

**Missiles and
Malnutrition:
The Links
Between Militarization
and Underdevelopment**

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The Problem

In a Cairo slum, a mother cradles a whimpering infant in her arms. The child has diarrhea — the result of impure water — and is severely dehydrated. She will probably die within hours, since the parents have no money for medical care. Three older children, pale and thin, huddle together in the corner of their small shack. Several kilometers away, at the seaport, a new shipment of military transport trucks is being unloaded onto the docks.

In the southern Philippines, a meeting is taking place in a small community. In the distance sprawls the vast pineapple plantation of a transnational corporation. The people at the meeting are listening to a young man tell how company agents bulldozed his land and prepared it for pineapple planting, while he stood by helplessly. His land was his source of livelihood; he does not know how he will support his family now. Far off in the capital city, government officials discuss how a recent purchase of helicopter gunships has exacerbated the country's foreign debt. A decision is made to encourage large corporations to increase exports as a way of improving the balance of payments.

In a Salvadoran village, a group of women and men take turns hoeing beans on their cooperative farm. The co-op is a new venture. Its aim is to help local people reduce their dependence on a few exploitative produce merchants. As they hoe, they sing and laugh, while young children dart among the rows of beans. Several days later, the tortured bodies of two co-op members are found beside a road leading out of town.

Underdevelopment. Militarization. These are the most pressing problems confronting the Third World today. Frequently they are treated as two separate issues. But as these vignettes illustrate, the problems are not unrelated. High military spending is one of

the reasons for inadequate health care and other social services. The drain on foreign exchange caused by arms imports is responsible for the promotion of export-oriented agriculture — a strategy which benefits a small elite, but which is generally disastrous for the common people. Those who pursue models of development which threaten the powerful are often confronted by the barrel of a gun. In short, militarization is a major factor contributing to underdevelopment.

Current world military spending stands at US \$900 billion (Canadian \$1,200 billion) or \$1.7 million per minute. The global military establishment, including support functions, accounts for 6% of the world's gross domestic product, and employs approximately 100 million people. An estimated 60,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled worldwide contain the explosive power of one million Hiroshimas.¹ This reality can only be described as militarized madness.

Especially sobering is the pace of militarization in the Third World. In 1960, 22 of 78 independent developing countries were ruled by military governments; by 1985 the number had risen to 57 of 114 or 50%. Since 1960 military spending by Third World countries has risen fivefold in constant prices; in 1985 they accounted for 20% of global expenditures.² Developing countries now absorb 75% of the world's arms transfers. Moreover, many of them are now in the business of producing their own armaments. Brazil, South Africa, Argentina, India, and the Koreas now supply their own armed forces and sell a wide variety of military commodities on the foreign market.

The level of militarization is perhaps highest in the Middle East where a steady succession of wars has led to fantastic levels of military expenditure. By 1980, 50% of all arms transfers destined for the Third World were being shipped to the Middle East.³ In Asia, which accounted for nearly half the 10.7 million victims of war between 1960 and 1982, military governments have become the

¹ Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1986* (Washington: World Priorities, 1986), pp. 8-14. Hereafter referred to as Sivard, *WMSE 1986*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³ Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, "Trends in the Middle East," *Alternatives* 10:1 (1984): 148.

Militarization means that lives are being lost and that life itself is brutalized.

rule rather than the exception.⁴

South America has witnessed somewhat of a de-militarizing trend in the past years, as military expenditures have been cut back in several countries, and as civilian governments have been inaugurated in Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. But in Central America the reverse is true. Between 1979 and 1984, the military budget of El Salvador increased in constant price terms by 51%, of Guatemala by 31%, of Honduras by 106%, and of Nicaragua by 184%.⁵

Africa remains in some respects one of the least militarized of the southern continents. Yet there has been substantial expansion in recent years. Between 1969 and 1978, total African military outlays in current dollars rose from \$2.8 billion to \$7 billion per year, an increase of 250%. Arms expenditures in the same period rose from \$145 million to \$5.25 billion per year, an increase of 3600%.⁶

As increasing militarization engulfs the Third World, the goal of just development for the poor is becoming more and more elusive. Between 1/4 and 1/3 of the world's population remains ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished. Twenty percent of infants born in developing countries do not survive their fifth birthday; 40,000 infants and small children die each day, most of them from easily preventable illnesses. Approximately 700 million people — more than the entire population of the western hemisphere — does not get enough food for a healthy life. Over half the adults in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa, most of them women, are illiterate. Only one out of four citizens in the Third World has an unrestricted right to vote.⁷

Statistics only tell part of the story of underdevelopment. They do not tell of the despair experienced by a mother who must watch her child die of hunger, the weariness of the farmer whose meager crop brings less income each year, and the lost hope of the unemployed and uneducated. Underdevelopment destroys the spirit as much as it wastes the body. Therefore the full

impact of underdevelopment can never be measured.

From 1960 to 1983, while annual military expenditures in the developed countries rose by \$459 billion in current prices, economic aid to the Third World rose by \$25 billion.⁸ Put another way, the foreign aid programs of the western industrialized countries equals two weeks worth of global military expenditures. Only Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have reached the United Nations set target of .7% of GNP for development assistance. The US and the USSR, the two biggest military spenders, devote only .3% and .15%, respectively, to aid programs.⁹ Canada allocates .5% of its GNP to projects of the Canadian International Development Agency. While official development assistance is not necessarily the best means of facilitating development, the tremendous discrepancy between what the developed countries allot for military purposes and for international aid, is testimony to their gravely distorted priorities.

These two realities — heightened militarization and deepening underdevelopment — go hand in hand. The militarization of the Third World means that lives are being lost, and that life itself is brutalized. It means that people are hungry and ill and unemployed because resources that could be used to tackle these problems are being used to purchase arms and support armies. It means that Third World governments are taking various drastic measures to find money to pay for these arms, the burden being borne by those who are already poor. It means that persons who advocate a different political and social order, one in which the poor participate in shaping their own destiny, are often subject to harassment, detention, torture, and even murder. And it means the sustaining of a world system which enriches the North while further impoverishing the South.

This paper will attempt to explore the linkages between militarization and underdevelopment in the Third World. Though there are significant ways in which militarization inhibits development in the industrialized countries, this discussion will be limited to the

⁴ Richard Tanter, "Trends in Asia," *Alternatives* 10:1 (1984): 161.

⁵ Mario Carranza, "Disarmament and World Development from a Latin American Perspective," *IDS Bulletin* 16:4 (1985): 70.

⁶ Eboe Hutchful, "Trends in Africa," *Alternatives* 10:1 (1984): 116.

⁷ See Sivard, *WMSE 1986*, pp. 22-23.

⁸ Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1985* (Washington: World Priorities, 1985), p. 23. Hereafter referred to as Sivard, *WMSE 1985*.

⁹ *Ibid.*



Third World. The paper will examine the reasons for, and the means by which, the developing countries are being increasingly militarized, and what impact this has upon socio-economic development and human rights. First, however, it is necessary that the terms "militarization" and "underdevelopment" be defined.

