

they do not like 'blackness' in colour. Such a theory would easily break down in the face of the numerous experiences such as those at Sun City, Swaziland Spa, Lesotho Hilton, etc. Racism is an acquired habit, and because it is acquired, it can be de-learned through force of circumstances. Radical analysis often locates these circumstances in the 'competition-for-scarce-resources'. This is the pulse-beat of the South African conflict: economic interests. Racism is, therefore, a function of capitalist exploitation and serves to legitimate the status of those who own the means of production and the position of their functionaries. As such 'race' is not a peculiarly South African problem.

South African Blacks are oppressed not primarily because they show a different skin-colour, but because, basically, their economic interests are antithetical to those who are the economically dominant class. So whilst the conflict manifests itself in forms that are racial, its origin is decidedly non-racial. Its origin is a collective attempt to protect group-interests: ^{of the Cape} the land, water, pasture, and later the mines, manufacturing industry and commerce. It is, therefore, not race-relations that one should study and focus on, but class-relations. In short, the 'face' of the problem is racial, but its essence is non-racial. Genovese summed it up neatly:

'...race relations are at bottom a class question into which the race question intrudes - and gives it a special force and form, but does not constitute its essence' (: 8).

To assess the explanatory power of race as a tool of social analysis, it might help to look at the treatment of Whites by other Whites in other countries, e.g. the Jews in Nazi Germany. It was not the colour of their skin, the shape of their noses, the texture of their hair that was the central motive behind the inhuman treatment meted out to them, -but the position the Jews held in Germany's economy at the time.

For the class-analysis approach racial conflicts are simply epiphenomena of much deeper conflicts - class conflicts. And classes are by definition determined by their relationship to the means of production. Economic - not racial - criteria are used in this analytic approach. The basic, structural polarisation is not between Black and White, but that between Labour and Capital. It is this latter polarisation that has international repercussions or implications: workers are workers, everywhere. Capitalists are capitalists, everywhere. Their colour or race is peripheral and incidental to these pivotal categories, 'Labour' and 'Capital'. This stand, class-analysts argue, is both theoretically and pragmatically correct. It is a stand fraught with ideological, strategic and tactical implications for the struggle of the oppressed masses in this country.

According to this analysis, a nationalist liberation movement, which is easily countenanced by a race-analysis approach, is by definition a bourgeois movement. It is bourgeois because, as in the South African case, every black man, simply by reason of his blackness would belong to the movement, regardless of his class position. The fact that he may be a rabid, exploitative capitalist would not seriously affect his participation in the national liberation movement. It is rather the wrong kind of colour or race that would throw one right out of the liberation movement. For instance, in a national liberation movement an E.T. Tshabalala and a Joseph Mavi can march cheek by jowl, shoulder to shoulder, completely oblivious of their deeply polarised interests. Such a movement cannot but be bourgeois, - and somehow reactionary.

It is this sort of reductio ad absurdum which clearly shows the inadequacies and oversimplifications of the race-analysis approach.

Thus whilst class-analysts would not be averse towards 'working together with progressive whites in the liberation struggle', the race-analysts would be wary of 'collaboration with whites - whether progressive or reactionary'. By reason of the racial

category to which they belong, they are basically part of the 'problem', and not 'solution', in this country.

The two paradigms are painfully at daggers drawn.

What then would be the respective views of these paradigms vis-a-vis Black Theology?

BLACK THEOLOGY IN SEARCH OF A BASE

It is perhaps about time we saw how Black Theology, that wave-raising phenomenon of the late '60s and early '70s, relates to our two conflicting paradigms: race and class analyses.

Now, since the concept of Black Theology has found entry into so many books and documents, the world over, our discussion of it will be very brief. In fact, our primary interest here is simply to map out the relationship Black Theology might have with the two warring analyses sketched above.

Let us start the discussion with a citation from one of the unpublished articles by James H. Cone, who is easily one of the foremost proponents of Black Theology. In one of his most blistering attacks against people who challenged the validity and Christian status of Black Theology, Cone had this to say:

'(They say) Theology is colourless! Such judgements are typical of those who have not experienced the concreteness of human suffering expressed through colour, or whose own comfort has so long accepted a theology which is colourless only if one is talking about 'white' as the absence of colour.

