sort of

show /...

C2.37

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COETZEE

show him to the world, but you - to, to try and keep him secret.

Precisely. The only way in which one can operate an informer, is by keeping his identity secret. -- That's correct.

To such an extent that not even the commissioner of the police, not even the minister of Law and Order, would know the true identity of an informer. -- Not at all times. Peter Casselton, I know⁽¹⁰⁾ exactly, Peter Casselton was an agent of Craig Williamson and he was in personal contact with General Johan Coetzee. A big friend of mine.

Ja, no, look. His position was something totally different. We'll get to that. -- No, but he's a informer ...

(intervenes)

But the fact of the matter is this, that an informer is registered under a number only. -- That's correct.

And is paid on that number. -- That's correct.

Now, by your own admission, you are a liar. -- Yes. Yes.⁽²⁰⁾
I ... (intervenes)

By your own admission, you're a perjurer. -- Perjurer, meaning?

You've perjured yourself.

CHAIRMAN: Yes. Meined. -- Meined. Ja. That's correct.

MR MARITZ: By your own admission, you are a car thief. -- That's correct.

By your own admission, you're a burglar. -- That is correct.

CHAIRMAN: A what? -- A burglar.

MR MARITZ: A burglar. By your own admission, you are a murderer.⁽³⁰⁾
-- I'm a murderer.

C2.39

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COETZEE

In fact, you're not a very pretty person, are you? -- No, like all of us in the security police.

No, I'm not talking about all of you in the security police. -- Well, I'm ... (intervenes)

I'm talking about you. -- Well, I'm talking about us all. You are making ... (intervenes)

You're not a pretty person, are you? -- Oh, well, I'm - I'm usually are if you look at my history, you'll see I've only the⁽¹⁰⁾ - they only misused my skills, that I normally not used for murdering people or stealing cars. My skills was misused in the security police, in the security family. And I was part of the gang. Never before I went to the security police did I murder, did I steal cars, did I burglar places. It's funny that just happened whilst in the security police.

So for a short period in your life, you were a bad guy and then you became a good guy again? -- A bad security policeman, yes.

But basically ... (intervenes) (20)

CHAIRMAN: A bad security policeman? -- Ja.

So for a short time you were a bad security policeman? -- A bad guy, if you want to put it that way.

MR MARITZ: Now when you left the security police, you became a good man again? -- I've never murdered again. I've never stolen cars again.

CHAIRMAN: That - that doesn't really answer the question, does it? Or is that your answer? -- Sir?

Are you satisfied with you answer? -- My answer is that whilst in the security police, my capabilities ... (intervenes) (30)

No. -- And my skills were misused to the benefit of the

security family.

The question was: When - since you've left the security police, did you become a good man again? -- Well, normal in my sense. Not a murderer and a car stealer. Not a - what I would call a you know, angel, but the authentic Dirk Coetzee that I used to be at school, before joining the police, during my uniform branch period and thereafter, after the security police.

MR MARITZ: The fact that you are a killer, a thief and a liar,⁽¹⁰⁾ you wish to justify by the fact that you were doing your duty as a policeman, as you saw it? -- I've tried to explain it to you. We were killers, liars and whatever else you've got to say. This is correct.

I know you are a killer and a liar and a thief on your - on your side, or on your own evidence, but what I'm saying is this: You wish to justify this by saying that you were all those things, this hideous person ... (intervenes) -- Yes.

Because you were performing your duties as a policeman. -- I was part of the security family in a security culture. (20) Hundred per cent correct, yes.

But you yourself, you did this, because you saw this as your duty? -- I saw it as my duty. I was trained in it, I grew up in it and my skills and capabilities was misused.

If it weren't for that - if it weren't for that, you wouldn't have stooped to the depths of the gutter, would you? -- I wouldn't have?

Stooped to the depths of the gutter. -- If it wasn't for what?

For the fact that you were misused. -- If I never went to the security police, I would have still been the same (30)

authentic Dirk Coetzee. During that period in the security police. To me it was an unconventional war. I didn't have the lookout at things that I do have now. I was fighting the enemy and I was at - I - I'd - it was justified a dirty war that we fought and what we have then seen - we - I didn't see myself as a murderer or a car thief and seen myself as a security policeman fighting the enemy, fighting the so-called terrorists, the communists, that tried to overthrow the white government in South Africa. It was an unconventional war.

So in this war, no holes were barred? -- No holes were? (10)

Barred. -- Sorry, I don't understand you.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, alright, I think ... (intervenes)

MR MARITZ: Anything went. -- Anything went.

Anything went. -- Anything went.

I see. Then please explain the incident with the diamond dealer. -- The diamond dealer, was a question of lending money to colleagues of mine to buy diamonds.

But that was a private enterprise. -- It was a private enterprise, sure.

It had nothing to do with fighting the war? -- It had nothing (20)
to do with fighting the war.

It had nothing to do with upholding your - your South African society as it was in that time? -- Not at all.

It was not a case of having your trust misused? -- Not at all.

It was not a case of being manipulated by your superiors? -- Not at all.

Then what was the rhyme or the reason for your conduct in the diamond case? -- Helping colleagues with money to buy diamonds illegally, to sell them, to get rich and it developed (30)

into /...

into a murder that was not planned. The intention was not to kill any people, or ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but being the honest upright policeman you were, how could you involve yourself in illicit diamond buying? -- Sir ... (intervenes)

Well, let's put it this way: Whose fault was it? You cannot blame it on the security police, or do you blame it on the security police? -- No. No, I don't blame ... (inter- venes)

Fine. So you have to admit that you, that you blame it on yourself. -- I blame it on myself.

Fine. Now, explain - explain your upright character against that? -- Okay. Being in the security culture, one sometimes go to extremes where you get involved in illicit - eh, in, in - in illegal things, that we did now. That - we did it now.

Why? What has it to do with your work? -- It is a question that if you could do it for, for - for, for a nation and for a country, illegal things that is not lawful, why not for yourself?

And it wasn't a murder that was planned. It wasn't a car thief - a car stealing expedition that was planned.

Yes, but you know, I don't understand the selective morality. Illicit diamond buying is to a policeman just as illicit or for - as to an ordinary citizen. -- Yes.

Just as illegal as stealing a car, or burning a car. -- Ja.

So? -- Not if policemen are involved in this hanky-panky eh ... (intervenes)

But that has nothing to do with the question of your own morality. -- Okay, that happened. I can't explain it. I saw
it /...

it as a small enterprise, worthwhile investing money into it and

that happened.

And what ... -- And I - and I admitted it out of my own. If I didn't mention it, no one else would have known it. And I just came out during this ... (intervenes)

Yes, but Joe Nofemela could have - could have mentioned it. -- He could have, but he did not.

Yes, but ... (intervenes) -- And I decided to do it.

Yes.

MR MARITZ: Why did you mention it? -- To get my conscience clear for once and for all, to have no acts hanging over my head once I've - I'm finished with this Commission, I've spoken out every⁽¹⁰¹⁰⁾ single thing in my life that I've done wrong.

You know, that's the strange thing about you. -- Why?

And that's the big conundrum that I can't work out. I've read your Mauritius statement. -- Yes.

I've listened to the tapes where you went on for hours and hours and hours, gushing out slime. -- Ja.

I've listened to your evidence in this Commission. -- Hm-m.

And I've not heard one word of sorrow by you? -- Of sor- row?

Do you want me to sit down crying? I went to the enemy that I've⁽²⁰²⁰⁾ done wrong. I took that calculated risk. I went to the ANC. The only people outside South Africa with a so- phisticated enough intelligence force to check on me. And I went and I said I've done wrong to you guys.

CHAIRMAN: But that doesn't - that is no indication of re- morse. And that is what Mr Maritz puts. -- So, what would - it's - five months have passed. I've lived with my conscience. I went through a lot of suffering. Do you expect me to stand up

this /...

(3030)

this morning and cry about it now? Or try and make the best of what happened in the past? And try and put it right in a way?

Try through what I'm doing now to stop the atrocities that's going on in South Africa that no one is believing here? Isn't that a remorse? Showing a remorse?

No. -- Not?

MR MARITZ: No. What disgusts me, is that you would say: "This table-cloth is white" and "I burnt Peter and Vusi" in exactly the same fashion. -- What disgusts me is that you defend dishonest policemen that are lying in South Africa. (10)

Not the slightest trace of emotion. Nothing. -- I had enough emotion during the past years and with my debriefing with ANC and I'm sure a lot await in the future when I meet those widows and children that I'd done wrong, that went widows and became orphaned children, because of my acts that I participated in. So there's still a lot of grievance ahead. That I can assure you.

But then your conscience must - and incidentally it's your conscience. -- Ja, ja. My English is not so very good. Was 1963 in matric and I suffered three exams to pass it.

But if it were a case of telling your story, your conscience⁽²⁰⁾ must have been salved long ago. At the very least on 5 November last year. -- That's what - how you - you want it, but it didn't happen that way.

The trouble is that that is not the case at all. -- It is the case. I can assure you that.

You've come here as the big hero. -- No hero at all. I'm - I'm afraid, you haven't met the ANC. There's no heroes in the ANC. To the ANC is a question of confirming what they have really known for very, very long, with a well

sophisticated /...⁽³⁰⁾

sophisticated intelligence force to check each and every story of mine and that I can assure you: You don't walk into the ANC and bluff them out of the pool with things after happening - that happened now. Incident after incident after incident they're well dug in, they're well informed and they get their feedbacks and they've got their files. So I just didn't walk therein and within one day was accepted by them. I was de-briefed for hours and hours and weeks and weeks.

The worst part of it is that one could still forgive you, but the only way in which you can face yourself is by drawing all⁽¹⁰⁾ around you and everybody around you into your own cesspit. -- Never in life. You as an advocate may know it's a dubious world, it's a dark world and I must explain in words to you. But the truth will come out one day. Maybe not now during the Commission ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: It's coming out. -- Is - is it coming - I hope so, but I mean the full truth.

Thank you. -- Of the whole death squads. I mean obviously no policeman in South Africa can come forward at this logically - forward and say: "I participated, I'm a murderer." What would⁽²⁰⁾ happen to him? He would be up against the wall. What - I, I would have sit in the same position trying to convince you and people around me with no evidence at all. At least I have got people - some people - that believe me and hopefully in the future will give me a chance to prove it. I can only make a fool out of me in future if I prove - if I'm proved wrong all over. Isn't it?

I want you to have a hard look at what you are doing. I'm going to demonstrate it to you now. Your wife, you walked in here, you hadn't been sitting there for 10 minutes when you

spoke /...⁽³⁰⁾

spoke about your own wife in the most disrespectful terms. -- My wife?

Yes. -- Did I spoke here in the ... (intervenes)

Yes. To the extent that the honourable chairman had to silence you. -- About my wife?

Yes. -- Read it to me?

You don't recall it? -- Here - was it now, today?

In Swaziland ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: I think - I think it - Mr Maritz talks about your evidence just when you began when I said I wasn't interested in⁽¹⁰⁾ your marital problems.

MR KUNY: With respect, do we need Mr Maritz's comment as to whether that was disrespectful of his wife or not? -- All I can ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Well, he puts it to the witness. The witness can admit it or deny it.

MR KUNY: Well, if he put to the witness what he said, he can deal with it. -- And then I would like to put the story - is it about that divorce you're speaking about?

MR MARITZ: Look I don't want to labour the point. -- Okay. ⁽²⁰⁾

Let's go on to the - with the next one. -- Okay.

About the first person you mentioned to Jacques Pauw, is Joe Robeirro. Have I got it right? The man who worked in Swaziland that had something to do with a - with a mechanic shop there? To service motor cars - what was his name? -- Joe Robeirro.

Who was that person you spoke of? -- In one of Luyt's motors was a - José Rollo Noivo.

Oh, Noivo. Was he a friend of yours? -- Ja, he was.

You made him a car thief. -- Yes. He made keys for us

and /...⁽³⁰⁾

and we stole the cars.

Yes. You made him a car thief. -- No, I made him a corroborator. A corroborator. It's ... (intervenes)

Collaborator. -- Collaborator, sorry.

Was it Charlie Bell who was the chief of police in Swaziland?
-- That's right.

Was he an honourable man? -- Honourable as I am, yes.

In other words you also want to drag him into the gutter with you? -- Charlie was part of the game. He was on the payroll of the South African security Police. I knew Charlie very, very well.⁽¹⁰⁾

So the chief of - of police in Swaziland, is in the gutter with you. -- Yes and the present commissioner of police too - Mr Sandy Mndiniso.

He's also in the gutter.

CHAIRMAN: Could you please turn your back over, that - I don't want to look at your back, I have to see your face. -- Okay, sorry.

I'm just ... (intervenes)

And if you'd just turn your chair in the ordinary position and talk into the microphone, it would be easy. -- I wonder ...
(intervenes) (20)

Mr Mndiniso, the present chief of police, do you say he's also a crook? -- Yes. He was on the payroll for quite long. There was a motor car accident, of Swazi - Ermelo security guys where they found documents in the back of the boot who was traced back to Mr Mndiniso, who was then transferred to Hlanganu whereafter his uncle, Mr Martin Mndiniso, the king's private secretary went to - to make his name good at - at king - king Subuza, the late king. He then came back to Mbabane and is at the moment commissioner and a big friend of mine.

You /...⁽³⁰⁾

You told Jacques Pauw that you stole a car in - in Swaziland, which later transpired, it was found back in ... (intervenes) -- Soweto.

Soweto. -- It was a car of Stanley Mabizela, the chief representative SD 17163, a Peugeot.

Stanley Mabizela? -- Yes.

And then you went to Mr Charlie Bell, the chief of the police in Swaziland and you told him this story. -- I was with him one morning in the office during one of our visits, normal visits, when a call came through from the Johannesburg vehicle branch and I could hear they found back Stanley's car and I showed to him he must first wait before he replied and that he must first contact Major Nick van Rensburg at Ermelo security. (10)

Instead of - instead of putting you in jail, or kicking you out of his country, he has a good old laugh about it with you. -- Good old laugh? Same when I break into the United Nation High Commission for Refugee offices. Charlie was on the payroll and a very good friend. At the moment he's staying in Pietermaritzburg with the Reserve Bank and his brother Joe Bell worked for national intelligence. (20)

General Johan Coetzee, one of the former commissioners of police. -- Yes.

One of the most revered and respected members of the South African Police in the latter years, world-wide. Not so? -- I would - I wouldn't know. I don't know.

He hasn't - he has quite a good reputation. It's common knowledge. -- Amongst the - the public in General, yes.

But you drag him into the gutter with you. -- He was involved in the London bomb blast of the ANC offices.

And more than that. When he heard about the Mxenge murder /... (30)

murder, he was full of rage. -- He - I - he was, he was interrupted at a meeting and according to his newspaper comment later on, he'd coincided exactly what we put up as the motive in the end.

And I suppose you suggested it he knew full well that this murder was committed by officers serving under him. -- That's correct. He asked Brigadier Jan du Preez and Brigadier Jan told him it's better for him not to know.

As a matter of fact, you go further than that. -- Yes?

You implicate him in the disappearance of a man with the name⁽¹⁰⁾ of Ntimkulu. -- Ntimkulu - that's correct. After he was poisoned, he was landed up in Groote Schuur hospital. He went back to PE after treatment and on his next - next trip to the hospital he disappeared while General Johan Coetzee was the person, investigating officer of this case.

So you think he was responsible for that? -- He was not responsible for the disappearing. Major - Colonel Nick van Rensburg from Port Elizabeth security was involved in that.

I see. So he's also a bad apple. Johan Coetzee. -- Unfortunately, yes. (20)

Brigadier Jan du Preez. -- Yes?

He was your friend and confidante. Wasn't he? -- He was.

As a matter of fact, he came to your aid when you were tried in your disciplinary trial. -- That's correct.

He came to your aid. -- That's correct.

He came and testified on your behalf and you read out of his evidence here yesterday. -- I did.

Not even him do you leave alone. You drag him into the gutter with you as well. -- I'm out not to conceal, to get everything out in the open and even Brigadier Jan du Preez, (30)

who's /...

who's - was - is very close to me, or was. I don't know how it's now - done now. And his wife, tant San, personally known to me, I've even got a letter here that I can prove. It's no way, there's no way that one can hide or try to protect someone. That I've done in Mauritius, like. To - to pretend that Mxenge's radio went into Schoon's car instead of in Brigadier Jan du Preez's Mercedes.

So it's not a question of dragging him in. If everyone comes into the open of the security forces, that commit - that has committed atrocities, and section ANC included, then peace can be made. Not before that. One can forgive and forget the past⁽¹⁰⁾ if you know what to forgive and what to forget. So it's no use for me coming out here, blaming it on certain persons and leaving the other out. And Brigadier Jan was like a father to me. Even Brigadier Van der Hoven in his day and Brigadier Nick van Rensburg. So it was - it - for sure it gave me no big joy to let those people down, if you want to put it in that terms.

So what you say is that in fact he was as bad as the rest of you. -- He was as bad as all security guys involved in these atrocities.

The catalogue is very long. -- The catalogue ... (intervenes)⁽²⁰⁾

It will take a long time to get through it. But I want you to realise what you're doing. -- I know exactly what I'm doing.

General Neethling ... (intervenes) -- Yes.

One of the most respected criminologists in the world today ... (intervenes) -- Yes.

You reduce him to a common poisoner. -- He - that is exactly what he is.

CHAIRMAN /...

CHAIRMAN: Or a bad poisoner. I don't know if it's a common

poisoner. -- Ja. (laughter)

MR MARITZ: Ja, a bad poisoner. -- Well, that is exactly what happened. And we can go into little, small nitty-gritty details and I'll prove it to you. Oh well, I'll try and prove it to you that I was present, that ... (intervenes)

But it goes further than that. Not just a bad poisoner, but an idiot. -- Well, if a bad poisoner is an idiot, that is what he is. (laughter)

Well you make him an idiot. -- No, that's what you said.

No, you make him an idiot. -- No. I make him a bad poisoner.

And an idiot too. -- That's your words, yes. (10)

Don't you? -- No. He's a plain bad poisoner.

Or shall I say a very unsuccessful one. -- No, successful until I've spoken out.

But his poison never worked. -- On the one case, the powder with Vusi and Peter not. The knockout drops worked very well and in 1987 it was tried out on some Askari's and it seemed to work well.

He had three tries at it? -- Pardon?

He had three tries at it? -- That's correct.

And he didn't even learn from his mistakes either? -- I won't⁽²⁰⁾ know. I left afterwards. It must have worked afterwards.

Captain Wal du Toit. -- Very big friend and a close associate.

Very big friend of yours. -- Ja.

He becomes the manufacturer of bombs and devices of death. -- That's his special job at the technical branch in security /...

security head office, preparing Russian time devices for each and every bomb, building 9 millimeter machine pistols into brief cases⁽³⁰⁾ with mufflers and extended trigger mechanisms. Building cameras

into brief cases so that you can walk past a guy and photograph him. Yes. If you call that - that is part of his job.

House friends over many years? -- I went to visit him frequently, yes.

Would you say he was your house friend? -- I met him - he never came to my house with his wife. I went to him frequently yes. But I see it as a house friend. I don't know he - how he sees it.

But he was rotten through and through. -- Not rotten through and through. Part of the security culture in this dirty war against the enemy as we saw it at that time. Unconventional.⁽¹⁰⁾

Excuse me. (coughing)

General Viktor. -- Johan Viktor, that's right.

He's also rotten. -- You call it rotten. That - that, that's what you call it. Yes, it is.

But people that murder and steal are rotten. Aren't they? -- In the normal sense, yes. But we in the security police - police, were fighting an enemy. You fight fire with fire. We were fighting what we believed in at that time as terrorists, communists that wanted to overthrow the white minority government in South Africa and that is how you must look at it. (20)

Brigadier Schoon. -- Coming from Koevoet. Oshakati.

He is also rotten. -- For sure. They asked him to stay on two years after his pension date to wait for his follow-up, Major Nick van Rensburg, well trained during the Swaziland escapades /...

C2.67

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COETZEE

escapades, Eastern Cape, Boland and then eventually ripened to take over Section C.

He's in the same class as Charlie Bell. -- Who's this now?⁽³⁰⁾

Willem Schoon. -- No, Charlie Bell was working in Swaziland

as a ... (intervenes)

But he's in the same class. Not so? -- I don't - I don't know of any murders or instructions that Swazi has - Charlie Bell has given in Swaziland for Swazi murders on - to his policemen.

You go and tell Willem Schoon with glee how the diamond smuggler was murdered and how you took him down to Durban and ... (intervenes)

MR KUNY: There's no suggestion that he told him with glee that that was so, he reported it. He reported what had happened and I don't think it was even to Schoon. -- And the worst is that the diamond dealer's car was replaced by a cheaper radio by Sergeant⁽¹⁰⁾ Schutte and the expensive radio went into Brigadier's official car, a light Cortina with a white vinyl top.

MR MARITZ: I see. -- And, I can go further.

Did you tell him the whole story? -- Exactly what happened.

He doesn't lock you up. -- He did not lock me up. They went so far in 1985 during the build up to my departmental trial when my phone was on tap - I told them all these little stories on the phone. They weren't very happy. And I told them how Brigadier Schoon falsify informants to pay his secretary at security head⁽²⁰⁾ office. I had to register a false informer, Johannes Nkosi, draw the R200 a month with which he

paid /...

C2.69

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COETZEE

paid his friend, the present Brigadier Piet Viljoen's wife, Joan Viljoen. And when I told the stories on tape, his then second in charge, Lieutenant-colonel Jack Cronjé, sent me a message through Sergeant Schutte if I drop Schoon into nonsense, they're gonna - they're gonna reveal that diamond dealer's case. And I⁽³⁰⁾ challenged them on that. Because I don't think that Colonel Jack

Cronjé at that stage knew that that radio went into Schoon's car.

As a matter of fact, I think this is the first time you have ever mentioned it. -- Mentioned what?

The fact that the radio went into Willem Schoon's car. -- You will see at the Mauritius interview, I said into both Brigadiers' vehicles went radios and I didn't want to commit Oom Jan - Brigadier Jan du Preez.

Listen to the question. As far as I know, this is the very first time you have stated anywhere in the world that a radio was taken from the diamond dealer's car and placed into Willem Schoon's car. -- Stated time after time with the ANC interviews. (10)

You didn't say that in the Mauritius statement. -- I didn't.

I also not in the Mauritius statements mentioned the - the big medal parade that General Johan Coetzee held after the London bomb blast. I think the ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: I don't ask - I don't think the two are related. Because I don't think medal parade ... (intervenes) -- But what I want to show to Mr Maritz is, at that stage my - there, there will be things that I left out. I couldn't even remember the Askari's, all their names. I talked of five groups on Vlakplaas and we were only four. So, what I'm trying to show is, I left⁽²⁰⁾ out several things and confused several things whilst /...

C2.70

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COETZEE

whilst at Mauritius.

MR MARITZ: But we're missing the point. The point is, that Brigadier Schoon is in the gutter with you. -- Ja.

He's a bad guy. -- Ja.

The same goes for Brigadier Van der Hoven. -- That whole list that I've mentioned, yes.

Van der Hoven you also told about the body in the boot of⁽³⁰⁾ the diamond dealer. -- Hundred per cent. For sure.

He said: "Get rid of it, get rid of it." -- I just asked him permission to leave, that I can go and get rid of it.

He didn't tell you to get rid of it? -- No, he didn't tell me. It was - had nothing to do with him.

Oh, I see. -- He was just covering.

He was covering? -- Ja.

Covering who? -- Whilst I'm being away out to the Durban area for two days to go and burn the body on the Swaziland border.

So he covered for you? -- Ja.

Full well knowing that you were going on your way to go and burn this body? -- That's hundred per cent. (10)

Of a man that has been murdered? -- That's correct.

He's a policeman. -- He's a policeman.

He's a Brigadier. -- He's a security policeman Brigadier.

He doesn't put you in jail? -- He doesn't put me in jail.

He pats you on the shoulder and he says: "Carry on, my boy, with your good work." -- No, he did not pat me on the shoulder.

Unfortunately not.

CHAIRMAN: Unfortunately?

MR MARITZ: Unfortunately not? -- No, well - what I mean, you suggested, but he did not pat me on the soldier, the - the (20)
shoulder /...

C2.71

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COETZEE

shoulder, to put it that way.

Is it time to take the adjournment?

CHAIRMAN: Are you asking, or do you tell me?

C3.0

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS. THE COMMISSION RESUMES.

GERT COETZEE (still under oath)

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: Thank you. With regard to this diamond smuggler, I understood from what you told Jacques Pauw (30) that Nofemela and Joe and Spyker came to your house in Pretoria

in regard to the - the borrowing of money with the purpose of going out to buy the - the diamonds. -- Ja. If I recollect correctly, it must have been at my house, ja. Not hundred per cent sure.

Well you told Jacques Pauw that they came to your house. -- Ja, I told him that, but I mean it, it could have been somewhere else too. I don't know exact - exactly where the money was handed over.

And you also told Jacques Pauw that they later on returned again to your house. -- Ja, they did return to my house.

That's in Pretoria. -- That's correct.

And that's when you then looked at the diamonds and found⁽¹⁰⁾ that they were scrap. -- That's correct.

And you sent them back. -- That's correct.

Now approximately how long were they away before they came back with the motor car? -- Difficult to say. I must guess, but I - it, it, it wasn't - it wasn't, I think it was one day, but I can't put my head on it. But it was short. It wasn't for a long time.

So from the beginning of the diamond smuggler saga it appears as if you were in Pretoria all the time. -- Must have

been /...⁽²⁰⁾

C3.1

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COETZEE

been, yes.

And it was also in Pretoria when they brought the car back when they told you that they had murdered the diamond smuggler. -- That's correct.

And then you decided to assist them by fetching the body from the plantation where the man had been murdered? -- That's correct.

Do you recall when you left to go and do that? -- It was during that same night. If I can remember, they arrived early evening.⁽³⁰⁾

I took the car to Sergeant Koos Schutte's house and immediately

left from there. Joe Mamasela went back to Krugersdorp. I think we left him at Vlakplaas and myself and Tshikalange and Almond left for the plantation near Lindley.

Then you retrieved the body there, near Lindley? -- We did, yes. That same night we put in petrol at Bethlehem on our way to Durban.

Where approximately in the Free State is Lindley? -- It's on your way from Sasolburg down to Lesotho. If you take the Sasolburg road right down. I don't know the exact towns. But you don't - do not go through, through Bethlehem. I think after Lindley you've got to turn away to Bethlehem. But it's from (10) Sasolburg down south.

How far is it from Pretoria? -- I don't know. I must really guess, but a few hours' driving, I suppose, but I - I'm really guessing.

Approximately how many kilometres? -- If you'd show me a map, I can tell exactly. I really can't remember.

I could do the same. That's why I'm asking you. -- Well, then we must get a map. Sorry, I want to assist, but I can't.

So you retrieved the body there during the night. --

That's /... (20)

C3.2

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COETZEE

That's correct.

And then, what did you do then when you retrieved the body? -- Put it in one of these mortuary bags - it's a white plastic bag, thick one.

Yes? -- Put it in there and back in - in, in my car's boot.

In the Datsun's boot and then we drove through Bethlehem. I still put in petrol that night in Bethlehem and then down to Durban, where we arrived early in the morning. (30)

Why did you go to Durban? -- The whole squad was down in Durban

and I was, if I can remember correct, our departure was only delayed by the arrival of Almond and Tshikalanga from Lesotho.

Were you supposed to have joined the squad in Durban? -- That's correct.

But you hadn't joined the squad yet. -- No. Not till after I have retrieved the body from Lindley in the bush.

Well then I still want to know: Why go to Durban? -- Because that is where I should have been with the squad. So I reported there, off-loaded - left Tshikalanga and Nofemela there, reported to Brigadier Van der Hoven, picked up Captain Koos Vermeulen and Warrant-officer Paul van Dyk and left for the Swaziland border.⁽¹⁰⁾

But, but - but you said on a number of occasions now, that you weren't tied by any rules or regulations. You could go where you wanted to. -- No, no, no. I had to report to the regional commander where - in which area I've, I've got to work. If I leave Pretoria, I've got to report in the morning, as I said in evidence-in-chief. Every morning at 06h30 at Brigadier Van der Hoven's office and sometimes in the afternoon too.

Now /...

C3.3

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COETZEE⁽²⁰⁾

Now but the point is this: Brigadier Van der Hoven did not know where you were. -- He knew I was still in Pretoria.

Right. So you could have reported to Brigadier Van der Hoven whenever you liked. -- No. As soon as the squad - I had to report there. I should have reported there with the squad that morning.

So I couldn't have just stayed away for three, four days without Brigadier Schoon at head office looking for me or Brigadier Van der Hoven.

Would that then have been on 11 November? -- I can't tell.

We can - I see that there's problems in tracing this diamond dealer, but I'm sure I can assist within an hour after getting⁽³⁰⁾

into Lesotho with Tshikalange. I'll be able to get to his home and find out who it was and find out when did he - when he disappeared and then we can check in the petrol book at Bethlehem when I put in petrol. Then I can give you an exact date.

No, look. You talk a lot, but you say nothing. The fact of the matter is that according to the worksheets, the Vlak- plaats group would have arrived in the main 4 November 1981. -- The Vlakplaas groups in Durban?

They arrived in Durban - well, they left Pretoria on 4 November, so they must have arrived on 4 or possibly 5 ...

(intervenes) -- In Durban.

(10)

November 1981 in Durban. -- That's right.

You arrived on 11. -- That's right.

CHAIRMAN: He left on 11.

MR MARITZ: Oh, you left on 11. -- That's right.

So you didn't report ... (intervenes) -- So ... (intervenes)

With the group. -- So, what you want to suggest is that

this /...

C3.4

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COETZEE

this - this killing of the diamond dealer took place in that period⁽²⁰⁾ and that's what I can't confirm. That's my problem.

Well, I don't know. I'm asking you. -- And I said I can't confirm and I told you why - how I can confirm and then you said I - I - I talk a lot.

No, but we have already made out that the group was not in Durban at any other time, excepting the periods showed on the ... (intervenes) -- The worksheets.

The worksheets. We've already made that out. -- But I've made the point thereafter that I can't just go on the work-sheets.

I will have to go on the cars, petrol intakes to for sure check⁽³⁰⁾ that we've never been thereafter, or therefore in - before that

in Durban.

It's not going to avail you to try and change your evidence now. -- No, no, no, no. That's not what I'm doing.

You said very clearly that you reported there when you arrived and you reported when you left. In between, you - you can't say what you did. -- Can I - you're putting it to me that this Lesotho diamond dealer's murder happened during the period 4 November till 23 November?

You said it occurred when the Vlakplaas group was down in Durban. -- In Durban, ja.

Now, the only time that the Vlakplaas group was down in Durban⁽¹⁰⁾ ... (intervenes) -- Durban.

Was in November 1981. -- According to the worksheets.

Yes. -- That's right. And I said I can't confirm that that was the only time that we've been in Durban, because I don't see that worksheets as reliable. Now, then I said if we could, could find out when did this diamond dealer appeared, disappeared, when did I put in petrol in Lindley, as in

Bethlehem /...

C3.6

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COETZEE⁽²⁰⁾

Bethlehem that night, then we can for sure make out which date it was that I went down to Durban. Whether it was on this specific date.

Very well. Have it your way. On the assumption that it was in November 1981, why would you then have taken the body to brigadier Van der Hoven? -- I didn't take the body to him. I went to report where I should have been and said he must - I'll be out of town for a day, myself, Paul van Dyk and Koos Vermeulen, to get rid of the body.

Did you not tell Brigadier Van der Hoven about the body in⁽³⁰⁾ your boot? -- I did tell him of the body in my boot that I must

dispose of.

And did you tell him that you wanted time off to go and dispose of a body? -- That's hundred per cent correct.

But that's stupid. -- It's not stupid. To - to you it might sound stupid, because you don't understand the security culture that I want to explain to you, that I've been explaining to you the whole day.

But it's totally illogical. You could have certainly went, it was so easy - gone and dispose of the body and then reported for duty in Durban. -- Well, I think, that is the way I did it.

So if you want to argue out - argue how I should have done it,⁽¹⁰⁾ I did not do it that way. Then see a case for method in my madness or madness in my method, but, but that's the way I did it.

I see madness. I see no method. -- Good. Then it's right. It's madness.

Let's look at another case.

CHAIRMAN: Well, the question is, the simple question is: Here you have a body. It has nothing to do with your work.

You /...

C3.8

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COETZEE⁽²⁰⁾

You find the body in the Free State. It's night. Why don't you simply, if the intention was to burn the body, why not burn the body and - and leave? And inform as few people as possible? -- I first had to get rid of the two black policemen that was with me, get them off and go and burn the body where whites only present.

Why? -- And I was already late ... (intervenes)

Why? Why? Just answer the question, why? -- For evidence purposes.

But, but they were the murderers. Why, for evidence purposes do you want to get - to don't show them where you burn the⁽³⁰⁾ body? -- Then they can never show where - where the final body

was burned. Where the body was burned. So it will be their word against my word. If - if they said that a Lesotho diamond dealer was murdered and I say where, where - where's this man that has been murdered, how are they gonna prove it if they don't know where we disposed of the body?

But - but they've nothing to prove against you. You had - you had a case against them. In other words you were the only witness who knew that they had murdered someone. -- That's correct.

Why now want to protect yourself? -- No, it's a - if, if they get caught out on this murder, it's exactly what happened with Nofemela now, he knows so much that that murder can put the whole⁽¹⁰⁾ Vlakplaas contingent in a lot of problems if Almond starts talking.

And Tshikalange. Like exactly what happened now.

Hm-m. Yes, but that still doesn't explain why you didn't burn the body there and then. -- It takes quite a long time. A night at least and I was already late to report to the

squad /...

C3.9

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COETZEE

squad. So I had to go down, I had to get rid of Almond and Joe.

They had to be - ag, Almond and Tshikalange. They had to be with⁽²⁰⁾ the - the - with their squad and Brigadier Vermeulen had to - eh, Van der Hoven had to know where I am.

Now, relying on your own recollection, when was the diamond dealer murdered? -- He was murdered just before Lindley and ...
(intervenes)

No, no. No. Where in time. Not where in place. -- I beg your pardon? Where in time was he murdered?

Where in - when in 19 ... sorry. When was he murdered? -- If I've got the opportunity, the only way is to - to go ...

(intervenes)

(30)

No, I asked you to rely on your recollection. -- No.

Forget the rest of this ... (intervenes) -- I'm not gonna - it must have been towards the second half of 1981. If I'm correct - recollecting correctly.

Well, it must have been, because I - I don't think it could have been before the second half of 1981. I think that's more or less common cause. The question is, when in the second half of 1981? -- I can't indicate it, but I, m - I'm prepared to help to establish the exact dates for the Commis- sion if it will help and very easy, too.

Ja. Yes, Mr Maritz.

MR MARITZ: Thank you. Let's look at another case as a for (10)
instance. The man whom we know to be Ntimkulu, he was the man who was in the Cape, who's been poisoned. -- That's cor- rect.

Yes. What do you know about that case? -- I was ori- ginally involved in the Ntimkulu planned murder. He would have gone in the same way as Kondile, released kidnapped

and /...

C3.10

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COETZEE

and then dropped and burned, knockout drops and burned.

Now, before you carry on, how were you involved? -- I was (20)
involved. I was said that this was gonna happen and they will let me know. And if I can recall collect, I was on - can recollect, I was on my way to Port Elizabeth and was stopped at Lindley police station by a call.

Who involved you? -- Brigadier Nick van Rensburg, briga- dier Jan du Preez and in the end Brigadier Van der Hoven came in. He flew the poison eventually down to - to Port Eliza- beth.

Now, what were you supposed to do? -- I was supposed to originally be involved in the kidnapping and disposing of him in the same way as Sizwe Kondile. (30)

So this was a case where you were brought in as a special

sort of a murderer to come and - and commit this crime? -- No.

No. Don't - I think you put it wrong. It was a team effort and if you follow my career from the beginning, that is how we operated.

CHAIRMAN: No, but - but I appreciate there's a team effort. But as a member of the team, what were you personally supposed to do? -- Originally I would have kidnapped him, but it - and I don't know whether then in the end it would - how many people would have been present, whether Colonel Nick van Rensburg would have followed like in the - in, in the case ... (intervenes)

No, the question is: What would you have, what were you supposed to do in the planning stage? Now we know kidnap. Just⁽¹⁰⁾, just limit it to yourself. What else did you have to do? -- The disposal of the body. Killing and disposal of the body.

Killing /...

C3.11

- 460 -

COETZEE

Killing and disposal? -- Ja.

MR MARITZ: And who arranged that with you? -- Brigadier Jan du Preez and Colonel Nick van Rensburg.

Where was it arranged? -- No, I can't get into details. I - it's long ago. I can just recollect that - that I was involved⁽²⁰⁾ in that.

Were Brigadier Van Rensburg and Du Preez both present when the instructions were given? -- No, I think Colonel Nick was down in PE and Brigadier Jan du Preez up in Pretoria.

So did Du Preez convey to you what Van Rensburg said? -- You're laying words in my mouth. I don't know. I can't remember.

CHAIRMAN: It - I think - you had a fair question. I don't think words were put in your mouth. -- Okay, but I can't remember.

You don't know? -- No.

MR MARITZ: But quite apparently they weren't up to doing the jobs⁽³⁰⁾ themselves, so they had to get you to come and do it.

-- No, surely there would have been more involved and I'm sure for the PE squad themselves would have been involved like in the Sizwe Kondile case.

How would you have had to commit this murder? -- In the same way as I disposed in the presence of Paul van Dyk, Colonel Van Rensburg and the rest, of Sizwe Kondile. Knockout drops, he - he would have got shot and then burned on a pyre.

Would you have given him the - the knockout drops? Was that the idea? -- That wasn't discussed up to that stage. It was a question of kidnapping him and then after - afterwards disposing.

There wasn't a - a, a meeting where everything was (10)
planned /...

C3.12 - 461 - COETZEE
planned and certain tasks designated to certain persons.

Now, but - but what did Brigadier Du Preez say to you? Did he say look ... (intervenes) -- We must ... (intervenes)

You must bring this guy down to Port Elizabeth and then help those guys down there to get rid of a man? -- Words with - words to that effect, that - yes.

So no details were discussed? -- No. (20)

Nothing at all? -- Nothing at all.

You were just sent down to go and help to get rid of this man. -- It would have been that way. I was on my way, I think from Durban and stopped at Lindley.

Who stopped you? -- There was a call from either Colonel Nick van Rensburg or from Brigadier Van der Hoven that I must return to Durban.

Were you at Durban at that time? -- As I can collect - recollect, yes.

Would that be in the November 9181 stretch, when you were (30)
down in Durban? -- I can't say. We'll have to look at the dates

of the release of Ntimkulu, his detention and at what stage I was down in Durban.

And then after the Lindley - after you were stopped at Lindley?
-- I returned ... (intervenes)

What did you have to do with this case further? -- Nothing.
I just returned to Durban and later heard that - that Brigadier Van der Hoven flew poison down to Colonel Nick and before his release poison was administered to him and apparently there wasn't enough in it - enough in his, in his - in his drink and he survived.

Who told you that? -- Colonel - eh - Brigadier Nick - Jan⁽¹⁰⁾
du Preez at head office and it was later confirmed by Colonel
Nick /...

C3.13

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COETZEE

Nick van Rensburg.

And what else were you told about this incident, if anything?
-- That he was sent to Groote Schuur hospital where they established
... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: To what? -- To Groote Schuur hospital where they
established exact poison that was administered and that General⁽²⁰⁾
Johan Coetzee personally got involved in investigating this case
and then on a follow-up visit to Groote Schuur hospital, he
disappeared with his wheel chair and his driver and his vehicle.
The vehicle was left near the Lesotho border and the bodies were
disposed of.

MR MARITZ: So that's your whole version of this - of this case?
-- That's right.

I want to read to you what you told Jacques Pauw. I'm
referring to EXHIBIT B3(a) page 134. Pauw asked you the following
question.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: Page 1?

MR MARITZ: 134.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, carry on.

MR MARITZ:

"Dirk, jy het vir my 'n storie vertel van die man wat in die rystoel
..."

And then you replied:

"Ja, dit is 'n ou ook wat in PE aangehou was. Ek het hom nooit
gesien of ontmoet nie. Ek het net nou maar by Brigadier Jan
du Preez en Schoon en Jaap, basies by hulle die storie gehoor
dat hy is toe ook gif ingegee wat hom sou ..."

And then Pauw interrupted you:

(10)

"Wie was hy?"

And /...

C3.14

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COETZEE

And you replied:

"Ek weet nie. Hulle sal weet. Hulle sal weet daar was so 'n ou
man aangehou as ek sal jou nou die storie vertel. Toe ook
geen klagte teen hom in kon bring nie en dit was 'n inwoner
daar wat nou ook soos Griffith Mxenge skynbaar was, jy weet
wat nou - toe het hulle vir hom gif ingegee, maar 'n gedeelte⁽²⁰⁾
het skynbaar afgeloop. As ek dit nou verstaan, is dit iets
soos Liquifruit. Alles het nie in die houer gekom nie, maar
het 'n bietjie gemors en toe is die ou nie dood nie. Hy het
verlam ..."

Pauw interrupted you:

"Hy het nie genoeg gif ingekry nie."

And you said:

"Nee, hy het nie genoeg gif ingekry nie. Hy het verlam geraak,
sy hare het uitgeval en toe het hulle hom Groote Schuur toe
gevat, waar daar vasgestel is dat hy gif inge- kry het en⁽³⁰⁾
ook die werklike soort. Jy weet, hulle kon 'n vasstelling

doen wat se gif het hy ingekry. En toe het Jan - Johan Coetzee nou kamtig die ding persoonlik ondersoek en is daar vir my gesê dat hy toe op pad Groote Schuur toe vir behandeling een dag, met rolstoel en al net van die aardbol af verdwyn het.

Nou ek was nie by nie, maar ek meen daai 'need to know' en daai - jy weet mos - en daai opset wat ek in was, was dit toe duidelik dat hy was ontvoer."

Is that what you told Pauw? -- That's right.

That's the whole story? -- Well, I've completed the story now, I did now.

You never told Pauw of your involvement in this case. -- But⁽¹⁰⁾
I told you exactly what happened at Mauritius. There's a
lot /...

C3.17

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COETZEE

lot of - of cases there that I could fill in a lot of details more and I told you what our time laps was, what my state of mind was and - but basically that's the same story.

Do you know that this man Ntimkulu was detained on 31 May 1981? -- No. I Don't know.

CHAIRMAN: Ekskuus? Could you just repeat that? (20)

MR MARITZ: 31 May 1981, you don't know? -- No, I don't know.

Do you know that he was discharged from custody on 20 October 1981? -- No, I don't know.

Did you know the following: On 13 May 1982 Ntimkulu's mother, Mrs Joyce Ntimkhule, made an affidavit. You didn't know that either? -- Didn't know it.

Now let me read to you what his mother said in paragraph 8 of this affidavit:

"Op 14 April 1982 om 09h00 die oggend het Topsy Madaka by my woning opgedaag."
(30)

Now Topsy Madaka was Ntimkulu's friend.

"Hy het vir Siphiwo na die Livingstone hospitaal geneem om sy medisyne te gaan haal. Dit was die laaste keer dat ek vir Siphiwo gesien het. Op 14 April 1982 om ongeveer 20h30 die aand, het Topsy Madaka by my woning opgedaag en vir my gevra waar Siphiwo is. Ek het vir Topsy Madaka meegedeel dat hy vir Siphiwo weggeneem het en dat hy nie vir my moet vra waar hy is nie. Topsy Madaka het my toe meegedeel dat hy weet waar om vir Siphiwo te kry. Voor- dat Topsy Madaka vertrek het, het ek hom Siphiwo se sweetpakbaadjie gegee om aan Siphiwo te oorhandig. Ek was bang dat Siphiwo dalk kon koud kry. Topsy Madaka het toe met sy motorkar (10) vertrek."

Dit you know about that? -- Nee, ek het nie.

Did /...

C3.19

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COETZEE

Did you know that in the Eastern Province Herald on 30 April 1982, the following was reported about Ntimkulu, and I quote from the - from the report:

"A former Port Elizabeth detainee, Mr Siphiwo Ntimkulu, who (20) disappeared on April 14, and a friend who disappeared with him, Mr Topsy Madaka, are safe. Mr Ntimkulu, who suffered from Thalion poisoning after he was released from detention last year, last night phoned a friend in kwaZakhele, Port Elizabeth. He did not say where he and Mr Madaka were. The friend relayed the message to Mr Madaka's mother. Mrs Ntsikhe Madaka of kwaZakhela. It is also believed that Mr Ntimkulu's parents, Mr and Mrs Ntimkulu of Zwide, Port Elizabeth, were informed that their son was safe."

-- That was a false call, as I can remember. Someone related it (30) in view of human rights, that with the disappearance of Ntimkulu

someone phoned his house, one of these anonymous calls and that the voice could have never been identified afterwards and that they eventually sent a party to Lesotho to investigate and it was discovered that Siphiso had never turned up in Lesotho. That's as - if I can recollect the end result of that story.

Did you also know that the vehicle with which Topsy Madaka was travelling with Ntimkulu, was found later near the Transkei border? -- That's right.

Not the Lesotho border. -- Well, how - Transkei and Lesotho, at what - what point was that?

At Thele bridge. -- How far is that from Lesotho? Perhaps,⁽¹⁰⁾ perhaps we can get a map. I know - I just know that the end result was that it was suggested that he had fled to

Lesotho /...

C3.20

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COETZEE

Lesotho and that intensive search was made into Lesotho and it was found completely to be untrue. As well as that - the phone call that you were referring to, they've tried to trace and they couldn't identify that. That - this, that was in fact someone that knew him. (20)

Where did you learn all these facts? -- From human rights. I can't remember at what stage.

Where did you learn these facts? -- In Lusaka.

MR KUNY: May I place on record, I've just been informed

that Thele bridge is apparently a border post between Lesotho and Transkei. I don't know if this person know, I was informed.

MR MARITZ: Now when you told Jacques Pauw the story, you didn't have these facts, did you? -- I did have the fact that he disappeared, that he was poisoned, that he was on his way to Groote Schuur hospital. He disappeared and that he was burned. But I⁽³⁰⁾ didn't have these latest facts of the - the search into Lesotho,

et cetera. And the anonymous call.

So when you told your story to Jacques Pauw, you knew that he was burnt? -- That - well, that he was disposed of.

And that must have been after he left Port Elizabeth with Topsy Madaka on 14 April 1982? -- Must have been, ja.

How did you know that? -- Well, he - he disappeared after that. Isn't it?

The question is, how did you know that he was poisoned and his body disposed by being burnt after he disappeared on 14 April 1982? -- It was told to me by Brigadier Jan du Preez personally, that on his way to Groote Schuur hospital Colonel Nick van Rensburg⁽¹⁰⁾ and them up - kidnapped him, abducted him and get - and disposed of him.

You /...

C3.22

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COETZEE

You didn't tell Pauw that. -- No, I suppose I didn't. There's a lot that I said is - that I can fill in after the Mauritius stories that I've given Jacques.

Well, the other side of the coin is that you are making up stories as you go along. -- You would dearly wish it to be so,⁽²⁰⁾ but it is not.

But it is so. -- It is not a fact. I can assure you that and it'll come out in the end.

The story that you've just told this Commission is not even remotely related to the one that you told Pauw. -- How do you mean?

It - it is related that a chap with the same name - well, I hadn't had the name at that stage, but a chap from Port Elizabeth was poisoned and he went - went to Groote Schuur and came back and on his way there again, he - he disappeared and he was disposed of. It's exactly the same story. I would have been without thumbs⁽³⁰⁾ if I'd sucked out all the stories out of my thumb. (laughter)

Let me remind you ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Now who - who would have removed your thumbs? -- But I can't just ... (intervenes)

Just answer my question. I - I know you're facetious, but - but just answer now the question. Who would have removed your thumbs? -- I would have done it, if I suck it all out of my thumb.

MR MARITZ: Let me remind you of what you said to Pauw at page 134. You said:

"Ja, dit is 'n ou ook wat in PE aangehou was. Ek het hom nooit gesien of ontmoet nie. Ek het nou maar by Brigadier Jan du Preez en Schoon en Jaap, basies by hulle die storie gehoor."⁽¹⁰⁾

-- Well /...

C3.23

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COETZEE

-- Well, isn't that what I've said?

No. -- No.

That's not what you've said. That's not what you've said.

-- Well, tell me what I've said, please?

You have added on a head and a tail to the story. Now ... (intervenes) -- I've - I've added on many heads and many tails and I explained why. What, what the - what my position in Mauritius⁽²⁰⁾ was.

So the head and the tail were also told to you by Jan du Preez and Schoon? -- The whole story I got from Brigadier Jan du Preez and Colonel Nick van Rensburg. The original planning of it, what went wrong and - I had contact with Brigadier Jan until last year, just before I left. And the story wasn't on one occasion, but on several occasions told to me by Brigadier Jan.

Now you're leaving Schoon out of it. -- Schoon was part of Section C.

I'm talking about who told you the story. -- Brigadier Jan⁽³⁰⁾ and Colonel Nick van Rensburg.

Not Brigadier Schoon? -- No, not Brigadier Schoon.

But when you spoke to Pauw, you were perfectly willing to say it was Schoon. -- Well, it was not intentionally. It was - I explained to you what the position was in Mauritius.

By the way, what did you think the interest of Jacques Pauw in you was? -- Jacques and myself had a long relationship since 1984. He was a friend of mine and I saw it fit to speak to him and give my story to him as a newspaperman before I left for London.

But he's a newspaper reporter. -- That's correct.

And you knew that he wanted to report your story. -- That was /...⁽¹⁰⁾

C3.24

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COETZEE

was the intention, yes.

And you knew that you had to be accurate. -- Well, I don't know how accurate the news was brought home in the newspapers as far as my evidence is in the Commission now, but - but the basic facts of the story, yes.

No. No. The question is this: You knew that he wanted to report in his newspaper a story which you told him. -- That's correct. (20)

So you had to make sure of your facts. -- Ja, well. Intentionally, I didn't lie at anything. I made sure of my facts.

And if you implicated somebody in the police force, you had to be sure that those facts were correct. -- That's correct.

Now, here willy-nilly, you implicate Colonel - Brigadier Schoon whereas he was not implicated at all. -- Okay, I told you why.

Why? -- My state of mind at Mauritius. I was on the run, I didn't know who was behind me and I was on my way to London. I didn't know what to expect there. (30)

I see. But at the stage when you spoke to Pauw, this was

in totality a story that you had heard from other people. -- Yes.

Is it still a story that you heard from other people? --
Exactly. It is, ja.

I see. With that story, you were prepared to implicate
Brigadier Schoon and Brigadier Jan du Preez and now in your
testimony, Brigadier Van der Hoven and Brigadier Nick van Rens-
burg. -- Colonel Nick van Rensburg and Brigadier Jan du Preez.
Brigadier Jan du Preez was one of the sources of the story and
have /...

C3.27

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COETZEE⁽¹⁰⁾

have I - as, as I explained, in our security set-up, he won't just
- just tell that story as a story. As I can recall it, I said
I'll have to check on my vehicle log-sheet, the back - the petrol
intake, then I'll be able to tell you whether at that stage when
I left from Durban and I was stopped at Lindley, whether that could
have been the - the trip that I was involved in when I was on my
way to PE.

Now let us look for instance at another one of your stories
and that would be the Lindley story. Bear with me, Mr Chairman.

Can I just point out this further fact to you, that is this: ⁽²⁰⁾
You left the security branch on 31 December 1981. -- That's correct.

And then you landed up in the weapons section of the police.
-- That's wrong.

Where did you land up? -- In SANAB. The Pretoria branch.
Narcotic branch in Pretoria. From January 1982 till about August
1982.

Now didn't you spend some time at the weapons section? --Not
at all.

Weren't you transferred to that section? -- Originally and
it was cancelled long before my transfer became due. ⁽³⁰⁾

At any event, at the end of 1981, your relationship with the

security police ended. -- No. Not at all. If you look at my claims, there's a claim in February 1982, where I went with sergeant Schutte from Vlakplaas to the army training camp for MNR rebels in Phalaborwa at - on the banks of the Olifants river to obtain stock from there, food stocks, and we got 303 rifles, et cetera.

It's indicated in our S & T claims.

CHAIRMAN: But that's not - I mean, let's take it as pure security /...

C3.29 - 471 - COETZEE
security police work. -- Ja. Purely security police work ended⁽¹⁰⁾
on 31 December 1981.

1981? -- 1981.

MR MARITZ: But then you weren't part of the family any more. -- No, not part. I would have done the job, the Durban job of the Swazi detainee whilst I was with the drug squad and that was cancelled and then I went only with the Lindley story to Welkom, to the district - eh - to the divisional CID officer and also was relating to my security work the previous year and then the Phalaborwa visit with Sergeant Schutte.

But you were kicked out of the security family in no uncertain⁽²⁰⁾ way. Weren't you? -- No. Not at all. No, I was transferred to West Rand security and Captain Jan Coetzee was transferred from West Rand security to Vlakplaas. Then in the end, Captain Jan Coetzee put in the application that he - whether he could leave his household in Krugersdorp whilst working in Pretoria at Vlakplaas, because of problems - his wife's health and his child being in matric and I did the same, because I was transferred to Pretoria as a result of health problems of my children and mine was shot down and Jan Coetzee's was granted.

Were you upset by the fact that you were kicked out of⁽³⁰⁾ security? -- I was not kicked out, I was then transferred to the

uniform branch, the weapon section, as you said.

CHAIRMAN: Ja, well let's - let's, let's ask the question slightly different: Were you upset because you were transferred to the uniform branch? -- Ja. It was. It did upset me.

MR MARITZ: Why? -- It's a demotion. Going from a elite squad back to the uniform branch.

What caused that? -- The fact that I couldn't take
transfer /...

C3.31 - 472 - COETZEE
transfer - I couldn't take my household to Krugersdorp (10)
security, where I was transferred to.

You expressed it - I can't find the passage now, but it, you told it at 183. Let's just read what you said at 183. Page 183 of the statement you made to - to Jacques Pauw.

MR KUNY: Would Mr Maritz perhaps refer us to the passage in the original transcript, because we don't have a new transcript to this tape, and the result is that we can never find what he refers to.

CHAIRMAN: I've also. It's always about 10 pages further. I've got the same problem. (20)

MR KUNY: We've now been given one, or lent one.

CHAIRMAN: What page are you referring to?

MR MARITZ: Page 183 of the new one and I will give you the old one in a moment. The old one is 222.

CHAIRMAN: Yes?

MR MARITZ: I'll start at page 182 of the new transcript.

CHAIRMAN: 182?

MR MARITZ: 182 of the new one. Right at the bottom. Here you said the following:

"Toe kry ek Jan Coetzee in die gang die oggend. Dit is nou nog (30)
voor ek weg is."

That's from the security headquarters. -- To security West Rand, yes.

"Toe sê hy hy het 'n aansoek ingesit dat sy vrou is siek en sy kind in matriek en hy kan nie sy huishouding skuif nie. En Johan Coetzee het dit goedgekeur, of ek nie ook so 'n ding wil insit nie, want hy weet nou van my omstandighede. Ek het onmiddellik so 'n aansoek ingesit en die volgende dag het Johan Coetzee dit afgekeur. Nou Jan

Coetzee /...

C3.33

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COETZEE⁽¹⁰⁾

Coetzee mag sy huishouding op Krugersdorp gelos het, en in Pretoria gewerk het, maar ek mag nie my huishouding met my siek kind, dit is hoekom ek Pretoria toe verplaas is, in Pretoria agterlos en op Krugersdorp werk nie, want ek was bereid om dit te doen."

And that irked you. -- That's correct.

"Toe het hy my soos wat Brigadier Jan du Preez dit gestel het, vir die wolwe gegooi. Hy het my verplaas uniform toe, terug na die vuurwapen afdeling toe, die vuurwapen afdeling daar op hoofkantoor op die tweede vloer."

(20)

-- Dis korrek. That's correct.

About a silly thing like that? -- That's correct.

He threw you to the wolves? -- Yes.

And you were irked by that? -- I was.

Now Pauw asked you:

"Wat is die vuurwapen afdeling?"

And you replied:

"Waar vuurwapenlisensies uitgereik word, aansoeke inkom en jy hanteer die aansoeke en deur dit goed, en jy weet vuurwapenlisensieaansoeke."

(30)

Pauw asked you:

"Was dit 'n verlaging in jou posisie?"

And you replied:

"Ag man, dit is so goed jy maak van die Pous 'n NG-predikant op Putsonderwater."

-- Dis korrek.

That's how you felt about it? -- Ja, that's right. 100 per cent.

"Maar toe het Brigadier Jan du Preez met generaal Ziets- man gepraat wat toe speurhoof was, die ex, vorige

Veiligheidshoof /...

(10)

C3.34

- 474 -

COETZEE

Veiligheidshoof, voor Johan Coetzee nog. Toe het Basie Smit my daar kom haal en gesê die generaal wil my sien, en is daar vir my 'n verplasing gereël. O, ek sou 'n spesiale ondersoek doen vir SANAB ..."

And then you carry on. -- That's right.

Right. Now, you were thrown to the wolves. -- Then, that's correct.

It looks as if you were kicked out. -- No. I could have stayed on if I was prepared to move with my household to Krugersdorp⁽²⁰⁾ security.

No, but you won't. -- That's correct.

As a matter of fact, you - what you did, was you made an application to - not to take your household along. -- That's correct.

To leave it in Pretoria. -- That's correct.

And this was turned down. -- That's right.

And the next thing you knew, you were out. -- I was on my way to the fire arms section, ja.

Right. So in this manner which irked you, you were di- vorced⁽³⁰⁾ from the security community - the security family in which you

had dwelt for a short time. -- That's right.

Now, on which basis would you have been taken into the confidence of those who had just kicked you out, in regard ...

(intervenes)

MR KUNY: With respect, the words "kicked out" are my learned friend's words.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR KUNY: There's no evidence to this effect and the witness doesn't accept it.

CHAIRMAN: I suppose that would be his evidence.

MR KUNY /...⁽¹⁰⁾

C3.36

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COETZEE

MR KUNY: He doesn't suggest that he was kicked out.

CHAIRMAN: No, that's well - Mr Maritz, use another word.

MR MARITZ: I'll temper that. You've just had a very unhappy divorce from your family. -- If you want to call it that way, yes.

And subsequent to that very unhappy divorce, do you want to suggest that you were then taken into confidence by those who had divorced themselves from you in telling you the story of Ntimkulu? -- You're talking about they, they, they. It's General Johan⁽²⁰⁾ Coetzee. I've always been, I'm still close - till before I left, I was very closely to Brigadier Jan du Preez, the second in charge then.

Yes. I can understand that possibly he would have told you the story. -- Ja.

But how does Brigadier Van Rensburg come in? -- I found Brigadier Van Rensburg whilst he was on Brigadiers course at the Oklahoma where the new officers met during last year.

And he told you this story as a little titbit? -- No, no. Not last year, but I mean that was our relationship. We had a⁽³⁰⁾ good relationship. Very good.

Now when and where did he tell you this story as this titbit?
-- No, quite a lapse of time since 1981, 1982 I can't tell you,
unfortunately.

Did he brag about it? -- Yes, of course.

Oh, I see. And that's how you know about the whole Ntimkulu
affair. -- That's right.

Now let us look at for instance this Lindley affair.
Do you remember when the Lindley incident took place? --

Which one is this now? The shooting with Joe ...

(intervenes)

The /...⁽¹⁰⁾

C3.37

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COETZEE

The shooting where you involved Joe. -- It was shortly after
two white people were killed in a caravan at Ogies by - by a
so-called ANC-member.

So you say it was shortly after Ogies. -- Ja. In - in that
- if I recollect right, it was over a weekend. That - that we
were called upon that.

Right. Now you encountered a drunk driver on the road. --
That's correct. (20)

And you wanted to pull him off the road. -- That's correct.

And then there was a shooting. -- That's correct.

And then you took these people to the police station. -- Yes,
and thereafter to the doctor, or the doctor acting as the district
surgeon in the main street in Lindley.

Now do you recall whether you spoke to anybody between the
shooting incident and arriving at the police station? --

Immediately when the car came to a standstill on the hill,

as you come past the Lindley turn-off keeping north on the road,

just op the hill, there's a gravel road turning off left⁽³⁰⁾

and as I stopped there, out of the way for the Escort and

Joe and Almond to come past, a old dominee and his wife and I think it was from Reitz - pensioners - stopped and offered help.

Yes, and that were - and then, did you take these people to the police station? -- After these two old people left, I took the people to the police station, ja. The injured.

What - what transpired at the police station? -- Well, I immediately contacted Schoon after attending - after getting the driver for a blood sample to the doctor and the injured man on the middle of the backseat for treatment.

And /...

(10)

C3.40

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COETZEE

And what did Schoon say to you? -- I suggested to Schoon that we put Almond in as the man who've made the arrest and the shooting and he agreed on that.

And that's what you then did? -- And that is what I did.

I see. So that's when you made the false statement? -- That's correct.

And what transpired after that? -- It was during 1982 whilst I was at drug squad in Pretoria, I was phoned from head office and - both security head office by Brigadier Du Preez, Brigadier Schoon, can't remember the exact sequence of it and told that we must go down to the divisional CID officer in Welkom. (20)

Yes? -- To put the story right because Almond was not prepared to take the responsibility from Joe any more.

Yes? -- And that the divisional CID officer, will contact with the Attorney-General in the Free State and I later learned that the injured chap at the backseat - a - a civil claim was - against the minister of Law and Order was settled at R1 500. And I've never heard again anything about any criminal charges against Joe or Almond. (30)

But the fact of the matter was that criminal charges were

preferred against Almond Nofemela. -- Eventually on that matter?

Yes. The - the Attorney-General directed that he be prosecuted. -- That's right, and then it was put right with him as far as I can remember.

And it was because the Attorney-General of the Free State had directed that Nofemela be prosecuted for attempted murder, that the, the - the situation was then set right. -- I see, yes. That's right.

Is /...

C3.41

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COETZEE⁽¹⁰⁾

Is that right? -- That's right.

It was for that purpose that the true position was then exposed. -- That's right.

Right. And that you say, happened in 1982. -- 1981. It was set right in 1982. Early 1982, I believe.

How was it set right? -- We had to report to the divisional CID officer in Welkom.

Yes? -- After that, I've just heard that it had been put right with the Attorney-General in the Free State.

Let's - were the affidavits rectified? -- I can't remember⁽²⁰⁾ what happened. We'll have to look at the docket and get the docket and see what went on there.

Do you recall whether you've made a fresh affidavit? -- I can't remember at all.

Now, when the record was then set straight, the charges against Nofemela were then dropped. Is that right? -- That's what I believe. I haven't heard personally anything afterwards of that.

You see, the difficulty I have in your whole story, is that we were able to trace some of the - or the affidavits that were⁽³⁰⁾ made by those who were in the motor car, which was shot at. There

is the affidavit of one Maredi Joseph Mokoena, which is dated 12 November 1981. And he was the - the driver of the car. And he tells - I'm not gonna tell you the whole story, but he says the following:

"In die teerpad het ek heen en weer oor die pad gery en 'n voertuig bestuur deur 'n blanke man het toe gepoog om my van die pad af te dwing. Ek wou nie stop nie, want dit was by - by 'n opdraende en het die feit met my reg-terhand probeer beduie. Net hierna het 'n voertuig

bestuur /...

(10)

C3.44

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COETZEE

bestuur deur 'n swartman van agter af gekom en twee skote op my voertuig geskiet. Die een koeël het die regterag-tervenster getref en dit gebreek. Ek kon nie op daardie stadium sê waar die ander koeël die voertuig getref het nie. Na die vuurwapenskote, is ek van die pad gedwing en ek het as gevolg stilgehou. Na ek stilgehou het, het die swart bestuurder daar my aan die kraag van my hemp gegryp en uit die motor getrek en die ander beveel om uit te klim. Almal het uitgeklim, behalwe Fonkoe. Ons het hom uit die kar getrek.⁽²⁰⁾

Ek was op die stadium van mening dat hy baie dronk was. Vir die eerste keer het ek toe agter-gekom dat die blanke en die swart bestuurder speurders is, want ek is deur die swartman gearresteer op 'n aan-klag van motorvoertuigbestuur onder die invloed van sterk drank. Na ek gearresteer is, is ons saam met die speur-ders na die Lindley polisiestatie, waar ek aangekla en aangehou is."

My difficulty is that the driver of that car mentions only two persons. You and the black driver. -- The driver of that vehicle was so drunk, he couldn't stand on his feet and there was⁽³⁰⁾ a shot in the back of his boot and we can perhaps succeed in tracing

the two old people that stopped there from Reitz and you will find out there were two black policemen who handled all five of them when they got out of the car. And it was like war behind me.

But you can offer no explanation why the driver, when he made the statement ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: He offered an explanation. -- I offered an explanation. It is completely untrue. Can I just put it to you also, that the station commander Lindley at that time, was a

Warrant-/....

C3.52

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COETZEE⁽¹⁰⁾

Warrant-officer Heath. He's on pension now.

MR MARITZ: Yes? -- And he can also be - be traced and he had to go with us on the day that we met with the divisional commissioner of CID in Welkom. In fact, his son is a Major Heath with the police magazine Servamus, so we can easily trace him.

Well, I must tell you further that there are also the affidavits of Fonko Motaung, Khumalo, Mokoena, Lefatswe, another Mokoena, all of whom do not mention a third person. -- All of them drunk. And as I say, I can get the Lindley station commander, Warrant-officer Heath of those days. He had to report with - with⁽²⁰⁾ us on that day that we went to the divisional CID commissioner in Welkom to put the matter right.

I see. But once again, apparently all we have is your word for the fact that an informer was involved. -- No, I'm sure it can be confirmed. Let's just get the right people in.

But at the moment, we have only your word for it. -- At the moment, ja.

Right. -- But I mean, I supplied you with enough names that we can sort of check on my word.

Now, can I ask you this: The groups at Vlakplaas were⁽³⁰⁾ established towards the middle of 1981. -- That is when I believe

the white policemen arrived at the farm. I don't know whether after Almond Nofemela and his colleagues arrived in January, whether they went out with the Askari's whenever they were needed by certain divisions.

Ja, but the groups you spoke of, were they established when the whites arrived? -- Eh - ja, as I say, except if you - the fact that some of the black policemen went out with the - with the ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Ja, but - but, but as group. The group system ...

(intervenes) /...

(10)

C3.55

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COETZEE

(intervenes) -- As - the group as I ... (intervenes)

That - was the group system introduced in middle of 1981? -- As I defined it, yes.

Yes.

MR MARITZ: And that occurred when the white members of the police came to Vlakplaas? -- That's correct.

I'm going to give you some dates. You arrived there, you said this morning, on 22 July 1980. -- I couldn't remember. I said roundabout August, yes, 1980, ja. (20)

Lieutenant Vermeulen was drawn from Bronkhorstspuit on 1 August 1981. -- Sounds correct. I confirm it, if you say.

Sounds correct. Warrant-officer Van Dyk was drawn from Nelspruit on 4 August 1981. -- No, from Oshoek border post. He fell under Ermelo security.

The date would be more or less correct? -- What date was that?

Yes. This was a year after you arrived on Vlakplaas. More or less. -- You, you - you are hundred per cent sure of those dates.

Well, these are the dates that I've been instructed with. -- Well, you know ... (intervenes) (30)

I'm only putting to you what my instructions are. -- Okay,

but I can't confirm it as hundred per cent correct, because I haven't ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: But is it more or less correct, 4 August 1981, more or less Van Dyk came to Vlakplaas. -- If that record says so, yes.

In your recollection. To your recollection, is it more or less correct, or don't you know? -- I - I don't know. I thought it could have been a little bit earlier, towards May,

June /...

C3.57

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COETZEE

June, July.

(10)

MR MARITZ: Well, I suppose the, the - the personal files of members of the police aren't falsified. -- Well, he didn't come from Nelspruit security. He came from Oshoek security - ag, from Oshoek security, which fell under Ermelo.

Well, it may have fallen under Nelspruit. -- No.

And he may have been transferred to Nelspruit first. -- No.

For sure not. Not as far as I can correct - I - recollect, I arranged that transfers and it fell under Middelburg regional security office and Oshoek under Ermelo security branch.

Braam du Preez, he arrived on - well, roundabout 31 July⁽²⁰⁾ 1981. -- Possibly.

He came from Ermelo. -- Possible, yes.

Gene Fourie. He came from Oshakati on 11 January 1982. That was after you'd left. You wouldn't know that, would you? -- That's right.

You didn't know Gene Fourie? -- No, I didn't.

Then Louis le Roux, he arrived roundabout 4 August 1981. -- If you say so, yes.

You recall Louis le Roux? -- I think he - I think he was from head of the security if I'm not mistaken. (30)

That's right. That's what my instructions say. -- Yes.

So you recall him. And then there was Badenhorst, he came from Oshakati on 1 March 1982. You don't know him. -- Don't know him.

After your time. -- Yes.

Kobus Olivier came on 1 February 1982, also after your time. -- Kobus Olivier that used to work with Colonel Viktor in Section C, came with Van Dyk and the rest to the farm and
during /...

C3.59

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COETZEE

during the same time. He was first a filing clerk or one of the⁽¹⁰⁾ clerks at the back of the office. If it's - if we're talking about the same Olivier. He - he - he's Sergeant Olivier. I thought it was Louis.

No, this one - this one I got down as Warrant-officer Kobus Olivier. -- I know Louis Olivier. I don't know ... (intervenes)

Well, I - I haven't got another Olivier. -- If it's the same chap that worked in the office with Viktor in Section C, then it was during the same time that Van Dyk and Vermeulen came to the farm.

Ja. And then there was a Warrant-officer Bellingham. --⁽²⁰⁾ Balletjies Bellingham. I remember him.

That came on 1 August 1981, also from Oshakati. -- I don't know where he came from, but I can remember him.

Now apart from those names that I've given you, do you recall anyone else? -- There was an explosives expert from Soweto on the farm during a time. I can't remember which time.

A, a white ... (intervenes) -- And, and - sorry - a Constable Van Jaarsveldt, Ernst van Jaarsveldt. He also came from Oshoek.

He is at present the - the branch commander security, Bronkhorstspuit, lieutenant.
⁽³⁰⁾

Van Jaarsveldt? -- E.J. van Jaarsveldt.

And apart from him, was there anybody else that you recall?
-- Eh - eh - no, not as far as I can remember now.

Okay, we'll check on the Van Jaarsveldt and we'll check on the Olivier. But any event, it was roundabout then when these people arrived and that must have been at the beginning of August when the groups were established at Vlakplaas.

-- Ja /...

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-- Ja, I - of course I think in August we were operating already and they arrived a little bit earlier than - I would say towards⁽¹⁰⁾ June, July. Maybe May, even.

No, no. Not - not, you weren't operating as groups, were you, before that? -- In August already, yes. It was the year that it snowed in Jo'burg, I think, if I correct - recollect it correct.

Yes, you're quite right about that year, I remember it too.

But I want to just refer you to a document. Kry net vir my die - die (speaks in the background). Yes, I want to refer you to - to two documents which ties up with the groups having been established roundabout August 1981. I'm going to refer to two documents which are contained in an affidavit by General Coetzee,⁽²⁰⁾ I don't know whether it's before the Commission yet. But we could place it before the Commission at a later stage.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARITZ: The first directive is the following: It's dated 11 September 1981. The reference person is Colonel Schoon and apparently it was signed by Brigadier Du Preez and it reads as follows. -- The date on the document?

11 September 1981. -- Yes.

"Bekamping van terrorisme. Republiek van Suid-Afrika"

That's the heading.

(30)

"In 'n poging om die toenemende terroristebedreiging in die RSA

die hoof te probeer bied, is 'n spesiale eenheid vir landswye
aanwending te hoofkantoor op die been ge- bring. Hierdie
eenheid wat onder Groep C ressorteer, be- staan uit blanke
hanteerders, gerehabiliteerde terro- riste, die meeste is
reeds volwaardige lede van die mag en gewone swart lede.
Die eenheid is onderverdeel in

afsonderlike /...

C3.62

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COETZEE

afsonderlike groepe wat elkeen met die nodige voertuie en
radiokommunikasie toegerus is." (10)

Would that be an accurate statement? -- Yes. That is accurate.

"Die gedagte is dat hierdie groepe of spanne na afdelings waar
daar 'n behoefte bestaan uitgeplaas sal word. Omdat
hoofkantoor beter daartoe in staat is om 'n behoeftebe- paling
te maak, sal die uitplasing van spanne in oorleg met
afdelingsbevelvoerders deur Groep C uit hoofkantoor
gekoördineer word."

Does that sound accurate to you? -- Ja. It sounds like the letter
that was sent out to the regions.

You're quite right. To inform the - here, all the - all the⁽²⁰⁾
security branches in the country ... (intervenies) -- Yes.

Of the existence of this facility. So what was stated here
and which I have read, would be accurate. -- Yes.

You agree to that? -- Hm-m.

"Hierdie is 'n relatief nuwe projek wat op hierdie stadium seker
nog heelwat skaafwerk verg. Die sukses daarvan sal
grotendeels op wedersydse samewerking en vertroue berus.
Dit is allermens hoofkantoor se bedoe- ling dat hierdie spanne
u taak oorneem, of om onafhanklik in u afdeling op te tree.

Would that be accurate too? -- It's correct. (30)

"Ten einde verwarring te voorkom, word die volgende riglyne

neergelê: Die uitplasing en onttrekking van spanne sal deur 'n senior offisier van Groep C met die betrokke afdelingsbevelvoerder gereël word."

Is that accurate? -- It sounds accurate, yes.

"Sodra 'n span uitgeplaas is, moet die senior lid homself onverwyld /...

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onverwyld by die afdelingsbevelvoerder se kantore aan- meld."

Is that right? -- It's right.

"Die span sal vir die duur van hul verblyf in 'n afdeling onder⁽¹⁰⁾ die bevel en beheer van die betrokke afdelingsbe- velvoerder wees."

Is that right? -- It's right.

"Die span moet uitsluitlik aangewend word om met die op- sporing, arrestasie en identifikasie van terroriste be- hulpsaam te wees."

Is that correct? -- That's what's standing there, that's right.

And that was the purpose of these groups. -- In theory, correct. Hundred per cent.

Once again, in theory. -- Ja. ⁽²⁰⁾

But later on you're going to tell us that in - in practice, it didn't work that way at all. -- Not at all.

I see. -- Some of them, yes. Up to a stage, yes.

And then lastly, it was stated:

"Indien u enige leemtes identifiseer of voorstelle ter verbetering wil maak, word dit graag ontvang. U persoon- like betrokkenheid by die projek sal hoog op prys gestel word."

That - that contains an appeal. Let's see and - let's see whether we can make this thing work. -- Hm-m.

So, what becomes very clear from that directive, is that here⁽³⁰⁾ we have a new concept. Something in its embryo stage and let's

see if we can apply this new medium, or this new aid usefully in our country. That's really the message going out in that directive. -- Ja. Although the Askari's has - was applied /...

C3.67

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COETZEE

applied in those jobs before we arrived on the farm already.

No, I'm not arguing with you. -- No, but I'm ... (intervenes)

But all I'm saying, is it was then that the whole concept became organised. -- That group effect, yes.

Yes. As a matter of fact, I think that is precisely what⁽¹⁰⁾ you've told - eh ... (intervenes) ... -- Jacques Pauw in Mauritius.

Jacques Pauw as well. At page 59 in the new transcription ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Now at page - was this the part with the brain-child? Mr Maritz?

MR MARITZ: I - I'm sorry?

CHAIRMAN: Is that where it starts: "Wie se 'brainchild' was hierdie" - that's at 64.

MR MARITZ: No, I want you to go back a bit earlier. Page 49.⁽²⁰⁾ That's the old page 58.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARITZ: Here you spoke of I think it's Brigadier Schoon, who came from Oshakati. You said the following:

"Dis hy, hy kom van ..."

Referring to Willem Schoon.

"Hy is 'n Oshakati man, en toe het, is daar aanbeveel weens die hoeveelheid Askari's wat op die plaas aangekom het, dat hulle in groepe opgedeel word, wat sou landswyd werk en normaalweg in die area ... "

(30)

You were interrupted:

"Ekskuus, was dit toe hoe die vorming van die "hit squad" storie?"

And you replied:

"Nee /...

C3.70

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COETZEE

"Nee, van die werklike werklike Vlakplaas "squad" nog."

And later on he said:

"So toe word Vlakplaas uitgebrei?"

And your reply was:

"Uitgebrei en gekoop, hy word toe aangekoop ook, en nou die
oorpronklike doel was net vir die uitkenning van ge- (10)
infiltreerde terroriste, met ander woorde, elke groep is
daar, jy het jou Noord-Transvaal groep met sy twee blankes,
jou Oos- Transvaal groep, jou Wes-Transvaal groep."

Do you recall having told Pauw that? -- I do.

Now were those the groups that were apparently esta- blished
when the white members came and we now know that that was roundabout
the beginning of August 1981. -- That was what I referred to, ja.

Is that what you referred to? -- Yes.

And then in regard to the activities of the groups, you said
the following. Question was posed: (20)

"Hoeveel groepe ... "

(intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Where are you now reading?

MR MARITZ: Sorry?

CHAIRMAN: Where are you now reading? Still - still on the same
page?

MR MARITZ: Now, I just carry on on the same page.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARITZ:

"Hoeveel groepe was daar toe gewees?" (30)

And then you said:

"Ek, vyf, daar was tien blankes, dit is vyf groepe en

hulle ..." /...

C3.71

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COETZEE

hulle ..."

And now today you qualify that, you say that there weren't five, there were in fact four. -- As I can recollect it now, yes. According to the cars then, I was thinking.

So you had Northern Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal, Western Transvaal ... (intervenes) -- No, it was not specifically located to that areas. I was just saying where Koos Vermeulen normally⁽¹⁰⁾ worked in Western Transvaal and that is what I intended saying.

And why I say four groups now, I remember that we got two Datsun Laurels and two Cortina motor cars.

Incidentally, you say that Koos Vermeulen worked Western Transvaal. -- That's right.

Who worked Eastern Transvaal? -- Mostly Paul van Dyk.

Paul van Dyk. He was Eastern Transvaal. -- Ja.

And who worked Northern Transvaal? -- I don't - I think whether there was a permanent group in that area. I think when necessary, Koos Vermeulen also worked that area. ⁽²⁰⁾

I see. But anyhow, then you carry on. The question was posed:

"So elke groep het bestaan uit Askari's, swart polisie- manne en 'n wit polisieman?"

And you replied:

"Twee wit polisiemanne - twee wit polisiemanne apart en 'n kar en 'n radioverbinding met ..."

And he interrupted you:

"'Right', wat moes toe gebeur het? Wat moes hierdie mense doen?"

And this was your answer: ⁽³⁰⁾

"Hulle moes basies by smokkelkroeë, stasies, busstoppe,

ensovoorts, rondloop en beweeg en kyk of hulle kan

geïnfiltreerde /...

C3.72

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COETZEE

geïnfiltreerde maats opspoor wat saam met hulle in kampe was oorsee. As daar 'n krisissituasie sou kom, soos met die vermoring van die twee blankes daar in die karavaan op Ogies, of in 'n spesifieke afdeling 'n voorval was, dan sal die hele, al vyf groepe saamtrek op die spesi- fieke plek, soos sê nou maar in PE of Durban, enso- voorts, van waar om te kyk dat daar 'n groot konsentrasie van Askari's is. Nou dit is ...⁽¹⁰⁾

And you then were interrupted again. But that was the basic idea.

Not so? -- That's right.

And that also accords fully with what is contained in the directive that I've read to you. -- That's right.

Is that right? Now, you further expanded on these groups and I want to turn to page 59 of this transcript. Pauw asked you the following:

"Nou ek wag nou, wanneer het jy vir die eerste keer gehoor of uitgevind dat daar iets soos "death squads" bestaan?"

And you replied as follows: (20)

CHAIRMAN: Just a moment, I'm not certain about the place.

MR MARITZ: Page 59 is it on the old one.

CHAIRMAN: How many pages from where you read?

MR MARITZ: I'll give you the reference in a moment. It is 71 of the old one.

CHAIRMAN: 71?

MR MARITZ: 71.

CHAIRMAN: I think now - don't think - yes, I have it. Carry on.

MR MARITZ: His - the question was then posed and now you replied as follows. Question was: (30)

"Wanneer /...

"Wanneer het jy vir die eerste keer gehoor of uitgevind dat daar iets soos "death squads" bestaan?"

And your reply is as follows:

"'Wel, dit is nooit vir my gesê spesifiek dat dit bestaan nie.

Nadat ek opdragte ontvang het om sekere goed te doen, het jy maar jou ... (tussenbei)'

'Wat se goed praat jy van? Jy moet daarvoor ook praat.'

'Oraait, maar verduidelik nou vir my van die Lesotho operasie.'"

And then you tell a story of a Lesotho operation and then you turn - return to this question of the hit squads at page 63. It's page⁽¹⁰⁾ 76 of the old one.

CHAIRMAN: Yes?

MR MARITZ: Pauw asked you the following:

"Nou wag, kyk, kyk oraait die ding is, daar is nooit amptelik 'death squads' gestig nie, maar die 'death squads' ontstaan uit die groepe wat saamgestel is, oor die Askari's, die swart polisiemanne en twee blanke offisiere."

And you replied as follows:

"Nee, hulle het basies net gewoonweg geopereer en ek en Paul, toe Paul nou op die plaas kom, en Almond en Joe, Joe is 'n ex⁽²⁰⁾ wel, hulle sê krimineel, hy is ook maar 'n gewone krimineel wat ..."

And then the tape changes and you carry on on the next tape"

"Die uitkenning en opsporings en uitkenning van terroriste met ander woorde, die beheer uitoefen oor die groepe. Hierdie 'death squad' en hierdie opblasery, was so, daar is nie iets op papier nie, daar is nie voorsiening in die werksaamhede van die 'squad' vir so

iets /...

(30)

iets nie. Dit is daai 'need to know', en jy weet mos wat Craig van praat, Jaap de Villiers Joubert."

Now, with that introduction, can you tell us anything about the existence, or the creation, or establishment of a so-called hit squad? -- Yes. If the mandate of the Commission allowed me, I said this morning, I would have been able to put the whole death squad culture, how I received ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No, the question is not the culture. -- But I just want to explain how to - how I - I grew into it, whilst at Oshoek border, doing operations into Swaziland, how getting introduced into this - into this operations and eventually coming inside the country⁽¹⁰⁾ after several experiences in Swazi- land of bombings, housebreakings, railway lines attempt bombings, et cetera and then ended up at Vlakplaas.

MR MARITZ: No. -- Coming at ... (intervenes)

No, hang on. -- Okay.

I asked you this question. Was there ever such a thing as a hit squad or a death squad at Vlakplaas? -- It's a of- ficial name that's been given to the - to hit squads by news- papers.

By the journalists. But Vlakplaas was established when I came there now as a operational squad and we started entering the arena⁽²⁰⁾ of the so-called hit squads. The elimina-tions. Bombings.

Now, for practical purposes, I know it's a - it's a horrible term, it's a very misleading term, but for practical purposes, lets talk about a hit squad. Did you establish a hit squad at Vlakplaas? -- Well, I think, eh - let me put it to you this way:

When I arrived at Vlakplaas and I was still there alone, the only white officer, the attack on Chris Hahni was planned in Lesotho by Colonel Viktor.

That's /...

(30)

That's not what I asked you. Please, don't tell us stories.
-- Well, no, I don't want to tell you stories.

Answer the question. -- I - I'm answering your question with
- with a story so that you can decide whether the hit squads -
I, so, so - my answer to you will be no. I didn't start it off.

You didn't start anything off? -- No, it was already there.
Do you know whether anybody else started off a hit squad? -- I
just explained to you that Colonel Viktor was busy with this
operation on Chris Hahni with Ernest Ramatala in Lesotho.

But that's not an answer to my question. -- Okay, I'll give
you another one. Then I was sent on a mission to Swaziland to⁽¹⁰⁾
blow up the ANC transit house, then the wooden house of Marwick
Nkosi.

That's also not an answer to my question. -- Well, then I'm
afraid you must just put the question to me again, because you
said that I started the hit squad. Now I've given you answers
and ... (intervenes)

Can I ask you the following question? -- Yes, sure.

Was there such a thing as a hit squad on Vlakplaas? -- When
I arrived at Vlakplaas, there was about 10 to 14 Askari's at
Vlakplaas staying there. Based there. (20)

Yes. -- And the farm was just rented and not bought yet and
there was no official squads on the farm.

But these Askari's when you arrived at Vlakplaas, were
employed to try and identify other infiltrators in the country.
-- That's what I said, yes.

Yes. And you did that also, if I understand you correctly,
at least from July 1980 until August 1981. -- No.
From August 1981 when the squads came in. In the meantime

towards /...

(30)

towards the second half of August after July 1980, I was involved in a operation, cross-border operation where I leaded three men on a bomb attack on two houses. Not from Vlakplaas. Not - I was the only chap from Vlakplaas.

So there was no squad? -- Official white members with cars, or what squad do you talk about?

CHAIRMAN: No, just - just answer the question. Was there, prior to August 1981 a squad at Vlakplaas which could be termed a hit squad? -- No. I said that there was only Askari's on the farm as - based as Askari's.

Yes.

(10)

MR MARITZ: Good. After August 1981, was there then a squad on Vlakplaas which could be termed a hit squad? -- Yes. If you want to put it that way. Even before that.

So okay, now tell us ... (intervenes) -- A one man squad, that was - you're talking about Vlakplaas. When I arrived at Vlakplaas in August 1980, I led a hit squad into Swaziland and I was the only member from - from Vlakplaas.

Ja, but you were the one man squad then. -- No, I had three men with me. But I was from Vlakplaas. And it was planned in conjunction ... (intervenes)

(20)

But none of the other were. -- No.

I'm talking about Vlakplaas people. -- Well, I was involved, I lead - and I led that operation into Swaziland.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, please. I know that you find it difficult to answer a question, but try and in the sense that you tend to add much more than what the question is all about. The question was, and you answered it, that there was no hit squad at Vlakplaas before August 1981. Do you - do you stand by that answer? -- Can I say August 1980, before I arrived?

Well /... (30)

Well I asked you about before August 1981, was there a hit squad at Vlakplaas and you said no. -- Ja. Okay, if that exclude my operation in 1980. I'm just afraid that ... (intervenies)

Now, just listen. Was there a squad at Vlakplaas before August 1981 which could be termed a hit squad? -- Okay, no.

Fine. So, so - that is why I say, just try and answer the question. There was no such squad. Now the question was - the next question was put: Was there a squad at Vlak- plaas after, or from August 1981, which could be termed a hit squad? -- Yes.⁽¹⁰⁾

Yes.

MR MARITZ: Now, who were the members of that squad? -- They vary, it was myself, Paul van Dyk, Koos Vermeulen, Joe Mamasela, Almond Nofemela, David Tshikalange, Brian Ngqulunga.

Is that all? -- That is what I can remember, ja.

Is that all? -- What I can remember, yes.

I'm not going to allow you to implicate people later on. You must make up your mind now. -- I made up my mind and I said that's what I can remember and you must accept it please, I'm not gonna elaborate on that. If you come up just now with an extra⁽²⁰⁾ name, then you want to know a long story again, why is this man added. As far as I can remember now, that was the people involved. And you'll just have to accept it. I rely on my memory and it's ten years ago.

Let me make it plain to you. You are making very very serious allegations. -- I know that.

And I want to remind you of the fact that you are under oath.

I want to remind you of the fact that we're not here to listen to old wive's tales. -- You're not listening to old

wive's /...⁽³⁰⁾

wive's tales.