Definitions

a) Militarization

In general, militarization is understood to involve a transformation of the state and its relation to the wider society in terms of increasing levels of armaments, the movement from civilian to military rule, an increased use of force domestically, and the prevalence of a militarist culture. More specifically, a society would be considered militarized if one or more of the following conditions exist:

1. levels of military expenditure are high;
2. weapons are procured at a rapid rate, especially those with a high capacity for destruction;
3. the state relies on the use of organized force to secure the compliance of the people;
4. the military has considerable power within the machinery of government.¹⁰

In discussing the interrelationship of militarization and underdevelopment, attention will be given especially to the impact which increased military spending and arms transfers have on development.

b) Underdevelopment

The term "underdevelopment" is generally used to describe a situation where the quality of life for a significant portion of the population is considered unsatisfactory. But that is where agreement ends. Theories on the causes of underdevelopment and the

strategies for encouraging development are numerous.

In the 1950s and 1960s development was considered virtually synonymous with economic growth. Underdevelopment, it was believed, resulted where there was little positive economic growth occurring. Thus, efforts were aimed at increasing the gross national product in developing countries, mainly by providing capital and technology for the process of industrialization, in the hope that benefits derived from industrialization would "trickle down" to the whole populace.

By the 1970s the economic growth model had been largely discredited as it became clear that the gap between rich and poor in the developing countries was actually widening. Unless the needs of the poor were addressed more directly, new theorists argued, underdevelopment would persist. Thus emerged the Basic Needs strategy, which aimed at ameliorating the situation of the poor through improved education, health care, nutrition, and water supplies.

Emerging more or less concurrently was the New International Economic Order (NIEO) strategy. Proponents of NIEO claimed that underdevelopment was caused by an international system which discriminated against weaker members through trade barriers, limited access to technology and capital, and inadequate financing arrangements. Such persons advocated a restructuring of international institutions enabling developed and developing countries to participate as equals.

More radical analyses of development and underdevelopment have become current as well. Andre Gunder Frank, one of the best known of the "dependence" theorists, claims that underdevelopment is a necessary product of capitalist relationships as they have evolved through history. According to Frank, the development of certain "metropolitan" countries is premised upon the underdevelopment of other "satellite" or "peripheral" countries. The process by which nations like the US, Britain, France, and West Germany have enriched themselves, has in turn impoverished others, primarily through the extraction of cheap raw materials, the exploitation of cheap labour, and the repatriation of profits.¹¹

¹⁰ Adapted from Tanter, pp. 163-164.

¹¹ See Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelop-

Underdevelopment, in the view of the dependence theorists, is not the absence of development but, rather, an integral by-product of capitalist development. It is "the complex of social relationships that results from a situation in which production in the underdeveloped country is geared to the fulfillment of needs of the developing country, rather than to the achievement of autonomous, self-generating growth serving local needs."¹²

Still another group discards the whole notion of "development" itself. Persons such as Denis Goulet argue that "liberation," rather than "development," should be the objective of most Third World countries. "Development" implies that certain material benefits are the goal and that the "developed" countries are the models to be emulated. Goulet does not deny the value of increased incomes and lower mortality rates. However, he insists that what is of utmost importance is the process by which change takes place within a society.¹³ What is more desirable than a new water pump is that the people themselves conceive of it and put it into operation. Instead of being simply the objects of the plans and schemes of others, people must become the subjects of their own destiny.

Proponents of "liberation" would also place more emphasis on the subject of political process and human rights than would most advocates of "development." Besides the right to life and the satisfaction of basic material needs, these rights would include freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom from torture, and the right to participate in the political process. Without these individual and collective rights, any social betterment is likely to be uneven and to favour only a minority. As one person has put it, "... freedom, autonomy, and liberty of active participation in political life are preconditions to the effective struggle for implementing social, economic and cultural

ment" in Charles K. Wilbur, ed., *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 94-103.

¹² Michael T. Klare, *War Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 14.

¹³ Denis Goulet, "'Development' ... or Liberation," in Wilbur, pp. 354-361.

rights."¹⁴

The concept of underdevelopment used in this paper relies heavily on that of the dependence theorists and the liberationists. As the dependence theorists argue, underdevelopment is ultimately not the result of geography or climate or the lack of capital or technological know-how, though all of these play a part. Neither is underdevelopment simply an earlier stage on the continuum which leads to the full-blown capitalist societies of the West. Rather, it is the consequence of a world order in which the economies of peripheral countries are linked in a relationship of dependence to those of the metropolitan countries. Underdevelopment is the result of a system which drains the former of wealth, expertise and human resources for the benefit of the latter.

Secondly, this paper shares the beliefs of the liberationists that the main force for constructive social and economic change among the poorer countries will be the people themselves, rather than the aid, trade, and investment supplied by the richer countries, and that respect for human rights is a fundamental component of development. However, where the liberationists eschew the word "development" — including the designations "developed" and "developing" — these terms are used here, simply because a satisfactory alternate vocabulary has not yet emerged. It is recognized that the language of "development" carries with it a western bias.

The Debate

Among persons interested in the interrelationship between militarization and underdevelopment, there are several "schools of thought" or analyses of the problem. The first of these has much in common with the "economic growth" theory of development. It is generally associated with a 1973 study by Emile Benoit for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.¹⁵ Benoit argues that

¹⁴ Marek Thee, "Militarism and Human Rights," in *Militarism and Human Rights* (Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, World Council of Churches, 1982), p. 14.

¹⁵ A summary of the study is found in Emile Benoit, "Growth

military spending may have a favourable effect on economic growth, and therefore may contribute to development. According to Benoit's study of 44 countries from 1950 to 1965, high defence expenditures can 1) maintain political stability which is a prerequisite for economic progress, 2) provide significant spin-offs for civilian goods and services, 3) induce moderate inflation, 4) attract increased levels of foreign aid, and 5) strengthen national unity and cooperation. All these factors, he claims, can contribute to economic growth.

In the years since Benoit's study was published, it has come under sustained criticism. Some critics argue that Benoit's methodology is faulty. Some, in fact, in replicating the study, reach the opposite conclusion — namely that military spending inhibits growth.¹⁶ Others object that Benoit's general conclusions are applied to all developing countries, but are only backed up with a few observations.¹⁷ Still others have problems with Benoit's equating of economic growth and development.¹⁸

A second approach to the militarization/underdevelopment debate is associated with the United Nations. In 1978 the UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament commissioned a group of governmental experts to undertake a study of the various measures which might reduce military expenditures as well as improve the quality of life of all people, particularly those in the least developed countries.¹⁹ A UN-sponsored conference on development and disarmament has tried to carry forward the

Effects of Defense in Developing Countries," in Pradip K. Ghosh, ed., *Disarmament and Development: A Global Perspective* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 135-149.

¹⁶ See Miles D. Wolpin, "Comparative Perspective on Militarization, Repression, and Social Welfare," *Journal of Peace Research* 20:2 (1983): 145.

¹⁷ Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg, "Disarmament and Development: Their Interrelationship," in Ghosh, p. 35.

¹⁸ Jan Oberg, "The New International Economic and Military Orders as Problems to Peace Research," in Ghosh, p. 274.