To ignore Black Theology is the easy way out...But what is more interesting, though not surprising, is the white response that

theology does not come in colours. They who are responsible for colour being the vehicle of dehumanisation are now telling us that theology is raceless, that it is "universal" (international). This seems a bit late after nearly 400 years of silence on this issue. Black Theologians wonder why we did not hear the same word when people were being enslaved in the name of God and democracy precisely on the basis of colour? We wonder where were these colourless theologians when people were being lynched because of the colour of their skin?...to criticise the theology of the victims because it centres on that aspect that best defines the limits of their existence seems to miss the point entirely' (Unpublished article).

There seems to be no doubt that central to the concerns of Black Theology stands the category of 'blackness'. This type of theology has taken up the role of uncovering, in a systematic way, the structures and forms of the black experience. In short, it aims at investigating anew 'the problem of the color-line' (Cone 1975: 16). Black Theology hates to trifle with the social phenomenon of colour. It takes colour seriously because it regards colour as being tragically co-terminous with the 400 years of slavery in the Deep South and the 320 years of blatant discrimination in this southern tip of Africa. In these regions, 'blackness' connotes man-imposed suffering. This category of 'blackness' needs to be put in theological perspective and expressed in God-oriented terms. The beginning and end of this exercise is the beginning and end of Black Theology.

This is in essence the theology of black victims, whose faces have been ground to the dust by a specific group of victimisers, fair-skinned victimisers.

Such a theology finds its natural home or base in an analytic approach which diagnoses South Africa's problems as being first

and foremost 'racism'. Within the race-analysis paradigm, therefore, Black Theology is merely a systematic religious manifestation of a state of oppression experienced primarily in racial, colour terms. 'Blackness' is the vehicle through which this oppression comes through. Liberation or salvation, outside this specific category of 'blackness' becomes an obscene irrelevancy. Black Theology is a theology of liberation from this specific category of suffering. To introduce 'class' into this process of liberation, is to intrude dilatory dynamics that would hamper the natural momentum of the national liberation movement. This would have the effect of diluting the struggle to a considerable degree.

The fad of class-ism divides the real opposition in this country and dampens the militancy of the oppressed masses. Therefore, in our situation of racial oppression, it is argued, a theology that concerns itself with class oppression will be to that extent chasing after a chimera, at worst, or a marginal issue, at best. Such a theology would be anaemic for lack of a natural source or base.

In short, race-analysts are the natural proponents of Black Theology. For them, if the reasons that gave rise to black theologising in the late '60s and early '70s were valid and impelling, the situation today has not changed one iota. Blacks, not as individuals, but collectively, are still catching hell from a specifically white system that is systematically rigged against them. This is something that cannot be easily overlooked and forgotten by the average black man in this country. The struggle of the races is still on, - and, if the recent hair-raising and mind-boggling events in the Vaal triangle are anything to go by, this struggle is not about to grind to a halt.

Black Theology is the religious manifestation of this conflict.

Class-analysts turn round to reject Black Theology as a theology which is based, not only on a superficial, but also erroneous reading of the South African situation. Whilst colour in South Africa, they argue, enjoys high visibility and biting pervasiveness, it must be read not as the cause but as the effect of a much deeper

structural malady in society. Therefore, to base one's theologising on an epiphenomenon of a social sickness is to run the risk of being incurably shallow in one's theological task. Black Theology operates at the level of 'mopping up water' from a room, whilst the tap is left completely uninterfered with. Needless to say, this is the classical exercise in futility. It is Liberation Theology, a la Latin American style, that one should opt for, because whilst Liberation Theology does not minimise the 'nuisance value' of the water, (if we be allowed to carry on with our metaphor), it throws its whole weight behind the attempt to close the tap.

It is in fact Black Theology that fragments real, effective opposition to oppression and exploitation by refusing to forge meaning links with other 'oppressed classes' of the world. This unfortunate refusal, apart from being Christian-ly suspect, narrows the parameters of the struggle by its ideological exclusivity. Thus the prime locus theologicus of Black Theology, namely, race/colour, is rejected by this paradigm as inadequate, shallow and misdirected. Talk of something as being only skin-deep! You are talking about the insights of Black Theology.