And I want to remind you of the fact that we want accurate statements from you. -- Can I just answer you on that one? I went in ... (intervenes)

No, no. I'm just reminding you of these facts. -- Well, I want to answer ... (intervenes)

Can we carry on now ... (intervenes)

MR KUNY: With respect, my learned friend has put a statement in the form of a question and the witness is entitled to answer it. -- And I want to answer on it, please. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes. -- I'm in exile to tell the truth and only the truth and uncover the whole hit squad story.

Yes. -- And and I'm going to do it.

Yes?

MR MARITZ: Okay. Now, who established this squad of yours? -- Brigadier Jan du Preez and Colonel Viktor.

CHAIRMAN: The hit squad? -- Well if you want to term it the hit squad ... (intervenes)

No, but you called it the hit squad. -- Ja.

Please, Mr Coetzee ... (intervenes) (20)

MR KUNY: No, no. with respect, the witness didn't call it a hit squad. He said it was a term used by the media. My learned friend said, well now let's call it a hit squad.

CHAIRMAN: Well, and since then it was called a hit squad and he have had a 100 questions talking about hit squad. And could he please stick to that question. -- Okay, there was no official meeting nominating persons who would be part of a so-called hit squad that you and you and that four guys is now a hit squad at Vlakplaas. There was no such meeting.

I want to know how this developed. -- If I could have (30)
told /...

told you my history from A to Z ... (intervenes)

I ... (intervenes) -- Mr Maritz, you will ... (inter- venes)

Please, for the last time, I don't want to hear your history.

-- Well ... (intervenes)

I want to know how this squad of yours developed. -- Yes.

Okay, then you will never in your life understand it and we are playing with words, because you live in a completely different atmosphere than a security policeman. It's a culture that you will not understand, until such time as you are prepared to listen to my whole story. And until such time, you will be keeping on ⁽¹⁰⁾ with these questions and we will be keeping standing on one place, because you don't understand.

CHAIRMAN: After the - the heated argument between you and Mr Maritz, try and answer this question. -- My apologies. Can you just put the question again?

How was the so-called or a so-called hit squad formed? Yes?
-- It's just a order that was given and I don't know which one was the first one. Say for instance the Mxenge one, get rid of Mxenge. And this developed out of previous experience that I had in Swaziland into such operations. ⁽²⁰⁾

Ja. Thank you. So - so it was simply that you were asked to get rid of Mxenge. -- That's correct. And as I say, I can't remember whether that was the first one, but I,m just giving an example of what happened.

Yes. No, I take the point. Yes, Mr Maritz.

MR MARITZ: Well, obviously the Mxenge stands out. -- That was the original story that came out in the press, yes.

Do you remember an occasion where you had to commit a

murder /...

(30)

murder before the Mxenge? -- If I've got dates, I don't know when Vusi and Peter were killed, when Kondile was killed, in date sequence, but if I've got that, then I can answer your question.

Alright. Let - let's, let's, let's take you on your own story. Let's take the Mxenge case. You say that somebody must have been selected I suppose to kill Mxenge. -- Is - is that what you know?

Is that what you say? -- Can I sort of tell you how the story happened, because I don't know what you're trying to get at. (10)

CHAIRMAN: No, but ... (intervenes) -- Can I just say ... (intervenes)

To anticipate where the question leads, your wish to always to know where the question leads, creates not a very good impression. So, Mr Maritz, would you please repeat the question, and we see whether Mr Coetzee can answer the question. -- Okay.

MR MARITZ: Okay. You led the so-called hit squad with the Mxenge murder. -- I led the Mxenge murder group, that's right.

Right. How was that group constituted? -- I appointed the members after getting instruction to make a plan with Mxenge. (20)

How did you go about appointing the members? -- Justing asking Paul, Almond Nofemela, David Tshikalange, Brian Ngqulunga and for Joe Mamasela to be brought down. No drama about it, it was just a choice. Just a choice of myself.

And then you had a hit squad. -- If you want to call it that way, then I had a hit squad.

CHAIRMAN /...

CHAIRMAN: But you called it a "moordbende". So, did you want⁽³⁰⁾ me to use the Afrikaans term? Will that be easier for you? --

Okay, call it a hit squad.

Well, it's your word. I've never - I mean you used the word "moordbende". -- Let's keep it to hit squad.

Polisie se moordbende. So - so I think that it's a fair translation. -- Okay, it's alright. Let's stick to hit squad.

And that was the hit squad and I selected it.

MR MARITZ: Anything else you can say about the selection? -- Nothing at all. Except that Brian Ngqulunga was from the area as I said earlier and I thought Joe and Almond to be killers. And ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Ja, I think what Mr Maritz has in mind is, you were⁽¹⁰⁾ not told who to use. -- No.

Or how to constitute. -- Not at all. Except ... (intervenes)

As far as - as far as ... (intervenes) -- The selection.

Van der Hoven was concerned, you could have done the work yourself. -- That's, that's right. That's right.

MR MARITZ: So you selected these people. -- That's right.

On which basis did you select them? -- Just because Joe and Almond was killers to me, Brian Ngqulunga know the area and I've known David Tshikalange for quite a while. (20)

Okay. -- My gardener.

In which way did you become aware of the fact that Almond was a killer? -- In no specific way, I just elected him for the task. There was no test that they've written, no questions that I asked them, I just selected them as I got to know them with their personalities.

Now, you - you evaluated Nofemela and you thought this
guy /...

you're saying? -- I don't know whether that exactly was my argument, I thought him fit for the job.

CHAIRMAN: Had he already killed somebody? -- Not as far as I know, not at that stage.

So that means that the Lindley murder took place after the Mxenge murder. -- I'll have to see the dates, really.

No, no. Just answer. -- But I ... (intervenes)

As far as you know, he was - he was inexperienced in killing people. -- Ja. We're talking of ten years ago. I - I really can't remember. I would like to have specific you know, sort of dates in front of me and then I can argue on them. (10)

Ja. -- But there was no specific, I just selected them because I saw them fit for the job.

MR MARITZ: But what did ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Do you know whether Joe had committed a previous murder? -- Beg your pardon?

Did you know whether Joe had committed a prior murder? -- No. Not as far as I know, I just knew he was a plain killer.

MR MARITZ: Just a plain?

CHAIRMAN: You knew he was a plain killer, but you didn't know whether he had killed before. (20)

MR KUNY: Plain criminal, I think he said.

MR MARITZ: So you thought of Nofemela and Joe as killers? -- Fit for the job and to execute that murder, yes.

And Paul van Dyk? -- Paul van Dyk has been a ..(intervenes)

Do you regard him as a killer? -- He was - we weren't involved in actual killing and I knew him since Oshoek since 1977.

Oh, that's okay. As long as he doesn't pull the trigger, he's /...

gument, it was in a black township, it was a black man involved and we as whites couldn't have gone in. Paul was in on the job as one of the whites involved.

But look you know something about common purpose and all this sort of thing, don't you? -- Not much.

You were a policeman. -- Ja but not much. But I know something.

Are you seriously suggesting that after having been a policeman for many years, you don't know that if you make yourself part and parcel of a murder, that you become just as guilty as the guy who pulled the trigger? -- Yes, yes, yes. That I know. I was ...⁽¹⁰⁾
(intervenes)

You know that? -- Yes, I was just afraid that you might go into a definition of common purpose. (laughter)

You required a man whom you regarded as a killer. Not so? -- who? Paul van Dyk?

Yes. -- No. He wouldn't have been involved in the killing at all, the actual killing.

So he didn't have any special qualities? -- I've been knowing Paul since 1977 and I could trust him.

So what did you say to Paul van Dyk about this mission? --⁽²⁰⁾
No - ag, I can't recall that, it was 10 years back. There was no big drama that - of selecting the people and planning the murder.

It was short and sweet. We picked it, it proved successful in the end. So for me to come and sit here and argue about exact words and my thoughts 10 years ago, is impossible. The murder was committed. The people involved has committed it. They were successful. For me to comment on what my frame of mind was, and the - the people

involved /...

(30)

involved, the capabilities, et cetera, I'm not trying to be funny, I mean, it's long ago.

Did you say ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Now, successful, but it was messed up. -- Well, the murder was committed in the end. And there was no traces left and the robbery just involved in a slaughtery in a - some, well politically motivated story. That's how we saw it. But I mean, the original result that we aimed at, the murder, was committed.

MR MARITZ: Look, the point is this: Did you say to Paul van Dyk:

"Man Paul, Brigadier Hovie (or whatever you called him) wil nou hê ons moet 'n swarte hierso doodmaak. Kom help my." (10)

Did you say that to him? -- I can't remember. I think you must ask him. He'll be able to answer that question.

Now I'm asking you. -- Well I can't answer the question.

You're the man who's, who's delivering the accusations.

-- Well, and I've told you plenty of times, it's ten years ago and you want me to lead me into exact conversations, the murder was committed and I told you who was involved and it was successful in the end and the car was burned, so I'm sure if Paul comes to the front one day, he will be able to answer all that questions.

But it's important ... (intervenes) -- I would have just said⁽²⁰⁾ ... (intervenes)

Listen to me, Mr Coetzee. -- Just now ... (intervenes)

It's important for this Commission to know whether Paul van Dyk at any time regarding the Mxenge murder, knew that he was involved in a murder. -- He knew. Hundred per cent.

How did he know? -- Sure you - if you understand our security culture, you will know that he knew it. I was

trying /...

"wegvat" of "uitvat" doesn't mean you take me out of this room, but you wouldn't listen. Now what else must I tell you now? He knew it.

How did he know it? -- I said, Van der Hoven said we must make a plan - words with that effect. That we must make a plan with Mxenge. And he - it wasn't a question of pulling him by the arm into the squad. He was there, and he was part of it.

Did Paul van Dyk also receive this instruction from Brigadier Van der Hoven? -- No, I can't remember at what stage Paul was present - Paul or, or - or Captain Koos Vermeulen. I paid every morning a visit to him. I paid visit after Brigadier Van der Hoven to⁽¹⁰⁾ Captain Andy Taylor and at a stage one or two of them could have been - could have been present.

CHAIRMAN: No. I think the only question Mr Maritz wants to know, is: Did Van der Hoven convey to Paul van Dyk and Vermeulen whoever, or did he - or did he inform you and you then as commander took the order further? -- As far as I can collect - recollect, it was to me and I conveyed further. But they could have been with me at a stage, one or two of them. But I can't remember.

MR MARITZ: What instructions did you give to Van Dyk, if any? -- No, I can't remember what instructions. He wasn't there to⁽²⁰⁾ commit the murder. We got meat from the kitchen, got the strychnine from the boot, poisoned the meat and it was handed - and if I can recall it correct, when Almond and Joe drove with us one night, when Almond went to throw the meat. That is how I recall it.

So he was involved in the murder of dogs. -- Murder or
the /...

C3.103

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COETZEE

the poisoning of dogs, was the same.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I'll - leave that kind of point. What is your

question?

MR MARITZ: Question is this: Was he involved in the killing of dogs? Van Dyk. -- I poisoned the meat, he was with me. If that puts him in the murder, I won't be able to say in law terms.

Was he, aside from being involved in the killing of dogs, was he involved in the murder of Griffith Mxenge in any way whatsoever? -- Accessory, included? You must please ...

(intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Did he do any - did he himself do any acts prior to Mr Mxenge's murder which contributed to Mr Mxenge's death? -- No, apart from being present when we poisoned the meat, helping me⁽¹⁰⁾ with preparing the meat, being with me when Almond went that night to, to, to throw the, the - the poisoned meat at the dogs and that's where it ended, until after the car. Until we took the car.

MR MARITZ: Well, that's the point. -- Well, but then you must put it this ... (intervenes)

Did you take Van Dyk into your confidence and did you say to him look, now this is the plan: We are going to murder Mxenge.

And part and parcel of murdering Mxenge is also poisoning his dogs. Let's go and do this job. -- Ja. I ... (intervenes)

Did you involve him? -- He was involved from the start. ⁽²⁰⁾

Specifically? -- Specifically.

Did you tell him? -- I told him.

I see. What qualified Van Dyk to act as a murderer? -- We're back to square one.

I /...

C3.106

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COETZEE

I want to know. Why did you pick on Van Dyk? Why did you choose Van Dyk as one of the murderers. -- Van Dyk has been with me on Oshoek border post for three years. We committed several⁽³⁰⁾ atrocities into Swaziland, stealing cars, he was with me in blowing

up the transit house of the ANC, he was with me in blowing up the wooden house of Marwick Nkosi where his 10-year old child was killed in. He was with me on several occasions. So, if I must still after three, four years get an ex-colleague of mine that's been involved with me in all these operations into Swaziland cross-border attacks and stories, now come and explain him like a primary school child what he's going to do now, he will never learn. Paul knew exactly what he was in for and there's not long speeches involved in our line of work. So what makes ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: I must say, I'm surprised to hear that. -- Beg your pardon? (laughter)

I think I'll take the adjournment now.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS.

THE COMMISSION RESUMES ON 30 APRIL 1990

MR ROBERTS: Before the witness continues may I place on record that two further documents have now been handed in. B124 and B125, B124 relating to the shooting incident at Lindley about which Mr Coetzee testified, extracts from the criminal aspect of the matter and B125 the same incident, extracts from the documents relating to the civil aspect of the matter.

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman just before my learned friend continues with the cross-examination, these documents were made available to (10) us at the conclusion of the hearing on Friday and we had an opportunity of looking at them over the weekend for the first time.

We just want to point out one aspect which does, is relevant to the cross-examination that was directed to Mr Coetzee. My learned friend put to him, referring to the affidavits that had been made by the various occupants of the vehicle, that they had been pulled out of the vehicle by a black man and in fact there is an affidavit here from Abraham Lefatswe who says "verder het ek net gesien dat swart mans my uit die voertuig uit trek en ons na die polisiestatie te Lindley neem" I thought we should place that on record. This (20) is quite apart from the other things that emerged from this file.

DIRK COETZEE: (still under oath)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: (continued) Mr. Coetzee over the weekend, did you have the opportunity of reading the transcript of what you said to Jacques Pauw? -- No I did no reading at all as far as this case is concerned.

When you came to give evidence here, you took the oath? -- I did.

And/...

(30)

And when you made the written statement at Mauritius, which we have already referred to as B2, you were also prepared to take

the oath? -- That's correct.

Have you ever had qualms in your life about taking the oath?

-- Not as far as I can remember.

So you have never had any religious or other reservations about taking the oath? -- I think maybe earlier in my life whilst I was with the Hatfield Baptist church, there was a spell in my life, but that was round about 1982, 1983 I think.

Now I want to point out something you said at your disciplinary trial, and I'm referring to Volume 10 of the evidence at page 569, where the prosecutor who is designated in that transcript as Major Professor Visser. He wanted to know from you at 569, at about line 17 ... (intervenes) (10)

CHAIRMAN: I suppose that is not the police rank, is it? (laughter)

MR MARITZ: I doubt it. They were at pains to give him all his titles Mr Chairman.

He asked you the following question:

"En nou wil ek by u weet wat beteken dit vir u om 'n verklaring te beëdig? Wat beteken die eed vir u?"

And you replied as follows:

"Die eed beteken dat ek, wat ek daarin skryf, ek glo die waarheid is." (20)

Do you still adhere to that? -- Yes I do.

Then he asked you the following:

"In elk geval ons sal later weer terugkom in detail na Bylae A.

Wat ek net nou by u wil weet is, is daar vir u 'n verskil tussen waar u 'n verklaring aflê wat nie onder eed is nie en waar u 'n verklaring aflê wat wel onder eed is?"/...

K1.54

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is.?"

(30)

And you replied:

"Dit hang af of jy by my" the prosecutor said "Ja by u." then you

said "Nee."

And then he asked you "Hoe so?" And you said "Daar is nie by my, dit hang van you eerlikheid af. As jy eerlik genoeg is, is dit nie nodig om te sweer nie."

Do you adhere to that still? -- I remember it, I suppose my attitude will be the same yes.

So you don't require an oath to bring anything to bear upon you to speak the truth or not the truth? -- That's correct.

Now in regard to the establishment of the various squads at Vlakplaas, I think on Friday we have made out that all factors point to the fact that apparently these squads were established during the beginning of August 1981? -- Yes can I in that regard just have a look at that black register, General van der Westhuizen, that one with the records, because documents were put to me as authentic from head office as far as the transfer of members to Vlakplaas were concerned and there was a few missing links there, and I would just like to have a look at that "werkskaart" it was a thick black file? REGISTER HANDED TO MR COETZEE (10)

-- No okay sir, what I actually wanted to just check on, whether in fact the amounts paid out for the members of the force that was transferred to Vlakplaas, when it was done, but I see it was done in August, but as I say I recollected them coming before August, during June-July, but I can't, I can't verify it with the records here. (20)

Well I gave you the dates on Friday, as it appears on the personnel/...

K1.94

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COETZEE

personnel files of the relevant members of the police. These dates were taken from their personnel files. I suppose you couldn't contest that? -- No Mr Maritz I would like to see it personally, because as I said that letter you produced, you for instance said (30)

that Warrant-officer van Dyk was transferred from Nelspruit security branch to Vlakplaas and it wasn't the fact. He was from Oshoek border post, which fell under Ermelo and then there was also a name omitted there, that one of Constable Ernst van Jaarsveld that was transferred from Oshoek, so I don't want to sort of agree on the authentic and correctness of the document if you understand.

But for the rest of them you can't dispute them? -- Not at this stage without the documents available to myself, the originals.

Very well. Now you said that there were four of these squads which were established? -- Four groups, that's correct. (10)

Four groups. Were all four these groups involved in the atrocities that you spoke of, or was there only one particular group? -- Well the members of one particular group, more specific, but I think I must try and put it more clear, that four specific death operation members were selected for that operation and for that specific hit operation, I suppose the member involves, involved in that operation, you could refer to as the hit squad members for that operation.

So there wasn't a, or shall I put it this way, was there a core group which operated to perform these atrocities you spoke of? -- Yes you can call it that. (20)

Which would you, what would you say was the core group? -- Myself, Paul van Dyk, Koos Vermeulen, Constable Nofemela, Joe Mamasela and Tshikalange. That was as far as

when/..

K1.120

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when black activists were involved, if we started, where we eliminated, well not in all cases, like for instance in the Khondile case ... (intervenes) (30)

CHAIRMAN: Please Mr Coetzee, the question is the core group at

Vlakplaas? -- Oh, at the Vlakplaas specific, yes that was the group at Vlakplaas who was normally involved.

MR MARITZ: How did it come about, can I put it this way, were you the leader of this group? This core group? -- Yes I was in charge at Vlakplaas of this core group.

And how did it come about that you were chosen to do all these jobs? -- Well originally when I landed at Oshoek border post in Swaziland in 1976, 1977, I was originally requested by security Ermelo to obtain information as far as refugees concerning flying out on the DTA Airline from Swaziland to Mozambique. Then when I intercepted escudo racketeers I was requested by security Ermelo to hand over these escudo's to them for use in the Rhodesian war and were, these escudo's were also exchanged on the mines. Then they involved me in breaking into the United Nation High Commission Office for Refugees in Swaziland. Then they involved me in bomb attacks, placing bombs on the railway line between Sidvokodvo and Maputo. Then I was not physically involved but informed of the bomb placing in the post office box in Manzini where an ANC member Bafana Duma's right arm was blown off. Then I was information wise involved in the kidnapping of a land cruiser of ANC people coming through from Mozambique to Swaziland where the driver was heavily wounded and died on his way and the body was disposed of.

And that is basically where, after then, that I moved over to the Middelburg security branch and then to head of the security Section C.

Then/...

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Then from Section C, before the black policeman and the white permanent policeman were transferred to the farm, I was leading instructed to go down to Ermelo and lead a group of, we were four, into Swaziland where we blew up the ANC transit house and a wooden

house of Marwick Nkosi. I was also leading a group of four into Swaziland during, whilst I was at Vlak-plaas already, but before the groups were transferred there, to go and blow up an ANC landrover in Manzini at the so-called Flat 6 and 9. That was what the flats were called where that ANC members made use of. And that is how I eventually in Vlakplaas, Vlakplaas became part of this so-called atrocities.

Did you take it upon yourself just to carry on where you left off? -- No for sure not. As I demonstrated earlier that before my involvement at Oshoek with the security police, I was never involved in any car stealings, in murders, in house-breakings, etcetera. I saw it as a sort of apprenticeship that I have done under Ermelo security whilst being at Swazi-land and then transferred to Vlakplaas where Vlakplaas members at top level were already involved in these operation I just became part of it, further part of it. That was when Vlakplaas sort of entered the so-called hit squad arena. (10)

So somebody must have placed enough trust in you to make you the leader of this gang? -- Ja, for sure.

Who was that person? -- That was at Section C headquarters, it was Brigadier Jan du Preez, the second in charge of security police that time, and the Section C leader, then Colonel Viktor and later Brigadier Johan Viktor. (20)

So they were the three people that placed this trust in you? -- And of course Brigadier Schoon after Viktor has left ja?

Yes. -- But whilst at Oshoek it was Brigadier van der

Hoven/...

K1.183

- 512 -

COETZEE

Hoven and the now Brigadier Nick van Rensburg chief of Section C. (30)

Now at page 66 of the transcript of your discussion with Pauw,

Pauw was also interested in this and he asked you the following question: ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: What's the question

MR MARITZ: It's page 80 in the old one Mr Chairman. Pauw asked you the following:

"Hoe is dit aan jou oorgedra, hierdie, oraait, wag nou, oraait, ek dink ons sal netnou weer terugkom na al hierdie goed, want ons raak nou deurmekaar. Was daar meer as een "death squad" of was dit net hierdie een?"

CHAIRMAN: Just moment, I think, that's not on page 80." (10)

MR MARITZ: 79, Sorry Mr Chairman. You understood the question?

-- I beg your pardon?.

You understood what I read to you?

CHAIRMAN: No, please read it again

MR MARITZ: I'll read it again. Pauw asked you the following question:

"Hoe is dit aan jou oorgedra, hierdie, oraait, wag nou, oraait, ek dink ons sal netnou weer daarna terugkom na al hierdie goed, want ons raak nou deurmekaar. Was daar meer as een "death squad" of was dit net hierdie een?" (20)

And you replied as follows:

"Waarvan ek weet net ons. Ek meen jy sal lees, as jy sien hoe Jaap de Villiers verduidelik in die departementele verhoor daai 'need to know' en so, jy sien goed gebeur. Na ek nou daar weg is en Jan Coetzee toe by my oorgeneem het aan die einde van 1981 en Gene de Kock by hom weer oorgeneem het."

Then/...

K1.208

- 513 -

COETZEE

Then he asked you:

"So dit kan wees dat daar ander is, maar jy weet nie daarvan nie?" (30)

Then you replied:

"Heel onwaarskynlik, net Vlakplaas, alle operasies word normaalweg van Vlakplaas af, wel ek sê normaalweg, negentig persent van Vlakplaas af beheer."

Do you adhere to that? -- That's correct.

Then he asked you:

"Hoekom is jy uitge, hoekom dink jy jy is spesifiek uitgekies om nou Vlakplaas te beheer of die groep te beheer?"

And you replied very significantly as follows:

"Ek weet nie, seker maar as vertroueling, ek weet nie, dit is moeilik om te sê, ek kan jou nie sê nie."

(10)

Do you adhere to that? -- Yes.

So can you still not tell us why you were chosen to do this job? -- I have just explained how it happened, how I have done my apprenticeship in Swaziland and I think I have explained earlier on to the Commission what my frame of mind and state of mind was, and basically it was exactly the same, I mean what I said in Mauritius, that we entered the hit squad arena that I lead hit squad groups from Vlakplaas but it is clearly shown in each incident that there in fact was, this operation was always in co-operation with relative regional office where the specific activist stayed as in all the cases that I have mentioned. So it is obviously that I, what the right position was.

(20)

The bottomline is that a very great measure of trust must have been placed in you. -- Always has.

Always /...

K1.234

- 514 -

COETZEE

Always has. Now you spoke of the murder of a number of people that you were involved in, can you name them? Those are, I'm talking about internally, in South Africa, I'm not talking about cross-border operations. -- Right it was the Mxenge case.

(30)

That's one. -- Peter and Vusi together.

Yes. Three. -- There was Sizwe Khondile.

Four. -- The diamond dealer.

Five. -- Ja, then I don't know, I don't know whether there is anyone else.

That's five people? -- Ja, there can be more if you can help me do it, I think it's on record, I don't know how many I missed out.

But Mr Coetzee I don't believe, I don't think anybody in the world can believe that you can sit there and say I don't remember who I killed in 1981. That's nonsense. -- That's absolute not
nonsense, it's ten years ago and it was normal practice to us, (10)
to us it was nothing funny and it's possible that I can miss out on one and I'm surely admit, I am sure there's enough on record up till this stage to show that if I have left out one it won't be some misery or secret one, it will be on record already.

CHAIRMAN: No but the point, the only question is, let's solve it in this way. There is no one not mentioned before by you, as far as you are concerned? -- Yes.

I mean you have mentioned everyone so far, not necessarily now but last week or to Jacques Pauw or somewhere along the line
you have mentioned each case? -- That's right. (20)

Okay that's fine. Yes.

MR MARITZ: Now can you give the sequence of these five
people, /...

K1.265 - 515 - COETZEE

people, the murder, the sequence murder? -- No unfortunately not.

With the Mxenge case I know now it was during November, on the 19th. The Lesotho diamond dealer was a little bit of extra documents and so I'll be able to a certain ease the exact date
round about his murder. The Peter and Vusi one, I think can fairly
accurate in a month be traced back to the first slip's date, (30)

informer slip date that he signed for his salary and the Sizwe Khondile one, I don't know whether he was at that stage, when I saw him at Jeffreys Bay, whether he at that stage already was officially released or whether he was officially detained at Jeffreys Bay, but that, if he was officially still in the detention there then we would come very close to a release date then, and the murder date of course. And I think with the help of the Swazi police, I don't know when his car was found at the Holiday Inn in Swaziland.

Now the salient point is this Mr Coetzee, as you are sitting there now, is your reply to my question I don't have the vaguest notion what the sequence of these respective murders was? -- That's correct. (10)

You don't know? -- No.

CHAIRMAN: You don't know which one was first? -- No, no, no sir.

MR MARITZ: But I must tell you once again that at Mauritius when you spoke to Jacques Pauw you had no difficulty in this regard.

At page 71 of that transcript (84 to 85 Mr Chairman of the old one). There he asked you:

"Oraait, wat was die eerste sensitiewe of eliminasië of enige soort van job wat hierdie groep gekry het?" (20)

You said:

"Binnelands, /...

K1.300

- 516 -

COETZEE

"Binnelands, Griffith Mxenge."

And he asked you again:

"Is dit die eerste ene?"

Binnelands, ja."

Do you adhere to that? -- I can't adhere to it, I'll have to check on it, I don't think it's possible if one think it was towards the end of November and I was only on the farm for, till (30)

the end of December and I can't remember that anyone of the others were, other murders took place during December, so that will mean logically that between the 23rd and, that last week in November all the other murders must have taken place, I mean so it is obvious that I have had my facts wrong there, that I couldn't have committed all the other murders, the diamond dealer, Khondile, Peter and Vusi, during one week and that the last week in November.

CHAIRMAN: No, are you saying in other words that on the probabilities the Mxenge murder was the last murder? -- It could have been the last murder yes sir.

Or the last one? -- Or the last one yes Mr Chairman, but I mean it wasn't a deliberate ... (intervenes) (10)

No, no, no all I want to know is, you now say that it is, or my impression is that you say on the probabilities that Mxenge was the last one. -- Could rather have been the last than the first one, that's right sir.

MR MARITZ: You know that's quite a switch. That's quite a switch.

How does a switch like that come about? -- But Mr Maritz I think you are building up small facts around things that happened, but that does not change at all that I've been involved in the murders of a lot of people ten years ago, five, say then for arguments' sake five. Now the fact that I (20)

couldn't/...

K1.327

- 517 -

COETZEE

couldn't remember, or did say during my state of mind at Mauritius that Mxenge was the first and he now proved to be the last, most probably the last one, that I did not in fact murder the other four. And as I said from the beginning, I mean you must accept my state of mind at that stage, I wasn't at all at ease and I could have got my facts mixed up, but I think basically throughout all these reports that I have made since then, the basic line remains (30)

the same. I've been involved with the murder of people which I've named and that is the basic fact.

But now wait a minute. Wait a minute. It was only after Nofemela came with his revelations in October 1981 that you decided that all of a sudden you want to get this off your conscience.

-- That's right.

And then you fled the country to Mauritius to go and do that?

-- that's right.

And that was on the 5 November 1981? -- That I left the country, that's right.

And three days later you started talking? -- Ja, three days, no actually on the Tuesday night we have done a little bit and on the Monday night a little bit, because I was running up and down between Port Louis to fix my air tickets to London and then actually started working the Tuesday night till 04h00 Wednesday morning, slept for two hours and then basically worked from 06h00 getting dressed, eating, in the car to Port Louis, one-and-a-half hours late at the airport, so it was quite a rush and I didn't even read through that statement that I signed in the bank at 14h10 in Mauritius, whilst I had to be at the airport already at 13h45 that afternoon. (10) (20)

CHAIRMAN: /...

K1.353

- 518 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: Yes we have had that, all that we have already had, please don't repeat it, I'm really not interested when you were at the bank in Mauritius and when you left the airplane, you have told us exact times already on Wednesday last week, so just answer the question, simply. -- Okay sir, can you just repeat that question then?

MR MARITZ: Now the salient point is this, this was the very first opportunity you had of telling your story? -- In Mauritius? (30)

Yes? -- I have on previous occasions during 1985 to Mr Tiaan van der Merwe from the PFP and in fact to Jacques Pauw and Brian Currin and Martin Welsch has told him some stories according, as to our atrocities without being specific or names. The Mxenge murder I always referred to the lawyer in Durban and in fact Jacques and myself wanted to start a book about two to three weeks before Nofemela spoke, on fiction as a result to all these atrocities that I was involved in, but the real coming out with the whole story was at Mauritius, it's right.

Possibly it would have been better in a fiction, because
(10)
it is a fiction Mr Coetzee. -- No.

And I'll show it to you, but that's beside the point. -- You'll have a struggle for life to prove that Mr Maritz.

The point is this you ran away to Mauritius to go and make a confession, not so? -- I flew to Mauritius to go and make a confession, that is right.

And this is your confession? -- That's right.

This is a confession? -- Well let's see it that way, it was a story left behind for incase something happened on the way with the basics of what happened in these so-called, if
(20)
we/...

K1.380

- 519 -

COETZEE

we can call it that way, as it was named later on, "Police Death Squads".

No it goes further than that. Jacques Pauw is a newspaper man and you knew it. -- Of course I've known him since 1985.

And you knew that he wasn't just standing in as your confessional father. He was after you to publish a story in the newspaper. -- That I knew for sure, yes.

Yes. And you knew that what you told him would be publicised
(30)
all over the world. -- I knew that for sure and I was relying on

the world press.

And while you knew all that you would have made sure of your facts, wouldn't you? -- The basic facts is still as it's standing now Mr Maritz. There is small little things that I forgot and could add now. The basic facts of the murders and the poisoning and the atrocities is still the same story that I'm telling today.

But this is a basic fact. What was the first job? Griffith Mxenge. Was that the first one? Yes it was the first one. -- Okay Mr Maritz, but I have explained it to you and I think you are grown up enough to understand it, to understand what my state of mind was, and I have explained it now and it is logic that it (10) couldn't have been the first one, isn't it?

Did your state of mind cause you to tell fibs? -- No, no fibs, the basics for true.

How does your state of mind bring Mxenge forward to the first one and how does your state of mind take it away to the last one here? -- Mr Maritz does it mean if I can't remember who attended my 48th birthday then I didn't turn 48, I'm still 47?/...

K1.406

- 520 -

COETZEE
(20)

47?

Don't argue Mr Coetzee answer the questions. -- No, I'm not trying to ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes all right Mr Maritz I think you have made your point.

MR MARITZ: But I even until today, because I have asked you again, while you are sitting there you cannot give us the slightest idea of the sequence of these five murders? -- Mr Maritz no, I don't want to repeat it again, I said in the beginning in what way I will be able to get you very near to exact dates, if I had the access that you and your team has had to certain things I would (30) have been able to quite help you up to very, very, very near close dates. But I don't want to repeat it again because I can see I'm

upsetting the Mr Chairman, but I don't know what else to answer you.

CHAIRMAN: No you are not upsetting me. Both of you are upsetting me. (laughter).

MR MARITZ: Very well, very well. Let us turn to the case of Peter and Vusi. Let's see how good your memory is. You went to Brits and you signed out Vusi at Brits police station. -- Yes I don't know whether I've physically signed it out because the chaps under whose interrogation he was was the regional commander, security Northern Transvaal, Brigadier Viktor and his men. Now whether they handed me his release order, because I haven't had the authority to release him, and whether there is any signature of mine appearing in the registers, I won't be able to say now. It should be a release order from the security police Northern Transvaal and then a signature of Vusi in the relative prisoners property register where he signed for all his property as a prisoner. (10)

No, but/...

K1.438

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COETZEE
(20)

No but the point is you went and fetched him there? -- Yes I went to fetch him.

Had you then already obtained the poison? -- I must have because I proceeded from Brits to Zeerust.

How did you go about obtaining the poison? -- I went to General Neethling's office after Brigadier Schoon made contact with him in Jacob Maré Street to the forensic laboratory.

Did you speak to him personally? -- I did.

What did he give you? -- He gave me a powder, two small folders with powder in which was to be administered to drinks and he also supplied me with the so-called knock-out drops that had a chloroform effect. (30)

What did you get the knock-out drops in? -- It was in like this eyedropper, eye-gene eyedropper little holders, plastic bottles.

How many did you get? -- I think it was roundabout 18 drops if I can remember correct.

No but I'm talking about the containers of drops. Was it one container or more than one container? -- No it was one container.

One container. Was that the first time that you met, or that you had met General Neethling? -- I don't want to put my head on it, I think it was the first time. (10)

I think you have said in your evidence here, that it was indeed the first time, I just want to check on that.

CHAIRMAN: Yes the witness did say so.

MR MARITZ: Did he say so?

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARITZ: So your evidence in that regard was then correct, it was the first time you had met General Neethling? -- As far as/...

K1.468

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(20)
COETZEE

as I can recollect ja, if one of the other murders took place earlier it could have been one of the other.

Was he a general by then? -- No a brigadier I think, if I remember.

Brigadier. He had no problems in giving you the poison? -- Not at all.

Not knowing you? -- Not knowing me, after Brigadier Schoon phoned him, no problem.

Did he give you instructions as to the use of the poison and the knock-out drops? -- The powder, the poison, he just said if it was given in for a sheep, I think between five and fifteen minutes (30)

the sheep will just jump in the air and the result of the death will be a heart attack. The drops he said one should administered about four drops to a medium built guy, and if you would give him more than that, he would most probably die, fall into a sleep and never wake up. But he wasn't sure of the exact times it depended on how fast the chap drank the drops, how much he had to eat etcetera, to be exact on the working of it, or how fast it would start working.

I see. And then you proceeded to where, to Zeerust? -- to Zeerust.

And did you meet up with Vermeulen there at Zeerust? -- I'm not sure whether I met up at Zeerust or in Zeerust I met up with Sergeant, Detective-sergeant Willie Mouton, he was a dog-handler and he picked up some old motor car tyres at the municipal dumping grounds as you come into Zeerust on your left, with his little dog-handler van and then we proceeded to this farm where the Western Transvaal group stay, just before Kopfontein gate and I think I met Koos Vermeulen with Peter

there/...

K1.500

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(20)
COETZEE

there.

And then, what did you proceed to do then? -- Koos, Willie offloaded this, Sergeant Willie Mouton offloaded the tyres. I gave the powder poison to Captain Vermeulen. He administered, Vusi didn't want a beer, he drank cool drink, it was administered in his cool drink and Peter in Peter's beer.

I see. -- And whilst Koos was doing that, I made Vusi sign three blank informants receipts as to his pay with two different pens. It was both ballpoint pens.

Now Willie Mouton, did he know for which purpose you required the tyres? -- For sure he did yes.

(30)

Did you tell him? -- Yes we told him.

Did you say to him Willie man we've come here to knock off two guys and we need some tyres to burn them with? -- That's right.

Will you bring us some? -- That's right.

And Willie Mouton was a dog handler? -- That's right.

At Zeerust? -- At Zeerust, but I have known him since Volksrust in 1976, that's where I have originally met him.

And he was a uniform man? -- No a detective, he was working with a tracker dog, he was in the detective branch.

Detective branch? -- That's right.

He had no difficulty, he said "Ja ou Dirk man" I'll bring you the tyres, no problem? -- Not at all. (10)

I see. And was that on the first night or the second night or the third night that you tried to poison these two? -- On the first night, we brought Peter under the impression we locked Vusi onto Peter, and Peter was brought, we kept him under the impression that he is actually there to guard Vusi.

I see./...

K1.531

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COETZEE

(20)

I see. So did they remain handcuffed to one another throughout? -- That's right.

So it's the first night you tried to poison them? -- That's correct.

It didn't work? -- It didn't work.

What did you do then? -- Koos Vermeulen went back the next day to Brigadier Neethling's office and reported back ...

(intervenes)

Well you don't know what he said to Neethling. -- Except what he told me.

You sent him to Neethling and he came back? -- That's correct. (30)

When did he come back? -- That same day.

That same day. And what did he bring with him? -- A double dose, it's the original dose was doubled up according to him and Koos reported that the general just couldn't believe that it is not working.

Allright now that was day two? -- That's right.

Did you try again that night or that day? -- Yes we did. Of course on the first night, after the, about an hour, hour-and-a-half expired we administered four drops to Vusi of this knock-out drops to keep, and kept record of his reaction how long did it take to knock him over, what his reactions was and that I reported back to General Neethling on a third occasion when we visited him. (10)

Now he asked you to make guinea-pigs of these two? -- Yes we said ... (intervenes)

So that he could see how his knock-out drops work? -- That's correct.

Okay. So on the second day you tried to poison them again?/...

K1.557

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COETZEE
(20)

again? -- That's correct.

And then what happened? -- Nothing at all.

All right. What happened then? -- We, the squad then pulled up to Groblersdal.

When was that? -- Sorry sir.

Was it the third day? -- No I can't exactly say, if I've got the things that I have asked for I can check on it, but, the vehicle log-sheets, I'll be able to tell you then.

The third or the fourth day maybe? -- I don't want to commit myself to that, but we eventually pulled up to Groblersdal, the whole squad, just outside Groblersdal, past the river on the Stoffberg road. (30)

Now, while you were at Zeerust trying to kill these two people, were you just busy with killing or, these two, or were you doing something else as well? -- Myself was only involved in the killing.

I know at a stage that Joe was busy, Joe Mamasela was busy with Vusi, sort of just hammering, have him knelt in the sun, trying to teach him the Lord's Prayer, and while he was doing that kicking the hell out of him.

That was over these first two days? -- Ja, during and after the second day. First, second day, it was during that period.

And did Joe remain with you throughout? -- No, no, no, Joe was with a group, but whenever we moved Koos Vermeulen, myself, Vusi and Peter moved alone, except when I went out front, Koos came alone with Vusi and Peter, behind. We didn't want the whole squad to see Vusi, Vusi's presence there with the eye on the future, so that there is no witnesses that he in fact has been with us on the farm.

But Joe was a witness? -- Joe saw him.

Joe/...

K1.590

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COETZEE
(20)

Joe saw him? -- Ja.

And was Joe there on the first and the second and the subsequent days? -- No, Joe wasn't present there where we administered the poison, he was present at the house when we had returned to the house at a stage to pull up, pack up and pull out to Groblersdal.

I see. So then you went to Groblersdal? -- That's correct.

You don't know whether it was the third or the fourth day or which day? -- No, I can't remember.

And at Groblersdal, what did you do there? -- As you go out Groblersdal on the Stoffberg road, there's two after war settlement smallholdings where the chaps that came back from the war was

settled and they, the one is called Fort El Alemein, or something, but we went to the one on the left, on the, to the North and specifically to the second house and stand, if you turn left alongside the river and Vusi and Peter, Koos kept in the first house as you turned left.

No, no, no, you say that you had to pull out and go to Groblersdal. What I want to know is do you recall what you had to go to Groblersdal for? -- No not at all but the whole squad went there.

Do you recall anything of any moment that happened at Groblersdal? Or were you just busy with your normal job? -- I can't remember, I think it was busy with the normal job in the Nebo area and Groblersdal. (10)

And do you recall how long you stayed at Groblersdal? -- No unfortunately not. It was days it wasn't weeks.

It was days. -- Ja.

Now was there, were there any further attempts at

Groblersdal/...

K1.624

- 527 -

COETZEE

(20)

Groblersdal to kill Peter and Vusi? -- We went, Koos Vermeulen and myself went to General Lothar Neethling's house on a Sunday morning.

Yes, on a Sunday? -- That's right.

Yes. -- It was quite early in the morning where we went to pick him up and went with him to his forensic laboratory in Jacob Maré Street.

Yes, what happened there? -- He, well of course he couldn't believe that the poison is not working and he triple the dose.

He diluted it in fluid and then pulled it up in two hundred unit insulin syringes of mine and we, he wrapped it in tinfoil so that the plunger couldn't go down and squirt the fluid out and we went (30)

back to administer that to Vusi and Peter, but still nothing happened.

You didn't inject them with the poison, you put it in their drink again? -- In the drink, ja.

Was that at Groblersdal? -- That was at Groblersdal.

Now, how long since you had taken Vusi from Brits, had now elapsed? How much time about? -- Sir, really I can't remember.

Approximately? -- No, I don't want guess at all. I can get very, very close to it if the things that I want ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes Mr Coetzee, you, I'm going to scream if you make that point again. Because you know that the petrol records, as far as we know are not available. So it doesn't assist me at all if you are going to make the same point again. You've made it at least 20 times this morning. -- Okay sir, but then I can't answer him. (10)

Well then you simply say you can't. -- I can't answer you

Mr Maritz/...

K1.659

- 528 -

COETZEE

Mr Maritz.

MR MARITZ: Now after you had administered the ... (intervenes) (20)

CHAIRMAN: What I find amazing Mr Coetzee is that you can remember the number of drops which were in a bottle ten years ago, but you cannot remember the number of days. -- But sir I didn't prepare at that time to come and give evidence in the court. There were certain things that made a greater and permanent impression on me, than other things.

So the number of drops was to you more important than the number of people killed or when they were killed, or the sequence in which they were killed? -- No, as to when eventually they were killed and how long, how many days expired and elapsed, but I mean I can, I'm sure I can still get that. (30)

Yes.

MR MARITZ: In any event you say you don't have the slightest idea how long it was, but any event you made a third attempt to kill these two, Peter and Vusi? -- That's correct.

Was that at Groblersdal? -- That's at Groblersdal.

And, what would have happened if it had worked at Groblersdal? Say now you were successful, and you had killed them at Groblersdal, what would you have done then? -- The corpses would have been put in the boot, a proper spot selected and the bodies would have been burned on a pyre.

Yes but what was your planning? -- The planning was to kill them and as soon as they were killed to get rid of the bodies. (10)

What did you plan in this regard, where were you going to take them to get rid of them? -- Any spot in the area that was suitable/...

K1.694

- 529 -

COETZEE

suitable to burn and dispose of the bodies.

Right there at, near Groblersdal? -- It would have been in the Groblersdal area, that's right.

And you would have gone to the station commander at Groblersdal and said look man we need some tyres to burn people? -- No I didn't say that Mr Maritz. (20)

What would you have done? -- I would have made a plan, go to the municipal dumping yard and get my own tyres.

When you moved from Zeerust, you didn't take your tyres along? -- No, in fact one can go to that farm and I sure he found this dump of old tyres in his lands.

I see, so in any case you would have got fresh tyres? -- Old ones yes.

Right. So then the poison didn't work? -- The poison didn't work. (30)

Now you must have been rather desperate at that stage? --
We were yes.

Now what did you decide to do then? -- We then decided to leave for Komatipoort and meet up with Major Archie Flemington of Lebombo, where we administered drops, Koos Vermeulen, myself and Paul van Dyk and Major Archie Flemington with two or three of his men and then right next to the Komati river we administered these knock-out drops and then they fell over. Koos Vermeulen shot them behind the ear, each one with a Tokarev pistol and a silencer on it and they were put onto a pyre of logs and tyres and burnt, right through the night. (10)

But now, you could have ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Where was that at Komatipoort? -- Sir if you come on the Nelspruit-Komatipoort road, just before you cross, I think it's the Komati river coming in from your right, just
past/...

K1.727

- 530 -

COETZEE

past the bridge, there is the crossing where you can turn off South to border, gate border post, North into Komatipoort or keep straight on to the Lebombo border post. But this was just before that bridge, on the right is an old farm gate and a little farm road. About, I'm guessing now, about 100 yards in it makes a split, I think that leads to the municipal dumping grounds of the Komatipoort municipality, but there is only one road leading left towards the river, where it end up under the trees on the bank of the Komati river, on the Western bank, under trees on an open spot about, I guess 100, 200 metres from the bridge. (20)

MR MARITZ: How far is that place from Komatipoort itself? -- Very near, a question of minutes driving. As I say it's just outside of town. (30)

Well how far would you say ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: So you say it's just across the river you have the Kruger Park? -- Across the river you look on into, onto the Lebombo mountains running North-South.

Yes, but what is across the river? -- We were on the Western bank of the Komati river.

Yes but what is on the Eastern bank of the river? -- Well if you look across the Eastern bank, the river was running South-North, before it meets up with the I think Crocodile river that comes through the Kruger National Park. So the Komati river at that place is running South-North parallel with the Lebombo mountains and between the river and the mountains were this Border gate road from Komatipoort to Border post on the Swaziland border. (10)

That's now before the confluence of the two rivers? -- Yes sir, I think just before the two rivers meet.

It's/...

K1.768

- 531 -

COETZEE

It's actually the Inkomati river not Komati river.

MR MARITZ: How far would you say that spot is from Komatipoort?

CHAIRMAN: He said a few minutes.

MR MARITZ: Yes but in distance not in time? -- I'm completely guessing a few kilometres. I can't think that it can be more than 10, five kilometres, I guess. (20)

Was there any special reason why Koos Vermeulen used a Tokarev with a silencer? -- A Makarov.

A Makarov with a silencer? -- It's one that Archie Flemington had at hand, was a Makarov.

But is there any special reason why he used that particular weapon? -- I can't say, not specifically. That was handed to him and he used it.

Was there any reason why he used a silencer, or a silent weapon? -- Well I suppose to prevent noise, to attract attention (30)

maybe from passers by.

Oh, I see. How close is that place to the national road?

-- From the bridge about, I guess 100 metres.

A hundred metres from the national road? -- Ja.

So it stands to reason that you wouldn't then have wanted to make a noise By firing two shots? -- Obviously yes.

And is that where you burnt the bodies as well, at that spot?

-- That's correct.

A hundred metres from the national road? -- That's right.

And a few kilometres from Komatipoort? -- That's correct.

CHAIRMAN: But beneath the trees you said. You said beneath the trees? -- That's correct. (10)

MR MARITZ: And you used tyres? -- And logs, heavy logs.

Tyres and logs. Old motor car tyres? -- That's

correct/...

K1.809

- 532 -

COETZEE

correct.

Now I think this question has been asked before, but I am nevertheless going to ask you again. You were going to burn these bodies in any event, not so? -- After killing them yes. (20)

Yes. So what did it matter how they were killed if you were going to burn them in any event? -- I don't understand the question, Mr Maritz.

Look you start off with a story that you got some poison from General Neethling which would simulate a heart attack. -- Ja.

What would that matter to you, or to anybody else in the world if you intended burning the bodies in any case? -- Ja no, I don't think post mortems were at all applicable, or we thought of that.

It was a question of I couldn't look a man into the eye, pull out a gun and shoot him at point-blank. (30)

But you weren't going to were you? -- No for sure, that's

why I tried the poison.

That's why you got Koos Vermeulen to do the shooting. -- Koos volunteered out of his sound will.

Did he have any difficulty with shooting a man while looking him in the eye? -- Well that I haven't asked him, but he waited till the drops was administered and he then did it without any ceremony.

So you weren't being humane about the whole thing, you were just queasy about doing it yourself? -- Myself meaning?

What I'm saying is that you weren't trying to be humane to the victims, you were just queasy yourself. -- No well I couldn't do it. (10)

So it didn't revolv around being humane to the victim? -- No I don't think that was the question. Well in a

way/...

K2.017

- 533 -

COETZEE

way it could.

You just didn't have the guts to shoot the man while looking him in the eye? -- That's right. (20)

So you decided you had to poison them? -- That's right.

CHAIRMAN: But wasn't, that was not your decision to poison them? -- I beg your pardon sir?

It was not your decision to poison them? -- No it was mine sir.

But I thought you were told to fetch poison? -- No, I asked whether they would arrange for me with General Neethling, Brigadier Neethling so that I can pick up poison.

So and only thereafter, so he didn't volunteer the poison, he was asked to give poison? -- That's correct. (30)

And then he asked you to at the same time, to use it as an experiment? -- No he just, at that stage just said when you give

that powder in to a sheep, for a sheep, between five and 15 minutes the sheep will just jump in the air and ... (intervenes)

So he did not use this as an experiment for his poison? -- Well sir he has never tried it on human beings and that would have been the first time that we would have done it.

But did he use it as an experiment, did he use you as an experimenter in an experimental programme he had to test the efficiency of his poison? -- No, no not put in that way.

MR MARITZ: But he used you to test the efficiency of his knock-out drops? -- Yes, and of course the result of the poison would have showed to him, although it was not an official request or a programme of him to test his poison on human beings. (10)

CHAIRMAN: But he would not know whether it simulated a heart attack/...

K2.035

- 534 -

COETZEE

attack, he would simply know it killed someone. -- Sir, ja he, well to a sheep he said that these ... (intervenes)

Yes but the test on the human could not have given him any test results to tell him it would for future use, if he uses it, he could simulate a heart attack. -- I think he would just accept it, the fact that if they died in fact of that poison that resulted in the same, the result if you give in for a sheep. (20)

MR MARITZ: Yes but he would have had to do an autopsy to establish whether his poison was any good to simulate a heart attack? -- Ja sir, that now, you are getting into small details that was not, that we didn't think of at that stage, I mean it was a question of getting this chap killed, in what I thought the most human way without shooting him, giving the poison, dying of a heart attack and then burn him, I mean it was never discussed to kill the people and before burning them to have an official autopsy done on them (30)

etcetera etcetera.

But quite probably it wouldn't have been a small detail to General Neethling? He would have been very interested? -- No I don't think he would have been, like to get involved in a murder case where chaps were murdered.

In any event the further startling point is this that I don't understand, you must try and help us. You had knock-out drops.

Now you have stated over and over again that if you gave or if you administered too much of the knock-out drops, then you would cause death? -- That's correct.

Why didn't you use that simple device of just giving too many drops? -- We could have done that just as well Mr Maritz, but it wasn't our decision. I'm sure if you would have been there you would have decided it that way. But we decided at

(10)

that/...

K2.058

- 535 -

COETZEE

that stage four knock-out drops, get them out and shoot them. That was, there was no specific meeting and reasoning on that, it was just done that way.

(20)

But it's absurd. -- To you it might sound absurd, in our circle of job it's got nothing to do with that, the end result must just be killing the guy.

Are you that stupid Mr Coetzee? -- For doing what Mr Maritz?

That you can't see the obvious? -- Mr Maritz are you that stupid that you want to argue with me in which way I should have killed my victim.

CHAIRMAN: No, no, please don't get involved in that kind of argument.

MR MARITZ: The point is this, you tried three times without any success to poison these men. -- Right.

(30)

But you had knock-out drops which you want us to believe,

that if you administered too much would have killed these people.

-- That's correct.

Surely after the third poisoning try you should have thought of using the knock-out drops in too large a volume. -- Ag, Mr Maritz then one can carry on, then I could just as well electrocuted him, hang him from a tree, I mean there was all different kinds of way that I could go about it and it was short and sweetly decided to give them four knock-out drops when they fall over we shot them and we burnt them afterwards.

You sitting there today, you can't explain why you didn't think of the simple expedient of giving too much knock-out drops? (10)

-- No.

CHAIRMAN: Can you explain why you went to Komatipoort? -- Komatipoort, to get away from the Groblersdal area, to get to the, /...

K2.077

- 536 -

COETZEE

the, our close rapport colleagues that also fell under Middelburg, these colleagues were involved in the kidnapping of the land cruiser in Swaziland earlier on and there was always teamwork amongst us. (20)

But why did you have to involve other people Mr Coetzee? -- Mr Chairman, we could have done it on our own, I mean ...

(intervenes)

That's why I ask you why did you go to the trouble of going to Komatipoort? -- Getting a selected spot where ... (intervenes)

Yes, but let me just tell you, unfortunately I have been to that area. -- Ja.

And what I know of the area it is bushveld. -- That's right.

And what I also know of the area is that there are game farms.

-- That's right. (30)

Next to the few cattle farms that are left for game farms.

-- Yes.

And therefore I presume that it is a fire hazard area. --
Yes.

And therefore I presume if there are burning tyres, which burn for quite a while, that it could cause at least people to come and look what kind of fire is burning. -- But Mr Chairman if I can just take you to the exact spot you would see it is a secluded spot, it's green, it's under the trees, it's right next to the river, the embankment is coming up steeply, fairly steeply at a spot making a "V" towards water level, and the pyre was built in this "V", it's trees all over and the remains were just dished into the river there. (10)

I'm talking about the fire. Why I say I have been to
that/...

K2.098

- 537 -

COETZEE

that spot, I may not have been at this exact spot, but I have been into that bush, to the right-hand side of the road, because I inspected a waterpump on the river, on the Inkomati river, so I know the area. -- But there was no fire hazard Mr Chairman. (20)

I don't say there was a fire hazard, I say this is a fire hazard area, you cannot make a fire near in the bushveld, anywhere without having all the farmers rushing out.-- Mr Harms I would just like to confirm that this is exactly what happened.

No, no, no, all I say, well, I put to I just wanted you to know that that is my recollection of the area. -- Yes.

And you agreed with my description. -- Well it's green at all, its green trees, it's next to the river, it's a secluded spot and no one noticed us there during the night, and didn't attract any attention at all and that was that.

No I'm just considering the risk you took. -- Well sir I'm sure there is always risk to it and I mean someone could have just (30)

as well driven into that spot and come across us and caught us red-handed, there is always ... (intervenes)

Isn't there a police farm near Groblersdal, a training farm or something? -- That's right Maleoskop trainig centre.

Which is, I presume fairly secluded? -- Yes.

More secluded than a few minutes, 100 yards from the national road. -- Sir but they have done training there, they are doing training there, they've got look-out posts, they are always out in the veld, it's not security, that farm doesn't fall under the security police, it falls under the counter insurgency of Major-general Wandrag those days, so it will be a very big risk going to a farm of any other section of the police./... (10)

K2.123

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COETZEE

police.

MR MARITZ: But you were above the law Mr Coetzee. -- I know but we couldn't expect to leave tracks and just expect the CID to close their eyes up for it, I mean ... (intervenes)

Were you afraid of being caught in what you did? -- Of course yes. (20)

But how could you then be above the law? -- We were above the law in, that no one would have entered and questioned us on a murder or enter a security ahead of us, but obviously if you leave your car registration plate on the site and you leave your ID card where you have burned a body, and you have left some evidence there, surely you must not suspect that the criminal investigation department will just cover you up there.

CHAIRMAN: But Mr Coetzee, then I don't understand that you use a member of the CID, who is a dog handler to produce the tyres for the burning of the body, and now you say you couldn't take that kind of risk. -- It was a trustworthy friend of mine Mr (30)

Chairman, and he was just required to put that tyres off there.

No but he was told what the operation was about. -- That's correct sir as a friend.

MR MARITZ: What is your understanding of being above the law?

-- Untouchable, you can do what you like.

Untouchable by whom? -- Untouchable by the CID, if you don't leave tracks, if you don't leave traces, exactly ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Everybody is untouchable if they don't leave tracks.

-- Mr Harms can I explain it this way? Being above the law is exactly what your clients' experience now, the

(10)
protection/..

K2.146

- 539 -

COETZEE

protection of no one trying in fact to prove them guilty, but everyone trying to prove me mad and a fool and wild allegations which is a complete contrast in the way the police act against the CCB. I mean at least one would expect with three policemen making similar statements, you would have at least detained some Askari's then Jeff Bosigo's, Brian Nqgulunga's etcetera, but it's not happening at all, not at all. Nothing has been done since, (20)
in fact when I speak about the Lindley case I, Lindley shooting the private claim documents is pulled out in stead of the blood alcohol percentage of the driver where one could see that that driver was so drunk he didn't know his elbow from his ass. But they want to put it forward to me that this is now the real facts, they wouldn't go to Warrant-officer Heath who was station commander at that stage to brigadeir, whoever he was the divisional CID commander, to the attorney-general in the Free State to check on that facts, they just come up with virtually nothing.

But I think you are quite unfair because what you are now doing is you directly or indirectly attacking the way I handle (30)
this investigation and I think you are slightly unfair because

we did get the necessary documents. -- But Mr Harms I am not at all reflecting at you, you must rely on your police's honesty, I mean they are ... (intervenes)

No, that's not the point. The question is where to look and what to look for. I give most of those instructions. -- Well Mr Harms I would have done it in a completely different way and I would have given you much more satisfaction.

Yes, but you have done more things in a completely different way than I would have done. -- Yes, no that's true.

MR MARITZ:/...
(10)

K2.169

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COETZEE

MR MARITZ: Can I ask you this question, then I need tea Mr Chairman. You are an insulin dependent diabetic? -- That's correct.

Since when have you been an insulin dependent diabetic? -- About February 1981.

And did you start using insulin on a daily basis since that time? -- Twice daily.

Twice daily? -- That's right.

With what volume of insulin do you inject yourself? -- At the moment I'm on 28 units in the morning and 14 at night, but that varies on, depending on the exercise, food intake, tension etcetera. (20)

Now, what is a unit -- A unit, 150 units is equal to 1.5 millilitre.

So it's a very very small quantity? -- It depends on what you mean by small quantity, quantity in relation to a liter of water or a liter of milk, yes for sure.

Now what would happen if you would inject yourself say with 5 millilitres? -- Of insulin? (30)

Of insulin? -- Well eventually you will build up to a high

(mediese terme?) in other words a diabetic coma having too much insulin which builds up over days, but you will eventually go into a (mediese terme?) coma.

What would happen if you gave me five millilitres of insulin, who is not a diabetic? -- I don't know whether five will have an affect, what affect five will have on you, but if I inject you enough insulin you with an active pankreas, you will for sure go into a hypoglycaemia which is an insulin coma.

I would die. -- Depending on the amount you are
injected./...
(10)

K2.193

- 541 -

COETZEE

injected.

Ja. I don't want to teach people to poison, but insulin is one of the most deadly poisons on earth. -- No if you eat enough, if I inject you five units and you get to enough sugar, chocolates and sweets, you will survive.

Ja but I don't get these things, I'm a normal person who doesn't have diabetes. If you injected a normal person who doesn't have diabetes with insulin, you are going to kill him. -- That's
(20)
correct.

Yes. Now you have known this for a long time. -- That if you inject him he will die?

Yes. -- Yes, but I didn't think of that.

And you knew this in 1981 too? -- That's right.

And you had insulin available? -- That's right.

Why didn't you just inject Peter and Vusi with insulin? -- Mr Chairman you are sitting here in an easy chair arguing what I as Dirk Coetzee should have done and think of, I didn't think of killing people with insulin, using insulin to take them out.
(30)

I did it in the way that I was taught, brought up and I just fell in with that.

CHAIRMAN: No but you asked for poison Mr Coetzee, it was your idea, so don't say you... (intervenes) -- But Mr Chairman I could have done it, but why ... (intervenes)

Who taught you to poison someone, you said you were taught to kill with poison, now who taught you to kill persons with poison? -- Who taught me to kill with poison? That story comes from the Rhodesian war in the, while Rhodesian was still independent, where clothes of so-called recruited terrorists were poisoned and they were dished out with these clothes and they died on their way out.

Who/...
(10)

K2.216

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COETZEE

Who taught you to kill persons with poison? -- In the security culture I was taught this, that food caches(?) is poison. No one took me by the hand and said inject this into a food cache and the guy will die.

MR MARITZ: Would it be convenient to take the tea adjournment now Mr Chairman.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR TEA. THE COMMISSION RESUMES.

DIRK COETZEE: (still under oath)

(20)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARTIZ (contd)

I must tell you something else about insulin poisoning Mr Coetzee and that is this, is that those cases of insulin murders which have been documented show that insulin death in a person who is not a diabetic simulates a heart attack, do you know that? -- I didn't know it and I have never gone into it. I just went into, because myself and my little son is a diabetic so I just went into the facts of the sugar diabetes problems.

I thought you knew that because I suspect that that's where you get your story from. -- No not at all Mr Maritz, not at all please.
(30)

In any event, how long did this whole episode take, more or

less? -- Now please don't confine me to time, it wasn't months.

I would guess, I'd guess days to a week or two.

A week or two? -- Ja, if you are pushing me into it, but I can't remember. I really can't remember and I am not trying to be funny with you.

Ja but this was a very ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: It could be hardly less than a week I think I mean if you went down to Zeerust, you spent at least two to three days in Zeerust. You went to Groblersdal, you went back

over/..
(10)

K3.022

- 543 -

COETZEE

over the weekend to Pretoria, you went down to Komatipoort. It sounds that it must at least be a week. -- It could be yes Mr Chairman.

MR MARITZ: Now another thing that strikes me as very strange is the following: You used a silenced pistol to kill these two people because you were afraid of attracting attention, not so? -- Yes.

But then you proceed and you burn these bodies with tyres?
-- That's correct.

(20)

Have you any idea of the stench the tyres give off? -- And the light, yes.

And what? -- And the light at night with tyres and a fire.

Yes. Have you any idea of how much stench it gives off? --
Stinks?

Stench? -- Stench, no I don't know what is stench?

Dit stink.-- Dit stink, oh yes it smells quite a lot ja.

I mean everybody knows that. -- Ja.

If you are burning tyres you are making a big stink? -- That's right.

(30)

And if you add two bodies on top of it, that is going to create a tremendous stench? -- No it smells like braai, now if you normally

"braai vleis" and the bones eventually smells like when you throw bones into a fire after a braai, that smell.

Now I also braai meat Mr Coetzee and I have experienced my wife leaving meat on the stove too long or in the oven burning it, and there is a very very distinct and separate smell attached to the two ways of cooking meat? -- Confined in the kitchen for sure yes, but out in the open with a breeze

blowing/..

K3.043

- 544 -

COETZEE

(10)

blowing and wind it's not that horrible.

That if you are burning meat it stinks to high heaven. -- Ja it all depends whether you are under the wind or above the wind.

Right, now I think you said here that it takes about nine hours to burn a body. -- Between seven and nine that's right.

So for nine hours or between seven and nine hours you burnt these two bodies with tyres and logs in close proximity to Komatipoort? -- A few kilometres away yes.

A hundred yards from the highway? -- From the bridge approximately 100 yes.

(20)

Right, across the river is the Kruger National park, isn't it? -- No

CHAIRMAN: No, no, let me just explain to you. The river between the Kruger Park and Komatipoort is the Crocodile and the Inkomati comes from Swaziland, so the confluence is just below the bridge.

MR MARITZ: Thank you sir. But in any event the Kruger National Park is not far off, if I understand the position correctly? -- A few kilometres away.

It's in close proximity? -- A few kilometres away yes.

There are farmers in the area? -- There is for sure farms, I don't know how near to that spot.

(30)

Cattle farmers? -- I don't know, on your way to Komatipoort

I did see some cane fields and bushveld mainly.

And these are people, and this is normal human experience that people in the bush farming with cattle and cane farmers are very very wary of fires in their areas. -- Yes that's correct.

And/...

K3.068

- 545 -

COETZEE

And you burn two bodies for nine hours with tyres and nobody comes to investigate? -- No one at all.

I find that extremely difficult to understand. -- Mr Maritz (10)
I'm sure if we did all our planning the way you are arguing now, no one would have ever been murdered, no cars would have been stolen, no cars would have been burnt. There is a risk factor to every operation and someone could have just as well walked right up to us and asked us all these questions but it didn't happen.

Ja. Well from that I must deduce that you operated willy-nilly?

CHAIRMAN: What do you mean by that Mr. Maritz?

MR MARITZ: I mean that you say now that if you had planned properly you wouldn't have done any of these things which stand out like (20)
sore thumbs. -- No if I had argued your way in planning the murders there wouldn't have, I would have just come up to obstacles. I would never have ended up committing any murder or stealing cars.

But in perpetrating your murders it looks as if you committed every absurdity in the book. -- Yes.

You went about it in the most absurd way that you could? -- And that's the way it works usually.

So if you are absurd then it works? -- In our cases it always worked.

If you reasoned it doesn't work? -- No, no I didn't say that, (30)
I just say if I start reasoning like you with all the obstacles placed in my mind, a job is as difficult as you want it to be or

want to make it and your problem is as big as you want to make it.

Now, you are not a stupid man are you Mr Coetzee? --

I could/...

K3.089

- 546 -

COETZEE

I could have acted like one, I won't be able to say, I have never seen my IQ.

Well you went out of your way to convince us of how precious you are by telling us of all the distinction you received and the first class passes you received. (10)

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman I don't think that's a fair question.

CHAIRMAN: I think we all know Mr Coetzee is extremely intelligent so you can carry on.

MR MARITZ: Right. What strikes me as terribly odd coming from an intelligent man is that you told Jacques Pauw at Mauritius, that the first time you got 60 grams of poison from General Neethling, is that right? -- That's correct.

That is contained in the written statement as well. -- That is correct.

Then you said that the 60 grams were doubled, making it 120 grams. -- That's correct. (20)

And then eventually you got 360 grams. -- Tripled that should have been 180, my calculations wasn't quite good there.

180 grams? -- Ja.

Do you have any idea how much 180 grams is Mr Coetzee? -- Ja unfortunately, yes I would have had to spoon it in for him if it was 180 grams and I realised that afterwards and I had science at school last and my symbol, I've got it here, I obtained an E, that's just above 40%, so my knowledge of weights isn't so good, I didn't try to mislead anyone, it's obvious that it should have been 60 milligram or something of that kind. (30)

But it is such a stupid mistake? -- For me as a layman as far as science is concerned, it's not stupid, I mean thinking now of it obviously to get 180 grams of poison into a chap I would/...

K3.114

- 547 -

COETZEE

would have spoon-fed him.

That's right, you would have had more than a cup full of poison. -- That's right. But I mean if you look at how, if you look at how the eventual, the third dose was pulled up into a 100 unit insulin syringe it's obvious that I was just making a mistake with the grams and the milli, whether it was milligrams or whatever it was, the figure 60 stuck in my head. (10)

Yes but you were in 1981 an insulin dependent diabetic.-- That's correct.

And so was your son? -- That's correct.

And you made a very careful study of diabetes? -- That's right

And you also knew exactly what the limits are of administering insulin to yourself and to your son? -- As to how much?

That's right. -- That's right.

And those are minute quantities? -- Working in units, that's right. (20)

But that's what I don't understand, is how does a man that is aware of these facts, how does he commit such a gross error in regard to grams of poison? -- Sir I can, Mr Maritz I can assure you I only later learned that 150 millilitre is equal to 150 units, in the diabetic world we work with units. You get five units or ten units and that is very small minute drops of insulin administered and I think it's a big difference between fluid and weights.

All right. Now you remember this Lindley matter where you were involved in the shooting with the drunken driver? -- That's (30)

correct.

Do you recall where you were coming from when that
happened?/...

K3.140

- 548 -

COETZEE

happened? -- Basically from the Ladybrand area, but I think we stayed in the house, the first border post South of Maseru bridge.

There was an empty house where the squad stayed, but the basic control office was Ladybrand, Captain Louw.

CHAIRMAN: Ladybrand or Lady Grey? -- Lady, where am I now? (10)
Ladybrand, near Maseru bridge. But we were sleeping in an empty police house just at the first border post to the south of Maseru bridge.

MR MARITZ: May I remind you that at that time, according to the work sheets and the S & T claim forms, you were supposed to have been in the Eastern Cape. From the 9th to the 29 October 1981, does that help you to work out whether you were on your way from, when you had this experience at Lindley? -- I think I have said enough about the work sheets and the help that I get from that and what its worth and I don't want to go into it again. (20)

So you think you were at Ladybrand? -- We were for sure at the Lesotho border and we were for sure sleeping in an empty house at the first border post South of Maseru bridge.

Now being able to remember that, what were you doing at Ladybrand? -- Normal surveillance I suppose at that time.

You weren't on any mission there? -- I can't remember whether that was the time that Almond and the Ladybrand security policeman went in through Ficksburg bridge with a Valiant to try and kill Comrade A, an ANC member in Maseru bridge that also happened on one of the Lesotho excursions. I don't know whether we were there more than once. (30)

But you weren't involved in that operation? -- I was. You

are thinking of Mr Chris Hani where Ernest Ramatlala was involved trying to eliminate him with a car bomb.

Was/...

K3.168

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COETZEE

Was that the case where you waited on the border? Where you waited outside or in the country? -- This was with the Comrade A one. The Chris Hani one was ... (intervenes)

No I'm talking about the comrade A one? -- Ja I was when waiting at Maseru, that's right.

(10)

Yes you didn't go into Lesotho? -- No I didn't.

So in fact you actually had nothing to do with it? -- I planned it, I was waiting for them to come out. I went with them to Ficksburg bridge, they went in and I came down and I waited at Maseru bridge for them to come out.

Now do you recall a case where you went into Botswana and one woman was killed there and another one possibly wounded but not killed? -- That was the Joyce Diphale case that I described that Joe, myself, Almond and Jan Coetzee, Rudi Crause, Captain Koos Vermeulen, Almond Nofemela and David Tshikalange was involved in.

(20)

Was it Joyce Diphale who was killed? -- I don't know who was killed, I never, the feed back I got that one woman was wounded, the other one got off with shrapnel wounds of the cement and the husband, Rollo whose bakkie was parked outside was taken to the airport that afternoon and he wasn't in the house.

Now where were you when that operation was planned? -- This operation was planned on this farm near to Kopfontein gate border post where Captain Koos Vermeulen had his base in an old farmhouse.

On that farm I described if you come out of Kopfontein from Gaborone the road travels west-east and then turns fairly sharp north-south and on that turn there is a mountain ridge running east-west in

(30)

front of you and you turn off left at the ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN:/...

K3.197

- 550 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: Yes, please Mr Coetzee, the question was simply where was it planned? -- But I'm explaining to you Mr Chairman .. (intervenes)

You have given us that geographical description at least three times so far, .. (intervenes) --- But Mr Maritz ... (intervenes)

(10)

So it's on the farm, at the same farm you have spoken about in the past. -- Yes Mr Chairman but ... (intervenes)

Yes it's on the farm. -- Yes Mr Chairman.

Thank you. -- Can I explain to you Mr Maritz ... (intervenes)

MR MARITZ: No you have done enough explaining now, don't you understand what the honourable Chairman said to you? -- I understand .. (intervenes)

Now listen to me further. -- Okay.

The attempt on, I just want to get this clear your honour, in my mind, that the attempt on Peter and Vusi, on their lives, that took place at Zeerust. -- At this Kopfontein farm.

(20)

Did it also take place at Kopfontein farm? -- That's right.

I thought you said it was at Zeerust? -- No I didn't say that.

CHAIRMAN: No it's at the same, he said it was the same farm.

MR MARITZ: Was it Kopfontein? Okay, sorry. In any event did you and Paul van Dyk and Joe and Almond Nofemela go to Kopfontein together for this operation or how did it work? -- For which one are you talking now, Peter and Vusi ... (intervenes)

No, no, no I'm talking about the two women in

Botswana./...

(30)

K3.215

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COETZEE

Botswana. -- As I can recollect it Paul, Almond, myself and Tshikalange went there, where we met up with the rest.

Who were the rest? -- Must I repeat it again because I have already said it? It's Jan Coetzee, Captain Rudi Crause, Joe Mamasela, Koos Vermeulen.

You met up with those there? -- Ja.

Right, and what transpired then on Kopfontein after you had met up? -- Okay, I have already explained that too. We, were in this old farmhouse where Koos stayed, where the layout of the house was discussed and showed to us. Then Joe, and I think Almond went with him into Botswana for surveillance after 14h00 in the BPC (10) bakkie. They came out. I went in after 16h00 in the same bakkie, came out. That night at 19h45, before the gate closed Joe Mamasela took the vehicle through, we crossed the fence to the south of the border post, walked a few, a kilometre or so up the road towards Gaborone and waited next to the road for Joe to come and pick us up roundabout 21h00 after making sure that there was no road blocks on the road.

And how long were you at Kopfontein with that operation? -- Early the next morning we left, as I say we, myself, Paul van Dyk (20) Nofemela and Tshikalange if I remember correct, I don't know whether Koos Rudi Craus and Jan, they were there in separate vehicles and Koos might have been in that area for his normal surveillance operation. I don't know whether he went there specifically for the Botswana raid.

Now do you recall the name Lilian Kiagile? -- Not at all.

You have never heard of her? -- I can't remember no.

Do you know of any interrogation that took place before this raid into Botswana? -- Not what I can recall now.

Possibly/...
(30)

Possibly I can prod your memory. Apparently there was a man by the name of Mohapbe Diphale, Ernest Mohape Diphale who was kidnapped in Soweto and this we get from Almond Nofemela. He says that he and Joe kidnapped this man in Soweto and then they took him to Zeerust and it could have been Kopfontein, we are not sure, he was there interrogated and the information regarding the house in Botswana was, well they got the information from this man Mohape Diphale and it was on the strength of that information that the operation was then launched into Botswana. -- That's quite possible.

(10)

Does that ring a bell? -- Not at all.

You don't recall that? -- No, I don't recall it.

You weren't involved in that? -- I weren't involved in that.

And if memory serves me Almond Nofemela says that the raid took place I think two or three days after the kidnapping of Mohape Diphale? -- I won't be able to assist there I don't know, I can't remember. As I say I don't even recollect a kidnapping of such a person.

And I can tell you further that Almond Nofemela also involved Jan Coetzee because it was actually Jan Coetzee's operation, he was closely involved with Joe and with Mohape and the killing in Botswana and that's what Coetzee did there, Jan Coetzee. -- Yes I know, apart from the fact that he was stationed at West Rand security, he closely handled sources in Botswana and that he worked with Joe Mamasela.

I see. -- And, it's not included in the question but I thought I would just mention it, that Botswana, Zeerust handles the Botswana network as Ermelo handles the Swaziland network, in the central area near Gaborone.

Now/...
(30)

Now do you recall that you were asked by Jacques Pauw at Mauritius whether you had caught anyone in the time that you were at Vlakplaas, do you remember that? -- Caught?

Ja, whether you had caught any so-called terrorist insurgent, whether you, ja caught anyone? -- Ja, I can remember something like that, ja.

You told Pauw that you hadn't? -- That's right. The only person that I did think pick up someone was Captain Koos Vermeulen on the Kopfontein road and if I can recall correct a shootout took place at that same koppie behind the farmhouse as a result of the (10) interrogation thereafter. But I wasn't present or involved in it.

Do you recall what the circumstances were of that person which was picked up by Koos Vermeulen? -- No, not at all. I wasn't in the area at that stage. I, he was hitch-hiking on the road, or walking along the road if I can recollect correctly and he was picked up by Koos Vermeulen then.

Just by accident? -- On Koos' initiative as he explained me that time. He just thought, his instincts just lead him to this, there is something wrong. (20)

So he told you about this? -- That's right.

And that it turned out that the man that he had picked up by instinct turned out to be a terrorist or involved with terrorist activities? -- That's correct.

And then they interrogated him? -- I believe so ja.

And what happened after that? -- I believe there was a shoot-out, if it was the same incident, in that koppie at the same farm that Koos stayed.

But you weren't involved at all? -- No I wasn't involved.

Where were you there? -- I can't remember, I wasn't (30) involved/...

involved there. Not at all.

Not at all? -- No.

Do you know that this man whom Koos Vermeulen picked up along the road was in fact Ernest Mohape Diphale? Did you learn that subsequently? -- No not at all, I won't even remember the name.

The only thing I knew about Diphale was what I've read in Almond's cross-examination but it doesn't ring a bell.

You see what happened according to Koos' version and this is substantiated by the police files and the police documents, (10)
is Koos' version is that he picked up this man, Mr Chairman the reference to this story is on page 57 of the new transcript, 68 of the old one.

Koos' version is this. He says that he was driving along the road and he saw two gentlemen walking, two black gentlemen.

They acted suspiciously and he picked them up. He gave them false names. Then he took them to the Ottoshoop police station where he locked them up, interrogated them and then he found out what their true identity was. Did he tell you that story? -- No not at all. As I can recollect he was handed over to the security (20)
branch in that area which should have been Rudi Crause, but that's a recollection. I won't dispute what he is saying there.

The record shows that Koos Vermeulen then advised security headquarters I think and Jan Coetzee was in fact looking for Ernest Mohape Diphale and he was then transferred, I think on 20 October 1981, he was transferred to Soweto. Do you know about that? -- Nothing at all.

And Koos Vermeulen further says that he picked him up on the 18 October 1981. You don't know anything about that

either?/... (30)

either? -- Nothing at all.

The strange part is this, do you know .. (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Was he transferred on the 20th?

MR MARITZ: I think it was the 20th Mr Chairman.

Do you know when Vusi was released from Brits? -- I haven't got the slightest idea.

It was in fact on 11 October 1981, not so? -- No I can't confirm it, not at all.

You cannot dispute it, it was a Sunday, the 11 October 1981 was a Sunday, according to the calendar. -- I'll accept it from you as a point of view but I made my view clear I believe when I see the original registers and entries and everything surround it, but I can't dispute it on what you say. (10)

All right, not being able to dispute it you must accept it? -- No under force yes, otherwise not.

All right accept it, it was 11 October 1981. Now as a matter of fact I think I've got it. I've got a release order here, Can I show you this document. It's a release order by the commissioner of police. -- Unsigned.

No but this is a copy. -- Ja but I mean it is not signed. (20)

That doesn't matter. We'll get signed ones if it's necessary. But the release order shows the 11 October 1981. -- But sir this document is meaningless if there is not a signature on it, I mean as I understand it, sorry I don't want to ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes we have your point, carry on. -- I beg your pardon sir?

I understand your point, carry on.

MR MARITZ: Very well. Many a case, there is no doubt about

this/... (30)

K3.406

- 555 -

COETZEE

this, the records at Brits can be produced, is that the man was

released on 11 October 1981. -- I've got insight into that records I'll comment on that one.

All right. Accepting that is so, your Sunday when you went to Lothar Neethling would then take you to the 18 October 1981. -- Your?

CHAIRMAN: The point Mr Maritz makes is this. If Vusi was released on 11 October you either took him on that day or the next day to Zeerust. -- That's correct.

And you went on for your third visit or second visit to Neethling, you went on a Sunday. -- The third one yes. (10)
Yes, and that would then, Mr Maritz says, be probably the 18 October. -- No, no sir.

Well then it must have been, if it is not the 18th then it's 26 October or 25 October. -- Mr Chairman I didn't mention any dates.

Now listen, listen Mr Coetzee you said that you came from Groblersdal on a Sunday to Neethling to fetch the fatal dose. -- On the third occasion.

Yes, that's right. Now if we assume that Vusi was released on the 11 October being a Sunday, it must have been the Sunday thereafter that you went for the third time to Neethling. -- I can't comment on it sir. (20)

Why not? -- Because I said, I said I can't give time lapses ... (intervenes)

All right Mr Coetzee, it wasn't within a week, then it was within two weeks. -- Yes.

Then it must have been the week, two weeks as from the 14th, as from the 11th. That will bring you to the 25 October. Or do you want to make it three weeks? -- Sir I don't want to be funny with you but I just say I went .. (intervenes)

(30)
No/...

No it's just strange Mr Coetzee that as soon as something is put to you, you hedge otherwise you have no doubt about anything.
-- Sir Vusi ... (intervenes)

And you may comment if you wish. -- Okay, sir I can't remember how long it took from the first release of Vusi till eventually he was killed. On the third occasion that we picked up poison from Brigadier Neethling that time was on a Sunday morning, from his house. Now I would not like to comment on whether it was days, whether it was weeks, whether, I said I can't remember and I said there is only one way that I can refresh my memory and I don't want to go into that again. (10)

MR MARITZ: No but we are trying to work out when you were supposed to have done all these things Mr Coetzee and I am putting it to you that we know when Vusi was released and that was 11 October 1981. -- But Mr ... (intervenes)

Now stop quibbling with me. Accepting the fact ...
(intervenes)

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Yes Mr Kuny.

MR KUNY: I take it that my learned friend has that document available. (20)

CHAIRMAN: Yes I presume it will be, it's on that assumption Mr Kuny.

MR KUNY: Well it's only an assumption until we see the document.

CHAIRMAN: Yes but he asked the witness to accept the assumption.

Fine. I think Mr Kuny you must accept that whether we will get the evidence in the end is a different question but we are conducting a difficult trial in a

foreign/..
(30)

foreign venue, not having access to everything we need.

MR KUNY: I understand that. It's just that my learned friend says that we know that this is a fact and then he asks him to accept that as an assumption.

CHAIRMAN: But will that, Mr Maritz says he knows it as a fact but he asked the witness to accept it as an assumption, I think that's a fair way of saying it. Those are his instructions so now he asks him to accept it for a moment for argument's sake.

CHAIRMAN: Precisely. If I can't put my money where my mouth is that's my problem, but my instructions are that Vusi was released (10) on 11 October 1981, now accepting that fact the Sunday that you spoke of that you went to General Lothar Neethling must then have been either on 18th or the 25 of October 1981. -- When the release, when Vusi was released, that Sunday?

No, no, no. You went and fetched Vusi at Brits and we have it that it was on 11 October. -- Which was a Sunday.

Which is a Sunday. Then you spend some time trying to kill them at Kopfontein. And then you went to Groblersdal and you tried to kill them there again. Then you said you remembered that on a Sunday morning you went back to Lothar Neethling to get a triple (20) dose of poison. -- Mr Maritz can I just interrupt at this stage please.

Carry on. -- Normal practice in the police is that no prisoner is released on a Sunday, normally on a Saturday or on a week day.

So although that document was signed maybe on a Sunday, the release couldn't have been effected on the Sunday.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but please, please bear with me Mr Coetzee. Vat, aanvaar vir doeleindes van die argument, as u nie die

Engels/...

stelling. As die stelling verkeerd is dan sal dit, dan is u antwoorde daaraan onderhewig. Maar net vir vredesonthalwe en dat ons iewers kan kom, voordat dit week om is vra ek u om vir argumentsonthalwe te aanvaar dat op die 11 Oktober 1981 op 'n Sondag Vusi vrygelaat is. As dit nie so is nie sal ons later vasstel, maar ek kan dit nie op die oomblik, kan dit nie bewys word nie. U volg -- Yes Mr Chairman.

Dankie.

MR MARITZ: Right now do you agree that the Sunday on which you then went to General Neethling on that supposition would then have been either the 18th or 25 October. -- That's correct. (10)

What do you think is more probable? The 18th or the 25th? -- I can't answer that question.

Accepting it was the 18th you then must have gone to Komatipoort on roundabout the 19th or 20 October 1981. -- I can't answer that one.

No, no you can answer that. -- Sir you said is it on the 18th, I said I can't tell you ... (intervenies)

CHAIRMAN: Nou, nou as, mnr. Coetzee, as ek weer met u moet Afrikaans praat sal ek dit doen. Die advokaat vra u om op sekere veronderstellings te werk. Hy vra nie vir u om te bevestig dat dit op daardie dag gebeur het nie. Die veronderstelling is dat as u na generaal Neethling of brigadier Neethling op 25 Oktober, die Sondag was, dan sê hy, dit was die derde keer wat u die gif gaan haal het, nie waar nie? -- Dis korrek. (20)

Op die veronderstelling dat dit op 18 Oktober was, dan was u, glo ek op u vorige getuienis daardie tyd in Groblersdal se/...

Dankie. Dis al wat die advokaat u vra. -- Okay.

MR MARITZ: When you returned from Brigadier Neethling as he was at that stage on the Sunday, did you administer the poison on that Sunday evening? -- It should have been, I can't recall it, it should have been. Koos Vermeulen did it, I wasn't, I didn't go to the house where Koos kept Vusi and Peter, it was one house away from us, the first smallholding on your left turning off from the road and we were on the second one.

But you were there? -- In the second house. I wasn't present with .. (intervenes)

But on the premises in another house? -- On the smallholding next door that's right. (10)

Right. So then apparently it didn't work. When did you then go to Komatipoort? The next day or the day after that? -- In the week thereafter yes.

In the week thereafter. That then takes us, this is all supposition, it takes us to the week of the 19 October 1981, right -- Yes.

Now how long were you then at Komatipoort? -- For a night, a day and a night. That day, during the night and we came back the next day. (20)

Well, then we would be at least roundabout 20 to 21 October 1981, not so? -- Yes sir.

Now I want to give you another piece of information. And this doesn't emanate from me, this emanates from counsel who act on your behalf in this Commission, I think or it may have been Mr Bob Nugent. There was an allegation that Ernest Mohape Diphale was kidnapped in Soweto on 12 October 1981, you don't know about that? -- I don't know anything about it.

Yes/... (30)

Yes it was Mr Nugent, and evidence was also introduced in the Commission, so at this stage I think you can accept that the allegation is that Ernest Mohape Diphale was kidnapped in Soweto on 12 October 1981, that would be a day after the release of Vusi, not so? -- Yes.

The evidence of Almond Nofemela was that Mohape was then interrogated, he gave some information and as a result of that information you went into Botswana and that's when the one woman was killed and one woman was wounded. Do you follow that? -- I follow it.

So that puts us in the week of 12 October 1981, not so? -- (10)
If Almond's correct yes.

Yes. I'll read to you what Almond said in his affidavit. At page 21 in paragraph 13 of the affidavit that Nofemela made for the purpose of the Commission and which is dated 6 March 1990, he said the following:

CHAIRMAN: That's exhibit number 98?

MR MARITZ: B88 Mr Chairman. He says as follows:

"As a result of the interrogation of Mohape referred to above,

I was sent on a mission into Botswana and was part of a group
contriving Lieutenant Van Dyk, Captain Coetzee, Lieutenant (20)
Vermeulen and Joseph Mamasela. Our mission was to attack
a certain house which was said to be the hiding place for
the ANC. I cannot recall at this stage whether it was in
Lobatse or Gaborone. We entered Botswana through the border
post using false passports and after being dropped some
distance inside Botswana we were joined by Coetzee, Vermeulen
and Van Dyk. We were travelling in a bakkie in the back of
which there were various weapons. At the house which we
raided there were

(30)
two/...

two women, both of whom were shot. Joseph Mamasela, Coetzee and I entered the house and shot many rounds of ammunition at random inside while Vermeulen was shooting from outside. We drove off in a bakkie, pulled down the border fence, drove the bakkie over it into the republic and returned to the farm house where we had left Captain Grobler and the kidnapped man Mohape."

Do you follow? -- Mm.

Is he telling the same story that you told us? -- In other words that a man was kidnapped inside and brought out? (10)

No, no. Don't make me read it again. -- Please do Mr Maritz.

Is this the same story that you have been telling us about the shooting of two women in Botswana. -- Let me tell you the story ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Is it the same, are you asking the same occasion?

MR MARITZ: The same occasion or is it the same incident that you two are trying to describe? -- Well he didn't go through the bakkie on the final run, on the mission I'm talking about. We got over a fence. Only Joe went through in a bakkie and we shot at two women and ... (intervenes) (20)

CHAIRMAN: No, no but I think let's get. There was only one incident in which you and Joe and Almond went into Botswana and shot at two women? -- That's right.