¹⁹ A popularized version of the group's report is Clyde Sanger, *Safe and Sound: Disarmament and Development in the Eighties* (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1982).

group's recommendations.

Briefly put, the UN Group of Experts regard the interrelationship of militarization and underdevelopment as a negative one; that is, militarization, as represented by high levels of military spending and the buildup of arms, hinders development because it utilizes resources that could be used in pursuit of social and economic development. The assumption is that if there was a reduction in military spending by the developed countries, the funds released would be available for development assistance. In other words, if there was disarmament, there could be development. To date, numerous proposals have been advanced for diverting resources from military spending into a fund for development.

The UN position has also been debated sharply. As Mac Graham and Chris Smith of the University of Sussex note, a central weakness is that the Group of Experts fails to recognize the structural linkages between militarization and underdevelopment. The problem, as the experts perceive it, is the scale of military expenditure, rather than its very nature. Graham and Smith argue that such a position does not come to grips with the way militarization sustains the unjust social and political conditions which make for underdevelopment. Nor does it explore how military purchases by the developing countries contribute to their economic and technological dependence on the developed countries.²⁰ To its credit, however, the UN Group of Experts has, through several extensive studies, advanced knowledge of the social and economic consequences of the arms race.

The third school of thought, or way of analyzing the militarization/underdevelopment problem, emphasizes the structural relationship between the two. According to this school, militarization is an integral part of a global order which ensures continued economic and political dominance for the developed countries and continued subordination for the underdeveloped.²¹ Thus, militarization fosters

²⁰ Chris Smith and Mac Graham, "Development and . . . What? A New Perspective for the Disarmament and Development Debate," *IDS Bulletin* 16:4 (1985): 29.

²¹ See Robin Luckham, "Militarism and International Economic Dependence," in Mac Graham et al, *Disarmament and World Development*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986), pp. 43-70;

underdevelopment not primarily through the misuse of resources but through the manner in which it enables the developed North to "underdevelop" the South. As a Nigerian scholar has articulated it, "The relationship between development and armament [may be regarded] in terms of the struggle to establish or sustain the political preconditions for a particular form of "development."²²

Though this latter view may err on the side of simplifying situations that are complex, it provides a helpful framework for analyzing the relationship between militarization and underdevelopment. A description of the specific consequences of militarization for development, later on in the paper, will rely heavily on this framework. First, however, it is necessary that we understand the reasons for the rapid militarization of the Third World.

Reasons for Militarization

Why are developing countries so interested in expanding their arsenals and acquiring ever more sophisticated armaments? Why are the developed countries so eager to supply weapons, technology and training to them? We will consider internal and external factors separately.

a) Internal Factors

One reason that motivates many less developed countries to enhance their military capabilities relates to the political vacuum left when independence was granted. Between 1945 and 1980, 114 developing countries gained independence, 41 of these in the 1960s alone. New governments found themselves plagued with inept bureaucracies, weak and stagnant economies, and restive populations, yet they lacked strong political institutions to deal with

these problems. The creation — and equipping — of standing armies in many instances filled the gap, as the military came to represent power, authority and even unity. "The appearance of armoured cars on the streets of newly independent countries — more recently tanks, modern artillery, and aircraft — served as an evocative symbol of state power and national independence."²³

A second reason spurring developing countries to become militarized is internal conflict. Racial, religious, and cultural tensions, particularly in Africa where artificial boundaries were established by the colonial powers with little regard for existing tribal division, have been the cause of numerous wars. One example is Africa's biggest bloodbath — the conflict between Nigeria and secessionist Biafra in the late 1960s.

In other instances, internal conflicts derive from disparities in wealth and social status. Throughout the Third World small elites maintain positions of privilege at the expense of the welfare of the masses. As people rise up against injustice, these elites frequently resort to repression to control social unrest. Sometimes full-scale civil war ensues. This is what has occurred to varying degrees in El Salvador, the Philippines, South Korea, Honduras, Guatemala and a host of other countries.

A third reason for heightened militarization is conflict with neighbouring countries. Many Third World nations increase military spending as a defence against attack or to pursue offensive ambitions of their own. Ethiopia's battle with Somalia for the Ogaden meant the expansion of its armed forces from 41,000 to 225,000 troops, from 1 to 20 tank battalions, and from 37 to 100 aircraft.²⁴

The internal factors behind the militarization of the Third World should not be disregarded. Yet, where underdevelopment results from integration with the international economy, regional, national and local conflicts are only "internal" in a superficial sense.²⁵ Many of the struggles occurring within the social formations of the developing world are linked to external forces. "Internal" conflicts

Nicole Ball, "Third World Militaries and Politics," in Graham et al, pp. 17-39; Mary Kaldor, "The Military in Third World Development," in Graham et al, pp. 71-100; Marek Thee, "Third World Armaments: Structure and Dynamics," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 13:2 (1982): 113-117.

²² Eboe Hutchful, "Disarmament and Development: An African View," *IDS Bulletin* 16:4 (1985): 66.

²³ Robin Luckham, "Armaments and Underdevelopment in Africa," *Alternatives* 5:2 (1980): 183.

²⁴ Hutchful, pp. 119-120.

²⁵ Luckham, "Armaments and Underdevelopment in Africa," p. 239.

Many industrialized countries look to military sales as a means of earning revenue, extending production and controlling Third World societies.

in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mozambique are examples of wars fuelled by outside intervention.

b) External Factors

What then are the factors that motivate the superpowers and the other industrialized nations to militarize the developing countries?

1) Economic. One of the most basic of all reasons is money. The sale and servicing of weapons is lucrative. Thus, many industrialized countries look to military sales as a means of earning revenue. In the US in FY 1985, for instance, military sales to the Third World amounted to \$7.8 billion.²⁶ Both France and Great Britain have built up large military industries, primarily geared to the export market, and are highly dependent on these industries for generating foreign exchange. A full 41% of France's and 35% of Britain's arms production are destined for export.²⁷ The Canadian government is increasingly involved in promoting military exports for their commercial value as well.²⁸

The Soviet Union also uses weapons transfers to earn income. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets offered generous discounts and terms of credit, and even gave away arms. But a large trade deficit incurred in the 1970s as a result of crop failures and the import of western technology prompted them to exact tougher terms. In the midst of the 1973 October war in the Middle East, Egypt had to pay cash before the Soviets would deliver needed equipment. Today, military commodities account for 10-15% of all Soviet exports.²⁹

²⁶ According to SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1986* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 327-328, orders under the Foreign Military Sales program for FY 1985 were valued at \$13.5 billion, and 58% of these were placed by Third World countries.

²⁷ Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 25.

²⁸ See Ernie Regehr, *Arms Canada: The Deadly Business of Military Exports* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1987).

²⁹ Luckham, "Armaments and Underdevelopment in Africa," p. 199.

A third economic reason for the transfer of armaments to the Third World arises out of the "logic" of arms production, particularly as it applies in the market economies. Most countries with arms industries produce primarily for domestic requirements. But in many instances, the local demand for weapons is insufficient to justify the production of advanced weapons systems. Thus producers seek to lengthen production runs to cover the initial capital outlay. Exporting weapons is the primary means of accomplishing this.