What should provide a point of departure for a truly liberatory theology is economic dependency or economic exploitation, not racial oppression. A theology that treats the Labour-Capital polarity as secondary can only be half-heartedly liberatory. The history of the ANC, at least up to the 1960s, has amply proved this point.

In short, there is no room for Black Theology qua Black in the inn of the class-analysts. On the contrary, it is theologians like Gustavo Gutierrez, Miguez Bonino, etc., and not a James Cone or a Manas Buthelezi, who are expressive of the class-analysis theological point of departure and basic concerns. In this paradigm the locus theologicus is economic dependency, not racial oppression. In this sense, therefore, Liberation Theology finds its natural home or base in the class-analysis camp.

Thus the controversy between our two paradigms has far reaching implications for the exercise of Black Theology in this conflict-ridden country.

THE NEGLECTED DIALECTIC: A PERSONAL VIEWPOINT

The reason why we started this paper with a kind of kaleidoscopic presentation of some important historical landmarks or phases of the black struggle in South Africa, is because we believe that any analytical paradigm or theory worth its salt is, perforce, derivative. It is derived from contexts that are real, concrete and historical. In short, theory must have historical and empirical rootage. Reality fathers theory, and not the other way round. This is trite but true.

Therefore the two paradigms we have been discussing thus far will only be true and useful to the extent that they mirror the concrete, historical and contemporary situation in South Africa; and they will be false to the extent that they subject the South African situation to a kind of Promethean solution: if the situation does not fit the theory, then alter the situation!

Which of the two paradigms is true to the South African situation? This is a toughie. But before we can take the risk of answering this all important question, let us first try to trace what we choose to call the historical roots of these two analytical approaches. This, of course, can only be done very sketchly here.

There is ample evidence that the two approaches share in the well known mid-19th century conflict between Hegelian Idealism and its Marxian rebuttal, which could be called Realism or, to use the more common term, Materialism. Idealism, as the general mode of understanding and interpreting reality, played and still plays the role of what may be called 'conventional wisdom', the commonsensical way of how people generally think about reality. Christian philosophy, history and practice, in particular, are marked by this mode of interpreting reality. Marx and Engels,

in the mid-19th century European context, mounted a vicious and vitriolic attack against this well accepted, 'conventional wisdom' (Kolakowski 1978: 55-8).

What is idealism? At the risk of over-simplifying what German idealism stood for, and what idealist-philosophers like Hegel taught, let us say this: according to idealism, ultimate reality is 'spiritual' and not 'physical'. The spirit, the idea, the mind is supreme. All that is is simply an unfolding of the idea or thought. It is the idea which creates what we see in the external world. This is so important that we have to say it again: the idea is creative, thought is creative and the world is merely a product of thought or human consciousness. This is, very briefly, the central point of idealism.

How would an idealist approach to reality affect one's strategies and tactics in the arena of social transformation? The answer is obvious. An idealist strategist would have his primary focus on the mind, attempting to change people's ideas with the hope that once people's ideas are changed, social reality, which is a product or effect of ideas, would ipso facto change. As we have just said, this would be strategically logical because in the idealistic context it is ideas that are creative of reality. The tools that an idealist strategist would employ would be on the whole psychological: education, preaching, heuristically oriented discussions, and so on and so forth.

As stated above, it was in the mid-19th century that social analysts like Marx and Engels opposed this line of thinking very strongly. Ideas, Marx and Engels taught, are not the causes of things; on the contrary, ideas are the effect of things. This is materialism or realism. Realism, as a mode of understanding and interpreting reality, says that ultimate reality is matter, and not spiritual. Ideas are the product of the material conditions of life. All ideas, thoughts, are subject to extra-mental social conditions.

This is, very briefly, how these mid-19th century social gurus understood the relationship between human thought and material

conditions.

How would this materialist approach to reality affect one's strategies and tactics? Obviously, a materialist strategist would not focus his transformative efforts on the mind or ideas, but on the material conditions of life, because for him these are the fons et origo of ideas.

So whilst an idealist strategist takes his point of departure from human consciousness, the materialist strategist takes off from the material or economic relationships between men. The latter believes, as Marx and Engels did, that

'The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness' (Bochenski 1962: 32).

We, therefore, wish to suggest that there seems to be a very close relationship between the idealist approach and the race-analysis paradigm, on the one hand, and the materialist approach and the class-analysis paradigm, on the other hand.