Fine. So it must be the same incident? Even if not in identical terms? -- That's right.

MR MARITZ: You see what bothers me Mr Coetzee, is that this must have happened in the week of the 12 October 1981, because it's coupled to the kidnapping of Mohape which took place on 12 October 1981.

(30)
MR KUNY: /...

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman may I interrupt again I'm sorry but I must do. In the affidavit to which my learned friend has referred no date is placed on this incident, it simply says as a result of the interrogation of Mohape and then the description proceeds.

You will remember that when Mr Nofemela gave his evidence before you he wasn't led on this, because this was an extraterritorial mission and the details of it were never explored nor was, as I recall it, the date ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: But I think what Mr Maritz puts is in the light of the fact that Mohape was taken on the 12 October, he was taken to Zeerust, and there was then thereafter this incursion. I think it's simply on that basis. (10)

MR KUNY: Yes, all I'm saying is that no time span is placed on that.

CHAIRMAN: Oh obviously not.

MR KUNY: At all.

MR MARITZ: We'll stretch it to the following week if you want to then. Stretch it to the week of the 19th, if that will make you happier. -- The only thing that will make me happy Mr Maritz if I get the records on the Botswana side and I'll be exactly able to tell you when we entered Botswana, how we went in, you will see it will exactly correspond with my story and you'll have the exact date and times. And I would like to stick to that because I can't say what went on in Almonds head, I would like to leave it to the Commission to decide on that one please. (20)

The point that I'm trying to make is this that if Mohape was kidnapped on 12 October and if the operation took place in Botswana within the two week period after that kidnap, you

couldn't/... (30)

couldn't possibly have had anything to do with it? -- With the Botswana raid?

Yes. -- Surprise waiting for you Mr Maritz.

Because then you were busy killing Peter and Vusi? -- That also took place at Kopfontein farm, the beginning of that.

Oh, so are you now saying that while you were at Kopfontein farm you also raided into Botswana to go and kill the women? -- No, no I said that if those dates that you put to me is correct, which I'll be able to confirm later with documentation from the Botswana side, then it coincided, it happened at the same time.

(10)

Are you now saying that when you were in Kopfontein with Peter and Vusi, you raided into Botswana to kill these women? -- I did not say that, I said if I can confirm the dates with the Botswana registers we can talk further.

CHAIRMAN: But the question is this Mr Coetzee. The raid into, you visited for present purposes, you stayed twice on the farm at Kopfontein, on two occasions, for two different missions? The one was the mission into Botswana and the other was the mission to kill Vusi and Peter? -- Yes sir.

Those were, all I want to know is that took place on two different occasions. -- I can't say sir, I'll have to, as I say I haven't got records and ... (intervenes)

(20)

But Mr Coetzee on your evidence so far it was always clearly two different occasions, it was not the same occasions. -- Two different incidents sir but I couldn't put them into the same week or the same month, or on two different periods.

No, no on the same visit. -- On the same?

Carry/...

Carry on. -- Oh well sir, I don't know, Mr Kuny isn't there

any registers yet available from Botswana.

MR MARITZ: No, please, please. -- But I want to help you Mr Maritz.

Mr Kuny will have the opportunity of re-examining you. --
Well I want to help you Mr Maritz.

No, no, just be quiet for a minute please. -- Okay.

I knew you were going to say this and you remember I asked you just now, what else did you do at Kopfontein when you were trying to kill Peter and Vusi and you said we didn't do anything else, we just tried to kill Peter and Vusi, do you remember that? -- Ja well I didn't know you were referring to the Botswana raid.

If you said, I have done two things on Kopfontein. We've done a Botswana raid, I've said it in my evidence-in-chief and we were trying to kill Peter and Vusi and from the start I said I haven't got dates to confirm and you are now pushing the whole morning on dates which I said I cannot confirm. (10)

CHAIRMAN: No but you can, could have told us Mr Coetzee, if you were dealing with more than one occasion or the same occasion.-- Ja well that I ... (intervenes)

Or the same period or not the same period. -- Ja, I can't answer that one sir.

MR MARITZ: Because you now appreciate that if your story about Peter and Vusi is the truth in your story about the Botswana incident cannot be the truth. -- Both is the truth and only the truth. Why must I sit and lie about incidents that I wasn't involved in? (20)

I'm wondering too. Now let us take it a bit further. You say, that with the Lindley affair, the shooting affair at Lindley, /...

(30)
Lindley, you were on your way from the Lesotho area, from Ladybrandt or somewhere and you said you do not know what you were doing there

at the time. -- The normal surveillance operations I said.

And that occurred on the 24th. -- The shooting incident at Lindley?

Yes, 24th of October 1981. -- Was it on - ja, that is what the police record say?

No, you said in an affidavit, that is what everybody else said in their affidavits as well and that is what the police say.

This occurred on the 24 October 1981. -- Okay.

So you were very far removed from Kopfontein and Botswana at that stage? -- That's correct.

You were also very far removed from Komatipoort at that stage. -- That's correct.

And you cannot explain how these two incidents relate to one another, the Komatipoort incident and the Lindley incident. -- How they relate to one another?

CHAIRMAN: Are they related to one another? -- I have said in evidence-in-chief we were on our way to Middelburg were two white guys were shot in the caravan at Ogies and the car was, the suspect in this incident overturned the car and we did a follow-up. We were called in to help to do the follow-up and get hold of this guy.

So as from 25 October more or less you were in the Ogies district. -- Middelburg, specific Groblersdal.

MR MARITZ: Was that when the Lindley incident took place. -- On our way to Middelburg.

You were on your way to Middelburg. -- That is right.

Yes the Ogies incident took place on 23 October 1981. --

That/...

That is right.

Is that right? -- I suppose so.

And then you were, you say, somewhere in the area of Ladybrandt doing surveillance there. -- Yes.

So you don't relate this period to the Vusi and Peter period at all? -- Yes they can most probably be when we ended up in Groblersdal. That was where we could have ended up in Groblersdal and with the first and last attempt on Peter and Vusi with the poison.

So you would have gone to Groblersdal in connection with the Ogies matter? -- We reported to Middelburg security regional headquarters where Brigadier Schoon, second-in-charge Lieutenant-colonel Roelf van Rensburg awaited us. (10)

In regard to the Ogies incident. -- That is right.

Is that why you went to Groblersdal? -- That is right, the car was overturned on it's way to Groblersdal from Witbank or, and he fled in those mountains near Loskopdam.

But you said that you were on your way from Ladybrandt to Groblersdal in connection with the Ogies matter on the 24th. -- I said I was on my way from Ladybrandt in connection with the Ogies shooting incident.

Is that when you then went to Groblersdal? -- Whilst we were in that area. (20)

CHAIRMAN: But that has nothing to do with your visit to Groblersdal with Peter and Vusi? -- The whole squad had to move up to Groblersdal, Mr Chairman, and that is quite possible that that was the time that Koos Vermeulen brought them up from Kopfontein to Groblersdal.

Where you not with Vermeulen when he brought them up to Groblersdal? -- No.

MR MARITZ: /...

MR MARITZ: Where were you then? -- At Groblersdal. At

Middelburg.

The Ogies incident was on 23 October 1981. -- Okay.

Right and you, the whole squad were taken to Groblersdal as a result of the Ogies incident. -- Correct.

So you would have landed up at Groblersdal on 23 October or subsequent to that. -- Afterwards, ja.

Right and that's where the attempt to murder Peter and Vusi was carried on, at Groblersdal. -- Yes, that is correct.

Now, once again ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: You see, I've got a problem with your evidence, excuse (10)
me, you were quite clear that you and Vermeulen and Vusi and Peter went from Zeerust to Groblersdal. -- That is correct.

Now you just now, questioning by me, gave me the impression that maybe you came from Ladybrandt to Groblersdal and found Vermeulen there with Vusi and Peter. -- Or before I went down to Ladybrandt.

Now just listen to my question. You gave me the impression, which is in conflict with what you had said earlier, quite clearly in conflict, namely that you and Vermeulen came from Zeerust with Vusi and Peter to Groblersdal. Do you stick to that, or don't you (20)
stick to that? -- No, I do not think I said I accompanied them to Groblersdal. I said ...

You said "we then left for Groblersdal". -- Ja, ja. I said I left for Groblersdal and Koos and Vusi came there, but it is possible that I first went down to Lesotho. It is difficult to say.

MR MARITZ: Well, you know just now you told us that you were prior/...

prior to going to Middelburg or now it transpires it was Groblersdal, you were at Ladybrand when you were doing normal

surveillance work. -- Mr Maritz, unfortunately we are to keep on for years on these dates. Until such time as I can get hold of vehicle register - and I have said for the hundredth time, so we can argue and - we have moved places overnight so we can carry for hours and you can try what you want. The fact is as how I have put it. You are playing with little technical points here and ...

CHAIRMAN: I think in fairness, I do not think it is technical, it is fairly vital for me to establish exactly what happened and when it happened, so I think you must accept that it is not - I do not regard it technical. You may regard it as technical. -- (10)
Okay, Mr Chairman, can I just put it to you this way: I found it so strange that the vehicle registers is destroyed so correctly after two/three years and something like the worksheets that is of no importance is kept for ten years and the only way that I can help this commission to exact dates, and I still think it is possible, if I can get petrol intakes of our different vehicles and you will see that I am speaking the truth. At the moment we are playing with dates and it is impossible ...

No, we are not playing with dates. We know as a fact when the shooting incident took place at Lindley. We are not playing with dates. It is not a play with dates. You have accepted that on that day when the Ogies incident took place that you were at Ladybrand. What is playing with dates? We know when Moabi was kidnapped. That is not playing with dates. -- And I was not involved in that. (20)

Yes, but Nofemela was involved and you were involved with the/...

the raid into Botswana. -- That is correct.

And we know when Moabi was in Johannesburg, that we also know

as an objective fact. -- Yes.

Which must have been after the raid. -- Well, sir, and I am telling the whole story as I have got it exactly, how I moved up to Botswana, I was involved in that raid, how I was involved with Koos on Kopfontein gate, how I was involved in the Lindley shooting incident, how I ended up in Groblersdal with Peter, Vusi eventually there and Koos Vermeulen and the whole squad. How we went down from there to Komatipoort and got rid of the bodies and that is the hundred percent correct story.

MR MARITZ: But your only problem is, Mr Coetzee, that your stories do not wash, they do not fit into one another. -- I will fit my story in hundred percent for you, Mr Maritz. (10)

All right let us do it. -- Just ...

Can I remind you of what you said to Jacques Pauw. I am referring to page 122 of the new transcript and 148 of the old one. That is when you were telling the story of Peter and Vusi and there again, as you had here in your evidence-in-chief, no difficulty:

"Nee, hulle drink, hulle proe niks, maar abso luut niks gebeur nie, maar dit loop toe nou al hier na 'n week se kant toe en ons is toe getrek Groblersdal toe, die hele span, al vyf groepe om daar te gaan werk, waar ons net buite Groblersdal ineen van daai ou na-oorlogse plothuisies, hulle het mos sulke oorlogsname op .." (20)

And you told us exactly the same story today. -- Okay, can I then just ask just to get things clear? So, do you insinuate that I was not involved in the Lindley shooting?

No, / ...

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COETZEE
(30)

No, I am not insinuating anything. I know that you were involved in the Lindley shooting. -- And the Lindley shooting

obvious took place between that period that I have been describing there now, moving from Kopfontein to Groblersdal, isn't it?

What I am demonstrating to you, Mr Coetzee, is that your stories do not wash. They do not fit. -- They fit hundred percent, hundred percent.

Now, will you then please explain how you could be involved in the Botswana raid when you were in fact busy killing Peter and Vusi? -- Botswana raid took one night. One night in, one night out, the same night in.

Was the Botswana raid during the period when you tried to kill Peter and Vusi? -- I cannot tell you that, Mr Maritz. (10)

If Nofemela says it was in that period what then? -- You would like to believe only that on Nofemela and the rest you make him out as a liar.

I am asking you what would you say about that? -- Nofemela is so mixed up with his dates that I won't go on that.

I think you are too. -- Do you think so?

Let us - incidentally, my junior has got a note here and I just want to hear what you say about this, is after the Botswana raid, what was the feedback that you had in regard to the damage you did there? -- That one woman landed up in hospital and the other one - I cannot remember, shrapnel I think, but one landed up in hospital and it was not the Joyce Dipale one. (20)

CHAIRMAN: But was no woman killed?-- No woman killed.

MR MARITZ: Was this the Botswana raid? -- Yes.

It/...

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COETZEE

It was not Joyce Dipale? -- It was Joyce Dipale.

Was that the Joyce Dipale one? -- That is right.

Who landed up in the hospital? -- According to what I learned then it was not Joyce Dipale, it was the woman that was with her (30)

in the house.

With her in the house? -- Yes.

And who sustained the shrapnel wounds? Was that Joyce Dipale?

-- Yes, I believe so.

You tell the funniest stories, Mr Coetzee. At page 93 of the transcript, it is the old 112 to 113, you told the story that these two women came out on the back stoop with .. -- Candles.

With candles, and now you tell the following story:

"Het hulle iets gehoor of wat? -- Ek weet nie. Ek
kan jou glad nie sê of hulle iets in die bakkie wou (10)
kom haal het of wat nie. Een van hulle het bly leef.
Sy was net gewond gewees. Hulle sal die storie by haar
kry. Toe gryp Joe die een so om die kop, druk die mond
toe, druk die Tokarev teen die kop en hy skiet haar
dood, kopskoot, en sy val en die ander een hardloop
terug in die huis in."

Do you remember telling that hideous story? -- Yes, I do.

You do not tell that story any more? -- No, I learned in exile
it was a flesh wound in the neck.

(20)
CHAIRMAN: Yes, but when did you learn it was a flesh wound in
the neck? -- In exile when I was briefed by the African Na-tional
Congress, they said that no one died in that incident.

But I have got a problem, Mr Coetzee. I thought you were
testifying of what you knew in 1981. -- Yes, that is what ...

Or are you now testifying what you learned during a
debriefing/...

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COETZEE

debriefing in 1990? -- No, this is what happened in 1981.

(30)
You told us just the feedback was that no one was killed.

-- Yes.

MR KUNY: Well, with respect, Mr Chairman, that is consistent with what he is now saying, that when he made this statement in Mauritius from which my learned friend is now quoting he did not know and he only learned subsequently that the person whom he thought was killed was not in fact killed.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Kuny, but when he gave his evidence he said that - well, the feedback he had from that incident was that no one was killed.

MR KUNY: Well, he is saying the same thing now.

CHAIRMAN: That is not the feedback he received. This is now the (10)
debriefing he received in 1990. The feedback then was someone was killed.

MR KUNY: Well, we can look at the record. I am not sure that that is what he said.

MR MARITZ: You like telling stories, don't you, Mr Coetzee?

-- Not at all, the truth will come out in the end. We are playing now in your arena unfortunately, but the truth will come out in the end.

CHAIRMAN: Now, what other arena is there where the truth will come out, Mr Coetzee? -- Sir, it is so difficult to come here and ... (20)
Just answer my question, Mr Coetzee. -- I beg your pardon?

In what other arena will the truth come out? -- Well, eventually if more people come out with the truth.

What is the arena you are referring to, Mr Coetee? -- Just the normal straightforward story.

What/...

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COETZEE

What is the arena, Mr Coetzee? -- With people - after whatever happened here with some more people coming from Vlakplaas ... (30)

Where is the arena, Mr Coetzee? Which arena are you referring to? -- Well, this one that we are involved in now, be-

tween me and Mr Maritz.

No, the other arena you were referring to, where is it, Mr Coetzee? -- Ag, Mr Chairman, I do not want to get into loggerheads with you.

Well, you make here a statement. Now I want to know where is the arena. -- No, what I meant by it is in the end more people will come out with the truth.

Where is the end? -- That I cannot determine, as soon as their conscience force them to do so.

MR MARITZ: So this story that you gave for consumption by the world, to be published in the world press which you gave to Jacques Pauw, was what you believed to have been the truth before you learned the truth. -- Which story is this? The whole incident, the whole raid into Botswana? (10)

"Toe gryp Joe die een so om die kop, druk die mond toe, druk die Tokarev teen die kop en hy skiet haar dood, kopskoot, en sy val en die ander een hardloop toe terug in die huis in." -- Ja.

That story you told. -- I did.

On which basis? -- On the basis what happened that night and as I saw it that night. (20)

So this big killer Joe could not even do a proper job of that one either? -- It looks like it, yes.

Because he was not successful. -- Yes.

Now, another very, very strange thing, Mr Coetzee, which

I find/...

I find impossible to understand, maybe you can explain it. I want to refer you to what you said at your disciplinary trial. You were trying to tell the world how well-known Vlakplaas was, at page 525 of the record of the proceedings there. -- That trial (30)

was held in camera, Mr Maritz.

I do not care threepence for that but I am reading to you what you said.

"In die opsig dat die mense wat nie moet weet nie weet en dit is die vyand, die ANC en die PAC omdat op die plaas omgedraaide of gerehabiliteerde terro-riste onder andere gehuisves word en hulle werk van daar af. Terwyl ek daar was, was daar byvoorbeeld gevalle van hulle wat gedros het terug na die ANC en ek kan hulle name noem"

(10)
and Mr De Vos said to you, I think it was Mr De Vos, "Noem hulle".

Now you said:

"Dit is onder andere Ben Lucky Zwane, die Mnisi-
broers, Chris is die een. Ek kan die ander een se
naam nie noem nie. Vusi wat destyds deur die weer-
mag uit Maputo gebring is, Peter wat homself gaan
oorgee het by Bulgarye in die ambassade daar en wat
ons toe ingevlieg het en 'n ander baie senior man
met

die naam van Chris. Dit het ook - later inligting,
terugvoering, het aangetoon dat die Mnisibroers onder
andere en Zwane weer verskyning anderkant gemaak het, dat die
ANC eenhonderd persent bewus was van die plaas, die
offisiere betrokke, die persone daarby betrokke, planne gehad
het van die plaas en daar is dan ook in my tyd daar in
Soweto pamflette versprei met foto's van die manne wat
toe op die plaas was waarin hulle beskryf is as

'sell-outs' / ...

Do you recall having testified this? -- That is correct.

Did you testify as to the truth there? -- I did and I said in my evidence-in-chief that I lied about Peter, Vusi and Isaac Ace Moema.

Why did you lie about Peter, Vusi and Isaac Ace Moema? -- If I have admitted that I have committed those three murders, Vlakplaas, I would have been in exactly the same position that I am now. So, I could not admit that we have murdered them.

But you did not have to admit that? -- So should I have lied in another matter, just omitted to name this kid of ..

You could have kept quiet about them. -- It is exactly the same. (10)

No, but is there a difference in the manner in which you tell a lie? -- Of course there is.

What I do not understand is that you had three people who had run away. The Mnisi brothers and then Lucky Zwane. -- That is correct.

Why bring the other three into it? -- I just did it.

Why? -- Because I did it.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but Mr Coetzee, I do not think that is always an answer. -- But, Mr Chairman, I brought it in. I do not know what was my thoughts at that time. I brought it in and then I said afterwards that only three of them served - the three real ones that ran away at the end served with the ANC again but not the three that was killed, but to ask me now why did I do it, I did it and how must I explain that I did it. (20)

Well, you are the only person who did it, so you are the only person who can explain it. -- Well, I just did it.

So/...

So, in other words you lied without any rhyme or reason?

-- I lied about it, yes, that is right.

MR MARITZ: But with no purpose. You just lied for the sake of lying. -- Yes, put it that way.

I think the the contrary is true, you were not lying and that is why you mentioned them. -- Were not lying in what way?

You never killed these people. -- We did kill them.

No, that is why in 1985 at your trial you could say these people disappeared. -- No, Maritz, Mr Maritz, we did kill them.

Because if it were not that way around then I do not understand you at all. -- Mr Maritz, isn't it strange that specifically those three people just disappeared from the earth and never came back to their families or with the ANC. Just never rocked up, they are just missing. (10)

No, they did not just disappear from the face of the earth and I will show you that a bit later, but could we do that after the luncheon adjournment?

COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR LUNCH.

(20)

(30)

THE COMMISSION RESUMES.

GERT COETZEE (still under oath):

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: We've already re-ferred to the worksheets and the S & T claim forms - or not the claim form, the S & T registers, and according to those documents, you were in the Eastern Cape from 9 October to 29 October 1981. -- That's correct.

You've seen that. -- I've seen it.

Do you recall anything you did in Eastern Cape during that period? -- No, not what I can think of. Between the period 9 to? (10)
9 to 29 October 1981. -- No, not that I can think of.

We've also made an extract from various other worksheets and it appears that during substantially the same period, being 11 to 29 October 1981, Almond Nofemela was in the Eastern Cape.

Do you recall whether he was there with you? -- No, I can't.

Spyker Tshikalange was also there from 11 to 29 October. That's in the Eastern Cape. So was Brian Ngqulunga and Thabo Makgaga was also in the Eastern Cape, but for a shorter period, from 17 to 29 October. Do you recall that at all? -- No, I can't.

And according to Schutte's worksheet, he was also in the (20)
Eastern Cape from 16 to 22 October. Do you recall that? -- Can't recall the incident.

Incidentally, Schutte was the - the farm foreman. -- That's correct.

He was inter alia responsible for constructing the fencing around the farm. Wasn't he? -- Not in my time. After my time, I - I believe there was a fence put up.

And /...

C3.1

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COETZEE
(30)

And he was responsible for the cars and the vehicles on the farm? -- That's correct. The Askaris' vehicles, keeping them in

order.

What else did his duties entail as foreman on the farm? -- Basically looking after all - fetching food, vegetables, everything on the farm.

But he had nothing to do with the operations of the various groups on Vlakplaas, that wasn't his job. -- No, it wasn't his job.

Now, in a case such as for instance the Eastern Cape when he came down from 16 to 22, why would he have gone down there? -- I won't be able to say. 16 to 20 October?

No, 16 to 22. 22 October. -- To the Eastern Cape? (10)

Ja. -- I won't be able to say.

He says that on occasion and the worksheets bear him out on that - that on occasion he travelled down to where the groups were, inter alia to bring them supplies. -- It is possible, yes.

So that would have been his - his obvious function, I suppose, to bring down supplies or what have you. -- Yes. Except after they were made policemen, they received S & T allowance. Then after that, they should have looked after themselves. That was what the S & T was for.

But if Schutte had no role to play in the various operations of the groups? Could you think of any other obvious reason why he would have gone down to where the groups were from time to time? (20)

-- I can't ... (intervenes)

For very short periods? -- I can't recall that specific incident in October, but 22, 23 November one was with the Mxenge car and then some time in - there should have been one

where /...

C3.2

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COETZEE

where he came down with the diamond dealer's car to Golela and then there should be one where he came down with Joe Mamasela from (30)

the farm to Durban.

Well, I - I don't know what you're talking about. What I can tell you, is that according to his worksheet, he was in Eastern Cape from 16 to 22 October. Eastern Transvaal from 14 to 16 November. Natal, 17 to 19 November and Eastern Transvaal 22 to 23 November. -- Ja. That's - that last three ones, I can recall.

On each occasion, for a very short space of time. -- That's correct.

So would he be correct to be saying that the reason why he travelled down on those few occasions, would be to take down supplies? -- No. Because at that stage, the - they were all already policemen and were receiving S & T daily for being away from headquarters out of which S & T they should have looked after themselves. (10)

Okay. Now, looking at the worksheets then, apparently there must have been some activity in the Eastern Cape over the period of 9 to 29 October. -- There should have, yes.

But you don't remember anything of what transpired in that period in the Eastern Cape? -- No. Wasn't it perhaps with the Aliwal North incident and Rhodes incident? (20)

I don't think so. I think the Elliot case - if you bear with me one moment, Mr Chairman. Let me tell you what happened in that period. From about 29 July there were serious - a series of occurrences in the Eastern Cape and border. On 29 July 1981 ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: What date?

MR MARITZ: 29 July 1981. There was an attempted murder, a - of /...

C3.4

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COETZEE

(30)
of a member of the Ciskei police at Mdantsane, in border. The border section. Does that ring a bell? -- No, it doesn't.

Then there was a case on 6 August 1981, sabotage business premises on Oxford Square East London on 6 August 1981. -- Doesn't ring a bell. I only remember being in East London once for a very short while.

Then on 7 August 1981 there was attempted murder on two members of the South African police at Navaha, near Elliot also in - in - in the border region. -- I think that was the time we could have been at Lady Grey.

At Lady Grey? -- Eh - based, ja. Based there at Lady Grey.

And in that incident too, those two members were seriously injured in the attack upon them. -- Ja, I can't recall exactly, but I think there were ANC members also shot during that incident. (10)

There was further activity on 8 August 1981. There was again a case of sabotage. Business premises in Port Elizabeth. -- Don't recall.

You don't recall. The same period, 13 August 1981, attempted murder, members of the South African police at Mountain Shadows near Elliot. -- Eh ...

In that case one policeman was seriously injured in the attack. -- Yes, as I say I know of one case I think, round about that period where there was a shoot out in the Elliot area. Between the South African police and members of the African National Congress. (20)

A further case of sabotage occurred on 19 August 1981, when a railway line was sabotaged - sabotaged at Mount Ruth, which is also in the border area. You don't recall that? --

Can't /...

C3.8

- 581 -

COETZEE

Can't recall it.

Then on 8 August 1981, also in the Eastern Cape, there was a case of sabotage at a business premises. It was a shop in North (30)

End, Port Elizabeth.

CHAIRMAN: You've already given that.

MR MARITZ: No, this is another one.

CHAIRMAN: So were there two on 8?

MR MARITZ: Yes. Then on 3 September 1981, there was a case of sabotage, a bus terminus at Ridantsane. -- Doesn't ring a bell.

So it is evident from the history in the Eastern Cape that in that period there was quite a concerted onslaught in the Eastern Cape, if one looks at all those occurrences. -- That's correct.

And that, I suppose, would have been the reason for the Vlakplaas groups having gone down to the Eastern Cape to try and trace those responsible for these deeds. -- Is that in the - which period is that? August of October? (10)

Well, the August, all the ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: All these dates are August, September. -- August.

MR MARITZ: August, September. -- Ja. As I say, I remember operating in Lady Grey area, Elliot, Aliwal North and Queens- town in the August - you know, in that period. In August, after the shooting incident at Elliot.

Now, the difficulty I have, is this: Let me spell it out to you. Incidentally, we'll - we, we, we're getting a signed copy of the - of release order in the case of Vusi. We'll give it to you tomorrow morning, or later in the day. But on the assumption that the Peter and Vusi incident took place from 11 October onwards, that the Mohabe incident and the raid into (20)

Botswana /...

C3.9

- 582 -

COETZEE

Botswana which is coupled thereto, took place on 12 October and from there on. The Lindley case took place on 24 October 1981.

According to your evidence and also the Ogies matter, which was on 23 October 1981, on your evidence thus far, you weren't in the (30)

Eastern Cape at all in the period from 9 to 29 October. -- Meaning that I was involved in the incidents, yes.

Well, you were everywhere, but in Eastern Cape. -- That's correct.

Now how do you explain that? -- That the worksheets is not at all accurate and that I was called and I was present at all that incidents that I described.

No, no. Wait a minute. We started off on Friday. And I asked you about these worksheets and you said on more than one occasion, that when these worksheets say I left Pretoria on the Eastern Cape on 29 October and I returned on such and such a date, those two dates are accurate. I have no problem with that. -- That ... (intervenes) (10)

Remember that? -- That's correct.

Do you adhere to that evidence that you gave? -- Ja, except as you say, penny stealing a few hours extra on arrival back.

Yes. -- Yes.

But on what you said, and on the work record, you left for the Eastern Cape on 9 October 1981. -- That's correct.

So you must have travelled down there. -- Must have left headquarters and I don't know where exactly in the Eastern Cape I was, because the work records, as I said from the beginning, is not an accurate indication of the specific spot that you've been in for the period that you've been there. (20)

But irrespective of where you were in the Eastern Cape, you /...

C3.10

- 583 -

COETZEE

you must have travelled to the Eastern Cape? -- To - I remember travelling in the - that's in August that we're talking about? (30)

No, we're talking about 9 October 1981. -- No - I don't know, I can't remember. But it's not necessarily that I would have gone

to the Eastern Cape. Would have been in the area and would have left the area - and could have left the area on occasion and - like the worksheets I've indicated on occasions where people has indicated in a certain area and that they were in fact never in that area.

I know. But your evidence has been throughout that you went down to this particular area where the worksheet said that you went and that you went and reported to the divisional commander because you had to go and report. -- With which incident is that?

Well, with every incident. -- No, but I - I always said that the -the worksheets isn't accurate as to the specific place where you've been. The times that I've been in Port Elizabeth, I did report to the divisional commander. The times I've been ... (10)
(intervenes)

Right, now just stop there. -- Okay.

So the worksheet says that you travelled to the Eastern Cape. You left Pretoria on 9 October 1981. -- Yes.

Then you would have travelled down on that date and as soon as you reached the Eastern Cape, you would have gone and reported to the divisional commander. -- That's correct. If I went there. (20)

But I thought you said throughout that we can accept that what this thing says, is so.

CHAIRMAN: No. I don't think - no, Mr Maritz. I think the -
I /...

C3.11

- 584 -

COETZEE

I don't think the witness went further than to say that they indicate the departing and return dates. But I don't think he specifically said that.

MR MARITZ: Well, accepting - even accepting that, why if you weren't anywhere near the Eastern Cape, would the record reflect that you were in the Eastern Cape? -- Then I must have travelled (30)

in that direction for some reason or another. Can I just make a cross-reference to the period 4 November to 20 November, whilst Captain Koos Vermeulen was indicated as being in Western Transvaal and in fact he was sleeping for that whole period in a room right next to me in Durban, for instance. So what I only want to indicate, is that there is possibilities that the worksheet is completely wrong.

Were these worksheets falsified? -- Well, completely wrong.

They were completed from the S & T sheets and as far as that is concerned, for sure falsified.

(10)
CHAIRMAN: Why? Why would you falsify your destination? -- To not indicate that we were in a certain area at a specific time, I should suggest, but ... (intervenes)

But, but - but that's not quite true, because you - you, in other instances you indicate that you went down to Durban and you indicated you were in the Eastern Cape when they - and they went to the Eastern Cape. Now why, in one instance, would that information be falsified? -- It's - the only thing I can say is that the worksheets is not accurate.

No. The question was, were they falsified and you said yes.

(20)
And now the question is, why were they falsified if other information entered, similar information was correctly entered. -- Can I just put it then this way that not meaning falsified - falsified as the fact that it not reflects the

real /...

C3.12

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COETZEE

real true position ... (intervenes)

But then, why - why was that done? -- We were called up from several directions at a time and it was never coordinated with the - with the clerk filling in the S & T. That we've now in fact left say Queenstown area for Botswana area and then Botswana

(30)

area again back to Lesotho area, but ... (inter- venes)

No, no. We talk about initial leaving of town. We're not talking about the - the movement thereafter. I mean, why indicate on the S & T form that you leave for the Eastern Cape if you don't intend to leave for the Eastern Cape? That's the only question. -- Oh no. That I'd say, is quite correct that one originally depart to the direction of the Eastern Cape.

Yes, you see, that - that was Mr Maritz's point. -- Oh.

He says, on the day 9 October it is indicated that you departed for the Eastern Cape. -- Ja. Oh, yes. Yes.

(10)

Yes.

MR MARITZ: I'm sorry, I don't understand you completely. Are you now saying that the records were not falsified? -- I'm saying that after I've departed for the Eastern Cape, I could have been re-, redirected to another direction, to another province, and later ended up where I should have gone.

CHAIRMAN: How?

MR MARITZ: But the fact of the matter is, that if one looks at this record, one sees that you again arrived back. You were ending, according to the worksheets, you were in the Eastern Cape and you arived back on Vlakplaas on 1 October 1981 at 08h00 in the morning. -- Yes.

(20)

Right? Then apparently you stayed in Pretoria on 1 until 9 October. -- Yes.

Do /...

C3.13

- 586 -

COETZEE

Do you recall what you did in that eight day period? -- Not at all.

Did you have leave, possibly? -- No. Then it would have been indicated on a leave form.

(30)

But you weren't away and you weren't involved in any

activities in that time? -- I can't say. I didn't - not as far as I can remember.

Now, when you travelled down to the Eastern Cape again on 9 October 1981, did you then go and report again to the divisional commander? -- I can't recall at all, whether I've gone down out of the fist. And where I did report, whether it - if Eastern Cape was in fact Aliwal North, East London or Port Elizabeth. Or which one of those areas in the Eastern Cape.

It doesn't matter where you reported. Any of those places, would you have gone and reported at any of those places? -- If I in fact went there, I would have reported, yes. (10)

Ja. Now, you see, the difficulty I have, is this: On the assumption that you took Vusi from the Brits prison on 11 October, and the murder was planned before you did so, in other words you went to fetch the poison from Brigadier - ag, from Brigadier Neethling as he then was, that would possibly or probably have been on the Friday or the Saturday. Probably the Friday, maybe the Thursday, that you fetched the poison. -- Possible, yes.

Now, having done that and having planned to go and murder Peter and Vusi, what I don't understand, is why you then go off to the Eastern Cape on 9 October. -- Because the records weren't accurate then as to my official destination. (20)

But /...

C3.16

- 587 -

COETZEE

But why create this falsity? -- I could have been booked out to go to the Eastern Cape and then changed at the last minute as a result of orders I received. And then diverted. So it's not a question of falsifying the - the S & T records, its a question of I'm away from my head office and entitled to that S & T. And it was never reported to the clerk which was Swiegelaar, who completed it, the S & T forms. (30)

Well, now I don't understand you at all, because when you were - when you, when you, when you had the body of the diamond dealer in your car, you drove down to Durban, with the body in your car, just to go and tell Brigadier Van der Hoven: "I'm here now, but I want some time off to go and burn this body." -- That's correct.

What made you so sensitive about reporting then and not sensitive about reporting in the Eastern Cape. -- Because I must have received instructions. If that happen, that's date was in the time period that Vusi was released and Vusi was taken care of, then I went there on instructions, so it was not a question of being sensitive on it then. It was a question of being on my way to the Eastern Cape and then receiving instructions as to Vusi's disposal. (10)

How would that have happened? -- On instruction from Brigadier Schoon.

No, but how - how, how would you have received instructions while you were on your way to the Cape? -- Could have happened before I left.

Oh, I see. Anyhow, I just want to put it to you, that the record belies your story. It doesn't corroborate you at all. -- The worksheet record? (20)

Yes. -- Ja, as I indicated, it's not reliable at all.

Right /...

C3.18

- 588 -

COETZEE

Right. Now, this man Peter, he in fact defected, or he came to the South African Embassy in Athens, during the week of 22 April 1981 and he asked for permission to come to South Africa.

Permission was granted and he landed at Jan Smuts airport in Johannesburg on 23 April 1981. Does that accord with - with your recollection? -- I can't recollect which date he's landed, but (30)

he was on the farm. He - he came from somewhere overseas, from a embassy. I thought it to be Bulgaria and he eventually came to the farm.

Now, the then Colonel Buchner, who is now Brigadier Buchner, you don't know of anything that he did wrong, do you? -- Colonel? Buchner. -- Eh ...

He's a Brigadier now. -- You mean did wrong, in what way?

He wasn't one of the bad apples, as I understand you? -- No, he's just involved in all the plannings, and raids into Maputo, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Angola together with Military Intelligence. (10)

Ja, but I'm talking about in - in, in South Africa internally. -- No, no. He was involved in interrogation of the so-called captured ANC members.

Do you consider him as one of the better members of the security? -- Ah - I'll reserve my opinion on that.

Well, please don't. -- Well, he was originally with the Rhodesian Forces, permanently based in Rhodesia and then came over to - to Pretoria, to security head office and then he was involved in all these plannings and all these atrocities and he's at the moment a commissioner of the KwaZulu police in Natal. (20)

In all that you've said about various people in the security /...

C3.20 - 589 - COETZEE

security forces, you never said an ill word about Buchner. Is that right? -- Eh - I did in fact had quite a lot to say of him.

Nothing ill? -- No, just as what he was involved in.

That's right. Now, in fact Brigadier Buchner, Colonel as he then was, met Peter Dlamini at Jan Smuts on 23 April 1981 and he interrogated him. -- Can't deny that. (30)

And he said that he then placed him a Vlakplaas for a few

days. Do you recall that? -- Is that the - the final analysis, over whether he ended up at Vlakplaas?

Ja, he says he was - he housed him on Vlakplaas for a few days. -- And thereafter?

He says that he could not place him anywhere. He was not useful for the South African police in whatever way and he told Peter to find his own way. After a few days, after arriving in South Africa. -- No, it's not true at all. He ended up in Vlakplaas and there is verification as to this on its way with a - a photograph.

Colonel Buchner further says and that will be his evidence (10) if called upon to do so, to give it, is that when Peter arrived at Jan Smuts on 23 April 1981, his baggage had gone astray and they waited until 19 May 1981 for the baggage, when Colonel Buchner gave Peter Dlamini his baggage, because he kept in telephonic contact with him after he left Vlak-plaas, and after Peter had received his baggage, he never saw him again after that. -- Completely untrue. He landed up at Vlakplaas. He was permanently there. He was often beaten up by all the other Askari's for being late. He was locked up by Almond Nofemela in one of the cupboards (20) on the farm and we had a lot of problems with him. He even wrote a letter at some

stage /...

C3.21

- 590 -

COETZEE

stage - can't remember the correct story as to it, but he had landed up at Vlakplaas permanently until we disposed of him.

I can further tell you that according to the information of the Security police, a branch of the Security police, this Peter was seen in Swaziland I think on 9 August 1982, or thereabout.

-- Impossible.

(30)

Impossible? -- Impossible.

I have a further document here which we got from Military Intelligence, which will be placed before the Commission in due course. This was an intercept of an ANC message and this message was intercepted on 3 September 1987. Military Intelligence intercepted this message. Now listen to what it says: There's some code words that I don't understand, and then there is: "4K4 Mazimbu to Quinton from Makgoti.

1. No discussion took place on authorisation given for Isaac Mokgotsi and Simfiwe Tswana to go for 9,5-graduate studies.

Inform embassy that we cannot release them - what work does Tswana do? (10)

2. Ref (I suppose it stands for refer) ticket for Mkize AM consulting treasury. Meanwhile try UNHCR3. Tenth candidate for primary teacher training is Peter Dlamini for Sweden. He is in Luanda. He will leave directly from Luanda to Sweden. Tanzanian D-candidates must be booked to Norrköpping, not Stockholm.

Regards ANCSAZA45390."

-- And that was on the?

That was on 3 September 1987. -- Definitely not the same Peter Dlamini they're speaking about. And I have got a photograph available which I'll put available to the (20)

Commission /...

C3.22

- 591 -

COETZEE

Commission and to you for identification purposes of the one that was killed with Vusi and we disposed of.

Do you know about this Peter Dlamini, the - the one that I'm - the ANC were talking about. -- Not at all, I only knew about this Peter. I didn't even know his surname was Dlamini. But Peter that was disposed of with Vusi, I've got a photograph of and I (30) hoped that it will help you to identify him. To - to make sure

whether this is in fact the same Peter Dlamini that they're speaking about.

MR SKWEYIYA: It's Skweyeya speaking, I'm sorry to interrupt.

That document is not an exhibit as far as I know and could it be made an exhibit? I think it's important.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I suppose it will be done in a second. Do you want a copy?

MR SKWEYIYA: Yes, please.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Maritz, please provide Mr Skweyeya with a copy.

MR MARITZ: We will. You see, I want to put it to you, you said (10)
you didn't kill Peter, you didn't kill Vusi. As a matter of fact, you didn't kill anybody. -- No, I did this. My story is exactly as I told it and I did kill Peter and I did kill Vusi.

Now, you also told us about Kondile who was killed. Do you remember that? -- It's correct.

And you said that this happened after you had stolen an Audi 80 in the Port Elizabeth area. -- After that.

Yes. -- That's right. Hundred per cent.

You see, you took the - the Audi 80 to the Jeffreys Bay police station. -- The Jeffreys Bay police station. That's correct. (20)

And there you saw a motor car. -- That's right.

And /...

C3.24

- 592 -

COETZEE

And there you saw a man sitting on a bed. -- That's right.

It was rather a tall slim person with a beard. -- Ja.

Now, where did you put the - the Audi 80 that you had stolen? -- In the garage as you come into the police station, to the left, there's garages, in one of the police garages.

And where did you see the motor car that you spoke of? -- (30)
In one of the adjoining garages in the same - it's not a big block of garages, I - only a few and this - this Datsun Stanza was in

one of the adjoining garages.

And I think you said the colour as well. What was the colour?
-- Light green or light blue.

Oh, I see. And did you inquire about this car? -- No, I was told that it was a detainee's car, the one that was held at the police station in the white single quarters.

Now, who were with you when - when - when you towed this car in the garage at Jeffreys Bay police station? -- The present Brigadier Nick van Rensburg of Section C, the Sergeant Young at that time of security police Port Elizabeth, myself and as I can (10) recollect, Almond Nofemela and David Tshikalange.

And how did it come about that you saw the detainee there in the police station? -- After parking the car, the then Colonel Nick van Rensburg paid a visit in the room.

Where - where did he pay him a visit? -- In the room at Jeffreys Bay police station.

And did he take you along? -- I went along with him.

Why did he take you along? -- I just walked with him there with no - he didn't prohibit me from walking with him and I went with him in - into the police station. (20)

And what exactly did - did - did Brigadier Van Rensburg tell /...

C3.27 - 593 - COETZEE
tell you about this man? -- Can't remember the exact words, except that he - during interrogation has dived through a window with his hands handcuffed behind his back, fell on his head and that a doctor's friend said that this chap got brain damage and that it was - we're gonna sit with a second Steve Biko case.

Was Van Rensburg serious about this? -- Yes, he was hundred (30) per cent serious about this.

Or was he worried? -- You don't often see Brigadier Van

Rensburg worry, he's a very calm - he's got a very calm appearance - appearance and slow speech and very calm person. I couldn't say whether he was in fact very worried.

Did he - did he say to you words to the effect that: "Dirk, here we've got trouble. You know, we've got to get out of this one some way or another." -- No. Not exactly that, only that they will have to make a plan with this guy some time or another.

Why would they have to make a plan with him? -- Because if he ended up after being released out of police custody with those injuries, it will mean problems for the police.

Oh - much worse, he could die on their hands. -- Also true, yes.

Because, if I understand you, what they thought had happened to the man was that he had sustained brain haemorrhage. -- That's right.

And that's in fact what their doctor friend said to them. -- That's what they said.

That this man can die. -- That he's received injury and they don't know what the end result's gonna be, but they were gonna end up with a second Steve Biko case.

(20)
Inter /...

C3.29

- 594 -

COETZEE

Inter alia that he could die. -- They didn't say that he could die, but that medical records could show that he was injured during police custody, being in police custody.

And you say as you understood Van Rensburg, he was deadly serious about this? -- He was, yes.

Now, was there any further discussion about this man? -- Just that it was planned to bring him up some time, take his car through to Swaziland and bring him up to the Komatipoort area to be disposed of.

(30)

Was there urgency in this matter? -- I can't say how urgent, but there was - suppose they, they weren't going to delay it for years.

Well, for days, for that matter, because I mean they were in a serious situation here. -- Now, well that was up to - to Colonel Nick. If you know him, he's not a man that - of many words and very calm in appearance.

As a matter of fact, it is rather difficult to hide a seriously injured man in a police station as small as Jeffreys Bay is. -- How do you mean, difficult to hide? They had him in one of the white single quarters at the end of the passage, handcuffed to a bed. (10)

Yes? -- Yes.

But - but there are quite a number of people that work at the police station. -- That's true.

There's the station commander, for instance, who inspects the place on a daily basis. -- That is correct.

There are people who stay there. -- That's correct.

There are also non-members of the South African police that work there. -- That's correct. (20)

Typists. -- That's right.

There / ...

C3.30

- 595 -

COETZEE

There are also convicted persons doing their time that come and work there. -- That's correct.

And I suppose it would be a tremendous risk to keep a man in such a seriously injured state in a - in a police station and try and keep him incognito any length of time. -- No one would interfere in that room where security is living with his - with their prisoner. No one will enter that room and by seriously injured, I don't know. He wasn't lying on the bed, he was sitting (30)

on the bed when I entered and he was able to speak to Colonel Van Rensburg.

So you didn't think he was injured at all? -- Well, I couldn't see any seriously - anything seriously wrong with him on the surface.

But nevertheless, you thought that Van Rensburg was deadly serious? -- He was serious.

In - in what he told you? -- That's correct.

And you had no reason to doubt his word. -- No.

I see. Now, did you then leave Van Rensburg with his problem?
-- Yes, I left Port Elizabeth area eventually. (10)

Yes? -- And on occasion was sent down from Pretoria to Komatipoort.

Well, how long after that were you sent to Komatipoort? -- Can't remember.

Would it have been days, or weeks, or months? -- I can't remember.

You don't know? -- No, I don't know.

You don't have the slightest idea? -- Not the slightest idea.

How did it come about that you were sent to Komati- poort?
-- I was sent down by Brigadier Schoon after collecting
drops /... (20)

C3.31 - 596 - COETZEE
drops from Brigadier Neethling and I met up with Major Archie Flemington and two of his men, myself and Paul van Dyk. At - at Komatipoort we drove to a farm on the left of the road from ...
(intervenes)

Alright, no. -- Okay.

No, no. All I wanted to know is how you - how it came about that you landed up at Komatipoort. -- On instruction. (30)

That was the question. -- That's right, on instruction.

Did you go and fetch some knockout drops from General Neethling again? -- I did.

Was it easy then? -- Beg your pardon?

Was it easy then to do this? -- After confirmation with Brigadier Schoon, yes.

So it looks as if this must have happened after the - the Peter/Vusi case. -- I don't know. We'll have to look at that. I don't know.

What do you mean you don't know? You said just now ... (intervenes) -- I can't re- - but I can't ... (intervenes)

(10)

Hang on. I asked you just now and you confirmed your evidence-in-chief that when you got the poison and the knockout drops for Peter and Vusi, that was the first time that you met General Neethling. So this must have taken place after that case.

MR KUNY: With respect, he qualified the answer. He said if that was the first time that someone was killed. He didn't say for sure that that was.

CHAIRMAN: No.

MR KUNY: He wasn't sure of the time sequence.

CHAIRMAN: No, but ... (intervenes)

(20)

MR KUNY: And he made that clear in his evidence in - ag, this /...

C3. 31

- 597 -

COETZEE

this morning.

CHAIRMAN: Well, that may be your recollection. My recollection was that the first time he met Brigadier Neethling was when he went to fetch the Vusi drops.

MR KUNY: Yes, and he then added the qualification as I remember it, depending upon when this incident happened.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: What is your note?

MR MARITZ: My learned friend's note is that there was a

qualification. The witness said: "I think that was the first time that I met General Neethling." Not a qualification, really.

MR KUNY: I am not going to argue about that.

CHAIRMAN: Yes? What do you say about that Mr Coetzee? -- I stick to what I've said originally. If that was the first occasion, then that was the first.

MR MARITZ: So if that is so, then you must have killed Kondile after you killed Peter and Vusi. -- If that was the first case, yes.

Now what is that ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but - but the point is. Isn't the simple point this, Mr Coetzee? Let - let's put it somewhat differently: What did you receive from Neethling? -- With the Kondile case, knockout drops. (10)

Only knockout drops? -- Yes.

Yes.

MR MARITZ: Very well. You told Jacques Pauw a very involved story, which I must confess, I don't understand as to cars that were taken and - to Bloemfontein and a man was released and given his car and left to go and he was then caught again and then taken (20) to Komatipoort. Do you remember that involved

story /...

C3.32

- 598 -

COETZEE

story that you told Pauw? -- Yes. Can I repeat it to you?

Please do, because I - I don't understand that story. -- At the stage - as I've learned from Colonel Nick van Rensburg this Kondile was arrested coming out of Lesotho. As I can remember, he was - his car was then booked in in a police station somewhere in the Free State. Then I said at the time when I met him at (30) Jeffreys Bay, I can't remember - or I can't say whether he was then already officially released and kid-napped again, or whether

he was then still officially detained at Jeffreys Bay police station. But according - what I can recollect what they told me, they released him eventually officially, handed him his car and all his belongings and then he was kidnapped thereafter. So at the Jeffreys Bay police station, I'm not - cannot indicate whether at that stage he was then already officially released, or still under official detention.

CHAIRMAN: I - Mr Kuny, just for the record - in evidence-in-chief the witness said when he dealt with Peter that he got the poison for Peter and the knockout drops from Neethling and he had had no prior contact with Neethling. (10)

MR KUNY: Alright, I accept that's what he said.

MR MARITZ: But now, let me just try and understand this, what Van Rensburg told you, he must have told you I suppose at Komatipoort. -- No.

When you met up with him at Komatipoort, did he tell you the story of - of the cars and releasing and so on? Or when did he tell you that? -- Ja, I don't know. I - I can't remember.

But anyhow, he told you some time. -- Yes.

At some time he told you. -- Yes.

(20)
Now /...

C3.35

- 599 -

COETZEE

Now, did Van Rensburg say that Kondile was released at Port Elizabeth or Jeffreys Bay and he was given his car there? -- No, he didn't specify at all. As I say, with the time being him in Jeffreys Bay, I don't know whether he was then already officially released or not, or whether he was detained there.

Ja, well - where did he get his car? -- I don't know.

According to what they told, he was - his car was kept after arrest somewhere in the Free State at a police station and then after his release his car was handed back to him and he was then kidnapped. (30)

According to them, the car was kept in - in - in the Free State? -- Somewhere at a police station in the Free State.

Yes. And then he must have been taken to the police station in the Free State? -- I suppose so, yes.

And given his car there. -- Suppose so, yes.

And allowed to drive off? -- Suppose so, yes.

And then they caught him again? -- According to them.

But you saw the car at Jeffreys Bay? -- That's correct.

But how is that possible? -- No, I don't know. It was a two-door Stanza. I don't know. I've seen the car there and I say I cannot say whether he was then officially detained again or already been released. (10)

No, but you said just now that Van Rensburg told you that that was the car of this detainee. -- That's correct.

Which you saw in, in Jeffreys Bay? -- That's correct.

But how could you see it in Jeffreys Bay if it was left in the Vrystaat? -- No, whether they've released him at that stage already and picked up the car and brought him back there, I can't say. It was just funny to me that he was kept

in /...
(20)

C3.36

- 600 -

COETZEE

in a white single quarter room at the police station and not in a normal cell.

So, what you're saying now is that they may have - they may have taken the man to Bloemfontein, given him his car there, having or allowed him to drive off, then arrested him again and then took him down to Jeffreys Bay, where you then saw him? -- It could have happened, yes.

Didn't you ask Van Rensburg to explain himself? -- No.

Sounds like a terribly incongruous story to me. -- No, I did not ask him to explain himself. (30)

Now, let's see what you said to Jacques Pauw. At page 126 of the new transcript. 153 to 154 of the old one:

"Maar toe ek, daar in die enkelkwartiere was 'n ou aangehou, 'n lang skraal, as ek reg onthou met 'n baard, en die storie was dat hulle hom gevang het toe hy uit Lesotho uit kom.

And then Pauw asked you:

"Wag, sê weer, dit was, wat se man?"

And you said:

"'n Lang skraal ou met 'n baard."

And he asked you:

"Maar het iemand, wie het vir jou die storie vertel?"

(10)

And now you replied:

"Nee, wag nou eers, ek sien hom mos nou daar. Nou is ek daam met PE Veiligheid se manne daar en toe vertel hulle my dit is 'n ou wat uit Lesotho uit kom. Bloemfontein het hom gejaag, sy kar is toe ook daar êrens. Dit was 'n Datsun Coupé twee-deur, as ek nog reg onthou. Ek het nie die motorkar op daai stadium gesien nie."

-- Just go on.

No /...
(20)

C3.39

- 601 -

COETZEE

No, no. -- Is that now ... (intervenes)

Let's just stop here for a moment. Let's just stop here for a moment. -- Oh.

When you told Jacques Pauw the story, you had no problem:

"Ek het nie die motorkar op daardie stadium gesien nie."

-- Was that now at Jeffreys Bay police station?

Yes. -- Couldn't have been correct.

You weren't trying to tell Jacques Pauw lies, were you? --

(30)

No. Please. I referred to my state of mind and what - what lay behind me and what was in front of me. It couldn't have been.

I've seen the car in Jeffreys Bay police station. I've said it.

CHAIRMAN: Ja?

MR MARITZ: Okay.

"'Maar in elk geval, toe hou hulle hom daar in die enklekwartiere aan. Toe het hy op 'n stadion met sy hande agter sy rug vas ...'

'Hoekom in die enkelkwartiere?'

'Waar anders steek - dit is nou, dit is seker nou 'n ongebruikte plek en hulle soek 'n plek om hom weg te steek, eh jy weet, vir ondervraging terwyl hulle met hom besig is. En toe het hy op 'n stadion met sy hande agter sy rug by die venster uitgeduik en op sy kop geval.'" (10)

That right? The story you told Pauw. -- That's right.

Is that story correct? -- The fact that he dived through the window with his hands handcuffed behind his back, correct.

And then you carry on:

"Skynbaar om te probeer wegkom, soos wat hulle dit vertel. Toe het hulle weer 'n doktersvriend ingekry, dieselfde as met die Biko-geval wat toe vir hulle gesê

het /...
(20)

C3.40

- 602 -

COETZEE

het - as ek sê dieselfde as die Biko-geval, hulle het ook mos maar eers "palle" ingekry om te kom kyk hoe, wat is verkeerd met die ou. Toe het die doktersvriend skynbaar gesê jong hier is nog 'n Biko-geval, hierdie ou het bloeding op die brein. Julle sal, julle gaan nou moeilikheid kry."

That's what you were told by Van Rensburg? -- That's correct.

"In elk geval, ek is daar weg en toe later is ek afgestuur. Ek weet nou nie of dit op Schoon se stadion of Viktor se stadion op hoofkantoor was nie, by Seksie C1 was nie, om ou kolonel Nick van Rensburg - hy het saam met 'n kaptein Du Plessis, (30)

hy was daai tyd Doep - ons noem hom Doep. Hy was ook saam met Piet Goosen, ou Brigadier Piet Goosen in die Biko-stories betrokke. Een van die hoofbeskuldigdes, sal ek nou maar sê, saam met Goosen, het toe saam met ou kolonel Nick en die ou in 'n kar opgekom. Die motorkar is deur die grenspos gevat op vals nommerplate. Ek was nie by daar nie."

Now that's the story. -- That's correct.

Now, this Doep, this Captain Doep du Plessis, who is he? -- The Doep that's been down there, I believe it's the one sitting here. That's what they say. I don't know whether it's him. I can't remember the face. (10)

You don't recognise him? -- He was a little bit younger and black hair. If it's him, he went quite grey now.

But you were told that the Colonel Du Plessis sitting in the Commission is the Captain du Plessis you spoke of in your statement to Pauw? -- No, I believe he comes from PE and it could be the captain I'm talking about.

But you don't recognise him? Or do you? -- Well, he looks /...

C3.41 - 603 - (20)
COETZEE

looks familiar. It's 10 years ago.

Well, the man is here now. He's facing you. -- Okay.

Please tell us now, was he the man who participated in the murder of Khondile, and be careful now? -- It was a Captain du Plessis from Port Elizabeth.

That's not the question. Look at the man and tell us now, and you are facing him now. -- Okay.

Is he the man who was supposed to have participated in the killing of Khondile? -- It looks like him, I can't say hundred per cent for sure. I've seen him about once or twice or three times that I've met with the Port Elizabeth security guys and never (30)

again.

Would you have that man hanged on that evidence? -- No they can check on it whether it, I didn't say he must stand up and that's the accused. They can check on it, isn't it?

CHAIRMAN: Ja.

MR MARITZ: Now if he were an accused for this murder and you would sit there and testify, would you have him hanged? -- I will first make sure that, that in fact was the Du Plessis that was with Khondile in 1981.

You don't recognise him to the extent that you can say he was responsible? -- No. (10)

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARITZ: Because I want to put it to you that number 1, the Colonel du Plessis sitting here in this Commission had absolutely nothing to do with Biko. You couldn't deny that could you? -- No I can't.

And I want to put it to you further that this Colonel du Plessis sitting in this Commission had absolutely nothing to

do with/... (20)

K6.018

- 604 -

COETZEE

do with a so-called or supposed murder of Khondile. He wasn't near Komatipoort. -- I'll accept that.

Or anywhere else, you accept that? -- Or in Port Elizabeth security?.

He was attached to Port Elizabeth security. -- In 1981?

In 1981. -- Well then it's debatable.

CHAIRMAN: Then it's what? -- Debatable sir, I mean then one will have to check whether this is in fact the same Du Plessis that I was, that I'm speaking about of 1981. (30)

Carry on.

MR MARITZ: Now the apparent reason why Khondile would have had to be killed was because he had sustained this serious brain injury.
-- It's correct.

During interrogation. -- That's correct.

There is substantiation for your story in regard to the theft of the Audi. By courtesy of our learned friend, Mr Roberts, we have before us now a computer print out which is numbered B128 Mr Chairman, and according to this computer print out an Audi 80 was stolen on 13 September 1981. Can you see that. They've got the name of the complainant there was Mr E A Mahedi, do you see that? -- Yes I see it. (10)

Now, I don't know whether this was Mr Nugent, it may have been Mr Nugent on behalf of the Independent Board, also filed an affidavit by a certain Mr Edwin Apholosi Mahepi and it's B115, Mr Chairman. In that affidavit he tells the following story, he says:

"During June 1981 I bought myself a blue second-hand Audi 80 GL registration number CCN 7700."

Does this sound like the one you stole? -- It was an Audi 80 that I stole.

(20)
An Audi/...

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COETZEE

An Audi 80? -- That's right.

Could it have been a blue one? -- It could have been a blue one.

He says I completed an H P contract which he attached. Then he says:

"I cannot remember the date but it was about six to seven months after I had bought the car," now he was apparently out there, "when the car was stolen one night. At the time I was already in bed, sleeping. At about 22h00 to 23h00 I was woken up (30)

by my mother shouting that something was happening to the car. I started shouting and tried to run after the car but the car just left."

And then he tells what he did after that. Does this sound like the case that you experienced? -- It sounds like it yes.

Well then we know, according to this evidence and according to the police records that this car was stolen on 13 September 1981, do you accept that? -- It's accepted.

We also know from your work sheets that were in fact in the Eastern Cape on 13 September 1981. You left Pretoria the 20 August (10) and you put in a claim up to 20 September, right, so you were there? -- Yes.

The problem I have once again with your evidence Mr Coetzee is that Khondile was released on 10 August 1981. -- From which police station now?

From Jeffreys Bay. -- On the 10 August?

On the 10 August 1981. -- Mm.

What do you say about that? -- I suppose I can't deny it.

So how do you then stretch it from the 10 August 1981 to 13 September 1981, it's more than a month? -- Yes.

Hence? -- It's not me that stretch it, it's Colonel Nick (20)

van Rensburg/...

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COETZEE

van Rensburg that stretch it Mr Maritz.

Now, if I understand you correctly, during interrogation this man fell on his head and he sustained a brain damage? -- That's what was told to me there.

Okay. Quite probably this must then have occurred before the 10 August 1981 when he was released. -- Must have yes.

Right? -- Yes. (30)

A month later he has to be murdered because of the brain

damage, the bleeding on the brain, haemorrhage? -- It's correct.

The man stayed alive for more than a month? -- That's correct.

Now he's got to be killed. -- He was killed.

But that's absurd. -- I suppose that's to say Mr Maritz but he was killed.

It's absurd. If the man survived for more than a month, why then kill him? -- Saphi Umthimkulu survived for three months afterwards, I mean if he had brain damage sustained during police, whilst in police custody it would have meant problems for the police.

No Umthimkulu has got nothing to do with it. -- Well Khondile then Mr Maritz. (10)

Now I'm talking about Khondile. -- Yes.

Now what I'm saying to you Mr Coetzee, is your story doesn't make sense. -- Mr Maritz it makes sense, if it was proved that the man has picked up brain damage whilst being in police custody then there would have been problems for the police. It's logic isn't it.

But it would have been a case of the second Biko. Here's a man who is about to die because he has sustained brain haemorrhage/... (20)

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COETZEE

haemorrhage. -- I didn't say he was on the point of dying Mr Maritz.

I said he sustained brain damage.

But that's what Van Rensburg is supposed to have told you. -- That he sustained brain damage.

And I had to kill him for that reason? -- Yes.

But now they allow him to live for another month before doing anything about it? -- It must be if this dates is correct yes. (30)

Can you imagine the risks involved in trying to keep a man with brain damage, or brain haemorrhage in the single quarters

of a police station for more than a month? -- There is a risk to it, yes that's correct.

The risk is horrifying. -- It is.

Now can you suggest any explanation why they would wait more than a month? -- I can't Mr Maritz but can I ask you where this person is at the moment? Is he alive?

That's not the point. That's not the point. -- Well I say his dead and I was present when he was killed.

CHAIRMAN: Yes but could I ask you a further point. You came back to Pretoria, after you saw Khondile in Jeffreys Bay, is that right?
(10)
-- That's correct Mr Chairman.

And at a later stage you were told to go down to Komatipoort.
-- That's correct.

Have you any idea when that later stage was? -- No I haven't.
Yes.

MR MARITZ: You see Mr Coetzee, the fact of the matter is that Khondile co-operated with the members of the security branch at Port Elizabeth and I'll read you the telex which was sent to head office from Port Elizabeth, and it was sent by Major
van Rensburg/...
(20)

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COETZEE

van Rensburg. The telex is dated 10 August 1981, which reads as follows:

"Die ondervraging van onderwerp is voltooi. Hierdie kantoor beskik egter oor geen getuienis om 'n prima facie saak teen onderwerp uit te maak nie. Hy beloof egter sy heelhartige samewerking en kan tot groot nut aangewend word. Om taktiese redes word dit aanbeveel dat hy op 10.8.81 vrygestel word van die bepalings van artikel 61 wet 83 van 1967."
(30)

Now this same telex contains a note in manuscript:

- "1. Vrylating goedgekeur.
2. Bevorder vrylatingslasbrief.
3. Afdrukke."

and it is signed by Colonel J C Broodryk, and that was on 10 August 1981. -- Yes.

Now did you know Broodryk? -- Brigadier Kalfie Broodryk from head office yes.

He was a man at head office? -- That's correct.

MR SKWEYIYA: Mr Chairman it's Skweyiya again. I have an interest in this I am acting on behalf of the family.

(10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes I think ... (intervenes)

MR SKWEYIYA: ...that telex ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No obviously, Mr Skweyiya, all these things, we just don't have, I haven't seen them and I don't think we have the facilities here, so everything you want you get from Mr Maritz and if he doesn't give it to you, then you ask me.

MR SKWEYIYA: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR MARITZ: There is a second telex. This was sent from the security branch Port Elizabeth to the security branch Western Province and also to Pretoria. It was sent by Major Snyman.

(20)

It reads/...

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COETZEE

It reads as follows:

"VERTROULIK: Op 7/18/10/1/1V7(AOSTRYDOM).

Inspekteurs van aangehoudenes artikel 61 wet 83 van 1967. Die Wet op Terrorisme.

BS7/18/10/1 brigadier du Preez gedateer 8 Junie 1978.

A.1 Die ondervermelde aangehoudene word vandag 10

Augustus 1981 onthef van die bepalings van

(30)

bovermelde wetgewing, swart man Kondisizwe

Khondile aangehou te Jeffreysbaai polisieselle."

It also bears the date stamp 10 August 1981. The significance of this telex is that security branch Western Province was advised that the inspector of detainees had to be advised of the release so it wasn't necessary for you to come and search for this man any longer. Do you follow that? -- Yes.

And then there is also a warrant for the release but you are going to say to me it's worthless because it wasn't signed but that doesn't matter, it's not a problem to get hold of a signed copy. -- What time was he released on August the 10th?

I don't know but he was released on 10 August 1981. -- Sir (10)
I'm sure his mom will come and testify that he arrived home that night safely.

No. What happened, and that will be the evidence of Colonel du Plessis if called upon to testify, is that he and Brigadier van Rensburg trip Khondile to Bloemfontein where his car was indeed. He was given his car and he was free, he could go where he wanted to go? -- Kidnapped on the road and taken back to Jeffreys Bay, it makes sense.

The only thing that doesn't make sense is if you are going to do a dangerous thing like that, why wait until well into (20)
September before doing something about it? -- No I think

Colonel/...

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COETZEE

Colonel Nick van Rensburg will explain that, my simple question would be why didn't Khondile go straight home after being a free man, co-operating willingly with the security policeman, no one had anything against him anymore. Why won't he go back home for a nice visit with his parents.

I don't know what he did Mr Coetzee, but I can tell you what (30)
the information is. Let me read it to you. On 27 June 1981 the security branch in Bloemfontein sent the following telex, inter

alia. -- That was June, sorry 27?

CHAIRMAN: Mr Coetzee would you please not write on the exhibits.

-- Oh sorry sir. If I can have another piece of paper I will appreciate it.

MR MARITZ: The 27 June 1981. I'm sorry can I just put the record straight please. I gave you a wrong instruction. My attention is drawn to the fact that only Captain du Plessis as he then was, Colonel du Plessis took Khondile to Bloemfontein, he and he alone. Van Rensburg did not accompany him. -- And that was on 10 August?

That was on 10 August ja. This telex reads as follows:

"Om ongeveer 12h00 op 26 Junie 1981 het Siswe Kwesi Khondile vanaf (10)

die RSA by Van Rooyenshek grenspos aangekom met motorkar geel Datsun Stanza 1980 model met registrasienommer A9987.

Onderwerp het Transkei paspoort reisdokument nr so-en-so uitgereik te Umtata op 3 November 1980 en geldig tot 2 November 1985 wat uitgereik is in naam van Vujane Mkhata maar waarin onderwerp Khondile se foto verskyn, vertoon en versoek om na Lesotho deurgelaat te word. Tydens deursoeking van die voertuig was die volgende in die voertuig gevind:

33 fotostate van ANC pamflet met titel 'Strikes - Stay at home'/. . . (20)

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COETZEE

home'

1 Kasset met vryheidsliedere.

Tydens ondervraging erken onderwerp:

1. Dat hy Sizwe Kwesi Khondile is en die RSA gedurende September 1980 onwettig en sonder wettige dokumente verlaat het.
2. Dat hy op 26/6/1981 die voertuig waarmee hy reis van Martin Hani geleen het."

-- Chris Hani se kar.

(30)

You're shaking your head? -- It's Chris Hani's car that's

right.

So he borrowed his car? -- Yes.

CHAIRMAN: How do you know that Mr Coetzee? -- I beg your pardon?

How do you know that? -- It was told to me that the Stanza belonged to Chris Hani.

When was it told to you? -- Now in exile.

MR MARITZ:

"3. Dat hy met die voertuig sonder Hani se wete na Port Elizabeth wou reis.

4. Dat hy egter naby Wepener, nadat hy by Maserubrug grenspos ingekom het besluit het om terug te keer deur Van Rooyenshek na Lesotho. (10)

5. Dat hy 'n lid van die African National Congress is en dat Martin Hani sy bevelvoerder is.

6. Dat hy reeds by drie geleenthede deur Hani na die RSA gestuur was om persone in die RSA vir die ANC te werf vir opleiding. Die laaste keer was hy gedurende Februarie 1981 na Port Elizabeth gestuur.

7. Dat hy reeds te Maseru by Hani se woning deur 'n

swart/... (20)

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COETZEE

swart man aan hom bekend as Hilton Mbungwa alias General wie gedurende 1978 vanaf P E uitgewyk het, in die hantering van AK47 geweer, Tokarev pistole en handgranate opgelei is.

8. Dat hy as wag diens gedoen het by Martin Hani se woning in Lesotho."

Were you told all these things too? -- No, no.

And then there's a long list of people whom he said were ANC sympathisers in the Port Elizabeth area, so he co-operated with the Bloemfontein people. But I don't think it's necessary to read (30)

it out in this Commission who all those people were. -- No.

But I can tell you that there were 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 10 people that he pointed out to the police in Bloemfontein.

-- Yes.

It was then that he was released from detention in Bloemfontein on the 10 July 1981 and then taken down to Port Elizabeth where he was detained. First at Humansdorp and then later on at Jeffreys Bay. So he was in detention for a full month from 10 July 1981 until, what was it 10 August 1981? -- 10 August 1981.

Yes. And the evidence of Colonel du Plessis will be that this man co-operated with him as he co-operated with the Bloemfontein police. You cannot dispute that? -- No, may I ask then why did they never charge him for being a member of the ANC furthering the aims of the ANC? Why was he given mercy and suddenly released? And as well register him as an informant seeing that he co-operated so well, he must have been a very good informant then if they saw it fit to discharge him or not charge him and been working for them

(10)

eversince/...

(20)

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COETZEE

eversince, I'm sure.

Very easy Mr Coetzee. -- I think it falls in more correctly with my version Mr Maritz than with yours.

No, no very easy. What the security branch thrives on is information. Without information they can't do anything and you know it. -- Yes but what they also thrive on is to get the culprits to justice and to get them locked up. There's enough informers amongst the community to, as to let a big fish like this get away that's been with them so long, operating with a big guy like Hani, Chris Hani and with all the information that they had on him that

(30)

you read off the file there.

Ag, I don't want to get involved in an argument with you which regards that Mr Coetzee, but one of the obvious things which you do with a man who is prepared to co-operate with you, is to release him and to have him co-operate. -- And register him immediately as an informer and pay him very well.

But I don't know, maybe this was done or not, I don't know, but it doesn't make any difference to the issue at all, whether he was registered as an informer or not. -- Well I'm sure if he co-operated that well he would have been available to give evidence in front of this Commission today. (10)

The fact of the matter is that after he was released he did not make contact again with Colonel du Plessis. -- Because he wasn't able to do it.

Well I don't know whether he was not able or not. -- We killed him Mr Maritz, he wasn't able to do it.

I don't know whether he's dead Mr Coetzee. -- He is in fact, I can promise you.

But what I can say to you is that your story, or your version of how he came to be killed is totally incongruous. (20)
-- I think/...

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COETZEE

-- I think it's more logic than your client's version Mr Maritz.

CHAIRMAN: If you wish to laugh this is not a comedy, you may leave the Commission room.

MR MARITZ: You also said, if I remember correctly that this Khondile had to be taken to Komatipoort. -- It's corret.

To be destroyed there. -- That's correct.

Because apparently only Flemington knew how to do this job? (30)
-- No I don't think I have said that Mr Maritz. I think the intention was to get his car through to Swaziland, Khondile's car,

to make it look like he's flee the country through Swaziland and then with our co-operation we always had a very close rapport with the Ermelo guys whilst Major van Rensburg was still there, Major Flemington from Komatipoort and myself in the Eastern Transvaal to assisting, killing and disposing of the body.

Was that the only reason? -- Ja as far as I know Mr Maritz.

Well you advanced a different reason when you gave your evidence. -- Please put it to me?

You told us in your evidence-in-chief that Nick had to, Nick van Rensburg had to be taught how to burn bodies. -- Yes but I (10)
now said Major Archie Flemington was not the only guy, it was not for the only reason because I also knew how to do it.

Yes that's the point. -- Yes.

You knew how to burn people. -- That's right.

Why didn't you just go about your business and burn this man then? -- We did after Colonel Nick van Rensburg and Captain du Plessis and Sergeant Jan has brought him up to

Komatipoort./...

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COETZEE
(20)

Komatipoort.

Not only that, not only that. You take Khondile up to Komatipoort, but a gentleman from Komatipoort does the shooting.

-- That's correct.

Who is that man? -- A light skinny, it was a sergeant or a warrant-officer. A light skinny, skinny built guy, fairly long, light hair and he was a sergeant or a warrant-officer.

You don't even know who he is? -- No I can't remember his name now as I can't remember the P E Sergeant Jan and he, I knew him from border post, he said he was with me on some border post earlier on and I couldn't remember his surname up till today. (30)

And you could never remember the name of Joe Mamasela? --

No, no Joe Mamasela I remember.

No you couldn't remember Joe's surname? -- Oh yes at the stage on Mauritius and I think there was quite a few people surnames I couldn't remember then.

This is the man who committed a number of crimes with you and you couldn't remember his surname? Joe Mamasela, you didn't know who he was. The big killer. -- Well there was, we refer to them only on names always.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARITZ: But you knew the surname of every other one that you referred to? -- No not on Mauritius. (10)

You did? -- No sir I'm sure if you check even of the white policeman that was involved, I couldn't remember, and the black policeman John Mphofu I don't think I could remember his name too.

So what you want to say to us is that once again you did a totally incongruous thing by taking this man up to

Komatipoort/...

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COETZEE

Komatipoort and you had him shot by somebody whom you don't even know who he is? -- It was a policeman from security Komatipoort. (20)

Why didn't you do the shooting yourself on that occasion? -- I have never done no shooting at all, I suppose I haven't got the heart to do it, so I let someone else do the dirty work.

You never did any shooting? -- No but I was always present.

Why were you always present? -- I was from the Pretoria, Vlakplaas, I was in charge.

But, you the big leader of this group, you are always there, but you never do a thing? -- But you just said yesterday Mr Maritz if you were involved, if I'm present there

I'm just as guilty as the man that did the actual shooting. (30)

CHAIRMAN: Have you ever killed someone yourself? -- No Mr

Chairman, no.

And neither has David Tshikalange? -- I beg your pardon Mr Chairman?

How many people has David Tshikalange killed? -- As far as I can remember only Mr Mxenge.

How many people did, and then how many people did Nofemela murder? -- In my time Mr Mxenge and the Lesotho diamond dealer. I think that's all sir.

And, how many people did Joe kill? -- In my time only Mxenge and the Lesotho diamond dealer.

(10)

And how many people did Paul van Dyk kill? -- Not one personally, just being present.

Well then I have great difficulty about what all this is about, because in your Saint Port Louis statement you made the following/...

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COETZEE

following statement, that affidavit which was not sworn:

"'n Ruk hierna is die vyf groepe op Vlakplaas gestig."

And you then amended it down to four.

"My groep was benewens ekself, Adjudant-offiser Paul van Dyk, Almond Nofemela, David Spyker Tshikalange en Joe. Hierdie groep het uiteindelik die kern van die veiligheidspolisie se moordbende gevorm."

(20)

In other words you say the five people formed the core of the security police's murder squad, or murder gang and of them they killed one person, between them they killed one person for a political motive only. -- Ja I think I haven't put it very clear there, I should put it this way that during an operation, hit operation people is choosed for that specific operation and then in that operation you can name that the hit squad of that specific operation.

(30)

I must tell a wonderful hit squad that they see to it that

they hit but the others hit. -- Ja well sir I think I have explained how we always co-operated with the different sections like with Eastern Cape, with Eastern Transvaal with Ermelo etcetera.

So the core of the murder gang didn't murder? They were only present? They are always present? -- Ja but that didn't make out the whole hit squad of the whole security police. It's misleading I agree sir. It wasn't put right.

Was it intended to be misleading, because that is, was the message to the world at that stage? -- Well sir we were for sure, Vlakplaas was part of the hit squad, we entered that hit squad arena of the security police. (10)

No you didn't enter, you were the core? -- From, as far as Vlakplaas is ... (intervenes)

No/...

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COETZEE

No that's not what it said. You were the core of, that was the murder gang "die kern gevorm van die moordbende, van die veiligheidspolisie se moordbende". -- Ja well that's misleading for sure sir. (20)

Yes, carry on.

MR MARITZ: Let's look at another thing. On this same ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Then I don't understand, why was there the need to have you present? You were not the senior officer, when Khondile was killed? -- No I wasn't.

So what did you do there? -- I took the drops down from Pretoria, myself and Paul van Dyk and Major Archie Flemington of Komatipoort and two of his men was there and then at that stage Lieutenant-colonel Nick van Rensburg with Captain du Plessis and a Sergeant Jan. (30)

Yes.

MR MARITZ: Why did you have to take drops down to Komatipoort?

-- To administer it to Khondile and to let him been shot there.

Why? -- I don't think anyone present, and I think I have said it already, have the guts to shoot a man sober with his full senses at point-blank.

CHAIRMAN: That goes for the man from Komatipoort as well whom you don't remember? -- Which man?

The man who did the shooting. -- Ja.

He had difficulty as well in shooting a man while looking him in the eye? -- He must have.

MR MARITZ: Well he could have hit him over the head. -- But he didn't Mr Maritz. (10)

But it's so stupid Mr Coetzee. Why get you to come from Pretoria/...

- 619 -

COETZEE

Pretoria to bring some knock-out drops, it's ridiculous. -- No it's not ridiculous, it was exactly how it was done.

How far is Pretoria from Komatipoort? -- Very far, it must be around about 300, 400 kilometres.

It's over 400 kilometres. -- Yes. (20)

So somebody gets you especially to drive with a little file of knock-out drops over 400 kilometres to go and knock somebody out. -- I have done more than 12 000 kilometres with my car in a month.

Where they could have bashed him over the head and he would have been unconscious in any case if they wanted to get him unconscious before shooting him. -- It is possible Mr Maritz but it wasn't done that way.

Well I want to put it to you that it's such a ridiculous story that it's devoid of any truth whatsoever. -- No not at all, it's the complete truth and that was exactly how it was done. (30)

CHAIRMAN: But why was he taken to, you say to Komatipoort. -- Sir, his car, they brought his car up from Ermelo security, took it through to Swaziland.

But then you would have killed him at the border post not at Komatipoort, which is not the Swaziland border post? -- Komatipoort is very near to the northern border post of Swaziland border gate.

Yes but if you are in Ermelo, you won't go to Komatipoort to enter Swaziland. -- No, no they went with a car through at Nerston or Oshoek border post where they park it.

That's right, so if they go there why bring the man then to Komatipoort, why not burn him at Oshoek where you did the other thing, or where you burnt this other car? -- Mr Chairman it was/... (10)

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COETZEE

it was really done that way, it was done at Komatipoort and it happened as I said.

Yes.

MR MARITZ: I want to read you this story. This is a beautiful one. At page 58 of the transcript, pages 69 to 70 of the old one Mr Chairman. You told the story of the case where Almond was supposed to go in with Captain Louw to go and throw a hand-grenade in somebody's house. -- Excuse me it was with one of Captain Louw's black warrant-officers I think (20)

Well irrespective of who it was. And then you said:

"hulle het terugrapporteur dat hulle 'n handgranaat deur die venster gegooi het."

And now you take flight:

"kyk agter in my kar was altyd 'n kas van 40 kilogram PE4, 'n kas offensiewe. Wat is PE4" you were asked by Pauw.

"Plofstof, militêre plofstof, 'n kas offensiewe hand-grenate en 'n kas defensiewe, als van Russiese oorsprong. (30)

Hoekom, hoekom is dit daar?

Vir gebruik op operasies as dit sou nodig word. Daar was ook vyf HMK's Suid Afrikaans vervaardigde 9 millimeter.

Wat is 'n HMK, wat se masjien?

Dit is 'n handmasjien Karabyn, 9 millimeter handmasjien Karabyn waaraan 'n spesiale metaal uitwerpstelsel. Hier oor die uitwerpstelsel is 'n metaalkappie vasgesweis gewees met 'n seilsakkie in waar die leë doppies in geval het en hulle het almal knaldempers opgehad asook 'n Makarov met 'n knaldemper, Tokarev.

(10)

Dit was nou alles in jou kar?

Ja, /...

- 621 -

COETZEE

Ja, ja in my kar, dit was 'n bewegende magasyn."

Is that the truth? -- Dis honderd persent korrek.

Good heavens. You repeat this again. Let me read it to you.

It becomes better later on, at page 164, page 200 of the old one. There you said the following:

Maar ek het ook 'n 9 millimeter Parabellum gehad, en 'n haelgeweer
(20)
in my kar, en 'n opvoukolf FN en soos ek sê die twee
verskillende kaste handgranate en 'n kas PE4, en 'n klomp
Russiese Zobo horlosies en strignien en kaste patrone en so,
jy weet. Die kas die self, en O ja, ja daai 5-HMK's met
die 'mufflers' en so."

-- Honderd persent korrek. U weet in my dae mnr. Maritz soos hulle nou vir die wêreldpers plaas toe gevat het hoof hulle my nie 'n 24 uur kennis te gegee het nie. Die oomblik wat die pers op die plaas aankom het ek daar uitgery met die hele magasyn in my kar. Daardie laaste opvoukolf en die haelgewere was

(30)

amptelike polisie uitrusting en na dit was dit in 'n polisietrommel agterop Gene de Kock se Landcruiser bak vasgesweis. Was daardie

hele arsenaal daarin en voor dit het Kolonel Jack Cronje dit rondgery en Jan Coetzee voor hom ook in die Datsun se bagasiebak.

You had all this in the boot of your car? -- Yes that's right.

Which was a Datsun Laurel? -- That's correct.

And how long did you drive around with this lot? -- The whole time till I have left the car, I've handed it all over to Jan Coetzee on 31 December 1981.

That doesn't answer my question. For how long did you drive around with 40 kilograms of explosive in the boot of your car?

-- For the whole period that I operated with it.

(10)
Basically/...

- 622 -

COETZEE

Basically I think I got the car in August 1981 and I had it for four months, when I handed it over.

So for four months you did, what did you say 10 000 kilometres a month? -- I think my car rode 65 000 kilometres from the clock the day when I handed over to Jan Coetzee.

Mr Coetzee, nobody in his right mind would drive around with that amount of explosives in the boot of his car. Not for five yards? -- We did with 40 kilograms of PE4 loaded already with the detonator connected, just the battery short over the fence, near Nerston border post into Swaziland, on gravel roads to go and blow up two houses. (20)

CHAIRMAN: How much did you then have left? 38 kilograms? -- No we always replaced it, that one we replaced it after we fused it.

Did you use all 40 kilograms for the one operation? -- Yes.

MR MARITZ: What kind of ammunition did you use in all these weapons? -- And the PE4, sorry ... (intervenens)

I'll ask the question again. -- No.

No no carry on. -- Oh sorry it was just now when you mentioned all Russian, the PE4 wasn't Russian, that was South African army (30)

issue.

CHAIRMAN: No well that you have said.

MR MARITZ: Now what kind of ammunition did you use in all these things? -- In all?

In all these weapons that you had? -- In the official police weapons we used police ammunition and in the Russian weapons, Russian ammunition.

Where did you get the ammunition from? -- There was a
sufficient/...

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(10)

COETZEE

sufficient supply at security head office and whenever we needed like hand-grenades was supplied by Military Intelligence in the Zanza Building on the 12th floor in Proes Street.

And did you use standard ammunition in all these guns? -- In the police issues.

Ja. -- Yes.

Standard police issue? -- For the specific gun .

Now Tokarev for instance, do you have a standard police issue of ammunition for Tokarev? -- No because it's a Russian weapon with a 2 millimetre bullet, ,32 bullet and a 9 millimetre shell at the back. (20)

Where do you get the ammunition for this thing? -- Well sir that's no problem, they come in truckloads full at the moment from Oshakati, from Koevoet that has just broken up.

That's at the moment, I'm talking about 1981. -- There was always available at the police, that was seized during Swapo raids and raids into the different countries, there was always stock available.

So you were standing shooting with standard, or you were supplied with standard enemy issue ammunition? -- That's correct. (30)

That's in the foreign guns? -- That's correct.

And in the local guns? -- Local ammunition.

Standard issue? -- That's correct.

Standard ammunition? -- Standard used ammunition yes.

I see. And this, these 5 HMK's, or whatever you call them, with the little thing welded on and the little pocket, this intrigues me. Where did they come from? -- From security head office, specially prepared by Captain Wal du

Toit/...

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COETZEE
(10)

Toit in the technical division.

For you? -- No, no they were already available when I started on the farm.

Wasn't this specially prepared for you? -- Not for me specially, it was already available.

For the farm? -- No, no for security police operations.

I must confess I've never heard of such a thing before. But you say that they were invogued at that time? -- That they existed?

Ja, for apparently they must have been widely used in South Africa? -- Well I've used them once in Botswana and that's the only place I've used them. (20)

And what's the principle on which it works? -- It's a 9 millimetre automatic machine-gun and it shoots, you can shoot someone with it without ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: I think counsel is interested in the bag, not in the gun. -- I beg your pardon sir?

Mr Maritz wants to know about the bag as I understand I, not about the gun. -- The bag catches up the empty shells for ballistic purposes so no traces is left after a shooting.

MR MARITZ: I see. So that is to be able to operate completely clandestinely? -- That's correct. (30)

I see. Now this arsenal of yours that you drove around with

for a number of months, aside from the one occasion when you used up some PE4, did you ever have occasion to use anyone of these weapons? -- No except in Botswana on one occasion and Almond in Lesotho on one occasion, him and the Ladybrand guy. The one attempt in Manzini on the Land cruiser at flat 6 and 9, the night of the first attempt of the raid into Mathola during the end of 1980, one of those... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: /...

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COETZEE

(10)

CHAIRMAN: But you only got the Laurel in 1981? -- Yes, but oh you mean specific during that period? From August. No, except only for that cases.

Now does one need any sort of a special ammunition for silenced weapons? -- Ja you have got to, if the load is too high and the bullet breaks the soundbarrier after going out of the silencer it still makes a noise, so Captain Wal du Toit has got the necessary machines to throw some of the power out, weigh it and put the bullet back. And it was always prepared by him.

So did you have these special bullets as well? -- Prepared
(20)
by Captain Wal du Toit that's correct.

This also went into the back of your car? -- That's right.

The last thing that intrigues me too is how did you fit the diamond dealer and this arsenal into the boot of your car? -- He fitted in and on the way to Bethlehem where we strike a dip in the road, it was just fire behind the car as the exhaust scraped on the road and it was heavily loaded. When we burned him on all this ammunition the plastic bag, the mortuary plastic bag is worn through and some of the fluid of the body dripped onto the, well, just flowed out onto the mat of the Datsun motor car and we had
(30)
to burn that too eventually. But he fitted in.

On that very low note Mr Chairman could we take the adjournment

until tomorrow morning.

CHAIRMAN: How long will you still be Mr Maritz?

MR MARITZ: Hopefully I'll finish tomorrow. I'm sick and tired of myself too Mr Chairman.

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman I think that the witness wanted to add something/...

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COETZEE

something just before my learned friend asked for the adjournment.

-- Yes sorry sir, what I just wanted to mention to Maritz, we can
always get a Laurel, get offensive, defensive hand-grenades, a (10)

crate of PE4, all those rifles

and I'll fit you onto that into the boot with (laughter.)

MR MARITZ: I decline the offer.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS.

(20)

(30)

COMMISSION RESUMES 1 MEI 1990.

DIRK COETZEE still under oath:

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: Mr Coetzee, I just want to deal with the Mtimkulu matter in more detail than we did on Friday. According to the police records Mtimkulu was arrested on 31 May 1981, you would not know that, would you? -- No.

Now, I just want to give you an idea how well this man is looked after. He was seen by a magistrate, Mr Knoetze, on 17 June 1981. He was seen by Dr Opperman on 20 June 1981. He(10) was seen again by Dr Opperman on 22 June 1981. He was seen by the inspector of detainees, Mr Van Zyl, on 22 June 1981. He was again seen by Mr Knoetze, the magistrate, on 26 June 1981.