Related to this is the fact that producing countries are anxious to export weapons as a way of utilizing surplus industrial capacity. Unemployment is a serious political liability. If the Canadian government can prevent lay-offs and plant closures by seeking markets for military equipment beyond Canada's borders, it will do so. Exports are also a way of maintaining repair services and the production of spare parts.

A fourth factor relates to the recovery of petro-dollars. In the early 1970s, when oil prices rose drastically, the US incurred a considerable trade deficit with oil producing nations. Selling arms to these countries was a way of recovering those dollars and thus absorbing a crisis.

Perhaps the most significant economic factor behind military expansion in the Third World is the need for capitalist powers to ensure an environment that is favourable to their business interests. Put briefly, capitalist business has three objectives in its operations in the Third World: 1) to market goods produced at home or in plants located abroad, 2) to invest surplus funds, and 3) to gain access to cheap raw materials and labour. The pursuit of these interests has come under sustained opposition from a growing number of Third World peoples because these interests represent an enormous obstacle to self-determination and to local control of the economy. By providing weapons, training, arms technology, and in other ways facilitating the militarization of the developing countries, the developed countries try to create the kind of environment that will keep a lid on popular opposition, as well as allow them to carry on their business exploits. The story is well documented of how the United States Central Intelligence Agency engineered a military coup and overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile because it had nationalized American-owned copper companies.

2) Strategic. Access to reliable sources of petroleum is crucial for the developed countries to maintain current levels of industrial production and international pre-eminence. For the USSR, which in 1967 accounted for 7% of world oil exports, external energy sources are not that crucial. For the US, which in the same year accounted for 7% of world imports, as well as France and Great Britain, the case is quite different.³⁰ All three countries are quite dependent on external sources of petroleum.

Arms sales to the oil producers are a way of maintaining friendly relations, and hopefully, guaranteed access to oil. This is particularly true for France and Great Britain. According to one study, between 1968 and 1973, the world's top ten oil producers received 30% of all French and 48% of all British major weapons exports.³¹ Between 1975 and 1980, thirteen OPEC countries accounted for over 40% of the arms imports of all the developing nations.³²

Besides oil, certain minerals are of strategic importance to the developed countries. Among these are bauxite, chromium, manganese, the platinum group of metals, and cobalt. Bauxite is the prime ingredient for the production of aluminum, which is essential for military equipment like aircraft. Chromium ore is also used in the production of aircraft, warships and rifles. Manganese is important as a cleanser in the manufacture of steel. Platinum group metals are indispensable as catalysts in the manufacture of gasoline, plastics, fertilizers, and other chemicals. Cobalt is needed for the high-temperature "superalloy" of jet engines.

Besides their significance for the production of war materiel, many of these minerals are essential in the production of consumer goods.

A total lack of these metals would shut down or throttle the steel, automotive, chemical, plastics and petroleum industries. It would halt the production of optical fibre for the communications industry. It would severely hobble the production of

food, computer components and weapons.³³

The United States is especially dependent on external sources for these strategic minerals. In 1986 it imported 73% of the chromium, 100% of the manganese, 92% of the platinum-group metals, and 95% of the cobalt which it consumes.³⁴ Its main sources for these metals, besides Canada, which has significant cobalt and some platinum reserves, are Third World countries such as Brazil, Zimbabwe, Turkey, the Philippines, and South Africa. In 1973, the US imported 30% of its chromium, 16% of its manganese, and over 50% of its platinum from South Africa.³⁵ In the case of platinum, the USSR is the only other major supplier.

Ensuring a steady supply of strategic minerals is therefore another reason for arms sales to the developed countries, particularly by the US. It is no accident that in Africa, five of the continent's six largest military importers, and eight of the ten highest military spenders (South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, Zambia, Libya, Zimbabwe, and Zaire) are major mineral exporters.³⁶

Besides maintaining access to oil and strategic minerals, the developed powers are interested in maintaining control over certain strategic areas. Strategic to both superpowers and their allies are North Africa and the Middle East. These regions control entrance to the Suez Canal, a major sea lane for both Soviet and US bloc nations. Indeed, for the USSR, the Suez Canal forms part of the only ice-free sea route between its western and eastern ports. For the NATO countries, control of the Mediterranean is viewed to be essential for the defence of Europe.

The Indian Ocean-Pacific Basin is another region of strategic importance to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Besides being an important trade route, it possesses vast untapped mineral, agricultural and forest resources. Off-shore oil reserves, which extend along the eastern edge of Asia and may rival those of the Persian Gulf, could significantly reduce American

³⁰ Jan Oberg, "Arms Trade with the Third World as an Aspect of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 12:3 (1975): 226.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Hutchful, p. 118.

³³ *Globe and Mail*, 16 July 1986.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Hutchful, pp. 130-131.

³⁶ Luckham, "Armaments and Underdevelopment in Africa," p. 195.



dependence on Middle East oil. Moreover, the Indian Ocean borders on the second, fifth and sixth most populous nations in the world (India, Indonesia and Pakistan). Particularly since the communist victories in Indochina in 1975, the US is determined to keep these important countries in its sphere of influence.

Both the superpowers have arranged for arms sales, technology transfer, and military training programs to these strategic regions. They have also negotiated the establishment of military bases, sometimes "paying" for them with weapons. (Ironically, where the Soviets now occupy American-built bases in Ethiopia and Vietnam, the Americans use what was originally a Soviet base in Somalia.) The positioning of rapid deployment forces are another means of "safeguarding" superpower interests.

3) Political. There are also political reasons for the involvement of developed countries in the militarization of the developing nations. These relate to how arms transfers, as the primary means of militarization, are used as a tool for gaining political influence.

The superpowers employ weapons transfers as a means of establishing a political presence in a particular area. This is especially true for the Soviet Union, which has less to offer new friends in the areas of trade and investment than does the US. Moscow's sale of weapons to Peru on a long-term low-interest basis is an example of this. The main goal was to secure a base of influence in South America, a region primarily under the American sphere of domination.

In other instances, arms sales are used as a means of influencing another country's policy decisions. This has been one of the considerations in arms transfers to the Middle East. Henry Kissinger, for example, promised Israel new weapons in exchange for Israeli approval of the 1975 peace agreement. Similarly, the Soviets have expanded arms sales to Syria, as a way of maintaining leverage over its behaviour, despite some dissatisfaction with Syria's involvement in Lebanon.³⁷

One of the reasons frequently cited by the superpowers for arming certain Third World countries is to maintain regional power

balances and thus to promote peace. The Middle East is, once again, a primary example. Both East and West have justified massive arms sales to the volatile region as a means of preserving the Arab-Israeli balance. The same rationale has been used to support US arms transfers to Chile and Pakistan, while Soviet sales have gone to Peru and India.

Several students of the international arms trade have pointed out, however, that instead of resulting in local balances, such a policy may serve to strengthen the regional hegemony of one particular country. One person has written, "the emergence of regional power centers in all parts of the Third World has been more common as an outcome than the establishment of delicate regional balances."³⁸ The emergence of such regional power centres as Iran, South Africa and Vietnam can be traced largely to the arms and arms-making technology transferred to these nations by the superpowers. Thus gaining local pre-eminence, these countries have been able to pursue regional ambitions through applying pressure or waging war on their neighbours.