Race-analysts are, strategically, mind-oriented; class-analysts would focus almost exclusively on the material conditions of life.

How then, does all this apply to our four phases of the struggle? What was the origin and nature of the conflict between the Khoisan and the white settler community at the Cape?

To us it does seem that to the Khoisan it would not really have mattered whether those 17th century invaders at the Cape were white, yellow or black; what would have mattered was the fact that the invaders harboured interests, material interests, antithetical to the interests of the indigenous Khoisan. The Settlers occupied and used the land, water and pasturage that the Khoisan had a

stake in. 'Competition-for-scarce-resources', to use a hackneyed phrase, was at the heart of this Khoisan-Settler conflict, it does seem. To describe this initial conflict in primarily racial terms would be to imply that the Khoisan would have easily acquiesced in the expropriation of their land, water and pasturage if only the expropriators had a different skin-colour or racial origin.

The dynamics at play in this struggle would indicate a definite de-emphasis of 'race' as the root-cause of the conflict, at least at this phase. The second phase of the struggle does not seem to be immune from this de-emphasis. In this Tribalistic phase, the Xhosas clearly resented being continually pushed east-ward across the Zuurveld, then the Fish River, the Keiskama, then the Kei River, etc., etc. The racial origin or pigmentation of these 'land-grabbers' had no room in the high motivations that lay behind the persistent attacks against what the Xhosas perceived as the source of an unjust usurpation of their land rights. In this conflict situation, these Settlers were, first and foremost, 'land-hungry grabbers' and only tangentially 'white'. The fact that they were 'white' and the Natives were 'black', visible as it was, was coincidental and not essential to the reprehensible rapaciousness of the invading Settlers. Again, 'competition-for-scarce-resources' seemed to have provided an explanatory key to the conflict. It was a clash of interests, not a clash of skin-colours. Historico-empirical observation does point, unmistakably, to the fact that, at least in these first two phases of the struggle, the Natives of this country fought valiantly and lost their lives in order to keep their L A N D to themselves. And, as the historian C.W. de Kiewiet so rightly observes:

'...the native were a process which gave the white communities more than possession of the bulk of the best land. It gave them a considerable measure of control over the services of the natives. The land wars were also labour wars (de Kiewiet 1940: 180).

Thus from being independent possessors of their land, the Natives, through having lost the various battles over land, were turned

into servile, obsequious, dependent kitchen boys, garden boys, herders, tenants or renters on the newly acquired white man's land. The land wars, which the Natives lost, were part of the classical process of proletarianisation. The Natives, thanks to this process, almost en masse, became dependent wage-earners. It is easy to see that almost all the crucial ingredients of the labour-capital model are already present in this scenario, at least embryonically.

So, a simple, straightforward response to the question why there was conflict between the Khoisan/Xhosas and white Settlers in the 17th and 18th centuries, should be: the embattlement was over the possession of the land. All other considerations are historically subservient and secondary to this: the imbroglio centred around the land. And if the Khoisan and Xhosas gradually became, in the eyes of the white Settlers, 'black vermin' or 'stinking black swine', it was because they had first become the white Settlers' arch-rivals in the competition for land.

Therefore, it would seem that a class-analysis fits these two phases of the struggle almost like a glove. To fully understand these two phases one would have to start from a materialistic point of departure. Something other than 'colour', which is some sort of prejudice lodging in the mind, became at this stage of our history the criterion of social segmentation.

But having said this, one would have to go on to say that because the protagonists on each side of the battle lines were of different races or colours, (although the basic motivation for the battles was not at the level of race or colour, as we have tried to state above), as time went on, colour gradually became an operative symbol for distinguishing one's competitors from the members of one's in-group. It would seem that from the second half of the 19th century, when South Africa with its discovery of diamond (1867) and gold (1886) began seriously to enter into the arena of world capitalism, the dividing line between the initial motivation of 'conflict of interests' and that of 'colour differences', had become dangerously blurred, especially in the minds of the white protagonists. 'Blackness' in the mining industry,

manufacturing and agriculture, somehow became an inseparable symbol of those who belonged to the other side of the great economic divide. Colour became increasingly significant in this way. From the initial stance of 'push them out because they disturb our peaceful possession of the land' to 'push them out because they are black' was a gradual but easy step of psychological association and internalisation on the part of the white conquerers. Most of them would soon forget how this white-black polarity originated. But as it was stated above, this apparent 'natural-ness' of racial antipathy is only skin-deep. Racism is acquired. It is not innate. Whether one explicitly recognises its origin or not, racism is born out of man's rapaciousness, competition for scarce resources. And in South Africa this is not a theory, but it is an historico-empirical assertion.