Mr Knoetze saw him again on 4 July 1981. Mr Knoetze saw him again on 11 July 1981. Mr Van Zyl, the inspector of prisons, of detainees, saw him on 13 July 1981. Dr Opperman saw him on 27 July. Mr Van Zyl saw him again on 3 August. Mr Knoetze, the magistrate, saw him on 7 August. Dr Delpont saw him on 14 August, Mr Knoetze again on 17 August, Mr Van Zyl on 24 August, Mr Coetzee, the chief magistrate of the area, (20) saw him on 2 September 1981, Mr Van Zyl 13 September 1981, then the peace officer, Mr Coetzee, saw him on 16 September 1981. He was again seen by Coetzee on 30 September and 14 October 1981 and then he was seen by a different inspector of detainess, Mr Mouton, on 20 October 1981 and all those people report that throughout the whole time Mtimkulu had absolutely no complaint as to the treatment he received at the hands of the security police. Now, I suppose you could not dispute that, could you? -- I cannot dispute that.

Now, the fact of the matter is that on the very day (30)
that Mr Mouton/..

that Mr Mouton, the inspector of detainees, saw Mtimkulu on 20

October 1981 and find him in very, very good health, no complaints whatsoever, on that day the man was released. -- Yes.

On 20 October 1981. -- I cannot dispute that.

You cannot dispute that. No. Now, when probably, if a man that is so well looked after, who is given a clean bill of health by the inspector of detainees on 20 October 1981, the day that he is released, why then would be cause to murder this man? I do not understand it. Could you possibly explain it? -- Well, for the same reason that they originally (10) arrested and detained him for more than five months. I mean, if he was such a good guy and such a true citizen of South Africa, why was he kept in custody by the security police for more than five months?

I do not want to debate that with you, but can you think of any idea why this particular man, with the care that he was looked after and having received the clean slate on 20 October, the day of his release, why one would then go along and murder him? -- To bring any charge against him and he was rationed for the security police, that was obviously why (20) they originally arrested him and then decided to get rid of him.

But there were a great number of people that could not be charged and that were released. -- And there was just a greater number of people that disappeared after their release and were killed.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but the problem I have, Mr Coetzee, is on the assumption that he was discharged on 20 October, he only disappeared in April of the following year. -- Yes, that was immediately after his release, he got very, very sick and (30) landed up/..

Cl.9

- 630 -

COETZEE

landed up in hospital unconscious and it was - they ascertained that he received poison from some kind from someone and there was a police investigation instituted and a civil claim against the

Minister of Police and then on his second visit to the hospital then just disappeared.

MR MARITZ: Now, what is more is that I am instructed that there were two other detainees who were detained with Mr Mtimkulu and who were released with him and they are alive and well and kicking, there is nothing wrong with them - three others. -- Ja, that I cannot deny, I won't deny. (10)

So, you would not know why Mtimkulu was chosen from the four? -- He must have been the biggest embarrassment to the police or ...

I see, but the difficulties persist, you see, because when Mr Mtimkulu fell ill, after his release, he was treated by various doctors, he was treated in various hospitals, he was taken to Groote Schuur Hospital where thallium poisoning was diagnosed. Do you follow? -- Yes.

So all these facts were known. -- That is correct.

And on record. -- That is correct. (20)

And it was after that, after Mtimkulu had recuperated or was in the process of recuperating from the poisoning, that he left the country. -- No, that he disappeared. He did not leave the country.

That was in April, 30 April 1982 - no, sorry, 14 April 1982. -- That it was alleged that he left the country.

Well, that was - what, six months after his release. -- That is correct and then as I say at that stage there was an investigation going against the police as well as a civil claim and he was on his way to the hospital and just (30) disappeared/..

Cl.10

- 631 -

COETZEE

disappeared.

What I do not understand is why the police would allow Mtimkulu and the doctors and everybody around him to build up the case for

six months and then try to kill him? -- No, they were not in a position to interfere before that and could only succeed in letting him disappear on his second trip to the hospital.

How do you know that? -- It was told to me.

When? -- By Brigadier Jan du Preez afterwards.

By Jan du Preez? -- Yes. (10)

When did he tell you that? -- On several occasions.

No, but when were these several occasions? -- Well, up till last year, he was again talking about the Mtimkulu case.

When was the first time that he told you these stories?

-- Shortly after he disappeared and when I met up with him.

But then you were away from Vlakplaas? -- Yes, that is right.

Now, when were you supposed to have gone down to Port Elizabeth or wherever to go and kill this man? -- I cannot remember if I - if I have had records I could have (20) confirmed it which I have not got.

Was that after you had left Vlakplaas? -- No, no, it was before that.

So, that would have been between 20 October 1981 and 31 December 1981 when you left Vlakplaas. -- It should have been, yes.

Was that when you received the instruction to go and kill the man? -- That I should be on stand by and I was involved in this plan - original plan of killing him, yes.

Now, what went wrong then? Why couldn't you go and (30) kill him/..

Cl.10 - 632 - COETZEE
kill him then? -- I do not know what the decision was. I was just stopped.

Didn't you enquire as to the reason why you were stopped?

-- No, I did not.

But you had a number of discussions with Brigadier Jan du

Preez about this affair and that is the one question you have never asked him. -- No, it was in the end decided that Brigadier Van der Hofen would fly the poison down to Port Elizabeth which he did and they have given it into his drink just before releasing him, treating him as a last (20) meal and then he would - became sick after his release and died. That was the original idea.

But you were not supposed to have been involved in that? -- No, no, I was involved in the plan of his release, kidnapping and then disposing of.

I see. Did you actually go down to Port Elizabeth on the assignment to go and kill Mtimkulu when you were ordered to do so? -- No, I did not. I was on my way to Durban at a stage and was stopped at Lindley. I do not know whether it is specific in this case, whether it was on the Mtimkulu (20) trip.

CHAIRMAN: Were you on your way to or from Durban? -- From Durban to Port Elizabeth but I had to stop over at Lindley and when I arrived there, there was a call that I should ...

No, but you said you were on your way to Durban, that is why I asked you. -- Yes.

Were you on your way to or from Durban? -- From Durban to Port Elizabeth.

MR MARITZ: Did you then receive your instruction to go and kill Mtimkulu at Durban? -- No, I was on my way to Port (30)

Elizabeth/..

Cl.12

- 633 -

COETZEE

Elizabeth and as I said I am not a hundred percent sure it was in fact on that occasion, but I know from Durban I was on my way to Port Elizabeth at a stage and I was stopped at Lindley.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but why were you stopped at Lindley? -- I cannot remember the exact circumstances, I was just asked to return to Durban.

No, but then where did you receive your instructions to go

and kill the man? Where were you when you received your instructions? -- In Durban.

That is what Mr Maritz asked you and you said no. -- (10)
Sorry, then I just did not understand you.

MR MARITZ: Well, will you answer the question then. -- Well, it was discussed previously that there will be another case where I will have to assist in getting rid of a detainee and then in Durban I received the instructions to go down to Port Elizabeth, if it was for that occasion, as I say.

Now, can you just explain how it came about that you were stopped at Lindley? -- If it was for that specific occasion there was a 'phone call at Lindley that I had to return to Durban. The exact circumstances and what happened I (20)
cannot remember.

Well, why would you have gone to Lindley, that is what I do not understand. -- I cannot remember what I had to do there. It was in connection with a shooting earlier on or what was the - but I had to stop at Lindley and that is where there was a message that I should ring either Brigadier Van der Hoven or Colonel Dick van Rensburg and the instructions were that I should return to Durban.

CHAIRMAN: But on present information the shooting incident at Lindley took place on 24 October and Mtimkulu was released(30)
on 20 October/..

Cl.14

- 634 -

COETZEE

on 20 October. -- Yes, but I said I am not hundred percent sure whether it was on this occasion in fact.

So, it could not have been on that occasion. -- That is correct.

MR MARITZ: You see, what bothers me is that Lindley is right out of the way. If one looks at a road map of South African you will find that Lindley is completely out of the way. It is not on the

way from Durban to Port Elizabeth or from Pretoria to Durban or from Pretoria to Port Elizabeth. -- Well, firstly with the arsin in my car I could not go (10) through the Transkei, secondly I had some business to do at Lindley. Exactly what it was, whether it was in connection with the shooting, the previous shooting or what I had to do there, I cannot remember.

A further fact of the matter is that I think this is the very first time that you mention that you were supposed to have anything to do with the death of Mtimkulu, not so? -- No, I must have mentioned it at Mauritius that I was on stand by for that time.

No, you did not. I will read to you what you said at (20) Mauritius to Jacques Pauw. At page 134 of the new record and 163 of the old record, Mr Chairman. Jacques Pauw asked you the following question:

"Dirk, jy het vir my 'n storie vertel van die man wat in die rystoel .."

and you replied:

"Ja, dit is 'n ou ook wat in P.E. aangehou was. Ek het hom nooit gesien of ontmoet nie. Ek het nou maar by Brigadier Jan du Preez en Schoon - en ja, basies by hulle die storie gehoor dat hy is toe ook gif ingege(30) wat hom/..

Cl.16

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COETZEE

wat hom sou .."

And Pauw asked you:

"Wie was hy?" and you said -

"Ek weet nie, hulle sal weet. Hulle sal weet. Hulle sal daar weet, daar waar so 'n ou man aangehou - as ek sal jou nou die storie vertel - toe ook geen klagte teen hom kon inbring nie en dit was 'n inwoner daar wat nou ook soos Griffiths Mxenge skynbaar was, jy weet wat nou,

toe het hulle vir hom gif ingegee, maar 'n gedeelte het skynbaar afgeloop, as ek dit nou verstaan, is dit (10) iets soos Liqui Fruit, alles het nie in die houer gekom nie, daar het 'n bietjie gemors en toe is die ou nie dood nie, hy het verlam"

and then Pauw asked you "Hy het nie genoeg gif ingekry nie" and you replied:

"Nee, hy het nie genoeg gif ingekry nie, hy het verlam geraak, sy hare het uitgeval en toe het hulle hom Groote Schuur toe gevat waar daar vasgestel is dat hy gif ingekry het en ook die werklike soort. Jy weet, hulle kon 'n vasstelling doen watse gif het hy ingekryf en toe het (30) Johan Coetzee nou kamtig die ding persoonlik ondersoek en is daar vir my gesê dat hy toe op pad Groote Schuur toe vir behandeling een dag met rolstoel en al net van die aardbol af verdwyn het. Nou, ek was nie by nie, maar ek meen daardie "need to know" en daardie, jy weet mos, daardie opset wat ek in was, was dit toe duidelik dat hy is ontvoer"

and Pauw asked you "Dit was toe hy nou eers terug was by die huis en alles" and you replied:

"Nee, skynbaar. Ek weet nie" and he asked you "Of (30) het hy/..

Cl.18

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COETZEE

het hy verdwyn by Groote Schuur" and you said:

"Ja, of êrens gewoon het daar in die omgewing en terug was op pad na Groote Schuur, toe of wat nou ook al, toe het hy met rolstoel en al verdwyn."

Pauw asked you "Toe sit hy nou. Is hy verlam of wat?" You replied:

"Ja, skynbaar, hy kon toe nog nie loop nie en soos ek sê as hulle 'n agtergrondstudie gaan doen sal hulle seker sien wat dit was. Ek weet nie, dit is nou maar

hoor - wat ek hoor." (10)

Now, this is a man who is guessing. -- It is not a man who is guessing. If you know about the close 'support' that there existed between myself and Brigadier Jan du Preez you will see why he entrusted me with discussions like that.

But you were not able to put this across to Jacques Pauw properly. -- I told you what my state of mind and my frame of mind and my time available was whilst I was at Mauritius.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but Mr Coetzee, let me just get this clear, when did you learn that Mtimkulu's car was found at the border? -- At the stage after it happened from Brigadier Jan (20) du Preez and - he told me the story. In fact he mentioned it last year recently. Just before I left ...

Why would he tell you the same story more than once? -- It just happened that way.

No, but please give me an explanation. -- I think one must put that question to Brigadier Du Preez. I do not know whether he forgot that he has already mentioned it to me or that he is just repeating himself.

MR MARITZ: You see, not even the substance of the story that you are telling here is the truth. -- It is. (30)

Because/..

C1.19

- 637 -

COETZEE

Because at the stage that Mtimkulu left the country, according to my instructions on 14 April, he had recuperated sufficiently that he could move around. He was at home. -- No, he was in a wheel-chair as far as I know.

No, he was not in a wheel-chair. That is nonsense. -- He was on his way to Groote Schuur Hospital ...

No, he was on his way to go and get medicine. -- At Groote Schuur via Livingstone. He was going to Livingstone Hospital where arrangements were made for his next visit

to Groote Schuur Hospital. (10)

No, he was staying with his parents in Port Elizabeth. He was not going to Groote Schuur. -- That is how I have got it.

Well, you have got it all wrong. You cannot even tell the story properly because you make it up as you go on. -- No, I do not make it up as I go on. The story is as I have told it, he was released, poisoned and on his trip to Groote Schuur Hospital disappeared, his car was found near Lesotho border and the impression was given that he fled across the border for no apparent reason because the security police re-leased him, they had nothing against him according to (20) them so why was there any necessity for him to just fly to Lesotho and disappear off the surface of the earth?

Well, he fled the country. I do not know why he fled the country, but apparently he thought so, but that is not the point.

What is niggling is that even on your own showing Brigadier Du Preez told you this story several times, the story that you told Jacques Pauw which I have just read to you. -- That is right.

So, on several times he told you the incorrect story. -- No, the correct story - I am sure it will be proved that (30) way/..

Cl.20 - 638 - COETZEE

way. On your assumption I cannot deny it, but as I have got the story that is what happened.

You have got no other facts? -- No other facts.

Save those facts which you say were told to you by Jan du Preez. -- That is right.

Now, just reverting to - there is one thing I forgot to ask you about which I am interested in hearing what your explanation is there. Yesterday when you spoke of the killing of Peter and Vusi you said that you went and collected (10) poison from

General Neethling on the Sunday morning. Do you remember that?

-- Ja, the powder poison for the third time.

That is right. Now, I want to refer you to page 122 of the new record and page 148 of the old transcript, where you told this story in the following way: Pauw asked you "So, die dubbel dosis het ook nie gewerk nie?" Now, you tried to give him the double dose at Groblersdal, I think so, and you answered as follows .-- The dubbel dose at Kopfontein.

At Kopfontein and then you were at Groblersdal and you got the triple dose there and you replied:

"Ook nie gewerk nie. Toe is ek eventueel na 'n paar (20) dae saam met Koos deur, en toe het Neethling dit, ek weet onder andere ons het hom een Sondagoggend by sy huis gaan haal, toe is hy laboratorium toe daar agter die universiteitkoshuise, toe het hy 360 gram dit was die derde keer per persoon aangemaak en dit opgelos."

Where did you go to a laboratory behind the university hostels?

-- No, that was his house. We picked him up at his house behind the university opposite the hostels and took him to the laboratory near ...(intervention)

No, no. -- .. Jacob Maré Street. (30)

No, no/..

Cl.21

- 639 -

COETZEE

No, no, listen, I will read it to you .. -- No, I understand.

I will read it to you again. -- Yes, yes.

This is you talking:

"Toe is ek eventueel na 'n paar dae saam met Koos deur en toe het Neethling dit, ek weet onder andere ons het hom een Sondagoggend by sy huis gaan haal, toe is hy laboratorium toe daar agter die universiteitkoshuise .."

-- I mean it is obvious there is no laboratory there. From the start I said it was in Jacob Maré Street and from the (10) start

I said that he was living behind the university in that street running west/east opposite the hostels, women's hostels.

You understand Afrikaans very well. -- Yes, very well.

It is your home tongue. -- It is, but I mean it is obvious to you that I have just made a mistake there.

And you know what you said to Pauw? -- Yes, I know.

And you understand what you said to Pauw? -- Yes, I do.

But you subsequently found out that Neethling never had a laboratory behind that university hostels. -- Well no, put it in that way, behind his house opposite the university (20) hostels because that is where he stayed.

But he never had a laboratory there? -- Never at all. He was in Jacob Maré Street, it is a well-known fact.

But you made this up when you told pose this story? -- I did not make it up. I can describe you General Lotter Neethling's house which I did on several occasions and the laboratory and his office, everything as I did. I mean, it is obvious that I just made a mistake there with the wording.

Now, on how many occasions did you go to General (30)

Neethling/..

Cl.22

- 640 -

COETZEE

Neethling to go and get poison? -- I cannot be exact. It could be round about four times.

Four times? -- Yes.

We know about two times that you were there. -- With the Vusi/Pieter case?

Yes, that is all we know about.

CHAIRMAN: There was also the other instance.

MR MARITZ: Which other one?

CHAIRMAN: Kondile.

MR MARITZ: Kondile. Okay, so there are three. What was (10) the fourth one? -- I tried to abduct General, an ANC member in

Swaziland in December 1981, together with Dennis Gordon Lockwood and Almond Nofemela.

Yes, did you go to General Neethling and go and get some knock-out drops from him? -- That is correct.

When was that? -- That was December '81.

December '81. -- Yes.

Now, you complained yesterday because I did not have signed documents in regard to Vusi. Can I show you an order which was signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Hanson, it appears, (20) which is dated 12 October 1981 and in which it is stated that Vusi was released on 11 October 1981. -- And this 11th, Mr Maritz, what day of the week was that?

It was a Sunday. -- Was it a Sunday?

Yes. -- And was it checked at the police station, the PPR register and occurrences book whether ..

I am not here to answer questions. -- I have got no ...

I am just showing you the document. You complained that you thought that - an unsigned document was no good to you. --
No, no, okay. (30)

Well, there/..

Cl.25

- 641 -

COETZEE

Well, there is a signed one. -- Yes.

Are you happier now? -- That it was a signed document as to his release, yes.

Thank you. It will be handed in in due course, Mr Chairman.
Can I have my documents back, please .. -- May I just read ...

Can I have my documents back, please. -- Well, I would have liked to read through the whole document.

Can I just get something out of the way here. You claimed that the members of the security branches all over the (10) country are, you say, beyond the law. -- That is correct.

Nobody touches them. -- There may be occasions that they end

up with the law, but as far as these atrocities are concerned, no.

Well, you know what, I asked the security headquarters in Pretoria to supply me with some figures relating to that allegation of yours. Now it may interest you to know that during the period from 1981 to 1989 there were 288 criminal cases brought against members of the security branch. -- In what regard?

(20)

Criminal cases. -- Yes.

Criminal charges. -- Yes, but drunken driving, assault or?

No, no, to do with the execution of their duties. -- I would like to have a split up of it to put it in proper context.

In that time 21 of them were found guilty. -- Of the 288?

Yes, 21 were found guilty. -- This ...

That is not a picture of a force which is beyond the law.

-- As it looked to me like it, no. (30)

They are/..

Cl.28

- 642 -

COETZEE

They are definitely not beyond the law and it makes nonsense of your story. -- Not at all, 288 people charged, 21 guilty and I would like to find out what was this 21 find guilty of just to get the proper picture.

The next thing you are going to suggest I suppose is that the courts are in on the deal. -- No, no, no, not - they must depend on an independent police investigation team. So, the court can only judge on what is put before them and a case is as successful as it is investigated.

Yes well, we are going to get into an argument with (10) you again and I am not interested in that. -- Ja, the same.

Because if that were the case then one would not have 21 convictions either. -- Out of 288.

Well, it does not matter, but if there was an attempt to brush

in everything under the carpet then you would not have had 21 convictions. -- Mr Maritz, I would like to have a comparison as to the exact period how many uniform and CID branch policemen were charged and how many of them were found guilty.

What has that got to do with it? -- To show you that (20) the security police is above the law and it is just unfortunate that a few of them end up in trouble, depending on whether this was in official duty capacity, but I mean out of this it could just as well have been drunken driving or some of those charges.

Well, do you for instance know about the case of Van As?

-- Van As?

Van As was a security branch policeman that during interrogation of a person shot him with a pistol. Do you know about that case? -- Excuse me, shot himself or the person?(30)

No, no/..

Cl.29

- 643 -

COETZEE

No, no, he shot the detainee. -- Oh, that was at Soweto I think.

Do you know about that case? -- Yes.

Do you know whose fault it was that that man was found guilty eventually? -- No, I do not know.

Botha Neethling. Botha Neethling's evidence caused the man to be found guilty. -- I won't deny that.

CHAIRMAN: But I thought - was he not entitled to protection, Van As? -- I beg your pardon?

Was Van As not entitled to protection if he had shot (10) a detainee? -- Well, sir, if it is open - as I said it is always planned in such a way that traces are left, so if a man shoots a detainee openly in custody, I mean how does he get out of that, I mean then ...

I thought he is above the law. -- Yes, but not recklessly above the law. I mean, if I just go around the streets killing

people then I must expect to eventually end up in the court.

No, but that was in the course of his duty. -- Interrogation and shooting a chap? (20)

Hm. -- No, not that - I mean, that is the degree - you cannot do that, kill a guy while interrogating him.

Oh, so was the Mxenge murder above the law or not? -- Our action was above the law, yes. If we have left places and were seen by people eventually and there was enough evidence we would have ended up in court.

But that makes nonsense of your statement about being above the law. All it means is that you leave no tracks and therefore you cannot be caught. Is that not true? Is that not really what you are saying? -- If no tracks are left, yes.(30)

If you/..

Cl.30

- 644 -

COETZEE

If you leave no tracks you cannot be caught. -- That is right.

That does not place you above the law. That is a lot of nonsense. -- No, they won't on suspicion come into security head office and keep us in custody and subject us to severe interrogation if there is a slight think - that they might think that we are involved in that case.

I think that as a general rule it is wrong for the police on mere a suspicion to detain people and interrogate them to the extend you suggest. -- But that is how it happened. (10) If there is a suspicion on it then they - if there is a reasonable suspicion then they can detain a person.

MR MARITZ: Now, in regard to this issue of being above the law, you also spoke to Jacques Pauw and I refer you to page 176 of the new transcript and 213 of the old one, Mr Chairman.

Pauw asked you point blank:

"Sal jy sê die 'Hit Squad' staan heeltemal bowe die reg, bowe die wet?" and your reply was very significant. You

said:

"Wel, ongeskrewe reël, ja, ek meen jy moet altyd (20)
versigtig wees dat jy nie uitgeloop word, deur die
speurtak, deur moord en roof, hulle sal nou mos 'n
moord geval ondersoek." -- If you leave evidence, yes.

Well, that is exactly what the honourable chairman is being
saying to you, anybody that is not caught out is above the law,
but if you are caught you are nog above the law.

CHAIRMAN: I see you proceed to say the following, the question
is:

"Ja, dit is wat ek vir jou wil vra, hierby kom die
feit, dat van die moorde wat gepleeg word, word so (30)
gepleeg/..

Cl.31

- 645 -

COETZEE

gepleeg dat die polisie dit moet ondersoek."

And you answered "Ja, hulle ondersoek dit" and the question is:

"Die uniform of speurtak weet nie dit was 'n polisie-
'job' nie? -- Dis hy, dis hy."

In other words you say that the police, the uniform branch did
not know that these murders were police jobs, so how could they
then protect you? -- What I am saying, I am sure these special
murder and robbery squads immediately know if they come to a scene
and see what the situation was and who the(10) guy involved is.

Mr Coetzee, that is not what you said. -- Yes, I agree with
that. I understand what you ...

Yes, so you are now contradicting what you said there. --
At Mauritius, yes.

Now, why are you contradicting it? -- Well, I told ...

Just because it suits you or .. -- No, not because it suits
me, Mr Chairman, because it is a fact. I think if one looks -
if I can remember correctly, especially Port Elizabeth area had
a very high success rate in their murder and rob-(20) bery cases.

I think very close near to a hundred percent at a stage. It was in the newspapers some years ago and it will be significant to see how that dropped from the 81's onwards but as I am saying not one will have to look at that.

MR MARITZ: Well, for that matter if one looks at Mxenge, Mxenge was a botched job, not so? -- A botched job?

A botched job. -- Would you just explain that to me, sorry.

Botched means ..

CHAIRMAN: Means messed up. (30)

MR MARITZ/..

C1.32

- 646 -

COETZEE

MR MARITZ: It was messed up. -- Ja, ja, it was.

Now, if the police arrived on that scene they would have thought these are the security policemen who killed this man, let us leave it alone? -- Well, there was not much evidence left there so they could not do much about it.

So, just because the knives were not lying around there, the CID must have thought well, you know, experts must have done this job, the security police, we must leave this alone. Is that what you are saying? -- Yes. Basically they would have gone to - to find out about Mxenge's political acti- (10) vities and find out who he was and swallowed the story that he was eventually murdered by the ANC.

Even though the whole purpose of the exercise was defeated by the way in which the murder was supposedly carried out by your fellows. -- From our point of view, yes.

Now, when you made your statement at Mauritius to Jacques Pauw you had the evidence which was given by Nofemela in his affidavit and that was published in the newspapers. -- I did.

So you knew full well what his allegations were. -- Yes, that is right. (20)

Now, you knew that Nofemela claimed that to be able to do

the Mxenge murder, he and Spyker and Brian and Joe travelled down from Pretoria to Durban. You knew that. -- That is - I think at that stage I said Joe and Almond came down, but as I say as I can recollect it only - the whole squad was down and only Joe was brought down.

That is not the question I asked you, Mr Coetzee. I said - the question is this and I will ask you again, did you know, when you made that statement to Jacques Pauw that Nofemela had claimed that he and Spyker and Joe and Brian travelled (30)
down from/..

Cl.35

- 647 -

COETZEE

down from Pretoria to Durban together in the same car. -- I did. Now, that is what he said I think in his statement.

Are you aware of the fact that Spyker Tshikalange came and testified before this commission to exactly the same effect? -- I am, I am.

MR KUNY: No, with respect, that is not correct. He did not say that Joe was with him.

MR MARITZ: I am quite sure he did. -- I think Spyker said that him and Tshikalange - him and Brian Ngqulunga and ...

I am quite sure .. -- But I know he is supporting (10)
Nofemela's statement.

MR KUNY: No, he spoke about Brian and Nofemela and a woman who was the girl friend of either Brian or Almond, accompanied them a certain distance.

CHAIRMAN: He said that he, Almond and Brian drove down to Durban. That was his evidence-in-chief.

MR MARITZ: I stand corrected, thank you, Mr Chairman. I thought he had said it. But in any event, let us leave it at that. He says then that he and Nofemela - that is Spyker, he and Nofemela and Brian drove down. -- That is correct. (20)

Nofemela also said that when he was briefed to go down to

Durban, he was done so in the offices of Brigadier Schoon. You were present there. Do you know about that? - He said that, yes.

That is not the truth? -- It is not true.

He also says that he went with you to Vlakplaas after-wards where the group was gathered together and then they travelled down. -- Not in the context in which he put it. They travelled down before me and I followed afterwards.

At page 74 of the transcript - it is about page 87 of (30) the old/..

Cl.38

- 648 -

COETZEE

the old one, Mr Chairman, you told Pauw the following. You spoke of the instruction to commit the murder and Pauw asked you: "En jy het dit aanvaar as 'n opdrag?" You said "Natuurlik, ja." He asked you "En dit was inderdaad 'n op- drag" and you replied "Dit was natuurlik, ja."

CHAIRMAN: Just a moment. You said 87?

MR MARITZ: Round about. We do not have the exact page.

CHAIRMAN: Just read the question again.

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, it starts out where the witness spoke of the instruction and then Pauw asked ... (10)

MR (?): Page 89, Mr Chairman.

MR MARITZ: 89. Thank you. I will repeat it. He asked you "En jy het dit aanvaar as 'n opdrag" and you said "Natuurlik ja" and he said "En dit was inderdaad 'n opdrag" and then you replied as follows:

"Dit was natuurlik ja. Toe het ek gesê maar Joe en Almond dink ek was nie daar nie, ek dink Spyker was by ons, maar Joe en Almond nie, toe is daar gereël met Schoon dat Schoon vir Joe en Almond moet afstuur. U sal sien Almond noem ook iets daarvan. Toe het hulle (20) daar aangekom en die huis is aan hulle uitgewys."

Do you remember saying that? -- Yes.

The point is this, that when you made that statement you already knew what Almond had told or had said in his affidavit. -- That is right.

Now, I want to read you another passage. At page 75, which is the next page. Mr Chairman, it just carries on in the old one.

Jacques Pauw asked you after that statement, he said whether Van der Hoven was an accessory and you said of course and Pauw said well, Almond did not mention it and (30)

you/..

Cl.40

- 649 -

COETZEE

you said well, Almond did not know and then you proceeded as follows:

"En hulle het toe opgekom Durban toe? -- Van Pretoria af gekom, is hulle twee toe gestuur om by die groep aan te sluit. Ek kan nie onthou wat het hulle in Pretoria gemaak nie, maar Schoon het hulle toe afgestuur. Ek weet Van der Hoven het Schoon seker gebel of wat ook al .."

and this is very important "Want ek het gesê ek kan dit nie sonder Joe en Almond doen nie". You could not do the job (10) without them and that is why they had to come down to Durban. -- Yes.

Now, when you made this statement you were fully aware of the fact that Almond had already made an affidavit in which he made certain allegations. -- That is correct.

You knew that your version differed from Almond's substantially. -- That is correct.

But you made it quite clear to Pauw that you were not in a position to perform this instruction without Almond and Joe, that they were not in Durban and that you made arrangements (20) for them to come down, is that so? -- Yes, it is.

And that they in fact came down together because you say that

later on. -- Didn't I say at the point I was not hundred percent sure whether Almond was also - but I see he says that he also was still in Pretoria, somewhere.

Well, that is what Almond claims. He claims - Almond says he was in Pretoria. -- Yes, but I am of course hundred percent sure that I am correct now.

But at Mauritius you were a hundred percent sure that you were right then too. -- That was how I recollected it and (30)

I was not/..

Cl.40

- 650 -

COET;ZEE

I was not deliberately lying and it does not change the end result of the story.

No, but you give a reason here. It goes further than that. It is not just a lapse of memory, you give a reason. You say "Want ek het gesê ek kan dit nie sonder Joe en Almond doen nie". You reasoned the thing there. -- I see your point, Mr Maritz.

Now, what were you about when you were telling Jacques Pauw stories at Mauritius? -- Well, I was not hundred percent sure of the situation, whether Almond and Joe was there (10) and I put it that way, but it is obvious that Almond was not in Pretoria that time and that Joe was brought down by Koos Schutte from the farm, between the 17th and ...

CHAIRMAN: Why is it obvious that Almond was not in Pretoria? -- His S&T shows that he was in Durban and I - when they passed ...

Well, I thought one could not rely on those S&T forms? -- Yes, that is in a way true, but can I just put it to you that when they brought me up Almond's - after he was at the commission they brought me up his story and I marked it out (20) very clearly then and as I recollected it, and that was before I had seen that worksheet, is that we were all down in Durban and Koos Schutte from Vlakplaas brought Joe down alone and he stayed with us for

one or two days in Durban and then went back.

MR MARITZ: So, what you are in fact saying is that you adjusted your story to fit into the facts. -- I could not re- collect that part hundred percent correct whilst at Mauritius but I do not think it makes any difference to the eventual outcome of the real fact and that is that Mxenge was (30)

murdered/..

Cl.755

- 651 -

COETZEE

murdered by the four of them and that we were involved in that.

It goes further than that, Mr Coetzee, and I want to put it to you that you are a dishonest witness. I am going to show you why, is another reason why you had to adjust your evidence because you landed up in difficulties with all your stories. If one goes back to the diamond dealer and it looks as if the diamond dealer is your nemesis and I will tell you why later on again. -- Is my?

Your nemesis. You know what you said about the (10) diamond dealer. I am referring to page 131 of the new tran- script, 159 to 160 of the old one, Mr Chairman. Now, you told the story of what they did and so on and came back and told you about the body in the plantation and that you went down and fetched the body and so on. Now, Pauw asked you the following:

"Jy het toe die lyk gaan haal? -- Ja, hulle het hom uit die bos uitgesleep en in 'n lykshuissak agterin die "boot" van my Datsun, die polisie Datsun, gesit.

Toe is ek af Durban toe direk van Lindley af waar (20)

die groep ook op daardie stadium was, jy weet die hele Vlakplaas groep, en vir Brigadier van der Hoven van die probleem vertel, en gesê ek moet nou maar van die lyk gaan ontslae raak, wat kan ek nou doen.

Het jy vir Van der Hoven gaan vertel? -- Ja, toe is ek en ..

Wat sê Van der Hoven toe? -- Net raak ontslae, raak

ontslae, raak ontslae. Ek meen hy het nou niks met die ding te doen nie, maar ek kan nie met die ding rondry nie. Toe is ek en Paul, ons het Spyker en (30)

Almond/..

C2. - 652 - COETZEE

Almond toe daar by die groep gelos in Durban" and that is where it catches up to you. -- With Spyker going to Empan-geni.

That is where it catches up to you. You see, this diamond dealer slots in to November when you were in Durban.

That is the only time you were in Durban with the group, not so?

-- According to the worksheets, yes.

CHAIRMAN: There is no other indication of any visit by the group to Durban. -- According to the worksheets, yes.

Yes, but I have got no other indication that the (10) group was ever in Durban. -- Yes. On what you have got in front of you that is hundred percent correct.

Now, could you just explain to me where did this - when was this occasion when the group was in Durban, the whole squad? Where does it fit in time wise? -- What I mean I know of the one between 4 November and 20 November.

Was that the only one? -- Sir, as I can correctly recollect it.

Was that the only instance the group was in Durban, according to your recollection? -- According to my re- (20) collection, yes.

MR MARITZ: As a matter of fact it goes further than that. You have just, a few minutes ago, used the records as an excuse why it was necessary to adjust your evidence to bring Almond down to Durban and to leave Joe up in Krugersdorp. You yourself did it.

You used the records as an excuse for the adjustment in your evidence. -- On this one that you enquire ...

No, no, no. On the Mxenge matter. -- That I have left Joe

in Krugersdorp ...

(30)

Ag no, please/..

C2.24

- 653 -

COETZEE

Ag no, please. -- Well, just put it to me straight, please, Mr Maritz.

I am. You do not want to understand but let me put it to you again. Just now when I said to you that when you made your statement to Pauw you knew that Almond had already claimed that he travelled down with ... -- Mamasela, Joe?

With Spyker and Brian, not so? -- That is correct.

And then you said that because you then saw the actual records later on, the S&T sheets and the worksheets later on, you realised that it could not have been that way and that(10) Almond was in Durban. -- Yes.

That only Joe came down. - Yes.

And that when you told Jacques Pauw the story that I read to you just now, you were not aware of the fact that Almond was already down in Durban. - Yes, I was not sure that is right.

And that is why it became necessary for you to adjust your evidence then. -- No, if only I had records - insight into records - I had to completely rely on my memory and if it is checked now it will be seen in fact that the whole (20) squad was down there and that Joe was brought down by Sergeant Schutte.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but that does not - but then I do not understand it at all. This is Mr Maritz's point, the squad went down on the 4th. -- Yes.

That is right. You went down a few days later. -- That is correct.

The squad included Almond, is that right? -- That is correct.

At that stage Almond was busy shooting the (30)

diamond dealer/..

C2.43

- 653 -

COETZEE

diamond dealer in Durban, went back to Pretoria to fetch you and you then took him down with you to Durban. -- When was he shot, this diamond dealer, Mr Chairman?

The diamond dealer was shot when the squad was down in Durban. You said that repeatedly. -- Yes.

And you said the squad was only once in Durban. -- As far as I can recollect.

From 4 November. -- Yes.

And you went down to Durban with Almond, after you had picked up the body of the diamond dealer, so .. -- Yes. (10)

But Almond was already in Durban, awaiting your arrival when he was supposed to shoot the diamond dealer. -- Sir, can I just have that record with the worksheets again, please. Can I just put it this way: I see according to Sergeant Schutte's worksheet he was in Durban from 17 until 19 November. Now, as I can recollect it that was when he brought Joe down. Then he was in Eastern Transvaal on the 22nd and the 23rd, that was the night that that motor car was burned and then there is another date, 14/11 until 16/11, I think also Eastern Transvaal and that could be the time that the diamond (20) dealer's car was brought down to Golela border post.

But then how did the murderers, what was the date you said the car was brought down? -- It looks like 14 November until 16 November.

But then you were in Durban, Mr Coetzee, and you said the car was brought to you in Vlakplaas. -- Yes, but then it was parked at Schutte's house and ...

Yes, but you were in Durban. -- Mr Chairman, I will never be able to sort out these records with the available documents here, that I have got at my ... (30)

You see, I have/..

You see, I have got the problem, I do not even think that

the petrol records will help you, because on your evidence, assuming you worked 25 days a month, you travelled in excess of 600 kilometres a day, about 650 kilometres a day. It seems as if you never did any work except travelling around. So, that means in excess of 600 kilometres a day means at least one tankful of petrol a day, all over the country for four months. I do not know what the petrol records will show us.

-- Mr Chairman, it will show exactly at which police areas I was at that stage, what police stations. Whilst the work- (10) sheet might say Eastern Transvaal, it will show during that period I had been in Pretoria say for instance at Lindley, at Durban and it will show that the motor car was there.

But Almond was quite specific and so was David, that they went down on 4 November and they stayed in Durban. They never left Durban and Joe, according to you, only arrived about on the 19th - what was the date you said yesterday? -- Ja, 17th.

On the 17th. -- November.

So, the murder must have taken place before you went down, when Joe was in Krugersdorp and the team was down (20) with you in Durban. I just do not understand your evidence.

-- Ja, unfortunately I cannot be clear on dates.

MR MARITZ: I just want to make the final point here in this regard, I told you when I started out on this that you are a dishonest witness. -- You are completely wrong, Mr Maritz.

You are a dishonest witness for this reason: That you realised, you realised full well that these two stories do not wash because you could not have had Nofemela and Joe brought down to Durban when you had already told the whole wide world that you had left Nofemela in Durban in connection with (30)

the/..

You could not have left Nofemela in Durban after the diamond dealer was collected, his body, and at the same time you could not have brought him down or had him brought down to Durban and you knew this. -- Ag no, I did not know it. It is ten years ago and I had nothing to refresh my memory. I just had to rely on my memory solely and if I had to reconstruct all this I will fit it hundred percent in, the travelling, how it could have been done.

If it was in that period it was done exactly like I said. Why would I try to be dishonest? Why(10)

would I leave my country just to come out and tell a lot of lies to the world.

I have a reason for that which I will put to you later on.-- You have? Okay.

But that is beside the point now. When you made the statement at Mauritius, you wanted to back Nofemela, didn't you? -- I wanted to back him for sure, ja.

You wanted to corroborate him. -- Yes.

You did not want to make him a dishonest person. -- No, I just want to corroborate the truth. (20)

That is right. -- That Nofemela is speaking the truth.

And you said so over and over again. -- Yes.

You wanted to help this man. -- No, not to help him, just speak the truth because I was involved.

And corroborate him. -- If that is what the truth means, yes.

In this respect the going down to Durban, you knew what he had said. -- I knew what he had said.

And you corroborated him in that. -- Yes, I said - and you must make sure, as I said in the record there that I (30)

see Almond/..

C2.143

- 656 -

COETZEE

see Almond said he was also on his way to Durban with Joe.

Yes, and you compounded it by saying that I said to Van der

Hoven I cannot do this job without Joe and Almond and they have to come down. -- Yes.

Right? -- Yes

So you offered a explanation for it too.-- Yes.

So you corroborated Nofemela to the hilt in Mauritius. -- Okay, is it such a big sin if Almond was not there, that I needed him. Eventually Almond was included in the murder. So, does that completely change the whole murder set up? (10)

CHAIRMAN: No, I think, Mr Coetzee, you must accept that in logic - let us put it this way, I think what Mr Maritz is trying to do, is to say you are wrong on point A, why would you then be right on point B. I think it is in that context that he says it. -- Okay well, I was wrong on point A and point B is correct as I put it to you now.

Yes, but you see we once again - I think what Mr Maritz is trying to do is he is also looking for corroboration one way or the other and he says if you are wrong on point A it shows that you may be wrong on point B. -- I see what you (20) mean.

I think that is the logic. So, it is no use arguing with him why he asked you these questions. That is why he asked you. -- Okay.

MR MARITZ: No but it goes further than that too. You coupled the diamond dealer with the group being down in Durban, not so? -- That is correct.

Now, we know today that the group was only in Durban from 4 November. -- That is correct.

In other words you must have taken down the (30)
diamond dealer's/..

C2.168

- 657 -

COETZEE

diamond dealer's body to Durban to go and tell Van der Hoven about this during that period, between 4 and 29 November.

CHAIRMAN: No, the 21st.

MR MARITZ: I am sorry, 21 or 23 November. -- Yes, if that was the only time that we have been down there, correct.

But now, do you recall a damaging little piece of evidence that you gave earlier on, that you had to go down to Durban and go and tell Van der Hoven about this body because you were late in reporting and you could not leave the reporting over any longer.

Do you remember that? -- (10)

Because the squad was already down there.

That is right. Now, we know that you left Vlakplaas, according to the worksheets, on 11 November. -- Correct.

And you were late because the squad had already arrived on the 4th. -- That is correct.

And you arrived a week later, on the 11th. -- Correct

And that was the reason why you were so anxious to go and report to Brigadier Van der Hoven. -- Correct.

Now, if Almond and Spyker were in Durban from 4 November how could they have killed the diamond dealer in that (20) -- They could have been up - if it happened during that time they could have been up for the week-end in Pretoria with me for some reason or another. As I already explained, this does not mean - this is not the alpha and the omega that they had been down exactly from that date exactly to that date, stationary at Durban for that time.

CHAIRMAN: But it was a hectic week-end, was it not? -- Yes, yes.

I mean, the week-end they came up from Durban to Pretoria, they borrowed money, they went to Lesotho, they (30)

came back/..

C2.193

- 658 -

COETZEE

came back with the diamonds, you sent them back to Lesotho, they killed the man in Lindley, they came back to Pretoria, you then went down to Lindley and then down to Durban, all in a week-end. -- That is correct.

I must say that I find difficult to believe. -- Well, sir, it is the truth.

MR MARITZ: Your problem is that your stories are fantasies of your own and they do not match the true facts, Mr Coetzee. -- I would have liked to know what would have happened if I came out with all the stories inside South Africa, whether you (10) would have also defended me on my behalf to show that I am talking nonsense and I would have walked out a free man out of court and ...

Fortunately I do not have to answer that question. -- Well, it is ...

We would have been faced with exactly the same difficulties.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR TEA. THE COMMISSION RESUMES

DIRK COETZEE still under oath:

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: Now, in regard to (20) the Mxenge murder we now know that you arrived in Durban on 11 November.

CHAIRMAN: He left Pretoria.

MR MARITZ: That you left Pretoria on 11 November 1989. -- That is correct.

So you must have reached Durban I suppose during the course of that day. -- It must have been, yes.

Now, how long after your arrival in Durban did you receive the instructions in regard to the killing of Mxenge? -- I cannot be exact on that. (30)

Do you/..

C3.12

- 659 -

COETZEE

Do you have no recall whatsoever? -- No, no recall whatsoever.

Well, assuming that you had received the instructions now, how did you go about planning the execution of this murder? -- It was discussed with Almond and Joe. I do not know at what stages, how many times and at what stages Tshi- kalange and Ngqulunga was

present, and poisoned meat was prepared and thrown at the house and the rest was left into the hands of Mamasela, Almond and Joe and - ag, Mamasela, Joe Mamasela, Almond, Brian Nggulunga and Tshikalange. (10)

Now, it is significant that you said right now that Joe was in on the planning, is that correct? -- He came in on the planning, that is correct.

So, did you do planning without him at first? -- I cannot recollect at which date we discussed what.

CHAIRMAN: No, the question was not which date, the question is whether you can recollect that you did some planning in the absence of Joe and that Joe then came along? -- The basic plan could have been done before Joe reached us.

MR MARITZ: Are you guessing now? -- I am guessing. (20)

Now, what would that basic plan have been? -- Preparing the poisoning for the dogs I suppose or getting the lay-out, the work place, the house, the parking place of the car, et cetera.

No, no, no .. -- I cannot tell you, Mr Maritz. I do not know what the basic - I cannot tell you exact which date at which meeting we said exactly what.

CHAIRMAN: No, but I think all Mr Maritz wants to know what was the basic plan, planning? -- The basic plan was to kill Mr Mxenge with knives. (30)

MR MARITZ/..

C3.39

- 660 -

COETZEE

MR MARITZ: Yes, I appreciate that, but that is a pretty bold statement. Look, I imagine that if you were asked to go out and murder someone and you had to involve four people - well, not four people, more than four because you involved Paul van Dyk and Koos Vermeulen as well, so that is six people with yourself that is seven people at the very least. You involved seven people in a murder. -- That is correct.

And you knew that if you were caught out you would probably be hung for that murder. -- That is correct.

So, I take it that you would have been very, very (10)
careful in planning this murder to obviate being hung for it.
-- I was careful in planning it.

Right, what was your planning? -- The planning was that we would kill the dogs, to give them the opportunity, if at home they can kill him there, if the opportunity will arise, that they should have on old clothes and shoes which I am going to take after the murder, and that was basically what it was all about, and that they must just have no identifiable things in their pockets like cigarette packets with numbers on, watches with names engraved on the back that can be (20) lost, identity cards or reference books in the pockets, et cetera.

Was there planning in regard to how they would have gone about committing the murder? -- No, it was entirely left into their hands, except that there should not be a shooting, there should be a stabbing staged like a robbery, but exactly at what point, what time and how was left in their hands for the opportunity whichever arises.

Now, was that the total extent of the planning that you did?
-- Basically, yes. (30)

But as it/..

C3.66

- 661 -

COETZEE

But as it appears to me, and I think you said this before, that being the commander of this group you were actually involved in planning all these operations. -- Ja, planning it, that is right.

You never executed the operations yourself? -- That is right.

You were the planner? -- That is right.

Is that the best plan you could come up with as the planner?
-- It worked hundred percent successful, Mr Maritz. That is why I think that was the best. (10)

No, that is not the point. Being wise after the fact does not help anybody. You could not have been wise before the murder was committed. Now, I am asking you this flimsy little plan you are talking about now, was that the extent of your planning? -- That is with my level best, with my intelligence, yes.

Now, let us take the dogs. Why did the dogs have to be killed? -- I already answered that question. I said ...

Answer it again. -- I think ...

Why did you have to kill the dogs? -- Because if the (20) opportunity should arise that they could kill Mxenge in his carport in front of his garage next to his house as he gets out of the car.

Well, how would this opportunity have arisen? -- With him coming home, stopping his car, switching it off, opening the door, putting his foot out, getting out of the car, before entering the house. He usually worked late at night, until after dark.

But at the house there was at least his wife, his children, neighbours who could have witnessed this. -- (30)

I do not/..

C3.86

- 662 -

COETZEE

I do not know.

It sounds like a stupid plan to me. -- I will agree and ...

You agree it is a stupid plan? -- Yes, I suppose that is why Almond and them did not in the end did it that way because they also must have thought it is a stupid plan of me.

At Mauritius you told Jacques Pauw that the idea was to poison the dogs and to murder Mxenge at his home, but something went wrong that night and they could not do that. Do you recall that?

I will read it to you. -- Yes, yes, I (10) will accept it.

Let me read it to you. At page 78 of the new transcript, 92 or 93 of the old one, Mr Chairman. You told the story of the

surveillance on Mxenge, you told about his office in Durban, the Audi that he drove, it is 94 of the old one, Mr Chairman. You said that they saw what he looked like and so on and then you said:

"Hulle het toe die gif gaan gooi.

Wie is die hulle? -- Almond, Joe, die vier.

Hoofsaaklik die vier van hulle nè! Joe, Almond. (20)

-- Brian Ngqulunga en Spyker. Toe werk die ding nie die eerste aand nie.

Het die vleis nie gewerk nie? -- Nee, die drie honde is dood dit het ons later ..."

You were interrupted by Pauw:

"Hy het vier honde gehad, nè? -- Ja, drie van die vier is dood want hulle het besluit hulle gaan sommer daar by die huis as hy uitklim uit sy motorkar.

Was dit die aanvanklike plan? -- Ja, om hom daar by die huis by sy garage te lem soos wat hulle met sy (30)
vrou gemaak/..

C3.123

- 663 -

COETZEE

vrou gemaak het. Toe werk dit nie, ek weet nie wat het gebeur nie, dit het nie gewerk daai aand nie."

Do you still not know what went wrong that night? -- No.

Did you go to any trouble to find out why it did not work?
-- The opportunity was not right. I do not know what happened.
I do not know what went wrong.

Did you ask them what went wrong? -- I must have asked them that night and they would have given me an explanation, either that he came in earlier or he was already at home (10) or did not come home that night or came home late that night or, there must have been an answer, yes.

So, your recollection is you were told something but you have forgotten? -- Ja, quite possible.

That is not what you said to Jacques Pauw. You said to Jacques Pauw "Ek weet nie wat het gebeur nie". -- Exactly what I am saying now.

No, it is not exactly what you are saying. There is a far cry between "Ek weet nie wat gebeur het nie" en "Ek kan nie onthou wat gebeur het nie". -- Mr Maritz, I said from the (20) start I cannot recall exact each trip to the house, to the office, who was involved, what was said. Now, you are pushing and pushing me and want me to say words and if I say something you come back on it. Won't you just accept the fact that I cannot remember exactly what was said at what stage and exactly who was present at what stage and exactly when did I do which trips?

CHAIRMAN: No, but if you say you cannot remember exactly who was present at what stage, does that apply to what happened in 1981?

-- Yes.

(30)

No well, that/..

C3.144

- 664 -

COETZEE

No well, that places me in a slight difficulty. If you cannot remember who was present so is there some doubt as to the fact that only these four were present when Mxenge was killed? -- Not at all, Mr Chairman, the basic facts ...

No, but that is - the presence of people at the different scenes is also a basic fact. -- Yes, but to that I cannot testify. I have to rely on their reports back to me after the murder. I was not present...

No, that is not what I asked you. You said that you cannot remember exactly who was present when in 1981. -- (10) With each meeting and each driving up to his house and the office and ...

No, you made a general statement, not only as far as Mxenge was concerned. -- Well, sir, sorry. Then I did not pronounce myself correctly. I did not understand it correctly.

I cannot think abstract. I am working with facts. I am just that

kind of person. So, what I wanted to say is we planned the murder.

Those four black policemen or people were involved. I was not present at that murder and they reported back as they all being present at the murder and making (20) a certain report at me, but the fact is they said they murdered that man as originally planned.

MR MARITZ: Well, I have a further difficulty with you, Mr Coetzee. If I can turn back in this transcript a bit to page 76. The old one would be round about 91, Mr Chairman. There you said:

"Ja, hy was, ek dink nou net of dit .. "

You are talking about Captain Taylor here I think, Andy Taylor.

"Ja, hy was, ek dink nou net of dit hy of een van (30)
sy swartes/..

C3.175

- 665 -

COETZEE

sy swartes was wat vir ons die huis gaan wys het en toe het ons later, dit was ek en Van Dyk, ek dink Koos Vermeulen en Almond en Joe, wat ons toe na die huis toe is om hulle weer te gaan wys.

Oraait, jou manne kom toe nou in Durban aan. -- Wel, sluit toe aan die twee kyk die manne is klaar daar. Ons was klaar daar besig met ons gewone.

Hoe beplan julle toe nou die hele ding? -- Laat dit soort van totaal oor in hulle hande van hoe hulle dit doen. Hulle moet net nie spore los." (10)

That is the sum total of your planning. -- That is what I have said, isn't it?

You were asked then after that "Wie is hulle", you replied "Joe, Almond, Brian Ngqulunga". So, you left the planning to Joe, Almond, Brian Ngqulunga. -- The final murder, how they will go about I left into their hands. I could just help them with general ideas, with the dogs poisoning if it should have happened at home, but for the rest it had to be left in their hands.

I left it in their hands.

My difficulty is that you were so explicit here, (20)
Mr Coetzee and it is absolutely explicit "Laat dit soort van
totaal", completely, "oor in hulle hande van hoe hulle dit doen.
Hulle moet net nie spore los nie." -- Exactly, that is exactly.

So, according to what you said to Jacques Pauw you had
absolutely nothing to do with the planning. -- Ag no, Mr Maritz,
do not - I stick to what I said. With the poisoning I helped,
for in case that would have happened, they planned to murder him
at his house and the rest I left in their hands.

If Joe only arrived on the 17th with Schutte, he (30)
surely/..

C3.205

- 666 -

COETZEE

surely could not have had very much to do with the planning, could
he? -- It all depends on how long the planning took, whether it
was one day or two days.

Are you guessing again? -- Guessing again.

You are just guessing? -- Yes.

Now, I am going to take you through a lot of little things
and I am going to show you that the various stories are so at
variance with one another that one cannot make head or tail of
what went on. Take a simple little thing. Nofemela said, and
Spyker says so as well, that you received a (10) photograph
of Mxenge in Durban. You say that is nonsense. -- I cannot
recollect having one. I know it.

No, you were quite explicit when you spoke to .. -- Yes. No,
I agree, I agree on that.

It is not a question of not recollecting. Listen to what
you said to Jacques Pauw. -- "Nooit, nêrens, niks". It is true,
I did deny.

You said - he asked you at the top of 76 of the new tran-

script "Well, 'obvious' was die saak nie baie sterk nie. Ja, gesukkel en helse probleme en 'n kopseer en raak van die (20) bliksem ontslae."

"Watse - het jy toe 'n lêer van hom gekry? -- Niks, niks, niks.

Het hulle nie vir jou 'n foto van hom gegee of 'n lêer? -- Niks, niks. Hulle het net kaptein Andy Taylor ...

Wie was hy? -- Hy was die lid in beheer van die ANC/PAC-bedrywigheede in Port Natal.

So hy het geweet van die hele storie? -- Hy is die ou wat gewerk het met daardie Mxenge." (30)

You were/..

C3.231

- 667 -

COETZEE

You were totally explicit. That is at the bottom of 91 over on 92 in the old one, Mr Chairman. Do you hear how explicit you were in Mauritius? -- Yes.

Are you still explicit? - I am still.

Let us take the knives. Page 79. It is 96 of the old one, Mr Chairman. You said here:

"Vir die doel van die operasie het hulle twee Okapi-messe gekoop en 'n jagmes.

Wat is 'n Okapi-mes? -- Okapi, hierdie Okapi's wat die swartes sommer die goedkoop oopknipmes. Hulle (10) noem dit die Okapi en 'n jagmes wat ek agter in die 'boot' gehad het van Koos Schutte, hy was die plaasvoorman tipe van, die ou wat op die plaas die boerdery en die regmaak van die karre en die goed behartig het, het hulle gevat."

Do you recall saying this? -- That is right.

Do you adhere to that? -- No, the - except that the hunting-knife belonged to Koos Schutte, but I was wrong of having

it in my boot.

What was the true position? -- As I recollect it now(20) Koos must have brought it down when he brought Joe down and I know that contradicts Almond and Mr Tshikalange.

And yourself. -- And myself, my original story, yes.

So all three of you stand contradicted now. -- Yes, but the hunting-knife exists and I have given the address of the person in whose possession it is and it was used during the murder.

The contradiction goes further than that. Almond says that when they arrived down in Durban you gave them a hunting- knife and two Okapi knives. No question of having gone (30)

out and/..

C3.264

- 668 -

COETZEE

out and bought them. -- Ja, he said that.

And the contradiction goes further than that as well as far as Spyker is concerned. Spyker says that in Pretoria before they left, Schutte brought three hunting-knives and held them for Nofemela to make a choice of his own as to which knife he wanted.

Nofemela then chose a knife and he brought it down with him in the bakkie from Pretoria. -- He said so.

Now, what do we make of all this nonsense? -- We must just make of it that we are all confused as to how the knives eventually landed up with the murder, but I can show you (10) where the hunting-knife is and you can go and pick it up and you can send it for forensic tests and compare it with the wounds in the body.

Where would you get it from now? -- Mr Paul Pretorius, a friend from Sergeant Schutte on a farm near Bon Accord.

But did you give the knife back to Schutte after the murder? -- Yes, a while thereafter I did. I cannot remember exactly when.

But last week you told us how you had destroyed everything. You destroyed the clothes, the number-plates,(20) the knives. -- The Okapi knives maybe, but I cannot remember me you will have

to show me, but for sure not the hunting- knife.

So you destroy everything but the chief murder weapon you keep? -- It is a very precious hunting-knife if you see it, an expensive one.

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman, the witness did not say that the clothes were destroyed, with respect, or the knives.

MR MARITZ: Well, I think he said he destroyed everything he had, that he had taken the lot. (30)

MR/..

C3.289

- 669 -

COETZEE

MR KUNY: No, no.

CHAIRMAN: Well, let us leave it at that for the moment.

MR MARITZ: Now, you went and pointed out the Mxenge house to the murder gang. -- That is right.

Describe the house. -- You haven't got perhaps a ...

Describe it, please, Mr Coetzee. -- Because I can point it between hundred other houses if you would just give me a photograph.

To the south of the house you can either come - here is not a drawing-board. I think you enter Umlazi, that area where he stayed, from a north/south direction and (10) then at a big junction turns west. After going for a while you turn right again right again north into a narrow road and if I remember correct there were no houses directly on the left or the right of that little road coming up. Then immediately under Mr Mxenge's house there is a narrow road turning towards the beach again, east, and that leads - there is a steep embankment up to his house, his house is the first one on top of that embankment and if I can recollect correct- ly it has only got a fence around it, a normal fence on that embankment. Then the road makes a horseshoe bend up (20) towards the house entrance gate and you do not - the driveway goes down into the yard. His house is on the left, the garage on the right next to it and if I am not mistaken there is a carport

in front of the garage and if I am not mistaken a little - I do not know what the fence between him and the neighbour is, if I am correct that is a prefab wall, it can be, at the gate. Somewhere there is a prefab wall.

Just say that again. The house on the right and the garage on the left? -- The house - as you come into the drive- way the house on the left and the garage a little bit to (30)

the/..

C3.320

- 670 -

COETZEE

the back on the right with the carport in front. I think a carport in front if I remember correctly.

And what kind of a roof does it have? -- No, I cannot remember.

What type of window frames does it have? -- I cannot remember.

Does it have burglar-proofing? -- I cannot remember.

Can you describe the front door? -- No, I cannot.

Can you describe the yard? -- No, I cannot except that it, as I say it is up a steep embankment and right on top (10) of the embankment is the fence of this house.

Is the house in front of the yard or at the back of the yard or in the middle of the yard? -- Not far into the drive- way. If you enter not far - I do not know how big it is at the back. I think it is not a very big premises if I recall it, but it is not deep in. It is only a few yards in.

What is the colour of the house? -- I cannot remember.

The colour of the roof? -- I cannot remember.

So excepting for the location you can remember absolutely nothing about the house really. -- You can put that house (20) photo between a hundred and I will point it out to you.

I see. Now, were you present when these dogs were poisoned? -- As I can recollect it, we went there with - and as I say we, myself, Paul and Koos Vermeulen with Almond and Joe and as I recollect it that was the night that they threw the poison at the

dogs.

CHAIRMAN: No, the question is, did you poison the dogs? Were you present during the .. -- Not myself, it ...

Just listen, were you present when the dogs were poisoned?

-- As I can recollect it, yes. (30)

MR MARITZ/..

C3.345

- 671 -

COETZEE

MR MARITZ: Sorry, I was interrupted. I did not hear the answer.

CHAIRMAN: He says as far as he can recollect. -- It happened on the night when we went to the house.

MR MARITZ: So as far as you recollect you were present? -- Ja.

At page 78 of the transcript, it is approximately page 94 of the old one, Mr Chairman, there you were quite explicit:

"En hom toe gesien hoe hy lyk, wie is die ou en hoe lyk die ou en toe het ons - as ek sê ons hulle het (10) toe die gif gaan gooi."

There you left yourself out of it. You qualified yourself. -- Almond eventually got out of the car and went to throw the poison, hundred percent correct.

CHAIRMAN: But that does not make it "hulle"? -- I beg your pardon?

That is not "hulle"? -- Okay.

MR MARITZ: When did you find out about the dogs, that they had in fact been poisoned? -- I cannot recollect whether I received the report the next morning from the security (20) police and if we read it in the newspapers, but I recollect that the dogs were - some of them were poisoned.

Would you have read about the poisoning of the dogs in the newspapers before the murder? -- No, I do not think so.

After the murder? -- It could have been after the murder.

Or if it had been reported to you that the dogs had been poisoned, would that have been before the murder or after the

murder? -- I cannot remember, Mr Maritz.

It was not important to you? -- That the dogs were
murder - were poisoned? (30)

Yes/..

C3.377

- 672 -

COETZEE

Yes. -- If they decided to pull the job at the house, the
garage it would have been important, yes.

Now, you have already told the commission, I think this was
in your evidence-in-chief, that the whole story that Almond
Nofemela told about the part that he played in poisoning the meat
was utter nonsense. -- It must be if you look at - as I say I cannot
recollect him being present but looking at the evidence he has
given he has never seen strychnine in his life.

But now, you see, he gave us a very vivid description(10)
that you gave him too little meat and he pointed that out to you
and then you sent him out to buy and buy some more meat which he
went and did and he came back with the meat and in front of C.R.
Swart police station, in a bakkie, on the front
seat of a bakkie, you and he sat there and the two of you then
poisoned the meat. -- Ja, that is wrong.

That is nonsense? -- That is nonsense. I first thought that
it is possible that he could have gone and buy some more meat and
that I could have handed to him the poison possibly. When I saw
his evidence I knew it is impossible, he has (20) never seen
strychnine in his life.

Now, let us take this meeting place. -- This?

The meeting place.

CHAIRMAN: After the event?

MR MARITZ: After the event. Well, you were not present when the
murder was committed at all? -- No.

You can only say or tell us that which you were told later
on? -- That is correct.

Now, the meeting place, as I understand you, the meeting place was a bar in Durban. -- That is correct. (30)

And as I/..

C3.408

- 673 -

COETZEE

And as I recall your evidence-in-chief you gave rather a vivid description of where this bar was located. -- Yes.

Do you know where it is? -- I will find it for sure if I go there again. I do not know - the streets running west away from the beach, not near the beach, but I mean in the direction if one would move away from the beach on a fairly long corner, horseshoe corner. It has got a verandah in front with pillars and the doors more towards - if you come south/north around this long corner, the door of the bar is more towards the northern corner.

(10)

And I recollect that you also said it was on the shore. -- No.

Wasn't it? You could see the sea or something when you came up. -- No, no, what I said and meant was that if you would come out of the bar you would be facing the sea, not that you can see it and not that it was near the beach, but the bar front was facing towards the sea.

That is rather a cruel supposition and I appreciate this, but would you be able to go to that bar now. -- Direction - and get it for you, yes. (20)

Would you? -- Yes, I will.

I must say you have a remarkable memory. -- Sometimes, yes, Mr Maritz.

Very remarkable. At page 79 - yes, how far is this or was, I suppose still is, this bar from C.R. Swart police station? -- A few minutes' drive. I can really not indicate in kilometres how far, but a few minutes' drive from C.R. Swart.

Now, this meeting place, when was it arranged? -- It was

arranged beforehand. I do not know how long beforehand, but I have made stops there on previous occasions too to see (30)

whether/..

C3.441

- 674 -

COETZEE

whether the bakkie was there. I do not know how many nights before and how regular but usually - it would have been later during the night, the meeting times.

Well, I take it that before the murder was to have been committed, this planning must have taken place, the meeting place. -- That is correct.

Do you know how long before the murder was this done? -- No, I cannot recollect.

Possibly the same day? -- No, they have done surveillance previously, they poisoned the dogs previously. I do not (10) know how long after the dog poison did Mr Mxenge - was he killed, so it must have been done on the final preparations of poisoning the dogs.

The poisoning? -- Ja.

Yes, I want to read to you from 79 of the transcript. It is 96 of the old one, Mr Chairman. There you also spoke of this meeting place in the following terms:

"Ons het 'n ontmoetingspunt gehad waar ons hulle toe gesê het 'okay' ons sal julle tienuur of elfuur, ek kan nie die tye onthou nie, so elke uur (20) daar draai."

Right? -- It is right.

Is that correct? -- Yes.

You adhere to that? -- That is right.

"'Fok it' toe ek die aand, ek kan nou nie onthou hoe laat ek daar gekom het nie toe staan Joe met Mxenge se baadjie aan, sy horlosie aan sy arm, Mxenge se horlosie aan sy arm, die sleutels van die Audi is

in sy sak en 'n 'wallet'.

Hy staan toe daar met Mxenge se baadjie? -- Daar (30)

in Durban/..

C3.473

- 675 -

COETZEE

in Durban in 'n kroeg of iets. Ek kan nie die plek spesifiek onthou nie." -- If I have got the opportunity and I can go there I will find this place and I will point it to you, that is what I said now, isn't it? I cannot give street names, et cetera, but Mr Maritz I will take you to that place.

That is why I am saying, you have got a remarkable memory. -- Ja, you must - in the beginning I haven,t put my Mauritius story in context. I mean basically it is all about the murder. Basically it is about the bar. I stick to (10) the stories of the bar. We committed the murder. I mean basically it is exactly the same. Now, you want to play with small words and I have told you what my frame of mind was at that stage and that a lot of stuff came up after that once I started - relaxed and I have met with the people and I thought about it, more at ease and ..

CHAIRMAN: Yes but on that basis, Mr Coetzee, let me just put to you a possibility and that is I can also describe, maybe not a bar but in a hotel in Durban, with accuracy where I have stayed ten years ago or eight years ago or five years ago.(20) That I can also do, so to give me a description, a detailed description, it took you quite a few minutes, of the bar and then to have said earlier that you cannot remember the place and you thought it was a bar or something and not - it is quite a difference. -- I stick to it it was a bar. I could not at that time remember exactly where it is. I still won't be able to give addresses and I will be able to find it and it is an Indian place, it is a place where non-whites were allowed to drink at that time and it was not a bar that I drank frequently at and I can give you the place and

I am (30)

sure/..

C3.508

- 676 -

COETZEE

sure once I have pointed it out ..

I am sure there is such a place, that is not the point counsel makes.

MR MARITZ: Well, the further disturbing fact, Mr Coetzee, I must tell you, is that you are the only one who is sticking to this point. Nofemela and Spyker whom you are supposed to corroborate tell a totally different story. -- Yes, it is true but if I had the time to prepare them for this case in the same way that you could be prepared and can show them, refresh their memories, we would have all sing together like your (10) stories is corroborating now.

So you say that if you were in a position to orchestrate the whole thing you would have spoken .. -- (Speaking simul-taneously)

MR KUNY: With respect he did not say that. -- Just refresh their memory, had access to everything you have got access to, they would have been very reliable on the small nitty-gritties that you want from us now.

MR MARITZ: This is not a small nitty-gritty .. -- It is Mr Maritz. I stick to it it is a bar, I can describe it (20) to you and I am sure once they have seen it they will immediately recall it.

But how is that possible? They both say they drove directly to C.R. Swart? -- You are working with individuals on something that happened ten years ago, once in their lives. The Mxenge murder only happened once and there is a lapse of ten years and some incidents make a bigger impression in some people's minds than in other people. We could - three guys watch one incident and everyone will give you ...

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I do not think I need that kind of (30)

lecture.

MR MARITZ: Let us take another thing. -- Okay.

Which is just as startling. On that same page, 79 of the new transcript, after you had met Joe now, you said:

"Toe ek nou daar kom toe vat ek die baadjie .."

that is now Mxenge's coat -

"die horlosie, die 'wallet' en die sleutels en as ek reg onthou hulle skoene ook vir spore, alhoewel dit het gereën, ek kan nie dink dat dit daar sou ge-
doen het nie, maar dar is 'n 'possibility' dat ek (10)
die skoene sou gevat het totdat ek eers gehoor het watse spore is gelaat, maar dit het gereën daardie aand, redelik gereën, toe het ek hulle gelos daar waar hulle was en gesê hulle moet maar net saam met die ander voortgaan, net aangaan soos normaalweg."

Do you understand that? -- I understand it.

There was no mention of taking their clothes there in Mauritius. -- No, there was not and I did in fact took it.

Yes. You heard that Spyker told the story that their clothes were taken. -- No, no, thinking of it later, it is(20) obvious that I would have taken the clothes for in case some- one had seen them in the shirts and the clothes they had on.

No. -- Yes, Mr Maritz.

The inference is inescapable that you are adjusting your evidence to fit into that of Spyker. -- No, I am adjusting my evidence according to my memory.

All right, where did you plan this then? -- Plan which thing?

This taking of this clothes. -- Just before we - whilst we discussed the murder plan. (30)

So that/..

So that was an important facet of the plan. -- Yes, it was an important facet of the plan.

Now you never mentioned that before. -- No, I did not mention it before.

Even when I asked you here just now was the planning involved .. (speaking simultaneously) -- But you see, Mr Maritz, you want to make a big drama about the whole planning of this murder and it was not a big drama. It was short and sweet and the murder was committed. The clothes I took for identification purposes afterwards, if anyone saw them so (10) that there would be no clothes that they could identify.

What did you do with the clothes? -- I handed it back to them at a later stage after hearing that everything was okay and there were no traces and no witnesses.

That is incidentally exactly what Spyker said as well. Did you hear that as well? -- No.

That Spyker gave that evidence? -- No, I know that Almond said that they handed the clothes to me at the farm whilst we were back at Vlakplaas.

I do not think he ever said that, but I do not recall(20) that. -- You will see it in the record.

Now, let us come to the motor car, the Audi. Incidentally what happened to the bakkie that the gang were travelling with? -- Almond, Joe, Spyker and Brian?

Ja. -- They went back later that night to C.R. Swart Square to go and sleep.

You took no steps in regard to the bakkie? -- Not as far as I can remember.

Well, Spyker says in regard to that, I think it was Spyker, is that you instructed them to remove the canopy (30)

and to/..

and to remove the false number-plates that had been fitted to the bakkie to obviate identification of the bakkie. -- I cannot remember it but it is quite possible that I did.

MR ROBERTS: Mr Chairman, sorry, Nofemela said that Spyker was not sure about whether that ...

MR MARITZ: Oh, sorry, I was not sure. It was Nofemela who said that. -- I cannot remember it.

You do not recall that at all? -- No.

Now, then you told a story and you repeated it here, that you sent Paul van Dyk and Brigadier Jan du Preez's son, (10) what is his name? -- Braam du Preez.

Braam du Preez, off to Golela with the car. -- That is right.

Nofemela puts himself in the car with you. No, no, he does not. He says you drove the car and he went with you with your car to Golela. -- I have read ..

That same night. -- I have read the story. It is completely untrue.

This whole murder of Mxenge, it is a very simple story to tell, if one analysis it, not so? -- It is, yes. (20)

There is nothing startling about it. -- Nothing.

But on virtually every detail surrounding this murder, the three of you all differ from one another, how does one make that out? -- On small little detail that you want to bring in, but on the basic of the planning, the poisoning of the dogs, stabbing of Mxenge, taking his car away and burning it, except for Almond saying that he was with, is exactly the same.

In the end about all the three of you can say is, and you have thrown up your hands in desperation a few times (30)

during my/..

during my cross-examination .. -- May I just ...

Is that the murder was committed and that is it. That is about as far as the three of you can get. -- The murder was committed, I think there is proof to it and the car was burned and I think there is proof to that too.

All right. Now .. --- And I just want to put it to you, Mr Maritz, that I definitely did not plan that murder and made notes of it to one day come and stand in court and give evidence as to the fine nitty-gritties of exactly what we did and how it was planned. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Did you make notes at what time did you leave the bank in November in Port Louis? -- At what time did I leave the?

The bank in Port Louis. -- Yes, because I was late ...

You made a note? -- No, no, I did not make a note. I just knew that we were still in the bank at ten past two and I had to be at the airport at quarter to two.

And you also did not make a note of the number of drops you received? -- No, but I mean there is certain things in a person's life that you remember more clearly than other (20) things. I mean that is logic, isn't it, Mr Chairman.

MR MARITZ: Well, let me test your memory a bit further and see how you fare on these details. Tell us exactly what you did in regard to the Mxenge motor car? -- I have said already that I sent Braam and Paul van Dyk that night to Golela border post. I asked them to wait for me around about lunch time the next day outside Golela, in other words before the Golela turn off on the north coast road ...

It is not necessary to go into that detail. You arranged, you prearranged ... (30)

MR/..

C3.682

- 680 -

COETZEE

MR KUNY: May I interrupt? If my learned friend asks a question he cannot stop the witness in the middle of the answer. He must

give him an opportunity to answer the question he is asked.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but with all due deference to your point, Mr Kuny, I think if I allow the witness to answer in exactly the terms in which he wishes to, we won't finish this week.

MR KUNY: My learned friend must not invite the answer by putting the question over and over.

CHAIRMAN: What I think, Mr Maritz, ask more specific (10) questions and not generalised questions. In other words if you want to know what he did thereafter, it took three days, the witness is able to deal with it on the basis that it took three days. So be specific.

MR MARITZ: I will do so, Mr Chairman.

So, the day after the murder you drove to Golela. -- That is correct.

Do you recall when you arrived in Golela? -- Round about lunch time, I think, that afternoon.

Did you then meet Paul van Dyk and Braam du Preez? --(20) That is correct.

What did you do then? -- We also met up with a security guy based at Golela, Pine Pienaar, Frederick Pine Pienaar - I think he was a sergeant or a warrant at that stage - and I cannot remember whether we first went to hide Mxenge's car in the empty house, police house's garage at Golela and then went back to the river, the big river that you cross just before the turnoff to Golela where we burned his jacket and wallet and threw the watch into the river together with the false number-plates.

(30)

And the knives/..

C3.720

- 681 -

COETZEE

And the knives? -- The knives, I cannot recollect. The hunting-knife went back to Koos Schutte in the end. The knives could be thrown into the river too there. I cannot remember.

Yes, and then? -- And then we went back to Pretoria and I met up with Brigadier Jan du Preez ..

Hang on, before you carry on, what time did you arrive in Pretoria, more or less? -- No, I cannot remember.

Was it on the same day? -- It must have been during that same night, the Friday night. (10)

The Friday night? -- Yes.

So then you are back in Pretoria? -- That is correct.

And then you met up with .. -- Brigadier Jan du Preez, Saturday morning, at his small holding.

You did not see anybody on the Friday night? -- No.

So, did you drive to Brigadier Du Preez's small holding the next morning? -- That is correct.

What happened then? -- I suggested that we swop the car with the car of Koevoet at Brigadier Hans Dreyer in Namibia and he immediately said that the car should be burned. (20)

Yes. -- So I went home and on the Sunday after lunch myself, Koos Schutte, from the farm, Warrant Officer Paul van Dyk, and we picked up Captain Koos Vermeulen at Bronkhorst-spruit, we went down, fetched Mxenge's car at Golela, took it to a spot just south of Houtkop border post, Bothashoop - Bothashoop, sorry - in the plantation, a regular known crossing point according to them of ANC comrades coming in and leaving the country and there the car as set alight.

That was .. -- On the Sunday night.

Sunday night. -- That is right. (30)

Do you/..

C3.762

- 682 -

COETZEE

Do you remember the time? -- It must have been well after twelve that we set the car alight and I know we have put in petrol at Piet Retief police station.

You were quite explicit in your evidence-in-chief. You said

it was 03h00. -- Yes. Well after twelve, I have said so.

No, you did not say after twelve, you said 03h00. -- Okay, 03h00.

So, when you gave evidence-in-chief you remembered that detail? -- Yes.

MR KUNY: We believe, Mr Chairman, that in his evidence-in-(10) chief he said between twelve and three. We are just looking for the passage.

MR MARITZ: Unfortunately we do not have a record. I am speaking from my notes. My note reads that it was 03h00.

MR KUNY: And somewhere else he said after 24h00.

MR MARITZ: How long does it take a car to burn out? -- I do not know at all. I don't know.

Well, you have burned so many cars that one would expect you to know. -- But I never sit next to it like with the body burnings having a braai and a few beers to check exactly (20) how long it takes. We immediately left the scene to get out of the way.

Let me read to you what you said at Mauritius about this story. At page 80 of the new transcript ...

CHAIRMAN: According - Mr Kuny, just to get back to your previous complaint, in chief he said "We set the car alight about 3 a.m. the night".

MR MARITZ: Thank you, Mr Chairman, my notes accords with that.

MR KUNY: My junior had a note about after twelve. I do (30) not know/..

C4.5

- 683 -

COETZEE

not know whether that was chief or cross-examination.

MR ROBERTS: Mr Chairman, sorry to complicate the issue I have got a note also that he must have burned it between twelve and 03h00, also in chief.

MR KUNY: I think it proves the point the witness was trying to make earlier. -- I think that makes my point of how four people

see one thing differently.

CHAIRMAN: The problem we have, I think, is that we have heard more or less the same evidence from more than one witness more than once and every time or quite often with slight (10) differences, but to attempt to recall that detail I think is not that easy.

MR MARITZ: And then there is also another vast difference, Mr Coetzee, you say that you experienced all these things, we have just got to listen to your story and that is the great difference. Now, at page 80 of the new transcript, 97 of the old one, Mr Chairman, there you told the story of Jan du Preez and Van Dyk taking the car to Golela and then you reported back to Van der Hoven early the morning as you have already said in your evidence-in-chief as well. -- Van der Hoven? (20)

Yes. The day after the murder. -- No, I report that night, oh ja, ja, that is right. Before I left for Golela.

Well, I thought that is what you said. -- Ja, before I left for Golela.

And here you said it too. -- Ja, ja.

You said:

"Die volgende môre het ek terugrapporteer weer by Van der Hoven en toe sê hy Mxenge se vrou het hom al gesoek" -- That is correct.

And then you spoke about the body that was at Umlazi (30) stadium/..

C4.30

- 684 -

COETZEE

stadium and then you told the story of the breakdown and so on and what they had told you and then at page 82 you say:

"Ek is toe met my Datsun en Spyker op Golela-grenspos toe met die Noordkusp pad langs en het Spyker op Empangeni afgelaai by 'n 'nyatsi' wat hy daar gehad het, 'n meisie."

You have already corrected that. -- Yes.

I am not going to trouble you with that again. -- Thank you.

It is page 99, Mr Chairman. (10)

"Ek het toe vir Paul en Braam du Preez, die konstabeltjie, net buite Golela se afdraaipad gekry. Van daar af het ons die kar eers .."

And then you said "Sy kar is al die vorige aand saam met Paul van Dyk" and then you repeated that after a question from Pauw because he could not understand you -

"Nee, Paul van Dyk en die konstabeltjie as passasier.

Ek het hulle toe die volgende dag daar gekry."

So, that is now the day after the murder. -- That is right.

"Jy sien, dit is hier waar Almond lyk my 'n 'link' (20)

probeer vind met die karstorie wat hy eintlik nie by was nie."

So then already you knew that Almond had told a different story.

-- That is right.

"Toe het ek hulle die volgende môre daar gekry, toe het ons die kar in 'n leë huis, 'n polisiehuis, 'n garage, op Golela-grenspos, een van die grenspos-huise wat leeg gestaan het, se garage gaan toemaak en eers opgekom Pretoria toe om by Brigadier Schoon te hoor wat nou gedoen moet word met die kar. Schoon (30)

se eerste/..

C4.50

- 685 -

COET;ZEE

se eerste woorde aan my was toe ek by hom instap het julle spore gelaat. Wat hy meen by spore natuurlik is bewysstukke."

Now, please explain that to me. -- Ja, that happened on the Monday morning as I said in evidence-in-chief. Saturday I went to Brigadier Jan du Preez and on Monday morning upon returnd, walking into Schoon's office that was his first words, so obviously I was

confused with the facts there.

Now, when did you find out that you were confused with the facts there? -- Ag shortly after I have met my so- (10) called enemy and I was in a more relaxed state and I knew where I was going to and I could think about it more clearly and I knew the South African police cannot catch up with me any more, et cetera, et cetera.

Then you carry on. "Waar ek hom net gesê het", that is now Schoon -

"Waar ek hom net gesê het dit het gereën ek glo nie.

Toe het brigadier Jan opdrag gegee dat die kar gebrand moet word, want ek het voorgestel ons stuur hom op om op Oshakati toe na brigadier Hans Dreyer toe vir hom (20) weer in 'exchange' vir 'n Askari-kar hierdie kant vir ons jy weet wat hulle weer daarbo steel en tekere gaan, toe sê hy nee, hy moet verbrand word."

Is that right? -- Hm.

"Toe is ons die volgende aand af." Now, which "volgende aand" was that? -- Ja, obviously I mean the Sunday night.

That is not what you said. -- Well, that is what you can check and prove, that my car has put in petrol at Piet Retief police station on Sunday night very late. I know that is not what I said there, but I said now on several occasions (30)

what was/..

C4.72

- 686 -

COETZEE

what was my state of mind at Mauritius.

Ja, you repeated that:

"Toe is ons die volgende aand af Golela toe. Ek, Paul van Dyk, ou Koos Vermeulen"

and so on and then you go and tell the story of how you burned the car. -- Yes.

The problem was with that story that you were a day short.

-- I was a day short?

Yes. -- In what regard?

According to this story you told at Mauritius this (10) car must have been burned on the Sunday. -- According to the Mauritius story, yes.

That is right. -- That is right.

Do you know that? -- Yes.

That is a day short. -- Ja.

Because subsequently to having told this story at Mauritius you found out the true facts, namely that the car was in fact burned on the Monday. -- No, no, no, long before the start at - the only evidence that I had to the car burning which I could refresh my memory from, was Almond Nofe- (20) mela's one and that was completely wrong.

Ja, you had no way of knowing that there was objective evidence of the fact that the car was in fact burned on the Monday, when you told this story at Mauritius? -- No, I had it. If I just had time to sit down and think about it clearly like everything in context I would have told it exactly how it is and that is how I have spelt it now and as I say go and check the petrol book at - it will still be there at Piet Retief. I am not talking about log-books now, and you will find out that petrol was put in. You will see that (30)

Schutte/..

C4.90

- 687 -

COETZEE

Schutte claimed S&T for that night. You will see that Koos Vermeulen claimed S&T for that night and we only arrived back in Pretoria on the Monday, the 23rd, according to our S&T, so we also claimed S&T for that period.

Well, I must put it to you, Mr Coetzee, and I am going to argue this, in all fairness to you - because I am going to argue it I must say this, this is just another case of where you adjusted

your your evidence to fit in with the facts. -- Not at all.

Now, even your attempt at adjusting your evidence (10)
does not succeed and I will tell you why. You say that the car
was set alight on the Sunday night between 24h00 and 03h00 in the
morning. -- That is right.

Now, this place where the car was burned, that is in a forest
area. -- That is right.

And those farmers there farm with I think pine forests. --
That is right.

And that is decidedly a fire hazard area. -- That is right.

And I suppose having known that area quite well I (20)
suppose you would have known that the one thing that terrifies
a forester more than anything else on earth is a fire. -- That
is correct.

They take the greatest precautions in preventing fire. --
That is correct.

Now, at the - I am sorry, Mr Chairman, can I beg a short
adjournment, please. I have got something in my throat.

(Discussions follows.)

COMMISSION ADJOURNS.

COMMISSION RESUMES.

(30)

DIRK/..

C5

- 688 -

COETZEE

DIRK COETZEE still under oath:

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: I wanted to refer you to
the evidence that was given by a certain Mr Potgieter at the inquest
which was held into the death of the late Mr Mxenge. It is
contained in book 3 of the evidence or of the record at page 395
where he said the following:

"Ek was op Atalia, Bothashoop in diens van Hunt,
Leaches en Hepburn, die houtmense. Ek bly op 'n
plaas daar. Op 1981-11-23 om plus-minus 11h00 was

ek in die plantasie om te werk. Ek stap toe uit (10)
waar ek gewerk het en sien toe rook en is toe direk
soontoe, want ek het gedink dit is 'n bosbrand, want
daar was 'n donker rokie en ek het direk soontoe gery
en gesien dit is 'n voertuig wat brand. Ek kon nie sien
hoe lyk die voertuig nie, toe ek daar kom was die kar in
vlamme. Dit het toe nog gebrand. Daar is vier paaie
wat na die voertuig toe gaan, die wrak is nog daar. Dit
was van die pad af, ek wonder of dit 15 treë is. Die
gras was kort en baie groen en het nie gebrand nie. Ek
het niemand in die omgewing gesien nie. Daar het nie-(20)
mand aangekom nie. Toe ek weggaan toe kom 'n voormalige
werknemer van my, Witvoet Dlamini, daar aan. Hy was
een van my vier boswagters. Ons was nie naby die kar
nie weens die hitte. Ons het teruggery."

Now, I also want to refer you to cross-examination of that witness
by Mr Skweyiya who is present here in the commission at page 399
the question was asked:

"How far from the car were you when you saw
the smoke? -- Plus-minus two kilometres.

Burning fiercely, lots of smoke? -- Very (30)

thick/..

C5.29

- 689 -

COETZEE

thick smoke, a very big fire."

Nou, die vraag wat by my ontstaan ...

CHAIRMAN: I think the witness wants to speak English.

MR MARITZ: Oh, I am sorry. I apologise. The question that
arises here is the following: The impression that I gain from
the evidence of Potgieter taken together with the fact that shortly
after he arrived on the scene one of his, what he calls a boswagter,
arrived there as well, his name was Wit- voet, a man specifically
appointed to the job of looking for veld fires, et cetera. The

impression that I gain is that(10) this was a fresh fire that they saw. From what I have read to you don't you agree with that impression? -- No, not at all. That car was set alight in the early morning hours ...

CHAIRMAN: No, no, the question is.. -- No, I do not agree.

No, no, listen, the question is that the impression from what the witnesses say, not what you say, is that this car was then more or less put alight. -- Just put alight.

Yes, that is what those witnesses suggest, do you agree with that? -- I agree with that.

MR MARITZ: Now, if your version is correct, and let us (20) take it at 03h00 in the morning, at the latest when this car was set alight, there are four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven - eight hours that this car must have been burn- ing. -- If their version is correct, that is right, and mine.

Do you have any reason to suggest that these people were committing perjury when they testified at the inquest? -- The feedback, yes, I do - the feedback I got that the car was still smouldering when they arrived there. That car was set alight in the early morning hours during Sunday, Monday morn- ing and it will be worthwhile, I think, to get that (30)

witnesses/..

C5.55

- 690 -

COETZEE

witnesses back to the box to exactly, ascertain from them how high these flames were and how far from the car and what was keeping them from the car so far.

Do I understand you correct, and I do not want to be un- fair to you, but do I understand you correctly to say that to have your story fit these people were perjuring themselves at the inquest? -- I will rather put it this way, it is misleading, their evidence, except if a car can burn for eight, nine hours, then it is possible, yes.

As fiercely as what they say? -- As fiercely as (10)
that.

That they could not even approach the car. -- That is right.

Now, the last matter which does bother me tremendously, it is just another piece of the puzzle in your story which does not fit and that is this: According to Braam du Preez's worksheet he returned to Pretoria from Durban on 17 November. -- Can I have a look at that worksheet, please?

(Somebody asks what the exhibit number is.)

That is J.A. du Preez. It is released in B99 at (20)
page 14, pages 14 and 15, and if you will just turn one page on you will get the S&T record as well. The "werkskaart" is at page 14 and the S&T record at page 15. -- Mr Maritz, can you just - we have been working with the worksheets all this time, what is this official SAP number of this worksheet? I mean, all police forms have got an official SAP number.

CHAIRMAN: No, but just look on the next page. I think you will see - is that the document? Page 49, 015 and 014. -- I am looking at 0014, "die werkskaart".

Ja, I do not know what it is. -- So, is there no (30)
official/..

C5.96 - 691 - COETZEE
official number? I just want to refer to it as an official document.

MR MARITZ: Look, I have told you before I am not here to answer your questions, but Mr Du Preez himself has identified these signatures which you see in the extreme right-hand column, those that appear there are his. He signed for that money. -- So, he left on 4 November.

That is right, and he returned to Vlakplaas at 08h00 in the morning of 17 November 1981. -- So that gives us thirteen full

days.