One of the most important political reasons for the superpowers' militarization of the Third World is to maintain spheres of influence which are sympathetic to their particular economic, political and ideological positions. For the US, this means advancing a pro-Western free market system. (Although American State Department officials wax eloquent on the promotion of democratic political systems, US involvement in South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines under Marcos, and Chile, for example, show that America gives higher priority to backing pro-American regimes than to promoting environments in which the people participate freely in political life.) Frequently, the US defends its activities in some countries by holding up the specter of communism, even though the popular movements there are often motivated more by nationalist fervor than by commitment to communist principles. In any case, this is the force behind US military sales and assistance to the Central American countries of Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, and for US support for the Nicaraguan contras.

In the same way, the Soviets arm nations which have opted for

³⁷ Michael T. Klare, "Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 40:5 (1984): 29.

³⁸ Raimo Vayrynen, "Economic and Political Consequences of Arms Transfers to the Third World," *Alternatives* 6:1 (1980):144.

communism, or at least an alternative to a western economic and political model. Thus they have supplied weapons to various national liberation movements, to governments like that of Allende's Chile and present-day Nicaragua, as well as to North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, and other communist countries. However, Soviet arms sales to Egypt, Libya, Guinea, and Algeria — all countries which have suppressed communist parties — indicate that the promotion of "world revolution" is not the only factor behind the USSR's arms export policy.³⁹

Arms transfers also maintain or modify military alignments. The famous quotation by a Lockheed official — "When you sell an aircraft, you buy a political partner" — supports this. Despite the trend for a number of developing countries to purchase arms from both Soviet and American blocs, most nations are armed by one of the superpowers or its allies, and are thus drawn into informal alliance systems.⁴⁰ The result of this has been to incorporate the Third World, particularly Asia and the Middle East, into Cold War politics, and to portray all conflicts as battles between East and West, to the neglect of domestic issues.⁴¹

While the superpowers continue to use arms transfers as a means of gaining political influence over other countries, the effectiveness of this method is being increasingly questioned. To be sure, both the US and the USSR could point to numerous successes. Yet there have also been many humiliating failures where the loyalties of client states have undergone a dramatic shift. For the Soviet Union, these include Sudan, Guinea, Somalia, Iraq, Indonesia and, worst of all, Egypt. For the US, included are Ethiopia, Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua. One authority on the politics of arms sales writes:

Influence and leverage are transitory phenomena: they can be

³⁹ SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1983* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1983), p. 366.

⁴⁰ A study by Vayrynen shows that more than half of developing countries are integrated either with one single supplier or with a predominant supplier within a given bloc. Vayrynen, p. 139.

⁴¹ Peter Lock, "Armaments Dynamics: An Issue in Development Strategies," *Alternatives* 6:2 (1980): 177.

lost even more quickly than they are acquired.... Creating an arms relationship is not sufficient to cement relations between two countries.⁴²

Nevertheless, arms sales will probably continue to remain a prime instrument for both the Soviet Union and the United States in their rivalry for the allegiance of much of the world.

c) Conclusion

This section has attempted to outline those factors which have led to the militarization of Third World countries. Attention was given to both internal factors, that is, reasons why Third World governments find it in their interest to pursue military might, and external factors, that is, reasons why the developed countries find it in their interest to foist military might upon the underdeveloped countries. It is obvious that the external factors are very important. Indeed, many scholars, such as Marek Thee of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, would claim that these are paramount:

a ... the main function of militarism today as a global force is the defence and preservation of the exploitative *status quo* between the North and the South, the rich and the poor countries. This in fact implies a fierce struggle between the great powers for predominance and the seizure of the greatest parts of the spoil... Though the visibility of militaristic postures sometimes seems higher in the military regimes in the Third World, the real driving forces of contemporary militarism — the armaments plants and caterers, and the guardians of the global "law and order" — are to be found on the apex of the world pyramid of power ... particularly the two superpowers.⁴³

Thee may have underestimated the importance of internal factors for militarization in the developing countries, especially the need

⁴² Pierre, pp. 16-18.

⁴³ Thee, pp. 10-11. Not all students of Third World militarization would agree with Thee. Mario'n Mushkat, *The Third World and Peace* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), p. 161, argues for the primacy of factors originating within the Third World.

Military spending by the Third World has grown phenomenally over the past thirty years and the biggest expense has been imported arms.

for Third World elites to protect their privileged position. Still, it is clear that the developed countries must accept much of the responsibility for the current militarized state of affairs in the Third World. What then are the means by which the Third World is militarized?

Promoting Militarization

a) *The Transfer of Arms*

In the late 1940s and 1950s, as the US was preoccupied with the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Europe, the majority of American arms transfers went to European NATO allies. With surprising rebel victories in Vietnam in 1954, in Cuba in 1959, and Algeria in 1962, American officials suddenly realized that the biggest threat to the country's perceived national security was revolutionary movements in the Third World. After 1960, therefore, the US State Department increasingly turned its attention to strengthening Third World governments and elites to resist, and even to extinguish, revolutionary movements. Arms transfers, first through aid programs and later through sales, were one of the means of accomplishing this. The Soviets followed suit and were soon busy sending arms to the developing countries as well, though they were slower to switch from supplying arms as aid to selling them.

Military spending by the Third World has grown phenomenally over the past thirty years, and the biggest expense has been imported arms. During the twenty-year period, 1964-1983, the developing countries imported \$223 billion (in constant US prices).⁴⁴ In 1982, the peak year for arms transfer agreements, sales reached a record value of \$46.8 billion.⁴⁵ In the early 1960s the value of arms imports by the developing countries amounted to less than 1/3 the value of foreign aid they received; by the 1980s these countries

were spending more on arms imports than the total of all economic assistance they received.⁴⁶

The percentage of global arms transfers destined for the Third World has been growing as well. In 1963 Third World nations absorbed 50% of world arms transfers; by 1975 this had risen to 75%.⁴⁷ In 1982, according to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the total reached 82%.⁴⁸

Since 1982 there has been a slump in the international arms trade. Sales in 1983 plummeted to \$24.7 billion and continued to drop, though more slowly, in 1984 and 1985. The main reason for this has been the worldwide recession and accompanying debt crisis in the Third World. Most developing countries are dependent on the export of raw materials or agricultural produce to earn foreign exchange. With declining prices and lowered demand for their products, they simply did not have the money to buy more arms. In addition, they could not get further credits because of already high debts.

Another reason suggested for the decline is that many countries are still trying to absorb the massive purchases they made between 1978 and 1982.⁴⁹ Since these purchases were generally the latest and most sophisticated of military equipment, it has taken some time for technology-poor nations to absorb them. Thus there is a temporary saturation of the market.

Even so, analysts predict that it is only a matter of time before the international arms trade resumes its momentum. As the international economy recovers, as earlier weapons purchases become outdated, and as the military industry keeps up pressure to sell arms, it is quite likely the arms trade will return to earlier levels

⁴⁴ Sivard, *WMSE 1985*, p. 14.