Any way, back to the point we wanted to make: with time the 'racial motivation' became inseparable from the motivation of 'conflict of interests'. The third and fourth phases of the struggle coincided with the blurring of the line between these two motivational categories of conflict. South Africa soon became known as the colour-bar society, - in which the indigenous people of colour were blatantly discriminated against solely on the basis of their colour.

This is also how the South African National Congress fundamentally perceived the conflict, especially judging from the strategies they employed. Their strategies were derived from and informed by what has been called in this paper 'conventional wisdom', namely, idealism. For Congress the basic location of the South African problematic was in the mind of the discriminators. It was therefore not surprising that these early 20th century black leaders employed strategies that were characteristically psychological: tactics of moral persuasion, sonorous appeals for justice, endless attempts to enter into negotiatory talks with the dominant group. But what was even more fundamental in this approach was the fact that these early nationalists seemed to have had no basic quarrel with the economic system that was then operative in South Africa; their gripe was instead aimed at the state racism which prevented them from their full

and rightful share in that economy. They were, as we know, ardent admirers of the Cape liberal tradition and the Westminster system. All they wanted was to prise open the doors of racial discrimination (Walshe 1973: 33). In short, their approach was idealistic, - that is, their point of departure was the consciousness or ideas of those who discriminated against them; their approach was also moralistic, that is, they believed in the transformative powers of preaching and teaching. Change of heart and change of mind could be effected by the power of argument and logic. Yes, they believed strongly in the goodness, inherent goodness, of human nature and in the supremacy of reason and logic. So they kept on arguing, persuading...and hoping. The aim of their approach was also integrationist, that is, they wanted to be part of the current system. The only serious obstacle was 'racism'.

Why, even an overtly trade union movement like the 1919 Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), failed to remain immunised against this idealistic, moralistic, and integrationist approach. For some time after its foundation in 1919, ICU, under the leadership of Clements Kadalie and George Champion, to all intents and purposes, usurped the role of the ANC. It became the principal vehicle of African discontent. And in so doing it was derailed from clearly and directly addressing the South African problematic from a purely economic, industrial platform. It became, like the ANC, a populist movement with but a slight touch of trade unionism or worker concerns.

It is on record that when the ICU leadership was challenged on this 'confusion', their general retort was that in South Africa economic and political issues were inseparable; that these issues had to be fought concurrently, at one and the same time (Webster, ed. 1978: 115). Their diagnosis might well have been correct, but their cure or prescription was of doubtful validity. Populism was substituted for trade unionism.

It is clear that both the ANC and ICU leadership were held in thrall by the idealistic approach to problems. As Philip Bonner so rightly says in connection with ICU:

'...for the best part of the decade they mistook protest for pressure and numbers for strength, ignoring all the while that there had to be some way for pressure to be brought to bear for it to have any effect' (Webster, ed. 1978: 115).

Whilst the reading of the conflict in South Africa from an idealistic point of view was not so explicitly articulated in the ANC and ICU, it did find an explicit and well articulated expression, we believe, in the fourth phase of our struggle, namely, the Black Consciousness phase. The Black Consciousness philosophy, particularly at the beginning, made it explicit that it would refuse to be derailed from viewing the South African problematic from the race-analysis point of departure. Without wishing to waste time in enunciating this well documented stance, it would suffice to cite the words of one of Black Consciousness foremost ideologues and proponents on this point:

'(The Liberals) tell us that the situation is a class struggle rather than a race one. Let them go to Van Tonder in the Free State and tell him this. We believe we know what the problem is and will stick by our findings...' (No Sizwe 1972: 125).

In yet another similar context, this ideologue said:

'A number of whites in this country adopt a class analysis primarily because they want to detach us from anything relating to race in case it has a rebound effect on them because they are white' (Noluntshungu 1983: 158).