(10)

That is right. -- Okay. Can we just start right at the beginning of that "werkskaart"? I just want to point out something to the commission. Where he left Vlakplaas on 18/8 until 28/8 from 08h00 to 08h00, is that correct? The very first entry.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARITZ: Carry on, Mr Coetzee. -- That gives us ten days which gives you R26,50 per day S&T. So, what I actually want to put forward is that the chaps receives R26,50 per day S&T, so if Braam left - was in Durban from 4 November until (20) 17 November, gives me thirteen days times R26,50 - can some-one help me perhaps with a calculator? R344,50. It looks to me that he was paid R292,50 who suggests to me that there is something wrong here, that Braam signed for less money that he should have received and that it slipped the auditor's eye and I do not know what else, so it looks to me like a forgery.

So, you are suggesting that this is a forgery? -- Well, I mean - I have just explained that Braam receives R26,50 per day S&T, if you look at the foregoing entreses(?), that he was in Durban from the 4th until the 17th, that gives me (30)

thirteen/..

C5.124

- 692 -

COETZEE

thirteen days times R26,50 and that gives me R344,50 and on both sheets it is indicated as R292,50 and on number 49 too. So, it must have slipped a lot of people's eyes, the auditor, Braam du Preez signed for less that money and he was happy with that.

So, then he must have taken far less than he was entitled to? -- Ja. I want to put to you that it is not true, Braam was in Durban until the Thursday Mxenge was murdered and he left with Mxenge's car. What they were trying to do here, and that is why I was asking whether I could perhaps get (20) the official SAP form number of this "werkskaart".

CHAIRMAN: How does that assist? -- It will assist in future.

Now, I am not concerned in future, how does it assist your evidence? -- No, it assists me in this way, it is funny to me that this "werkskaart" which is not an official form, was kept for eleven years and not strictly destroyed ..

But you have made that point so often. -- Okay, sir.

And the SAP number will also assist to establish that point. -- But it is not ...

The document was - is signed in the original. I (20) mean there are which were signed by Mr Nofemela and by Mr Tshikalange and they admitted it was their signature, so the document existed. The fact that they have not been destroyed, I do not know what the significance is. -- Well, to me as a policeman it is very funny that they ..

Well, it may be funny, but what is the significance in the totality of the case? As a policeman. -- As a policeman I would have rather kept the log-sheets ...

But that is irrelevant. What is the significance of the fact that these documents have been kept? It is a (30) completely/..

C5.149

- 693 -

COETZEE

completely different question, whether the logs have been kept. -- I am sure according to standing order stores these things also would have - must have been destroyed long ago.

Well, they have not been destroyed or do you say they have been destroyed? -- No, no, they have not been destroyed.

Oh, fine, they have not been, so what is your point? -- No, I cannot ...

Nor do I. Thank you. Carry on.

MR MARITZ: Well, irrespective of how the thing is calculated, I do not know whether he was on one scale at the one time (10) or another scale at another time or whatever the situation was,

the fact of the matter is that he signed this document which reflects that he was away from 4 November to 17 November. Right?

--- Ja, that is right.

The salient point is this, it is another piece of evidence which does not fit your story. -- It is not a piece of evidence.

That evidence - a man's S&T can never reduce. It can increase but never reduce and he was in Durban on 20 November, I can assure you that.

So, you are forced to the conclusion that this docu- (20)
ment must then have been falsified. -- In some way or another,
that is correct.

And why would it then have been falsified? -- To fit in with your client's story and not mine.

CHAIRMAN: But are you saying it has now been falsified or in 19
.. -- I cannot say when, I do not know. It just does not fit in
with their story that he has been there for thirteen days and the
amount of S&T received for thirteen days.

MR MARITZ: Well, it is the first time that you have gone to the
extent of saying that these documents have been (30)
falsified/..

C5.169

- 694 -

COETZEE

falsified. -- No, I have pointed out that Koos Vermeulen's one
is Western Transvaal whilst he should have been down in Durban
with me, sleeping in the room next to me during that same period.

CHAIRMAN: But you said for purposes of this case or for purposes
of this hearing they were falsified. -- Well, this specific entry,
yes.

But an entry could not - then the whole document must have
been falsified. You could not have falsified the entry without
writing out a new document. -- Okay, Mr Chairman, (10) then that
is the case.

MR MARITZ: So, what you are then in effect saying that only in

the case of young Braam du Preez the documents were falsified to hide the fact that he took the car to Golela on 19 November? -- I can draw no other conclusion, yes.

But in respect of all the other participants the documents were not falsified? -- No, but you must remember you are busy building up a small parcel out of small pieces and this one small piece would just fit in nicely with the rest of the story.

(20)

No, my problem is that none of the piece of your puzzle fit. -- Well, I am afraid this one of yours also not.

That is right, it does not fit.

MR ROBERTS: Mr Chairman, sorry, perhaps I can just throw some light on this point that Mr Maritz is busy with at the moment. If you look at the second part of the document which comes out of a register, we have got the originals back at the offices of the commission in Pretoria and these are copied from them. They are bound in the original official book with a SAP number.

(30)

CHAIRMAN/..

C5.188

- 695 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: They are bound in a book?

MR ROBERTS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN: Now, what do you say now, Mr Coetzee? -- The amounts just not correspond.

No, no, your allegation that these things have been falsified. -- I stick to it, Mr Chairman.

But if they are in a bound book, how do you explain that? -- Well, Sir, this Mr Beeslaar, I think it is Mr Beeslaar that has made them out, Warrant Officer Beeslaar, and he is in Vlakplaas, since he has left that section, and the woman (10) that worked with these worksheets at that time is still in section three.

Anything else, Mr Coetzee? -- No, no, no.

I thought you were thinking. Yes, Mr Maritz?

MR MARITZ: Now, in regard to this "kopgeld" we have it from Nofemela that he received "kopgeld" on more than one occasion. -- It is possible after my time, yes.

After your time? -- Yes.

You only paid him "kopgeld" once? -- That is right.

But he will have it otherwise. He says at page 463 (20) of the record of proceedings before this commission that after the Botswana operation you paid him "kopgeld" as well. -- No, not at all. It is not true.

In regard to this "kopgeld" business, there is no way of finding out whether it was in fact paid or not? -- Nofemela's Botswana one?

Well, any "kopgeld" for that matter. -- No, you will find to trace is difficult. The Mxenge ones were said to be drawn against the Koevoet account in Namibia but I do not know whether that in fact happened, and it was handed to me in (30)

cash/..

C5.225

- 696 -

COETZEE

cash. I did not sign for it and I handed it over to Nofemela again in cash.

I am not quite sure what you said about this "kopgeld". Who organised the "kopgeld"? -- Brigadier Jan du Preez.

And how did he organise that? -- He said against Koevoet's account he will ask for Brigadier Dreyer to put in a claim against the security fund and in that way obtain R3 000. Oh, I see. Well, anyhow, in that regard I can only say to you that those people that you try to involve in the "kopgeld" story just deny this. They say it is nonsense. (10)

-- Ja.

There is no such thing. -- Yes.

I think I have just about dealt with all the major aspects

of your evidence. There are a couple of loose ends here. The story of the hippies, do you remember you told us the story of the Volkswagen and .. -- At Rhodes.

And a truck or something that you wanted to burn of the hippies. -- That is correct.

Was that at Rhodes? -- That is right.

Is that in the Eastern Cape? -- It is near Barkly (20) East. I do not know whether you would see that as the Eastern Cape.

What did these hippies have to do with the security of the country? -- Well, that you must ask to the Aliwal North commander of security. There was a docket officially opened and the district CID officer of Aliwal North personally attended to this case.

CHAIRMAN: No, that was after the burning of the car. The CID at Aliwal North attended to the matter after the burning. -- That is right. (30)

That is/..

C5.251

- 697 -

COETZEE

That is not what Mr Maritz asked you. He asked you why were the cars burned of the hippies. It has got nothing to do with the investigation after the event. -- The instructions from the regional commander in Aliwal North.

MR MARITZ: The point is why, why burn their cars? They are a bunch of hippies, why do you want to burn their cars? -- According to him they were a bunch of leftist hippies staying in Rhodes and they wanted them out of there.

So, just to frighten the hippies away they asked you to come and burn their cars? -- That is correct. (10)

Because you were the big hitman of the SAP. -- If you want to see it that way, yes.

CHAIRMAN: How do you see it? -- No, I do not see it that way at all.

Who was the big hitman of the SAP? -- The whole security

establishment was involved and as I say at Vlakplaas during an operation when there were so-called hit operations, members were selected and I usually led that specific squad.

MR MARITZ: So, the moment you were available you led the squad.

-- If it was a Vlakplaas involvement, yes. (20)

And it became a Vlakplaas involvement because you were asked to go and burn these cars? -- That is correct.

But you do not know why you were involved in burning the cars other than the fact that you were involved? -- No, it was said it is a lot of leftist hippies that they wanted out of there.

But I do not understand, why couldn't they have done this themselves? Why bring you, a complete stranger, a man from Vlakplaas, into it? -- It was done that way. I cannot explain it unfortunately. (30)

CHAIRMAN/..

C5.277

- 698 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: Could I just ask you this because I may have a wrong impression, I see Mr Pauw reported quoting you "Ek was die bevelvoerder van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie se moord- bende. Ek en my manskappe moes politiek- en veiligheidsteen-standers vermoor en elimineer". Is that a true statement? -- No, to the effect of the Vlakplaas ..

It is not a true statement? -- It is not a true statement.

Well, it is provided as a quote from what you said.

It is also untrue that "My groep het uiteindelik die kern (10) van die veiligheidspolisie se moordbende gevorm"? -- As it stands there, yes, untrue.

And is it also untrue "Vlakplaas, die hoofkwartier van die moordbende"? -- As it stands there, yes.

It is also untrue? -- Yes.

MR MARITZ: Incidentally - I am just waiting for my junior to give me the relevant record, but I can tell you this in the meantime,

I have checked it, at page 163 of the record, and I think he was being examined by Mr Roberts at that time Nofemela was asked about the three months stint in the (20) Eastern Cape as reflected in the worksheets and there he confirmed that the Vlakplaas, the whole Vlakplaas contingent was in the Eastern Cape for that three month period as reflected on the ..

CHAIRMAN: It is not three months.

MR MARITZ: Well, more or less three months.

CHAIRMAN: No, it is not. It is August to September.

MR MARITZ: No, right into October, Mr Chairman .

CHAIRMAN: There was a separate instance in October, yes.

MR MARITZ: Ja, there is a short break of a few days and (30)
then it/..

C5.309

- 699 -

COETZEE

then it runs virtually to the end of October. It is at page 163.

Can I read it to you. The question was asked:

"You and Dirk Coetzee and Tshikalange stayed for three months in Lady Grey? -- With other group as well.

Yes, but he and you too. -- That is correct.

And during that period you burned the farmer's ..

-- That is correct.

And you have burned a so-called activist or tried to burn his car. -- That is correct. (10)

Was it the same time? -- That is correct.

You did not travel back? -- No, no."

What do you say about that evidence? -- It is not correct. We have travelled all over. We did not stay in Lady Grey for three months.

And you took Nofemela along with you in your travels? -- On some of the occasions he was with me, yes.

Now, in regard to this theft of the Combi, you say that when

you got the kombi back to the farm the moment you opened the engine compartment there was the dagga lying. -- Open, (20) openly.

What kind of dagga was it that you saw there? -- It was in paper, turned up in paper and a little bit longer than the, about that thick.

CHAIRMAN: Is that what was called in ordinary police bonds as a "vinger dagga" or an "arm dagga" or what? -- An arm is a little bit thicker.

Oh, is it a "vinger"? -- It is a little bit more than a finger.

No, I do not ask its exact size. -- Oh. (30)

But/..

C5.336

- 700 -

COETZEE

But dagga dealers - or don't you know that? -- Ja, I do not know what they exactly call it.

I am surprised as an experienced policeman that you do not know what is the difference between an arm of dagga and a finger of dagga. -- Well, I see the size of a finger meaning a cigarette that they also could call a zol, but it was thicker than that and longer than that, more like a long cigar. I do not know what reference do they have to that size.

MR MARITZ: I must say your evidence now also surprises me because you spent some time with Sanab, didn't you? -- (10) I did.

How long were you in Sanab? -- Eight months.

So you would know what the difference is between an arm and a finger and a zol? -- I have just explained that a finger and a zol is exactly the same and that was more than a finger and a zol but it was definitely not the length and thick of an arm.

But anyhow, the moment you opened the engine compartment you found this dagga? -- That is correct.

So, once again it appears as if it was case of those (20) at Queenstown having been totally inept in executing their duties. -- Hundred percent correct.

They did not think of the obvious thing of opening up the engine compartment? -- That is obviously.

Everybody around you is inept, those people too, but now listen to what Nofemela says about this kombi. You implicate him in the theft of the kombi, don't you? -- That is right.

He went with you. -- I said so, ja.

And he was the man who was supposed to have stolen the kombi. -- Yes, and he denied it. (30)

But then/..

C5.358

- 701 -

COETZEE

But then Koos Vermeulen says no, look man, I am dying to steal this kombi, allow me to do it. -- That is right.

Right? -- That is correct.

Now, listen to what Nofemela says at 499, at the bottom of the page and it is the honourable chairman that asked him this:

"You referred just before lunch to the theft of a kombi in Johannesburg, do you remember? -- I remember.

Did Dirk Coetzee steal that kombi? -- That is what(10) he said to me.

Private enterprise? -- No, he did not mention that.

He did not mention the purpose for the theft? -- No.

But he has told you that he stole the kombi? -- That is correct." -- I have read it.

He disinvolved himself in the stealing of the kombi. -- I have seen that, yes.

Do you have any explanation why he would have done that? -- No, I do not know at all. (20)

But you say your evidence is correct? -- That is correct.

He was present? -- He was present.

And now the reason for the theft of the kombi was to prevent

these delegates from the union to reach Harare. -- That is right.

But that did not work either, because in fact they did go to the meeting. -- Well that I won't know.

So, it is just another case of your plans going awry. -- It was not my plans originally. It was coming from Port Elizabeth.

I just assisted. (30)

CHAIRMAN/..

C5.387

- 702 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: Your plan was to prevent them - you received the instruction to prevent them from reaching Harare. -- That is right.

And counsel says that did not succeed. -- Ja, and I agreed.

MR MARITZ: Then you went and sold this kombi somewhere in Swaziland. -- That is correct.

How did you go about that? -- Contacted a Portuguese guy in Swaziland.

Who was he? -- I have mentioned his name. Arnaldo Santos. (10)

Arnaldo Santos. -- That is right. At that time working at Matsapa Motors with Mario Loupez.

Did you know him as a car thief? -- Well, I have known him for quite a while whilst I was at the Swazi border, wheeler and dealer.

CHAIRMAN: No, the question was did you know him as a car thief? -- I know that they were involved in bringing stealing cars from overseas into the country, yes.

MR MARITZ: Was that while you were still at Oshoek that you have learned that? -- Shortly I have left I think with the Lockwood incident thereafter. (20)

Then you learned of their smuggling activities. -- That is right,.

And when you had this kombi to sell he was the obvious man

to go to? -- That is right.

And then he sold the kombi on your behalf? -- No, he bought it.

He bought it? -- Yes.

For R7 000 I think you said. -- That is right. (30)

And that/..

C5.407

- 703 -

COETZEE

And that money you were supposed to have paid over to Brigadier Van Rensburg. -- That is correct.

Well, I must tell you once again that Brigadier Van Rensburg says that is the biggest lot of nonsense he has heard in his life. -- That is the only thing he can do, Mr Maritz.

Now, Ace Moema, the man who left Vlakplaas, when did he leave Vlakplaas? -- He did not leave Vlakplaas. He was disposed of by Koos Vermeulen. I was not present. This is what Koos Vermeulen reported to me.

When did he tell you that? -- Shortly after he dis- (10)
posed of him.

Was that while you were still at Vlakplaas? -- It was while I was still at Vlakplaas.

Not after that? -- No, for sure not. It was just before the Mnisi brothers and Ben Lucky Zwane ran away.

When did the Mnisi brothers and Ben Lucky Zwane run away? -- During my time at Vlakplaas.

When during your time in Vlakplaas? -- It must have been towards the second half of 1981.

Now, if I tell you that that Ace Moema left Vlak- (20)
plaas on 16 February 1982 - no, let me rephrase it. If I tell you that Ace Moema went - no, a different word. Let me just say that he left on 16 February 1982, can you dispute that? -- I dispute it. That time he was long not more alive.

Are you sure? -- Yes.

CHAIRMAN: So you say he was dead on 16 February 1982? He was dead before 16 February? -- Yes.

MR MARITZ: Do you know when he arrived at Vlakplaas? -- It was also - he was not there very long, but it was shortly before the time that we were operating on the Lesotho (30)

border/..

C5.452

- 704 -

COETZEE

border near Ladybrand. During the time at Lesotho he was with my squad with Almond and myself.

Well, according to my instructions he was released from detention on 7 October 1981 and then he was attached to section C1 at Vlakplaas from that date onwards. 7 October 1981. -- It sounds possible, yes.

Now you say that he was murdered before you left? -- That is correct.

Why would he have been murdered? -- He was not fully with, as you could sense that Mohema was on his way back. (10)

How could you sense that? -- Easily. You know the Askari's, when they are spontaneously falling in with the rest of the group and when they are withholding.

Did you discuss this with Koos Vermeulen? -- Yes, I did and with Brigadier Schoon.

And did the three of you then decide that you are going to get rid of the man? -- No, Koos decided to get rid of that man in conjunction with Brigadier Schoon. I was not involved in that.

You had no part in it? -- No, not at all. (20)

Nothing whatsoever? -- Nothing.

Even though you were the commander of Vlakplaas? -- That is correct.

Schoon and Koos Vermeulen acted behind your back. -- No, I knew very well that Koos was on his way to take Mohema out.

But anyhow, I have a report here which was filed by Koos

Vermeulen. It is dated 2 March 1982 and it reads as follows:

"Op Maandag, 15 Februarie 1982, het die bovermelde
opgeleide ANC-terroris .."

referring to Isaac Mohema -

(30)

"en ek/..

C5.491

- 705 -

COETZEE

"en ek ondersoek gedoen na die opsporing van
moontlik teruggekeerde terroriste na die RSA.
Gedurende die nag van 15 en 16 Februarie 1982
het die onderwerp en ek ongeveer tien tot vyf-
tien kilometer vanaf die Mosambiek-grens waar
moontlike kruising kan plaasvind, in die veld
geslaap. Die oggend van 16 Februarie 1982 om
ongeveer 04h30 het ek wakker geword en gevind
dat Isaac nie in sy slaapsak is nie. Ek het
dadelik begin soek, maar kon sy spoor slegs
vir ongeveer 20 meter volg waar ek dit toe ver-
loor het en ek my soektog gestaak het. Dit word
aanbeveel dat die besonderhede van die onderwerp
teruggeplaas word op indeks asook in die foto-
album." -- Dit klink vir my omtrent na net so 'n storie soos
wat ek oor Vusi gemaak het.

(10)

You say that this is a falsification. -- Yes, for sure.

Even as to the date? -- Yes, for sure. I think Koos must
have had him slips signed too if there is any informant re- ceipts
exactly in the same way that we did with Vusi. (20)

But then you see I fail to understand your logic, if there
is any logic in what you say. You referred to this man Ace Moema
earlier as one called Chris. -- Yes, I was not sure of the name,
that is right.

So you gave him a name Chris. -- Yes. That was at Mauritius.
Now, at page 165 of the transcript of the conversation that

you had with Jacques Pauw, page 201 in the old one, Mr Chairman.

At 165 you said the following:

"Op die plaas het 'n ou aangekom, as ek sy gesig (30)

weer sien/..

C5.529

- 706 -

COETZEE

weer sien sal ek hom herken, ek dink dit was 'n
Chris, hy was so 'n stil teruggetrokke ou, maar ..

'n Swartman? -- Ja, ja, 'n terrie. Jy kon sien
hy was 'n intelligente donder, nou het hy nooit so
spontaan ingeval soos die ander nie en Koos Ver-
meulen het hom in die Nelspruit/Komatipoort-omgewing
het hy van hom ontslae geraak. Koos is net een aand
met hom glo weg. Ek was nie by nie, en teruggekom en
hy is nooit weer gesien nie. Soos ek sê sy gesig en
hy was natuurlik op dieselfde wyse maar as die (10)
Komatipoort-ouens soos Koos sê geskiet en verbrand.

En dit is nou die Chris? -- Ek dink sy naam is
Chris. Hulle sal weet.

Het hy op die plaas aangekom as 'n gevangene of
wat? -- As 'n - jaa, as 'n terroris wat saamwerk nou.
Hy is nou in die groep, maar jy kon sien hy was
intelligenter as die ander, altyd stil.

Wie het hom geëlimineer? -- Koos Vermeulen.

Hoe weet jy dit? -- Koos het vir my gesê. O! ja
en toe later terwyl ek by werwinghoofkantoor ... (20)

Wag nou, hoe is hy geëlimineer? -- Wel, met
skiet en brand, ook druppels natuurlik eers inge-
kry.

So, dit is nou daardie hele ding van eers drup-
pels, dan skiet, dan brand? -- Ja, dis hy. Terwyl ek
op werwingshoofkantoor was .."

And then you carry on with a different story. -- Of Vusi, yes.

So there you told it totally as a hearsay story. -- From Koos directly, that is right.

Now, is there any, any substance or proof or (30)
objective/..

C5.559

- 707 -

COETZEE

objective fact or whatever you wish to call it, that you can offer that this man was supposed to have disappeared before 31 December 1981? -- Except for what Koos told me. Never there- after he was on the farm again and never thereafter he was anywhere - seen anywhere in the world again. He just dis- appeared from the surface of the earth.

Okay, so what you are basically saying is you are entirely dependent on Koos, on what Koos told you? -- That is right and what - I mean thereafterwards Mohema was just missing from the farm, sorry. (10)

Well, I must put it to you - well, I have already told you what Koos says of this. -- Yes, you did.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Coetzee, just one thing, on your evidence so far the real hitman at Vlakplaas was Vermeulen. -- I do not understand it.

The killer at Vlakplaas, the real killer was Vermeulen? -- Who shot Vusi and Peter and who got rid of Ace Moema, yes.

He is the man who committed most murders personally at Vlakplaas. -- That is correct. (20)

What I find strange is that in your statement and as published in the Vrye Weekblad, he was never mentioned as a member of the group of the murder squad as you called them. He was not even a member and he was the most vicious of the lot. -- Is that now what I in my interviews at - or do you mean published in the newspaper itself?

Yes, and in your intended affidavit. -- Sir, but I for sure said that he was involved with Vusi and Pieter.

Oh, you said that, but he was never a member of the murder squad. -- Yes, sir, but I explained yesterday that (30)

I must/..

C5.594

- 708 -

COETZEE

I must have put it over wrongly, that the specific hit operation members were selected for and you can see that selected members on that specific operation as a ...

But the man who was involved in at least three instances you did not even bother to mention him. -- But I did mention him.

But you mentioned Van Dyk who did not kill a single person. -- But in all that instances that I mentioned I mentioned Captain Koos Vermeulen.

Yes, but you never mentioned him as a member of your (10) hit squad or of your "moordbende" and that is what I find so strange.

The same with Van Rensburg. The real murder - or Flemmington. The real murderers were never members of the hit squad. -- Flemmington did not kill anyone.

Or Van Rensburg? -- He did not kill anyone personally as far as I know where I was present.

But he was just as much a member of the hit squad as you were. -- Yes, that is right.

Flemmington. -- Yes.

And Van Rensburg. -- That is correct. (20)

So, the hit squad did not only have people you mentioned previously. -- No.

MR MARITZ: Well, as a matter of fact as far as Brigadier Van Rensburg is concerned you were at pains to throw in the fact that after he was taught how to burn people he went about it on his own there in the dunes at Port Elizabeth. -- That is correct.

Well, that is also a hideous story. Where does that come from? -- Well, I suppose these three will tell it - I do not have

personal knowledge of it first hand. It is just he (30)

never called/..

C5.629

- 709 -

COETZEE

never called in help again.

It is just another story that you heard. -- Ja.

Incidentally, my learned junior has been sitting here while I have been talking to you, making calculations in regard to the worksheets and what comes up is this that in the period from 11 to 23 November you also received R22,50 per day S&T, exactly the same amount as did Braam du Preez and the reason why you received R4 less appears to be that you stayed in arres. -- That is quite possible, yes.

That is quite right. Nothing ... (10)

CHAIRMAN: Now, what do you say now about Du Preez's S&T form? Do you still say it is falsified? -- Well, my only answer is he was there on the 20th.

No, but do you still say the form was falsified? -- Yes, as far as these dates is concerned for sure.

MR MARITZ: Now, this thing of Pillay, the Indian gentleman that you kidnapped from Swaziland, do you recall when that was? -- No.

It could have been end '80/'81, beginning'81.

I think my recollection is that Pillay was kidnapped round about on 26 February 1981. -- That is quite possi- (20) ble, yes.

No, sorry, not the 26th, 19 February 1981. -- I cannot deny it.

Now, to Jacques Pauw you told a rather involved story, that I think Brigadier Schoon had decided that houses in Swaziland had to be bombed.-- That is right.

And then the whole Vlakplaas group .. -- No, not the whole Vlakplaas ...

The few that you were, went down .. -- I was ...

Sorry, you were? -- Sorry, I was the only white at (30)
that/..

C5.676

- 710 -

COETZEE

that stage at Vlakplaas that went down.

No, no, you said that Van Dyk went along. -- He was at Oshakati at that stage, I believe, because he was not transferred - if it was in February '81 he was not transferred yet to Vlakplaas, but he went along to Swaziland.

So you learned that subsequently? -- No, I said Paul - there was a captain or Major Paul Hattingh from the explosives expert department that went with me.

I do not want to do an injustice, Mr Coetzee, I just want to see what you said. At page 97 of the transcript, it is (10) page 118 of the old one, Mr Chairman:

"O! ek wil jou nog eers sê terwyl ons met die groepe ook al aan die gang was, is daar besluit dat die ANC nou op groot skaal opgeneuk gaan word in Swaziland, maar omdat hulle die .."

You are interrupted by Pauw:

"Wie het die besluit geneem? -- Was dit nou Schoon of Viktor? Schoon, Schoon, Schoon.

Ja, maar Schoon is dan nou hier verkeerd. -- Ja, dit was Schoon. Schoon was al op daardie tydstip (20) daar. Ek sal jou nou sê hoekom ek dit onthou. Toe is ..

Hoekom spesifiek in Swaziland? -- Seker maar weer inligting wat ingekom het deur Ermelo deur Stanley se verraaiers en dat hulle besig is met operasies op verskeie plekke bly. Toe het ons nou die klomp Askari's, 'n hele klompie, ek dink jy sal sien hoeveel was gearresteer daar na die tyd, maar toe lê ons laag by die

Smokey Mountain Village, ons blankes, ek Paul en die
plofstofdeskundiges op hoofkantoor, die hoof ou (30)

Paul/..

C5.721

- 711 -

COETZEE

Paul Hattingh hy is 'n vol kolonel vandag." -- That is correct.

That is when the groups had already been formed accord- ing
to you. -- Ja, but as you can see I was wrong with that.

So, where does Paul van Dyk come into it? -- He was at Oshoek
border post since 1976 as a representative of Ermelo security.

Did you go and gather him up from Oshoek to go along on this
operation? -- We went through Oshoek border, that is right.

(10)

Now, then you tell a story that while you were there you
were called back by Brigadier Schoon to Pretoria. -- That is right.

Do you know why? -- To come and report to him, brief him on
the matter.

Didn't you have telephones in those days? -- Yes, I did.
We were talking to him on the 'phone and he requested us to come
back and leave the Askari's behind.

Who came back? -- Myself and Paul van Dyk - went to Oshoek
and myself and Paul Hattingh went back to Pretoria (20)
headquarters.

So when the Askari's ran amok there and kidnaped Pillay they
did so as a sort of a private enterprise. -- They went on on their
own. It was discussed, they knew about him being a teacher and
that he has been involved in the Natal machinery of the ANC
previously and that there is a possibility that he would be abducted
in future, but not at that stage.

But they had no instructions to that effect? -- No, they have
not.

So, in fact what you say is they blew it. -- That is (30)

right/..

right.

Well, my instructions are that that is not the case. My instructions are that you blew it. You went along and you got hold of five Mozambicans which you used to kidnap Pillay. -- Not at all. There were Mozambicans from Brigadier Viktor on the farm, Amaru, Nicholas Karamanolus and a George who Colonel Viktor after that incident sent to Oshakati, they then came back to Vlakplaas at a stage and two of them were handed over to the Frelimos at Komatipoort ..

CHAIRMAN: I do not think that is all of assistance. Did (10) you use five Mozambicans? -- There was not five Mozambicans, there were Vlakplaas Askari's, ANC guys, and Mozambicans involved. I cannot remember exactly how many of each group, but it was not my informants.

MR MARITZ: I must put it to you that Pillay in fact made a statement, he made quite a lengthy statement, and I will read to you from the statement that we have of Pillay. At page 8 of this statement, paragraph 39 thereof, he says the following:

"On the evening of 19 February 1981 at approximate- (20)
7 p.m. I was having dinner with David Manyatse, a
teacher colleague of mine, at his house on the St
Joseph's school premises. After having had dinner I
left David's house and went across to my house to
mark some school books. At approximately 8.30 p.m.
I heard a knock at the back-door. I enquired as to
who was there, the reply came back Joe. It sounded
very like my principal's voice and I opened the door.
In front of me stood a medium-sized round faced black
man. He informed me that he had been sent from (30)
Mozambique/..

Mozambique to contact some refugees. I was suspicious of him and told him that I knew of no refugees. On my asking him who had sent him, he replied that he had been sent by a man by the name of Dube. This made it clear to me that there was something wrong. This black stated that he was trying to contact a man by the name of Pillay. I informed him that as I was a new teacher at the school we should go across to David Manyatse's house and he would be able to help me. At Manyatse's house this black again enquired about Pillay and was informed by David that there was no such person on the staff. This black man then left. He returned after a while and said that he had left his car keys in my house and would I kindly come out and return them to me." (10)

I suppose he meant to him.

"I requested David's younger brother to go over to the house and return the car keys to him. I did this as I was at this stage very suspicious of this man's motives. This black man then pulled out a pistol and four other black men came into the house. The black man holding the pistol said to me that he knew me and that I was the person they were looking for. One of the others said that I was a member of the ANC and that I was to accompany them. I refused. A struggle ensued and I was taken by force. I put up a fight and screamed as well as kicked out at my assailants. I was beaten and heavily assaulted by these five men. They all appeared to be Mozambican blacks." (20) (30)

-- Well/..

-- Well, Mr Maritz, the following day, after he was put over to the fence at Oshoek, I think only one of the five blacks came out, the other four stayed and they were picked up by the Royal Swazi police and army in Manzini in a green Valiant and arrested, subsequently put in jail. They appeared in court and it was arranged with the Swazi police and they each went out on R800 bail and they were smuggled back into the Republic into the boot, so their names will be in the Manzini court registers for that time.

No, according to my instructions what really trans- (10)
pired is that you sent one of your Askari's into Swaziland with a package apparently to go and pay those mercenaries that you had got from Mozambique and it was then that he was arrested by the Swazi police. -- No, not at all. It is exactly how it happened, I am sure it can be checked with the Swazi police records.

And I think that that Askari is available to testify before this commission if need be to that effect. -- You can check with the Manzini court records, Mr Maritz. You will find my story correct. (20)

There was only one Askari that was locked up and who was bailed out. -- For what amount? R800?

I do not know what the amount was, but he was bailed out. -- There were four altogether, there were five. One came out with Pillay and I think four was locked up in Manzini and the Valiant they had, car they were travelling, the Askari, was a Valiant from Jan Smuts airport, an official Valiant that operated there for years and new tyres was put onto it and I think it was shot full of bullet holes and it took quite a while thereafter to get the Valiant back to South Africa (30)

through/..

C6.48

- 714 -

COETZEE

through the Swazi police.

You see, Mr Coetzee, according to my instructions you acted

completely on your own and completely out of order and after this man, Pillay, was abducted you took him to Vlak- plaas. -- Not at all. Not at all, it is not true.

And Brigadier Schoon in fact, when he learned of what you had done, he was furious. -- No, not at all. No, not at all. I was not involved - I slept that night - when the abduction happened I was in Pretoria, sleeping in my bed with Captain Paul Hattingh back in Pretoria. (10)

As a matter of fact you caused quite a bit of trouble as a result of this abduction. -- That caused a little bit of trouble, that is correct, on foreign affair levels, that is right.

That is right. General Coetzee had to go and speak to the Swazis about this matter. -- I said so, yes, on the Nerston border on a Sunday accompanied by one of foreign affairs people, that is right.

And you created quite a embarrassment to South Africa in abducting this man Pillay. -- It looks now that success (20) has got many fathers and failures are orphan. It was not my operation. I did not act on my own and I was called back to Pretoria by Brigadier Schoon. As I said they went on on their own, they were locked up and their bail were paid by the South African Police and it caused a lot of upset, that is correct.

CHAIRMAN: But you recall, Mr Coetzee, that you could not give me any reason why the man was taken to Vlakplaas? -- He was originally brought there awaiting Major Jerry Fourie from Pietermaritzburg, Captain Any Taylor from Durban and ...

No, the point I am trying to make, and you know what (30)
point/..

C6.70

- 715 -

COETZEE

point I am trying to make, is you could give no reason why he was taken to Vlakplaas which was not a place of detention. -- I did say that if they would not discover that he was abducted he would

not have been locked up anywhere, they would have disposed of him after the interrogation.

Where do you get that from? Where do you get that from, that he would have been disposed of? -- Well, that is why he was brought to Vlakplaas and not ...

But where do you get the fact from that he would have been disposed of? -- Sir, I think I mentioned it to you (10) earlier when you asked it to me.

No, you have not. You can answer now. Where do you get the fact from that he would have been disposed of? Are you not answering the question or don't you wish to answer the question or can't you answer the question? -- (No reply)

Carry on, Mr Maritz.

MR MARITZ: And then you came along in your statement to Pauw and your evidence in this commission and you romanticised the whole thing. Now we have an army doctor with a tooth serum. -- That is correct. (20)

Where do you get this nonsense of a tooth serum? -- Where I was present and where it was administered to him intravenously.

I am saying to you where do you get this nonsense of a tooth serum? -- Told by the army doctor to me.

But there is no such thing. -- Well, that is what they call it.

Call what? -- The serum that they inject - that they have given to him intravenously.

There is no such thing as a tooth serum. It does not(30) exist/..

C6.93

- 716 -

COETZEE

exist. -- Well, that is what they call the serum that they have given to him.

Do you know what the best tooth serum is? -- No.

Alcohol. You make a man drunk and you break down his

resistance with alcohol. That is the best tooth serum in the world. That is the only one. -- Is that so.

Yes, there is no such a thing as a tooth serum. -- Well, they have administered a serum to him intravenously and that is what they have called it.

No, I think that you read too many James Bond stories. -- No, I do not read at all. (10)

Let us look ...

CHAIRMAN: What day did you say, Mr Maritz, was Pillay abducted?

MR MARITZ: 19 February 1981, Mr Chairman. If I can just get the record complete. He was released on 10 March 1981.

CHAIRMAN: I see, Mr Coetzee, that you did claim S&T for the day of 19 February. -- That I - can you just refer me to the page?

Page 0009, on 18th from 15h00 to the 19th 22h00. -- (20)
And he was abducted, sir, the 19th?

Of February 1981. -- Yes. So, I was back .. So do you mean that I was still down at Oshoek or back at..

I mean nothing. All I tell you is that you claimed S&T for the day of the 19th. -- Can you just show me the page, please.

MR MARITZ: Look. Your S&T is there. Look at mine.

CHAIRMAN: At least I think your signature is next to the .. --
It was on the 19th of?

February 1981. -- 22h00, that night I was back in (30)

Pretoria/..

C6.121

- 717 -

COETZEE

Pretoria, yes.

MR MARITZ: Listen to the further or the end of your own story, Mr Coetzee. You have now stirred a tremendous em- barrassment for the South African government. -- Ja, that only came out the next day very late, after they were arrested ...

Ja, in respect of that you created an extreme embarrass- ment. -- At first it was seen as a very successful operation that morning.

At some stage or another it ended up in an extreme embarrassment. -- That is correct. (10)

High officers of the police had to go and negotiate with the Swazi people. -- That is correct.

I suppose foreign affairs was pulled into it to come and help. -- That is correct.

And this man is guarded at the house of Koos Schutte, your farm foreman. -- That is right.

And Spyker Tshikalange with a knopkierie who was not even a policeman at that stage. Are you serious? -- That was now after his interrogation and he was on his way back.

This is this man who has created all this trouble, (20) the whole world is screaming and shouting, and you have him guarded by a farm foreman and a labourer on the farm with a knopkierie. -- He is being guarded - I do not know whether he had a knopkierie, that you must ask him, but he was hand- cuffed onto Spyker whenever he was left alone from the be- ginning until he left for Lothair police station when he was on his way back to Swaziland.

And Spyker was not even a policeman then, he was a labourer. -- I do not know at that stage whether he was a policeman already.

(30)

CHAIRMAN/..

C6.144

- 718 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: He was a cook at that stage. -- A cook.

MR MARITZ: And Pillay was beaten up to boot. -- In Swazi- land by the Askari's, that is correct.

CHAIRMAN: No, South Africa. -- He was not seriously assaulted in South Africa.

MR MARITZ: But I thought one had to keep him at Nerston to let the swelling come down and let his blue eyes or black eyes turn into normal eyes again. -- That is hundred percent correct, yes.

Now, when did he sustain all those injuries? -- He (10)

was heavily beaten up during abduction in Swaziland.

Oh, I see, and even in that time to allow this man to return to normality he was once again guarded by your farm foreman and a labourer or a cook. -- It was just for that night or that afternoon before he was taken to Lothair police station where he was locked up.

CHAIRMAN: No, but he was also guarded by Tshikalange at the observatory, so it could not have only been for that one night. -- Yes, he was at the observatory too guarded by Tshikalange.

(20)

MR MARITZ: It must be even plain to you, Mr Coetzee, that your stories are totally ridiculous. -- My stories is hundred percent correct.

Now, I want to put it to you, Mr Coetzee, and I do not want to be misunderstood in the generality of the supposition I am putting to you, but it is going to take just too long and it is too involved to go and deny every little allegation, but I want to put it to you that those members of the South African Police that you have scurrilously involved in all these supposed enterprises of yours will deny your

(30)

allegations/..

C6.175

- 719 -

COETZEE

allegations, everyone of them. -- I believe so, Mr Maritz, they have got no other option.

You left Oshoek at the end of 1979 rather under a cloud, didn't you? -- An original cloud, that is right.

I mean there was this allegation of supplying an attorney - I think her name was .. -- Rika Lourens Botes.

Rika Lourens Botes with a false alibi. -- That is correct.

Did you? -- Yes, I did.

You did? -- Yes.

(10)

When that was investigated during the end of 1979 you denied

it. -- The investigating officer is in this room, it is General Ronnie van der Westhuizen there. I cannot remember whether it was bluntly denied or what was exactly in that statement.

No, you denied it. -- It is possible. I cannot remember what was in that statement.

CHAIRMAN: But let us just get it this way, this had nothing to do with your culture as a security policeman, did it? -- Everyone in the security police has got his little hanky- (20) panky on.

No, but, Mr Coetzee, it has got nothing to do with your work and I know it is very funny, but I do not find this funny at all.

I know you find what you did fairly amusing, I find it horrifying, but let us get to the facts. Applying a person with a false alibi not within the context of your work has nothing to do with the fact that you were a security police- man. -- No, that is my private enterprise.

That is simply plain dishonesty. -- That is right.

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, I am going on a new tangent. (30)

Can I/..

C6.209

- 720 -

COETZEE

Can I ask for a five minutes smoke break?

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS. THE COMMISSION RESUMES.

DIRK COETZEE still under oath:

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: Mr Coetzee, on 22 October 1979 you made a statement to Colonel Van der Westhuizen which was not on oath in which you denied that you had knowingly given Mrs Lourens Botes an alibi. You now admit it. -- Yes.

It was in that time, because you have made another statement on confirmation on 18 July 1979 I think in which(10) you also denied it, the having given an alibi. -- Yes, I think it was.

But it was at that time that you refused to take the oath. You confirmed. -- At the second or the first one?

Well, the first one was not either confirmed. It was just

a statement taken by Colonel Van der Westhuizen, but the one I am referring to now you preferred to confirm it not to take the oath. -- That was in July.

That was in July 1979. -- It is quite possible, I cannot remember. (20)

Was that when you had religious scruples(?) about taking the oath? -- I cannot remember.

Be that as it may, it was the Rika Botes incident, there were also allegations that you had been involved in the smuggling of pornographic material. -- Which was completely untrue.

Were there any other allegations concerning you? -- No, that was the only I know of.

Rika Botes apparently also smuggled people into the country illegally through Swaziland, Portuguese immigrants(30)

or something/..

C6.241

- 721 -

COETZEE

or something. -- Not at all, not to my ...

Or Angola or Mozambique immigrants. -- Not to my know- ledge.

She had very good contacts at the Department of Interior and obtained visas for each and everyone. She never smuggled anyone through me.

Wasn't there a story that you were involved in that ring as well? -- Why didn't they charge me for it?

CHAIRMAN: No, no. -- No, no.

The question was, was there a story. -- No.

It is not whether it is true or not, was there a (10) story? -- No, not as far as I can remember.

MR MARITZ: Well, as a result of all these allegations and stories and so on, it was then decided to take you away from Oshoek and to send you to Sunnyside. -- That is correct.

Now, I want to emphasise it once again that when you were at Oshoek you were not a member of the security branch. -- We were

completely under the security branch. We fall under Middelburg security regional office.

Yes, you fell under security. A security branch also had .. -- Border posts. (20)

As part of its responsibility border posts. I believe it is still so today. -- That is right.

But those who were employed at the border post were not members of the security branch and neither were you. -- Well, I was - ja, you can put it that way.

The only man that was a member of the security branch there was Paul van Dyk. -- That is correct.

Now, what I have here is after it was decided to transfer you away to Sunnyside, what I have is a telex dated 19 November 1979 and I want you to listen very, very (30)

carefully/..

C6.268

- 722 -

COETZEE

carefully. It is from security branch, Middelburg to the commissioner of police in Pretoria for attention Brigadier Coetzee who is now General Coetzee.

"Verplasing nr. so en so, luitenant D.J. Coetzee.

1. Bogenoemde offisier gestasioneer te Oshoek-grenspos word met ingang 1979-12-01 verplaas na Sunnyside."

That is correct? -- Is that from head office to Middelburg?

No, that is from Middelburg to head office. -- Okay, yes.

That was the position. You were supposed to have (10) started at Sunnyside on 1 December 1979. -- No, I had it 13, but - I think there was a delay in my ...

Okay.

- "2. Hierdie offisier toon besondere aanleg vir veiligheidswerk afgesien daarvan dat hy nog nie 'n veiligheidskursus deurloop het nie."

That was also accurate. -- That is correct.

" Hy het goeie kennis van Swaziland en die inwoners van die land. Weens die huidige opsetten opsigte van terroriste in Swaziland is hierdie offisier se kennis vir afdeling Oos-Transvaal van besondere waarde. (20)

4. Met die verplasing van luitenant D. Nel vanaf veiligheidstak, Middelburg na veiligheidstak, Burgersfort op 15 Januarie 1979 het daar 'n vakature vir 'n luitenant te Middelburg-veiligheidstak ontstaan wat nog nie gevul is nie en waarop nog nie aangedring is nie weens die mannekragtekort. Met die toename in terrorisme in hierdie afdeling word dit aanbeveel dat die (30) vakature/..

C6.292

- 723 -

COETZEE

vakature wat deur luitenant Nel gelaat is nou gevul word. Graag word verneem of daar nie oorweging geskenk kan word om luitenant Coetzee se verplasing na Sunnyside af te gelasen hom vanaf Oshoek-grenspos na veiligheidstak, Middelburg te verplaas nie."

You have got that? -- Ek het dit.

That is apparently how you landed up at Middelburg. -- As u ingaan op die storie sal u sien net voor die 19de het generaal Zietsman, die toe speurhoof, en generaal Johan (10) Coetzee afgekom Swaziland toe om die Swazi's te woord te staan. Hulle het toe op die - ek dink dit was die .. Dit moes net 'n dag of wat voor daardie 19de gewees het, het hulle op Badplaas geslaap waar hulle deur brigadier Van der Hoven en majoor Nick van Rensburg van Ermelo op hoogte gebring is oor die toestande in Swaziland en watse vrae hulle kan verwag en watse vrae hulle moet antwoord.

Die aand na die samesprekings, so is dit aan my meegedeel deur majoor Van Rensburg en Brigadier Van der Hoven, het my geval ter sprake gekom, my verplasing - my so-called - I am sorry, I am in (20) Afrikaans, my so-called porn-ring story. So, it was put right the exact story as to that porn ring and then the following morning when General Zietsman and General Coetzee stopped at Oshoek they have heard about a club-house that we have built there, me and the men, and they wanted to see it and General Zietsman in the next week has sent down the sub-editor of the police magazine Servamus, Lieutenant-Colonel Minge, to come and do a story on this club-house which appeared in the March 1980 edition of the police magazine. It was during that morning that General Coetzee then asked me how would I (30)

like to/..

C6.319

- 724 -

COETZEE

like to go to Middelburg security and then the following day that telex should have been sent, but that is how the story originated.

I am very grateful for that introduction, Mr Coetzee, because I am now going to read to you what General Coetzee, who was then a brigadier, wrote in manuscript on this self same telex. Now listen to this:

"Kolonel Kotzé .." Do you know "kolonel Kotzé"? -- No, was he at security head office.

At security head office, ja. Apparently he was .. -- (10) Oh, Ampie Kotzé, that was right.

He was the personnel officer. -- That is right.

So now Brigadier Coetzee as he then was, the chief of security branch, wrote to Colonel Kotzé as follows:

"Kolonel Kotzé,

Asseblief, u moet hierdie verplasing sterk aanbeveel by HK. Tydens 'n onlangse besoek na die afdeling het dit aan die lig gekom dat die persoon (offisier)

daadwerklik betrokke is by verskeie onafgehandelde
ondersoeke (ANC) in Swaziland. Die Swazilandse (20)
kommissaris versoek ook dat hy beskikbaar bly, memo
na Kompol minister."

It is dated 20 November 1979. Do you understand what went on here?
-- Not exactly. Put it to me straight, please, Mr Maritz.

Brigadier Coetzee, as he then was, also spoke to the
commissioner of police in Swaziland and the commissioner of police
in Swaziland said look here, Brigadier, I am very afraid that this
man of yours, this lieutenant Coetzee, is involved in a lot of
cases which we are still (30)

investigating/..

C6.351

- 725 -

COETZEE

investigating and please do not take him away, we need him, we
want to investigate these cases and then you were taken to
Middelburg on the request of the Swazi commissioner of police.

You never knew that, did you? -- No, not at all.

Well now you know. -- Well, I went frequently back to Swaziland
and the present commissioner is a personal friend of mine.

And what did they do with you at Middelburg? -- I was on the
branch, Middelburg branch.

No, they stuck twelve files in your hands and made (10)
you walk around and go and follow up families and see where you
could get something to hook onto. -- I did exactly what all the
other people on the branch did, received a few files on suspects
and had the area to control.

Yes, you were just stashed there. -- No, with a car, I was
out for weeks, I claimed S&T. You can check on it. I went to
the Kruger National Park to go and pick up muti for my witch-doctors
and travelled all over Nebo and Groblersdal area.

Anyhow, you were then taken to Middelburg. Now, the (20)
next letter we have is one dated 6 June 1980 which was signed by

the then Brigadier Coetzee and the reference was again Colonel Kotzé and he wrote as follows to the commissioner of police:

"U magtiging word hiermee aangevra vir die verplasing van bogenoemde offisier vanaf die veiligheidstak, Middelburg na veiligheidshoofkantoor. Vanweë 'n nypende tekort aan lessenaaroffisiere word luitenant Coetzee se dienste dringend te veiligheidshoofkantoor benodig."

The next letter I have is one dated 23 July 1980 addressed(30) to the/..

C6.385

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COETZEE

to the commissioner of police and which is signed, I think by Lieutenant Stander at security headquarters in Pretoria. It reads as follows:

"Bogemelde offisier het op 1980-07-22 (that is 22 July 1980) vanaf die veiligheidstak, Middelburg te veiligheidshoofkantoor vir diens aangemeld."

Is that right? -- That is right.

And then you were taken to Vlakplaas. -- That is right.

Now, at Vlakplaas there was brigadier - or the then Brigadier Viktor. -- He was in charge of section C and C1 (10) was at Vlakplaas, that is right.

And I think he was replaced during December 1980 by Brigadier Schoon. -- Brigadier Schoon took over.

Now, the then Brigadier Viktor was a disciplinarian, not so? I mean, it is legend in the police, that he is a disciplinarian. A very strict disciplinarian. -- Yes.

Is that right? -- Yes, I did not see him that way, but that is the way other people saw him, that is right.

Well, he did not like you. -- I think it was a mutual feeling.

(20)

Mutual feeling? -- Yes.

The two of you did not like one another. You did not

hit it off well, did you? -- No.

Then Brigadier Schoon arrived. -- That is correct.

Now, he is a very quiet, reserved man, isn't he? -- He is.

As a matter of fact his nickname in the security branch is Stil Willem. A quiet man. -- No, I do not know of that.

And then this whole Pillay affair occurred and he was furious about this, Schoon. He was very cross. -- (30)

Mr Maritz/..

C6.415

- 727 -

COETZEE

Mr Maritz, can you just put it - so he did not know that I was going to Swaziland, that I claimed S&T, that I was there with Askari's, not at all, nothing?

No, he knew you were at Swaziland but he did not know you were going to abduct people. He didn't give you instructions to that effect. He is not crazy. -- Well, nor did I gave the Askari's instructions to abduct Pillay that night.

No, but you should have looked after them. -- I did look after them. I was called back to Pretoria by Brigadier Schoon.

(10)

No, you did not. You just saw in your S&T claims just now that you were there on the 19th. -- No, I arrived back in Pretoria at 22h00 and it is at least a four and a half hours' drive from Swaziland.

Well, that is the day on which he was abducted. -- That night, yes.

So, your Askari's just waited until the cat was gone before the mice could feed. -- That is what it boils down to.

Oh, I see, but anyhow, that so much the more it would have been cause for him to be quite furious with you. (20)

-- He could not have been furious with me, it was a risk that was taken and I had nothing to do with it. They took the risk and he was chief of that section.

Look, Mr Coetzee, the picture which emerges so far is that you were not regarded as a very good policeman. -- No, I think I was regarded as one of the best. That is the picture they would like to paint now.

No, that is the picture that the documents paint. -- No, not at all.

MR KUNY: Well, with respect, Mr Chairman, I do not think (30) that it/..

C6.437

- 728 -

COETZEE

that it is for my learned friend to comment any further from documents. He has put the documents, the witness has answered and it is for you ultimately to decide the question.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I do not think it is useful - Mr Coetzee, when did they start making you out as a bad policeman? -- It is difficult to say, Mr Chairman. I also did not always get on very well with Brigadier Johan Coetzee, so I do not think Brigadier Coetzee was very fond of me, especially after the Rika Lourens Botes' story and the porn-ring story.

MR MARITZ: And the Pillay story. -- The Pillay story was (10) an operation from head office that I could not help for.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, in other words the point is that even Brigadier Coetzee was dissatisfied because of the Pillay story, with you. -- In the end.

Rightly or wrongly. I mean, it is .. -- Yes, but that morning, just after that Pillay story, Brigadier Coetzee congratulated me on the good work that I have done and later in the day when it came through, round about twelve, 13h00 when Pillay was already on his way to Vlakplaas, when it emerges that it was a mess on the other side, that they (20) picked up the Askari's, then of course the whole attitude changes.

No, but that is I think the point Mr Maritz made, for reasons good or bad already in 1980 you got blamed for certain things.

-- That is correct.

MR MARITZ: I am just putting it to you that the inference is, from these facts, as I understand it, is that you were given the job of looking after the Askari's at Vlakplaas to get you out of harm's way. I mean it was a stupid, ridiculous little job you had to go and do there. -- So that is what it is (30)

now too/..

C6.466

- 729 -

COETZEE

now too. I mean, Vlakplaas - I started off on Vlakplaas and look what there is today. How many whites are there? It is a massive operation where I had only 18 Askari's under me and at the moment there is more than 70.

And as a matter of fact on your own showing apparently you did quite a bad job at Vlakplaas too. -- No.

Because what you say, what it boiled down to is while the Askari's were walking around in the townships you were sitting at the veld fire, well, at least at the braaivleis fires, braaiing meat and having liquor and while you were having (10) liquor and braais the Askari's were enjoying themselves in the township. -- Exactly how it is going today, yes.

And that is how it went in your time as well. -- That is right.

And that is why you never caught anybody either. -- No, it was up to the Askari's. That is where they find their people. It is in the shebeens. So, if they do not start drinking in the shebeens, just sit there up up against the wall as guards they won't achieve anything, everyone will see them.

(20)

It does not look as if you were doing your job, Mr Coet- zee. -- Well, it will be interesting to see amongst the his- tory after me how many were caught then.

Listen to this: On 14 October 1981 there is a telex from commissioner of police, Captain Dreyer is the reference per- son,

to the security branch, West Rand. It reads as follows:

"Verplasing kaptein D.J. Coetzee, veiligheidstak-
hoofkantoor na veiligheidstak, Krugersdorp en kap-
tein J.C. Coetzee, veiligheid, Krugersdorp na
veiligheidstak hoofkantoor. H+B1 verkry asseblief (30)
ook/..

C6.495

- 730 -

COETZEE

ook koppeltenders vir die vervoer van die bogenoemde
lede se besittings."

So that is when you were transferred to Krugersdorp. -- That is
right.

14 October 1981. -- Due for 1 January 1982.

You knew about it? -- Yes, I knew about it.

You were informed? -- I was.

And then on 5 November 1981 you sat down and you wrote the
following letter:

"Die bevelvoerende offisier, Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie (10)
Veiligheidshoofkantoor, Pretoria.

Aansoek om huishouding agter te laat, verplasing kap-
tein D.J. Coetzee, veiligheidshoofkantoor na veilig-
heidstak, Krugersdorp.

1. Graag wens ek aansoek te doen om my huis-
houding in Pretoria agter te laat tydens
bogemelde verplasing.
2. My twee jaar en elf maande oue seun is 'n
diabeet sedert 6 Februarie 1980, die rede
waarom ek gehelp is met 'n verplasing na (20)
Pretoria gedurende Julie 1980.
3. Omdat ek en my vrou moet werk, is my ouers
(albei pensionarisse) al persone in wie se
sorg ek my kind kan laat omdat:
 1. Die juveniele diabeet se behandeling be-

staan uit 'n delikate ineengevlegte teg-
niek van koördinasie van die volgende:
Insulien en inspuiting, diëet, oefening,
baie, baie liefde, sielkundige en sosiale
aspekte, mediese raad en behandeling in (30)
gevalle van/..

C6.522

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COETZEE

gevalle van nood.

2. Anders as by die volwasse diabeet is 'n mens by die kind totaal aangewys op uiterlike waarnemings van die kind se gedagtes, gedragspatroon letterlik van minuut tot minuut, daaglik, om die nodige aanpassing te maak om die kind te kontroleer en sodoende komas te verhoed.
4. 'n Mens voer voortdurend 'n verlore stryd om die kind se bloedsuiker te probeer hou tussen die (10) vyf en vyftien millilitermerk ten einde kort termyn komplikasies van breinskade en aan die ander kant lang termyn komplikasies van hartversaking, nierversaking, blindheid en kanker te vertraag.
5. Met die praktiese behandeling van die kind is jy op jouself aangewys en hang alles af van jou as ouer en in my geval die kind se grootouers se toegewydheid, stiptheid en kennis van die siekte. Die dokter is die spreekwoordelike stuurman aan (20) wal wat slegs van hulp kan wees wanneer die siekte-toestand heeltemal handuit ruk, hetsy na watter kant toe.
6. Ek het die afgelope 18 maande in belang van my kind 'n diepgaande studie gemaak van die siekte

deur etlike boeke op te lees en ontvang nog elke twee maande leesstof asook jaarliks die mediese jaarverslag oor diabetes uit Amerika, die voorste land op dié gebied. Voormelde kennis het ek oor gemelde tydperk met verdrag aan my ouers (30) oorgedra/..

C6.549

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COETZEE

oorgedra en ingeprent.

7. Om derhalwe met alle respek en beskeidenheid in detail op papier uit te wei oor die feite en punte soos vervat in paragraaf 3 hierbo is werklik 'n onbegonne taak aangesien elkeen boekdele spreek.
8. Ek wil dus beleefd voorstel dat ek 'n afspraak maak met enige dokter van die Departement Gesondheid van die Departement Polisie se keuse welke dokter na oorleg 'n kort onafhanklike (10) aanbeveling kan maak met betrekking tot hierdie aansoek.
9. Ek wil dit ten slotte as 'n feit konstateer dat ek letterlik met my kind se lewe dobbel sou ek hom op hierdie kritieke stadium en wel ongeveer tot en met sy tiende lewensjaar uit die sorg van my ouers neem."

And those were your overtures to your office, your superior offices, is that right? -- That is right.

Now, the next document which follows on that is the (20) following: It is dated 12 November 1981, it carries the date stamp or two date stamps, the date stamp registration 13 November 1981 and it has the date - it looks like the commissioner of police's date 16 November 1981 and it is a letter written by Lieutenant-General by that time Coetzee to the

commissioner of police and is headed as follows:

"Verplasing kaptein D.J. Coetzee.

U druktelegram so en so gedateer 1981-10-08 het
betrekking."

That is the one in which you were transferred to (30)

Krugersdorp/..

C6.584

- 733 -

COETZEE

Krugersdorp.

"'n Afskrif van 'n vertoë deur bogenoemde gaan
hiermee.

3. Ten einde die offisier met sy besondere pro-
bleem tot hulp te wees word dit aanbeveel
dat hy vir gewone diens vrygestel word en
by 'n standplaas in die Pretoria-kompleks
geplaas word."

That is on 12 November 1981. Right? -- Yes.

Now, listen to this, there is a note by the commis- (10)
sioner of police in manuscript which reads as follows:

"Luitenant-kolonel Smith. Verplaas hom na HK
(vuurwapenseksie), asseblief"

and signed by the commissioner of police on 20 November. -- And
who was the commissioner then?

Ag, it does not matter. -- But the thing is ...

I think it was Geldenhuys. -- But it was signed Gelden- huys,
isn't it?

Yes, that is his signature. The commissioner of police
signed this on 20 November 1981. You see, Mr Coetzee, (20)
this history is not the history of a man in whom the great trust
was placed to commit these murders. -- Mr Maritz, can I just put
to you one as far as you have been now? During that same time
one day before me when I asked to leave my household in Pretoria
and that I am prepared to go and start and work at West Rand

security, on Captain Jan Coetzee's file will be a similar application where he asked for his household to be left behind in Krugersdorp and he will proceed with the transfer to Vlakplaas and it was granted.

You see, that makes it worse. Jan Coetzee is helped. (30)

He is not/..

C6.622

- 734 -

COETZEE

He is not the police's hitman. -- Ja.

He is helped but you, the big hitman, you are knocked down, you are given a backhander. -- Yes.

You are thrown to the wolves. -- Yes.

But that is totally incongruous conduct by your superior officers. -- Yes.

Not so? This is not the picture who was appointed the hit squad leader because of a position of trust, is it? -- No, not at all as it is on paper there.

Not at all. As a matter of fact it does not look as (10) if these people trusted you at all. -- No, certain individuals certainly not.

CHAIRMAN: Who did not trust you? -- I think the only man there involved was General Johan Coetzee, the chief of security at that time. Can I show you something that might put matters right that second-in-charge of security, Brigadier Jan du Preez, and the so-called father of our security laws, still close to me since - just before I have left South Africa.

MR MARITZ: Yes. Show us that, please. -- This was a (20) letter that Brigadier Jan du Preez's wife - it was written to my wife unfortunately undated, but I think it clearly indicates that it was written after I have left. Now, she asked - I was with Brigadier Jan du Preez that Saturday morning after Almond Nofemela's revelations and before I decided then to leave the country. So, after I have left Brigadier Jan du Preez's wife sent

a message to my wife to come and see her, tant San as we called her, on the farm because she did not trust the 'phones and my wife would come with her vehicle. So she writes "Liewe Karin", that is (30)

my wife/..

C6.660

- 735 -

COETZEE

wife "So jammer jy het nie saamgekom nie". That was now on the appointment that she arranged with her friend's daughter Rina who is a friend of my wife. "Ons ken mekaar nie, maar my hart is by julle. Ek wil net vir jou verseker dat daar nie veel gaan gebeur nie, altans so sê hulle. Van ons kant af is daar niks, net liefde vir julle in die dae wat voorlê. Kom kuier vir my, ek wil graag met jou gesels. Laat my iets van jou af hoor deur Rina se foon te gebruik. Ek wil jou bel, maar is ook maar versigtig. In gebede dink ons aan jou en die kinders. Hoop die Heer sal krag gee en julle dra en ver- (10) troos. Liefdegroete, tant San" and then in this letter she includes two little notes "Mag Sy heerlikheid hierdie Kersfees oor u wees en mag Hy die werk van u hande bevestig in die nuwe jaar asook.." there is also another one "Hoop hierdie lieflike Kersfees is die begin van 'n jaar waarin vreugde altyd in die hart sal wees". So I find it very strange that the second-in-

charge of the security police was so close to me and that the chief of security just could not sort of take me.

CHAIRMAN: Was there anyone else in the hierarchy who had difficulty with you or that you had difficulty with? -- (20) I beg your pardon?

Was there anyone else in the hierarchy who caused you some grief. -- No, in fact I had a very good relationship with Brigadier Nick van Rensburg too whilst he was at Ermelo and whilst I was working with them in Swaziland. Unfortunately the writings in his handwriting that I have got here is not

so - but I can read it to you, Mr Chairman.

No well, if it is as inconsequential as what you have read I do not think you need. -- I beg your pardon?

Yes well, I suppose someone else will decide on that.(30)

Carry/..

C6.703

- 736 -

COETZEE

Carry on. -- May I read it to you? Just to show you the relationship of the present Brigadier Nick van Rensburg of section C1 - I would like to read it to you, what our relationship was whilst he was in Swaziland.

No, all I want to really know at this stage, Mr Coetzee, is did you have difficulty with other members of the hierarchy except General Johan Coetzee? -- No, not at all.

You had difficulty with Viktor. -- Not really, I mean ..

No, but you disliked each other. -- Ja.

Who else did you dislike in the security set up (10) except - we have now Coetzee and we have got Viktor. -- No one else.

No one else? -- No.

That is all I want to know.

(Discussion follows on how long Mr Maritz is still going to be, et cetera.)

MR MARITZ: The only point I want to make is this, I think you have just mentioned the fact that the morning after the allegations by Nofemela were publicised in the newspapers you went and visited Jan du Preez at his plot near Pretoria which (20) you have spoken of before. -- That is correct.

Do you know what he says about that? -- Yes, I have read what he said in the statement.

He says you said to him "Oom Jan, het jy gesien wat sê hierdie Nofemela? Hy sê nee, ek het nie gesien wat sê hy nie" and then he said to you "Nou wat sê hy? Hy sê man, ons het mense doodgemaak

en hy praat sommer 'n klomp nonsens" and then Jan du Preez said to you well, are these allegations true and you said to him "Nee, man, dit is die grootste nonsens wat daar bestaan" and then he said to you "Nou, waarom is jy (30)

dan bekommerd/..

C6.750

- 737 -

COETZEE

dan bekommerd" and you said no, "ek het niks om oor bekommerd te wees nie". -- Mr Maritz, I can assure you that is not the trend that that conversation went.

Well, that is going to be his evidence. -- Ja, that is going to be his evidence and I can see it, but it is hundred percent not sure and I would still like you just - I mean, all these officers are sketched as angles and I would really like to bring in a small piece from the present Brigadier Nick van Rensburg, even if it is tomorrow morning then, in his own handwriting, just to demonstrate the relationship as such (10) between us and I am sure that you would appreciate it.

Whatever existed of that relationship before has been totally destroyed by .. -- No, no, but I mean just to show you what - I cannot understand how they have changed against me like this now. CHAIRMAN: Yes. No, I appreciate that. All I was really interested in was at this stage more or less what your relationship with your superiors was in 1981. -- Oh, but this specific one is just two years back, in 1979, as I say.

But you said it was good? -- Well, I want to show (20) you ...

Except - no. -- Ja, very good.

Yes, you may read that tomorrow. -- Thank you very much.

Just remind me. -- I will, thank you.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS UNTIL 2 MAY 1990.

COMMISSION RESUMES 2 MAY 1990.

DIRK COETZEE still under oath:

CHAIRMAN: Mr Coetzee, you wanted to read a letter yesterday.

-- Mr Chairman, I have given it a second thought and I am going to leave it.

You what? -- I have decided to leave it, not to lead it.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARITZ: Mr Coetzee, in regard to Joe Mamasela I have a note here of your evidence-in-chief where you said that Joe stayed at Vlakplaas with his wife and child at some stage and then you said that you had heard (10) that. -- That is correct.

Was that then after you had left Vlakplaas that you heard that Joe and his wife and child had stayed there? -- That is correct.

I am asking you this question because David Tshakalange also had something to say about that and his evidence was that Joe stayed at Vlakplaas with his wife and child during 1981 for quite a long period. -- No, I think it was '82. He slept there a night or a few nights in 1981 but it was not with his wife.

(20) Well, quite clearly David Tshikalange was incorrect in his recollection there. -- Of 1981?

Yes. -- Quite sure as I can recollect it, yes.

You see, your recollection ties in with the true facts because Mamasela in fact became a member of the police on 4 February 1982 and from then on he stayed at Vlakplaas at some stages. -- I believe so, yes.

Now, I also understood your evidence, both in chief and during cross-examination, that during 1981 when you needed Joe for operations you got him from Krugersdorp or that area. (30)

-- Yes/..

-- Yes, he was sent to the farm. I never went personally there to fetch him.

Yes, but he was never one of the Vlakplaas inmates or a permanent member of any group at Vlakplaas in 1981? -- No.

And if you created that impression, that he was at Vlak- plaas in 1981 in what you told Jacques Pauw that would be an erroneous impression? -- No, he was for quite long periods with us at Lesotho, for instance I know specifically.

CHAIRMAN: No, the question is whether he was a permanent member at Vlakplaas in '81. -- No, no. (10)

That is not correct? -- No, not a permanent member at Vlakplaas.

MR MARITZ: You see, I want to refer you for instance to one passage. I do not want to labour this point, but can I refer you to this passage? At page 71 of the new transcript, 84 to 85 of the old one, Mr Chairman, you said the following. The question was asked:

"Nou, hoekom moet mense soos, ek verstaan Joe, maar mense soos Spyker en Almond, is hulle ingetrek na Vlakplaas toe, hierdie nuwe beleid deurgekom het van (20) die groepsvorming? -- Spyker, watter groepsvorming? O! Kyk, Spyker het saam met my geloop al die pad nog en Joe is Vlakplaas toe gestuur na die groepsvorming deur Jan Coetzee omdat hy uitgeloop is in Botswana dink ek en Jan nie huisvesting gehad het en nie geweet het wat om met hom te doen nie, of hom oorgestuur het as 'n bruikbare man."

Now, when you said that, I suppose you were referring to 1982?

-- No, 1981.

No, but as I understand you now that was not entirely(30)

correct/..

correct? -- No, it was not entirely correct.

I must put it to you in regard to the question of Joe Mamasela that both Jan Coetzee and Mamasela deny your evidence in that regard and both say that he had absolutely nothing to do with Vlakplaas before 1982 when you had left already. -- Well, of course that is also not correct, because as I have stated there, he was frequently with us on Vlakplaas and I have mentioned on which occasions.

There is one other loose end which I have been asked to put to you and that is in regard to General Lothar Neeth- (10) ling.

You made mention in your discussion with Jacques Pauw to the fact that you would have heard from Archie Flemmington that they poisoned liquor which they smuggled to the ANC and that this poison apparently came from General Neethling. Do you recall that? -- That is correct.

Well, I must just place on record that that story of yours is denied as well. -- Yes, of course I stick to it. It was at the fire-place the night when Vusi and Peter was burned and this not working of the poison powder was discussed, that this subject came to discussion. (20)

In your evidence you referred on a number of occasions to being briefed or debriefed by the ANC after you had left the country. Do you recall that? -- Specifically debriefed, that is right.

Now, can you tell us some more about that? -- No, I do not want at this stage for security reasons, but I was just debriefed in full as to my stories from - my whole career, since birth until - when I ended up with them.

Did the debriefing also entail you being briefed with further facts and information? -- Ja, not to the full, (30)

just as to/..

just as to certain names, et cetera. I mean I was never briefed on the for instance colour of Chris Hani's car. It was just mentioned that the car that Kondile was picked up with was a car of Chris Hani but no further details, no dates confirmed with me, for instance with the Botswana raid. They never helped me on any dates, et cetera.

Well, you said something very interesting yesterday. Do you remember when I told you what the late Mr Potgieter had testified at the Mxenge inquest? - Yes.

About the burning of the car, do you remember that? (10)
Do you remember that? -- Yes.

Then you said and this is not a verbatim quote, but as I recall what you said is that according to your information when Potgieter arrived on the scene the car was only smoulder- ing.-- That is correct.

Where for instance did you get that information? -- From Pine Pienaar, the security chap at Golela shortly after the murder and robbery Durban was there to take photographs of the burned out car. He brought us up to date with that.

Now, when did you get that information? -- Shortly - (20)
a day or two or it could have been that night after the inci- dent, that Monday, the Tuesday, I am not hundred percent sure.

Well, I suppose it won't come as a surprise to you that Pine Pienaar has already made an affidavit denying all your allegations in this regard? -- Ja, no surprise.

Mr Coetzee, from what I have read of what you have said, from what I can puzzle together of your history in the police, it does not appear as if at least from 1982 you had a happy experience in the police. -- I was not happy in the police at all, that is right.

(30)

The matter/..

The matter became worse and worse as time progressed. -- Not necessarily worse exactly, it was boring to me after I have left the security police, if that is what you ...

And it appears to me as if you built up severe aggro towards your superior officers in the police. -- No, in fact I had a big respect for several of my superior officers as well for the South African Police, has treated me very well over the years, but to certain individuals within the police, yes.

Was it for instance during late 1984 when you became involved in the Welpton and Blaauw affair you learned that (10) your telephone was being tapped? -- I learned that after the police has found out that I have sided with Welpton and Blaauw, that is correct.

As a matter of fact well into 1985 your telephone was tapped. -- That is correct.

Now, you were aware of that fact. -- I was.

Now, I have some transcripts of conversations and monologues you had on the telephone. The one in particular that I have here is quite a shocking one where apparently you picked up the telephone and told everybody that you had (20) anything against in the police exactly what you thought of them. -- That is hundred percent correct.

You did this on occasion. -- I did it on several occasions, yes.

So you vented your rage and your frustration. -- Ja, you will find out from that transcripts, when I get exasperated I vent my helpless feelings by using the utmost foul language that I do not think you will get the equal in the police force.

Look, this is so embarrassing to me that I am not (30) going to/..

at this one for instance because it will be introduced into evidence later on. I have a transcript here of one of your monologues on 11 March 1985. Will you just look at it and read it and satisfy yourself whether that transcript is of your monologue on that day.

It is so shocking that I do not want you to read it, please. -- If you want I can, because this ...

Well, if you want to read it, read it. -- It is part of my -- as I say if I get exasperated it is my .. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but I do not think we need abusive language at this stage. Just read whether - I will read it on my own. -- Okay.

Just read whether you are satisfied, that is more or less what you said. -- (Witness reads the document.)

Well, Mr Coetzee, is it more or less? -- Ja, it is will be hundred percent correct.

MR MARITZ: What does come out of this conversation of yours, Mr Coetzee, is that at that stage you were filled with hate actually. -- And I was - hundred percent correct - exactly(20) in the same position that I am now.

And your feelings have not changed, have they? -- In fact after they have made peace with myself until this event that came up now.

When you stayed in - or well, after you left the country. I think you found your way to Zambia, didn't you, to Lusaka? -- Ja, via England and Zimbabwe.

And you met up with David Tshikalange there, didn't you? -- I did.

As a matter of fact you and he stayed together in the(30) same/..

Cl.188

- 747 -

COETZEE

same lodgings for a while. -- That is correct.

How long did you stay together in those lodgings? -- About two and a half months.

Well, you know David Tshikalange came here and he denied that.
Do you have any idea why he would have denied that simple fact?
-- That we lived together?

Yes, he says he has never seen you after he left the country.
MR KUNY: No, I do not think that was his evidence. He said he
did see him but they did not stay together. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think he said he saw him on a single or two
occasions.

MR MARITZ: On a single occasion yes, sorry. You would not know
why he would lie about that? -- No.

There are also two young men by the name of Grobler and Stevens
who fled the country I think somewhere in March, was it? March
this year. Let me just get the date for you, please. Yes, they
fled the country on 10 February this year.

-- I met them in Zambia at a stage.

Yes, they also landed up in Lusaka. -- That is right. (20)

And you met them there? -- I did.

And you spoke to them as well? -- I did.

And as a matter of fact at some stage or another Grobler was
to undertake a mission to South Africa to do certain things and
then he fell ill and then Stevens volunteered to undertake the
mission. -- I believe so, yes. I was not involved in the mission,
but I have heard of it.

And when you learned that he was coming to South Africa you
gave him two letters. -- That is correct.

To deliver to the addressees. -- To post in Ermelo (30)

for me/..

Cl.221

- 748 -

COETZEE

for me, that is right.

The one letter was to Mr Chris Crause and his family. -- That
is correct.

And the other was to Mrs Minnie Robertson. -- That is right.

Now, this young lad did not go on his mission. He went and turned himself over to the police again and unfortunately your letters were never delivered. -- Yes.

They are in the hands of the police. Now, you penned your observations in regard to certain evidence and cer- (10) tain aspects of this commission in both these letters.

CHAIRMAN: Could I have ...

MR MARITZ: Sorry, I made copies. Is there a copy for the witness as well?

CHAIRMAN: B129.

MR MARITZ: These are the letters that you wrote or at least the copies thereof? -- Ja.

Unfortunately the copies are not as good as I would have liked them to be, but for instance at page 2 of the letter to the Crause family about a quarter from the bottom or three(20) quarters down the page, you wrote the following:

"Daardie klomp veiligheidspolisiemanne is so skelm soos die houtjie van die galg. Hulle is besig om die Harms-kommissie in 'n sirkus te laat ontaard. Arme Awie moet al die pak vat. Gelukkig ken die ANC veiligheid se taal. Almond het ook die grootste klomp snert verkoop wat ek nog in my lewe gesien het. Ek kry die indruk dat die Boere het hom omgekoop om die saak om te dinges. Sal maar sien, miskien is ek eendag bevoorreg genoeg om die hoofondersoekbeampte te (30) wees in/..

Cl.264

- 749 -

COETZEE

wees in Suid-Afrika se eiegere na-oorlog Neurenberg-verhore." -- Dit is korrek.

Are those still your sentiments? -- Dit is.

Is this an extension of your hate, Mr Coetzee? -- Well, for sure it is.

CHAIRMAN: What I find surprising, Mr Coetzee, is that you talk here about the "na-oorlog Neurenberg-verhoor" and you earlier indicated about your sentiments of forgiveness, every- one must just say and they will be forgiven and now you want to be the senior investigating officer. -- Ja, Mr Harmse, (10) firstly this is private ...

Please, my name is not Harmse. -- No, I said Mr Harms - oh, I am sorry, Mr Chairman, as I see it personally, I mean it has come out now into the open, Mr Maritz has forced me now to explain to you, I cannot see under the circumstances as it is going now with what they lay before the commission that the truth can easily come out and that is why I said if this is the way that the security police is going to mislead the com- mission to a negative result in the end, then I hope that I will have the opportunity one day to put it right. (20)

No, but it goes further than that. -- I beg your pardon?

I think that is an over-simplification of the views expressed. Do you truly believe that "Almond het die grootste klomp stront verkoop wat ek nog in my lewe gesien het"? -- As far as the car is concerned for sure.

No, but this is a generalised statement. -- Ja, but I was - in my mind I was referring to the motor car incident.

Do you still believe that he was - "dat die Boere hom om-gekoop het"? -- It could be anything. I cannot understand how he could have told the commission all that stories. (30)

MR MARITZ/..

Cl.298

- 750 -

COETZEE

MR MARITZ: I take you a bit down the page. You are talking about Mr Zuma there, the fact that the present commanding officer of the security branch of the South African Police saw him and spoke to him and that he had the grace to send you re- gards and this is how you are treated:

"Vertel ook vir Zuma hoe goed hy vir my en Karin ken
ensovoorts, ensovoorts. Kruip seker maar 'n bietjie
gat by sy toekomstige Minister van Polisie om .."

some word that I cannot make out. Do you make it out. O, "ou
Chris", that is right. (10)

"Ou Chris ek het dit seker al gesê, maar ek sê dit
weer, hulle leierskap wat bestaan uit 32 lede, is
die bakgatste, intelligentste klomp donners wat jy
nog gesien het. Almal spreek jy op die naam aan,
geen tierlantyntjies nie, doodgewone mense met hulle
voete plat, plat op die aarde, die een meer gaaf as
die ander en 'n ou moet weet presies waar jy met hulle
staan. Hulle praat kort en reguit, loop nie
draaitjies nie."

Now, this is a very, very interesting statement. On the (20)
one hand you derogate General Smit, don't you? It is no good
doing that, can I have it on record, please. -- I beg your pardon?

Is that a yes? -- Yes.

On the other hand you are building the picture of the ANC
members to great stature. -- That is right.

So, here you have totally switched your allegiance. -- That
is correct.

And you are still filled with hate towards General Smit, Basie
Smit. -- Yes. Of course I had more in my mind when (30)

I wrote/..

Cl.333

- 751 -

COETZEE

I wrote this as is before the commission at the moment in the way
for instance the world press was mislead, today they visited the
farm and I am sure you do not know about that, or do you, Mr Maritz?

The following page that I want to refer you to for my purposes
is page 5. Will you turn to it, please? About a quarter down
the page you have some observations about the

conditions in South Africa.

"Ek dink natuurlik ons onderwysstelsel, genasionaliseer deur die Nasionale Party-regering soos (10) vervoerdienste, die poskantoor, Eskom, ensovoorts, nasionaliseer is mos 'n Kommunistiese woord sê hulle, is net so verouderd, uitgedien en in 'n groef soos ons politiek. Hier is ek al weer besig om julle te 'brain wash'. Lyk vir my ek is al 'n regte 'blerrie' Kommunis."

Are those your true sentiments? -- That is right.

On the very next page, about two thirds down you are seeing visions of grandeur for yourself again. Listen to this:

(20)

"Miskien kry ek ook weer 'n 'job' in die polieste onder 'n ANC-regering, 'n kokkejoor of 'n kokke-raal of so iets met 'n pak eie buskaartjies vir S&T. Jy weet, watse (something) doenery is dit nou." -- "Getake doenery".

O, "getake doenery is dit nou vir bevorderings-eksamens. Dit is mos nou net rompslomp. Seker weer een of ander goggaraal wat probeer 'important' wees."

Are those your sentiments? -- Yes, it is my sentiments. (30)

Now, then/..

C1.372

- 752 -

COETZEE

Now, then you wrote to Mrs Minnie Robertson in virtually the same vein. -- Yes.

At page 1, listen to what you wrote there. This is on 27 March 1990.

"Ou Almond lyk nog net soos altyd. Ek het sy verklaring gesien wat hy afgelê het. Hy praat op 'n stadium die grootste klomp snert en lieg dat die vonke

spat. Dit is nou oor stories voor die moord en na die moord. Iets skort daar, maar ons kan nog nie ons vinger daarop lê nie." (10)

Now, let me just stop there. Who are the "ons" that you are talking about here? -- Wel, ek, myself en van die ANC-kammerade: intelligensiediens waarmee ek dit bespreek het. So, it looks as if you discussed the evidence before this commission in rather detail or big detail with your ANC com-rades? -- No, not at all. I just mentioned it. They gave it to me to read and I explicitly showed them out, pointed out where he differs from me and where it was completely untrue.

Then you carry on:

"Dit lyk of hy nou doelbewus oor sy binnelandse operasies stories opmaak en stertjies bylas. Ek wonder of die polieste nie besig is om met sy kop te smokkel nie. Sal maar sien. Die ANC is in elk geval uitgeslape en sal hulle nie vir 'suckers' laat vang nie." (20)

Now, what made you write that? -- Just what I know of the intelligence service. I am sure they will be able in the end to sort it out if there is any hanky-panky in it.

You are not able to elucidate this statement today are you or are you? -- Elucidate? (30)

Can you tell/..

C1.404

- 753 -

COETZEE

Can you tell us what you were saying there? How were the ANC going to go about not making suckers of themselves? -- Well, they have got enough inside information and sources inside South Africa and the South African Police to confirm when and whatever is going on there.

So they have their own spies as well? -- Yes, of course.

Inter alia in the South African Police. -- That is correct.

And those spies I suppose will be used to blow the ANC's whistle, play their organ. -- No, to keep their records up(10) to date as to for instance what is happening at the moment at Vlakplaas.

Oh, I see, and then you opine as follows about Lubowski:
"Lubowski se storie is die grap van die jaar. Waar het jy nou al gesien dat 'n ou wat jare al by Swapo is en met Namibië se toekoms duidelik uitgespel ontvang ewe skielik twee maande voor sy dood R60 000 van MI? Die waarheid sal nog daaroor ook uitkom. Ek hoop nie die Harms-kommissie ontaard in 'n sirkus nie. Die grap vir my bly natuurlik dat die polieste (20) die weermag se CCB-ouens op strepe toesluit, maar hulle eie moordbende-stories los hulle doodstil."

-- Dit is korrek.

Are you of the opinion that this commission is a circus? -- I am not referring to the chairman as a circus, I mean the commission can only accept what you put in front of him or we put in front of him or the lawyers put in front of him or the witnesses and to me obviously, that is my opinion, you are asking it from police side, it is a circus, but I am sure Judge Harms has got the knowledge and the know-how(30)

and /...

C1.440

- 754 -

COETZEE

and eventually be able to unraffle the truth if this is not the truth. So, I was not referring to any insults on the chairman as such but the chairman has got to rely on evidence that is put in front of him and with the mandate that was made available to him and obviously I am sticking to my story as, you know, telling the truth and obviously you are putting it to the commission, to the chairman, that I am the biggest liar and making up stories and fiction writer on earth.

Now, in regard to Mr Stevens, I have already told you that he went back to South Africa and that he went to the (10) police. -- I knew he went back, yes. I think it was on a Sunday. I of course asked him one favour on his way back. I do not know what his specific instructions was, it is some- thing related to the Chesterville inquest that I know, but it was not handled by me but I asked him to get hold of the petrol register of 1981 for me at Piet Retief, November '81, if possible, and make a copy of a certain entry in that re- gister.

I am not going to read the whole of this affidavit. It is quite lengthy. It is before the commission at this stage.(20) There is a copy, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: All right, I will make that B130.

Mr Marais, I have got only one serious concern and I think you will have to consider this. I thought or my im- pression was that your prime client was Mr Nofemela and it seems to me as if there may be a serious conflict of interest between the two clients.

You might have to consider that in due course.

MR MARAIS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR MARITZ: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I want to refer you(30) to page/..

C1.484

- 755 -

COETZEE

to page 5 of the affidavit. -- Is that of Mr Stevens?

Of Mr .. Do you have a copy there? -- No.

I am sorry, I do not think there is a copy available. I think your copy was switched by somebody else, but I will read it to you.

CHAIRMAN: Is it necessary to read everything?

MR MARITZ: No, no, I am just going to read small portions. I just want to put the witness into the picture. At page 5 he says he arrived in Lusaka on 10 February 1990 and then he met certain people and a day or two thereafter he met a cer- (10) tain Mr Mtu again

and then on page 6 of the affidavit at the top he says:

"Ongeveer drie dae later het Mtu .."

He spells it M-t-u, do you know such a person? -- Yes.

"Met Dirk Coetzee daar aangekom. Hy het ons net kom groet en gemeld dat ons later weer sal gesels. Van toe af het hy ons gereeld een keer per week kom besoek."

-- It was basically once in ten days. I think I have seen them whilst I was staying there three times, maybe four times in all.

(20)

Then he says "Die gesprekke het gewoonlik oor die onder- soeke te Piet Retief gehandel en die moordbendes". Is that right? -- Yes, in general, mostly on Piet Retief, what they were there for.

"En hy het gereeld na die veiligheidshoofkantoor as die hartjie van die hoer verwys". -- Nee, ek het altyd van die moordbendes gepraat vanuit die hoer van die hart - uit die hart van die hoer, ekskuus tog. Dit is 'n polisiespreekvorm vir iemand wat iets baie vertrouliks weet.

VOORSITTER: Is dit wat dit beteken? Mnr. Coetzee, is dit(30)

wat /...

Cl.524

- 756 -

COETZEE

wat die uitdrukking beteken? -- Ja, basies, mnr. Harms, vir dit wat baie vertroulik ..

Beteken dit nie iets meer as dit nie? -- Ja, 'n baie vertroulike posisie wat jy nie maklik van weet as jy nie self daaruit kom nie.

MR MARITZ: Then on that page, on page 6, he carries on with certain information that he gave and then at page 7 he says:

"'n Paar dae later het Dirk Coetzee ons weer besoek. Hy het aan ons genoem dat hy besig is om Askari's van Vlakplaas te werf om na Lusaka toe (10)

te kom. Hy het gesê dat twee Askari's al reg was om te kom, maar dat die ANC te tydsaam was en dat

hulle toe teruggekeer het Vlakplaas toe. Hy gebruik Spyker se vrou as sy kontakpersoon. Hy bel haar en dan gaan sy na haar suster se huis en wag daar vir die oproep omdat haar telefoon afgeluister word."

Is that the truth? -- No, I contact Spyker's wife, I did on a few occasions but she did not went to that house, to the other house.

No, but the salient point is that you were acting as (20) an agent to try and get people away from Vlakplaas. -- To get the truth out from Vlakplaas via people that was involved. Hundred percent correct.

Then he carries on:

"Dirk het ook aan my genoem dat hy 'n plan vir die ANC uitgewerk het om veiligheidshoofkantoor op te blaas sonder dat daar enige komplikasies sal wees. Die ANC het egter gesê dat hy eers moet wag omdat hulle nie nou die onderhandelinge in die wiele wil ry deur geweld te gebruik nie." -- Not at all true. (30)

Do you/..

C1.573

- 757 -

COETZEE

Do you deny this? -- I deny it.

Of course if it were true it would make total nonsense of all your evidence in regard to your conscience and your deep regret at your misdeeds in the past. -- It was made clear from the start that I would not be compelled to join the military wing of the ANC but that I will be incorporated in the intelligence section.

Then he says:

"Dirk het ook by 'n geleentheid aan ons genoem dat Spyker wat saam met hom uitgewyk het nie meer (10) saam met hom woon nie omrede Spyker op sy rug gery het en hy wat Dirk is altyd moes kosmaak en Spyker net rondgesit het, hy toe die ANC versoek het om vir Spyker ander verblyf te reël .." -- Nee.

"Dat Spyker toe later na 'n ander plek verskuif is
waar hy by ene Malaza woon."

Is that true? -- No, that is not true. It is a question that I
had to be near more frequent food with my diabetes, in other words
near motels and hotels where there is regular food and Spyker could
stay with a friend of him called Malaza. (20)

Well, then he carries on and the plans that Grobler had to
go over and so on, he did not go and then Stevens was supposed
to go and on page 9 he says that you gave him the following
instructions:

"Om foto's by konstabel Terblanche te kry wat hy van
die Toyota Corolla geneem het" -

that is in regard to the Piet Retief matter. -- Yes, I had nothing
to do with that at all.