⁴⁵ Ernie Regehr, "Canadian Military Sales and Human Rights" (Paper presented to Workshop on Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, Toronto, 13-14 June 1986), p. 5.

⁴⁶ Sivard, *WMSE 1986*, p. 12.

⁴⁷ Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide, eds., *The World Military Order: The Impact of Military Technology on the Third World* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 5.

⁴⁸ See Table 1 in "Disarmament and Development: Security in an Interdependent World," *North-South Institute Briefing Paper No. 9* (May 1985): 4.

⁴⁹ Michael T. Klare, "Who Reaps Benefits of Third World Arms Sale Boom," *Current News*, 9 January 1985, p. 5F.

possibly by the late 1980s or early 1990s.⁵⁰

Till the mid-1960s the two superpowers accounted for almost all arms sales to the Third World. In the late 1960s France, Great Britain and West Germany joined the race. From 1976 to 1979 these six nations accounted for 89% of all arms sales to the developing countries.⁵¹ Beginning in 1980, however, a new group of secondary suppliers emerged, taking a significant chunk of the Third World arms market. Included in this group are Canada, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland — as well as Third World suppliers such as Argentina, Brazil, Israel, North and South Korea, and South Africa. In the 1980 to 1983 period, this group of second-tier suppliers captured 30% of the Third World market share.⁵²

The emergence of particular Third World countries as arms exporters has been striking. Between 1972 and 1982, Israel's arms exports grew from \$10 million to \$360 million, Brazil's from zero to \$625 million, North Korea's from zero to \$480 million, and South Korea's from zero to \$400 million.⁵³ Numerous other countries, hoping to cash in on the bonanza, have begun arms export programs as well.

Another feature of the arms trade with the Third World since 1980 has been the preference shown for low and medium technology items such as small arms, artillery, and ammunition. This is in contrast to the fascination of the 1970s with sophisticated high-technology items such as fighter jets. The shift is due to a number of factors: disillusionment with the more sophisticated weapons; a need to replace ammunition and spare parts that were used up in wars in the Falklands, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the 1980s; as well as to a Third World preoccupation with regional and internal conflicts which are usually fought with counter-insurgency arms and other

⁵⁰ Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, "The Future of Arms Transfers: The Changing Pattern," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 10:2 (1985): 133-134.

⁵¹ Michael T. Klare, "The Transformation of the International Arms Trade," *The Ploughshares Monitor* 6:1 (March 1985): 7.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

low-technology equipment.⁵⁴ Guerrilla wars in Central America, southern Africa, Indochina, and elsewhere have kept governments purchasing machine guns, hand grenades, and small artillery. The fact that many developing countries have been engaged in local conflicts has been another reason for the success of new Third World arms suppliers, since the latter tend to produce rugged low-technology hardware that is well suited for use in underdeveloped areas.

b) The Transfer of Arms-Making Technology

In addition to direct arms transfers, another means by which the developed countries participate in the militarization of the developing countries is through the transfer of arms-making technology, thus enabling the latter to produce and even export their own armaments. It is this factor which has led to the emergence of indigenous arms industries in a growing number of Third World nations.

The transfer of arms-making technology is a step-by-step process. It begins with the construction of maintenance and repair facilities to service weapons that have been imported. The next step is importing components which are assembled locally. This is followed by the local manufacture of components with imported raw materials, usually under some kind of licensing agreement with a partner in the developed world. The final stage is the production of components with locally available raw materials. The ultimate aim is to produce armaments, wherein the research, design, and development has taken place within the developing country. Instances of this last stage are quite rare.

Third World countries which engage in military production can be found all along the continuum just described. The larger producers manufacture sophisticated equipment that has been designed locally. In Israel, for instance, 96% of military production would fall into this category; in Brazil, 74%. More common, however, are countries which are highly dependent on foreign technology, transferred by means of licensing or co-production agreements. Taiwan, India, and South Africa would be examples of this kind of situation, with 85%, 77%, and 62%, respectively, of

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

domestic arms production under license.⁵⁵

The annual value of major weapons produced in the Third World has grown fairly steadily since 1950, and declined only since 1980. In 1950 production was valued at \$2.3 million (in 1975 US dollars); in 1984 the value was \$1200 million, or 500 times higher. The total value of major weapons produced between 1980 and 1984 was 25 times as high as that between 1950 and 1964. Despite this phenomenal growth, arms production in the Third World still is limited, and accounted for only 1.5 to 2% of the global production of major weapons in the early 1980s.⁵⁶

The five largest arms-producing countries in the Third World in the 1980 to 1984 period were Israel, India, Brazil, Taiwan, and Argentina. They were followed by South Africa, South Korea, North Korea, Egypt, and the ASEAN countries.⁵⁷ These nations manufacture a full range of conventional weapons, ranging from ammunition for pistols to sophisticated jet aircraft and guided missiles. The types of weapons a particular country specializes in reflect a variety of considerations. South Africa, for instance, produces equipment that can be used against its black population — low-level technology with high-use value, such as munitions, small arms, vehicles, and light aircraft. India concentrates on high-technology weapons such as jet fighters, military transport vehicles, tanks, frigates, and helicopters as a substitution for arms imports. Brazil and Egypt manufacture weapons geared to the export market.⁵⁸

There are several reasons why both the developed and developing countries seek the transfer of arms-making technology. For the former, technology transfer is a way of cutting costs. By assembling certain labour-intensive components in a country where wages are low, and then re-exporting them, corporate profits are

⁵⁵ Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds., *Arms Production in the Third World* (Sweden: SIPRI, 1986), p. 10.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15. This book provides case studies of all the major Third World arms producers, as does James Everett Katz, *Arms Production in Developing Countries* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984).

increased. Thus, the "multinationalization" of the arms industry is not unlike the process whereby corporations producing civilian goods establish subsidiaries in the Third World.

A second reason is to avoid export restrictions. Most of the developed countries possess some kind of regulations — some much more stringent than others — which are meant to prevent arms sales to areas of conflict, and to human rights violators. Many of the developing countries do not have these kinds of restrictions. By initiating joint production schemes in the Third World, firms based in the First World can bypass such restrictions.

A third factor, related to the second, enables arms manufacturers to gain access to markets that would otherwise be closed to them. One such market is South Africa, against which the United Nations imposed its first arms embargo in 1963. In the 1960s both French and Italian firms took advantage of licensing arrangements with South Africa as a way of circumventing the ban on direct arms sales. A decade later, when pressure from Black African states led France to reduce support, Israel stepped in as an important supplier of arms and technology. Today, South Africa produces French Mirage-III and F-1 jet fighters, Italian-designed light aircraft, and Israeli-designed missile boats.⁵⁹

Western developed countries are eager to enter into co-production agreements, drawing the line only at the most sophisticated of military equipment. In 1982, the US Department of Defence was involved in 21 major military co-production programs, as well as numerous lesser programs and hundreds of licensing agreements. In addition, American firms such as Northrup, General Dynamics, Chrysler, and Westinghouse were jointly producing fighter jets, rockets, helicopters, tank components, and radar with counterparts in Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Thailand.⁶⁰ By contrast, the USSR has only occasionally engaged in the transfer of conventional arms technology. Only India and North Korea, as well as China prior to the

⁵⁹ Thomas Ohlson, "Third World Arms Exporters — A New Facet of the Global Arms Race," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 13:3 (1982): 214.