It is assertions like these which led political scientists like Sam C. Noluntshungu to think that, despite some uneasiness with capitalism within the Black Consciousness philosophy

'...there was no systematic economic analysis

of class, nor, even a political account of what the interests and roles of the various classes might be in the process of liberation' (Noluntshungu 1983: 155),

The black Nationalists of the early 20th century implicitly espoused the idealistic methodology of analysis and practice; the Black Consciousness leaders, while vehemently rejecting the integrationist tendencies of the earlier movement, explicitly adopted the latter's idealistic methodology: racial prejudice became the starting point of their struggle.

It was in the aftermath of the October 1977 bannings that objections against this idealistic approach were openly and persistently raised within black political circles, in favour of a materialist methodology. Matters have reached a stage where one is either an idealist in one's approach or a materialist.

But as we have suggested, this either/or dichotomy between idealism and materialism breaks down in front of what we have called the inseparability of the two motivational categories: 'conflict of interests' and 'colour differences'. We would like to suggest that the either/or manner of posing the problem introduces an air of artificiality into the race/class debate.

The materialist or class-analysis approach is certainly right in holding fast onto the idea that the material conditions of life are the root cause of the conflict between Black and White in this country; but they are less than right when they deny that 'beliefs' or 'ideas' pertaining to racism have also a role in shaping society. To subscribe to the fact that racial attitudes are the effect of infra-structural economic conditions, does not carry the logical necessity of inextricably binding one to the acceptance of the relative unimportance or role-insignificance of racism and other non-economic ideas (e.g. the Christian Crusades in the 11th century) in shaping and stratifying society and affecting the life-chances of a large section of members of this country. Heribert Adam, himself a strong believer in the determinative role of material conditions, is right in posing

this question:

'Why should the independent role of beliefs (racism) not be granted, even in shaping an economic environment? Marxist (materialist) interpretations of South Africa rarely go beyond the notion of base and superstructure. By mechanically relegating the realm of ideology to a mere reflection of underlying interests, Marxist usually ignore the subjective reality. A peculiar sterility - therefore - characterises much of the recent leftist writing on South Africa' (Adam : 47).

Those who grant an almost exclusive and absolute autonomy to material, objective conditions, and deny even relative autonomy to a system of beliefs, ideas, prejudices, etc., will be hard put to it to explain some obvious South African examples which point to the powerful influence and motivational dynamics of these beliefs, ideas, prejudices, etc. Examples abound which show that a belief system does play a role in shaping the course of history. For instance, as we noted before, in 1963, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, addressing a mammoth Afrikaner crowd on the threat of economic sanctions against South Africa, defiantly and feelingly declared:

'I am absolutely opposed to concessions of any kind. I personally would rather see South Africa poor but white rather than rich and mixed' (Botha 1967: 111).

The 2,000 strong audience gave him a thunderous applause and chorused 'Amen'. It does seem that there are a hundred and one factors, outside the purely economic sphere, which are as capable of motivating individuals and groups of people as well as the so called infra-structural objective conditions of life advanced by the class-analysts. Take another example, outside South Africa this time. The planned return of Jews to Israel under

the charismatic leadership of people like Ben Gurion, Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, etc], is one example among many of numerous incidents in human history which simply refuse to be unlocked by the explanatory key of economic determinism. Something much more than mere economics impelled this particular people to some heroic feats. The Masade experience? The motivation behind this wholesale self-emolation of men, women and children is explainable in other than mere economic terms. The recent Guyana religious tragedy in the USA? How can this be fully and adequately explained within the parameters of the base-superstructural model alone? Reality seems to be much more vast than this model allows. The South African situation is such a complex reality which refuses to be subjected to the over-simplification of the materialist, economic calculus. Says Heribert Adam, once more, in Perspectives in Literature:

'In the South African case, material rewards are at present only one part of the payoff that accounts for the maintenance of Afrikaner unity. Almost equally important would seem the cohesive power of a symbol system, rewards of esteem and status, the integrating role of ideology, which is frequently underestimated, if not altogether rejected in economic analysis. Only a genuine synthesis of the interplay between ideology (beliefs) and economy, not focus on either at the expense of the other, would seem to hold the key for deeper insights into the complex conflict' (Adam : 49-50).