Did you give him those instructions? -- Not at all. My only
request for him was, he was sent in by some section (30)

of the/..

C1.614

- 758 -

COETZEE

of the ANC that is dealing with the Piet Retief inquest at the
moment, trying to collect evidence in conjunction with the lawyers
and my only request is if he is there and he has got access to
the petrol-book of November 1981 I would be interested in the page
where petrol was put in that night with the burning of the Mxenge
car.

Oh, he says so. That is his last item. "Ek moes ook 1981
se petrolboek in die hande kry om vas te stel op watter datum hy
en Van Dyk petrol .." - "hy" referring to you - "en Van Dyk petrol
op Piet Retief ingegooi het en die voorvalleboek (10) waar daar
'n klagte aangemeld is van 'n voertuig wa tussen Houtkop en
Mahamba-grenspas uitgebrand is. Dit hou alles ver- band met die
Mxenge-moord." -- Dit is hy, dit is hy, maar ek het hom die presiese
datum gegee wat ons petrol in sou gooi, die Sondag/Maandagnag,

22/23 November, en gevra as daar 'n inskrywing is ten opsigte van die brand van die voertuig, wie die persoon is wat die brand ontdek het. Ek het nie geweet dat daar alreeds verklarings van die persoon - dat hulle al so 'n persoon gevind het nie.

I recall that, I do not know exactly when it was, but(20) during cross-examination I asked you something and you turned to my learned friend, Mr Kuny, and you asked him whether you could have reference to certain documents. Were you then referring to the expected documents which Stevens was supposed to have gone and stolen for you? -- No, I think it was with reference to the Botswana documents, whether they have received it already.

It was not these documents? -- No.

Well, you now know why they never turned up, this petrol-book, because Stevens did not go and do his job. He (30) turned himself/..

Cl.657

- 759 -

COETZEE

turned himself over to the SAP. -- Yes.

What is more .. -- But you also know, of course Mr Maritz, that there were three warrants of arrest according to Stevens out for him for not attending court cases and I suppose he made some compromise. His brother was a sergeant at Piet Retief police station and it looks to me that he ended up with a compromise and they withdraw the warrants of arrest which he said was issued against him and I was once present when he spoke to his mother from the Pamotsi Hotel from a TV teams room when his mother specifically was very worried (10) about this warrants of arrest and he said do not worry about it. So, it looks to me it was to some kind of compromise.

CHAIRMAN: Warrant of arrest not to appear, for failure to appear in court is not that serious, is it? -- I believe he said there was three out, three warrants out. I do not know for what purposes specific.

MR MARITZ: Well, I suppose you and your ANC comrades evaluated the situation and decided that he was not a risk, that he would go and do as he was told. -- I was not at all involved. When I learned he was going in, I asked him for(20) that last favour, the petrol-book, if he has got the oppor- tunity like he said he had and maybe just to check on the entry when that car - who found that car burning and when it was found.

Can you think of any reason why he would be lying when he tells a story of your plans to blow up the security head- quarters in Pretoria? -- I was not at all involved in any planning of blowing up any places.

CHAIRMAN: No, the question was do you have a reason to sus- pect Stevens, why would he implicate you? -- I cannot at (30)

all tell/..

C1.694

- 760 -

COETZEE

all tell.

MR MARITZ: In the final analysis, Mr Coetzee, I want to put it to you that you saw in the revelations of Nofemela the oppor- tunity to vent your hate towards the police. That is the fons et origo of your whole attack, of all your stories, of all the nonsense that you have been spouting over the past months and there is not a word of truth in it. -- Not at all. It is exactly as I said and I am sure with the capability of Mr Harms and the commission the truth eventually will come out.

I had the opportunity there or the choice to just sit put (10) and lie, as everyone else is doing now, or to come out with the truth. I had no reason. I had a very good job coming up at that stage, had a wife, my whole family is there. My fight with the police was something of the past. I have accepted it and at that time there was no hatred at all in me. In fact, it was the first time again that I had to make a decision and I decided this was the right time to get into the clear and that is why, you will

see too, even although Almond did not mention this diamond dealer I brought out but everything. So if there is an opportunity to go back one day, I can go (20) back with a complete, clear conscience and start a new leaf. If not, then I will remain out in exile but at least I have made peace with myself and I think with the Man above.

CHAIRMAN: But what entitles you, in your own view, to any so-called new life as far as your involvement say with the diamond dealer - you committed a crime on your own showing.

-- Yes, I did, but I mean then I can start afresh. There is nothing hanging, no axe hanging over my head any more ..

Why can't there be an axe hanging over your head about your involvement in that crime? -- No, I just wanted (30)
everything/..

Cl.746

- 761 -

COETZEE

everything out, Mr Chairman, everything.

No, but in other words you foresee that you will return or may return and what you did would bear no consequences? -- I do not understand it, Mr Chairman.

In other words what you now say is that you foresee the day when you will return to South Africa and what you did would bear no consequences. -- No, not in that way. I just meant that I want to clean my past. I do not want to be threatened if ...

No, but your past is not cleaned. I mean, how do you(10) do that? Simply by telling the truth? -- No, but I am talking about my conscience now.

Yes, but why don't you put up with your conscience and take the consequences, if you want to cleanse your conscience? -- I have cleaned it and I am sitting up with the consequences, Mr Harmse.

No, you are not. -- I am.

You are expecting a new life, becoming a general in the police

or a brigadier without examinations. -- Mr Chairman, I think you could hear of the words goggojoor and kollojoor (20) and so I was only joking and it is my brother-in-law, I mean ...

No, but you said just now that those are your true feelings.

You did not say just now that you regard that as .. -- No, I said it is true what is standing there. I mean, it was jokingly. If Mr Chairman reads it again and you will see - I can hand you the letter that him and his children and wife has written to me and then you will see in what context the reply is. It was not at all a serious ambition to go and work for the police again one day or seeing it as such. (30)

Yes/..

Cl.788

- 762 -

COETZEE

Yes, Mr Maritz?

MR MARITZ: I have done, thank you very much, Mr Chairman. Thank you for your patience.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Coetzee, your ordeal is not over unfortunately. There are others who still want to ask you questions.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR TEA.

(10)

C2.2

- 763 -

COETZEE

THE COMMISSION RESUMES AFTER TEA:

DIRK COETZEE still under oath:

CHAIRMAN: As far as EXHIBIT B130 is concerned, that is the affidavit of Stevens, the affidavit is under embargo until further notice and may not be distributed by the lawyers who received copies.

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman, I may just point out out at this stage that when I came back at some stage during tea some journalists were reading my copies that were lying around. I do not know if they were reading the Stevens copy as well. So, I just want to place that on record. (20)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, during the course of your evidence during cross-examination you posed a question, the question was this, you said "Why would I sit here and lie about these incidents". Now, that appears to us to be a matter not only of public concern but also in fairness to you a matter which ought to be investigated. My learned friend, Mr Maritz, has suggested to you one possibility and that is that you are on a personal (30)

campaign, crusade, if you like, because of a grudge which you bear against certain members of the police. What we would like to do is put forward to you for your acceptance or denial other possibilities and the first which we would like to put to you as a possible reason why you would do exactly what you have done is because we suggest to you that there is a financial gain in all of this probably for you, is that so? -- Not at all. Financially at the moment it is going very bad with me.

Have you not negotiated with anyone, any person or institution, newspaper, to sell your story as it were? -- No, not as yet

(10)

Did you have that intention? -- Once I have got all my

whole/..

C2.28

- 764 -

COETZEE

whole - I am busy writing up my whole story. I am busy writing up my whole story and if someone is interested in it I will for sure sell that story, that is correct.

Well, the question is really this ...

CHAIRMAN: But have you attempted to obtain office for your story?

-- Not from the start. As I said - because I had to always on debriefing by persons start from A to Z I decided to write up the whole story as it is and at the moment I am not finished with it yet, but it is everything out of the commission, falling out of the mandate of the commission, from day one, when I was born, until where I am now. I did write - I am busy writing it up.

MR VISSER: But, Mr Coetzee, before you left South Africa was the financial implication of your story to be sold possibly not at the back of your mind? -- No, not at all. In fact all negotiations as to TV rights, I think there was offers from Kern News Magazine, from ABC Network and amounts mentioned from up to R50 000 or dollars. I have never been involved in any of them.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: No, but you have received offers? -- Not directly. They

could not ...

But you know of offers? -- I know of offers that was made.
MR VISSER: Would you say that such offers would be conditional upon how your evidence went down here before the commission? -- No, not at all. Up till this stage I have received nothing.

My interviews have been organised by the publicity department of the ANC and that is where it ended. I have not received any refunding, any money for any interview at all, not from day one.

But you/..

C2.51

- 765 -

(10)
COETZEE

But you told this commission that you and Mr Jacques Pauw, since as early as 1985 spoke about, the two of you together, writing a book about, if I may call it, your story. -- No, I do not think it was put that way. I met Mr Jacques Pauw in '85. About - a few weeks before Nofemela spoke Mr Jacques Pauw approached me to write some book in a romance"sation" form of my life. That is true.

Would that not have been a true account? Would that have been a fiction book? Is that what you say? -- Not revealing the true facts and true names, fiction building. I do not know he would have gone about it. He approached me on it and as I said I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but he wanted to write a book which he would have sold. (20)

CHAIRMAN: But what facts of your life were of interest to him at that stage? -- All this that happened at Vlakplaas.

No, but then he must have known of it. -- Yes, he did.

So, Jacques Pauw knew before Nofemela's revelations of your whole story? -- Ja, not in fine detail ...

Yes, but he had the general picture before then? -- Yes, he had the general picture.

So, it was not because of Nofemela that you made your disclosures, you had already made them before Nofemela? -- Not (30)

in the way that I have done now, the whole ...

No, but sufficiently for Jacques Pauw to know that there were so many atrocities committed by the police over such a year, such a period? -- Yes.

I find that amazing, any way. -- Yes, but it was just for the fiction story. It was not to tell the ...

No, but Jacques Pauw's interest in your story on a fictionalised basis was based upon the facts you had given

him/..

C2.74

- 766 -

(10)

COETZEE

him of your life. -- Yes.

So, before Nofemela spoke Jacques Pauw knew the story. -- Yes.

In broad detail. -- In broad detail, not ...

Who else knew the story before Nofemela spoke in broad detail? -- Well, I have also spoken to Mr Tiaan van der Merwe, a member of parliament, in 1985 about it.

You gave him the story in broad detail? -- In broad detail, ja.

(20)

Who else? -- And just before I left I have given my brother, I discussed the story with him and said - to get his opinion whether I - what stand me to do. That was after Nofemela spoke.

So it was not a surprise to you when Nofemela broke his story? -- I do not think it was to anyone of us a surprise that was involved.

Now, who else - it was Tiaan van der Merwe and it was Pauw and it was your brother, who else? Who else knew your story before you .. -- I cannot think of anyone specific now. Mr Martin Welsh of Rapport those days was with Mr Pauw.

I see, you also told the story to Welsh. -- Ja.

(30)

MR VISSER: In fact, if I could refer you to a newspaper report in the Sowetan of 20 November 1989 or as far as one can believe

newspaper reports let me read to you what this report says. It says:

"PFP members knew about killings says spokesman" and it is under the heading "'Squads' MP's knew" and the article proceeds to say:

"At least two prominent members of the old Progressive Federal Party heard about death

squad/..

C2.103

- 767 -

COETZEE

(10)

squad activities within the South African Police a number of years ago."

Can you tell us who those two prominent members were? -- I only know of Mr Tiaan van der Merwe.

The articles says:

"Mr Tiaan van der Merwe, the Democratic Party spokesman for law and order 'Heard this from Captain Dirk Coetzee himself'. He told the Sowetan yesterday Van der Merwe said he was instructed by Dr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert to meet with a civil servant, Mr Frans Welpton, and Coetzee 'to discuss improper activities with regard to telephone tapping'. It was at this meeting in Johannesburg that Van der Merwe heard of 'killings by the security police'. 'Coetzee told me he was directly involved in the Ruth First murder and about the smuggling of explosives by diplomatic bags into London' Van der Merwe said."

(20)

Is that true? -- Ja, not the Ruth First murder personally involved, through an envelope that was stolen in Swaziland. About the smuggling of explosives in the diplomatic bag, yes.

(30)

The meeting did not take place in Johannesburg, but in Mr Frans Welpton's house where Mr Van der Merwe slept those days

and for instance I always referred to the Mxenge murder as the lawyer from Durban.

Mr Coetzee, the question was simply this: Were you personally involved in smuggling explosives by diplomatic bags into London? -- No, no, no. I did not say that.

So, the report is not correct? -- Ja. No, I did not say that. I said I knew about it.

The question was then posed: Why didn't he do anything about it/..

C2.123

- 768 -

(10)
COETZEE

about it? -

"I was not surprised at all. Everybody knew that these things were going on in the country and anyway I tried to get something on paper but failed."

So it goes on and there is another article, just to be placed on record.

CHAIRMAN: But the point here is the following, Mr Coetzee, if the report is correct and if Mr Tiaan van der Merwe is correct you told him of two instances. The exportation of explosives in diplomatic bags and the death of the lady in Mozambique. (20)

-- I think it was more than that, far more detailed in that - as the incidents that happened.

Did you tell him of your personal involvement in anything? -- Yes, that I was involved with the lawyer in Durban's murder for instance and ...

That you planned it. Did you tell him that? Did you tell Mr Tiaan van der Merwe that you .. -- No, not in that detail.

How do you say you were involved? -- In the - well, say for instance in the planning of the killing, but I cannot remember the exact words that I told him. (30)

Did you tell him you were involved in the planning of the killing of a black lawyer in Durban? -- I do not know my exact words but it was to the effect that I was involved in the killing of a lawyer in Durban, a black lawyer, and of course more incidents than that, but very broadly without specific details.

MR VISSER: Why didn't you tell Mr Van der Merwe that you were referring to Mxenge? -- Well, if I had been given details, I would/..

C2.147 - 769 - COETZEE
(10)

would have been ended up in the country, faced up with a wall of denials as I am now here in exile faced with it.

What difference would it have made if you had mentioned the name Mxenge as opposed to referring to the killing of a lawyer in Durban? -- Then they would have had details of it and I would have been found guilty of murder.

CHAIRMAN: But there was only one black lawyer in Durban killed. -- That is how I referred to it.

No, but the question is why and now you explain it that they might trace you and then I say to you that they in any could trace it would be Mr Mxenge because it was a notorious killing of an important black lawyer, so that the reason you gave cannot be correct. Can you suggest any other reason? -- No, the only reason is or the fact of the truth is I mentioned - I always referred to Mr Mxenge's murder as the lawyer in Durban. (20)

But why didn't you mention his name? -- I do not know. That is how I referred to him. To me it was then giving fine detail of it and I could end up in trouble.

MR VISSER: Let me just ask you this last question on this issue, we have a copy here of a press report of the Star of the same day - no, I am sorry, 20 November 1989 and in that report the following is stated. (30)

"Democratic Party law and order spokesman,

Mr Tiaan van der Merwe, said at the week-end .."

May I interrupt myself, this is in 1989, do you understand?

"Said at the week-end that Captain Coetzee had himself told him a number of years ago about death squad activities."

Is that true? -- Yes, I have said I have told him in broad

sense/..

C2.170

- 770 -

COETZEE

(10)

sense of the poisoning, the killings, I did.

You told him about Vusi and Peter and Mtimkulu and Kon- dile?

-- In general, yes, without mentioning names.

Now, can you offer any reason or explanation why a politician, who is an opposition politician to the government, made nothing of these stories which you told him? -- I cannot say at all. I think Mr Van der Merwe will be able to explain it, Mr Visser.

Well, maybe he might be asked to come and explain that. -- Yes.

(20)

Well, to wrap up this point, you say it was not for personal financial gain that you are telling these stories?

-- Not at all.

And we now know it is not because of a grudge you bear against the police. -- Not at the stage when I left.

There is a third possibility here. What about personal prestige? Aren't you a person - and I am asking this, I am not putting it as a statement, I am asking this, aren't you a person who likes to believe that he is the man of the moment? -- No, not at all, not in that way. If it comes to the truth or if it comes to an incident I do my best and I give everything. I was just before leaving the country - I do not know whether, you must

(30)

please say when it is getting boring or you want to stop me - I was busy with General Visser, the previous CID chief and in conjunction he spoke to Major-General Basie Smit and his son, Nico Visser, with the South African Insurance Association, Mr Rodney Schneburger in Johannesburg, to start off a private company pricing motor cars, so I was well on my way with a good, private business that we wanted to start with the co-operation of the police at that stage. General Visser

specifically/..

C2.194

- 771 -

(10)
COETZEE

specifically asked General Basie Smit, he said no grudges against me and I would have started that off. I made peace with myself and the fact that I could not fight the system as I saw it in 1985 and went on with my life. I had a family to care for and two children.

Mr Coetzee, perhaps we misunderstood each other. I thought I suggested to you that we are through with the question of personal financial gain. I am now on another aspect entirely. I will repeat the question to you and perhaps you can answer it this time.

(20)

I am asking you whether your telling of these stories or the reason therefore, does not have something to do with a personal prestige which you seek for yourself? -- Not at all. I was not brought up that way.

And I also asked you whether you do not consider yourself from time to time as wanting to be the man of the moment and you denied that. -- If it comes to the push and there is something to do then I do it very well. If that means the man of the moment, then I am the man of the moment.

Let me put another possibility to you because you see, Mr Coetzee, at the end of the commission the chairman is going to have to weigh up all these possibilities and find out whether any

(30)

of them are not probable and that is why in fairness to you we put these to you. -- I am sure.

Are you a man who sometimes suffer, if I may call it that from flights of fancy? -- Flights of fancy?

Yes, romantacise yourself in situations, suffer from a run-away imagination. -- No, not at all.

And if anybody should say so it would be entire incor- rect? -- Ja well, apart from the normal human being day- dreams and not an extraordinary flight of imaginations,

getting carried/..
(10)

C2.220

- 772 -

COETZEE

getting carried away.

In other words you do not suffer from an imagination more than other people is what you say? -- Than the normal, that is right.

The next point, Mr Coetzee, is I believe with respect, has been shown amply by my learned friend and I just want you to wrap up your final reply to that question in the system which we are working on now and that is this: We are going to argue, if we
(20)
are allowed, before the commission at the end that you had an unsuccessful career in the South African Police, firstly, secondly, that you became at loggerheads with the system quite early in your career. In fact when you were at the police college and that that situation never changed to the end. Now, there are two questions here. Would you like me to break them up? First of all you did not have a success- ful career in the South African Police, is that correct? -- I think I have had a very successful career in the South African Police. If you go through my career I think you will see it. So much so at 1981, as Mr Maritz suggested,
(30)
when I was at my lowest and they had just sort of at Vlakplaas to get rid of me I was awarded on 25 May 1981 the police medal

for faithful conduct and service.

Yes, you were in the police for ten years by that time, weren't you? -- Yes, eleven years.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Coetzee, beyond - since end of - let us put it this way, since the end of '81 your career in the police was highly frustrating, let us put it that way. -- Ja, that is correct.

So, if you had a successful career up to then, from then onwards it either became static or it was not, as far as you were/..

C2.250

- 773 -

(10)

COETZEE

were concerned, a great career any longer. -- That is correct.

MR VISSER: And isn't it true that in your own mind you blamed certain people for it in the police, certain officers? Isn't that true? -- Yes, after getting into loggerheads with them, that is right.

That is right. -- I do not know whether you want us to deal with it because if you are going to argue it in full, for instance the police college version where I came up for an adjust rule that was in working for more than 22 years and it was eventually put right. (20)

Mr Coetzee, that may very well be so, the point there be you yourself used certain words which meant only one thing and that is that you came to loggerheads with the system. -- Yes, that is why I say I do not want you to argue, just as it stands there, but if you listen to the specific case and the end result you could see that I was not doing it on my own and just for fighting the system. I was putting a rule that was interpreted wrongly over more than 20 years correctly so that justice could prevail amongst the students in the college.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: No, I take your point. I think the only point Mr Visser is putting to Mr Coetzee is that what you felt was right was not

how the police saw it, the police force as a whole. So, you fought for what you thought was - that right was on your side or justice was on your side. -- And in this specific instance it was proved.

That was such an instance. -- And it was proved that I was right.

Yes, yes, I take your point.

MR VISSER: You became at loggerheads, this is the only point really, you became at loggerheads .. -- Well, if that is what you call/..

C2.279 - 774 - (10)
COETZEE

you call standing up for justice, I became to loggerheads.

Yes. -- Ja.

And then there was a question of a transfer and you asked to be left in Pretoria and you were transferred to Volksrust. -- Yes, just for that year to finish my studies.

And so we can go on and on about things that happened in the police which upset you. -- Yes, but I can put them all in context and you will see it was not so upsetting when it was resolved in the end.

Yes, but you resented these things happening to you in the police? -- No, not at all. I abide by the final decisions always. (20)

Now, at the end, and we will come to that in a moment, at the end when you left the police you were declared medically unfit for service in the South African Police. -- On my application, that is correct.

Now, I want to ask you this, didn't you regard this really as being kicked out of the police? -- Not at all, not at all. That is the way the police would like to see it. It was not that.

I applied for it on my own, I got it in the end and I received a normal police pension and a free police medical for the rest of my life and I retained my rank like any normal police pensioner. (30)

While you are on that point, it is true that today as you sit there and giving evidence you are receiving a police pension.

-- That is correct.

A free medical from the police. -- That is correct.

And you received a gratuity. -- That is correct.

When you left the police. -- That is right.

The gratuity was approximately R43 000? -- No, I think it was less/..

C2.302

- 775 -

COETZEE

(10)

was less than that because we bought pension back and I think in the end it was something in the 30 000.

And your pension was at the time of your disciplinary hearing an amount of R1 009 per month. -- It would have been that if I got out on pension, yes, but I was not out on pension yet at that stage.

I am talking about the first pension you received after you were declared medically unfit. -- Ja, that was on 31 January 1986 after I have left the police.

Well, would you just tell us what the amount was that you received. -- Roundabout that. (20)

Well .. -- Well, you said during the disciplinary hearing, Mr Visser, and I did not receive pension.

CHAIRMAN: All right, let us not carry on with the argument.

MR VISSER: And that has increased as time went by? -- Every time the civil service gets a 10% increase I think the pension goes up accordingly.

Yes, you share and can you just tell us what the pension is which you are receiving from the police today? -- Roundabout R1 280 I think.

(30)

Would it be true to say of you, Mr Coetzee, that if you became disenchanted you are prepared to take the scrum with you? -- It

has always been my attitude. If the truth must come out I will tell the whole truth and what I mean by that even a man like Brigadier Jan du Preez that has been close to me, Brigadier Van der Hoven, Brigadier Van Rensburg, everyone has to get out and speak the truth. It is the only way the problem can be resolved.

So, we might have stumbled here on one of the reasons why you are giving this evidence and that is that according to
your/..

C2.328

- 776 -

COETZEE
(10)

your view of what is right and wrong you are here to take the scrum with you? -- If that is what you mean by speaking the truth and wanting everyone else involved to speak the truth, exactly that is. With other words not prepared to stand up being scapegoat alone.

The truth as you see it? -- Yes.

Would you say that you suffer from a persecution complex?

-- No.

Is that possibly a reason? -- No, not at all.

And that you are doing this for personal satisfaction. --
(20)
Not at all.

All right. So we rule out that one on your evidence. The next possibility, again because if it is true that you feel wronged and you have a resentment and you may have a grudge, are you a person who becomes aggressive to people and who would act more aggressively than would a normal person perhaps? -- No, I usually resolve - when I get exasperated, a feeling of helplessness, to the conventional - unconventional way of venting my helplessness by swearing like no one can in history, but I have never went into a fist fight or - with anyone.

(30)
In point of fact, while you are on that point, while you were, according to your evidence, the leader of the police assassination

squad in South Africa, not only did you not personally and independently ever kill anyone, but it appears that you did not even assault anyone, is that correct? -- Yes.

I am specifically referring to Pillay, you never assaulted Pillay, did you? -- I did not.

Mr Coetzee, I want you to bear with me while I refer you to certain evidence which was given at a disciplinary hearing where you/..

C2.360

- 777 -

COETZEE

(10)

where you had to answer to certain charges which were brought against you. By way of introduction is it correct that the person who instigated this hearing against you was General Johan Coetzee? -- That is correct.

Is it also correct that this particular hearing was slightly different than a normal police disciplinary hearing inasmuch as the chief regional magistrate of Pretoria was the presiding officer at that hearing? -- I think one of the biggest hearings of that kind in the history of the police in the words of the prosecutor. He was also assisted by Major- General Frans van Rensburg.

(20)

Yes. Is it correct that according to police regulations when an officer, a member of the police, has to stand trial before a disciplinary hearing, he is presented with the charges and given an opportunity to explain or to answer the charges before the hearing? -- That is correct.

And that was done in your case also? -- Yes, that is correct.

And at the time when you were asked to give your answer to the charges, is it correct that you said that you did not want to say anything because you believed that you would not receive a fair hearing. -- That is correct.

(30)

Nor a fair appeal. -- That is correct.

And is it correct that as far as you thinking that you would

not receive a fair appeal was on the basis that the Minister of Law and Order, then Minister La Grange, and the commissioner of police were involved also in an illegal telephone tapping and that would be the reason? -- That is correct and this matter related to the resignation of Minister Fanie Botha at that time and the involvement of

Minister Fanie/..

C2.393

- 778 -

COETEE

Minister Fanie Botha at that time and the involvement of Minister Fanie Botha with Brigadier Jan Blaauw and Frans Welpton into diamond concessions. (10)

Let us not get .. -- Yes, but I would just like you to put it in context otherwise you put bits and pieces to the chairman that might mislead him.

Well, the whole .. -- If we want to deal with the trial I think we must deal with it in full for you to be able to understand the whole trial.

Mr Coetzee, I undertake to place all the documents concerning that trial before the honourable chairman in due course. -- Good. (20)

Is it correct that you were represented at that hearing by my learned friend Mr De Vos? -- And the attorney Brian Currin, that is correct.

Yes, he was the attorney, and is it also correct that on your behalf evidence was given by Dr Marquard de Villiers? -- That is correct.

Now, I want to first of all take you through some of the evidence which he gave on your behalf and which evidence you accepted, not so? -- Yes, that hearing was a footwork hearing in all because I was trying for my medical fund, but you can go on and I will refer you in the prosecutor's own words at the end that (30)

- where you could see clearly that it was foot- work, but start off with that, please, Mr Visser.

Are you now saying that you .. -- Yes.

You did not agree with what Dr De Villiers said on your behalf. -- No, I did not because you will see - start with it, I will put it in context. You start with it, read it, please.

At page 760 of the record he describes you as a
diabetes/..

C2.420 - 779 - COETZEE
(10)

diabetes mellitus and he says diabetes mellitus concerns the metabolism of the brain. Do you have any comment on that? -- Depending on what your blood sugar level is, yes. I must just remind you before you go on, our world's best sportmen - in all facets there are diabetics - insulin dependant diabetics there too, so we are for sure not insane that I can promise you.

I never said that. -- If you are not regulated you get disturbances, that is for sure.

At the same page the doctor on your behalf then went on to explain to the preceding officers that there are two types of
(20)
diabetes, the one being a matured type which is controllable and the other being a type which he called a brittle diabetes. -- Juvenile onset, yes.

And he said "that is a condition which is brought about as a result of an insulin deficiency in the body". -- That is correct.

You do not have any problem with that? -- No.

He also explained at page 761 that he considers that condition to be a very serious condition. It is a condition, he says, that can only be treated by introducing insulin into the body but, says he, on your behalf that that is a hit and run type of affair,
(30)
he says because it is not possible to determine the exact levels at each occasion when you administer insulin to such a patient

what his sugar, blood sugar levels are, the result of that being that you may give too much or too little insulin on any particular time. Would that be correct? -- Can I just help you right, I have got a glucose meter here with me and my little son, that is also a diabetic and I can tell you, if you give me five minutes that I can

go and/..

C2.451

- 780 -

COETZEE

go and fetch my glucose meter and I will tell you exactly what my blood sugar is now, in one minute's time. (10)

According to your expert he gave evidence to the hearing, disciplinary hearing, that it is a very difficult condition to control. -- Yes.

Let us leave it at that. -- Okay.

And then he says at page 761 that when too much insulin is administered to such a person he goes into a state when he referred to as hypoglycaemia. -- That is right, or a low blood sugar level, you can call it.

Let me read to you exactly what he says in the light of your last answer. I am reading, Mr Chairman, from 761 of the record, Dr De Villiers's evidence. He says: (20)

"En met die hulp alleen van insulien kan die toestand hanteer word. Dit is verder 'n toestand wat veelvuldige metaboliese effekte het, veelvuldige metaboliese effek, dit wil sê die werking van die brein onder andere word ook aangetas. Die gebruik van insulien in hierdie gevalle word in elke geval individueel bepaal. Dit word bepaal deur wat die Engelse noem 'trial and error'. Die man word gespuit totdat die bloedvlakke van suiker op so 'n vlak is dat dit nie mer 'n gevaar vir hom inhou

(30)

nie, maar ongelukkig in dié proses gebeur dit dat te veel insulien op sy eie ou 'n nuwe toestand skep. (Dit is seker nou 'n nuwe toestand skep.) Dit is die toestand van lae bloedsuiker of hipoglisemie. Hipoglusimie is 'n toestand waar die bloedsuiker tot 'n vlak daal waar dit die funksie van die brei benadeel."

And then/..

C2.482

- 781 -

COETZEE

(10)

And then he goes on to explain that the brain takes nourishment from the blood to, as he put it, charge its batteries and if there is insufficient sugar in the blood the batteries run flat and the brain does not function properly. Let me just ask you this at this stage: This is the evidence which De Villiers gave on your behalf. -- That is right.

About your particular, you, Dirk Coetzee's, particular condition. -- What I told him. If you go further you can sum up that whole story, if you come to the prosecutor addressing the ...

(20)

We will come to that. -- Okay, but you are wasting a lot of time.

Well, maybe so. At page 762 he continues to say:

"Dit is die rekeningsvermoë van die brein en die vatbaarheid van die brein en die besluitneming van die brein, die logika en al die ander vermoëns van die brein is afhanklik van die integriteit van daardie sellulêre massa en die bestanddele wat hom voed.

Nou is dit so dat die brein is afhanklik van suiker as 'n energiebron en in suikersiekte word hierdie energiebron versteur sodat as ons so 'n persoon te veel insulien sou toedien dan sal daardie selle

(30)

funksioneer soos 'n pap battery."

And he refers to medical books, et cetera, one of which is Cooper, Schwer and Smith Alcohol, Drugs and Road Traffic and he quotes "Such person may be confused, excited, aggressive and disorient for time and place and then he goes on to say that if such a person takes in alcohol on top of it, then it is really a serious situation. -- I can stick you a drinking spree and I will drink you under the table and drive you home

and put/..

C2.512

- 782 -

(10)
COETZEE

and put you in bed and still go to sleep.

That is quite possible, Mr Coetzee, I cannot hold my liquor. -- Well, take me on on that challenge, please.

Now, he then at page 763 explains to the chairman that he examined you and that he obtained a history from you and he says that you suffer from hypoglycaemia .. -- Which I told him. He could not prove it in tests. That is what I told him.

So, it is true, and ...

CHAIRMAN: Well, did you lie to him or not? -- Yes, I did.

(20)
It was footwork because I could see I was on my way out and I think if he just turns to the last page where the - or to the pages where the prosecutor argues this medical condition of mine. It says the law makes provision for a person to be under observation for a month, or I do not know how long, for medical tests, et cetera, and I was only with Dr Marquard de Villiers for three days and he tried to push me int a hypo- glycaemia with accessive doses of insulin and I had such a strong resistance that he could not get me into that hypo- glycaemia. So, what this all actually boils down to is that at a stage, if you go in an insulin coma of too
(30)
much insulin then for that few minutes or that - because you cannot stay there too long then I mean you eventually won't wake up or

have per- manent brain damage, so for that period there can be a dis- turbance of the brain, but the prosecutor argued it quite strongly on the end that it was never proved. I was never subjected to severe - all these severe tests according to the law and that it was in fact of no saying, all this that Mr Visser ...

CHAIRMAN: Well, obviously they did not believe the prose- cutor.
-- It is one way of putting it.

I mean/..

C2.549

- 783 -

COETZEE

(10)

I mean that is the fact, the prosecutor's argument was not accepted. -- Well, it was true, his argument.

MR VISSER: That may be but it was not accepted. -- Okay, let us get to it.

Well, isn't it true? It was not accepted? Obviously the function of the prosecutor was to break down Dr De Villiers's story.

CHAIRMAN: But I think let us hear what Dr De Villiers said.

MR VISSER: He then says, as far as ...

CHAIRMAN: In other words what you say, Mr Coetzee, you fabricated the evidence at the police trial to get out of your difficulties?

(20)

-- That was based on information that I gave him ...

Fabricated information. -- Yes.

Fabricated information for that trial. -- That I go into comas, ja.

Carry on, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: And Dr De Villiers swallowed all of this. -- Yes.

He says, referring to a book by Mia, Gross, Slater and Roth Clinical Psychiatry he quotes and he says:

"In hypoglycaemia on the other hand no delirious symptoms are seen. You cannot see a delirious symptom, like anoxia. It produces only a falling off in mental performance."

(30)

Then he says about a falling off in mental performance, he goes on to quote and he says: "Restlessless, irratibality and full-hardy behaviour are early signs" and then he goes on to say hypoglycaemia may be induced by insulin by may also occur spontaneously if caused by pancreatic neo-plasm. Over the page, at 765, Dr De Villiers, on your behalf, goes on to say/..

C2.577

- 784 -

COETZEE

say, he refers to Todd, Colins and Maartens, another ...

(10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, couldn't you cut it slightly shorter, Mr Visser.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, and he speaks of the deceptive nature and the diversitility(?) of the condition and then I would like to quote what Dr De Villiers said at the bottom of 765, he says:

"Ook die teenwoordigheid van emosionele onstabili-
teit en van aggressiewe gedrag. Ons moet eintlik
sê en of, en of elke keer en ook die moontlikheid
van amnesiese episodes, dit wil sê episodes wat
nie later onthou word deur die persoon nie"

and then, Mr Coetzee, he regards March 1981 as a watershed date
in your medical history. Do you remember what happened in March
1981? -- I became an insulin dependant diabetic. (20)

You were certificied an insulin dependant diabetic, is that correct? -- I became an insulin dependant diabetic, yes.

Were you not certified then? -- No, I do not know.

And he says that, to take up your point about the prose-
cutor, when the prosecutor asks this point, he said that there is only
one true examination of your condition and that is to look at the
Dirk Coetzee prior to March 1981 and subsequent to March 1981.

What he is saying is that there was a fundamental change in you
since March 1981, would he be correct to say that? -- He has never
known me before March 1981. Dr Marquard de Villiers? (30)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but he presumably gave his evidence on information you gave. -- That he got from me.

From you? -- Yes.

And that you fabricated? -- Ja, I told him what I wanted to tell/..

C2.613

- 785 -

COETZEE

to tell him, yes.

MR VISSER: Then very quickly I want to refer to 767 where he explains that a person in your condition becomes irrational and he refers to an appointment which he had with you the previous day for which you did not turn up and you just went to sleep and he says at line 20: (10)

"En dit klop met ander gevolgtrekkings wat ek gaan maak oor sy onverantwoordelike gedrag wanneer sy bloedsuiker laag is."

And then he goes on to say:

"In ieder geval die posisie is dus dat sedert 1981 .."

He means to say March 1981 -

"het hy 'n broes diabetes wat nie alleen op vyf geleenthede nie, maar op baie ander geleenthede gelei het tot hipoglusimie. Die simptome van hipoglusimie is fisiese gewaarwordings daarvan, dat so 'n persoon sweterig word, ensvoorts en dan ook subkliniese tekens waar jy glad nie dit kan sien nie" (20)

and then he comes to the point where he talks about what you told him and I want to read to you exactly what his evidence was in this regard. It is at 768. He says:

"Hy (that is you) het my as volg gesê: Hy sê hy word impulsief en aggressief: 'I do not weigh up the odds'." (30)

Het u dit vir hom gesê? -- Ja, ek het dit vir hom gesê.

I am sorry, did you tell him that? -- I did.

And was it true? -- What I told him, yes.

I am sorry. -- Yes.

He goes on to say "hy word onverantwoordelik, kan nie

'worry'/. .

C2.645

- 786 -

COETZEE

'worry' nie". Did you tell Dr De Villiers that? -- Yes, I did tell him that.

(10)

And was it true? -- If it comes to the stages, yes.

He goes on: "Vat die hele skrum saam met my". Did you say that to Dr De Villiers? -- I did.

And that we know already is true? -- We know already it is true.

He goes on, he says: "Hy sê ek word 'n 'man on the spur of the moment'". Did you tell Dr De Villiers that? -- I did.

And is it true? -- No, I first weigh my consequences as I did in this case.

He goes on to say ...

(20)

CHAIRMAN: No, always, do you always weigh your consequences or?

-- No, sometimes I might refer to ...

So that is partially true? -- Ja, partially true.

MR VISSER: "Hy sê", says Dr De Villiers about you "hy het al ingebreek in plekke en op mense geskiet wat hy nie moes ge- doen het nie". -- Ja, referring ..

Did you do that? -- I did.

Incidentally, when did you shoot at people? -- In Botswana, Gaborone.

That was at one person. -- That is right.

(30)

Who were the other "mense"? -- No one else.

But you said to him "op mense geskiet". -- I was referring

to the house-breaking of the United Nations High Commission for Refugee offices and to the shooting in Bots- wana which I well planned in advance and took place over hours.

He goes on to say "Hy sê (you did) hy het al briewe geskryf wat hom in die moeilikheid sou laat beland het, maar dan is/..

C2.675

- 787 -

COETZEE

dan is dit gestop deur sy seniors". Did you tell him that? -- Ja, I did.

(10)

Was it true? -- Yes, it is true.

"Hy sê dit het hom ontstel, want ten tye van hierdie dinge lyk dit heeltemal reg vir hom". Did you say that to him? -- I did say it to him.

And is it true? -- Yes.

And then he goes on at page 769: "Hy is in dieselfde al- gemene toestand as 'n persoon .." this is Dr De Villiers speaking again "wat nie klinies dronk is nie, maar wat drank in hom het. Ek maak hierdie stelling en ek staan daarby dat selfs een tot alkohol jou oordeel kan benadeel en hy is in dieselfde posisie as 'n persoon wat twee of drie tots alko- hol in hom het en dat die oordeel benadeel word. Dit is die persoon met hipoglusimie. Dat die oordeel benadeel word en dat waar hierdie toestand vir ure kan aanhou is die oordeel van so 'n persoon nie die oordeel van daardie persoon met 'n normale bloedsuiker nie. Hy het die pap batterye waarmee sy brein werk." Is that true? -- Yes, it is true. (20)

And then at the bottom of 769 the doctor says, I am starting in the middle of a sentence "maar ongelukkig het hy deur onverantwoordelikheid, deur sy onverantwoordelike optrede gister, nie daardie toets bygewoon nie en dit is die optrede wat nie willekeurig is nie. Dit is nie dat hy dit moedswillig doen nie. (30)

Hy doen dit willekeurig, maar dit is nie die op- trede van 'n

persoon wat 'n beredeneerde, sober besluit neem nie. Hy is in dieselfde posisie as 'n persoon wat twee of drie drankies in het" and he goes on again as he has explained before, and then your representative, Mr De Vos, obviously saw the end of the rainbow and he wanted obviously for

Dr De Villiers/..

C2.720

- 788 -

COETZEE

Dr De Villiers to say that you were completely irresponsible for your actions, but Dr De Villiers would not go that far, would he, (10) and what Dr De Villiers at page 771 was prepared to concede to is that you are in fact diminished responsible for your actions. -- Diminished responsible meaning?

Ja. "Verminderd toerekeningsvatbaar". -- Ja, I think he could not get away with that argument in the end.

No, no, that is exactly the argument that he got away with, that your lawyer got away with, Mr De Vos, because otherwise you would have been dishonourably discharged. I will read to you just now, Mr Coetzee. Is it correct, is all that I want to know, as far as you are concerned, that you are a man of diminished (20) responsibility or would you say that is incorrect? -- No, it is incorrect. If you are referring to what is going on at present, I weighed up my odds for two weeks and for sure during that two weeks I weren't in a hypoglycaemia irresponsible state, if that is what you come to.

And then Dr De Villiers was given an affidavit which was annexure H in the hearing to read and to make his comments, if he saw fit, about what he read and his first comment, at 773 of the record, Mr Chairman, was that you involve yourself with affairs that is none of your affairs. Do you remember that evidence? -- (30) I cannot remember it.

Now, let me tell you what it was about. It was you involving

yourself with the Frans Welpton/Brigadier Blaauw affair which, reasonably speaking, had nothing to do with you. That is what he is referring to hear and he goes on to say that that is typical what he would expect from you in your condition, of hypoglycaemia.

-- Of course not completely

correct/..

C2.767

- 789 -

COETZEE

correct. Frans Welpton was a friend of mine and his 'phone was illegally tapped and I went to great extends to go and see Brigadier (10)
Roelf van Rensburg and find out from him why is Frans Welpton's 'phone on tap, is he a security risk and he said no, it is just this Fanie business, cool your relation-ship with him and then I decided no, I will tell Frans his 'phone is on tap.

Mr Coetzee, the point is just in illustrating, you did involve yourself with that. -- With a friend.

And it had nothing to do with you. -- No, it had a lot to do with me. It was an illegal 'phone tap on a friend's 'phone and I am sure you will do the same.

And then it is a question of whether it was a judgment fault (20)
and at page 774 Dr De Villiers says - first he is asked the question:

"Kan ek vir u vra, sou dit, hierdie tipe oor- deelsfout, inpas by die kliniese waarnemings ten opsigte van die aangeklaagde offisier" that is you and he says "Ja, dit kom in waar hy nie geweet het ek gaan hierdie sien nie. Ek het dit vanoggend eers gesien" en dan so 'n entjie verder gaan hy aan en hy sê he states that during periods of low blood sugar concentration becomes impulsive, aggressive, does not way up the odds, et cetera, et cetera. And then he comes, at page 775, to what I put to you a little earlier today where Dr De Villiers speaks of it being typical of a person (30)
with your particular problem, to suffer from a flight of ideas, a hyper- active or over-active forming of ideas where the one idea

pushes out the other before that idea is fully developed and he puts it in these words ... -- And he was referring to?

He was referring to you. -- Yes, but in what context there. He must have seen something that has made him ..

Yes, he/..

C3.10

- 790 -

COETZEE

Yes, he was referring in fact to the tape-recording between you and Cragin Williamson which was also handed in, a transcript of which was also in at the hearing. He says:

"My evaluering hier .." Well, let me ask you the question which will answer your question. "Nou eerstens" says Mr De Vos, "kan u moontlik net kommentaar lewer op die tipe van gesprek wat daar plaasvind, die aard van die tipe woorde wat gebruik word" and the answer comes "My evaluering hier is dat dit 'n geweldige onsamehangende gesprek is. Daar is 'n beskrywing in die Engelse literatuur van 'n 'flight of ideas'. Dit is 'n hiperaktiewe of ooraktiewe gedragsvorming waar een gedagte 'n ander gedagte uit die weg uitdruk voordat daardie gedagte volledig ontwikkel is. 'n 'Flight of ideas' is 'n hipomaniese, dit is 'n teken van 'n taamlike onstabiele emosionele persoon. Dit is 'n hipomaniese verskynsel en as ek niks geweet het van hierdie persoon nie en iemand sou my hierdie gee as 'n - verskoon my, iemand sou my hierdie gee as 'n gesprek vir diagnostiese doeleindes, dan sou ek sê hierdie persoon is hipomanies of hierdie persoon is geestelike aangedeur deur alkohol of deur ander faktore". -- Are you finished with that part?

He says "Maar hierdie is 'n totale, abnormale gesprek tussen twee volwassenes en dit is nie deur majoor Craig Williamson se toedoen nie. Hy het skaars tyd om 'n woord in te voeg dan is die gesprek al weer aan die gang en dit is dikwels op 'n heeltemal ander tema en 'n tema wat nie volgehou word nie, maar onmiddellik

in een paragraaf is daar vier, vyf temas." Do you remember that evidence? -- Yes, and I feel at this stage, Mr Craig Williamson, in volume 6 - before you go on, while this is fresh in the memory of the

chairman/..

C3.32

- 791 -

COETZEE

chairman, just look at what Craig Williamson says of that same piece of evidence, where he says it is a typical conversation that you would have with a source between two security police- men who is close friends and had a close rapport and although it will sound (10) completely understandable to you, to him and me as security policemen and friends who has got a close rapport, he understood that conversation very, very well and he was talking about exactly that same conversation.

I am going to try and finish with this. At page .. -- Have you seen it in volume 6, Mr Viser?

Mr Coetzee, I am also not here to answer your questions. -- Well, I just want to help you because you are misleading the chairman at the moment.

(20)
CHAIRMAN: No, Mr Coetzee, I do not think - I will see it, I will handle it. -- Okay, sir.

MR VISSER: We will place everything before the honourable chairman, I guarantee you that. -- But I would like you to do it orally too, because ...

CHAIRMAN: No, no, I appreciate that.

MR VISSER: During cross-examination by Major Professor Visser or Professor Major Visser, I am not sure which, at page 793 - I call you as a witness that it was not me, that Visser? -- Who? No, that I could see. I have got a fairly good memory.

He asked this question:

"En ek stel dit ook sê nou maar die aangeklaagde

(30)

offisier sou op 'n bepaalde stadium ontevrede geraak het met die opset in die mag, hy sou byvoorbeeld sê nou maar 'n grief gehad het teen 'n persoon of persone, dan sou u seker saamstem dit kan net soseer 'n aanleiding wees tot die skryf

van so/..

C3.51

- 792 -

COETZEE

van so 'n verklaring, nê, 'n haatgevoel?"

The answer comes:

(10)

"Behalwe dat die ontstaan van griewe en ontstaan van vervolgingswaan of vervolgingsgedagtes is ook deel van die toestand wat ons in gedagte het so- dat die 'irritability' of die feit dat hy nie meer gelukkig is nie kan deel wees van sy probleem."

And then lastly, I just want to read to you at page 800 of Dr De Villiers's evidence in cross-examination, he says:

"Dan wil ek ook net by u weet, sou u nie sê voor 'n mens verdere gevolgtrekkings maak of so, sou dit nie wenslik wees dat die aangeklaagde offisier sê maar aan 'n meer - aan 'n ondersoek oor 'n langer termyn blootgestel word en, u weet, om presies vas te stel wat enige moontlike invloed van die diabetes mellitus kan wees op sy psigie nie."

(20)

That is the point you were trying to make earlier, that is in cross-examination by Mr Visser. This is the answer:

"Dit sal in algemene terme beter wees om baie meer ure te spaneer. Ons kan psigometriese toetse en ons kan ook sielkundige toetse laat doen op kaptein Coetzee en ek kan u verseker

(30)

dit sal meer en nuwe sienswyses skeep ten opsigte van sy geestesprobleme wat ontstaan het van sy diabetes, maar dit sal dit nie uitskakel nie."

That is the point you were trying to make just now. -- Be- spieling, ja. Ek was nog nooit in 'n insulienkoma in my lewe nie.

Well, I/..

C3.70

- 793 -

COETZEE

Well, I did not suggest that you .. -- Well, that is what he is suggesting. If you go into a low blood sugar coma or - then that would be the typical reaction. (10)

Mr Coetzee, while Dr De Villiers speaks of psychological tests, we read a newspaper report which was an interview with your wife Karin in which she referred to the fact that people back in South Africa were trying to make you out as a crank, or words to that effect, and in which she said, and I want to ask you about this, please, that you were in Europe at the time and that you were undergoing psychological tests, psychiatric tests .. -- No, it is not true at all.

That is not true? -- No.

(20)

Because I was going to ask you whether you have a report about that. -- No, not at all.

At last we are coming to the results of all of this, and - it may take a little time, but I want to read it to you, Mr Coetzee, not that the chairman of this commission is necessarily bound or bound at all to any findings made by that disciplinary committee, but merely because of the similarity which existed then as we are going to submit to the commission exists now and that is at page 46 of the findings - en wat is aanbevelings?

CHAIRMAN: Recommendations.

(30)

MR VISSER: Recommendations, thank you, Mr Chairman. At page 46

Magistrate Krigel says, the last paragraph:

"Opvallend is in dié verband dat Coetzee, wat sekerlik lank voor die Vrydag in September 1984 toe hy sy eedsverklaring geskryf het, van die beweerde ongerymdhede bewus moes gewees het, hom nie teenoor enige van sy vriende of kollegas binne die mag daarvoor uitgelaat het nie, maar/..

C3.96

- 794 -

COETZEE

nie, maar dat hy dadelik die stuk opgestel het en toe hy tot besef kom dat hy self aan ondersoek onderwerp word. Dit het dus ook maar, soos sy vriendskap met Welpton en die ryk Johannesburgse dokter, gegaan om wat sy persoonlike finansiële vriendskaps- en moontlike politieke belange op 'n gegewe tydstip die beste gepas het." (10)

Can you tell us what the magistrate is referring to here? -- No, I cannot.

He goes on to say: "Die gewaande beste belange van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie" - may I interrupt myself here, because what you said was the reason why you involved your-self, this is what you said in your evidence, in this illegal 'phone tapping, is because you wanted to do the favour by ridding the police of these high officers who had become part of this illegal act, is that correct? -- Correct. (20)

This is now what the magistrate is now referring to. He says: "Die gewaande beste belange van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie wat hy op die hart sou gedra het is bysaak en na alle waarskynlikheid is by die hele aangeleentheid bygesleep toe die eedsverklaring in Welpton se besit ontdek is en 'n verweer' gevind moes word. Belangrik hierby is Coetzee se oortuiging dat hy binne afsienbare tyd as medies ongeskik met pensioen uit die diens (30)

sou tree en dat die eedsverklaring nie vir die oë van die polisie, die skuldigdes, bedoel was nie. Hy was moontlik oortuig dat hy reeds lank uit pensioen, uit diens sou wees .."

and he goes on and then comes the recommendation and I am going to read/..

C3.110

- 795 -

COETZEE

going to read from the second paragraph. The magistrate says:

"Sonder om die element van besmootlike genadig-
betoning (whatever that may be) in al die omstan- (10)
dighede van die geval uit die oog te verloor, soos
aantons meer duidelik sal blyk, sien die raad nie
sy weg oop om aan te beveel dat 'n boete ingevolge
artikel 10(6)(c)(e) van die wet op elke aanklag op-
gelê word of enige ander straf wat nie die erns van
die aangeklaagde offisier se wangedraging sal ver-
beeld nie. Die boetebepalings is heeltemal ontoe-
reikend ten opsigte van die aanklagte met uitsonder-
ing van aanklag nr. 6. In die omstandighede meen (20)
die raad dat die vyf klagtes saamgeneem moet word
en word nie aanbeveel dat 'n afsonderlike straf
opgelê word nie"

and then he says:

"Die raad se hoofaanbeveling is dat Coetzee nie toe-
gelaat kan word om enigsins langer as 'n lid van die
mag aan te bly nie, omdat die raad oortuig is dat hy
met die dislojale en skynbaar politiek geïnspireerde
gesindheid wat hy gedurende die tydperk van die ge-
wraakte gedraginge openbaar het en tot op datum steeds (30)
openbaar, so 'n groot sekerheidsrisiko vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Polisie in besonder en selfs vir lands-

veiligheid inhou dat hy nie vertrou kan word om ver-
antwoordelik op te tree nie."

Do you have any comment on that? -- Yes. I hope you are going to allow me to comment on it in full, from charge one till charge seven ...

No, I am not talking about the charges. I am asking -
sorry/..

C3.137

- 796 -

COETZEE

sorry. -- To put that in context I will have to answer it in full.
You have taken it completely out of context, Mr Visser, and I
am going to answer it in full. I am insisting on it. (10)

CHAIRMAN: No, what Mr Visser wants to know is, there was a recommendation that you be discharged because you are not competent to be trusted. The question is do you accept that recommendation or do you say the recommendation was unfair in the light of your evidence and the facts? -- It was unfair and not even practicable executable and I will show it.

Yes, that is fine. I think that is all I need to know.

MR VISSER: That is the answer. And then he goes on to say:
"Sy wangedrag per se is ernstig genoeg vir oneer-
volle ontslag en as dit nie was vir die vermindering
in toerekenbaarheid wat deur sy siektetoestand, wat hy
nie kan verhelp nie, meegebring is en ander straf-
versagtende omstandighede, sou die raad nie gehuiwer
het om so aan te beveel nie." (20)

And then he says:

"Na rype oorweging van al die ekonomiese en praktiese implikasies en ook die feit dat dit in die lig van Dr. De Villiers se getuienis, soos gesteun deur ander medici, kyk bylae U, vir die mediese raad van ondersoek moontlik behoort te wees om aan te beveel dat hy as (30)

medies ongeskik met pensioen uit diens tree, beveel
die raad aan .."

and they knocked you down two notches and they gave you the option
of taking that avenue and you in fact, is it not correct, signed
a declaration in which you accepted that? -- I had, before he made
his decision, and his decision he made on 2 September 1984 and
the Minister of Law and Order had to put

his signature/..

C3.142

- 797 -

COETZEE

(10)

his signature on it to finalise it and they did not do it until
12 December before I have sent a letter by hand through lawyer
Chris Pethy over to police head-quarters where I said I will in
fact abide by that decision, I am not going to appeal because I
intended to take that whole case on review but I ran out of money
because that case cost me R41 000 and they were then already
building up cases against me out of that conver-
sations, telephone conversations, 35 charges, that I behaved in
a manner unbecoming to my rank. So they themselves, after this
whole farce of a hearing, as I call it ...

(20)

What did you say, farce of a hearing? -- Farce, yes, in the
end decided this thing is not going to stand up in the appeal court
and only when I then on 12 or 11 December 1984, on the 2nd that
hearing was completed, we sent over a letter by hand to police
head-quarters, I think General Engels was still second-in-charge,
and immediately thereafter the next day the Minister of Law and
Order, Mr Louis la Grange, signed and confirmed the finding of
that. It is funny to me that it took him so long and only after
one day receiving my final sort of, you know, undertaking that
I won't appeal, he then signed and dropped the 35 charges that
they were building up out of my private telephone conversations,
that I behaved in a manner unbecoming to my rank, for using abusive

(30)

language on the 'phone. That was the end result, but if you hear the story from A to Z you will have a quite clear picture of that.

CHAIRMAN: No, Mr Coetzee, what concerns me is this dilemma. Forget all that. You decided to call or have called Dr De Villiers to testify on your behalf. Is that correct? -- Yes.

And you decided that, and you were satisfied that he should come and testify about certain mental deficiencies you

have/..

C3.187

- 798 -

COETZEE

(10)

have and certain mental aberrations you have. -- If I reach a certain stage of the insulin coma which he relied on the history from me, you will see it coming out ...

Yes, that is right. It is on that basis. Now, then you gave him false information to base his evidence on. -- That is correct.

So, the dilemma I have is this: You fabricate evidence or if you did not fabricate the evidence, the evidence which dealt with your mental state indicated that you are irrespon- sible, impulsive, et cetera, et cetera and the diminished ca- pacity. -- If .. I am sorry.

(20)

Do you follow? -- If I reach that insulin coma.

No, it made you unfit in his eyes to be a policeman. That was the whole purpose. You could not be a policeman with your mental state. -- That was what I was going for, yes.

Yes, and you either fabricated evidence to show that you are incapable of being a policeman on the one hand. -- Yes.

Or you were incapable of being a policeman. -- That is correct.

It is a kind of dilemma, is it not? -- Yes, sir, I was up ..

Either you are incapabale of being a policeman or you are capable of fabricating evidence, to suit your circumstances.

(30)

-- Yes, I would put it the last way, that I am capable of fa-

bricating evidence to suit me as the whole police force is at the moment of chaps involved in these hit squads.

Yes, but my problem is then, Mr Coetzee, it is a very simple problem, where does the fabrication begin and where does it end? -- Well, I have got no reason to lie now, I am out in exile, it is the only way that I could give my evidence

and/..

C3.215

- 799 -

COETZEE

and prove ...

(10)

No, but my problem is still you are willing to fabricate to reach a certain result and now all I say to you is how must I now distinguish between fact and fiction. -- Mr Chairman, I am sure with months to come whilst you are still in the commission, that you will be able to see later on, out of evidence coming up whether I am in fact doing that at the moment and whether I am talking the truth.

But you yourself said that there is no corroboration available for your evidence. -- Well, that remains ...

And that all the traces have been destroyed. -- Yes, but I mean witnesses might come forward in the future which might help you in this regard. If not ...

(20)

Who are these witnesses that you envisage will .. -- I have got no idea, but I am sure there is going to be more people appearing in front of the commission, the policemen I have been implicating.

They will come under cross-examination, facts will be put to them and I am sure you will then be able to determine whether I in fact, have been for this past week in a insulin coma, telling lies, and whether I in fact ..

No, you need not be in a coma to tell lies, because when you lied to Dr De Villiers you were not in a coma. When you fabricated your evidence you were not in a coma. -- Yes, but I mean you must

(30)

accept that a policeman inside South Africa - I am sure you have come upon many cases where a policeman is just where an accused would say I was electrocuted by this or shocked by this policeman, I was beaten, I was done this with, I was done that with and the policeman will just deny under oath because ..

No, I/..

C3.236

- 800 -

COETZEE

No, I appreciate that, Mr Coetzee, and I know that such denials are not always the truth, but it does not solve my dilemma. -- (10)
Yes, but I am sure, Mr Chairman, in future - I am hopeful that in months to come that ...

I am not - yes, thank you. -- Even if you reject my evidence-in-chief then that you will find corroboration in some way or another. I hope ...

But you said it is simply a question of hope, that as far as you are concerned there is no corroboration available. -- Well, I do not know what the lawyers and advocates have got in hand, of the other parties involved in this hearing.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR LUNCH. COMMISSION RESUMES.

(20)

DIRK COETZEE still under oath:

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, just to round off the question of the disciplinary hearing, would I be correct in putting to you that at that time, which was 1985, was it? -- April 1985 until 2 September '85, that is right.

You had already decided to take it upon yourself to rid the South African Police of unwanted elements. -- To, at that stage, to be specific, to rid illegal 'phone tapping committed by the then commissioner of police, General Johan Coetzee and his co-operatives like the present Lieutenant-General Jaap de Villiers Joubert and company, correct. (30)

Would your evidence at page 520 of the record, when you were

asked about that affidavit which you made, EXHIBIT H, sum up the position correctly, when you were asked:

"Nou, kan ek net ingaan oor die doel van die verklaring. Waarom spesifiek het u die verklaring gemaak? -- Om ernstige wanpraktyke in die veiligheidspolisie, wat betref onwettige meeluistering, aan die lig te/..

C4.18

- 801 -

COETZEE

lig te bring aangesien ek gedink het dat dit die naam van die polisie sou skaad en nie tuishoort by offisiere van die range wat daarby betrokke was en in elk geval by geen polisieman sal tuishoort nie." -- It is correct. (10)

So, the point is just this that at that stage already you had taken it upon yourself to rid the police of people whom you thought were - should not be there? -- Whom I knew were doing illegal 'phone tapings.

CHAIRMAN: But did you regard illegal 'phone tapings as a more heinous crime than murder? -- No, Mr Chairman, but that is why I am here because ... (20)

No, but why in 1985? In 1985 you thought that murder is less heinous than 'phone tapping? -- I could not do anything to what happened in the past. I did not have the options that I did not - I was not pushed into it like now, that I had to decide must I come up with it and in which way.

Who or what pushed you into it? -- Well, Almond Nofemela's revelations and then I had to at that point made a decision whether I am going to live with it for the rest of my life or going to stop it just there.

MR VISSER: Now, just on that last point which is reason which you offered in your evidence as to why you were giving evidence and that was the clearing of your conscience. Do you remember that? (30)

-- Yes.

Do you also remember that the honourable chairman asked you this morning about that clearing of the conscience and the question was put to you, if I remember correctly, if you want to clear your conscience, why don't you also accept the consequences? Do you remember that question? -- I remember.

Well, what/..

C4.41

- 802 -

COETZEE

Well, what I do not remember is hearing an answer from you. (10)
-- I will give you one as soon as every single one has admits his part in this murders and atrocities, I will be there the first, I will be accused 1 in the box.

Let me make it as simple as I can, isn't it a normal human experience for a person who wants to clear his conscience that part and parcel of that clearing of the conscience is a need to accept the penalty, the punishment that goes with it. -- Yes.

That is part of clearing your conscience. -- That is, but is it not also human to want to everyone that had part in it, my - I had a small part in it for a few months, a year and four months, (20) apart from the atrocities in Swaziland, that the chaps - to expect from the chaps that was there from '81 till now and went on with it according to me. Isn't just normal to sort of expect that we all come together and all stand there and all clear our conscience and all take the punishment therefore and all make peace with the past. Isn't it human, isn't it normal, isn't it, you know, christian?

Mr Coetzee, I do not want to labour this point, but if you want to clear your conscience, what has that got to do with whether or not other people wish to clear their consciences? -- Well, (30) it concerns me. It concerns me for sure. I have got with that also achieve something towards it. It will serve no purpose alone

if I clear my conscience and these atrocities remains unrevealed and it just goes on, and go on, so it will serve no purpose at all.

Yes. Well, I am not sure I understand. -- No, I do not think you will.

But in any event, the last possibility which I believe we should/..

C4.63

- 803 -

COETZEE

we should put to you as a reason for telling these stories, is (10)
that you - a very simple one, you have been dishonest again. --
The future will prove. I have got no reason to be dishonest now,
no one can touch me now, if you want to put it that way. I know
it and you know it. I can only be touched by the law if I go back
to South Africa, so I have got no reason to lie now and my set
up at home, I had no reason whatsoever to leave my kids and my
household, family, every- thing that I have got, behind, get out
of the country to come and sit here and sort of tell all stories
again.

Mr Coetzee, I just have to put this to you because this is (20)
what the argument to the honourable commissioner will be on our
behalf, is that we believe that the reason why you are telling
these stories, is a combination of the factors, the possibilities,
which I put to you as possibilities of all or some of them. --
It is completely incorrect and you miss the point by far, Mr Visser.

Now, you keep on speaking of atrocities. Mr Coetzee, can
you just tell us have you applied for membership of the ANC? --
Not officially on black and white.

What does that mean? Did you apply or didn't you apply? --
I did not fill in an official form. As I have got it I am a member (30)
of the ANC.

You are? -- A member of the ANC.

You are a member? -- That is right.

Were you made an honorary member or what? -- No, no, I do not know. There is no official completing of forms as I have got it. I am accepted among them as one of them.

And when did this happen? -- As soon as - very soon after they debriefed me and they were happy to accept me.

Now, as/..

C4.85

- 804 -

COETZEE

Now, as I understand it, what happened here, chronologically, is that the affidavit of Nofemela was published on 20 October 1989 and you read the article about his revelations, is that correct? -- I have heard of it on the news, the eight o'clock news, on the 20th and I have seen a statement of Nofemela from Jacques Pauw some time or another thereafter. (10)

It is clear that you spoke to both Jacques Pauw and Spyker Tshikalange shortly after these revelations. -- That is correct.

Did you discuss with Jacques Pauw the whole issue of your book and your revelations and your version of events soon after Nofemela's affidavit was published? -- No, no, the book was spoken of weeks before and after the revelations I said I will make as full statement but not inside South Africa. (20)

And you then made arrangements to leave South Africa. -- That is right.

And did you make them through Jacques Pauw? -- I said I will go to Mauritius. If he can arrange the bookings for me I will speak with him on Mauritius.

Did you then arrange it through Jacques Pauw? -- He arranged it.

And did you also make arrangements on behalf of Mr Tshikalange? - I 'phoned Mr Tshikalange from London and arranged for him to come out through Beit Bridge. (30)

Were these arrangements also made through Mr Jacques Pauw?
-- No, no. That was made by me - between myself from London with Mr Tshikalange.

Do you know of a trip which Mr Tshikalange took with Mr Jacques Pauw from Kayalami to the Northern Transvaal? -- He told me about it. He should have left that morning with his
brother/..

C4.109

- 805 -

COETZEE

brother on a railway bus, who is a railway bus-driver between Jo'burg and Sibasa. (10)

This was not something which you arranged to enable Spyker Tshikalange to tell Jacques Pauw what he knew? -- No, not at all.

You see there is a strange anomaly here and that is that Mr Tshikalange told this commission that you telephoned him while back in South Africa .. -- Whilst he was back in South Africa?

Both of you. You 'phoned him and he came to see you. -- That is right. He 'phoned me and I listened to the news that night.

It is on Tshikalange's revelation that I only switched on the TV and learned the news about Nofemela.

(20)

And I stand corrected but my recollection is that he said that you said to him did you see what Nofemela had done or had you seen the newspaper article or words to that effect and you gave him a copy of the newspaper article. Is that more or less correct? -- Let me just put it to you straight. He 'phoned me on the 20th, the night, just past six, and I watched the 20h00 news. I 'phoned him back. He landed up in Pretoria shortly afterwards, days afterwards, and he had a copy of the newspaper with him.

Now we really come to the anomaly. According to Mr Tshikalange you and I never discussed the contents.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: You and he?

MR VISSER: What did I say, Mr Chairman? -- You and I.

CHAIRMAN: You and I.

MR VISSER: You and Mr Tshikalange never discussed Nofemela?

-- That is ridiculous. Of course we did discuss it.

Well, that is all I wanted to know. -- Yes.

And you/..

C4.130

- 806 -

COET;ZEE

And you then found your way to London and thereafter to Zimbabwe and then to Zambia. -- That is right.

(10)

Who paid for all of this? -- ANC.

And who paid for your .. -- Original departure from Johannesburg, Die Vrye Weekblad. I do not know whether they were refunded in some way or another, but that is the part I knew they paid.

To Mauritius? -- That is right.

And from Mauritius the ANC paid for all your expenses? -- That is right.

Now, speaking for myself personally and with respect, Mr Coetzee, I have a problem with the morality of your wanting to clear your conscience because of so-called atrocities which you participated in and I will tell you why. You have now gone to confess to an organisation which on its own admission is responsible for atrocities in South Africa. -- It is not so strange. If you accept that I come from an organisation in South Africa, the South African Security Police, that were involved in atrocities against the ANC.

It was an eye for an eye then, if you want to put it that way.

Mr Coetzee, can we just try and put some logic into this situation. Is it not true that the explosion of bombs and limpet mines, et cetera, in public places, is a matter of public safety?

(30)

-- That is hundred percent correct.

Is it not true that the maintenance of public safety is the

responsibility of the security forces of the South African Police?

-- That is hundred percent correct.

Now, why do you call them atrocities? -- Mr Maritz, if after all these years, after all these unsolved murders of activists and so-called left wings and arms cachets that have
been booby trapped/..

C4.156

- 807 -

COETZEE

been booby trapped with other words as soon as the man releases the hand-grenade it explodes in his hands, do you really think
all that was done by angles or by the South African security police. (10)

CHAIRMAN: But that ...

MR VISSER: Did you see any of this happen? -- No, but I was present. I have explained through this whole hearing in which atrocities I was present.

Sorry, Mr Chairman, I interrupted you. -- And I mean, if you look at the recent interviews that the ex-Major Craig Williamson had on TV, it is obvious that he admits that we were not any angles.

CHAIRMAN: No, but I think what Mr Visser asks you, accepting for a moment that the security police or the security establishment
is not an angle and you therefore wish to dis-associate yourself (20)
from persons who commits atrocities. -- The police within the police?

Yes, the atrocious aspects of the South African society. -- You must put it to me please clearer. Just put it plainly.

MR VISSER: I cannot do better than the chairman. I think the chairman must repeat it.

CHAIRMAN: And he says why then join the ANC, if you wish to clear your conscience? What does that assist in clearing your
conscience? -- Well, at first it was - I did not know who they
were. They were the, you know, enemy, terrorists as I have become (30)
to know them in the South African environment, but it was no use

for me running all over the world, running away from the South African Police and the ANC. So, I had to start off somewhere, so I went to the people that I have done wrong, or I thought/..

C4.181

- 808 -

COETZEE

or I thought I have done wrong and I started off with them and after arriving at them I had a complete changed image as to who they were and I stuck with them. So now is that strange? What would you have I thought I should have done under that circumstances? I would like to hear that.

(10)

I would like to tell you, Mr Coetzee, but under different circumstances. -- No, you can here, with pleasure.

CHAIRMAN: I do not think it will assist me to know what Mr Visser would have done. -- No, but what he thought I should have done.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you spoke on a number of occasions, at least seven occasions in your evidence, about so-called just war and we got the impression that you were being sarcastic about it. -- No, not at all.

You were saying a so-called just war but you were trying to convey, through your tone of voice, that it was in fact everything but a just war. Are we correct? -- No, I am quite clear you do not understand me right.

(20)

So you do believe that what the security police force was doing as far as public safety was concerned, was being involved in a just war? -- In an unconventional just war. That is why they committed atrocities. They have seen it as an unconventional just war. That is why they committed atrocities. They have seen it as an unconventional just war.

CHAIRMAN: No, the question, Mr Coetzee, is you were not sarcastic, that is what you say, when you said that the security police was involved in an ..

(30)

MR VISSER: Unconventional unjust ..

CHAIRMAN: A just war, a just war. -- No, no. No, I was not.

So, in other words they were involved in a just war? --

What they/..

C4.207

- 809 -

COETZEE

What they see - their ...

No, no, listen carefully. What Mr Visser says and you say is you were not sarcastic when you said the South African Police were involved in a just war. -- Referring it into what context, Mr Chairman? Excuse me, I cannot remember which phrase ...

(10)

In general, in combatting terrorism for instance. -- I was specifically referring to unconventional methods and not being at all sarcastic about the just part of it.

So you say the unconventional methods were just in the light of the war? -- We saw it as just.

No, but he wants to know whether you still see it as a just war or whether you were sarcastic when you referred to the just war. -- No, at that time it was seen as a just war.

MR VISSER: The question is how do you see it now? -- How do I see it now? I think from both sides, if all would come out to the front and admit what they have done wrong, the sooner we can come to a peace agreement.

(20)

CHAIRMAN: No, the question is is the war - do you now regard the war as an unjust war? In the new light. Do you now say the war is an unjust war from the South African government side. -- As far as the unconventional part is concerned.

But we just talk about the war, we do not talk about the fight, is the war - do you now say the war is unjust? -- Mr Chairman, I do not understand what you - really I do not ...

Daar is 'n verskil tussen die geveg en die oorlog. Is dit 'n billike oorlog maar wat op verkeerde wyse geveg word of is dit 'n onbillike oorlog wat op 'n verkeerde wyse geveg word? Dit is

(30)

wat mnr. Visser by u wil weet. -- Wel, ek dink dit is 'n billike oorlog vir albei kante gesien wat op 'n

onkonvensionele/..

C4.233

- 810 -

COETZEE

onkonvensionele manier geveg word.

Van albei kante? -- Van albei kante af.

MR VISSER: In other words, the only question remains is the question of the morality, the justness of the methods used. That is really what caused you, what prompted you to decide to purge your conscience. Is that what you are saying? -- Just repeat it again, Mr Visser. (10)

It is not the war, it is not the situation as such which you find unjust, from the point of view of the South African Security Police, but it is the methods used by them which prompted you to decide to purge your conscience. -- Yes, that I was involved in, that I could pick up problems or justice with as far as justification is concerned. I mean, I would not have been able to justify Griffiths Mxenge's murder within the context of justice.

Mr Coetzee, I understand what you say, that is on the assumption that Griffiths Mxenge was murdered by security policemen or by the security police, but let us take the obvious example, the combatting of terrorists which come into South Africa, are you aware that this happens? That terrorists come, infiltrate into South Africa? -- I think you used the wrong term, it is freedom fighters. (20)

I see. As you will, freedom fighters, are you aware that freedom fighters infiltrate into South Africa? -- Yes, I am.

That they carry weapons and live ammunition. -- Yes, I am.

Bombs. -- Yes.

Limpet mines. -- That is right. (30)

With the view of inter alia killing and maiming civilians.

-- Yes.

Of all/..

C4.260

- 811 -

COETZEE

Of all colours, of all races in South Africa. -- Yes.

Do you say that the security police is entitled to protect the public against those type of people whom you call freedom fighters? -- Lawfully, according to law, within the law, yes.

And if such freedom fighters cannot be apprehended and they cannot be dealt with otherwise than by killing them, is that justified? -- That is why I am sitting here, that is what we have done. (10)

I am asking you a question, is that justified. -- Not according to justice.

I see. -- Under any circumstances. I mean, we are not allowed to take the law into our own hands and go and kill ..

CHAIRMAN: No, the question was put to you, as I understand it by Mr Visser rather in the context of self-defence or a state of emergency. -- No, but I did not understand it that way. I think he is getting out of the circle of justice. I mean, I have ... (20)

No, no, I think, as I understood the question within an emergency situation or within a self-defence situation. -- That is justified.

That is justified, but .. -- Yes.

Mr Visser, are you putting it beyond that kind of situation?

MR VISSER: Not at all, not at all, Mr Chairman. So, we have now defined the areas here, Mr Coetzee, please tell me if you disagree. What you say is where you draw the line is where people go unconventionally, clandestinely and go and murder in the normal criminal way a person? -- From the police side now? (30)

From the police side. That is where you draw the line.

-- That is/..

-- That is right.

And the only issue remaining then on that answer is whether in fact it happened, yea or nay? -- Yes.

You see, let me put it to you this way, Mr Coetzee, the anomaly has not disappeared. You see, the ANC has publicly admitted to acts of atrocities as you call them, in the Republic, and yet they are the people that you go to when you want to purge your conscience.

Now, do you see an anomaly in that or not? -- Listen, Mr Maritz, you want to get political now. I went to the ANC, they are a legal organisation today. They are in South Africa legally, to negotiate legally. They have admitted to atrocities as you said, as Craig Williamson has admitted to atrocities. The only exception is that the security forces is withholding the truth that that happened inside the country too, because they know that this commission's mandate is only confined to acts inside South Africa. So, there is still a lot to do on the part of the South African security forces before this atrocities can come to the surface and please do not get more technical on it. That is what it is. (10)

Let me make the question very simple. Would you agree with the fact that the ANC has since at least 1986 waged a revolutionary war in South Africa? -- Would you deny, Mr Visser, that since 1912 the ANC has been trying to negotiate till up to 1962 when Comrade Nelson Mandela was standing in the dock and addressed the court and he said - he was quoting Chief Albert Luthuli - saying for 30 years, no one can deny that for 30 years in vain I have been knocking moderately, patient at a barred and closed door and it is again 27 years later, so do you expect this people just to speak and to speak and to knock/.. (20)

and to knock and to knock for ever? What did our forebears - also (30)

just knock on the door? They started blowing up bridges and railway lines.

It was 1964 when Mandela was convicted, not not '62 and you have not answered the question. -- Oh, a few years difference. Well ..

CHAIRMAN: Mr Visser, I do not think that a political debate is taking us anywhere.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I was not trying to get involved in a political debate.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but your questions invited a political debate.

MR VISSER: Well, let me put it to you this way. You see, I am still looking for possible reasons why you are giving this evidence. -- Well, can I help you ... (10)

Can I make a suggestion to you? -- Well, can I put it to you and I think there won't be any questions any more. I left the country to clear my conscience and if you find it very difficult why I went to the ANC, I went to them because that was the people I admitted atrocities against and I thought that is the point to start off with and that was Dirk Coetzee. It was not Advocate Visser speaking, it was Dirk Coetzee and that is the way I thought and I have done it and I think I have done the right thing, so you can sit here for hours and gossip on which way you think I should have gone about it. I have done it that way and the commission can judge me on just exactly what I did and the only reason therefor was, is to get the truth out. So, now from here onwards there is no one that can come back to me and talk about this Mxenge case and that whatever - Lesotho diamond dealer case. I have cleaned my conscience and whether I am speaking the truth, the commission/.. (20)

as more witnesses appear, as your witness is being under cross-examination. So, let us leave it there. It does not help you go on arguing. That was my reason, that is my reason and I stick to that reason.

Mr Coetzee, may I be allowed just to put a proposition to you because we are going to argue this and I am going to give you an opportunity ..

CHAIRMAN: Mr Visser ... -- But you can argue it.

Mr Visser, if it involves an argument, I do not think - the witness does not want the opportunity to get involved in the argument that you are going to represent. I think put facts to him. You need not put to him conclusions. (10)

MR VISSER: Well, then I put it to you that your giving evidence about all these incidents, involving police death squads, fits in neatly with the ANC policy as expressed by Comrade Oliver Tambo since 1986 onwards and that is the reason why you are giving this evidence. I am putting it to you. -- No, not at all. I think Oliver Tambo's speech that he has done, whenever you said, is exactly what his opposition, P.W. Botha, has done. He rule by the sword and sort of die by the sword. (20)

Mr Coetzee, I must admit that frankly I now do not know any more what precisely your evidence is about hit squads. I do not want to cover any ground which is covered by my learned colleague, Mr Maritz, but what I want to ask you is do you maintain that the newspaper report which the commissioner read to you, where it was stated that you were the head of a police hit squad, is incorrect? -- I have explained what I meant by it.

CHAIRMAN/..

C4.380

- 814 -

COETZEE

(30)

CHAIRMAN: No, just answer the question. Is it correct or in-correct? -- As it stands there incorrect, of the Vlakplaas

hit squads involved in a certain hit, yes.

MR VISSER: And what is more is you also told the chairman yesterday, if I remember correctly and if I understood you correctly, that you never regarded Vlakplaas as the head-quarters of a police hit squad. -- Nee, of the security police hit squad.

Security police hit squad? -- Yes.

Is there a different hit squad in the South African Police, different to that of the security police hit squad? -- If you see that we have committed this murders in conjunction with Port Elizabeth security and Eastern Transvaal security and Nelspruit security, you could clearly see that - I mean, that is not the headquarters of the hit squad of the security police. (10)

The question is this, you have just drawn a distinction between a security hit squad and apparently some other hit squad or am I mistaken. -- In the security police.

Can you offer any explanation where the world press, and I am talking about South African press as well as the press in overseas country, got those two stories from? -- That there is hit squads within the South African Police?

That you were the leader of the - of a police hit squad and that Vlakplaas was the headquarters of the police hit squads. -- As far as Vlakplaas is concerned and the atrocities I was involved in, yes. (20)

Are you now saying that Vlakplaas was the headquarters of the police ... -- No, I said as far as the operations at Vlakplaas was involved in, I usually led those hit squads and

it evolved/..

C4.407

- 815 -

COETZEE

it evolved from Vlakplaas.

You see, Mr Coetzee, we have seen two video recordings of television interviews which you had, one was the Global Vision (30)

and the other was on a programme called Dispatches. Now, I do not have the video recording here to through it with you. The best I can do, if you insist on doing it, is to play a sound track for you, but I suggest that you probably saw Dispatches. -- I have done so many. I do not know which I have seen and which not.

And you see, on this particular programme, Dispatches, can I just tell you inter alia what was said. They spoke about police brutality against ANC supporters. Did you give such information to anybody? -- As to?

The programme speaks of police brutality against ANC supporters. All that I am asking you is did you give such information to any person? -- To several TV networks, yes. (10)

So, what you are saying is that merely because a man is an ANC supporter there was police brutality against him. -- Like the Mxenge case for instance, yes.

No, but that was a murder. All right. -- That is brutality, isn't it?

All right, and then it is stated on that programme "To-night's Dispatch reveals dramatic new evidence on the operations of the notorious death squads and where the real chain of commands lie". (20)

Did you give that information to the television? -- Well, read it to me that I can know because that is an answer -- a question you put to me now and I do not know what the answer is. If I hear the answer then I can know. I have done several TV interviews on the chain of command, on death squads, so please read it to me.

Did you/..

C4.444

- 816 -

COETZEE

Did you tell anybody that what you had to say could reveal dramatic new evidence on the operations of the notorious death squads and where the real chain of commands lie? -- It all (30)

depends on what my answer was on that. Read it to me, please.
I cannot remember.

It was not a question put to you. I am referring ..

CHAIRMAN: Mr Visser, I do not think you get anywhere, just read the statement.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it would have been preferable to have the ..

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but the witness does not answer it because he says he cannot answer it, then read the rest.

MR VISSER: This is another statement which is made on this programme, perhaps you would care to comment on it then. (10)

"Former members of the squads came out of the shadows and point the finger at ministers still serving today in De Klerk's government"

and the question is posed "Are they apartheid's assassins". --
And my only answer would be to that one was that the only time that I know that a Minister of Law and Order was involved was in the London bomb blast when permission was given, according to me and to my information, by the then Mr Louis la Grange that Peter Kasselton's parcels in the diplomatic bags should not be tampered with. (20)

All right, let me ask you one last thing about this, I see we are getting nowhere. It was also stated on this programme, and you can go and check it and we will play it for the commission when we get back home, it was stated "This is a police death squad camp" - now, I just want to put you in the picture. There is a helicopter shot taken of Vlakplaas. --

Yes/..

C4.470

- 817 -

COETZEE
(30)

Yes.

And this is the commentary:

This is a police death squad camp, some 15 miles west of Pretoria. From this place, Vlakplaas, attacks were organised by SAP death squads".

Is that statement true? -- Ja, it is true.

You see, if that had been so, would one be correct in assuming that there would have been a great secrecy about Vlakplaas in that event? If this was where death squads operated from? -- Vlakplaas as a whole is treated as a secret project.

And a secret place? -- A secret place.

People were not allowed to go there? -- Several people came there, builders, private - if you read my departmental trial you will see what Brigadier Jan du Preez' comment was on that, as exactly how secret that was. (10)

Well, that is exactly the point. According to your own evidence there was nothing secret about Vlakplaas. People came and went, virtually unrestricted. -- No, now you are putting it off. As I said it was an open, public picnic spot. I did not say that.

I never said it is a picnic spot. -- Well, it was treated as a secret place and a secret project, as a secret project. (20)

I put it to you that your evidence was quite clear that there was nothing secret about Vlakplaas while you were there and you said so to the disciplinary board. -- And what was the reply of Brigadier Jan du Preez and Brigadier ...

CHAIRMAN: No, what Mr Visser says is that your evidence was it was not a secret place. -- Ja.

Do you agree with that or do you disagree with that? --

Yes, as/..

Yes, as to that that builders came there to the farm but not normal public. They wanted to make it out as a top secret story that

I had blown and then I was trying to bring it forward, if one put it in context, that several ANC people have already 'deflected' from the farm and went back to the ANC, so the people to whom the farm should actually be top secret knows about the farm.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but that creates for me a bit of a logical difficulty and that is if you work with Askari's who are inherently security risks, I mean they are people who have defected and tend to, some of them, defect back. -- Yes.

I find it difficult to see in logic how the security police would be that stupid to involve Askari's who are inherently security risks in operations which they could then easily, if they defect again, testify about. -- Well, that is exactly what happened. (10)

Yes, but I say I cannot understand that they can be so stupid, Mr Coetzee. -- Well, there is ...

And you say they are that stupid? -- Yes.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Coetzee - I think Mr Maritz has put this to you and on behalf of the South African Police I also put to you that your stories about so-called official death squads - I am sorry, that was unfair, I think you did say they were not official. -- Put it as you like. (20)

No, no, how do you put it. -- Official.

Were they official? -- Non-official, official, yes.

No, were they official or non-official? -- Well, they were above the law. They committed it and they were never brought to justice. Whether you want to call that official or non-official, that is up to you, Mr Visser.

You see/..

You see, Mr Coetzee, I seem to have the same difficulty with that kind of evidence as did my learned friend, Mr Maritz, and

really I do not want to waste time, but I want to put it to you quite categorically that you had no trouble, no trouble when Jacques Pauw on no less than five occasions tried to draw out of you an admission that there were official police death squads you kept on refusing to budge and you said explicitly there was never any official police death squad. Is that correct or not? -- That is correct, but we operated above the law. It happened up to - the top structure knew about it and nothing happened to us.

Just one loose end which I want to put to you, as I understand your evidence there is a printing machine in security head office and what you do there, the fancy takes you, is you just print licence disks and third party disks and you just go and make yourself a registration number with DGC036T, no problem at all. -- Exactly. (10)

Can I ask you this, do all the security policemen have their initials and ages on their motor-car registration numbers? -- I have never seen anyone else. It is apparently only myself.

Just you? -- Ja.

Why didn't they do the same? -- They use other false numbers.

Why must they also use their initials? Why must we all be Advocate Visser? I am allowed to be Dirk Coetzee and that man is allowed to be Mr De Wet Marais. It is the same question. It is what he wants to give his car registration number. I decided to give my initials, O36T, and you can go and ask any Askari that number-plate ran for years on that car, even after I have left. (20)

Mr Coetzee/..

C4.567

- 820 -

COETZEE

Mr Coetzee, such a facility must have been common knowledge among the security police, surely. -- What facility?

That you can just go and pick a number and digits for your car. -- They print those licence discs at security head office, Sergeant Beppy, and it is handed out to all the security cars (30)

and the days that the third parties was used, and it has all got the same serial number. Until recently they were still running on the farm.

All right, you are not going to answer my questions so we will leave it, but you also said that you were given a pack of blank discs for future use and all that you had to do was just fill in information on them and stick them onto cars. -- That is right.

Well, I just want to put it to you that that story is a lot of nonsense. -- Ag, shame.

(10)

Ag, shame, Mr Chairman, I am finished.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BURGER: Mr Coetzee, will you please tell the honourable chairman where, when and under what circumstances we met. -- I beg your pardon.

You know me. I want to know where did we meet, under what circumstances. -- In the civil trial that involved out of my departmental trial, charge no. 4, I think, where I said you defended a client, where I said I received certain information from a Captain Bruce Smit who had a relationship with Rina van der Merwe, the wife of Major Van der Merwe and then at the trial I objected to being tried on that one because summons were already issued ..

(20)

No, forget about your trial, I am referring to the morning we met. -- Okay.

Van der Merwe instituted civil proceedings against you.

-- Right/..

C4.599

- 821 -

COETZEE

-- Right, and you defended him.

Because you defamed her. No, I did not defend her. I acted for her. She was the plaintiff, you were the defended. -- Okay, you acted. You must excuse, my law terms is not so very up to

(30)

date. It is like my English, in 1963.

What happened on that morning after trial? -- That morning - let us begin the day before the trial, if you check on your account, fax account, I got cost in that trial if you remember right.

Mr Coetzee .. -- Let me just finish, please. You asked me a question. I am coming to it.

I am asking you what happened on the morning of the trial. -- Unfortunately I will have to start with the day before to illustrate what happened on the morning of the trial.

No, I am not asking you about the day before, Mr Coetzee, I want to know what happened on the day of the trial. -- Then I will tell Mr Chairman, because ... (10)

You in any event speak to the chair, not to me. -- Well, I am looking at you then if you do not like it. The morning before the trial, on your account there is an entry, a telephonical call from - he was then Colonel Van der Merwe to Piet Niemand, ex-Major Piet Niemand, who acted as an attorney for you, informing that - what did they call me then? Respondent or defendant in that trial, whatever I was, that I am working. The next entry, telephonical call to Mr Klingenberg of the Medical Aid Board who inform him ... (20)

Mr Coetzee, please .. -- Wait, no, no ...

CHAIRMAN: Mr Coetzee, please ...

MR BURGER: You make ..

CHAIRMAN/..