⁶⁰ James Cracraft, " Militarization of the Third World," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 40:5 (1984): 32.

An estimated five hundred bars, night clubs, massage parlours and discos form the core of Olongapo's economic life.

Olongapo: A City Misdeveloped

Susan sits at a small bottle-stained table in one of Olongapo's many bars and stares out the window. There is no ship in port at the US military base, so business is slow. As she sits, Susan thinks about her poor family on a distant island — her widowed mother, her younger brothers and sisters, and her three-year-old daughter, whom she has not seen for two years. She remembers how she left her home for the city, hoping to find work to support them. She remembers the months of fruitless searching and then the bus trip to Olongapo. She remembers the bar manager saying that if she refused to provide sexual favours to American sailors, there would be no job.

Olongapo is the city that has grown up next to Subic Naval Base, one of the largest US military facilities outside the continental United States. A small town of some 2,000 prior to World War II, Olongapo had mushroomed to a bustling city of 250,000 by 1980. Its burgeoning growth is largely due to the Korean and Vietnam wars, which gave Subic Base new importance as a repair and supply depot for the American navy.

Subic Base and nearby Clark Air Field have become increasingly important to US strategy in the Far East. That strategy is 1) to maintain access to sources of raw materials needed for industry, 2) to preserve and expand its markets for manufactured goods, and 3) to keep shipping lanes open to the flow of trade, particularly oil. With Communist victories in Indochina and Soviet occupation of formerly American bases in Vietnam in the mid-1970s, the importance of the Philippine bases to the continued pursuit of this strategy and to the preservation of US domination in the East has grown considerably.

Today Subic Base is the US navy's largest logistical support base in the western Pacific. It performs two-thirds of the repair work and other support functions for the US Seventh Fleet, an armada consisting of 70,000 personnel, 550 aircraft, and 90 ships. The base itself comprises a combined land and water area of 25,000 hectares and is permanent home for 29,000 American citizens (civilian and military).

Olongapo City is extremely dependent on the military base for its livelihood. Besides the 30,000 Filipinos who work right on the

base, there are thousands of others who are indirectly employed, particularly in the "rest and recreation" (R and R) industry. An estimated five hundred bars, night clubs, massage parlours and discos form the core of Olongapo's economic life. Remove the base, and the city would quickly die, unless deliberate steps were taken to convert existing facilities to civilian use.

Olongapo is a sobering example of how militarization contributes to underdevelopment or, perhaps more accurately, misdevelopment. First of all, Olongapo runs on prostitution. Approximately 16,000 "hospitality girls," as the prostitutes are euphemistically called, provide sexual favours to American sailors. These women come to Olongapo from the poverty-stricken rural areas in the hope of finding respectable jobs. They soon find themselves forced, by economic circumstances, to become prostitutes. And once they are drawn into the web, it is very difficult for them to leave.

Besides prostitution, Olongapo is noted for the related problems of sexually transmitted diseases including AIDS, illegal abortion, and "souvenir babies"—the abandoned offspring of Filipino women and American servicemen. Organized crime, illicit PX trading, and drug trafficking also flourish in Olongapo and are linked to the base. A 1982 study revealed that 78% of fourth-year high school boys in the city were using dangerous drugs coming from American servicemen.¹

An estimated \$66 million is spent by US marines passing through Olongapo each year.² The major part of this wealth ends up in the pockets of the bar owners. The women who work in the clubs (prostitutes must be registered with a particular entertainment establishment) are poorly paid; many in fact receive no set wages, but only the bonuses they receive upon selling drinks to customers. They may earn a fair bit when an aircraft carrier is in port, yet several "good" days may be followed by weeks of little

¹ Patricia Ann Paez, *The Bases Factor* (Manila: Center for Strategic and International Studies of the Philippines, 1985), p. 17.

² Brenda Stoltzfus, "Situationer on Prostitution in Olongapo" (unpublished paper, 1986), p. 1.

business at all.

The base thus contributes to underdevelopment in Olongapo by sustaining a social system which enriches a few, while keeping the majority of workers dependent and impoverished. Yet development is much more than putting money in people's pockets. Even if economic benefits were distributed more evenly, it would be imperative to ask: Can activities which have such a degrading impact on the moral fibre of the community result in sound and wholesome development? The answer, it seems evident, must be no.

There are other ways in which the military base has contributed to underdevelopment for the Olongapo community. It has virtually destroyed a local fishing industry. Pollution from the base has killed many fish, and the vibrations and motor noises from large ships has frightened others away. In addition, a giant portion of Subic Bay, an estimated 11,000 hectares, has been marked off by buoys for American use. Filipino fisherfolk who venture into this area are subjected to embarrassing interrogation. Yet in order to feed their families, they must travel far out into the South China Sea to fish. The customary small boats used make these trips treacherous, and high fuel costs make them expensive.³

The base has also seriously disrupted the lives of the Negritos, the tribal people who originally occupied the land. Traditionally, the Negritos roamed the lush rain forests feeding themselves by hunting and gathering. As the base was built up and the forest destroyed, they were pushed inland. For a time, the Negritos were given exclusive rights to scavenge the base dump and sell what they could find. Now many of them live in a reservation area, where they try to survive by farming and selling rattan, a fast diminishing forest product. They live in abject poverty, with many basic needs unmet.

Subic Naval Base employs approximately 19,000 civilian Filipinos, excluding employees of contractors and concessionaires and privately hired domestic helpers. US navy spokespersons and Olongapo city officials are quick to point to these jobs as evidence of the positive contribution that the base makes to the life

³ Paul Hutchcroft, "In the Shadow of Subic: Castaways on an Imperial Navy," *Southeast Asia Chronicle* # 83 (April 1982): 24.

of the city. But once again, the question should be asked: Do these jobs represent genuine development?

For one thing, although Filipino base workers have been represented by a union since 1968, recognition of their union can be summarily withdrawn if it is deemed to be engaging in "disruptive activities." Secondly, a Filipino does not have security of tenure; his or her position can be abolished, downgraded, or reclassified at any time as the authorities see fit. Thirdly, Filipino workers are paid only a fraction of what Americans are paid, even if doing the same work; moreover, wages are based on an occasional survey of other Philippine firms done with minimal worker or union participation.⁴

If Subic Base contributes to underdevelopment at the local scene, its existence also ensures underdevelopment at the national level. Roland Simbulan, a noted Filipino authority on the bases, has pointed out that Philippine-American relations have, since the late 1890s, been structured to secure "the economic advancement of the former and the economic impoverishment of the latter."⁵ Notwithstanding the granting of independence to the Philippines in 1946, the Americans have utilized trans-national corporations, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the American Chamber of Commerce to maintain this relationship. For the Philippines, the result has been inflated prices, huge internal and external debts, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, a devaluing currency, and widespread unemployment. Simbulan claims, "Philippine economic underdevelopment and US intervention are two sides of the same coin."⁶

The US bases in the Philippines maintain this status quo. As long as the bases are there, the Philippine government is helpless to alter existing economic structures and relationships and to assert control over its own economy, for moves to do so would invariably lead to US military intervention of some sort.