If the materialist or class-analysis approach errs, not by acknowledging the determinative role of material conditions, but by down-playing the determinative role of belief systems as mere reflections of the base, the idealist or race-analysis approach errs by down-playing and de-emphasising the role of economic motivations in South Africa's social formation. It is not in what both camps uphold, but in what both camps tend to reject or de-emphasise that the fault lies. Heribert Adam's plea for '...a genuine synthesis of the interplay between ideology and economy' is crucial. The separation of these two possible

motivational bases in the South African situation inevitably leads to paucity of explanatory theory. Yes, to gloss of the dialectical relationship between these two important variables - class and race - in the South African situation, can only lead to a Promethean explanation of the conflict.

As Deborah Posel says, in substance, it is disastrous to seek a uniform ranking of one variable over another. It is to their concrete interrelationships, their dialectical relationships, that we should focus on (Social Dynamics 1983: 52). We can neglect this dialectic at our own peril. Hermann Giliomee suggests:

'The challenge in this case is to show how racial ideas and cleavages, on the one hand, and class relations, on the other hand, structured and reinforced each other' (Social Dynamics 1983: 18).

The phrase used by some people to describe the South African system as 'racial capitalism' may be more than just a fad, after all. This phrase tries to come to grips with the whole South African reality. South Africa is both a racial oligarchy as well as a capitalist society. But the two do not run parallel; they are mixed and inter-twined. Even the protagonists in the game do not know when they are being only racially motivated, or when capitalistically impelled. The two variables reinforce each other all the time.

ANALYSIS INFORMS STRATEGY

But it is important to realise that when one says that the two variables are mixed and intertwined, one speaks only of analysis - not of strategy or tactics. It is tragic to confuse analysis with strategy or diagnosis with the cure. It is this which probably led to the relative ineffectiveness of ICU. Because its leaders analysed the situation in this country in political and economic terms, in the sense that in South Africa politics

is inseparable from economics, they concentrated mainly on political manoeuvres to the virtual neglect of industrial, economic action, thus confusing analysis with the cure.

Now, how does this apply to our analysis of the situation in terms of racial capitalism? The determination of strategy to transform this kind of situation cannot be assumed automatically from hearing what the analysis is. For instance, there are those of us who believe that racial capitalism can be effectively combatted only on the basis of black solidarity, whereas others take the stand that it can be successfully fought only on the basis of forging trans-racial links and alliances with other people who are sympathetic to our course. These are strategies which may or may not be the correct remedy for racial capitalism. But they are strategies, - and it is important to remember that they are strategies and not principles (i.e. goals, the focal point of political actions). Strategies are by nature flexible: what may not be a good strategy today, may be okay tomorrow. Strategies have a flexibility which principles do not quite enjoy. That is why it is important to realise that disagreement, however deep, at the level of strategy is not disagreement about principles. Strategies and tactics are subservient to principles.

'IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES'

The term 'ideology' runs through our everyday political conversation like a greased pig. It is slippery; it lacks a precise content. But somehow we cannot allow this term to stride the world like a colossus. It must have some residual connotation that one can trap and look at.

In the contemporary scene, there seems to be some measure of agreement among social scientists that 'ideology' refers to a system of ideas or beliefs containing assertions about the nature of the desirable society and the actions required for the attainment or maintenance of that desirable society. It is, in short, a group's blueprint of, or visualisation of the desirable society. But I think Albert Nolan is right when he clinches this notion of ideology by saying that this set of ideas about what society should be like '...is called an ideology only when the set of ideas is adhered

to uncritically, dogmatically, and with a great deal of emotion rather than as a result of some kind of objective reasoning based upon facts' (Nolan 1982: 1).

In short the term 'ideology' has come to have, in politics, almost the same meaning the terms 'creed', 'faith' have in religion. It is for this reason that Daniel Bell regards 'ideology' as '...a set of beliefs, infused with passion, (seeking) to transform the whole of a way of life' (Waxman, ed. 1968: 261). In essence, therefore, the residual meaning of 'ideology' is: a blueprint, adhered to with passion, of what society ought to be. If this notion of ideology is correct, it follows that only people who happen to possess such 'blueprints' may differ ideologically. 'Ideological differences' are differences at blueprint level. The challenge of the hour is to look at and examine our contemporary political groupings and clearly distinguish at least three distinct elements in their political doctrine and practice:

- * Their blueprint
- * Their strategy, and
- * Their tactics.