C4.624

- 822 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: Let me just explain to you, there cannot be a telephone call reflected on an advocate's account. It may have been on the attorney's account. -- On the attorney's account. (30)

But he is the advocate, he is not the attorney, so you cannot

say on his account there was this, that and the other. -- Okay, sorry, then ..

So, please just answer the question, I ask you what happened on the day of the trial. -- You pulled the carpet under me the previous day, I lost my advocate and I stood up alone in court to defend my own civil case.

MR BURGER: I pulled no carpet under you. -- I was busy explaining it and you stopped me.

What happened on the morning of the trial? Did you apologise in writing to Mrs Van der Merwe? -- On the morning of the trial?

Yes. -- No, you forget. I first stood up and I de- fended my own - I said I am going to defend it myself, then it was postponed and then eventually it was before Judge Pierre Roux and then I found out there was a lot of pre-hearing proceedings that should be adhered to. I wanted to hand in photographs of how your client has broken into my garage, my official house and I was stopped in every way and ...

Mr Coetzee, Mrs Van der Merwe never broke into your garage and you know that. -- If you remember correct there were two claims, from her husband, the policeman, Colonel Van der Merwe, and his wife Rina van der Merwe, R10 000 each.

Mr Coetzee, do you admit that you retracted the alle- gations against Mrs Van der Merwe? -- Yes, because ...

In writing? -- I did because I was ...

Do you remember that you apologised to her husband? --

Yes, I/..

C4.562

- 823 -

COETZEE

Yes, I did.

Do you remember that in writing you told Colonel Van der Merwe's superiors that you lied when you said his wife .. -- You drew up that. I do not know whether I have done it ..

Did you sign that? -- I signed it, that is right.

And now in 1989 you make exactly the same allegation. -- Yes, I explain to why I had to do it. You people pulled the carpet under me with my advocate. I had to stand there alone. I wanted to start and tell the judge a story, pulling out photos, I was stopped, with reports and everything, and said that had to be produced at the pre-trial hearing and my hands were cut off. I was pushed into a corner and I had no other alternative as to sign that.

Did I send a hit squad to get rid of your advocate? -- Did you send a? (10)

A hit squad to get rid of your advocate. -- When was that?

I was trying to explain ...

CHAIRMAN: You said counsel removed your advocate or got rid of your advocate. -- I was trying to ...

MR BURGER: You know, in your type of language that only means one thing. -- I think you finish shouting then I will start. Just finish yours and then - and you give me a chance and I will show you.

CHAIRMAN: No, Mr Coetzee, please. -- But sir ... (20)

Please, Mr Coetzee, you accuse Mr Burger of removing your advocate. Now, he wants to know how did he remove your advocate. -- Well, Mr Chairman, I started off to tell him how I can show through the account that I received from Piet Nie-mand ...

But how did Mr Burger do it? I never heard one
advocate/..

C4.681 - 824 - COETZEE

advocate being able to remove his opponent. -- Okay, but I was on the point - I wanted to give the whole story and I was stopped and I had to start off where he wanted me to start off that morning. (30)

Could you just give me in one sentence how did Mr Burger remove

your advocate? -- It is Mr Piet Niemand, the ex-Major Piet Niemand, that 'phone Mr Klingenberg of the Medical Aid Board and informed him that I was working. Then my medical - my medical aid - my legal aid. Then Mr Brian Currin was 'phoned immediately afterwards and said that my legal aid is withdrawn, then the next entry on the lawyer, Major Piet Niemand's account was receiving a telephonical call from my attorney Brian Currin, informing that they are withdrawing because of my legal aid being withdrawn and that is what I ..

Yes, but Mr Burger did not do that. -- No, I know, but I was
(10)

..

But you accused him of doing that. -- Yes, but I was trying to explain this then I was stopped. They did not give me a chance to get to the next morning, so I said okay, you pulled the carpet under me.

MR BURGER: But, Mr Coetzee, you made the allegation that I removed your advocate. -- Well, you did not give me a chance to come up to my story, so you said start, so I said you were part of a team there.

CHAIRMAN: All right, Mr Burger, I think, let us leave that.
(20)

MR BURGER: You see, that is how easy you tell stories. -- Shame.

I want to get to Joe Pillay. Is it correct that as you say he was interrogated and then you said on page 103 of EXHIBIT B3IT B3A:

"Toe word/..

C4.714

- 825 -

COETZEE

"Toe word daar nou ondervra, maar jy kan sien die arme ou weet boggerol."

Is that right? -- Yes.

(30)

He did not know anything. -- I was present.

And he did not know anything, is that correct? -- In the end

it proved he did not know anything, that is right.

He did not know anything. -- Yes.

You could see that? -- Yes, in the end.

And it also turned out that you had the wrong person there.

-- The right person that was not active any more. Joe Pillay was part of the ANC machinery in Northern Natal I think.

In any case he knew nothing. -- At that stage - he knew quite a lot, but he was unactive, he did not know of the immediately past activities.

Mr Coetzee, you know Afrikaans? -- I beg your pardon?

(10)

You know Afrikaans. -- Ja, but we are talking English now.

Yes, and did you say - this is what you said to Pauw, "Toe word hy nou daar ondervra, maar hy kan sien die arme ou weet boggerol". -- Yes.

What does that mean? He knew nothing. -- He knows nothing, yes. Nothing new, nothing that he could tell the security police knew of, the recent happenings of the ANC.

No, that is something different, Mr Coetzee. -- Mr Burger, I think you must get to your point. We are going up to the truth here. Let us get there.

(20)

Before we get to the truth, Mr Coetzee. -- Okay. Because after the truth here, and it was to me quite clear that he did know ..

Mr Coetzee/..

C4.742

- 826 -

COETZEE

Mr Coetzee, I did not ask you anything about the truth serum as yet. -- Well, I am helping you because you are going towards it.

Please answer my question. -- Then we must get to real questions, please.

(30)

Listen to them. -- I listen.

What did you mean when you said "Toe word hy nou daar ondervra, maar jy kan sien die arme ou weet boggerol"? --

What I meant in the end you could see this. He was not active any more and he had no new information.

Yes, and the funny part is at one stage he knew, as you said, "boggerol" and then after the truth serum "Nou toe lê hy nou daar en nou praat hy". -- No, I did not say - what did he say? I did not say - the way he was speaking you could hear he still knew nothing. Did I say there that he came out with information about ANC activities?

(10)
Mr Coetzee, if you read the two together, one can easily see what you meant. -- Well, read it.

Before the truth serum he knew nothing, but after the truth serum "toe lê hy nou daar en nou praat hy". -- What did he say?

No, that is what you said, Mr Coetzee. -- Okay but then go on. Of course he spoke. They asked him questions and he spoke and you could still hear that he knew nothing.

And what is the significance of that? "Nou toe lê hy nou daar en nou praat hy". -- Well, he was not sleeping, he was talking to us. They were asking him questions.

(20)
Now, I put it to you, you meant now he was giving the information that you required. -- No, no, I did not - did I mention what information he has given there?

Mr Coetzee, I/..

C4.775

- 827 -

COETZEE

Mr Coetzee, I must again ask you. -- He was talking to us. He has been asking questions and he answered.

Give me a moment, please. I must again ask you do you understand Afrikaans? -- Yes, I understand. You still have got your steam-roller attitude that you had in 1985.

Yes.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: Two steam-rollers against each other will get us nowhere.

MR BURGER: "Nou, toe lê hy daar en nou praat hy", what does that mean? -- Exactly what it says. He was asked questions and he answered it.

Yes, and before that he did not speak? -- He did speak.

But why do you say that now he spoke, after the truth serum? -- Let us put it short, we interrogated - well, Captain Andy Taylor and Major Jerry Fourie, and he answered certain questions and out of that you could sense this ou does not know much any more, he was not active involved any more, so they got in an army doctor, made him lay down on a stretcher, put a needle into his arm intravenously and controlled it with a drip and he sort of kept the guy he does not fall asleep but that he can still answer a question. According to what he explained is so he cannot control his subconscious mind or his mind so much, but you could see he dozed away, he lay on his back, he had an erection, he played with it with his hands like this, but you could see the ou was out, dozing off in that way. That is the whole story, Mr Burger. (10)

Are you finished? -- Yes. I hope you have got no further questions now. (20)

No, you are not that lucky. -- Okay.

Why was it necessary to have Tshikalange there? -- To guard Pillay/..

C4.815

- 828 -

COETZEE

guard Pillay and I decided he will be the guard and he was quite successful because Pillay did not escape.

Did he sit next to Pillay? -- When not interrogated he was locked onto Pillay, handcuffed to him. (30)

And the SADF members present, who were they? -- Major Callie Steyn as I previously said, Sergeant Du Plessis and this army doctor

in uniform which I do not know the name of.

And Steyn and the other chap were they in uniform? -- No, no, Major Steyn was always working in civilians. I have never seen him in uniform, so Sergeant Dup from military ..

So there was nobody there in brown uniforms? -- The doctor was there in a brown uniform.

And what was his name? -- No, I cannot remember. He did not want Tshikalange to be present too and the bunker - under in the bunker where this interrogation started. He was taken into a room at the back. On the eastern side of the bunker
(10)
at the back is a little room and there he was made laid down on a stretcher.

And how much of this truth serum was injected? -- No, I cannot remember. It was on a drip like in a hospital and they kept on for a while, I cannot remember how long, and when it was clear to them, interrogators, that this ou knew nothing they took it off.

Oh, it was on a drip? -- I beg your pardon?

It was on a drip you say. -- In a drip kind of thing, yes, hanging on a drip.

(20)
It was not injected intravenously with a seringe? -- No, no, there was a needle intravenously hanging onto a drip and that was controlled by the doctor.

I put it to you that that is a lot of nonsense. -- Ag,
you would/..

C5.16

- 829 -

COETZEE

you would so much liked it to be. It is the truth.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERTELSMAN: No questions.

(30)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HARRIS: Mr Coetzee, there are certain aspects of your evidence which puzzle me and I would like you to

clarify them. What was the status of Spyker Tshikalange in this squad, and I am not talking about his actual position, what was his status in terms of the others that he used to work with? -- Well, he was the youngest of them all and at first he was not an official policeman. He was, as I said in evidence-in-chief, he was made an HKZ "wag", guard, and then an HQ informer and eventually afterwards, I do not know at what time, a student constable, but he was basically the youngest under the lot of them.

Because one of the things that puzzles me is that he should be sent on the operation to kill Griffiths Mxenge and not be told much about it at all. -- Well, I do not think he was in a position to contribute quite much againstn planning in this operation. Joe and Almond was the chief two guys according to me. (10)

I want to come to the issue of documentation and pocket-books. Both Almond Nofemela and Spyker Tshikalange and now yourself have said that no pocket-books were kept by the rank and file police at Vlakplaas. -- That is correct.

You have said that as an officer you did not keep a diary. -- Yes, that is correct.

As I understand it there are police standing regulations which say that pocket-books have to be kept by rank and file and that a diary is to be kept by an officer. -- That is hundred percent correct and the security police is no exception or should/.. (20)

C5.39

- 830 -

COETZEE

or should be no exception on the rule.

CHAIRMAN: But are they an exception? -- Ja, we just do not keep it, but we must keep them strictly according to police regulations.

MR HARRIS: But why not? -- It was just done that way. I cannot tell you. It was never kept. I think up till this day, I do not know, you can check on it, but we never kept it in our time and (30)

we were never reprimanded on it, we were never compelled to do it, it was just left that way.

Did Brigadier Schoon, the commander of C1, know that in fact no pocket-books were being kept and that your diary was not being kept? -- Of course he did, yes. Even with the vehicle log-sheets, you should complete each trip that you make in that log-sheet and as I indicated in my time I only put 1 January and at the end of January booked it back and one entrance on the C8 and 16 12 000 kilometres.

All right, we have been through the vehicle log-books. Let us try and stick to the area of the pocket-books and the diaries. (10) You see what concerns me is that for the period at least in which you were at Vlakplaas, there is no record of your activities or that there may be record of what claims for S&T were made and what travel to and from destinations was made, et cetera, but there seems to be no record. -- No, there is no record.

CHAIRMAN: But in any event would pocket-books - fall also under the destruction time? They also have to be destroyed within a certain period, don't they? -- Yes, all police registers will have to be destroyed in a certain time. They have got certain years (20) allocated to each specific register.

MR HARRIS: You see, Mr Roberts, who is assisting the commission/..

C5.60 - 831 - COETZEE
commission, has told us that there are not in existence any reports made by yourself or any other officer for the period 1981 currently in existence. Now, what I want to know is were reports made by you which have subsequently been destroyed because of police standing regulations?

CHAIRMAN: Written reports. -- No, no written reports - orally. (30)
No, I have made no written reports in my time.

The only one that is - the statement that I have made is the one on Vusi's file.

MR ROBERTS: I would just like to correct something there that Mr Harris has put. He gave us in Pretoria a written list of things that he wanted and one of the items was no. 11 on the list, reports made to Brigadier Schoon or by Brigadier Schoon concerning the activities of personnel stationed at Vlakplaas during 1981 and the answer we gave, as supplied to me by the police, was that such things were non-existent. Nothing further than that.

MR HARRIS: That is quite correct.

What I find very difficult to understand is that if you were involved in a year's activities carrying out surveillance, et cetera, going on operations, doing the things that you were doing and one can take this two ways. The first way is that you were involved in a lot of legal activities of which no reports were kept and the other is that you were involved in legal activities and yet there are still no reports. -- That is correct. (10)

Why were no reports submitted to Brigadier Schoon and why, as far as you are aware, weren't there any in existence? -- Well, I cannot say that there was no instructions from him that it should be done. It was done in that way and it left (20)

us with/..

C5.82

- 832 -

COETZEE

us with a lot of leeway and scope.

You see, we are trying to find documentation about the activities of the persons stationed at Vlakplaas. At your meetings that you had with Brigadier Schoon at 07h30 every workday were minutes kept of those meetings? -- No, not at all.

Were there any departmental meetings which you attended of which minutes were kept which would reflect what took place on that file? -- No, not in my time. (30)

Can you think of any other documents besides the vehicle records, the work-cards and the S&T claim forms which would reflect the activities of what took place in 1981? -- The best reliable one would have been the vehicle log-sheets and ..

Okay. Well, I think you have dealt with that in some detail before.

CHAIRMAN: No, but the question is there is no other document. -- No, no other document.

MR HARRIS: Let me ask you a question with regard to Ace Moema, would it surprise you or did you know that the brother of Ace Moema, Telle Moema, is in this court-room? -- Well, I have met him last night. (10)

Did you speak to him? -- I did speak to him.

About his brother? -- About his brother, yes.

What did he say to you? -- Well, he was very concerned, to just find out exactly where his brother was disposed of and, as he said, if he could just see the place where he was - whatever happened to him, he will feel better.

What I was going to you is that I have consulted with Mr Telle Moema and he states that he has not seen his brother since 1979. (20)

I was then going to ask you if that would come

as a surprise/..

C5.105

- 833 -

COETZEE

as a surprise to you, that it is clear that you have already met this man? -- No, I know exactly what happened to him, as explained in evidence.

I now would like to deal in some detail with regard to the allegations that you made concerning Siphwe Mtimkulu.

-- Yes.

Now, that was gone into in some detail by my learned friend yesterday and what I would like to do is ask you certain questions (30)

on that incident because we represent the family and they are most concerned about the fact that he has never been seen since a particular date.-- Yes.

Did you ever, yourself, see or meet Siphawe Mtimkulu? -- Not at all.

So the basis of your allegations are what were told to you? -- So the basis?

Of the allegations that you make about his poisoning and subsequent disappearance, are on what you were told. -- That is right.

Now, yesterday it was put to you essentially that through sequence of events he was arrested, detained for some months, released and then subsequently was not seen again. During the course of that a number of medical reports were put to you, is that correct? -- Yes. (10)

Or they were mentioned. -- They were mentioned.

Essentially if you remember those medical reports gave Siphawe Mtimkulu a clean bill of health. -- Yes, if I recall correct, that is right.

You remember that? -- Ja.

It was put to you by Mr Maritz. -- Yes, that is right. (20)

I want to put to you certain allegations and certain facts/..

C5.131

- 834 -

COETZEE

facts which have come to our knowledge, including certain medical reports that we have access to. -- Yes.

Did you know for example that Siphawe Mtimkulu was shot at the time of his arrest? -- No, I did not know.

MR KUNY: Mr Chairman, with the greatest respect, this witness does not know anything about this. If Mr Harris has this evidence, the proper way is not to put it in through this witness, but to (30)

call the witness who can give this evidence or present the documentation to you, Mr Chairman, with great respect. This witness has no idea of what - in fact he has just replied that he does not know. -- But I was asked ...

It is most unfair and out of order, I would suggest with respect, to present evidence to the commission in this way.

MR HARRIS: With respect, Mr Chairman, a particular sequence of events and a particular version was put to Mr Coetzee yesterday.

I have a somewhat different version according to my instructions and in the same way as Mr Maritz put his version to the witness for comment I would like to put mine on my instructions. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, carry on.

MR HARRIS: And I hopefully will not be too long. Did you ever know that he was shot at the time of his arrest? -- No, I did not.

Did you know that on 1981-06-01 he was taken to Livingstone Hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound? -- No, I did not.

Did you know that from 2 to 6 June 1981 he was also treated for a gunshot wound? -- No.

That same gunshot wound. -- No, I did not.

From 16 June he was moved to Jeffreys Bay police station/.. (20)

C5.145

- 835 -

COETZEE

station and this is where the medical reports that were put to you yesterday I think largely come from. The medical report, and this is from the further particulars to a plea in the action for damages by Siphwe Mtimkulu against the Minister of Law and Order .. -- Was...

Reflect - let me finish, please. -- Excuse me.

Reflect that on 20 and 22 June 1981 he was treated by the assistant district surgeon, Dr Opperman, and Dr Delpont on each occasion for a laceration of the anus. -- No, I did not know that. (30)

Did you know that from 2 September 1981 to 1981-09-11 he was transferred to the Algoa Park police station where he was extensively interrogated? - No, I did not.

You see, the relevance of that is that he subsequently issued summons against the Minister of Police or Law and Order in December 1981 after he was released for an amount of R40 000 in respect of various assaults that were perpetrated upon him, as he alleges, by members of the South African Police. -- I knew that he instituted a claim against the Minister of Law and Order, but I do not know what the amount was.

That was in respect of the damages for the assaults. It was put to you yesterday and it was a source of argument and I quote "After his release he could walk". -- That is right, I can remember.

You said he could not walk. -- Yes, I said he could not but it was put to me that he could walk.

On what basis do you say that he could not walk? -- No, I said Mr Maritz has put it to me that he could walk, but I had it that he could not walk, that he was in a wheel-chair.

CHAIRMAN/..

C5.172

- 836 -

(20)
COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: No, but the question is on what basis do you say he could not walk? -- He was poisoned beforehand with a certain poison and he went into a coma and after that he could not walk, he was in a wheel-chair.

Yes, but how do you know that he could not walk at the time when he disappeared? -- It was put to me by Brigadier Jan du Preez that he was still in a wheel-chair.

MR HARRIS: You see, he was released on 20 October 1981, that is the date that we have. We are told that on October 21 he started vomiting and was in serious pain and I would like to read to you from a medical report which will show as to whether he could

walk or not walk and what his precise condition was.

CHAIRMAN: No, the question was whether he could walk at the time when he disappeared. I think that was the point made.

MR HARRIS: I thought it was at the time he came out of the hospital.

CHAIRMAN: No, no, it was on the basis - no, it was never put by Mr Maritz that he could walk immediately after his release or shortly thereafter. The point was made that in the following year he could not walk. That is how I understood it.

MR HARRIS: Okay, Mr Chairman, in fact that goes to more to what I was saying in fact.

(10)

CHAIRMAN: Does that agree with what you say?

MR HARRIS: Yes, it does, substantially. What I would like to read from is a medical report compiled by Dr Moodley and I will read it as follows ..

CHAIRMAN: The date?

MR HARRIS: I haven't got the exact date. He saw him on

24 October 1981/..

C5.195

- 837 -

COETZEE

24 October 1981. "He complained of pain for feet which has started one week previously. He also had occipital headaches and pain between the shoulders for the past few months and he was passing blood through the rectum. He also had a sensation of pins and needles down both legs. A provisional diagnosis of peripheral neuritis was made. On examination he was found to be very, very tender over both calves and feet, even to a very light touch." (20)

He then was admitted to Livingstone Hospital. Now, an article was written about Siphwe Mtimkulu and it is contained in the South African Medical Journal Volume 64, 27 August 1983 by Drs Majoos, Marais and Aims and I will just read certain extracts because what it appears to me is that you mention thallium, is that right? -- (30)
I did not mention the name specific. I just said he was taken

to Groote Schuur Hospital where they exactly found out ...

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but Mr Maritz put it to him that it was thallium.

MR HARRIS: That is right, but you never knew that it was thallium?

-- No, I did not know.

What you say in your Vrye Weekblad interview, it was published on 17 November 1989, you said "Hy het egter nie al die gif ingekry nie, is verlam en sy hare het begin uitval". -- That is correct.

Do you remember that? -- Yes.

Let me read to you certain extracts from this article.

"At the time of his arrest he was in perfect health.

(10)

He stated that several months before his release

he started suffering from abdominal pains accompanied

by constipation and rectal bleeding. He stated also

that his hair started thinning while in detention.

On discharge/..

C5.223

- 838 -

COETZEE

On discharge he was unable to eat solid food, vomitted frequently and could not sleep at night."

(20)

There is a further note from this article:

"Medical practitioners, however, only noticed alopecia .."

and that is a description of hair falling out

"In cases of acute poisoning with high doses of thallium hair only begins to fall out ten to thirty days after poisoning. It was during this time that a urine analysis was done and the presence of thallium was established in his system."

(30)

What I would like to ask you is at no stage was it ever mentioned to you that the poison was thallium? -- No, no, it was not.

And no one in the police mentioned thallium to you? -- No, no, I cannot remember.

Let me put the conclusions that were made by these doctors to you. The conclusion in Siphwe Mtinkulu is:

"The assumption is that he took thallium in by ingestion because of the early gastro intestinal symptoms. It was also thought that he had previous exposure because of the alleged sub-acute cause of his illness with a final dramatic intensification of symptoms. Gastro intestinal symptoms appear twelve to 24 hours after ingestion. Neurological symptoms usually start to to seven days later, although very occasionally it appears within one day." (10)

Is that/..

C5.247

- 839 -

COETZEE

Is that broadly consistent with what Brigadier Nic van Rensburg told you? -- Well, as I said in evidence-in-chief I just learned that he was poisoned on release, that he ended up in a wheel-chair, that his hair fell out and that he disappeared on his second visit or his proposed second visit to Groote Schuur Hospital and that General Johan Coetzee was personally investigating the case and that his car - him and his driver disappeared. (20)

Okay. -- And his car was subsequently ...

We will get there, we will get there.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but from whom did you get that information?

-- From Brigadier Du Preez.

Yes, I think Mr Harris said Van Rensburg, so that ...

MR HARRIS: You never got that from Van Rensburg? -- No, I spoke to Van Rensburg too at a stage. I cannot remember what, but for sure from Brigadier Du Preez on several occasions thereafter. (30)

As far as I recall your evidence you said that you got it from Van Rensburg and Du Preez. -- That is right. I was at the stage on stand-by for Mtimkulu for - to get rid of him in some other way than he was eventually ...

CHAIRMAN: Was that the time when you spoke to Van Rensburg?

-- Yes.

Did you speak thereafter to Van Rensburg? -- Yes, it was called off. I did speak thereafterwards to him.

No, but after the occasion, did you speak to Van Rensburg?

-- No, not after '82, in '82 afterwards.

(10)

You did not speak during '82 to Van Rensburg? -- No, no.

MR HARRIS: What was Brigadier Van Rensburg's position in the police at that stage? -- I just know he was at

Port Elizabeth/..

C5.268

- 840 -

COETZEE

Port Elizabeth regional security office and his rank was colonel.

Lieutenant-colonel.

Was he divisional commissioner of security police, Port Elizabeth? -- No, he was not a divisional commissioner. I think he was second or third in charge. There was at that stage Brigadier Gerrit Erasmus and I think there was another colonel or lieutenant-colonel. (20)

In your evidence you stated that on his way back from Groote Schuur Hospital he disappeared. -- I think I said on his way to Groote Schuur Hospital he disappeared. He never reached it a second time. That is how I can remember it.

Let me put to you the actual circumstances according to my instructions. On 14 April 1981 he was given a lift to Livingstone Hospital in PE, not Groote Schuur. -- Yes.

(30)

And I would like to read to you an extract from the Herald dated 3 December 1989 ..

CHAIRMAN: '82 or '89?

MR HARRIS: '82, sorry. I beg your pardon, that is 1982-04-28. He was given a lift to Livingstone by his friend Topsy Mdaka wearing sheepskin slippers, khaki trousers and a short-sleeved black sweater with a yellow stripe on the collar, using a walking-stick. He left the house and greeted his mother in the usual way. He was picked up about three houses down in Joly Street from home towards the square by Topsy Mdaka. That name was mentioned yesterday to you by my learned friend, Mr Maritz.
-- Yes.

At Livingstone Hospital at about 11h00 his physician saw him arrive at the hospital and told him to fetch his file from the out patients section and return for his pills. When he did not return the doctor assumed he had become impatient and had

left/..

C5.297

- 841 -

COETZEE

left. He was never seen again. Now, it was put to you yesterday that in fact his car was found at the Tele Bridge and that the logical explanation for the car being there and for his disappearance was that he must have left the country. -- That is correct.

Let me put something else to you then ..

CHAIRMAN: It could not have been his car, could it, Mr Harris?

MR HARRIS: It was Topsy Mdaka's car, you are quite right.

CHAIRMAN: Did Topsy also disappear?

MR HARRIS: That is right.

Various interested parties, including his mother, went to Lesotho. United Nations representative in Lesotho arranged for a check of United Nation records and they interviewed representatives of the largest South African political organisations, all of whom were represented in Lesotho.

(30)

It was established third hand that a number of organisations had already previously investigated the matter in Lesotho and in South Africa. From all reports it was apparent that he was not in Lesotho. -- Ja, that does not surprise me. It fits in with the exact method that we used with the Sizwe Kondile case.

Now, according to a report in the EP Herald and this was put to you yesterday by Mr Maritz, dated 30 April 1982, Siphwe Mtimkulu disappeared on 14 April 1982. Are you aware that on 2 April 1982 summons was issued against the Minister of Law and Order for R150 000 damages for the thallium poisoning? -- No. I just knew there was some civil claim. I do not know exact when and how much it was. (10)

You are not aware of the exact nature then? -- No,

I do/..

C5.328

- 842 -

COETZEE

I do not know.

CHAIRMAN: But did you know there was a claim against the police for the poisoning? -- Yes, yes.

MR HARRIS: Just two small further issues, Mr Chairman.

(20)

Mr Coetzee, when you were at Oshoek there were various allegations made concerning you and I am talking here about the pornographic movies, films, I am talking about the false Rika Botes affidavits, you are aware of those? -- That is right.

And it was put to you yesterday that you were then transferred to Middelburg to stash you away. -- Ja, but of course that is not correct. I was not stashed away there.

Why do you say that? -- Well, I was promoted in that six months while being at Middelburg to captain. I do not know whether that was because of my pornographic activities or what.

(30)

I will tell you what concerns me ..

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I must put the record straight on behalf

of Maritz who is not here, the evidence was that he was kept in Middelburg at the request of Archie Bell, the commissioner of the Swaziland police because various investigations were going on and they wanted him close at hand. That was the evidence.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, I did not know whether ..

MR HARRIS: Mr Chairman, that is correct, but inter alia Mr Maritz said that one of the reasons that they took him from Oshoek was that he was stashed away in an office where he could cause no problem and they had dumped certain files on his desk.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that was with reference to Vlakplaas. (10)
-- No, no/..

C5.355

- 843 -

COETZEE

-- No, no, that was at Middelburg. He said they stuffed twelve files into my hand and they left me there.

CHAIRMAN: No, he said specifically at Middelburg he received twelve files. -- And I just want to put that also straight, I do not know whether it is relevant now, but there was no allegations in Swaziland against me as a person ...

No, I do not think that as put by Mr Maritz it necessarily (20)
ly meant that there were allegations against you in Swaziland.

I think it was ambiguous. It could just as well have meant that the Swazi police had certain investigations pending against other people and they needed you in the vicinity if they so required and not against you as a person. So I ...

MR HARRIS: I think that is correct, Mr Chairman. That is my reading of the situation. You say you were promoted to captain during the period you were at Middelburg. Approximately how long after your transfer to Middelburg did that take place?

-- Between four and six months, I am not exact - I think in April, (30)
it can be a month or two later.

CHAIRMAN: Well, when did you become captain? -- During April,

May, June. They might have it on file, but whilst in Middel- burg.

MR HARRIS: Because there appears to be a mistake somewhere and I am not sure because I have not had sight of the various telexes that Mr Maritz had yesterday, but on one I recall clearly that they talked about your transfer from Middel- burg to Vlakplaas and they referred to you still as a lieutenant. -- No, I was a captain when I went to security head office.

Are you sure about that? -- Yes, hundred percent.

You mentioned just now that you had received some special medal/..

(10)

C5.374

- 844 -

COETZEE

medal during 1981. What medal or commendation was that? -- It was on 25 May 1981, the South African Police medal for faith- ful service and then my number ...

CHAIRMAN: But that every policeman gets after a certain number of years. -- No well, sir, this is for ten years faith- ful service and exemplary conduct.

MR HARRIS: Is it not so that every policeman gets that re- gardless of your record? -- If he complies with this, as they say, you know, (20) ten years faithful service and exemplary conduct to get this.

CHAIRMAN: The only point is this, that is not a very unusual medal. -- Ja, sir, it can be made off. I mean ...

I mean they dish them out quite freely. -- But I do not think they will issue it to chaps smuggling porn videos and Portuguese into the country ...

No, all I say I do not think it is that special. -- No, I do not think any police medal is special to that extend. If we look at that newspaper report to what - they say Craig Williamson for the London bomb blast was awarded the highest medal, police medal and what did he do, nothing. He was not involved in the (30) actual blast, so ...

No, but the occurrence or the frequency with which certain medals are issued, that frequency is larger with some medals than with other medals. -- Yes, sir, but I am sure that if I behave - I did not behave in ...

No, all I ask - I accept your point that if they did not think that you were a good policeman they would not have granted you the medal. -- That is right.

MR HARRIS: I want to move to the incident of the red kombi. Various affidavits have been placed before the commission

which/..
(10)

C4.403

- 845 -

COETZEE

which indicate that in fact a red kombi was stolen from the Johannesburg Hotel. -- Yes.

I want to refer specifically to the affidavit, EXHIBIT B117, of Desmond L. Pearce. In this respect he states as follows, and Desmond L. Pearce is the branch manager of the Aegis Insurance Company at Norwich Life House in Port Elizabeth and I am not going to read the affidavit to you to save time and I just briefly - he talks about a claim, an insurance claim in connection with a kombi stolen from the Johannesburg Hotel. He gives the date of the theft of the kombi or the date of the reporting shall I say, as approximately August 1981. -- It could be correct, yes. I haven't got the exact date, but it could be correct. Can I just mention, I do not know whether it is in there, but it was an automatic kombi, red and white, it had a Pioneer radio in with four round speakers and an amplifier under the radio. (20)

I do not want to deal too much in detail with the exact nature of the kombi because I think that is fairly much common cause. (30)
There is just one element that I want to clear up, is that you stated I think in your Mauritian statement to Jacques Pauw that

you were being told by Nic van Rensburg that they had 'phoned up to the insurance company and, although you did not say what exactly was said, you said that to make the thing more difficult for the union. -- Yes.

To mess them around basically. -- That is correct. That is correct. It was told to me. As I had it they left before they could insure this kombi, it was brand new, and then they tried to insure it on their way back, coming back then, to sort of back date that insurance and then 'phone calls were made to this insurance company to obstruct them from getting

(10)
that right/..

C5.439

- 846 -

COETZEE

that right.

What was the intention behind that? -- The usual harassment. I mean, it is a lot of money that the union must, that they lose if they cannot get the kombi insured.

Let me read to you from the fifth paragraph of the affidavit of Desmond L. Pearce.

"I do, however, recall that approximately a week after the theft had been reported to us an anonymous caller had telephoned me, implying that the theft had been contrived and that he was in possession of certain information which he would be prepared to divulge to us for which he would have expected some form of award or gratuity."

(20)

And then he goes on to say he did, however, telephone once thereafter but since the investigations were still under way he was not able to agree. -- It fits in with my story I think reasonably.

But he mentions two telephone calls here. -- Yes, it is possible. They did not say specific how many calls they made. They

(30)

just said they made calls to ...

What concerns me could this be seen, in your eyes anyway, or do you think that this is an attempt to extort further money from the insurance company? -- To do what?

To get further money from the insurance company in exchange for information. -- No, I won't say that. I think it just boils down to plain harassment of the insured person.

CHAIRMAN: The non-insured person according to you. -- Or the non-insured person, yes, sorry.

MR HARRIS: And then one final thing, Mr Coetzee, the commission (10)
was told yesterday by Mr Maritz, and this is in
connection/..

C5.465 - 847 - COETZEE

connection with the murder of Peter whom you recall was the Askari that you say you murdered along with Vusi. -- That is correct.

When I say you I mean that you were present and that Lieutenant Koos Vermeulen actually committed the murder. -- That is correct.

It was put to you by Mr Maritz that Peter's real name was Peter Dlamini. -- I do not know his surname, but I know he (20)
was Peter and I know what he looks like. I have got a photo.

Are you sure you know what he looks like? -- Yes, hundred percent.

A telex was read out yesterday which my learned friend, Mr Maritz, said was a telex that had been intercepted from the ANC.

Unfortunately I have not, Mr Chairman, been able to get sight of that. Mr Roberts does not have it either, but I am sure we will get it in due course. In that telex as I understand the substance was that Peter Dlamini would be proceeding from Luanda to Sweden for education. Do you remember that telex being put (30)
in? -- I can remember, but they said in '82 and it is impossible.

He was not alive by then. We have killed him in 1981.

There is a Peter Dlamini here in this court-room. I have his ID document, he was a member of the ANC and he was in Luanda at that time. He has stated that he was never at Vlakplaas and he stated that he has never been arrested by the South African Police. -- And is this the Peter that they mentioned in that ...

It would appear so because as I recall the telex the telex mentioned that Peter Dlamini was flying from Luanda
to Sweden/..

C5.495 - 848 - COETZEE
(10)
to Sweden for education purposes. I have here a ticket in the name of P. Dlamini and its listing is from Luanda/Harare/ Nairobi and it ends up Copenhagen and then something else which may be Sweden. I am not sure of that. I will hand this to Mr Roberts, but I am going to ask this man to stand up because I think it is quite clear that he is the man that was the subject of that telex .. -- I can assure you ...

And it was put to you that in fact he was still alive. -- It cannot be the same Peter.

Let us see. -- A hundred percent for sure not. I am positive
(20)
sure.

Are you absolutely sure? -- Hundred percent.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Harris, could I in due course have a photograph of Mr Dlamini?

MR HARRIS: Certainly, Mr Chairman. I have Mr Dlamini's certificate of registration ...

CHAIRMAN: Yes, you need not hand that in. If you could just in due course bring us the photograph along.

MR HARRIS: I can ask one of the photographers out here to take a picture I suppose, yes. I have no further questions.

COURT: Yes, Mr Mxenge?

MR KUNY: While there is a lull, Mr Chairman, may I ask through

(30)

the chair whether Mr Harris would be prepared to ask this Mr Dlamini whether he is prepared to give his finger- prints of himself because that is the only way to check on the veracity of this situation.

A photograph is not going to help anybody.

MR HARRIS: Mr Chairman, I am sure there won't be a problem with that. Perhaps Mr Maritz could make the arrangements. I obviously do not have finger-printing material.

CHAIRMAN/..

C5.531

- 849 -

COETZEE

(10)

CHAIRMAN: I do not think anyone has. -- Can I ask Mr Harris something?

You can ask him afterwards, Mr Coetzee.

Yes, Mr Mxenge?

MR SKWEYIYA: Mr Skweyiya.

CHAIRMAN: Sorry. I beg your pardon. I have so identified you with him.

MR SKWEYIYA: He was very close to me, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR SKWEYIYA: Yes. Mr Coetzee, as I understand your evidence about the worksheets, an entry was made on a worksheet when you left the base in Pretoria. Is that correct? (20)

Vlakplaas, in other words. -- As - as I can remember it, the worksheets were completed from the S & T sheets.

CHAIRMAN: No, I think what he said is the that the S & T - the lead, the date of leaving Vlakplaas would be on the S & T form.

MR SKWEYIYA: Yes, thank you.

CHAIRMAN: And the worksheets were derived from the S & T.

MR SKWEYIYA: Now, as I understood your evidence, also you said that once you had left Vlakplaas being, having been called to a particular place ... (intervenes) -- Yes? (30)

You would then report at a particular place. Is that correct?

-- That - that's correct. To the regional commander, ja.

And you'll be called because your squad was a special squad.
Am I correct? -- For surveillance purposes. That's right, yes.

And you would be called all over the country in other words.
In South Africa. -- That's correct.

Now/...

C5.1243

- 850 -

COETZEE

Now, on your arrival at whatever place where you were called, did the divisional commander of that area make an entry of your arrival at that point, or not? -- Not what I know of. I just had
(10)
to report to him every morning. Some- times in the afternoon to receive orders from head office,
but I don't know whether he made a specific entry.

CHAIRMAN: No. He did - did you every - say for instance you were in Durban for a week, would you then every morning also report as you did at head office? -- That's correct.

MR SKWEYIYA: And, and to your knowledge, were there any re- cords kept at the place where you had gone to by the divisional commander of your activities whilst you were there? -- Not that I know of.

Should they have been kept, to your knowledge? -- I - I really
(20)
don't know. Not - not according to what I know. I don't know whether he's made a entry in his specific file or, or diary that he would have arrived, and what the procedures was.

You also said that when ever it was decided to get rid of anyone who had been in detention, an arrangement would be made where that person would be formally released. -- That's correct.

And then after they released him, he would be appre- hended and killed thereafter. -- That's right.

Remember that? -- That's right.

Now I want to deal specifically with the Kondile matter. --
(30)
Yes.

Did you know that Kondile came from Port Elizabeth? -- No,

I didn't.

Not. -- I didn't. I just heard that he was - he was
arrested/...

C5.1309

- 851 -

COETZEE

arrested when he came out of Maputo, but I didn't know that he came from PE.

Do you know that - also that in fact he lived in Port Elizabeth? His parents were in Port Elizabeth. -- No, I didn't.

And did you know that his father is an attorney from the early 70's in Port Elizabeth? -- No, I didn't know it. (10)

And of course you know that Ntimkulu also came from Port Elizabeth? -- Yes. I, I know it afterwards, but I didn't know it at that time.

And you also said that you met Kondile at Jeffreys Bay. -- I met him in Jeffreys Bay.

At the same police station which we know Ntimkulu was kept at some stage. -- Yes.

Now I'm asking you now as a security policeman, I'm gonna ask you certain questions. -- Yes. (20)

As a security policeman. Is it correct that after the death of Biko in September 1977 there were certain instructions which were given to the security police as to what to do when they detained one under the security laws? Do you know about that? -- I knew about instructions being issued. I don't know what they were, because I never worked with detainees myself.

Well, let me tell you. Did you know that if one got detained in terms of section 6 then, which is now section 29 under the new act. -- Yes?

Within 48 hours, the police would then have to arrange for that person to be examined by a district surgeon where he's kept? -- No, I wouldn't ... (intervenes) (30)

Do you know that? -- No, I didn't know the specific time.

I/...

C5.1376

- 852 -

COETZEE

I knew there was such arrangements that he is being visited by magistrates and doctors and so, but I didn't know exactly what - or what it contains, the instructions.

And did you know also that in terms of the law in fact that people who are entitled to see the detainee, are firstly the magistrate, who is supposed to see him every 14 days as I (10) remember the law. Do you know that? -- I knew he had access to a magistrate, yes. Or a magistrate to him.

And you also know that a detainee is supposed to be seen by a district surgeon every two weeks. -- I know he was allowed, but I don't know how often. But I know it.

And you also know that in terms of the present law, he is also supposed to be seen by an inspector of detainees. -- Ja. I know there is such arrangements, but I - as I say, I can't go into - to details of it. But that is what I've read of it, yes.

Now, well, it's on that basis that you know Mr Maritz put (20) to you the various dates when Ntimkulu was seen by doctors. -- I remember.

When he was seen by a inspector of detainees, when he was seen by magistrates. -- I remember, yes.

Now, you were also asked various questions based on statements from various correspondence or telexes between Bloemfontein and head office in Pretoria? -- That's right.

And Bloemfontein and PE security police. -- That's right.

And PE security police to head office in Pretoria. Remember that? -- That's right.

When Mr Maritz was dealing with the Kondile matter. -- That's (30) correct.

Remember that? -- I remember it.

And/...

C5.1437

- 853 -

COETZEE

And after certain portions were read from those telexes, you were asked to comment. Do you remember that? -- That's correct, I can't remember ... (intervenes)

You made your comment. No, I'm telling you. That's what happened. -- Yes.

You remember that? -- Yes.

And you expressed a certain view after those things were put to you. -- Yes. (10)

Remember that? -- That's right.

Now I am going to read to you - put to you further facts and I'm going to ask your comments firstly, and secondly whether, after I have placed these further facts, you have changed from your view about your version about Kondile. -- Yes.

Correct? -- Good.

Now firstly, you know that at least up to now, the state - Mr Maritz did not put any medical records regarding Kondile. You are aware of that? -- Yes. (20)

They were not put to you at all. -- No. No.

And am I correct in saying that the crux or - or the real reason for the killing of Kondile according to you, was because it was said that Kondile sustained ... (intervenes) -- Brain injury.

Some brain injury. -- That's right.

Remember that? -- That's right.

And that therefore the police should pretend as though he's been released. -- That's right.

And then thereafter dispose of him. -- That's correct. (30)

Remember that? -- That's correct.

Now after his disappearance from where he was in Lesotho,
his/...

C5.1498

- 854 -

COETZEE

his father who is an attorney in PE ... (intervenes) -- Yes?

Then instructed other attorneys to make inquiries about where
he was detained in the country. -- Yes.

And he wrote a letter afterwards. After he had gathered that
in fact he had been detained in the country. And I'm going to
read to you the letter which he wrote to the head of the security
police in Port Elizabeth. -- Yes. (10)

And I want also to read to you the response by the head office
in Pretoria. -- Yes.

The letter I'm referring to is dated 2 April 1982. It is
from Mr Kondile, whose initials are D.S.S. Kondile. He is an
attorney in PE. It reads thus:

"Dear Sir, re: Xinisizwe Kondile, (which is the name of the person
that disappeared). I am the father of the abovenamed, who
went to Lesotho during the middle of 1980. I obtained
confirmation of the presence of my son in Lesotho from
Sergeant Visser, a member of your staff who had called me
to his office on 23 October 1980." (20)

-- Yes.

"I subsequently learnt that Xinisizwe had suddenly disap- peared
from Lesotho in unusual circumstances. Your head office in
Pretoria advised through attorneys Herbert Fischer and
Associates that he had been detained in terms of section 6
of the Terrorism Act and released on 10 August 1981.
Xinisizwe has not returned to Lesotho or to his home in Port
Elizabeth or communicated with me since the detention. Will
you give me the following information and details: (30)

1. Copies of all documentary evidence which indicate when and where he was released.

2./...

C5.1575

- 855 -

COETZEE

2. Details of all visits made to my son by magistrates or district surgeons during his detention showing the following:

a. Date of each visit.

b. Name of person who visited him.

c. Purpose of the visit.

(10)

Please state from precisely what place he was released and in whose company he was when released and his present whereabouts.

I would like to know the names of the person who saw to his release."

-- Yes.

"I am very anxious about my son's life and safety. Please advise per return of post."

-- Yes.

The next thing is that Mr Kondile then received a letter acknowledging this letter I've read to you from the Port Elizabeth police ... (intervenes) -- Yes. (20)

Saying that he was gonna get a response from Pretoria. -- Yes.

And the response from Pretoria is dated 27 April 1982. The reference is a Captain Hawkins and it's addressed to Mr Kondile: "Sir, re: Xinisizwe Kondile. Receipt of your letter addressed to the head of the security branch Port Elizabeth dated 2 April is hereby acknowledged. We are able to furnish you with the following information: On 26 June 1981 Xinisizwe Kwasilonso Kondile was arrested at the Van Rooyenshek border post between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Lesotho. He was returning to Lesotho from South Africa (30)

Stanza 1980 model with registration number A9987."

That's the car which you say belonged to Hani. Is that correct?

-- That's right.

Chris Hani. -- That's right.

"He was taken to the police cells at Hilton Bloemfontein where he was held until 10 July 1981 on which date he was removed to Port Elizabeth for further investigation. The vehicle in which he had been travelling at the time of his arrest, (10) was left at Bloemfontein. He was released from custody in Port Elizabeth on 10 August 1981 and taken back to Bloemfontein by Captain Du Plessis."

Who we now know is the man you saw yesterday. -- Yes.

The day before yesterday. -- Yes.

"Of the security branch at Port Elizabeth where he was placed in possession of the motor vehicle ... "

I'm sorry.

"Where he was placed in possession of the motor vehicle and allowed (20) to proceed to wherever he wanted to go. He has not been seen by any member of the security branch since his departure at Bloemfontein and his present whereabouts are unknown."

After having had these facts which I've stated to you, what are your comments, firstly? -- It's quite obvious to me that the normal method was used. That he was released, placed in his car, everyone saw him driving away, he was kidnapped and at the time that I saw him there in Jeffreys Bay police station in fact when the car was there and he was abnormally held in a white policemen single quarter in the police station and not in a cell ... (intervenes)

Okay, now, does this change your view which you

expressed/... (30)

expressed ... (intervenes) -- No.

After certain facts were placed to you? -- No. I'm keeping - that fit in with my story.

Let me give you something more. -- Yes.

From the documents which - from which Mr Maritz was quoting, there is a telex - I'm sorry, let me just ..., a telex which is from the security police in Port Elizabeth. It's dated 10 August 1981. This is the date on which, according to the police, Kondile was released. -- Yes.

And it's addressed to the head office in Pretoria to Major Van Rensburg. I presume that's the Nick van Rensburg you have referred to. -- That's right. (10)

And the reference of Port Elizabeth is Captain Du Plessis, who is now Major Du Plessis, I think. -- Colonel, I think.

And in this telex sent to, to - to head office, the Port Elizabeth police are saying that they're finished interrogating Kondile and that his interrogation revealed no prima facie case against him and the last paragraph says this, which is what I want you to comment on: On technical - it - it's Afrikaans of course, I'm just translating it. -- Yes. (20)

On technical - on tactical, I'm sorry, on tactical grounds it is requested that Kondile should be released on 10 August 1981 from the terms of section 61. Are you able to comment on what the tactical grounds could be? -- Well, I think that according to my knowledge, I would interpret it as that he - he's now working for the security police he's gonna bring information and - tactical release. That's why they don't charge him, because I believe Mr Maritz said he had quite a lot against him to charge him with, had he cooperated.

(30)
CHAIRMAN: / ...

CHAIRMAN: I think we're getting into the area of absolute guesswork.

MR SKWEYIYA: As your worship pleases. Regarding - in so far as the disappearance of Kondile is concerned, according to you, and the killing of Kondile is concerned, who of the Port Elizabeth security police do you say conspired in his killing? What are their names? -- The now Brigadier Nick van Rensburg.

Yes? -- Colonel Du Plessis.

Yes? -- There was a Sergeant Jan, but I can't remember the
(10)
- the surname.

Yes. -- They were the three that brought him up to Komatipoort.

Hm-m? -- And the people that took the car through to Swaziland, was the Ermelo security branch, Major Chris Deetlefs or then Captain Chris Deetlefs, maybe at that stage and his men.

Now let, let - let's leave Kondile now. Let's go to Mxenge.

To the Mxenge issue, killing. In so far as the Mxenge killing is concerned, which are the members of the security police in Durban or in Natal who you say conspired in the killing of Mxenge? I
(20)
know about you know, the people who stabbed him and so on and I know about you. I'm talking about the policemen from Durban. -- The regional commander, Brigadier H.R. Van der Hoven at that stage and Captain Andy Taylor and his men.

What? Captain Andy Taylor and his men you say? -- Ja, well, one of his black staff took us to the - the house and showed us around.

And can you remember the name of this black policeman? -- No, unfortunately not. I can't remember.

Incidentally/...
(30)

Incidentally you know, you gave a very graphic description when you were asked about Mxenge's house. -- Yes.

About how you get there and I must tell you that it's correct, hundred per cent in terms of getting there, where the house is situated, and so on. Now I want to ask you about his office. You say that you kept a surveillance of his offices also for some time. -- That's right.

Are you able to remember, are you able to describe the offices well, or not? -- Yes, fairly roughly. It was in a - it was in a road leading away from the beach. I don't know where it stands on the beach, but running east-west. And if you drive east-west up that road, his office was on the right-hand side in a block about - it, it was more than one floor. About, I don't know exactly how much, but he was halfway up about on the fourth or the fifth floor. (10)

Yes? -- On the right-hand side if you go up. And just past his office, there's a road coming sharp from the right, going left, forming a triangle on the opposite corner.

Yes? -- And that's where he parked his car and on the you know, opposite corner behind a cement slab, there's concrete walls. I don't know whether there's - ja, I think there were buildings further down, but it started with a triangle at the corner. Just past the office left, there he parked his car opposite the street in that open parking lot. (20)

Was his car parked there, or not? -- He parked it there always, yes.

What - what type of parking was this? -- Open parking. It was a open parking. There wasn't parking meters. It looked there as if it was a - they, they've brought down a building there previously and that they were later to build

(30)
there/...

there again.

Now you spoke of Brigadier Van der Hoven. Remember it? --
That's right.

I got the impression that you knew him for quite a long
time. -- Very well, since 1977. 1976.

And was there any special relationship between the two of
you? -- Well, there was a close rapport, I mean, he was my superior,
but there was a very close rapport between as I previously mentioned
between myself and him, myself and Brigadier Van Rensburg and
myself and Brigadier Jan du Preez. (10)

Was there any special name by which you called him, or special
way by which you would talk to him when you referred to him? --
Yes. Oom Hofie.

Come again? -- Oom Hofie. Uncle Hofie. As I referred to
Brigadier Jan du Preez also as Oom Jan.

I see. Sorry. Now, we know that the Askaris, when they came
to Durban in November to go and Kill Mxenge as you say, stayed
at the quarters, the police quarters. -- At C.R. Swart square,
that's right. (20)

Now, do you know whether there were any entries made in any
book of any sort on their arrival there and their departure? --
I don't know exactly, because as was pointed out when this - at
- was pointed out to me when I was referring to Constable Braam
du Preez, from our S & T a certain amount was subtracted, I think
it was R4, for staying into the - in, in the single quarters.
I don't know what was it in their case. They were sleeping in
the - in a dormitory right next to the offices of the dog handlers,
in the - in the premises just next door on the C.R. Swart square
police station. I don't know whether there was any entries made
specific to keep (30)

record/...

record to the fact that R4 had - had, to be subtracted, or how much from their pay for sleeping in police facilities.

Just one last question from me. It was so that your superiors were very angry about the abduction of Pillay from Swaziland. Remember that? -- Yes.

Was there ever any departmental inquiry concerning your conduct that in regard? -- Not - not at all. Never. Never.

I think I've finished.

CHAIRMAN: Are you finished?

MR SKWEYIYA: Just one last aspect you know. There was an inquest into the death of Mxenge. There was an inquest, you know, which was held. -- Ja, I've heard it.

You know that? -- Yes.

And there's a long record, you know, of the proceedings there. -- Yes.

Have you ever read the contents of that record? -- Never had insight to any statements whatsoever. I was shown two - two - eh - you know, photocopies of photos that was taken of his body, but that was all. Nothing else.

That is all, thank you.

CHAIRMAN: Fine, thank you. That - that leaves Mr Roberts and any questions in re-examination and we shall finish tomorrow afternoon.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS UNTIL 3 MAY 1990.

THE COMMISSION RESUMES ON 3 MAY 1990.

DIRK COETZEE (still under oath):

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROBERTS: You see yourself as the chief investigator in what you call South Africa's own Nürnberg trial. -- I said that could happen in the future if the truth doesn't come out at this stage, yes.

But you foresee yourself as being in that role? -- I was hoping that I could get in that role one day, yes.

Now is that the type of trial that you had in mind in evidence (10) a few days ago when you said that the truth will come out, if not in this arena, then in another arena. -- No, no. At that stage I just meant hoping that there will still be some more people like myself that was involved that will come out in front of this Commission at present and give the truth as - was - what to had - what had happened.

So when you made that remark a few days ago, the Nürnberg type trial hadn't entered your mind at all? -- No, no. That - I didn't mention it. That wasn't in my mind at that time. I've explained it to the Chairman to that way. I think it was (20) misinterpreted. It was put in a way that it could have been misinterpreted, yes.

Now would you agree with me that the following qualities inter alia are required of a good investigator. I'm not saying these are the only qualities, but that these are some of the qualities: impartiality, integrity and reliability. -- That's correct.

Right. Now, let's start with your own impartiality. First of all, you were deeply involved yourself in these atrocities. -- That's correct.

Then how can you be impartial? -- I - I've implicated (30) my /...

my - myself. I said I'd been involved, so it's just a question of bringing out the truth as to the people that was involved with me - with me. According to my point of view, of course, the present team assisting the Commission, police team, is not at all impartial.

I see. Well, I was going to get to that, but thank you for mentioning it now. So on your example now, let me give you an example. If a policeman is charged with let us say, robbery and he pleads guilty and handsup, do you give him a docket to investigate the case further himself? -- Well if the - the rest (10) of the people does not come out, I mean there's ample examples in our law system where they used one of the people that was involved as a witness ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Ja, but that ... (intervenes) -- For the state.

No, as, as - as chief investigator. The question does not turn on - on ... the question does not turn on, on - on your ability to give evidence, but to be the investigator. -- Ja, well I was - I, I hope if it is that if the truth does not come out, if the - my you know, colleagues does not come to the front with the truth, that there will be opportunity one day that I could lead an (20) investigation.

Ja, but the question - the question is, can you be an impartial investigator? -- Well, I'm sure I can be an impartial investigator.

MR ROBERTS: Very well. When did you first start using this word "atrocities" to describe what you did? -- Very difficult to say.

I can't remember.

Not at the time when you did these things? -- No. No, not at all.

Not before you left South Africa? -- No.

Only /...
(30)

Only after you left South Africa? -- That's correct.

Now let's take this question of your impartiality a little bit further. You have an intense hatred for certain key figures in the police and political establishment. Is that correct? -- Eh ... hatred in this sense that they are too - too coward to come out with the truth and get everything out into the open.

CHAIRMAN: Ja, but that's not hatred. Do you hate them, or don't you hate them? -- Well, ja well, then, then it's not hatred. Then you can't call it hatred.

What is it then? But you said repeatedly that you hate - (10)
you hate certain people. -- I - eh ... (intervenes)

You hated them in 1985 and you hate them again. -- No, certainly ... (intervenes)

It's not the reason why you hate them. See, the reason why you hate them, is because they won't tell the truth. -- Yes.

But you still hate them. -- Yes, that's right.

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman - yes, well, okay.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, what is it Mr Marais?

MR MARAIS: No, the witness has said it now. I just wanted to (20)
put that I can't remember that the word "hate" was ever used by him.

CHAIRMAN: He used it quite clearly yesterday. More than once.

He said: "I hated them in 1985 and I hate them again." And now he confirms it. So ... yes?

MR ROBERTS: While we're on the topic of your relationship with the police force, when you were discharged on medical grounds, you had to take a drop in two notches in salary.

Didn't /...

(30)

Didn't you? -- Yes, I had to.

That's not a normal situation for somebody being discharged from the force. -- That is not - that was only the result of a departmental trial. My reason for discharge was medical reasons that followed thereafter and has completely got nothing to do with the departmental trial.

Yes, but you left ultimately, you ultimately left the police force having to take a drop in two notches in your salary. -- I left the police force medical unfit, with the scale that I was on at that stage a few months after a hearing, during which hearing the end result was that I was dropped two notches in, in - in salary. (10)

Alright. Now most people who leave on medical grounds, or grounds of incapacity, don't have any drop in notches, do they? -- I won't know. I don't know each - each case.

CHAIRMAN: Ja, but he's just asked you, are most people. Hasn't asked you a answer on ... every (intervenes) -- Well, I don't know.

I haven't got a answer to it, because I haven't seen it.

MR ROBERTS: Let's take another instance of your so-called impartiality. I'm going to refer to EXHIBIT B(3). That's the transcript of the conversation in Mauritius between you and Jacques Pauw. Page 192 to 193. B(3)(a) the equivalent page is 158. The question bottom third of the page from Pauw: (20)

"Kan jy enige goed nog onthou wat Spyker vir jou gesê het hulle moes gaan doen?"

And your answer:

"Jong, dis so baie. Dit is in so 'n algemene werksopset, jy luister nie eers nie altyd na die stories nie. Jy sien dit gebeur in die koerant en dan weet jy. Ek meen,

jy /...

(30)

jy wat daar was en die ondervinding het en in die groep was en as daar 'n voorval was waar die weermag in betrok- ke was, dan het dit altyd uitgekom amptelik in die koe- rante. Dis erken. As daar 'n voorval was wat niemand kon verantwoordelikheid voor gevat het en so nie, dan moet jy weet dis Vlakplaas se mense wat dit doen en soos ek sê, as hulle, hulle kan maar net ..."

ensovoorts. -- Yes?

That's what you told Pauw there. -- That's right.

So if we can sum that up, if there's anything which you would term an atrocity and nobody steps forward and takes the blame, then it means Vlakplaas did it. -- No. For instance when I read about the - the - the taxi driver that came from the airport at Matsapa on the Lesotha road to Mbabane who's pushed off the road by a white BMW and the three ANC occupants of the vehicle were killed and I then made my conclusions out of that and it was confirmed in 1987 during a visit in September.

That ... (intervenes)

That is not the question involved.

CHAIRMAN: No, that's not what you've said here. You said here: "As daar 'n voorval was wat niemand kon verantwoor- delikheid voor gevat het nie en so nie, dan moet jy weet dis Vlakplaas se mense." -- Ja.

Is that a true statement? -- That's correct.

Now, no one as far as I knew, accepted responsibility for the bombing before - in Church street in Pretoria was killed in access of 100 people. So you say that was Vlakplaas's people? -- No, I say, I think it is general knowledge that it was pointed at the ANC.

I /...
(30)

I see. So - so it's not true that if there is an incident and no one accepts responsibility it must be Vlakplaas's people. -- Well, the Church street bomb was hang onto the neck of the ANC.

Yes, maybe wrongly. According to you, it must be Vlakplaas's people. -- No, ... (intervenes)

If this statement is general true - generally true. -- I think then you must accept is as a very general rule that I put it.

But is it the Vlakplaas people, or is it ... (inter- venes)
-- Not the Church street bomb. That was the ... (in- tervenes)

No, no but in general, If there's an atrocity that you cannot hang on the neck of the ANC, or PAC, then is it Vlak- (10)
plaas's people?

-- As far as Swaziland concerned, yes. That was what I actually had in mind at that time.

Only in Swaziland? -- Yes.

But not atrocities in general in South Africa? -- Not in general in South Africa.

I see.

MR ROBERTS: But you see, this is the problem, you're talking to Pauw now and you know that what you tell him will be circulated throughout the world and you make a general statement like that. (20)
-- Ja, I told you what my state of mind was at Vlakplaas - ag, whilst I was in Mauritius. Basically what I meant and it comes - it boils down to that the South African security police is involved in killings and bombings and other atrocities. That is what it's basically about.

But you told us that your - your state of mind when you made that statement in Mauritius, was so that you could record the /...

C1.6

- 869 -

COETZEE

the truth for posterity in case something happened to you. -- Yes, (30)
that's right.

But surely if you're going to record the truth for history

in years to come, you've got to be very careful what you say. -- But surely, basically I wouldn't have been wrong, that the security police is involved in atrocities of murders and bombings and the like?

But that's not the same thing as what you said there. -- In general it is.

What you said there is that if you can't find any other culprit, then you must assume that it's the security police. In particular Vlakplaas. -- Ja. But I think basically, I wasn't wrong.

So you still ... (intervenes) -- But what I wanted to bring over to the world, is that the security police is involved in atrocities of bombings and murders, blowing up of cars, stealing of cars, et cetera. So basically it wouldn't have changed that. That, that - that is the truth. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes?

MR ROBERTS: So, now you have the nerve to point a finger at the investigating team of the police force, to say that they don't qualify to act as investigators for this Commission, because they're not impartial. -- They can't be impartial, yes. (20)

But you can be? -- Well, I'm sure I can, because I've come into the open and I've admitted my part.

Right. Now, let's turn to the second of the three elements that we discussed a little bit earlier, that's integrity. And now we're talking about your integrity. On your own admission, you falsified an alibi for Rika Lourens

Botes /...

C1.7

- 870 -

COETZEE

Botes in her prosecution. -- That's correct. And I could admit that I've done it. (30)

Yes. And then you denied in a statement that you've made

to the police that you had done that. -- That was a whole discussion where Brigadier Van der Hoven, Brigadier Schutte - Stan Schutte and General Ronny van der Westhuizen was involved.

CHAIRMAN: But you denied it. -- Yes, but they knew exactly what the position was.

You made the statement. -- Yes, I know. I know. But I mean, I've still got it in me to come and say that was the question - that was what happened. That I did in fact help her.

MR ROBERTS: They - they didn't force you to make a statement to the effect? -- No. No, they didn't.

(10)

Right. Let's look at the killing of Vusi. -- Yes.

First of all you falsified informer fee slips to provide a cover story in case anybody inquired where he got to. -- That's correct.

You then later put up a false affidavit when there was talk of some civil proceedings in relation to him. -- That's correct.

With the full knowledge of my superiors.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but that doesn't make you ... (intervenes) -- No.

That - that - you, you were - it still affects your integrity. -- Yes. I accept it. I accept it.

(20)

MR ROBERTS: What I mean, they didn't force you to do any of these things. -- Well, no. But I - they know I had no option.

Alright, now - let's come to the diamond dealer. You didn't - you did have an option not to become involved in that

IDB-transaction /...

C1.19

- 871 -

COETZEE

IDB-transaction, didn't you? -- Yes, and I preferred - how do you mean in - when it - when ... (intervenes)

When you lent them the money to do this? -- Yes, yes, yes.

(30)

I had a option.

Right. You know it's a very serious crime in South Africa

to get involved in diamond dealing? -- Yes.

Then afterwards the three who were involved in the actual killing, on your version, came to you and told you that they'd killed somebody and you helped by disposing of the body. -- That's correct.

And covering up the whole incident. -- That's correct.

This was a private matter, not a matter relating to security police atrocities. -- Not at all.

As a policeman, surely you had a duty to expose that matter. -- Yes, and I'm sure just as my superiors had it when I reported to them. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but I think what - what Mr Roberts is doing, he is not assured on your evidence quite clearly certain of your superiors had a lack of integrity. So the fact that they had a lack of integrity, does not justify your lack of integrity. -- No, exactly. But I think I have explained in chief that I - if I did not help Almond and them at that stage, or we, because Paul and - and Captain Vermeulen was involved with me with the disposing of the body - the present happenings and revelations of Almond Nofemela ... (intervenes) (20)

What, what - because that was before, on your evidence, before the murder on Mxenge. It was before the murder of Maphonya. What - what atrocities ... (intervenes) -- I think ... (intervenes)

Could Almond then, then - then, then bring to the

world /...

C1.20

- 872 -

COETZEE

world? -- I didn't put the exact ... (intervenes)

No you didn't put the ... (intervenes) -- Dates, but there - still, a lot of things has happened at Vlakplaas already. I don't know ... (intervenes) (30)

What? Such ... (intervenes) -- When the cars were stolen,

et cetera.

Car theft. So, big deal. -- Well, that was the case.

So, so it's not comparable at all - it's not comparable in any sense. So, so - so you got involved in the disposal of a body to cover up car thefts? You were covering up your own diamond dealing. -- Not at all.

Obviously you had to cover up your own diamond - IDB-deal. -- No, I had to kill a - sort of cover up that murder of - of the diamond dealer.

No, I know. But disposing of the body was a cover up for your diamond dealing. -- No. (10)

What else was it? -- Okay. Accept it that way.

Thank you.

MR ROBERTS: Let's take it further. You sold the car and pocketed the proceeds. -- No, I - Yes, I - basically I did, but it was going back to my mother-in-law from whom it was borrowed.

But be that as it may, it wasn't your motor car. -- No.

You knew they'd robbed the car off him. -- Yes.

Let's move to the Lindley shooting now, the one in which you say Joe Mamasela was involved. -- That's correct. (20)

You were involved by putting up false affidavits by yourself and Almond Nofemela in that regard. -- I was.

And manufacturing evidence in supplying a "doppie". -- That's correct. After conferring with my superiors as

to /...

C1.21

- 873 -

COETZEE

to Joe's identity.

CHAIRMAN: But that was afterwards. -- No. Before I started writing any - any, any statement that night, I first phoned Brigadier Schoon. (30)

MR ROBERTS: Alright, we'll come back to that one. Let's move

on now to your departmental trial. You admitted yesterday when Mr Visser was examining you that you deliberately misled your own witness, the doctor, and helped to fabricate evidence about your medical condition. -- Yes, I did.

This was so that you could gain a personal advantage. -- That was - well, I could see it as a whole stage against me and a it was a farce I described that trial as.

I see. So you thought that they were stage managing against you? -- I've got to use the same footwork, yes.

Alright. So, that entitles you now to meet fire with fire (10)
and to be dishonest also? -- That's correct.

CHAIRMAN: You see, that raises serious question. Because you now here also accuse the police team of causing fire. So you're also meeting that with fire. Or you can meet it with fire. -- This, this present one, or the one ... (intervenes)

Yes, the present one. -- As far as my knowledge is - as far as I see it, they know exactly what happened at Vlak- plaas and ... (intervenes)

Ja, I know. Listen to the - listen to the point. The point is the following: At that trial you felt that they falsified (20)
evidence and therefore you would meet it with false evidence. -- Yes.

That right? -- That's right.

Now here in this trial you say the police falsify evidence, therefore the question can be raised, legitimately I think /...

C1.23

- 874 -

COETZEE

think, are you prepared to meet that with false evidence?

-- No, I've had no ... (intervenes)

If not, why? Why, what is the difference? -- Because I ... (30)
(intervenes)

What is the difference between 1985 and 1990? -- In 1985 I was inside the - the country, subjected to - to the laws of the country. At the moment I'm out in exile and I've got no reason to lie. Coming out ... (intervenes)

But, but then - I think you have - you could have conceived that you have more reason to lie, because you know you're now immune. -- No. No.

You're immune for - you, you have a complete protection against any possible lies. -- No. I've - my, my evidence could be checked by the ANC and was checked thoroughly according to their intelligence records. (10)

Yes. Well, I - it's - unfortunately I have to check it. -- Yes, but I mean ... (intervenes)

Whether the ANC believes you, doesn't assist me much, because I don't know what facts they have. -- Well, I - they have ... (intervenes)

On which they based their ... (intervenes) -- Ja. They've got the full facts, that I can assure you. And they could check on my story.

Yes.

MR ROBERTS: Right, the next item in relation to your own integrity, is the civil trial in which the Van der Merwes sued you for defamation. -- That's right. (20)

And you admitted to Mr Burger yesterday that you signed a false retraction of your original allegation. -- And I explained to you that I was forced into it. I could do

nothing /...

nothing. The - the day before the hearing my law assistance, the carpet was pulled under me and I had to stand up alone in the supreme

court and I walked into a wall of rules which I was not aware of.

Prehearing procedures, where you had to show your hand, whatever you're gonna put forward in the trial to the opposition.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, but, but ... (intervenes) -- But I didn't appear ... (intervenes)

If you cannot proceed with a trial, you can ask for a postponement or you can withdraw. But you need not give a retraction in any case. And it terms on the retraction. -- They would have proceeded and they were prepared to settle if I admit that ... (intervenes) (10)

Well, they could proceed, you're not there. But that doesn't justify the retraction which, well, you say is false. -- Well, I just threw in the towel at that stage and ... (intervenes)

Yes, but you could have thrown in the towel without giving a false retraction. -- That was one of the conditions. Otherwise they wouldn't have - have settled for it.

Yes?

MR ROBERTS: Well, when you say you were forced, I mean nobody came up to you and said to you if you don't do this, then we'll do that and - and, and twisted your arm in that fashion. -- Well, there was no use on going on. They were prepared to drop the R10 000 each to R100 each, This - this claim and I got the legal cost against me, which I knew I couldn't pay and as a result of that I was sequestrated and the legal cost was about R20 000. (20)

So what you really mean, was that it was more convenient for /...

C1.25

- 876 -

COETZEE
(30)

for you to make a false retraction. -- No, no, no, no. Not at all. I was forced into it. I was prepared to fight until the

end and I just couldn't. As I said, pre-hearing procedures made me throw in the - the towel at the end.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR ROBERTS: Let's turn to another item. When you went to Mauritius and you spoke to Jacques Pauw, and through him the world, you lied about Brigadier Du Preez's involvement in the question of Griffith Mxenge's car radio. -- Yes I did, and I explained it why.

CHAIRMAN: But I don't understand that explanation. -- Brigadier Jan was always very, very special ... (intervenes)

(10)

No, no. - Okay, but I tried to protect Brigadier Ja.

But you didn't protect him. You didn't protect him, because you involved him in that statement, but you also involved an innocent man. So you didn't protect Du Preez. You involved him in the - in, in the - in the, in the Mxenge murder and the car radio. And now you say you protected him. That's a lot of crap. -- Okay, the radio went into Brigadier Jan du Preez's car. The 230 Mercedes.

Yes, but you didn't protect him at Mauritius, but you ... (intervenes) -- Okay, I've ... (intervenes)

(20)

Implicated Schoon. -- But Mr Chairman ... (intervenes)

Dishonestly. -- The diamond dealer's car's radio went into Brigadier Schoon's car.

Yes. Carry on.

MR ROBERTS: Right. Now let's get to the third of the three elements required of a good investigator as we discussed at the beginning: That of reliability. Your own doctor gives evidence at your departmental trial that you're compulsive,

unreliable /...

(30)

stage of Henson coma, yes.

And at the end of this Nürnberg procedure which you think is a possibility, after you have flushed everybody out are you going to then turn yourself in so that you can be prosecuted along with the rest? -- That's right. Accused 1.

That makes about as much sense as it would be if at the original Nürnberg they'd made Rudolph Hess the chief investi- gator. -- Is it?

Doesn't it?

CHAIRMAN: Yes? Carry on.

(10)

MR ROBERTS: Pardon?

CHAIRMAN: No, carry on.

MR ROBERTS: Has anybody suggested that you be given the job of chief investigator one day? -- Not at all. I was hoping for it.

So do you want to build up you credibility in order to get the job? -- No, no. Not at all. As I've said in the beginning, it - you know, takes a thief to catch a thief and Mr Chairman said it takes a murderer to catch a murderer and I still stick to that.

Now in that letter that you wrote to Chris Krause which was handed in yesterday, B129. -- Yes.

(20)

You refer to yourself as a "bleddie kommunist". -- It's a brother-in-law of mine and I got a letter that he wrote and I'm prepared to give that to you to show you what the answer thereto was.

CHAIRMAN: No. -- It was completely a joke ... (intervenes)

No, it's - that's all - all he wants to know, was it a joke that you call yourself - that you call yourself a
communist /...

C1.28

- 878 -

COETZEE

(30)

communist. -- Ja. He's still in South Africa.

No, no. -- He's an honest policeman and I was writing to him

in the way that I know they would look at me.

No, that's all ... (intervenes) -- Ja.

The answer is, it was a joke. -- Ja. Yes.

MR ROBERTS: At the time when you committed all these what you now call atrocities, you said you were fighting a just war. -- That's right.

You don't think that what you did - at this stage you don't think what you did was just? -- No, not at all.

Now when did you change your mind? -- After I've met the so-called enemy, so-called terrorist and I've seen how we've been brainwashed over these years by negative propaganda on the part of the South African government, TV and newspapers. (10)
A deliberate and a systematical campaign of disinformation. And if you would just you know, take the opportunity to come up to Lusaka and meet these guys as many other South Africans have done, you will hundred per cent agree with me.

Are you now against violence in any form? -- Violence in any form, that's right.

And is that why you didn't want to become a member of the MK part of the ANC? -- That's correct.

So instead, you're a member of their intelligence section? (20)
-- That's correct.

And the intelligence which you supply, I presume, is put to use by them in some way? -- No - yes, in this way that they can't be misled by the South African security forces and I can give you an instance where I've given information, if you want to. For instance, that day that they showed Vlakplaas as an innocent place to the world press. The day before Vlakplaas

was /...

Now, why I've given this information, is so that they know what they're dealing with if they deal with Vlakplaas. That there's a big Russian arms buildup at Vlak- plaas and intelligence sources in that way. To assist them in other words, to not being - be misled by the South African security forces.

Was it your conscience that caused you to leave South Africa?
-- Amongst other things, yes. For sure.

What were the other things? -- Ending up against a wall of denials, as is the case now.

CHAIRMAN: No. What denials? Were you not concerned that you
may be prosecuted on what Nofemela had said? -- No, not at all. (10)

I was assured that everyone has denied, as I put it, and as I've stated before, the McNally Commission is still secret and the - I'm sure, you can have a look at that week that I said who gave witness and what they've said and it will prove to you ...

(intervenes)

No, no. But I don't understand. What, what was your concern about the wall of silence? -- No, I mean I could have just like my ex-colleagues have done, stay inside and denied everything.

I take the risk that I could in the end be made scapegoat. Because
I'm now ... (intervenes) (20)

In other words, there was a risk that you could be the scapegoat. -- That's right.

On Nofemela's evidence. -- That's correct.

So, so you - you were concerned that you, you may be made a scapegoat. You may be prosecuted in the light of Nofemela's allegations. -- And all the others will get off.

And the others would, would, would - would clear
themselves /...

By denials. -- By denials, ja.

So you were concerned that Nofemela's allegations would place you in the, in the - in court. -- Yes, there was a possibility, but it was put to me that everyone had denied and I must also just deny.

That was - that was a reason. -- That was a?

That was a reason why you decided to leave the country. -- Eh - what, was this?

The possibility that everyone may turn against you as in the past and that you may be the only accused on Nofemela's allegations. (10)
-- That's correct, that was one of the reasons.

Yes.

MR ROBERTS: You only decided to join the ANC after Nofemela came out with his allegations? -- No, I decided to go and see them and tell my story to them and after meeting them, I've decided to join them.

Yes, but that decision to - to approach them, you only made after Nofemela's allegations. -- That's correct.

How much - how much - how long after he made his allegations? -- I don't want to go to - into the details of it, but (20)
it was very soon afterwards. I eventually landed up with them to be precise a week and three days after Nofemela's re-velations.

Was it your own idea, or did somebody suggest it to you that you go over to them? -- It was my own idea that I have to start off somewhere at some point and try and make peace.

So how did you go about contacting them? -- No, I don't want to go into that, because there's - could still be a lot of - of the Vlakplaas guys coming out in future and I don't

want /...

therefore will not be to come and support me in lies, but to try and bring the truth up before this Commission.

As far as I'm concerned now, what I see as the truth.

Before Nofemela made his allegations, you had already told Jacques Pauw, I take it, about various atrocities that you had committed. -- Yes, I did.

In some detail? -- No, no, no. Very briefly and he wanted to do a book on - I don't know what you call it, fiction and facts on - on my life story.

Did he come with the idea of writing the book? -- That's correct. He - since, he says he had it in his head since 1985 when he heard about it. (10)

I see. And he hadn't pest you over the years between 1985 and the time when Nofemela made his allegations in October 1989 for more details about these atrocities? -- No, only in the week or two before - or three before Nofemela spoke, this book was discussed again.

I see. -- After I have made contact with him in regard of some, some - you know, other news as to ESCOM or something.

CHAIRMAN: As to what? -- ESCOM irregularities that went on there. (20)

What irregularities? -- It was just a personal friend of mine, that was involved in some hassles there and he wanted to be introduced to a newspaper man and I introduced him to - to Jacques Pauw.

MR ROBERTS: So is it quite by coincidence then that just a few weeks before Nofemela's allegations you started talking again to Pauw about your atrocities? -- When he asked about it, yes. That we must do a book on my life. In the police.

And /...

these atrocities"? -- I beg your pardon?

Did he say to you: "Well, tell us more about these atrocities."
-- Yes, in brief, without going into specific details.

Why didn't he want the details then? -- Beg your pardon? He wanted it, but I wasn't prepared to give it, because I - I was - I first wanted to make quite sure from a lawyer's point of view that I can land into trouble with that book.

Didn't he show any interest in wanting to publish the story as a true story? Forget the fiction for a moment. --
Wasn't he?

(10)
Interested in publishing what you had to say as a true story perhaps? -- As near as possible without landing me into trouble and mixing - mixing it up with fiction.

And how on earth can one start mixing fact and fiction so that nobody knows that you're the person behind it? -- I've got no experience to book writing. I'm sure Mr Jacques Pauw will be able to explain it.

CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now - now, did you get the lawyer's advice?
-- Not yet. Not at that stage. We only had one night meeting in a restaurant, in the Pinocchio and discussed it and never came
(20)
to it again after that. Just in brief terms.

MR ROBERTS: And when you told Tiaan van der Merwe about the atrocities you had committed, he wasn't interested in the details?
-- Not in specific details. I can't remember. I'm sure he'll be able to tell you what - what I brought over to him. I - I can't remember the exact words. That was also roundabout 1985.

He didn't suggest to you that this should be raised in parliament, or something like that? -- Well, I put it to him
and /...

and as I could see it, he saw it as being up against a wall.

Oh, he thought in parliament you would be up against a wall?
-- Well, he proved out of the illegal phone tapping that he actually
came up to with and he showed me how he had to, to, to - to table
his questions to the minister of law and order two weeks in advance
and the answers that came back, that didn't at all comply with
his original questions and how it take two weeks again to get
another answer out of ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Ja, but what I find strange is, you gave him the
information on the phone tapping. Is that right? -- I prepared
a whole report on it, yes.

Yes. So now he uses that for putting questions. -- That's
right. (10)

But you also give him details of your - or some details of
your involvement in - in - in a murder, on behalf of the security
police. -- Yes.

He doesn't bother to put any questions on that point ...
(intervenes) -- Well, I'm sure ... (intervenes)

Put to parliament. -- I - yes, I believe so. I'm sure Mr
Tiaan van der Merwe will be able to answer it.

Yes. I just ... Yes?

MR ROBERTS: Very well. When you went to Mauritius and spoke to
Jacques Pauw, you explained that you still had a soft spot for
Brigadier Du Preez and that's why you mixed up the - deliberately
mixed up the information about the car radio? -- That's correct. (20)

That was to protect him, you say. -- That's right.

Well, just let's have a look at that. Because if you look
at the transcript, the original one B(3) on page 100, you
say /...

say the following. I'm just going to give you a bit to give you
the context. You were busy reporting back in Pretoria after the (30)

Griffith Mxenge killing that Saturday morning or somewhere round about then.

"Schoon se eerste woorde aan my was toe ek by hom instap: 'Het julle enige spore gelaat?' Wat hy meen by spore, is natuurlik bewysstukke. Ek het aan hom gesê dit het ge- reën, ek glo nie. Toe het Brigadier Jan opdrag gegee dat die kar verbrand moes word."

And then it carries on and the next question is:

"So Jan du Preez het ook geweet van die hele storie?"

And your answer there, is:

"Ja, hy was tweede in bevel van Veiligheid."

(10)

Now how on earth can you be protecting Brigadier Du Preez or be intending to protect him if you make statements like that? -- I think it's short, short - shortsightedness and narrow-mindedness on my side. Must be.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR ROBERTS: And over the page, page 101 towards the bottom you tell Jacques Pauw that it's Brigadier Du Preez who told you the story about how General Coetzee was called out of the Sanhedrin to hear the news. -- That's right.

(20)

Is your explanation for giving Pauw that information the same as the one you had just given now? -- No. That is in fact what happened.

Yes, but your explanation for being prepared to tell him this about Du Preez. -- I don't understand you. That he called - he said that General Coetzee was called out of the meeting and the news of Mxenge's murder was - was broke to him - broken to him that day.

Yes /...

does it do Brigadier Du Preez to leave some doubt about the car radio if you've already implicated him in these two other ways? -- By calling out and reporting the news after you've received it from Port Natal officially and calling the General out to say that they found Mxenge murdered that night.

CHAIRMAN: Yes?

MR ROBERTS: Ja, but you go further, on page 101. You say:

"Brigadier Jan du Preez het my vertel, die hele spul het heluit tevrede gelyk as ek sê aangeprys, ons het nie medaljes of iets gekry nie, maar die spul was hoogs in hulle skik." (10)

And so on. Quite clear that what you were telling Pauw, implicated Brigadier Du Preez. -- That's right.

But that didn't worry you? -- No.

CHAIRMAN: Yes?

MR ROBERTS: You've told us how you drove around the country- side 12 000 kilometres a month on average from August until December 1981 with inter alia 40 kilograms of military explosives and two cases of handgrenades in the boot. -- That's correct.

Did anybody issue you with this equipment? -- Yes, I got it from as I said, the explosives and the handgrenades from Military Intelligence and the weapons from security head office. (20)

But whose idea was it that you get the explosives and the handgrenades? -- It was handed to me by Brigadier - arranged by Brigadier Schoon.

So he, in fact, he suggested that you must have this - as part of your issue. -- I suggested that I wanted it and he arranged /...

C1.38

- 886 -

COETZEE

arranged it for me, through Major Kallie Steyn.

But you weren't an explosives expert. -- Not at all. But there was always one available in the area where we went. (30)

And when you were driving around inside the country looking for insurgents, what on earth did you need explosives for? -- No, we did quite a lot of cross-border attacks, like ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No. No, the question is while you were say for instance, you went down to the Eastern Cape for - for a fairly lengthy spell, you went down to Durban for a lengthy spell. The question is, why do you need the explosives? Why do you drive around with the explosives in your car? -- It was always at hand for instructions on short notice we could receive to blow up a house, or do a certain job and that was carried on, that explosives was transferred to my - Jan Coetzee first and then after to Gene de Kock. (10)

Yes?

MR ROBERTS: Was it not - excuse me - was it not dangerous if you for example your car became involved in a car accident? -- Very dangerous. Could have blown up in the air.

That didn't worry you? -- No, not at all.

Why not? -- I don't know why certain things doesn't worry me and certain things might worry you. I'm that kind of person.

It didn't worry me and it didn't worry Jan Coetzee after me and it didn't worry Gene de Kock after him. And Colonel Jack Buchner - eh - Colonel Jack Cronjé in between them. (20)

Explosives experts who work with explosives, get a special allowance, don't they? -- I think they get a special allowance, that's right.

Danger /...

C1.39

- 887 -

COETZEE

Danger pay. -- I don't know what they call it, it's possible, yes.

But that's the effect of it. Isn't it? -- Yes. (30)

You never got anything like that? -- No, not at all.

You didn't think of asking for anything like that? -- No.
No, I didn't.

You didn't complain to anybody about this dangerous
situation? -- No, I didn't. No, not at all.

While we're on the subject of driving around the country,
you have repeatedly stressed here that the only reliable records
which will corroborate you would have been the petrol log-sheets.
-- Hundred per cent correct.

Those log-sheets will show you the dates on which you put
petrol in ... (intervenes) -- At - at every ... (intervenes) (10)
Just - now just, just - I'll take you through it in one moment.
-- Yes, yes.

The date, the place. -- That's right.

And the amount of petrol. -- Ja.

And then presumably, by the signature or whatever you can
tell who put the petrol in? -- No. No. On - on your vehicle sheet
at the back just that particulars and then you've got to go back
to the - to the petrol register at the relative station to check
who specifically has put in that amount of petrol and the petrol
readings.

Alright. So, with those two sets of documents, you would (20)
have been able to establish date, place, amount and identity of
the person putting in the petrol? -- That's correct.

And the car number. -- That's correct.

It wouldn't show you, for example, who else was in the car
with you? -- No.

It /...

C1.40

- 888 -

COETZEE

It wouldn't show you where you were moving from or to? -- (30)
No. But it will show you where you've been at a certain stage,
with other words that I put in petrol last night say for instance

at Zeerust and the next day during - if you look at roundabout when petrol is put in during the afternoon, I was putting in petrol at Lady - Ladybrand, for instance and the next morning roundabout if you check when the - the entries, I put in petrol in, in - in Durban, so my car must have been there at that stage.

When you're talking about the afternoon, morning and so on, it doesn't show you the time of the day when you put the petrol in. -- No, no.

Alright. -- No, but you can estimate it quite well according to the petrol intakes at the relative station, how busy they are.

Now, let's assume you put petrol in at Zeerust and then three days later you put petrol in again at Zeerust and nothing in the meantime. Just accept that for the moment, alright? -- Yes.

You won't be able to say whether you were driving round and round in Zeerust busy with tracing terrorists or whether you'd gone to Pretoria and back, or whatever you've done. -- No, it could have just shown you that I've been around Zeerust and if - if one tank of petrol could take you to Pretoria and back, that - that was a possibility, but it wouldn't indicate that I'd been there.

Exactly. -- Yes.

And you averaged 12 000 kilometres a month? -- Average, yes and because I think my car had 65 000 kilometres on it when I left it on 31 December 1980. 1981.

So /...

C1.41

- 889 -

COETZEE

So that would represent at least 24 times having to fill up your car a month. -- A lot. I can't say how much, but a lot.

For 500 kilometres a tankful, that's reasonable, I suppose? -- I can't remember what the Laurel has done on petrol, but - but it'll be a lot of entries.

Yes.

(30)

CHAIRMAN: As - as police driver I suppose, a tankful doesn't go very far? -- No. No, we - unfortunately not.

MR ROBERTS: So you can - you get, you'd have to fill in more times than 24 times a month on average? -- That's right.

So how on earth are you going to be able to unravel all of those details as to where you were just by looking at the petrol entries? -- Well, if we look at the worksheet, you will see that will indicate Eastern Cape all the way and the petrol intakes will tell you but I've been in the Free State, in Pretoria, in Zeerust, in Eastern Transvaal and all over whilst the worksheet will only indicate East, East, Eastern Cape. (10)

CHAIRMAN: No, no. I understand that. Yes? -- Yes.

MR BURGER: So it'll just show that the worksheets give a very broad summary and they don't give you all the detail of where you moved? -- Not at all. Ja, but the ... (intervenes)

Alright? But they won't show that you were involve in any particular atrocities, will they? -- It will show the - the possibility that is - that looks now impossible, that I in fact was in Zeerust with Vusi and Peter and that I was in the - in the Lowveld with the burning of Peter and Vusi and I know the - the place where I put in petrol, but I would like to reserve that as a result of the Stevens story, because I was actually hoping to get hold of the petrol book. Although (20)

the /...

C1.43

- 890 -

COETZEE

the records must be destroyed after certain months, I know at a police station that is neglected. As I know according to my information that the vehicle log-sheets were not destroyed at security head office after three years period, but only in the second week after Nofemela spoke on a Friday. So I wouldn't like to reveal that date might still come up to show that I was in fact (30)

in Nelspruit area, ag in Komatipoort area during the time of the burning, which I said Vusi and Peter were burned.

Yes, but we don't even know on your version, when that time was. -- No, no. But I've got insight into documents, et cetera, I'll be able to pinpoint it. I - it was whilst being at Groblersdal with the investigation of the Ogies incident, where two whites were shot in a caravan at Ogies.