⁴ Paez, pp. 187-193; Roland Simbulan, *The Bases of Our Insecurity* (Manila: Balai Fellowship, 1983), pp. 254-260.

⁵ Roland Simbulan, "The Threat of Heightened US Intervention in the Philippines" (speech delivered to the National Conference on Nuclear Power and US Military Bases, 15 October 1983), p. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

1960 Sino-Soviet split, have been recipients of Soviet arms-making technology.⁶¹

There are also compelling reasons for Third World countries to pursue foreign technology for arms production. First and foremost are security concerns. Most Third World countries which have developed their own arms industries have at some point been the subject of arms embargoes. This would include India, Israel, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil. Their venture into arms production is a way of ensuring that they will not be left stranded if they should suddenly be cut off by a major supplier or group of suppliers, or if they should suddenly be refused spare parts.

Related to this, Third World countries initiate arms production as a way of achieving political independence from the industrialized supplying countries. If the former have their own source of arms, they are less likely to be manipulated by the latter. Moreover, a domestic arms industry powerfully symbolizes a break with a colonial or neocolonial past.

There are also economic factors involved. Developing countries assert that producing arms locally is less expensive than importing them; moreover, that these arms generate foreign exchange, if exported. They also argue that an arms industry will create employment and that it has a positive spin-off effect on education, infrastructure, and general economic development.

Recent studies have shown that in pursuing their own arms industries, few Third World countries accomplish what they set out to achieve. Later on, it will be shown that instead of greater independence and economic gain, the results are often increased dependence and deeper debt. Despite this reality, it is doubtful that nations will abandon their efforts to establish arms industries, particularly as long as voices from the developed world admonish them to do so.

c) Military Training

A third way that the developed countries foster the militarization of the Third World is through military training programs. Unlike arms transfers (whether those be sales or security aid), and the transfer of arms-making technology, military training does not add to a

⁶¹ Ibid.

nation's stock of war materiel. However, it does provide the rationale or justification for these kinds of transactions, as well as enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the country's new military capabilities. In addition, military training implants among the trainees an ideology and world view which, among other things, has a profound impact on development within their own countries.

The United States is the world leader in providing military training to Third World personnel. Training programs emerged after World War II alongside the provision of surplus weapons, and became available to whichever government was prepared to join the anti-communist network. In the late 1950s, when the concept of counter-insurgency gained currency, the number of officers from developing countries at American military academies soared. Special training schools, such as in the Panama Canal Zone, were established for leading officers. Between 1950 and 1980 the US trained some 411,000 personnel from the Third World.⁶²

Britain and France have also developed extensive military training programs. Britain and other members of the Commonwealth have trained thousands of officers from English-speaking African states and the Caribbean. Canada, as a member of the Commonwealth, provides military training to at least 15 African states, including Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia, and the Caribbean nations of Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, Dominica, and Grenada.

Soviet training programs lag behind those of the western nations, in the same way as do technology transfer agreements. Between 1955 and 1979, only 43,000 military personnel from the developing countries received training from the USSR, a fraction of those trained by its rival.⁶³

Military training programs do much more than teach military personnel how to use new weapons or how to instill discipline in the rank and file. "A central objective," according to Miles Wolpin of the State University of New York, "is political indoctrination."⁶⁴

⁶² Wolpin, p. 136.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Miles D. Wolpin, "Military Dependency versus Development in the Third World," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 8:2 (1977): 139.

Worldwide, some two million personnel are serving abroad, 400,000 of them engaged in fighting wars.

Participants are inculcated with a particular ideology which, it is hoped, they will succeed in transplanting to the Third World.

Wolpin notes that the American military training program revolves around several key themes: 1) the legitimacy of "civil" (or stable) rather than civilian government, 2) the promotion of development through corporate investment that receives subsidies, tax breaks, and other forms of protection from the state, 3) the liberalization of trade, 4) a denial that capitalism is exploitative, 5) faith in western and optimally American leadership, and 6) a diabolical portrayal of communism.⁶⁵ Besides communism, the program targets nationalism, leftist revolution, insurgents and their allies, political dissidents, and radical elements as evils to be stamped out.

In addition to formal classroom education, training programs provide more informal ways of indoctrinating students with a particular world view. Guided tours, controlled exposure to certain aspects of US society, hospitality programs, and social activities are more subtle ways of bringing about identification with "the American way."

An examination of its components blatantly shows that the goal of the US military training program is to convince Third World military leaders that a capitalist open-door development strategy — that is, one that is favourable to the exploitation of markets and natural resources by foreign concerns — is best. The program also aims to discredit any elements which pose a threat to this kind of development. In essence, the program is a way for the United States to gain the loyalties of elites who can defend American interests. As has already been suggested, and as will be discussed further, this kind of strategy contributes not to development but to underdevelopment. In the words of the International Peace Research Association, the priorities of such a program "flatly contradict the requirements of a development oriented towards self-reliance and the satisfaction of basic human needs."⁶⁶

d) Military Bases and Foreign Military Personnel

A final way in which the developed countries contribute to militarization in the Third World is through the establishment of military bases and the positioning of military personnel in the developing countries. Distant military bases are "required" by the developed countries to supply and service their navies, to provide landing fields for their aircraft, to test nuclear weapons, to keep rival powers at bay, and to monitor political developments on the other side of the globe. Military forces are positioned overseas to provide training, to lend support to sympathetic governments, and to engage in direct defence functions.

Currently 91 countries have foreign military forces operating on their soil. Worldwide, some 2 million personnel are serving abroad, 400,000 of them engaged in fighting wars. While the superpowers are by no means the only countries with military forces based overseas, they have by far the largest number. The Soviet Union leads with 23,000 men permanently stationed abroad, 115,000 fighting Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan, and 640,000 based in eastern Europe and Mongolia. The US has 95,000 forces detailed overseas, in addition to 385,000 more assigned in NATO Europe and Japan, and 250,000 which are afloat. Vietnam, which has 190,000 troops in Kampuchea, ranks third.⁶⁷

The superpowers, together with their allies, control virtually all foreign bases. The US has the most elaborate system with over 300 major naval and air bases covering some 2 million acres, besides a whole host of lesser installations. The US budget for supporting its overseas base operations is \$8 billion annually, only a bit less than Canada's entire military budget.⁶⁸ The total number of American bases worldwide has declined since the 1960s, because of reliance on long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles and missile-firing submarines, as well as new satellite observations techniques. But foreign bases are likely to remain an important component of US and Soviet strategic planning for a long time to come.⁶⁹

Both the US and USSR have used arms transfers as a way of

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ International Peace Research Association, "The Impact of Militarization on Development and Human Rights," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 9:2 (1978): 173.

⁶⁷ Sivard, *WMSE 1985*, pp. 12-13; Sivard, *WMSE 1986*, pp. 10-11.

⁶⁸ Sivard, *WMSE 1986*, pp. 10-11.

⁶⁹ Pierre, p. 21.

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