Ideological differences are differences at the level of blueprints of society. And if this notion is strictly adhered to, then one say there were no 'ideological differences', say, between the older ANC strategists and the white regime that the former so persistently fought against. This is so because the older ANC membership seemed to have had no serious quarrel with the basic blueprint of their current society. Our plea here is simply this: let us distinguish our differences at the level of blueprints from our differences at the level of strategy or tactics. The two sets of differences are like day and night.

The first level is that of 'what-to-achieve' (the blueprint); the second level is that of 'how-to-achieve' (strategy, or general plan of action); the third level is that of 'what-specific-tools-to-use' (tactics, or immediate, specific plan of action). Differences at the second and third levels may be very important, but not half as serious as those at the first level. Untold confusion is

often created when people pretend to have ideological differences whereas in fact, their differences are merely strategic and tactical. Dr. Neville Alexander, in his 1983 Hammanskraal talk, seemed to sense this distinction. Weighing against those who supported the thesis that our struggle is not for national, but class liberation, thereby de-emphasising the race/colour category, Dr. Alexander said:

'To deny the reality of prejudice and perceived differences, whatever their origin, is to disarm oneself strategically and tactically' (National Forum Publication 1983: 25).

These words allow us to think that Dr. Alexander believes that at this juncture in our history the strategy and tactics of fighting the struggle at the level of National liberation and, by implication, on the basis of black exclusivity, carries decided advantages. To say this is not to say, automatically, that one's blueprint is Pan-Africanist, Socialist or Capitalistic. In fact to say what Dr. Alexander said above is not to speak about one's blueprint at all. This is a crucial distinction which must not be lost on us.

In our contemporary situation the million dollar question is: whether to forge alliances trans-racially for the struggle, or to operate solely on the basis of black solidarity, black unity. At what level do we locate this question? At the level of blueprints or at the level of strategy and tactics? The answer to these questions may yet bring about greater tolerance, effectiveness and sophistication in the formulations of our principles (blueprints), strategies and tactics, within the all important struggle that all of us are engaged in.

When one looks at some of the NFC and UDF 1983 write-ups on their respective policy statements, one is struck more by their similarities than dissimilarities. NFC explicitly visualises what it terms 'anti-racist and socialist Azania'; but at the same time we know that the 1975 Freedom Charter, which most UDF affiliates accept and respect, has definite socialist elements in it. So

it does seem that both the NFC and the UDF are attracted and fascinated by blueprints, albeit not completely spelled out, which are not that dissimilar. The challenge of the hour therefore is for this conference on Black Theology to ferret out the fundamental differences, dissimilarities between these two 'embryonic blueprints', If there are dissimilarities, then we can truly say that the two seemingly irreconcilable camps differ ideologically, that is, they differ at the level of blueprints about the nature of the desirable society. In short, if they differ ideologically it means they have antagonistic visualisations of tomorrow's South Africa/Azania/Maluhdi, the name is immaterial.

But as we all know, the most visible difference that one observes between the NFC and the UDF camps is that whilst the former operates on exclusive black solidarity, the latter operates on a non-racial basis. But even AZAPO, one of the moving spirits within NFC, has repeatedly declared that its racial exclusivity stance is only confined to what they term the 'pre-liberation phase of the struggle', - thus implying that in the 'post-liberation phase' the said exclusivity would be phased out. What this says to us then is that this exclusivity is not a principle or a goal or a blueprint; it is a strategy, as Dr. Neville Alexander seemed to suggest; it is a broad plan of action to achieve a socio-political blueprint, namely, 'an anti-racist, socialist Azania'.

If this is the case, what we called the most visible difference between the UDF and NFC affiliates, must be located at the level of strategy, not at the level of blueprints about how society should be organised. Differences at this level are more shattering than differences at any other level.

BLACK THEOLOGY: BIENVENU OR ADIEU?

As long as the black people in this country suffer a double bondage: racial oppression and economic exploitation, the task of Black Theology will always be double-pronged. Racial capitalism is the name of the game. This is the sin that Black Theology wants to uncover and eradicate in God's own name. The term 'black' must perforce remain

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