But how long were you busy at Groblersdal with that Ogies ... (intervenes) -- I can't at all say, the petrol intakes again, would have indicated it.

No, they won't. They'll just show you that you filled up at Groblersdal. -- For say, two or three, three days, so that meant we would have been in that area for two or three days. (10)

But it would involve on your part an immense amount of guess work, if you had - even if you did have all those log-sheets, to pinpoint your movements so that you can corroborate your version. -- It would have come much more closer that the worksheets that you put for - or that is put forward to the Commission now of just roughly Eastern Cape and then Durban and then, just accept - accepting from that that we've operated for that two full months just in the Eastern Cape area. It would give much more detail. (20)

CHAIRMAN: No, but - but I don't think anyone has suggested that /...

C1.44 - 891 - COETZEE
that I have to accept that. -- Yes.

So I don't accept that, that - that since it indicates you were only in the Eastern Cape, you were only in the Eastern Cape. -- But I mean, I - I could see there is some dispute about the Vusi and the Botswana raid ... (intervenes)

No, no. That - it's - the problem arises if you were two - two different places on the same day. That's where the problem (30)

arises. If you travelled to Groblersdal on the same day from Ladybrand and from Zeerust, that's where the problem arises. -- Yes, but I think that might possibly indicate that in fact the Vusi and the Botswana raid might have been two different incidents and would help you to ... (intervenes)

Ja, but on the assumption that they were two different incidents ... (intervenes) -- But I am sure, if I just, I mean it's ... (intervenes)

I take - I understand your problem, but you must understand mine as well. -- I understand it, but I've got to rely on my memory. (10)
I've got no access to documents, nothing.

I have to rely on your evidence. -- Beg your pardon?

I have to rely on your evidence. -- Must you rely on my evidence?

Yes. -- Yes, I accept that too.

MR ROBERTS: Where we can give you some dates where you can touch down, then it doesn't seem to help, because we had the dates of the release of Vusi from Brits on 11 October 1981. We had the date of the Lindley shooting on 24 October 1981 and then we had the date of the Mohabi kidnapping on 12 October 1981 and when these (20) were put to you, it didn't seem to help clarify the matter at all. -- Yes, but I didn't make any notes. Just put it to me again, let's - or, or don't you feel

like /...

C1.46

- 892 -

COETZEE

like going over it all again?

No, I don't feel like hearing it all over again. -- Oh, oh.

I'm sorry. -- But as I say, I know what happened and I'm sure I can reconstruct it to the Commission to show that - that I'm (30) speaking the truth if I just had access to what I need.

It would just give you something more with which you can make

guesswork, wouldn't it? -- No, no, no. Not at all. No. No, the truth will come out. It will come out.

You said in your evidence in chief that you were going to show the connection between Joe and Vlakplaas in your time at Vlakplaas. -- Yes.

But you haven't shown it yet. -- Well, I've asked if I can just get access to his old reference book, know, application, to his travel document original application before someone else get their hands on it for in case there's some story again, because still four days before I left that country I had a small passbook what they called those days, photo of Joe Mamasela and Isaac Moema and I burned it with my passport in a state of panic four days before that. And they will tell us - tell us, I don't know whether it'll make any sense, but my 13-year old boy Dirk Coetzee, will be able to identify Joe Mamasela. (10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes. Yes, but that does - the fact that your son can identify Joe, doesn't make Joe a member of the Vlakplaas squad in 1981. -- Okay, but how else would Dirk sort of remember Joe and the stories about Joe and - eh - I mean, it's absolutely untrue.

In 1981, how old was this son ... (intervenes) -- Five. (20)
He /...

C1.47

- 893 -

COETZEE

He was five. -- That's right.

MR ROBERTS: And you had in your possession from 1981 until 1989 a photograph of Joe in any event. -- Of Joe Mamasela, of Moema, Isaac Ace Moema, of a Maputo guy - eh - of, of - of Nofemela, of Tshikalange, I always had spare photo's for passport and reference books. Always.

But why, after you left Vlakplaas, would you have kept things like that? -- I just had it with me. I - no one else asked it for return to me, as I had the passport of that Swazi citizen that (30)

was detained in Durban, with the photo of Brian Ngqulunga in it that I replaced. No one ever asked it back from me.

And you burnt that photo along with other things. Is that right? -- Along with my old passport, four days before I left the country.

At the time when you have already decided to approach the ANC? -- Yes, I did, in a state of panic not knowing what's waiting for me and a state of panic what does the security police know.

Are they gonna catch up with me before I get out of the country and I panicked and I burned it unfortunately.

(10)

But surely this would have been the thing to take with you, to show the ANC who this man was. -- It should have, but I - it's, I'm sure it's not stuff that one would have liked to be - be caught with on Jan Smuts airport by the security police on your way out of the country. I didn't know how much they knew already, how close behind me they were, et cetera.

CHAIRMAN: But they knew everything. -- I beg your pardon?

They knew everything. -- They knew everything?

Yes. -- No, they didn't know I was leaving the country. They only ... (intervenes)

(20)

Ja /...

C1.49

- 894 -

COETZEE

Ja, but you - you were concerned to know how much they knew.

-- Yes, but ... (intervenes)

What they knew about you. They knew everything about you.

-- About me planning to leave the country?

No, about what you did. -- Yes, but I mean they didn't know that I planned to leave the country and tell my story to the world, to - to come out with the whole truth.

(30)

Yes.

MR ROBERTS: Well, you left, I take it, under your own name. --

Yes.

With your own passport. -- That's right.

With your own photograph in it. -- That's right.

So if anybody was looking for you, they would have recognised you there going through emigration. -- That's right.

Now what on earth difference would it have made then if you had had a photograph of one or more black men with you somewhere on your possession? -- Was Askari's on Vlakplaas. They would have seen it as top secret stuff that I'm smuggling out of the country.

In fact, I've had a whole - I've got a book towards a whole head
(10)
- security head office, sections, sub-divisions, telephone numbers, houses, regional offices, all the offices involved, I had that also. But I could not risk taking that out of the country too.

I see. Because it seems strange to me that in certain instances you're very worried about your own safety and you exercise extreme caution, but on other occasions you act with complete recklessness about being - whether you're caught or not. -- Where was this now? In what relation? Leaving the country I was extremely careful, yes.

(20)
But /...

C1.49

- 895 -

COETZEE

But not in relation to how you committed the atrocities and how you maintained security ... (intervenes) -- That was with the full knowledge of my superiors and protection. So I could at all times act with - with the greatest self confidence and I knew I had protection.

Alright, let's turn to another incident. The burning of the hippies' vehicles at Rhodes in the Eastern Cape. Nofemela
(30)
describes the place where this burning took place. He calls it a farmer. He doesn't call them hippies. -- Yes, I see. He's got

it complete - mixed up.

He says it's near Port Elizabeth. -- Ja. I think he's got it wrong and if I'm - if only he had the opportunity what the team has got, to just go and show him to refresh his memory, he will immediately recognise the place.

And which ... (intervenes) -- It's just, and Nofemela wasn't in the position where I was, could relax and think again and - Nofemela was in the Commission, back at night with - on his own; in the Commission, back at night on his own. So I'm not at all surprised that he's completely confused as to exactly what (10) happened. And I'm sure if I was in that position, you - I would have come up with even more confused stories. I'm sure of that.

CHAIRMAN: But he came - he prepared his evidence in advance. He had a written statement in advance prepared by counsel. -- Yes, but ... (intervenes)

So - so, so, so, who's going to help him - who helps you overnight? -- No, just - just the fact that I can relax, I know where I am, I'm safe and I can relax and rethink every- thing overnight.

He's also fairly safe where he is -- Beg your pardon? (20)
-- He's /...

C2.0 - 896 - COETZEE

He's also fairly safe where he is. -- Well, I don't think his future looks too bright. And I'm sure as I say, one can just drive past this - this bar, without saying anything where I said we've met them. Drive past that block - office block without - they will immediately recognise it. Just by re- freshing their - their memory in that way.

MR ROBERTS: You're just guessing now. -- No, no, no, no, no. (30)
I'm hundred per cent sure. That I'm hundred per cent sure of.

You would agree that the town or the little village of Rhodes

is many hours' drive from Port Elizabeth. -- Ja, ja. It is. It's - it couldn't have been true that we'd been in Port Elizabeth.

We were at Lady Grey at that stage. And you will see, I can exactly explain to you what in that - what happened in that police docket too. For instance, the man were trapped ... (intervenes)

No, I'm not asking you that. -- O, but I can give it to you exactly ... (intervenes)

I'm sure you can, but I'm not asking that. -- Oh. You're afraid that it might be the truth that I'm talking?

CHAIRMAN: No, I - I think that comment is uncalled for. -- Okay, (10)
I withdraw it. I'm sorry.

MR ROBERTS: Merely trying to avoid having all sorts of things repeated which we've already heard. -- Oh, but I didn't think I went into detail ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: You went into detail about the police docket and what was in the police docket and how - how you were warned about what was in the police docket. We had that. -- Yes, but I think there was where we entered, how we entered and how we exit without lights and how the - the truck owner said he specifically watched the road up the mountain, he couldn't see

(20)
lights /...

C2.1

- 897 -

COETZEE

lights and I can explain him why. Why it come out, because we took out the - the fuse of the lights, the brake lights, switched off the main lights and we, we drove out with night - night, night glasses up, because Rhodes is lying down in a - in a - in a sort of, what do they call - basin. And you can see the road up the mountain and this truck owner specifically said he watched the road up and he could see no vehicle leave and that will be in the (30)
police docket.

MR ROBERTS: How do you - how do you know what the truck owner

said? -- That was explained to me by the major at Aliwal North security police.

Nofemela said that you were trying to kidnap the farmer. -- No, that's not at all true.

And that because of the dogs, that they - you then decided to burn the vehicles instead. -- No. It was - there was no kidnap or murder planned on that one.

You think Nofemela was just a bit confused when he gave this version of his? -- I'm sure he was.

CHAIRMAN: Which instance did he confuse? He can only confuse (10)
places. Which instance did he confuse? -- For instance that it was a white farmer near Port Elizabeth. That - I forgot about that whole story. Only when I read Nofemela's story - statement - I could see he was referring to this Rhodes incident. That's what triggered me ... (intervenes)

But I say with what instance or incident does he - did the confusion arise? -- The fact that he's been travelling all over so much of the Eastern Cape and that he couldn't recollect where was this little place where ... (intervenes)

No, no. No, but here you have a careful explanation of a (20)
planning of a kidnapping, dogs, aborting the operation,
putting /...

C2.2

- 898 -

COETZEE

putting trucks and I think tractors to light. -- Yes.

With what against another instance where no kidnapping was planned and no dogs which are put - put alight, small - small vehicle ... so you say he's confused. Now all I ask you, is what instances is he confusing? Which instances? -- In that specific case?

Yes. -- As to the planning of the murder. I'm sure if I look (30)
at what happened in the few months that I was there and Almond was still on the farm for five, six years afterwards, he was

involved in much more, to my opinion that he's come out with up to now. I'm hundred per cent sure.

I thought in your letter you said he was involved in much less than what he said. -- Beg - I beg your pardon?

In this one letter of yours, you suggested that he - he made up stories of further involvements in which he was not involved. -- No, I think I ... (intervenes)

And now you say he's - was involved in less. -- No, I - I, I said about the Mxenge killing before and after the murder. The stories that he's poured this - this poison over the meat and we were in the bakkie. I mean, it's obvious he's never seen strychnine in his life. And the fact that he followed us with - that he followed me in Mxenge's car and the car was burned that night, it's obvious that it's not true. (10)

No. No, I'm talking about something completely different.

Eh - yes, carry on.

MR ROBERTS: Very well. Let's turn to another incident. The red and white combi which was stolen from Johannesburg. How did you know that the keys would be in the vehicle? -- I didn't know it at all.

When ... (intervenes) -- I only - only when I walked in and /... (20)

C2.3 - 899 - COETZEE
and to check, I discovered that, that the keys was in the vehicle and a parking ticket also.

You decided as leader of the group that Nofemela should steal the vehicle so that it wouldn't arouse suspicion? -- Yes, because I was aware of the fact that blacks drove it into the garage.

Then one of your subordinates, Vermeulen, asks for a chance to do the job. -- That's correct. (30)

So you just let him do it? -- Yes.

But what about the security of the whole operation? -- There's a risk factor to every security operation.

Yes, but ... (intervenes) -- We could have been caught inside.

CHAIRMAN: But why, why in - what Mr Roberts wants to know is why do you increase the risk? -- As I say, it's difficult to sit here and explain why did I do it or why not. It worked in the end.

I mean, I decided let's go for it and Koos went for it and he came out with the vehicle and that - it, it worked.

Yes.

MR ROBERTS: Why didn't you tell Jacques Pauw about the sticks (10)
at - or the dagga that you found in the engine compartment? --
I think we did. I did tell him that. If I can recollect. My
story was always when we stopped at Vlakplaas, opened that engine
compartment, it was lying openly in the engine compart- ment.

Well, my recollection is different from yours, then. Perhaps when we adjourn for tea, we can check up there. If I'm wrong, I shall apologise in advance. -- And if I'm wrong, then I'll also apologise, because there's a lot of things that's not in that statement in Mauritius that came out later.

CHAIRMAN /... (20)

C2.6

- 900 -

COETZEE

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR ROBERTS: Wouldn't a dagga tend to start catching fire or start at least smouldering if you place it on the engine and drive from Port Elizabeth to Johannesburg? -- In certain spots it should certainly cause smoke and it can get - eh - onto, onto a fire, but it didn't. It was in the engine compartment ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes. Yes, I know. Could you just explain where in the engine compartment? -- Well, just lying. It's a flat en- gine (30)
... (intervenes)

Just lying on the engine? -- Round the engine. As the air

vents went. One can check. Throw it in and see where it falls.

It was round the engine in the engine compartment.

MR ROBERTS: Just lying loosely, they're not strapped down, or anything? -- No, lying loosely.

CHAIRMAN: In other words, these - these longish objects went through the air vents. -- Air vents. That's right. Into the engine compartment.

And into the engine compartment.

MR ROBERTS: The air vents for the cooling of the engine, not for the passengers in the vehicle? -- Yes, I think so. It's at the back of the - on the rounding of the back next to the back window. (10)

Was it an air cooled combi engine? -- Must have been, yes. Yes, I think so. Standard engine.

You said that that vehicle was sold for R7 000. -- Yes.

And the money went to Port Elizabeth security branch? -- To Major Nick van Rensburg, that's correct.

Why did the money go to them? -- The - the combi originated from them and there was a little hanky panky in

some /...

C2.7

- 901 -

(20)
COETZEE

some security branches where they build up their own private kitty apart from the - the official security fund. Now I can't see that that went into - into that private kitty. I just handed that money to Colonel Nick van Rensburg during a visit of him and Brigadier Gerrit Erasmus at Lady Grey at the single quarters. I don't know on - where were they on their way to.

Was this some time later? -- Ja. I don't know exactly how long later.

Didn't Vlakplaas have its own little hanky panky private kitty? -- No, we didn't. We had a R1 000 or a R2 000 security fund - sorry - that we worked with. And now, of course like the (30)

escudo racketeers that we picked up from Lesotho - ag, from, from
- from Swaziland whilst I was at Oshoek border, that also ended
up in some kitties. I don't know where.

Now I move to something else, now. The killing of Vusi and
Peter. -- Yes.

Vusi was the detainee who you had released from Brits. Is
that right? -- that's right.

Peter was the Vlakplaas man who was a nuisance to you.
-- Ja. That's it.

Now, you went to to some trouble to forge documents that showed
that Vusi was drawing an informer's allowance some months into
the future after his actual death. -- Three months to be exact,
yes. (10)

That was in case somebody should come along and say where's
Vusi. -- That's correct.

Now, in the case of Peter, was any similar sort of camouflage
worked out? -- No, not at all.

How could you then explain his disappearance to his
colleagues /...

C2.8

- 902 -

(20)
COETZEE

colleagues back at Vlakplaas? -- Well, Peter was seen as not all
there - always there and it's after he's written some letter to
the minister of police complaining about things on Vlakplaas that
it was decided that he must get - get rid of. So he was officially
on Vlakplaas, placed there. Everyone has seen him there.
Everyone knew that he was always late for work. They'd beaten
him up quite a lot, the - the blacks on the farm. They'd locked
him up in steel cupboards for quite a while and that made him
eventually wrote to the minister of police and they decided to
get rid of him. (30)

So how much longer after he wrote that letter to the minister,

did they get rid of him? -- Eh - I don't know. One will have to check and see how long after that he disappeared.

I think they will have it on record.

But how can we check up? Because you can't tell us when he actually disappeared. -- He disappeared together with Vusi.

But you can't tell us when Vusi disappeared. -- Well, we can come very near to it, because we can look at the first date on the - the informant's pay. Eh - that would reflect it. Nearby, within a week or two.

What happened to the money that Vusi was signing for? -- That money was every month - at that stage Lieutenant-colonel Roelf van Rensburg who ended later up as Brigadier Roelf van Rensburg of the regional security office in Northern Transvaal and is now on pension, he took the receipts and the money at the end of each month. (10)

For how many months? -- Three months.

You told us also that you didn't have the heart to shoot these two people in cold blood. -- Which two, Peter and Vusi?

Yes. -- Yes, I didn't.

And /... (20)

C2.9

- 903 -

COETZEE

And yet you were prepared to administer poison and then sit round, waiting for the poison to take effect? -- Ja, well they said it's a fast story and Koos administered the poison and I was sitting there and I was part of it, I know it.

Well? -- I think it is a way of myself - distancing myself from the actual murder. Very stupid, but I know it's ...

(intervenes)

But isn't it far more callous to poison somebody and then wait for him to die a slower death than shoot him? -- Well, if it's a heart attack, I think it's quick. (30)

CHAIRMAN: No, but watching him die and repeating, and re-peating, and repeating and travelling round - travelling him round like a - like a sheep to slaughter, carting around from one place to the other. -- Ja, well ... (intervenes)

For about shall I imagine 1 000 kilometres first in the one direction, then in the other direction, right across the breadth of Transvaal. -- Koos took him always with him and Peter ... (intervenes)

That doesn't matter, you - you were intimately in- volved. -- Yes, I know. But it's just the exact way that it was done. (10)

MR ROBERTS: And not - just in the same vein, not only were you prepared to poison him, but you allowed Joe to beat him up and have fun with him. -- Ja, that's right.

CHAIRMAN: But why? -- I - I can't explain it. He was seen as a - as a terrorist and Joe wanted to teach him a lesson and he was given a ... (intervenes)

What - what lesson did Joe want to teach him? For what? He was going to be killed. So why did you allow Joe to beat him up? -- It - it, it happened, I can't ... (intervenes)

No /...
(20)

C2.10

- 904 -

COETZEE

No, but ... (intervenes) -- But I can't ... (intervenes)

That's not an answer. -- But I can't explain to you why I specifically allowed him to do it. Joe started beating him up. In the end I said that's enough and it stopped.

But, but - but that didn't bother you. That didn't bother you? -- Well, we - it didn't bother me at that time.

Yes. So, - so why must I believe you if you say that shooting him bothered you? Or having him shot. Why didn't you tell Vermeulen shoot him and walk away? -- No, I said per- sonally shooting him would have bothered me. (30)

Now why didn't you tell Vermeulen shoot him and walked away?
-- Koos offered it out of himself ... (intervenes)

No, I talk - I say, at - at, why torture the man by allowing him to be beaten up, by inject- , or allowing him to be injected and administered poison not once, but twice, all in your presence?

It takes more than a week, you do it again, then you say you didn't have the heart to have him shot, or shoot him? -- It's exactly what I've said.

And then you sit around a fire watching him burn - being burnt to ashes for seven, eight hours? -- That's correct.

You haven't got the heart? -- Well, I think you must draw your inferences from that. That is what happened. (10)

Yes. I, I - I can draw many inferences from that. -- Okay.

Yes.

MR ROBERTS: When Isaac Ace Moema disappeared in similar circumstances, was any series of false documents prepared so that if anybody made inquiries, they wouldn't see when he disappeared? -- I wasn't involved in it, but looking at the date that they've said to me that he only disappeared in

February /... (20)

C2.11 - 905 - COETZEE
February 1982, one will have to look on record whether there was any signed slips, because he disappeared in 1981 whilst I was still on the farm.

CHAIRMAN: Who disappeared in 1981? -- Moema. Isaac Ace Moema.

And I think they put it to me that he was in fact in February 1982 if I can remember correctly.

Yes.

MR ROBERTS: This is perhaps an appropriate moment for the adjournment. I'm going to another subject. (30)

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR TEA.

(10)

(20)

C3.001

- 906 -

COETZEE

COMMISSION RESUMES AFTER TEA.

GERT COETZEE (still under oath)

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROBERTS: Mr Coetzee just as a matter of interest. What was the first car that you stole? -- It was in Swaziland, and I think it was Stanley Mabizela's Peugeot SD 17163, if I recollect.

And roundabout when was that? -- During my stay at Oshoek between January 1977 and December 1979, I can't say what dates. (30)

All right. Now I want to turn to the incident with the diamond

dealer. -- Yes.

We have already confirmed this was a private enterprise, nothing to do with security police matters. -- That's right.

According to you, Almond, Joe and Spyker came up with the idea. -- That's right.

Were you shocked when they put this proposition to you?

-- No not at all.

Why not? -- Well, sir in 1985, for instance, this happened now long before that, but I can just give you an example. 1985, charge 4 in my departmental trial was withdrawn against me where I alledged that the police was busy planning a diamond trap for my friend Frans Whelpton and if they can't succeed that they will plant him in fact with diamonds and I was charged on that and during the trial that charge was withdrawn and it was proved that the year long chief of the gold and diamond branch, Brigadier Hannes

Erasmus was then going on early pension and had to pay over R6 000 admission of guilt on diamond charges and that was kept all quiet so diamond smuggling in the police, I can assure you, it is not amongst the normal policeman an offence like murder or something serious like that. I mean it was a

(20)
question/...

C3.027

- 907 -

COETZEE

question of them going to buy diamonds in Lesotho from a friend and then re-selling them at a price.

But we are not talking about 1985, we are talking about 1981. -- Yes but I'm giving you a general idea as what the policemen's attitude was, if that was the attitude of the chief of the diamond branch I didn't see anything very, very serious about helping them with money to go and buy diamonds in Lesotho ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No, it is not, it doesn't turn on the seriousness of the crime, the fact is a crime. -- Ja.

(30)

Your subordinates come to you and suggest let's commit a crime. -- Yes.

And you, it doesn't bother you at all? -- No.

MR ROBERTS: It didn't bother you at all the thought that maybe they will get caught? -- No, they couldn't have got caught if they are going to Lesotho to a chap that they know and buy diamonds from him.

CHAIRMAN: But why can't they be caught at the border post for in possession of uncut diamonds? -- Okay, there was a risk to it.

And if they get caught the whole, they could blow the whistle on Vlakplaas? -- Ja that was possible. (10)

Ja. -- That was possible.

MR ROBERTS: The further point is this that they would have had to sell the diamonds to somebody to make a profit? -- That's correct.

And surely there's a risk that they can be caught by a police trap, trying to sell diamonds? -- That's correct.

It didn't worry you at all? -- No it didn't.

So when they came with this suggestion did you

immediately/... (20)

C3.045

- 908 -

COETZEE

immediately agree? -- Yes I did.

Was this at night time? -- I can't remember when it was. But I did help them.

And you saw a chance to make money yourself in the process? -- Well if they have made a lot of money I would have for sure shared in it, yes.

But did they agree with you on any way of splitting up the profits? -- No not at all. (30)

You didn't have the R5 000 yourself? -- No I didn't.

You had to go and approach your mother-in-law? -- That's right.

Was she immediately prepared to lend you the money? -- Yes she did, she said it was only for a week or two and I would give it back to her.

Did she, did you tell her what the purpose was? -- I can't remember, I don't think I would, but I can't say for sure.

She didn't have the money, I presume, under a mattress or ... (intervenes)? -- No, no, no she had to draw it from the bank. There is record of it.

And she would have had to draw it from the bank, that would have been during business hours? -- That's right. (10)

You didn't have any doubts about the wisdom of this transaction from the profit ability point of view? -- Doubt as to the?

Well let me put it another way. You hadn't previously heard that these three people, who were going to do the deal, that they had been involved in diamond dealing before? -- No.

They were amateurs? -- That's right.

How did you know that they would make a wise deal? -- They/... (20)

C3.063

- 909 -

COETZEE

They would have done it with Ernest Ramatlala, the Lesotho citizen that tried to blow up Hani and grew up in Lesotho and was a well-known personality there, him and his family and they had very good contacts in Lesotho.

So that was what they told you? -- That's right.

You didn't check with Ernest? -- No I didn't.

I think we established clarity earlier on. This thing took place at some stage when the squad was down in Durban? -- Yes. (30)

So that means it was in November 1981? -- If we were not there

at any other stage which is not indicated on the worksheets, yes.

Almond was driving his private car at this stage, wasn't he?

-- On the first trip down, yes he was.

What do you mean by on the first trip? -- On the first trip when they went to Lesotho. When he came back I think he took his official bakkie.

But I thought Almond went to Durban in the police bakkie?

-- No I'm talking about the Lesotho deal now when they went to Lesotho to buy the diamond originally, they went in Almond's private car.

Yes. But where did they go to Lesotho from? -- They came back to me. (10)

So did they drive the police bakkie back from Durban to Vlakplaas and then pick up Almond's car, or how did it work? -- No I don't, I can't give you that particulars. I just know ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: But it must have been that way if they had been in Durban. -- Well I can't confirm it sir, whether they in fact were in Durban before they started the deal or whether they

were/... (20)

C3.084

- 910 -

COETZEE

were involved in the deal before going down to Durban.

MR ROBERTS: But we have had it from Almond that he went to Durban with the others in the police bakkie. -- That's on that November 4 incident with the Mxenge stories, yes.

I think we can assume he didn't make a practice of driving around at his own expense in his private vehicle when the police were going to provide him with an official vehicle for the purpose.

-- He was not going down to Durban in his private car, I didn't say that. (30)

All right. -- And you, I say if there was no other incident

that we were in Durban apart from that, but you accept now that that was the specific only incident.

Well let's put it this way, if this was the time when they were in Durban, you would have had to come up with a police vehicle to Pretoria and then come to you with his private vehicle, it's the only way it could have worked. -- No I put it to you we could have done it before we went down to Durban, left originally for Durban. I mean it will be much more easier to argue this point if one knows when did the diamond dealer in fact disappear from Lesotho.

(10)
CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you, that's easy to establish is it? -- Yes.

How? We don't know who he is? -- His house can be easily pointed out by Almond or Tshikalange.

Mm. Yes. -- But I will assist, I can assure you sir.

MR ROBERTS: Anyway they come back to you some time later, how much later by the way? -- It could have been one day, I can't, I'm not exactly sure.

And they bring you some stones? -- That's right.

And they show them to you and you immediately see that

this is/...
(20)

C3.103

- 911 -

COETZEE

this is trash? -- That was absolutely trash yes.

How did you know? -- Well if I look at my wife's diamond ring a nine pointer which cost I don't know how many rand and you look at this match-heads dirty stuff with cracks all over it, you could see it was absolute rubbish.

So you sent them back to get your money back? -- That's right.

Did you have any idea how they were going to get they money back? -- With the impression that they knew exactly who they bought it from, Ernest a friend or contacts of Ernest Ramatlala, yes for sure.
(30)

So they are just going back to the diamond dealer and saying sorry we took these things but I want to return them, please pass a credit and give us the money? -- That's right.

Just like that? -- Just like that.

Quite innocent? -- Quite innocent.

All right. Then a little while later, to your great horror you discover that they have killed a man and stolen his car? -- That's right.

This must have shocked you immensely? -- Ja, I was shocked at that stage.

I mean this places the incident in a totally different catagory altogether, doesn't it? -- Why? (10)

Well I mean it started off as a little bit of irregularity from your point of view. -- Oh yes of course ja and it ended up in a murder, yes.

And now it's a private murder? -- That's right.

And a robbery of a car? -- That's right.

You didn't think of reporting this to your superiors immediately? -- I did report it to Schoon, my first thing

was/...
(20)

C3.118

- 912 -

COETZEE

was to get hold of that body and get rid of it.

Before or after reporting to Schoon? -- Before reporting to Schoon. I first reported to Brigadier van der Hoven in Durban and only coming back to Pretoria I reported the whole matter to Schoon.

Yes but you, we are not talking about when you went down to collect the body, before you set off you had been told now there had been a murder and a robbery. -- We immediately departed, it was after dark that they arrived. We immediately left for Sergeant Schutte's house, parked the car in his garage, put Joe Mamasela (30)

Now once again we have heard your evidence that your status as a security policeman would have enabled you to pass safely through any road-block, but what would have happened if you had been involved in an accident, serious accident? You were unconscious and they find this body in the back with a bullet hole in the head? -- Serious trouble. I think they shot him twelve times if I can recollect .. (intervenes)

Well even worse. It didn't worry you, that danger? -- No it was always a risk in all these operations. There was a risk to it, that's hundred percent.

So then you drive halfway across the country, you go from Lindley to Durban and then right up to the Swazi border just to burn the body? -- That's correct. (10)

Not worrying about the risk of being caught? -- No there's always a risk in the back of your head and we worked with that in mind.

Let's move to the other incident at Lindley now. That's the shooting incident. If we can just recap. The actual shooting took place outside the town, correct? -- Just to the North yes.

Did the police then come out to the scene? -- No I went to/... (20)

C3.159

- 914 -

COETZEE

to the police station with the whole lot them.

All right. You then arranged for the driver to be examined by a doctor so that it could be confirmed that he was under the influence? -- That's correct and for the injured person to get to hospital.

And did you actually accompany them, the one or the other of them? -- I was at the doctor's consulting room in the main street in Lindley but from there on I didn't, I think they took the injured chap to Betlehem hospital. (30)

All right and then? -- I went back to the police station.

let me put it this way, from the time of the actual shooting.

Sorry let me withdraw that and put it a little further. After you got back from the district surgeon you then phoned Brigadier Schoon? -- Yes.

To tell him? -- Yes.

Now give us an idea please of the time lapse between the shooting incident and the telephone call. -- Impossible. This happened fairly latish afternoon, if I remember correct, and I ended up with this statements fairly late at night, but I think it will be on record if you check with the doctor what ... (10)

(intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: But will you say it occurred early, early evening and you made your statements late at night? -- Ja, late afternoon and it went late into the night.

You say it was late afternoon? -- If I recollect correctly yes.

Oh against late night statement. -- All right.

MR ROBERTS: Now you mentioned the problem to Brigadier Schoon? -- I did.

Whose idea was it that Nofemela would have to stand

in and/...

C3.179

- 915 -

COETZEE

in and take the blame? -- I suggested it and he agreed with it.

So you had thought that out as you went along? -- No as I spoke to him I said what else can we do, Joe is involved, Joe did the shooting with his Tokarev and I suggest that Almond take the rap and make the story.

CHAIRMAN: When did you think of the idea to displace the liability from Nofemela to Joe? -- Well on the scene already and when we picked up all the Tokarev shells that was on the road and we fired (30)

a few shots out of a 9 millimetre police pistol and took that empty shells to the police station.

MR ROBERTS: So you did all of that at the scene? -- That's right.

Firing of shots in the presence of the occupants in the car? -- No, while they were on the move. I don't know who exactly got into the car with them and moved to the police station.

And you then discussed the matter with Almond I take it? -- Yes it must have been yes.

And he was quite happy to stand in? -- Yes he was.

The thought didn't enter your mind that he might end up being prosecuted for a crime he didn't commit? -- No I thought the way we would put that it was drunk, that's what happened they were a risk on the road up that hill, they were dangerous and the shots were fired and I didn't there would be any consequences. (10)

So you said that was the way you would put it? -- Yes.

What did you mean by that? -- Well exactly what happened and I didn't think that there would evolve any criminal cases against Almond out of that.

Because/...

C3.199

- 916 -

(20)
COETZEE

Because I don't understand that use of the expression the way we would put it. -- Well ... (intervenes)

Because that implies making something up. -- No I suggest you draw that relative police docket and read exactly what I said there.

CHAIRMAN: No, no but what he wants to know is what you now said.

So we don't know, I mean you made up part of the story in the police docket, so how must we accept that the rest is the truth in the police docket? -- I don't understand it Mr Chairman. (30)

I mean you lie about part what's in the police docket, I mean you create a story for the police docket. -- That's right.

Now you say half the story in the police docket is true, the other half is untrue? -- No I didn't say that.

No, obviously because you say the story that these people were drunk, that's true? -- Ja.

But how must I believe you on that point? -- Well I'm sure the district - I took them for blood samples with the district surgeon .. (intervenes)

Yes and how the accident happened, why must I believe you, or how they drove, may have been drunk? Why must I believe if your explanation how they drove? -- Well sir.

If it's in the police record, that's my problem. You say look at the police record. You say I talked the truth. If I look at the police record I see you lied, on your own version? -- As far as Nofemela is concerned yes. (10)

But why must the rest be true? Where must I know to draw the line? -- Well sir I think they can go and point out where the car eventually stopped and at which hill they were shot.

Yes/...

C3.218

- 917 -

COETZEE

(20)

Yes but that's not, all I say is the police record, or the police docket gives me an untrue picture, at least partly and I don't know where to draw the line, between what is true and what is untrue. -- But I mentioned where what happened sir.

Yes, thank you very much but then you lie. Now how must I know that what you now say is the truth and then you lied or vice versa? -- Ja I know.

That's the dilemma I have, can you understand it? -- I understand it.

Yes thank you.

MR ROBERTS: Mr Coetzee I'm going to put to you what Almond Nofemela says in his police statement which he made that same day. He says (30)

"The incident took place at 16h30 roundabout." Is that about right in your recollection? -- It can be I said later afternoon yes.

Then, I'm going to show you his statement. It's typed and signed and the time is given at 19h05. -- It can be correct.

Right. Same day. Do you mean to tell us that this whole thing from the very commission of the incident, allowing for the fact that you had to make up a story, contact Brigadier Schoon, arrange the whole thing to look authentic and then have the statement not just written out but typed, that could all have been achieved between 16h30 and 19h05? -- No it must have taken longer. (10)

Well you can have a look at the statement. -- No, no I believe you, but I mean it's obvious that I couldn't have done it in one hour, so I don't know whether it was that I have written it in when I only started off or when I ended off

with /...

C3.241

- 918 -

COETZEE

with that specific statement. But it ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: But as a matter of fact already typed when it was signed.

-- No it was written out by hand if I can remember correctly. (20)

Yes but here is a signed statement with a time on. With the time of 19h05.

MR ROBERTS: And we can show further in the same Exhibit B124, your own statement, of which there's only a typed copy unsigned here which shows that you completed your statement at 18h03. -- Well I'm sure one can check in the occurrences book too at Lindley.

It happened there. I can't exactly say how long it took, so I can't answer you on that.

See the point I'm making is this Mr Coetzee that the shortness of the period indicates that what you stated in the statement is probably what happened and that the story about the third person being present is a subsequent invention? -- No not at all. (30)

CHAIRMAN: To get Nofemela off the rap. -- Eventually yes.

No but that's the point. Why could you not have invented the story of Joe after the event when you realised that Nofemela was going to be prosecuted? -- I was then out by that time. It was discussed by police headquarters and we ... (intervenes)

No but you gave the evidence. You came along and said Joe was the man who shot. You and Nofemela said that. -- That's right.

Right. Now all I put to you is why could that not be a lie thought up after the event to protect Nofemela and why must it be a lie thought up at the day that Nofemela did the shooting? (10)
-- Sir I don't understand you correctly. Does it

imply/..

C3.268

- 919 -

COETZEE

imply that we did not eventually went to the Divisional Commissioner?

No it does imply. -- Oh.

You went eventually to the Divisional Commissioner and you said Joe shot. Right? -- Yes.

Fine. And then they said all right to protect Joe we won't prosecute Nofemela? -- Yes. (20)

Right. All I say to you is why did you not, is that not a lie that Joe shot which you thought up afterwards when you realised that Nofemela was going to be prosecuted, because at this stage you thought there would be no prosecution? -- No it was not a lie thought of ... (intervenes)

But why, I mean how do I test that the one is a lie and the other is not a lie? -- Sir I can't give you any more answers that the story that I tell you and please ..(intervenes)

Yes but the one was a lie and now all I ask is when did the lie originate? It could have originated ex post facto? -- The lie about the shooting originated just after the shooting and was (30)

put down that way.

But do you agree it could just as well been a lie at a later stage to protect Nofemela? -- By whom? I was ... (intervene)

By you? -- No but I was out by that time sir, I was not with security headquarters anymore.

You and Nofemela? Nofemela was in difficulty. He was to be charged with attempted murder. -- Yes that's right.

That's right. So you and Nofemela then dream up this story as a possibility. Only put it as a possibility. -- No sir, I wasn't there at that stage anymore. That thing was handled by Brigadier Schoon and Brigadier Jan du Preez and (10)

they/...

C3.289

- 920 -

COETZEE

they knew about it.

No but you gave the fact. You gave the fact to the divisional commissioner of police later. You went together with Almond to say that Joe had fired the shots. -- That was arranged by headquarters by Brigadier Jan du Preez.

Yes. -- Yes.

(20)

Let's assume that to be correct. But that was because Nofemela was unhappy about his involvement. -- That's correct.

Who thought he wouldn't be charged initially. And now he was being charged and that's an easy way to get him out. -- Well I'm sure ... (intervenes)

To protect them. -- No that would have been a headquarters decision. It wasn't in my hands sir at that stage, not at all and if that really happened ... (intervenes)

All I say is the one is just as probable as the other. -- Well then Brigadier Jan du Preez and Brigadier Schoon was involved with these lies because I was ... (intervenes) (30)

No why? They need not have been involved with ...

(intervenes) -- I mean why would they allow Almond to get off with it if he in fact did the shooting?

But if you then come along and say I confirm that Almond did not do the shooting, Joe did it? -- And Joe could have said nonsense I've never been involved in a shooting.

Yes well I don't know what Joe said. No one has said that Joe admitted his involvement. -- Well sir I'm sure if we call in the chap that was in charge of Lindley police station at that time, Warrant-officer Heath, and the divisional CID officer they will be able to explain how they have learnt of the story and what they (10) knew of it and who asked them to come up for this meeting and how it was put right.

MR ROBERTS: /...

C3.313

- 921 -

COETZEE

MR ROBERTS: Well you were a friend of Nofemela's even after you left Vlakplaas, weren't you? -- Yes he never came to see me again as far as I can remember, but he was a very close friend of mine, yes.

And I think, correct me if I'm wrong, but the impression I've got from you in your evidence is that you are very loyal towards your friends? -- Always. (20)

And we've heard that you went to considerable risk to yourself to expose the irregularities about the telephone tapping relating to your friend Frans Whelpton? -- Yes that's right.

So if you were already away from Vlakplaas, it would be nothing strange for you to try to help your friend Nofemela by getting him off the charge? -- I couldn't have done it with on the position where I sit, just leave Pretoria area, where I was working then with drug squad and then go to Welkom, pick Almond Nofemela (30) with the whole of Vlakplaas not knowing it, Brigadier Schoon not knowing

it ... (intervenes

CHAIRMAN: No, no but that doesn't follow Mr Coetzee. It's fairly simple. If Nofemela goes, or you phone head office and say well we lied at that stage because Nofemela didn't shoot. -- Yes.

Joe shot. They would have sent you down to rectify the fact, isn't that so? -- After they arranged it.

Yes. -- Yes.

Yes, because you they were now told, I want only to put it as a possibility, they are now told that the affidavits were wrong and the question then is they will then arrange for the matter (10) to be put right. -- No sir I'm sure if you enquire if they appear in front of this commission you will hear the

true/....

C3.336

- 922 -

COETZEE

true story.

Oh, we'll hear about that. -- Yes.

All I say is it's just as probable that as was Almond's involvement fabricated at the early stage, if you are prepared to fabricate that on your initiative, you could just as well have (20) fabricated Joe's involvement at a later date. -- Sir then my superiors would for sure known of that, they weren't that stupid.

But they ... yes all right. -- They really, they are intelligent people you'll see it.

But all I say is the one is as good as the other. You still fabricate evidence. -- Ja, but that one wasn't sir.

But this was fabricated at your request. -- Ok sir.

At your suggestion you said. -- After discussing it with Schoon, confirming it.

Yes but you made the suggestion to him. -- That's right and (30) he's my superior and he must say yes go ahead or do not do it.

I mean it wasn't my, neither was the shooting, it was Joe that

... (intervenes)

No but you had to make the affidavit. Yes.

MR ROBERTS: Mr Coetzee all these movement of yours around the country, we worked out, I think you've said that you did 12 000 kilometres a month for an average. -- Yes.

When you moved around like this did you get instructions each time from somebody that you must move from A to B or go from A to B? -- Yes from sure as from Lady Grey to Queenstown we had to report there and I would have received it through the major at Aliwal North. Whilst in the Queenstown area again we will receive (10) it from the commander of the security offices there, what would be the next move, when I must phone

up to/...

C3.363

- 923 -

COETZEE

up to head office and move to the next spot.

That's when you are moving from area to area? -- And region to region.

Yes, but your movements within each region, nobody had to instruct you to go from here to there or whatever? -- Well I report (20) and discuss it with the branch commander or the regional commander of that office.

You see what I can't understand is that on a conservative estimate you must have done an average of 500 kilometres a day. -- Easy.

Well if you were driving around like that all day when did you actually do the work? -- By patrolling, checking.

But you didn't have to do the patrolling, the Askari's did the patrolling surely? -- We surely had to be near them. I mean for instance, whilst we were at Lady Grey doing road-blocks there (30) at Sterkspruit, we drove that whole Lesotho mountain roads up to Rhodes, Barkly East and back every day.

Just looking to see if there were terrorists walking along the road? -- Any cars on the road we stopped, anyone strange walking around the road we stopped.

I'm not quite sure if I understood your evidence correctly about your experiences in Rhodesia. Did you yourself get involved with the burning of bodies there? -- We fell under the Rhodesian BSAP force there under Superintendent Sword Mandawen and we were asked to assist these officers in burning these bodies after identification.

And you yourself got involved in the actual burning, is that right? -- Our dog handlers yes, South African police dog handlers. (10)

I want to move to another topic now and that is the raid into/...

C3.391

- 924 -

COETZEE

into Botswana that we have spoken about already from Kopfontein relating to Joyce Diphale. -- Yes.

Now Nofemela has testified, and I am sure you've read it in the meantime that he and Joe first of all went to Soweto when they kidnapped the brother of Joyce Diphale that was Moabe Diphale? -- I've read it yes. (20)

He says further that you instructed that kidnapping? -- No not at all. That was an operation as I can, I know nothing of it and I can't recall this incident. But looking at the way evidence is given I'm sure he's got myself mixed up with Jan Coetzee who regularly worked in Soweto with Captain Grobler and who handled the Botswana area together with Rudi Crause at Zeerust.

According to Nofemela, after the kidnapping he went to a mine near Roodepoort where he met you. -- No not at all.

And that when all of you got to the farm near Zeerust that this person was beaten up by various people, yourself included. -- No I was not near that scene, I don't know nothing about it. (30)

I just remember that Almond at a stage has hidden his car on the farm, I don't know whether it was related to this incident but at a stage his car was on the farm. He left it on the farm.

But during the planning for the mission from Kopfontein into Botswana if a suspect or a person had been detained and was being interrogated and beaten up you would have known about it? -- If he was there, yes for sure.

You've just told us that you've read Nofemela's evidence in this regard.-- That's right.

I take it you've read the two affidavits that he made for the purposes, the one for the purposes of the Commission and the/... (10)

C3.419

- 925 -

COETZEE

the one that he made the day before he was due to be hanged? -- No the chief evidence that I've read of him was the cross-examination, I didn't read his evidence-in-chief. I had his cross-examination insight into.

We went to some trouble before we came over here to London to send you copies of your statement that you made to Jacques Pauw on Mauritius, Exhibit B2. -- I've received nothing of that kind. (20)

And a transcript of the tape recording Exhibit B3. -- I have received nothing.

And we also took some trouble to send you actually copies of the tape so that you could listen to the tape and verify whether the transcription was satisfactory. -- I've received nothing and I am sure the ANC can confirm that. I don't know whether it is still lying around or has gone astray somewhere. I've never received anything. The only thing I received was what Mr Mbeke of Human Rights brought me and that was basically the cross-examination of Nofemela and one statement, that he made, (30)

must have made after that original one on the ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes that's the statement he is talking about. -- Oh, oh, ja.

MR ROBERTS: So you say if you didn't read it it wasn't your fault? -- No, no I've read that one. Sorry, that one I've read. But I have not, the Mauritius interview with Jacques. That I have never received or tapes of him, the transcripts of the tapes etcetera.

I just wanted to make quite sure that it wasn't the case of well you had access to these things but couldn't be bothered to read them. -- No, I'm sure if you have, no the communication/... (10)

C3.443 - 926 - COETZEE
communication problems in Zambia you will understand. How it's possible that I've never received it.

When you got to your debriefing, and I am not going to ask you all the details about it because I can understand your position.

But you found that certain information which you had about your atrocities was in fact incorrect? -- As far as I had it that someone was killed in Botswana for instance yes. (20)

Well let me put it another way. You gave them all sorts of information about the atrocities that you had committed. -- I gave them my whole story yes.

Right. They pointed out to you that your information was incorrect relating to that killing in Botswana, that in fact it was only a flesh wound of the neck? -- It was mentioned in the pass yes, they didn't discuss it in full, dates with me in full, never.

Were any other details mentioned by them from which you could gather that your information was incorrect? -- I think as far as the Swaziland transit house that I bombed as I had it one comrade (30)

that slept right next to the wall was cut in three and three landed up in hospital and I think it was less than three that landed up in hospital, as far as I can remember.

So just on those two points that it was clear to you that your information wasn't their information? -- No that the feed back that I got from guys could have been wrong. I don't know whether it was only on that two points or do I have to go into the whole story to see.

CHAIRMAN: Please not.

MR ROBERTS: I want to come to the Mxenge killing now. You said
(10)
in evidence that you chose Almond and Joe and

Tshikalange, /...

C3.475

- 927 -

COETZEE

Tshikalange, inter alia, for the mission because they were reliable people? -- Yes.

Trustworthy? -- That's right.

Now let's go into that. At that stage they had killed the diamond dealer all on their own? -- I don't know whether they have
(20)
done it in fact at that stage.

CHAIRMAN: But you see Mr Coetzee you have made it quite clear. -- That it was whilst we were in Durban sir, and I've said that I am not sure whether there was any other ... (intervenes)

But you made it quite clear that you didn't go down to Durban again, that nothing, no murders or atrocities occurred in December.

That point you made very clear. You made it clear that, as far as you know, the squad was only once in Durban, that you also made clear. So, and I think it is unlikely the squad was told to come back on the 21 or the 20 November. They would have been back in
(30)
November or early December, back in Durban. -- O K sir I'll agree on it but I would have liked to know the disappearing date of the

diamond dealer, but I ... (intervenes)

Yes so would I. -- But I'll go with that.

So would I. -- But I mean then I would have been more explicit on that specific ... (intervenes)

Yes but just take it on this assumption. On all these facts point that the diamond dealer was killed before Mxenge was killed.

MR ROBERTS: Let's just take this further Mr Coetzee you, during that spell November 1981 when you were in Durban, the final thing that was done was the Mxenge killing, because immediately afterwards people then disappeared back to

(10)
Pretoria/...

C3.505

- 928 -

COETZEE

Pretoria and you went off to burn the body and so on. -- The motor car yes.

So if the diamond dealer incident took place while the group was in Durban it couldn't have been after Mxenge's killing? -- No.

Right. So I'm coming back to my point then. You've got your hit men for this mission, three people who had acted in a, to put it very mildly, a highly irresponsible way in committing a murder of the diamond dealer. Right? -- Yes. (20)

Who could have thereby jeopardised the security of Vlakplaas in the process. -- Correct.

That they had, or rather two of them, that is Joe and Almond that had been involved in the Lindley shooting. -- That's right.

Because that was before the killing of Mxenge, right? -- Right.

Joe had acted highly irresponsibly in shooting in that incidence. -- From your point of view yes.

Not from your point of view? -- No not at all. (30)

Quite in order? -- Yes he was saying that could have been

terrorists that could have put me off the road and shoot me and he just opened fire.

But they weren't terrorists? -- I know.

He didn't make any effort to check if they were terrorists? -- Yes but you see sir you want to argue it from your point of view, to me it was not. That was not points against them, because you are getting at it why did I select them? I selected them, for us and for me that wasn't points that counted against them, for sure. I can assure you that.

If somebody just acts very irresponsibly and firing with
a pistol/... (10)

C3.535

- 929 -

COETZEE

a pistol that he is not really even supposed to have. -- He was walking around with that pistol with everyone's knowledge, Jan Coetzee, he had a letter in his little pouch describing exactly who he is and whom they must contact if Joe ends up in trouble.

To you now, to argue it now from your point of view it sounds highly irresponsible, to us it wasn't.

CHAIRMAN: No it sounds illogical do you agree? Its irresponsible
and illogical? -- Yes. (20)

And improbable? -- Yes sir, yes, no not improbable. I've done it, I've selected ... (intervenes)

But if it's illogical it must be improbable? Is that not so? Something done illogically is done improbably. Do you agree or disagree? -- Sir it's true but we are arguing it now not as, I'm not referring to you, but I mean from an easy chair attitude.

I decided that in the atmosphere I was working in and to me it was not, they were not irresponsible it did not sound illogical to me. I chose them for the job and it worked.

Yes but they messed it up according to you, so it didn't work.
-- Yes but the final result was to kill him and they messed up (30)

the ... (intervenes)

Yes but the final result was that there was an outcry immediately that the security police, or someone had killed him.

That was the immediate reaction if I read the newspaper reports.

So the whole purpose of killing him in such a manner that that would not be the impression, that was not attained, so it was messed up from your point of view. It was an absolute mess up and you said that much. -- But it was corrected afterwards and it took ten years for anyone to find out about the murder. So the end result ... (intervenes)

(10)
But/...

C3.565

- 930 -

COETZEE

But the suspicion has always remained? -- Yes but it remains with every political murder in South Africa, with Webster with everyone, every activist that gets murdered there is always, has been that.

Yes carry on.

MR ROBERTS: Very well. Well the point has just been made that the way in which they did the killing defeated the whole point of the exercise, right? -- As originally planned but he eventually died. The idea was to murder him, he was murdered and the so-called original robbery that they had to stage just didn't happen and it ended up in a mess. (20)

So you say successful in the sense that he man was dead and that was the object? -- Yes that was the object.

After the event Joe meets you in a bar, he is wearing the deceased's jacket? -- That's correct.

And has his watch? -- On his arm.

Right. -- That's right.

Do you think that's a very wise thing to do? -- No not at all, I think very stupid and you can have Joe fit one of Mxenge's (30)

jackets and you will see it will have that effect, the jacket was too short for him.

Did you reprimand him or take any disciplinary measures? -- No, not at all. How can I reprimand him if he has just committed a murder for the security police. I just said quick take it off, let's put it in the boot of the car.

Yet in spite of all these things that looked like a mess-up, the three important killers get a R1 000 reward each. Everybody is very happy? -- That's right.

And according to you and according to what you told Jacques Pauw, and you can look it up on Exhibit B3, the transcript/... (10)

C3.596 - 931 - COETZEE
transcript, page 101, the senior people at security headquarters were delighted. -- They were yes.

In spite of the mess-up? -- It wasn't a mess-up, he was killed in the end. To them it wasn't a mess-up, he was killed. The purpose was to kill him and he was killed. I'm sure if he was just stabbed even four shots or once and died there, they would have still blamed it on the security police. I think it would have just made General Johan Coetzee's announcement afterwards a little bit easier, statement easier. (20)

You gave a very detailed description the other day of how one gets to Griffith Mxenge's house and what the place looks like. -- Yes.

How many times did you go there? -- Twice, it could have been three times.

To do what? -- To go and do surveillance the first time there with the, I can't remember on which incident, who was with me, but the first time was when Captain Andy Taylor's black colleague went to show us the house and the second time with the poison, (30)

it could have been two times, yes.

Why did you take the trouble to remember all this detail after nine years? -- Bring it to me and I will show you sir, you can put that house between hundred houses, I don't know, I don't know why certain things stick more clearly than other.

How often did you go to his office? -- His office we've passed on a few occasion. It's in the near city centre in the, I think Indian business area.

How did you know that his car was always parked at a particular spot? -- Well I've seen it at that parking lot quite a few times. (10)
I can't remember, if I say quite a few times, I've seen it there.

When/...

C3.630

- 932 -

COETZEE

When we look at Exhibit B129, those are your two letters which we intercepted, right? -- That I ... (intervenes)

No that the police intercepted? -- Yes.

Right. But they were written by you? -- That's right.

You mentioned in the one to Crause that Almond had spoken a lot of nonsense? -- Yes.

In fact you put it in very serious terms you put it almost as if you thought somebody got at him? -- Yes I did. (20)

What points of Almond's evidence did you have in mind when you made that allegation? -- That pouring of the strignine poison over the meat and the stories of the car, burning of the car that he followed me the day afterwards, and how we stopped in some town and he went in and under a false name took in petrol and I don't know what else. But basically on that.

What's the story about, sorry, following you around and putting in petrol under a false? -- On our way to Piet Retief, (30)
I think he said something in his statement that we stopped in some town and I waited in the Audi in the street, in the one that he

prepared after his, I think for the Commission, I've seen one of those statements and that he went to a police station and gave up a false SAP number of a vehicle and he got petrol and I waited in town and he came up to fill up the Audi and he went to Piet Retief to the old police station etcetera and all that stories and then the burning of the car ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: In other words what you say is that the security police planted this story with these falsities with Nofemela even before he made his first affidavit, because he made those statements in his first affidavit, the day before his

(10)
execution? --/...

C3.667

- 933 -

COETZEE

execution? -- In his first affidavit?

Mm. -- I immediately said when Paul came to me that Monday morning, Paul pointed that out first to me, he said, and Almond wasn't there ... (intervenes)

No but you say that, but he got this from the security police?
-- What is this sir?

These, you blame these additions. -- No I said I can't lay
(20)
my finger on it, I don't know what is going on it looks like the boers had bought him ... (intervenes)

Yes that it looks like the security police got involved in it. -- Yes.

So the security police must before, before the date of his first affidavit already got hold of him to assist him in manufacturing the story? -- No when I first saw he just mentioned it in short, he just said he followed me in a bakkie to burn the vehicle and then at Mauritius I said I think he ... (intervenes)

No, no he said in his first affidavit "I had bought the meat
(30)
and mixed it with the poison" that's he himself and then he said that, he said "I accompanied Coetzee to the car and he told me

to accompany him to Piet Retief that night. He drove Mxenge's car and I drove his service bakkie" -- That's right.

And then he told in his first affidavit how they burnt, you and him burnt the car in the plantation. -- In very short.

No not in very short. He said "how they stripped it, where it was, it was parked in a garage of someone, it was closed, they stripped the car of the spare wheel, radio tape and placed it in Coetzee's car. Then Coetzee and one of the men in Mxenge's car, I in the bakkie and the other drove to

Swaziland border, we parked in a plantation. Coetzee then
ordered/... (10)

C3.703

- 934 -

COETZEE

ordered me to chipper petrol from the bakkie. I did so and poured the petrol into a container I had carry in the bakkie. He then drove some into plantation, he beckoned to me to come with the petrol to the car, he took the petrol and poured it all over the inside of the car and the outside. He poured a line of petrol outside the car and lit the grass on the line. It reached the flames, explosives sounds were made, the veld burned. We all
returned to Piet Retief." No that's not a short story and he had
that story before ... (intervenes) -- Right sir and at ...
(intervenes) (20)

So the point is on your version this he must have received from the security police when they got to his head? -- No sir at that stage I said at Mauritius the only reason that I can think that Almond made up that story is to keep the chain between the murder and burning of the vehicle ... (intervenes)

No but in your letters you say ... (intervenes) -- Ja.

He did it because the security police got hold of him. --
Ja, then after that there was a long statement how he said he put
in petrol, how, he describes in a very very long manner how we (30)

poisoned the meat and then ... (intervenes)

But that was in his evidence. -- Was it in his evidence?

Yes. -- But then referring to that statement and I know then that he must have known by that time that I am out of the country and why he has made up all that stories then, I had no explanation for.

But his statement was prepared by his own lawyers. -- Yes. I know.

And you say that's after the security police got hold of his head? -- Well sir I was in a private letter putting down
(10)
what/...

C3.734

- 935 -

COETZEE

what I was thinking.

Yes you thought it, now I just want to know on what you base this amazing thought? -- Well I can't give any other explanation.

If you would ask me why would Almond lie on that long story, then I can't answer you and I can ... (intervenes)

So blame it on the security police, that was your answer?
-- I said it could have been yes.

(20)

That was the only thing you could think of? -- Yes sir.

MR ROBERTS: I just want to make quite sure that what you were referring to then as "die groot klomp stront wat hy verkoop het"
-- Dis die "stront" wat ek nou van gepraat het.

Ja, it's the little bits before and after the killing of Mxenge, that is what you were complaining about in the letter?
-- The little bit before and the big lot afterwards.

Yes, all right whatever you want to call it. And then you describe it "ek kry die indruk" and I'm reading from page 3 of the Crause letter "ek kry die indruk die boere het hom omgekoop
(30)
om die saak op te dons". So you actually had an impression, it wasn't just a freaking thing going through your mind? -- Ja O K.

Did you actually have that impression? -- Yes I had thought that's quite possible.

But what about all the other bits and pieces of Nofemela's evidence which don't tie up with your evidence? -- That could also be included sir. I didn't exclude everything, that could also be excluded, just put it to which parts you are referring to?

Well let's start with the bit about Moabe and the Botswana raid. -- I was not at all involved in the Moabe ... (intervenes)

And/...

C3.769

- 936 -

(10)
COETZEE

And he implicates you in the kidnapping of this man? -- Ja I was not at all involved in that.

And the beating up of him? -- Not at all. So that's also "stront".

I see. Why didn't you mention that earlier? -- You have mentioned it and I said to you it's nonsense, it's not true.

And also the details about the "hippies" and what not, about the burning of the farmer's vehicles near Port Elizabeth, do you think maybe he made that up also? -- I'm sure, as I said, if he could have had the access to everything that the policemen, the guys here he will have recapped his store, not make it up, remember and would have given a much more better evidence in front of this Commission. (20)

I have no further questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Marais do you want the adjournment now, or do you want to proceed?

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman I think we can continue now.

CHAIRMAN: You wish to continue now.

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman, firstly we have considered the position with our also being instructed by Mr Nofemela, we do not consider it at this stage as a conflict of interest. (30)

CHAIRMAN: That's your problem, it's not my problem.

MR MARAIS: So we will go on representing this witness as well.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR MARAIS: Mr Coetzee do you appreciate that there is a difference between the term above the law, in Afrikaanse "verhewe bo die wet" and to say that you act with no regard for the law in Afrikaans "om jou nie aan die wet te steur nie"? -- I agree yes.

Now when you were describing your situation as being

above/...

C3.821

- 937 -

(10)

COETZEE

above the law, what did you mean by that? -- Well we could do jobs and depend, we could have committed a murder and all the atrocities that we were involved in and rely on the protection of our superiors.

But if you were caught by civilians while committing a murder, what would have happened? -- Well surely we would have had trouble, I'm sure.

So then you were not above the law? -- No.

But you acted without any regard for the law? -- That's correct. (20)

Now let us look at the Lindley shooting. Did you have any insight into the documents about the shooting, the police docket or any other correspondence about the shooting? -- Not at all.

I just wrote the two original statements, opened a docket, of myself and Mr Nofemela and that was the last I have seen of the docket.

And that is up until now, you haven't seen these documents during the weekend or yesterday or the day before? -- I have seen no documents ever afterwards.

Now there is a letter from the state attorney, a certain Mr Earle addressed to the divisional commissioner in which it is said

(30)

that:

"Op 24 Oktober 1981 was kaptein Coetzee en sersant-konstabel Nofemela op 'n geheime ondersoek in die distrik Lindley. Elkeen het met sy amptelike voertuig gery. 'n Sekere passasier was saam met speurder-konstabel Nofemela in sy voertuig. Op 'n stadium het kaptein Coetzee gepoog om 'n sekere voertuig waarin eiser 'n passasier was te stop, dog sonder sukses. Speurder-konstabel Nofemela het toe ook gepoog om die betrokke voertuig te stop maar toe

ook/...
(10)

C3.867

- 938 -

COETZEE

ook die onsuksesvol blyk te wees het die passasier 'n aantal skote met sy vuurwapen op die betrokke gevuur. In die proses het die passasier die eiser wat 'n passasier in die voertuig was wat hulle agtervolg het gewond as gevolg waarvan hierdie eis ingestel is. Hierdie kantoor het uitdruklike instruksies van brigadier Van der Merwe van die veiligheidspolisie te Welkom ontvang dat die identiteit van die passasier wat die skade veroorsaak het onder geen omstandighede bekend gemaak mag word nie en dat alles in ons vermoë gedoen moet word om die saak te skik." (20)

Now from this letter it appears that there was a passenger with ... (intervenies)

CHAIRMAN: No that doesn't appear. Who knew that there was a passenger? Who had personal knowledge of the fact that there was a passenger?. Only you and Joe and Nofemela. -- And Brigadier Schoon and ... (intervenies)

No but you told him that, I say who had personal knowledge of the fact that ... (intervenies) -- That he was travelling with us that day? (30)

Yes, in the car? -- Three of us and we reported in Middelburg to Brigadier ... (intervenes)

MR MARAIS: Yes let's look at it this way. From this letter it appears that your version was that there was a passenger with constable Nofemela in the car. -- That's correct.

Can you tell the Commissioner who this Brigadier van der Merwe "van die veiligheidspolisie te Welkom" who was that? Do you know? -- No I can't remember the face or ..(intervene)

Now the argument presented to you earlier by my learned friend Mr Roberts was that you could have made up this
evidence/... (10)

C3.912

- 939 -

COETZEE

evidence about a certain passenger to protect Nofemela from prosecution, did you follow that argument earlier this morning? -- Not exactly what I could have ... (intervenes)

What was said to you was that Nofemela was to be prosecuted.

Now you went to your superiors and told them that there was another person in the car who was an informer whose identity could not be revealed and therefore nobody in effect could be prosecuted and on your lie to your superiors they acted and they influenced the Attorney-General not to prosecute. -- Yes. (20)

That's the argument. Do you follow it now? -- Yes. But it's far-fetched it's never been so.

That means that your superiors did not know that you were lying to them and on your information they acted? -- That's what it means.

Yes. Now excepting that it still indicates that the blame was placed by you on Joe in 1981? -- That's right.

CHAIRMAN: Why do you say that?

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: That the blame was placed on Joe in 1981?

(30)

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman with respect, it's the same statement as that you made earlier, you said to the witness and you went to your superiors and you told them that Joe had shot.

CHAIRMAN: In 1981, I never ... (intervenes)

MR MARAIS: That was when the incident happened.

CHAIRMAN: Yes carry on, I don't know what you're trying, but in any event, carry on.

MR MARAIS: So if you went to your superiors at this stage after you had left Vlakplaas and you told them that Joe had shot in 1981, that indicates that you knew Joe in 1981? --

(10)
That's/...

C4.078

- 940 -

COETZEE

That's right.

CHAIRMAN: Yes but, but you're working on a long list of suppositions all based upon - the witness has to pull himself up on his own shoestrings.

MR MARAIS: Yes Mr Chairman we will try and present more evidence as regard to ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: No that may be so but to base one supposition upon another supposition the re-examination doesn't assist me. (20)

MR MARAIS: There is also a statement from one of the passengers in the car, a certain Abraham Lefatswe in which he says that certain black men pulled him out of the car, so that indicates that there was more than one black man present? -- That's correct.

The statement from Captain Jan Coetzee before the Commission at this stage, indicates that Joe Mamasela was an informer in 1981, do you know that? -- Yes I know.

CHAIRMAN: The question is was he an informer in 1981? Do you agree with that statement? -- Yes he was an informer. He was made a policeman, I don't know at what stage. (30)

MR MARAIS: Now from the documentation we have available it appears

that Mr Nofemela was supposed to be prosecuted on instruction of the Attorney-General on three counts of murder in the Regional court, do you know about that? Attempted murder? -- Is that to the Lindley... (intervenes)

Yes. -- I know there was charges, I can't remember exactly what they were, but I knew they said that he should have foreseen that he could have injured innocent people.

Now for arguments' sake let's accept now that you did lie to your superiors about the presence of a third person and on your lie they acted to prevent Nofemela from being prosecuted,
(10)
let's/...

C4.110

- 941 -

COETZEE

let's accept that for arguments' sake. The effect of that was that statements was again placed before the Attorney-General to the effect that another person did the shooting, is that correct? -- Yes I believe so, that was now after we went to Welkom?

Yes. -- Ja.

And according to your statements that other person was Joe Mamasela? -- That's right.

(20)
Now we also have a note here on a letter that "verklaring met die werklike feite in verband met die skietery behels, word deur Brigadier Van der Merwe in sy kabinet bewaar" but we have information from Mr Roberts that these documents do not exist anymore so we cannot trace the real facts and who this person was at this stage. -- I'm, not surprised at all.

Now after this new position was presented to the Attorney-General, there's a letter from the Attorney-General, or reference to a letter from the Attorney-General on which reconsidered his previous position of prosecuting Nofemela and he decided that he will not be prosecuted anymore. -- I believe
(30)
so.

Do you know whether anybody was ever prosecuted for this incident? -- Never not as far as I know.

Now we have now a letter from the State Attorney indicating that he is, his opinion is that nobody should be prosecuted because this person acted in the country's interests because he thought these people were terrorists, and you say that is also what was put to them that Joe thought these people were terrorists? -- That's right.

But Joe never, as was put to you by my learned colleague Mr Roberts, never checked whether these people were terrorists (10)
and/...

C4.143 - 942 - COETZEE

and he had no real suspicion that they were terrorists. -- No not at all, it was obvious to me immediately that they were a lot of drunkards and we'll have to get them off the road because they were a danger on the road.

And still nobody was prosecuted? -- No one was prosecuted, I don't know what happened to ... (intervenes)

(20)
CHAIRMAN: What is the point you are trying to make? I mean if the witness tells them or assists Joe in lying to the prosecuting authorities, now you ask this type of question?

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman the point I'm trying to make will be made in argument.

CHAIRMAN: No well then do it in argument ... (intervenes)

MR MARAIS: I'm trying to get facts before the Commission.

CHAIRMAN: Well you're not putting any new facts before me so far.

MR MARAIS: Well Mr Chairman I think the witness just said that it was apparent that these people were drunkards and that they (30)
did not act as terrorists, so I think that is a new fact that was placed ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: That was his evidence so far.

MR ROBERTS: Mr Chairman, sorry, on this point, just in case there is any further assumptions about who is involved in cover ups and things like that, may we place on record that the Attorney-General of the Free State at this time was not Mr McNally, he succeeded the then Attorney-General only in the beginning of 1984.

MR MARAIS: Mr Coetzee when you burned the cars of activists or stole the cars and then burnt them, you said it was to harass them and I think you also mentioned that it was to intimidate them, is that correct? -- That's right.

(10)
How/...

C4.164

- 943 -

COETZEE

How would they know that it was the security police trying to intimidate them if you never let them know that it was the security police? -- Well I'm sure history of all activists' statements after these harassments have always pointed fingers to the South African police, even journalists, if I've read some articles in, a book for instance "South Africa a Different kind of War" by Julie Fredrickson, where journalists were harassed in P E in the early 80's and when they were asked their views and who was it they said well to them it's obvious it's the security police, but they can't say it because they've got no proof. So to assist them in catching the people that's done them wrong they always went to the police knowing that it couldn't be anyone else ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes that's all of very little assistance to hear what you read in a book by a journalist. -- Well sir ... (intervenes)

Please ask material questions.

MR MARAIS: Mr Coetzee you described the security police as an elite branch of the police. Now is there a difference in the way you see the security police now than to the way you saw it before

you got disenchanted with the police? -- Yes of course.

Do you think there are still people in the police who regard, or is your experience that the general policeman regard the security police as an elite branch of the police? -- That's right.

You have given your evidence as regard to what would happen if you were stopped in a road-block by an ordinary policeman. I want now to hear what you say about the burning of the bodies near Komatipoort and the risk of being detected

there./...

C4.194

- 944 -

(10)
COETZEE

there. What would have happened if a member of the public or of the local police saw the smoke and came to that area, what would have happened then? -- We would have blocked him off long before he came to the scene and just ask him to leave. It happened during the night always so you could have seen a car come from a distance.

It was not near houses and it was out in the veld, so you could see when someone was approaching, but obviously we would have kept him away from the scene.

And if you would have blocked them of, as you say, would you have expected any opposition from these people? -- No not at all. (20)

Mr Chairman my learned friend Mr Maritz put earlier, he is not here now, I don't know if his junior can maybe assist, that he would place documents of Joe Mamasela's passport before the Commission. I don't know whether those copies have been placed before the Commission. We do not have it. I would like the witness to have a look at the passport. They had it available at that stage. The witness said that he got these travel documents for Joe Mamasela.

CHAIRMAN: Yes, now what is that going to assist if he sees the passport? (30)

MR MARAIS: Well I want to know whether he can, from that ...

(intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: You can't see from a passport who applied for that passport. They will try in Pretoria to see whether they can find the application form.

MR MARAIS: As it pleases you Mr Commissioner.

Mr Coetzee do you appreciate the difference between the terms falsified and incorrect? -- Falsified ... (intervenes)

You/...

C4.217

- 945 -

COETZEE

(10)

You have referred here to worksheets being falsified. -- Yes.

Do you understand that there's a difference between the words falsified and incorrect? -- Yes.

Afrikaans "vervals en onakkuraat of verkeer"? -- Yes I know.

Now what did you mean when you said the records were falsified? -- At that stage I exactly meant that, that they must have been cooked up because Braam du Preez was on the sight till the night of the 20th with the murder and when he left with the car with Paul van Dyk.

With regard to the diamond dealer incident, you raised this on Mauritius? -- That's correct. (20)

And to your knowledge that's the first time it was raised in public? -- That's correct.

It was not raised by Nofemela? -- No one else as far as I know.

Can you remember the dates on Mauritius that you talked to Jacques Pauw? -- I left on the Sunday the 5th and we've done interviews the Monday night the 6th and the Tuesday the 7th, and during the morning of the 8th till the afternoon before I left, I don't know exactly at what stage. But it must have been between the 6th and 8th of November. (30)

You said in evidence that your story was not news to the ANC.

-- Not at all.

And that you have discussed this with their intelligence section and got confirmation for it. -- That's correct.

CHAIRMAN: Now what's the question Mr Marais.

MR MARAIS: I'm trying to phrase the question Mr Commissioner.

Did this play a part in your original decision to go to
the/...

C4.245

- 946 -

COETZEE

the ANC, the fact that they have means to corroborate what you're
saying? -- Yes that was the main reason because I knew they had
a highly intelligence, out of my previous experience in the
security police, they had a highly equipped intel-ligence source
through which they could verify my stories. (10)

It was put to you by my learned friend Mr Maritz that you dwell for a very short, for a short time in the security family, would you agree with that? -- No theoretically yes, but I mean I was with them from 1977 January till December 31st, 1981. On Vlakplaas itself only a year and four months.

CHAIRMAN: But did you ever do a security police course? -- Yes
I did. It will be on my file I don't know at what time but it
was whilst I was in Pretoria or Middelburg I think. (20)

MR MARAIS: Mr Coetsee you said in cross-examination at a stage that you never killed anybody yourself. -- Not personally yes.

And Paul van Dyk never killed anybody yourself? -- That's correct.

And that Nofemela and Joe Mamasela killed only Mxenge and the diamond dealer. -- Yes.

And that David Tshikalange was only involved with the killing of Mxenge. -- That's right.

And then it was put to you that while you were talking to
Paww you referred to these people as the hit squad. -- Yes. (30)

Or the "moordbende". -- That's right.

Now when you were talking to Pauw, were you talking only about missions inside South Africa or were you referring to all kinds of missions? -- Well I had all kinds of missions in mind and as I explained the members of the so-called hit squad was the members selected for a specific hit operation.

CHAIRMAN: /...

C4.283

- 947 -

COETZEE

(10)

CHAIRMAN: Yes but the question was a general question. Did, when I asked you did Nofemala kill, how many people he killed you said Mxenge and the diamond dealer, that was inside and outside of South Africa. -- Yes.

Fine, so yes. -- No, no the diamond dealer was also killed in South Africa.

Yes I said, but your answer related to, you didn't limit your answer to South Africa, or are you now suggesting Mr Marais that the evidence is that the answer related to killings by those people across the border?

(20)

MR MARAIS: Mr Commissioner I'm asking the witness whether when he was talking to Pauw in general he was talking about inside South Africa, or about in general. I can just go on with that question and maybe it can be clearer.

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARAIS: Were you involved in missions outside the country where people were killed? -- Yea.

The bombing of the transit house for instance? -- Yes, yes that's right.

CHAIRMAN: Yes but he said he never killed someone outside the country as well nor did these other people killed persons by themselves, they were always present. Spyker never killed someone

(30)

across border, did he? -- No not as far as I can remember.

I don't know what's your point Mr Marais.

MR MARAIS: I'll leave it there Mr Chairman.

In your statement on Mauritius on page 6, that is B2 now, the statement that you were going to swear to. In paragraph 14 I find the word "moordbendes" for the first time and I see there it is in inverted commas "aanhalingstekens"? -- Yes.

Now/...

C4.310

- 948 -

COETZEE

(10)

Now whose word was "moordbende"? -- I can't remember, we'll have to listen to that tape is that the transcript ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: This is not the tape, this is your affidavit. Your so-called affidavit.

MR MARAIS: Was "moordbendes" a word that you used and introduced into this ... (intervenes) -- No I didn't introduce it ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: So Pauw introduced it? -- That's right.

And you then happily adopted the word? -- Yes.

As a convenient word. -- Yes that's what it actually was.

(20)

MR MARAIS: When you were cross-examined about the fact that on Mauritius you said that you had Joe and Almond brought down for the Mxenge, the killing you said that you would like to be referred to as a transcript because you think that you somewhere said you thought that you asked for both of them. -- I said I think, I said Joe and Almond says he too, so I can't confirm it if I remember correct.

The passage in the transcript, I think that you refer to I will just read it and you can say if it is that, reads on page 89:

(30)

"Dit was natuurlik ja. Toe ek gesê het maar ja en Almond dink ek was nie daar nie, ek dink Spyker was by ons, maar Joe en

Almond nie. Toe is daar gereël met Schoon dat Schoon vir Joe en Almond noem ook iets daarvan."

Is that the passage you refer to? -- That's right.

Mr Chairman it is 13h00 now, I do not have very much more ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Do you want - I leave it to you if you think you can finish ... (intervenes)

MR MARAIS:/...

C4.337

- 949 -

COETZEE

(10)

MR MARAIS: I think I can finish in ten minutes or so.

CHAIRMAN: Oh fine. I don't want to press you.

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR LUNCH. THE COMMISSION RESUMES.

MR MARAIS: Mr Coetzee it was put to you that you would have to drive an average of 500 kilometres a day and that if you drove like policeman you would not get very far on a tank of petrol, now if you drove like a policeman, how long would it take you to drive 500 kilometres? -- Easy three to three-and-a-half hours if not less than that.

This spot where Vusi and Peter were burnt, is that the same spot where Khondile was burnt? -- No. (20)

Not the same spot? -- No it's not the same spot.

Is it on the same farm? -- On the same?

Farm? -- No, the one is next to the river, just next to the bridge the one of Peter and Vusi and the other one is between Komatipoort and Border gate on that road on the left towards the Lebombo mountains. I think the old wagon trail goes over that part of the farm.

Now the spot where Vusi and Peter were burnt, that's the spot that's 100 metres from the road? -- Approximately yes down the river. (30)

Is this place in such a position that a fire would be

noticeable from the road? -- No, no not easily noticed.

And the farm is it an occupied farm or is it deserted? --
Deserted, I could see no houses or dwellings from where I stood
on the farm.

Was the farm cultivated? -- No not that piece that we were
on.

And you said these burnings always took place at night? --
At night that's right.

It/...

C5.025

- 950 -

(10)
COETZEE

It was put to you that you changed your story in order to
corroborate the evidence of Nofemela, do you remember that? --
I can't remember it.

Well what is your, your comment was that you were telling
the truth and you were not trying to corroborate Nofemla. -- That's
right, that's right.

Your evidence also was that you knew and pointed out to Paul
van Dyk before you left the country that there is a discrepancy
between Nofemela's evidence and your memory with regard to the
fact that the car was taken up to Golela. -- He pointed it out
to me first, because he, at that stage he has already seen that
statement and I haven't. (20)

And if you then only wanted to corroborate Nofemela I take
it you could have changed your story to fit in with his version?
-- Yes easily.

And also told David to change his to fit in? -- That's right.

CHAIRMAN: (inaudible)

MR MARAIS: Yes Mr Chairman. The incident of Pillay. It was put
to you that you made a mess or you botched it, do you remember
that? -- That's right. (30)

How long was Pillay kept after his kidnapping, do you

remember? -- Very difficult to say. If I can remember he was brought out on a Thursday night and the meeting between General Johan Coetzee and a member of the foreign affairs department took place on the Sunday at Nerston border post and then he was kept for a while, shortly after that he was, I can't remember whether it's the Monday or the Tuesday, but shortly after that meeting he was transferred to Lothair police station where he was kept I don't know how long and

then/...

C5.044

- 951 -

(10)
COETZEE

then taken back to Swaziland.

But anyway he was not set free immediately after this mess was discovered? -- No, no, no. In fact he went back to Swaziland after the, our people that were involved, was released on bail for R800 and came back.

And for how long after that did you remain in command at Vlakplaas? -- When did the Pillay incident take place?

In february 1981. -- Till 31 December 1981, that's, so it's another ten months approximately.

Your evidence about the affidavit that you made in which you denied that you knew Mrs Botes. -- Yes. (20)

Was that when you arrived there the affidavit was already half-written by General van der Westhuizen, is that correct? -- Yes he was already busy with it and it was, the contents thereof discussed between Brigadier van der Hoven and Brigadier Stan Schutte, the divisional CID officer, because Brigadier van der Hoven was fully informed as to the correct, exactly what happened.

But your denial was false, is that correct? -- That's correct.

But he knew that what actually happened and the denial was false.

CHAIRMAN: That had nothing to do with security? --- I beg your pardon. (30)

That had nothing to do with security. -- I think it was put that she was a source of the security police and very well known ... (intervenes)

She was nevertheless prosecuted, was she not? -- Not, on which charges?

She was prosecuted on leaving the country and coming back illegally? -- No no sir.

Was/...

C5.048

- 952 -

COETZEE

(10)

Was she not prosecuted? -- No she's a South African.

Was she not prosecuted? -- No she was in the diamond deal involved, illicit diamond dealing.

But she was prosecuted for that? -- Yes that's right.

MR MARAIS: Do you know that Joe, or whether Joe Mamasela is a security policeman now or an ordinary policeman? -- I've read out of statements that was put to Nofemela that Jan Coetzee said he was made a policeman in February, I think 1982 when he was on the farm.

According to your evidence he was a car thief before he was, before he became an informer. -- That's correct. (20)

You mentioned that your telephone was tapped in 1985, is that correct? -- That's correct.

And that's while you were still a policeman? -- That's correct.

Do you know why it was tapped? -- It was, let me just see, it was in 1984 that it started off with, and basically it was done because I sided with Frans Whelpton and Brigadier Jan Blaauw and during that time I was closely followed by the then CID chief Lieutenant-general Kleinjan Grobler and the present second in charge of the CID Lieutenant-general Jaap de Villiers Joubert. (30)

Yes but was it specifically tapped for that incident or was

it tapped and they got information during that incident, or don't you know? -- They tapped it to get a hold on me in some way or another because they saw it as I was double-crossing them. I would just like to remind, I think the transcript was handed in yesterday that was not read out, but on 12 February 1984 at 16h00 these two gentlemen the then CID Chief and he was then Brigadier Jaap de Villiers Joubert,

drove/...

C5.094

- 953 -

COETZEE

(10)

drove into the flat premises, turned their car around, drove out, walked back and was seen breaking into my garage by my neighbours.

CHAIRMAN: Where are we now going? Mr Marais do you want this evidence?

MR MARAIS: No it's not... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: And if so what has it to do with the question.

MR MARAIS: That was not part of the question. -- Oh sorry you must stop me if I

The letters that were presented yesterday before the Commission. The one was written to Mr Chris Crause, you say that he is your brother-in-law. -- My brother-in-law and a policeman in the, P T instructor in the Police College in Pretoria. (20)

And the second letter? -- Is a cousin of my father, her husband is Mr Roberts, a well-known attorney in Pretoria, or Robertson, sorry.

esterday when it was put to you that certain people were terrorists, you pointed out that you consider them as freedom fighters, is that correct? -- That's correct.

Now you end the second letter, the letter to Mrs Robertson by signing "terroris Dirk", now do you consider yourself as a terrorist? -- No it's in a jokingly fashion, I mean ... (intervenes) (30)

CHAIRMAN: Do you consider yourself as a freedom fighter? -- No

I said I'm not part of the MK of the ANC army, I'm part of the intelligence department.

MR MARAIS: So this would indicate that you were joking when you wrote it? -- That's correct.

CHAIRMAN: Are you saying everything was a joke Mr Maritz, Mr Marais?/...

C5.113

- 954 -

COETZEE

Marais? Are you suggesting that everything was a joke in the letter?

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman I'm referring to this ... (intervenes) (10)

CHAIRMAN: Well it was signed as joke, do you say the rest is a joke, because that's not what the witness said yesterday?

MR MARAIS: No I'm coming to the content as well Mr Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Oh well then put it.

MR MARAIS: In the first letter you say "ek moet ophou" referring to that you have to stop writing now "ek moet ophou netnou word jy en Marietha ook terroriste". -- That's right.

And do you give the same explanation for writing that? -- Yes, the same.

CHAIRMAN: Mister, have you never re-examined a witness? How can you ask the type of leading questions you do? I cannot allow leading questions. (20)

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman I can do it in another way, I just think it will take longer ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Well then if you want to do it in your way, do it your way. I've told you before that I find your way of re-examining very strange.

MR MARAIS: I can read the following to you "hier is ek al weer besig om julle te 'brainwash' lyk my ek is al 'n regte bleddie kommunis" What did you mean by the brainwash? -- Brainwash, indoctrinating them to my point of view which I've got at present, (30)

but also in a joking way.

You were referred to your interview with Jacques Pauw and the fact that you mentioned that General Neethling's laboratory was behind his house. -- No that was ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: That was never said.

MR MARAIS: /...

C5.137

- 955 -

COETZEE

MR MARAIS: It was, if I understand correctly, it is near the university? -- Yes.

(10)

Is that correct. -- That's right.

Can you describe where the house of General Neethling was? -- It's in the road, if you go up past, or up Lynnwood Road and you turn at the robot behind the university, the street running North-South, is Prospect? I don't know what that street is, under the building that leads over the road, behind the university.

CHAIRMAN: That's Roper Street. -- Roper, and the second street you turn right after that, it's in other words before you come to the park, I don't know whether it's Park Street extension you turn right, in other words East, you drive along that road and somewhere down the road opposite on the left-hand side of the hostels of the university, women students on the left-hand side of the road, is his house. (20)

Yes.

MR MARAIS: Can you describe it? -- His garage is in front of the house and the gate leading to the house on the left of the garage wall and if you go in there is a verandah in the middle of the house in front and the passage down the front door, virtually divides the house into a left and a right-hand side. But as you come in his sitting-room is on the right, it had wooden floors and he had two big dogs, Dobermann dogs. (30)

And you have been to his office as well? -- I have been to

his office.

Can you describe the office? -- In that old offices were in Jacob Maré Street, you enter, it's on the left-hand side of the street if you pass Paul Kruger and then a little small street leading up to the railway station, Pretoria railway station/...

C5.161

- 956 -

COETZEE

station. There's a double door entrance as you go in immediately on your right is a double wooden door, you go down that passage about the third or fourth office on the right-hand side of that passage was his office and as you come into his office the door's on the South, was on the South-Eastern corner of the office and his desk, sitting behind his desk, he faced the door and on the left, on the Eastern wall of this, next to desk, inbetween the desk and the wall was a safe, a police safe, these that you get in the charge offices standing on a small wooden table, if I can call it that way and above that a certificate was hanging of a Concorde, drawing of a Concorde aeroplane where he is indicated as doctor Neethling being an honourable guest on one of the first flights of this Concorde. Then on the Western side of this office wall was a book shelf and on the Southern wall of this office was a rugby photo of Oostelikes where General Neethling was one of the standing persons on this photo. (10) (20)

CHAIRMAN: Yes.

MR MARAIS: That is all Mr Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Coetzee, thank you very much for your attendance.

That is the end of ... (intervenes)

MR ROBERTS: Mr Chairman before we adjourn may we just place on record the documents that Mr Harris put in through the witness yesterday. That is the copy of the air ticket for one P. Dhlamini and also a travel document for him. It's one exhibit, we've given (30)

it number B131.

CHAIRMAN: Mr Marais I not have an indication from you as to what is to happen on Monday.

MR MARAIS: On Monday Mr Chairman?

CHAIRMAN: Yes, you represent a section of the Lubowski
interest/...

C5.197 - 957 -

interest and I don't know what you are going to do on Monday. You are supposed to lead evidence.

MR MARAIS: Yes our interest in the Lubowski matter is merely holding as it were, a watching brief to see what the evidence brings out. We do not have an interest and that's why we had a different interest than the family because we are not concerned in what way the evidence goes, we just, our old watching brief for the executor of the estate. (10)

CHAIRMAN: But you have represented the executor and the executor was under subpoena, now the postponement was asked and now the subpoena has fallen away. So must I assume the executor will not be there on Monday?

MR MARAIS: Mr Chairman I did point out to you in chambers earlier that this will have to be considered before the independence of Namibia because I do not know what the executor's attitude will be after the independence. I have not had contact with him ... (intervenes) (20)

CHAIRMAN: Well he's your client is he not?

MR MARAIS: He's my instructing attorney Mr Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: And your client at the same time?

MR MARAIS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN: Yes but I still, .. yes?

MR MARAIS: Well I have not been asked again whether he will be there to give evidence, I had no idea that he should be in Pretoria (30)

on Monday to give evidence. Mr Roberts did not contact me in this regard and the impression we had when we left South Africa was that the evidence would be on the 7th presented by the family to the contrary of the evidence presented so far.

CHAIRMAN: Yes now you know for a week that they are not going to/...

C5.221

- 958 -

to present evidence, so what's now going to happen?

MR MARAIS: Well Mr Chairman I would have expected to be asked about his presence if it was necessary. (10)

CHAIRMAN: All I want to know is, is he going to be there as a witness? Are you going to present evidence or are you not going to appear on Monday?

MR MARAIS: No we are not going to present evidence on Monday.

CHAIRMAN: Are you not going to appear on Monday? In other words as far as you are concerned your interest has expired with that of the family?

MR MARAIS: No our interest still remains, but ... (intervenes)

CHAIRMAN: Yes but what must I make of that interest? (20)

MR MARAIS: I will have to take instructions from my attorneys what they want to do now. I have not done it since the family has withdrawn.

CHAIRMAN: Yes I will appreciate it if I could no some time or other what you intend doing because it affects me.

MR MARAIS: Yes I will try and contact him Mr Chairman and see whether I can reach him today still and I will let Mr Roberts know.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Apart from that, thank you Mr Coetzee, I adjourn until Tuesday in Pretoria. (30)

THE COMMISSION ADJOURNS UNTIL TUESDAY IN PRETORIA.

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